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I would be interested to see the number of randomized results (defined here) in the final report. Also, terming a fingerprint that is randomized but where the number of randomized_results < 4 as unique might be misleading... (cf. Tor Browser 10.0a6).
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Even if a browser randomizes certain metrics, a tracker may not use any of the randomized metrics. The chances of this happening decreases as the number of metrics with randomized results increases - there is a higher chance of overlap between the set of used metrics and the set of randomized metrics, bounded by some expotent. Ideally, we'd try to do research and quantify the characteristics of that overlap, but in the meantime we've somewhat arbitrarily chosen 4 metrics to be sufficient to confuse trackers. Otherwise, the behavior is to fall back to the entropy calculation.
I'll think about how we might incorporate the randomized results into the results page.
I would be interested to see the number of randomized results (defined here) in the final report. Also, terming a fingerprint that is randomized but where the number of
randomized_results < 4
as unique might be misleading... (cf. Tor Browser 10.0a6).The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: