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0809-execution_rules.xml
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0809-execution_rules.xml
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<group name="execution,">
<rule id="255901" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>-e PAA|-en PAA|-enc PAA|-enco PAA|-encod PAA|JABlAG4AdgA6AHUAcwBlAHIAcAByAG8AZgBpAGwAZQ|QAZQBuAHYAOgB1AHMAZQByAHAAcgBvAGYAaQBsAGUA|kAGUAbgB2ADoAdQBzAGUAcgBwAHIAbwBmAGkAbABlA|IgAoACcAKgAnACkAOwAkA|IAKAAnACoAJwApADsAJA|iACgAJwAqACcAKQA7ACQA</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1059: Powershell execution techniques seen with Emotet malware</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255902" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>-noP -sta -w 1 -enc|-NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Enc|-NoP -NonI -W Hidden -enc</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1059: Powershell execution techniques default PowerShell Empire launcher</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255903" level="10">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>certutil -urlcache -split -f </regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1059: CertUtil Download Technique</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255904" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>-exec bypass -Noninteractive -windowstyle hidden -e</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1059: Powershell execution techniques default Posh C2 launcher</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255905" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>/w 1</regex>
<match>value.toString</match>
<description>ATT&CK T1059: Powershell execution techniques default Unicorn Powershell Meterpreter launcher</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255906" level="9">
<if_sid>60100</if_sid>
<field name="win.system.eventID">^400$</field>
<regex>PowerShell</regex>
<description>Windows PowerShell was started.</description>
</rule>
<rule id="255907" level="9">
<if_sid>60100</if_sid>
<field name="win.system.eventID">^800$</field>
<regex>PowerShell</regex>
<description>Windows PowerShell command executed.</description>
</rule>
<rule id="255910" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>englishsize|adamteapot|initijpn|classchx|choreengine|pixelproc|cablesongs|mscmsknown</regex>
<description>Potential Emotet Executable running detection</description>
<group>MITRE,execution</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255911" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event3</if_group>
<regex>englishsize|adamteapot|initijpn|classchx|choreengine|pixelproc|vertclient|cablesongs|mscmsknown</regex>
<description>Potential Emotet Executable running detection</description>
<group>MITRE,execution</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255912" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<field name="win.eventdata.currentDirectory">AppData\\Roaming</field>
<regex>ipconfig|workstation|domain_trusts</regex>
<description>Potential Trickbot Executable running local and domain reconnaissance</description>
<group>MITRE,execution</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255913" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>Roaming\\NuiGet|Roaming\\HomeLan|Roaming\\netRest|Roaming\\netcloud|Roaming\\netRest</regex>
<description>Potential Emotet Executable running detection</description>
<group>MITRE,execution</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255914" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event3</if_group>
<regex>Roaming\\NuiGet|Roaming\\HomeLan|Roaming\\netRest|Roaming\\netcloud|Roaming\\netRest</regex>
<description>Potential Emotet Executable running detection</description>
<group>MITRE,execution</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255915" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>RwBlAHQALQBXAG0AaQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAFcAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAbwB3AGMAbwBwAHkAIAB8ACAARgBvAHIARQBhAGMAaAAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAewAkAF8ALgBEAGUAbABlAHQAZQAoACkAOwB9AA==</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1485: Powershell Ransomware technique to delete shadow copies seen in Sodinokibi strains</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1485,ransomware</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255916" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>WMIC.exe shadowcopy delete</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1485: WMIC Ransomware technique to delete shadow copies seen in Robinhood strains</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1485,ransomware</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255917" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1485:Ransomware technique to delete shadow copies</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1485,ransomware</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255918" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>/c Bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1485:Ransomware technique to delete backups seen in Robinhood strains</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1485,ransomware</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255919" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>wbadmin delete catalog -quiet</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1485:Ransomware technique to delete backups seen in Wannacry strains</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1485,ransomware</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255920" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1486:Ransomware technique to grant all permissions seen in Wannacry strains</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1486,ransomware</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255921" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>gandcrab.bit|ransomware.bit|carder.bit</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1486:Ransomware technique to look up Ransomware Domains seen in Gandcrab strain</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1486,ransomware</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255922" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>EQNEDT32.EXE</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1173: Potential use of Microsoft Equation Editor for Exploitation</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1173,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255923" level="12">
<if_sid>255561</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.parentImage">\\powershell.exe</field>
<description>ATT&CK T1117: Regsrv32 execution spawned from Powershell (Ursnif IOC)</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1117</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255924" level="12">
<if_sid>255901</if_sid>
<regex>IwBwAGEAY</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1059: Powershell Signature Matching Ursnif Malware</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255925" level="5">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<field name="win.eventdata.image">\\wscript.exe</field>
<description>ATT&CK T1064: WScript Execution $(win.eventdata.image)</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1064</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255926" level="12">
<if_sid>255559</if_sid>
<regex>WINWORD.EXE</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1064: Word Executing WScript $(win.eventdata.image)</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1064</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255927" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>.doc</regex>
<description>Powershell Spawned from Office Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255928" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>.xls</regex>
<description>Powershell Spawned from Excel Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255929" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<regex>WINWORD.EXE</regex>
<description>Command Line process spawned from Microsoft Word Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255930" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<regex>EXCEL.EXE</regex>
<description>Command Line process spawned from Microsoft Excel Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255931" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<regex>POWERPNT.exe</regex>
<description>Command Line process spawned from Microsoft Powerpoint Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255932" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<regex>OUTLOOK.EXE</regex>
<description>Command Line process spawned from Microsoft Outlook</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255933" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<regex>VISIO.exe</regex>
<description>Command Line process spawned from Microsoft Visio Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255934" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<regex>MSPUB.exe</regex>
<description>Command Line process spawned from Microsoft Publisher Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255935" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>POWERPNT.exe</regex>
<description>Powershell Spawned from Powerpoint Doc</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255936" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>OUTLOOK.EXE</regex>
<description>Powershell Spawned from Microsoft Outlook</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255937" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>MSPUB.exe</regex>
<description>Powershell Spawned from Microsoft Publisher</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255938" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<regex>VISIO.exe</regex>
<description>Powershell Spawned from Microsoft Visio</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1059,attack.t1202,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255939" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<regex>start microsoft-edge:http:</regex>
<description>Potential Trickbot behaviour spawning Microsoft Edge via the Commandline</description>
<group>MITRE,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255940" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>whoami.exe</regex>
<match>SYSTEM</match>
<description>Whoami ran as SYSTEM user, potential user recon after privelge escalation</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1033</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255941" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>CollectionMethod All</regex>
<description>Bloodhound Active Directory enumeration tool executed</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1087</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255942" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<regex>rar.exe</regex>
<description>Rar file archive action detected, potential data being staged for exfiltration</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1002,attack.t1074</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255943" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<match>net.webclient</match>
<regex>downloadstring|downloadfile</regex>
<description>Potential powershell download anomaly investigate for potential malware</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1086</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255944" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event7</if_group>
<match>Revoked</match>
<description>T1073 Potential DLL Side Loading by Executable with Revoked Certificate: Image loaded by $(win.eventdata.image)</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1073</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255945" level="8">
<if_group>sysmon_event7</if_group>
<match>false</match>
<description>T1073 Potential DLL Side Loading by Unsigned Executable: Image loaded by $(win.eventdata.image)</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1073</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255946" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event_11</if_group>
<match>WINWORD.EXE</match>
<field name="data.win.eventdata.targetfilename">\\.exe</field>
<description>WORD document wrote executable file: $(data.win.eventdata.targetfilenam)</description>
<group>MITRE,</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255947" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.image">cmstp.exe</field>
<field name="win.eventdata.commandline">.inf</field>
<description>CMSTP Executing Remote Scriptlet - T1191</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1089,Execution,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255948" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.image">cmstp.exe</field>
<field name="win.eventdata.commandline">.inf</field>
<field name="win.eventdata.commandline">/au</field>
<description>CMSTP Executing UAC Bypass - T1191</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1089,Execution,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255949" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.image">hh.exe</field>
<field name="win.eventdata.commandline">.chm</field>
<field name="win.eventdata.commandline">http|https</field>
<description>Compiled HTML Help Remote Payload - T1223</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1223,Execution,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255950" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<field name="win.eventdata.image">control.exe</field>
<field name="win.eventdata.commandLine">.cpl</field>
<description>Compiled HTML Help Local Payload - T1196</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1196,Execution,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255951" level="12">
<if_sid>255561</if_sid>
<match>appdata</match>
<field name="win.eventdata.commandLine">.txt</field>
<description>Ursnif DLL loading via Regsrv32 T1218</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1218,Execution,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255952" level="12">
<if_sid>255551</if_sid>
<match>regread</match>
<regex>WScript.Shell</regex>
<description>Ursnif loading from Registry via MSHTA exec, T1170</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1170,Execution,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255953" level="12">
<if_sid>255531</if_sid>
<match>SQB</match>
<description>Encoded Powershell IEX, T1086</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1086,Execution,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255954" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event3</if_group>
<match>psexec</match>
<description>potential lateral movement using psexec</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1570,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255955" level="12">
<if_sid>255524</if_sid>
<match>127.0.0.1\\</match>
<regex>ADMIN\$|C\$|IPC\$</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1021.002: Execute command writing output to local Admin Share</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1021.002,sysmon</group>
</rule>
<rule id="255956" level="12">
<if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
<match>w3wp.exe</match>
<regex>cmd.exe</regex>
<description>ATT&CK T1505.003: Potential webshell interaction</description>
<group>MITRE,attack.t1505.003,sysmon</group>
</rule>
</group>