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@Article{BaergLowe2020,
  author    = {Baerg, Nicole and Lowe, Will},
  title     = {{A textual Taylor rule: estimating central bank preferences combining topic and scaling methods}},
  journal   = {Political Science Research and Methods},
  year      = {2020},
  volume    = {8},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {106--122},
  doi       = {10.1017/psrm.2018.31},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
}

@Misc{Hayo2012,
  author       = {Bernd Hayo and Ali M. Kutan and Matthias Neuenkirch},
  howpublished = {{Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 08-2008}},
  note         = {\url{https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29}},
  title        = {{Financial Market Reaction to Federal Reserve Communications:Does the Crisis Make a Difference?}},
  year         = {2012},
}

@Article{Bennani2018a,
  author   = {Hamza Bennani and Etienne Farvaque and Piotr Stanek},
  title    = {{Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement}},
  journal  = {Economic Modelling},
  year     = {2018},
  volume   = {68},
  pages    = {416--424},
  abstract = {This paper sheds some new light on the determinants of FOMC members’ monetary policy preferences. For that purpose, we use a new dataset of macroeconomic indicators for the Fed districts, as well as preferences revealed by FOMC members in the Transcripts, to compute a desired interest rate for each individual member. First, we find that FOMC members react to the regional unemployment rate. Second, individuals holding a Master or Bachelor degree, and issued from either the central bank, or from the private or public sector have a higher propensity to disagree on the dovish side, while women tend to disagree on the hawkish side. These findings provide further insights for central bank watchers about the upcoming policy decisions that are likely to be implemented by the FOMC, following the composition of its committee and the evolution of regional cycles.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2017.08.014},
  keywords = {FOMC, Interest rate, Individual Taylor rule},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999316304357},
}

@Article{MeadeStasavage2008,
  author   = {Meade, Ellen E. and Stasavage, David},
  title    = {{Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve}},
  journal  = {The Economic Journal},
  year     = {2008},
  volume   = {118},
  number   = {528},
  pages    = {695--717},
  abstract = {Transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers. We consider one potential cost: the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. We construct a model that compares incentives for members with ‘career concerns’ to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private. We test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee, asking whether the FOMC's 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent. We find evidence that this is indeed the case.},
  doi      = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02138.x},
  eprint   = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02138.x},
  url      = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02138.x},
}

@Article{Bennani2018b,
  author   = {Hamza Bennani and Tobias Kranz and Matthias Neuenkirch},
  title    = {{Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate}},
  journal  = {Journal of Macroeconomics},
  year     = {2018},
  volume   = {58},
  pages    = {139--153},
  abstract = {We examine the degree and sources of disagreement between the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s) staff about the appropriate policy rate for the period 1994–2012. For that purpose, we compute a recommended interest rate for the Fed’s staff based on its own Greenbook forecasts and a time-varying monetary policy rule à la Taylor (1993), and compare it with the actual target rate. First, we find that there has been internal disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff about the appropriate policy rate. Second, we reveal that members with an occupational background in finance favor a relatively more hawkish monetary policy. In addition, a preference towards a tighter monetary policy is found under a Democratic President and during Alan Greenspan’s tenure as the Fed’s Chairman. Finally, higher oil prices, a low degree of uncertainty, and episodes of financial stability are also associated with higher interest rates as compared to the Fed staff’s recommendation.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2018.09.002},
  keywords = {Disagreement, Federal open market committee, Federal reserve staff, Monetary policy, Taylor rule},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0164070418300296},
}

@Article{Tillmann2011,
  author   = {Peter Tillmann},
  title    = {{Strategic forecasting on the FOMC}},
  journal  = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  year     = {2011},
  volume   = {27},
  number   = {3},
  pages    = {547--553},
  abstract = {The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if they favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.01.006},
  keywords = {Monetary committee, Inflation forecast, Forecast errors, Monetary policy, Federal Reserve},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268011000176},
}

@Article{RülkeTillmann2011,
  author   = {Jan-Christoph R{\"u}lke and Peter Tillmann},
  title    = {{Do FOMC members herd?}},
  journal  = {Economics Letters},
  year     = {2011},
  volume   = {113},
  number   = {2},
  pages    = {176--179},
  abstract = {We show that growth and unemployment forecasts submitted by individual FOMC members do not exhibit herding behavior, while the inflation forecasts show strong evidence of anti-herding. Interestingly, anti-herding is more important for non-voting members than for voters.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.07.016},
  keywords = {Federal Open Market Committee, Monetary policy, Forecasting, Herding},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176511002837},
}

@Article{EichlerLahner2014a,
  author   = {Eichler, Stefan and L{\"a}hner, Tom},
  title    = {{Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects}},
  journal  = {Public Choice},
  year     = {2014},
  volume   = {160},
  number   = {3},
  pages    = {429--453},
  abstract = {Using data from 1992 to 2001, we study the impact of members' economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Employing standard ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real GDP growth forecasts (relative to the committee's median) significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton administration `natural' monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.},
  day      = {01},
  doi      = {10.1007/s11127-013-0099-1},
  url      = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0099-1},
}

@Article{Sheng2015,
  author   = {Xuguang Sheng},
  title    = {{Evaluating the economic forecasts of FOMC members}},
  journal  = {International Journal of Forecasting},
  year     = {2015},
  volume   = {31},
  number   = {1},
  pages    = {165--175},
  abstract = {This paper provides a detailed analysis of the forecasts of real GDP, inflation and unemployment made by individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) for the period 1992–2003. Despite a general tendency for the committee members to underpredict real GDP over the sample period, we find evidence suggesting that the FOMC has a considerable amount of information about output growth, beyond what is known by commercial forecasters. We also document a substantial level of variation in the members’ forecasts, which can be explained in part by the differences in economic conditions between Federal Reserve districts. The members’ heterogeneous forecasts for output growth and inflation contain useful information for explaining their preferred policy settings, beyond that in the Greenbook forecasts.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2014.03.001},
  keywords = {Forecast disagreement, Forecast efficiency, Greenbook forecast, Inflation forecast, Monetary policy reaction function},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016920701400034X},
}

@Article{Gildea1992,
  author    = {John A. Gildea},
  title     = {{The Regional Representation of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents}},
  journal   = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
  year      = {1992},
  volume    = {24},
  number    = {2},
  pages     = {215--225},
  publisher = {[Wiley, Ohio State University Press]},
  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1992737},
}

@Article{Eichler2018,
  author   = {Stefan Eichler and Tom L{\"a}hner and Felix Noth},
  title    = {{Regional banking instability and FOMC voting}},
  journal  = {{Journal of Banking \& Finance}},
  year     = {2018},
  volume   = {87},
  pages    = {282--292},
  abstract = {This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period 1979–2010, we find that a deterioration in a district's bank health increases the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to Governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.10.011},
  keywords = {FOMC voting, Regional banking sector instability, Interaction effects, Dodd–Frank Act},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842661730256X},
}

@Article{EichlerLahner2016,
  author    = {Stefan Eichler and Tom L{\"a}hner},
  journal   = {Applied Economics Letters},
  title     = {{Do Federal Reserve Bank presidents’ interest rate votes in the FOMC follow an electoral cycle?}},
  year      = {2016},
  number    = {9},
  pages     = {669--673},
  volume    = {23},
  doi       = {10.1080/13504851.2015.1100239},
  eprint    = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1100239},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1100239},
}

@Article{EichlerLahner2018,
  author   = {Eichler, Stefan and L{\"a}hner, Tom},
  title    = {{Regional, individual and political determinants of FOMC members' key macroeconomic forecasts}},
  journal  = {Journal of Forecasting},
  year     = {2018},
  volume   = {37},
  number   = {1},
  pages    = {119-132},
  abstract = {Abstract We study Federal Open Market Committee members' individual forecasts of inflation and unemployment in the period 1992–2004. Our results imply that Governors and Bank presidents forecast differently, with Governors submitting lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts than bank presidents. For Bank presidents we find a regional bias, with higher district unemployment rates being associated with lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts. Bank presidents' regional bias is more pronounced during the year prior to their elections or for nonvoting bank presidents. Career backgrounds or political affiliations also affect individual forecast behavior.},
  doi      = {10.1002/for.2481},
  eprint   = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/for.2481},
  keywords = {FOMC, individual characteristics, individual forecasts, regional bias},
  url      = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/for.2481},
}

@Article{MeadeSheets2005,
  author    = {Ellen E. Meade and D. Nathan Sheets},
  title     = {{Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns}},
  journal   = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
  year      = {2005},
  volume    = {37},
  number    = {4},
  pages     = {661--677},
  abstract  = {This paper looks at the monetary policy decisions of the U.S. Federal Reserve and asks whether observed voting patterns have been driven entirely by national concerns, or whether regional factors have also played a role. We find that Fed policymakers take into account developments in regional unemployment when casting votes on monetary policy. These results are robust to different specifications of the voting equation. This research is relevant for the Fed, and it may also be relevant for Europe's fledgling central bank in Frankfurt in light of regional differences within the euro area.},
  publisher = {[Wiley, Ohio State University Press]},
  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3839057},
}

@Article{HayoNeuenkirch2013,
  author   = {Bernd Hayo and Matthias Neuenkirch},
  title    = {{Do Federal Reserve presidents communicate with a regional bias?}},
  journal  = {Journal of Macroeconomics},
  year     = {2013},
  volume   = {35},
  pages    = {62--72},
  abstract = {In this paper, we analyze the determinants of US monetary policy stance as expressed in speeches by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials over the period January 1998–September 2009. Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of these speeches. Our results are, first, that a rise in the inflation rate or the Leading Index makes a hawkish speech more likely. Second, when Fed presidents make a speech in their home district, its content is influenced by both regional and national macroeconomic variables, whereas speeches given outside the home district are influenced solely by national information. Third, the influence of regional variables increases during (i) Ben Bernanke’s tenure as Fed Chairman, (ii) recessions, and (iii) the financial crisis. Finally, speeches by nonvoting presidents reflect regional economic development to a greater extent than those by voting presidents.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2012.10.002},
  keywords = {Central bank communication, Disagreement, Federal Reserve, Monetary policy, Regional representation, Speeches},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0164070412001012},
}

@Article{Patman1975,
  author    = {Wright Patman},
  title     = {{What's Wrong with the Federal Reserve and What to Do about It}},
  journal   = {American Bar Association Journal},
  year      = {1975},
  volume    = {61},
  number    = {2},
  pages     = {179--184},
  abstract  = {The Federal Reserve System got off on the wrong track when private banks were permitted to own stock in the district Fed banks, letting the tail wag the dog. Now the Fed's Open Market Committee has control of the banking system but operates in secrecy, while the Fed itself operates cavalierly, even with private auditors. It's time to curb the abuses of the Fed and reform the system.},
  publisher = {American Bar Association},
  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25727061},
}

@InCollection{Bordo2016,
  author    = {Michael D. Bordo},
  title     = {{Some Historical Reflections of the Governance of the Federal Reserve}},
  booktitle = {{Central Bank Governance \& Oversight Reform}},
  publisher = {Hoover Institution Press},
  year      = {2016},
  editor    = {John H. Cochrane and John B. Taylor},
  pages     = {221--254},
  address   = {Stanford, California},
}

@Misc{CenterforPopularDemocracy2019,
  author       = {Sabri Ben-Achour},
  title        = {{Does the Federal Reserve need reforming?}},
  howpublished = {{The Center for Popular Democracy / Marketplace}},
  year         = {2019},
  note         = {\url{https://populardemocracy.org/news-and-publications/does-federal-reserve-need-reforming}},
}

@Misc{GAO2011,
  author       = {{US Government Accountability Office}},
  title        = {{Federal Reserve Bank Governance - Opportunities Exist to Broaden Director Recruitment Efforts and Increase Transparency}},
  howpublished = {{GAO Report 12-18}},
  year         = {2011},
  note         = {\url{https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-18}},
}

@Misc{ContiBrown2015,
  author       = {Peter Conti-Brown},
  title        = {{The Twelve Federal Reserve Banks: Governance and Accountability in the 21st Century}},
  howpublished = {{Brookings Hutchins Center on Fiscal \& Monetary Policy Working Paper No. 10}},
  year         = {2015},
  note         = {\url{https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PCB_WorkingPaper10_June24_Final.pdf}},
}

@Book{ContiBrown2016,
  title     = {{The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve}},
  publisher = {Princeton University Press},
  year      = {2016},
  author    = {Peter Conti-Brown},
  address   = {Princeton, New Jersey},
  date      = {2017},
  keywords  = {United States. Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve banks, Banks and banking, Central–United States, Monetary policy–United States, BUSINESS & ECONOMICS–Finance, Banks and banking, Central, Economic policy, Monetary policy, BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Banks & Banking, United States–Economic policy, United States},
  language  = {eng},
}

@Misc{Ainsley2019,
  author       = {Caitlin Ainsley},
  howpublished = {{Forthcoming at Governance}},
  title        = {{Decentralized Central Banks: Political Ideology and the Federal Reserve System of Regional Banks}},
  year         = {2020},
}

@Misc{ContiBrown2013,
  author       = {Peter Conti-Brown},
  title        = {{The Structure of Federal Reserve Independence}},
  howpublished = {{Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 139}},
  year         = {2013},
  note         = {\url{https://law.stanford.edu/publications/the-structure-of-federal-reserve-independence/}},
}

@Misc{FederalReserve2019,
  author       = {{Federal Reserve}},
  howpublished = {{Press Release}},
  note         = {\url{https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20160219a.htm}},
  title        = {{Federal Reserve Board approves reappointment of Reserve Bank presidents and first vice presidents}},
  year         = {2019},
}

@Misc{FederalReserve2017,
  author       = {{Federal Reserve}},
  title        = {{Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Reserve Directors}},
  howpublished = {{Federal Reserve System Publication}},
  year         = {2017},
  note         = {\url{https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/pdf/roles_responsibilities_FINALweb013013.pdf}},
}

@Book{Clifford2016,
  title     = {{The Independence of the Federal Reserve System}},
  publisher = {University of Pennsylvania Press},
  year      = {2016},
  author    = {Clifford, A. Jerome},
  volume    = {Anniversary Collection},
  address   = {Philadelphia},
}

@Misc{Headtler2016,
  author       = {Jordan Haedtler and Andrew Levin and Valerie Wilson},
  title        = {{Making the Federal Reserve Fully Public: Why and How}},
  howpublished = {{Economic Policy Institute Report}},
  year         = {2016},
  note         = {\url{https://www.epi.org/publication/making-the-federal-reserve-fully-public-why-and-how/}},
}

@Misc{FederalReserve2020b,
  author       = {{Federal Reserve}},
  title        = {{Directors -- Appointment of Reserve Bank Presidents and First Vice Presidents}},
  howpublished = {{Federal Reserve Banks -- Policies Governing Directors}},
  year         = {2020},
  note         = {\url{https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/PDF/appointment-of-reserve-bank-presidents-first-vice-presidents.pdf}},
}

@Book{Woolley1984,
  title     = {{Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy}},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  year      = {1984},
  author    = {John T. Woolley},
  address   = {Cambridge},
}

@Book{Adolph2013,
  title     = {Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  year      = {2013},
  author    = {Adolph, Christopher},
  address   = {New York},
}

@Article{Rogoff1985,
  author    = {Kenneth Rogoff},
  title     = {{The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target}},
  journal   = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  year      = {1985},
  volume    = {100},
  number    = {4},
  pages     = {1169--1189},
  abstract  = {Society can sometimes make itself better off by appointing a central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead places "too large" a weight on inflation-rate stabilization relative to employment stabilization. Although having such an agent head the central bank reduces the time-consistent rate of inflation, it suboptimally raises the variance of employment when supply shocks are large. Using an envelope theorem, we show that the ideal agent places a large, but finite, weight on inflation. The analysis also provides a new framework for choosing among alternative intermediate monetary targets.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885679},
}

@Article{Lohmann1992,
  author    = {Susanne Lohmann},
  title     = {{Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility}},
  journal   = {The American Economic Review},
  year      = {1992},
  volume    = {82},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {273--286},
  publisher = {American Economic Association},
  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117615},
}

@Article{HavrileskyGildea1991b,
  author    = {Thomas Havrilesky and John A. Gildea},
  title     = {{The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes: Comment}},
  journal   = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
  year      = {1991},
  volume    = {23},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {130--138},
  publisher = {[Wiley, Ohio State University Press]},
  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1992770},
}

@Article{Belden1989,
  author    = {Susan Belden},
  title     = {{Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes}},
  journal   = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
  year      = {1989},
  volume    = {21},
  number    = {4},
  pages     = {432--441},
  publisher = {[Wiley, Ohio State University Press]},
  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1992351},
}

@InCollection{HavrileskySchweitzer1990,
  author    = {Havrilesky, Thomas and Schweitzer, Robert},
  title     = {{A theory of FOMC dissent voting with evidence from the time series}},
  booktitle = {The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  year      = {1990},
  editor    = {Mayer, Thomas},
  pages     = {195--208},
  address   = {Cambridge},
  doi       = {10.1017/CBO9780511571947.014},
  place     = {Cambridge},
}

@Article{KydlandPrescott1977,
  author   = {Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C.},
  journal  = {Journal of Political Economy},
  title    = {{Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans}},
  year     = {1977},
  number   = {3},
  pages    = {473--491},
  volume   = {85},
  abstract = {Even if there is an agreed-upon, fixed social objective function and policymakers know the timing and magnitude of the effects of their actions, discretionary policy, namely, the selection of that decision which is best, given the current situation and a correct evaluation of the end-of-period position, does not result in the social objective function being maximized. The reason for this apparent paradox is that economic planning is not a game against nature but, rather, a game against rational economic agents. We conclude that there is no way control theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational.},
  doi      = {10.1086/260580},
  eprint   = {https://doi.org/10.1086/260580},
  url      = {https://doi.org/10.1086/260580},
}

@Article{BarroGordon1983,
  author   = {Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon},
  title    = {{Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy}},
  journal  = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
  year     = {1983},
  volume   = {12},
  number   = {1},
  pages    = {101--121},
  abstract = {In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymaker's incentives and form their expectations accordingly. Because the policymaker has the power to create inflation shocks ex post, the equilibrium growth rates of money and prices turn out to be higher than otherwise. Therefore, enforced commitments (rules) for monetary behavior can improve matters. Given the repeated interaction between the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules. Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the outcomes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule. In particular, the rates of inflation and monetary growth look more like those under discretion when the discount rate is high.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-X},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/030439328390051X},
}

@Article{Chappell1995,
  author   = {Henry W. Chappell and Thomas M. Havrilesky and Rob Roy McGregor},
  title    = {{Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions}},
  journal  = {Journal of Economics and Business},
  year     = {1995},
  volume   = {47},
  number   = {2},
  pages    = {113--136},
  abstract = {We estimate monetary policy reaction functions which describe how individual FOMC members' monetary policy preferences vary according to their professional and career backgrounds, their appointment status (as a Governor or Bank President), and their partisan or district Reserve Bank affiliations. Based on our results, we present examples illustrating how proposed changes in the composition of the FOMC might be evaluated.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/0148-6195(94)00041-B},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/014861959400041B},
}

@Article{HavrileskyGildea1991a,
  author   = {Havrilesky, Thomas and Gildea, John},
  title    = {{Screening FOMC Members for their Biases and Dependability}},
  journal  = {Economics \& Politics},
  year     = {1991},
  volume   = {3},
  number   = {2},
  pages    = {139--149},
  abstract = {This paper develops conjectures regarding the process by which the President as a principal selects Federal Reserve Governors and Bank Presidents as his agents on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). It first establishes that FOMC members can be grouped into sets which are marked by ease and tightness biases in voting behavior. It then identifies certain career characteristics of FOMC members which are correlated with each of these biases. The paper goes on to isolate reliable partisan subsets within the ease and tightness sets and identifies a career characteristic which is highly correlated with membership in these subsets; that characteristic is a career as an economist.},
  doi      = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00043.x},
  eprint   = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00043.x},
  url      = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00043.x},
}

@Article{Acharya2019,
  author   = {Acharya, Viral V and Eisert, Tim and Eufinger, Christian and Hirsch, Christian},
  journal  = {The Review of Financial Studies},
  title    = {{Whatever It Takes: The Real Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy}},
  year     = {2019},
  number   = {9},
  pages    = {3366--3411},
  volume   = {32},
  abstract = {{Launched in Summer 2012, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program indirectly recapitalized European banks through its positive impact on periphery sovereign bonds. However, the stability reestablished in the banking sector did not fully translate into economic growth. We document zombie lending by banks that remained weakly capitalized even post-OMT. In turn, firms receiving loans used these funds not to undertake real economic activity, such as employment and investment, but to build cash reserves. Creditworthy firms in industries with a high zombie firm prevalence significantly suffered from this credit misallocation, which further slowed the economic recovery.Received March 21, 2018; editorial decision November 13, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.}},
  doi      = {10.1093/rfs/hhz005},
  eprint   = {https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-pdf/32/9/3366/29194638/hhz005.pdf},
  groups   = {elisa:6},
  url      = {https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz005},
}

@Article{Boeckx2017,
  author  = {Jef Boeckx and Maarten Dossche and Gert Peersman},
  title   = {{Effectiveness and Transmission of the ECB's Balance Sheet Policies}},
  journal = {International Journal of Central Banking},
  year    = {2017},
  volume  = {113},
  number  = {1},
  pages   = {297--333},
}

@Misc{LambertUeda2014,
  author       = {Frederic Lambert and Kenichi Ueda},
  title        = {{The Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policies on Bank Soundness}},
  howpublished = {{IMF Working Paper WP/14/152}},
  year         = {2014},
  note         = {\url{https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14152.pdf}},
}

@Article{Lamers2019,
  author  = {Martien Lamers and Frederik Mergaerts and Elien Meuleman and Rudi Vander Vennet},
  title   = {{The Tradeoff between Monetary Policy and Bank Stability}},
  journal = {International Journal of Central Banking},
  year    = {2019},
  volume  = {15},
  number  = {2},
  pages   = {1--42},
}

@Article{BrunnermeierSannikov2014,
  author  = {Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Sannikov, Yuliy},
  title   = {{A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector}},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {2014},
  volume  = {104},
  number  = {2},
  pages   = {379--421},
  doi     = {10.1257/aer.104.2.379},
  url     = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.104.2.379},
}

@Article{Chappell2008,
  author   = {Henry W. Chappell and Rob Roy McGregor and Todd A. Vermilyea},
  title    = {Regional economic conditions and monetary policy},
  journal  = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  year     = {2008},
  volume   = {24},
  number   = {2},
  pages    = {283--293},
  abstract = {We use county-level unemployment data and data derived from FOMC meeting transcripts to test the hypothesis that monetary policymakers are influenced by economic conditions in regions that they represent. The analysis confirms that regional conditions affect the policy preferences of Reserve Bank presidents. Regional conditions also appear to influence Governors, but the evidence is weaker. For all FOMC members, we find that national conditions matter more than regional conditions; however, we are unable to verify that the evolving regional composition of the Committee's voting membership has any effect on the adopted policy stance.},
  doi      = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.10.002},
  keywords = {E52, E58, Central banking, Federal Reserve, Monetary policy, Regional economic conditions},
  url      = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268008000153},
}

@Article{Meade2010,
  author   = {Meade, Ellen E.},
  title    = {{Federal Reserve Transcript Publication and Regional Representation}},
  journal  = {Contemporary Economic Policy},
  year     = {2010},
  volume   = {28},
  number   = {2},
  pages    = {162--170},
  abstract = {This article looks at disagreement within the Federal Reserve's monetary policy committee, the Federal Open Market Committee or FOMC, following a change in transparency practices taken in 1993 to publish verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings. Other literature has examined the effects of opening the FOMC's deliberations to public view and provided empirical evidence that the publication of transcripts made policymakers less willing to voice disagreement with the chairman's policy proposal. This article adds to that work by examining whether regional variables are important to the analysis and whether the transcription effects are robust to the inclusion of regional variables. The results indicate that transcription effects are indeed robust, regardless of the regional indicator used, and that larger Federal Reserve districts may be more likely to voice agreement with a given policy proposal. (JEL E42, E58, E65, F33)},
  doi      = {10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00175.x},
  eprint   = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00175.x},
  url      = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00175.x},
}

@Article{ApelGrimaldi2014,
  author  = {Mikael Apel and Marianna B. Grimaldi},
  title   = {{How Informative Are Central Bank Minutes?}},
  journal = {Review of Economics},
  year    = {2014},
  volume  = {65},
  number  = {1},
  pages   = {53--76},
}

@Article{Romer2010,
  author   = {Romer, David},
  title    = {{A New Data Set on Monetary Policy: The Economic Forecasts of Individual Members of the FOMC}},
  journal  = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
  year     = {2010},
  volume   = {42},
  number   = {5},
  pages    = {951--957},
  abstract = {This paper describes a new data set of the forecasts of output growth, inflation, and unemployment prepared by individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee. The paper discusses the scope of the data set, possibilities for extending it, and some potential uses. It offers a preliminary examination of some of the cross-sectional features of the data.},
  doi      = {10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00314.x},
  eprint   = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00314.x},
  keywords = {E52, E58, monetary policy, forecasts, FOMC},
  url      = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00314.x},
}

@Misc{LuccaTrebbi2011,
  author       = {David O. Lucca and Francesco Trebbi},
  title        = {{Measuring Central Bank Communication: An Automated Approach with Application to FOMC Statements}},
  howpublished = {NBER Working Paper No. 15367},
  year         = {2009},
  note         = {\url{https://www.nber.org/papers/w15367}},
}

@Article{EichlerLahner2014b,
  author   = {Eichler, Stefan and L{\"a}hner, Tom},
  title    = {Regional House Price Dynamics and Voting Behavior in the FOMC},
  journal  = {Economic Inquiry},
  year     = {2014},
  volume   = {52},
  number   = {2},
  pages    = {625--645},
  abstract = {This paper examines the impact of house price gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from 1978 to 2010. Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than Board members do. (JEL E31, E58, R31)},
  doi      = {10.1111/ecin.12050},
  eprint   = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ecin.12050},
  url      = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12050},
}

@Misc{Wirsching2018,
  author       = {Elisa Wirsching},
  title        = {{The Revolving Door for Political Elites: Policymakers' Professional Backgrounds and Financial Regulation}},
  howpublished = {EBRD Working Paper Series No. 222},
  year         = {2018},
  note         = {\url{https://www.ebrd.com/publications/working-papers/revolving-door}},
}

@Misc{Brookings2016,
  author       = {Aaron Klein},
  howpublished = {{BROOKINGS Op Ed, January 8, 2016}},
  note         = {\url{https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-feds-striking-lack-of-diversity-and-why-it-matters/}},
  title        = {{The Fed’s striking lack of diversity and why it matters}},
  year         = {2016},
}

@Article{Reagan1961,
  author    = {Michael D. Reagan},
  title     = {The Political Structure of the Federal Reserve System},
  journal   = {The American Political Science Review},
  year      = {1961},
  volume    = {55},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {64--76},
  publisher = {[American Political Science Association, Cambridge University Press]},
}

@Article{Baker2013,
  author    = {Andrew Baker},
  journal   = {New Political Economy},
  title     = {{The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift}},
  year      = {2013},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {112--139},
  volume    = {18},
  doi       = {10.1080/13563467.2012.662952},
  eprint    = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2012.662952},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2012.662952},
}

@Misc{LopezMoctezuma2019,
  author       = {L{\'o}pez-Moctezuma, Gabriel},
  title        = {{Sequential Deliberation in Collective Decision-Making: The Case of the FOMC}},
  howpublished = {Working Paper},
  year         = {2019},
  note         = {\url{http://www.glmoctezuma.com/research/seq/}},
}

@Misc{FederalReserve2020a,
  author       = {{Federal Reserve}},
  title        = {{The Structure and Functions of the Federal Reserve System}},
  howpublished = {{Federal Reserve Education}},
  year         = {2020},
  note         = {\url{https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/structure-and-functions}},
}

@Misc{FederalReserve1996,
  author       = {{Federal Reserve}},
  howpublished = {{Board of Governors - Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems}},
  note         = {\url{https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/description-federal-reserve-districts-678/federal-reserve-district-boundaries-23467}},
  title        = {{Federal Reserve District Boundaries}},
  year         = {1996},
}

@Article{Bonica2014,
  author   = {Adam Bonica},
  journal  = {American Journal of Political Science},
  title    = {{Mapping the Ideological Marketplace}},
  year     = {2014},
  number   = {2},
  pages    = {367--386},
  volume   = {58},
  abstract = {I develop a method to measure the ideology of candidates and contributors using campaign finance data. Combined with a data set of over 100 million contribution records from state and federal elections, the method estimates ideal points for an expansive range of political actors. The common pool of contributors who give across institutions and levels of politics makes it possible to recover a unified set of ideological measures for members of Congress, the president and executive branch, state legislators, governors, and other state officials, as well as the interest groups and individuals who make political donations. Since candidates fundraise regardless of incumbency status, the method estimates ideal points for both incumbents and nonincumbents. After establishing measure validity and addressing issues concerning strategic behavior, I present results for a variety of political actors and discuss several promising avenues of research made possible by the new measures.},
  url      = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/24363491},
}

@Book{Lavelle2013,
  author    = {Kathryn C. Lavelle},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  title     = {Money and Banks in the American Political System},
  year      = {2013},
  address   = {Cambridge},
}

@Misc{Tabakovic2018,
  author       = {Tabakovic, Haris and Thomas G. Wollmann},
  howpublished = {NBER Working Paper 24638},
  note         = {\url{https://www.nber.org/papers/w24638}},
  title        = {{From Revolving Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners}},
  year         = {2018},
}

@Article{dehaan2015,
  author    = {Dehaan, Ed and Kedia, Simi and Koh, Kevin and Rajgopal, Shivaram},
  journal   = {Journal of Accounting and Economics},
  title     = {The revolving door and the {SEC}'s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation},
  year      = {2015},
  issn      = {0165-4101},
  number    = {2-3},
  pages     = {65--96},
  volume    = {60},
  abstract  = {We investigate the consequences of the “revolving door” for trial lawyers at the SEC’s enforcement division. If future job opportunities motivate SEC lawyers to develop and/or showcase their enforcement expertise, then the revolving door phenomenon will promote more aggressive regulatory activity (the “human capital” hypothesis). In contrast, SEC lawyers can relax enforcement efforts in order to develop networking skills and/or curry favor with prospective employers at private law firms (the “rent seeking” hypothesis”). We collect data on the career paths of 336 SEC lawyers that span 284 SEC civil cases against accounting misrepresentation over the period 1990–2007. Our overall evidence is consistent with the “human capital” hypothesis. However, we find some evidence of “rent seeking” when SEC lawyers are based in Washington DC and when defense firms employ more former SEC lawyers. The revolving door likely impacts numerous aspects of SEC regulation setting and enforcement. This study examines accounting-related civil cases and is not able to study administrative or non-accounting enforcement cases. Further, the study does not address the choice of which cases to pursue, the incentives of employees other than trial lawyers, or how the revolving door affects rule making. Subject to these caveats, our study provides an important first look into the effects of revolving door incentives on the SEC’s enforcement process and lays the groundwork for future research.},
  keywords  = {Sec ; Lawyers ; Revolving Door ; Enforcement Actions ; Accounting Fraud},
  language  = {eng},
  publisher = {Elsevier B.V.},
}

@Article{lucca2014,
  author    = {Lucca, David and Seru, Amit and Trebbi, Francesco},
  journal   = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
  title     = {The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation},
  year      = {2014},
  pages     = {17--32},
  volume    = {65},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
}

@Article{Mishra2019,
  author   = {Mishra, Prachi and Reshef, Ariell},
  journal  = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
  title    = {How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector},
  year     = {2019},
  number   = {2-3},
  pages    = {369-402},
  volume   = {51},
  abstract = {Abstract Do past employment characteristics of central bank governors affect financial regulation? To answer this question, we construct a new data set based on curriculum vitae of all central bank governors around the world in 1970–2011. We interpret work experiences as indicators of preferences toward deregulation. Over the average duration in office (5.6 years), a governor with financial sector experience is associated with three times more deregulation than a governor without experience in finance. Similar results hold for past experience at the IMF; in contrast, past experience at the BIS and the UN are associated with less deregulation.},
}

@Article{Shive2016,
  author    = {Shive, Sophie A and Forster, Margaret M},
  journal   = {Review of Finance},
  title     = {The revolving door for financial regulators},
  year      = {2016},
  number    = {4},
  pages     = {1445--1484},
  volume    = {21},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
}

@Article{Stigler1971,
  author    = {Stigler, George J},
  journal   = {The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science},
  title     = {The Theory of Economic Regulation},
  year      = {1971},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {3--21},
  volume    = {2},
  publisher = {JSTOR},
}

@Article{Header2015,
  author    = {Header, Simon F. and Yackee, Susan Webb},
  journal   = {American Political Science Review},
  title     = {Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget},
  year      = {2015},
  number    = {3},
  pages     = {507--522},
  volume    = {109},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
}

@Article{Carpenter2020,
  author  = {Carpenter, Daniel and Devin Judge-Lord and Brian Libgober and Steven Rashin},
  journal = {Forthcoming at Interest Groups \& Advocacy},
  title   = {{Data and Methods for Analyzing Special Interest Influence in Rulemaking}},
  year    = {2020},
}

@Misc{Libgober2019,
  author       = {Brian Libgober},
  howpublished = {Working Paper},
  note         = {\url{https://libgober.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/meetings-comments-and-distributive-politics-qjps-rr.pdf}},
  title        = {{Meetings, Comments, and the Distributive Politics of Rulemaking}},
  year         = {2019},
}

@Article{Ban2019,
  author  = {Ban, Pamela and Hye Young You},
  journal = {Business and Politics},
  title   = {{Presence and influence in lobbying: Evidence from Dodd-Frank}},
  year    = {2019},
  number  = {21},
  pages   = {267-295},
  volume  = {2},
}

@Misc{Cohan2014,
  author       = {William D. Cohan},
  howpublished = {Politico Magazine (September 26, 2014)},
  note         = {\url{https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/why-the-fed-will-always-wimp-out-on-goldman-111356}, accessed on July 15, 2020},
  title        = {{Why the Fed Will Always Wimp Out on Goldman}},
  year         = {2014},
}

@Article{McGregor2013,
  author   = {McGregor, Rob Roy and Young, Warren},
  journal  = {History of Political Economy},
  title    = {{Federal Reserve Bank Presidents as Public Intellectuals}},
  year     = {2013},
  issn     = {0018-2702},
  month    = {12},
  number   = {suppl_1},
  pages    = {166-190},
  volume   = {45},
  abstract = {{In this essay, we focus on three district Federal Reserve Bank presidents who took on the role of public intellectual in the 1970s and early 1980s. They reflected their districts’ economic concerns, presenting them and their own views at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) while expressing both in public pronouncements in speeches and in print. Despite possible dissonance, the presidents were able to integrate information emerging from their district constituents with the overall state of the national economy in their input to the FOMC, while explaining the economic situation—in the framework of their economic worldviews—to the public at large, that is to say, both communicating their views externally and disturbing the internal status quo of economic thinking at the Federal Reserve.}},
  doi      = {10.1215/00182702-2310989},
  eprint   = {https://read.dukeupress.edu/hope/article-pdf/45/suppl\_1/166/430336/HOPE455\_08McGregor\_Fpp.pdf},
  url      = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2310989},
}

@Misc{Malmendier2017,
  author       = {Malmendier, Ulrike and Stefan Nagel and Zhen Yan},
  title        = {{The Making of Hawks and Doves: Inflation Experiences on the FOMC}},
  howpublished = {{NBER Working Paper No. 23228}},
  year         = {2017},
  note         = {\url{https://www.nber.org/papers/w23228}},
}

@Misc{NechioRegan2016,
  author       = {Fernanda Nechio and Rebecca Regan},
  howpublished = {{FRBSF Economic Letter}},
  note         = {\url{http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2016-26.pdf}},
  title        = {{Fed Communication: Words and Numbers}},
  year         = {2016},
}

@Article{Xu2018,
  author  = {Xu, Guo},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  title   = {{The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire}},
  year    = {2018},
  number  = {11},
  pages   = {3170-98},
  volume  = {108},
  doi     = {10.1257/aer.20171339},
  url     = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20171339},
}

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