Draft 2024-11-20
These Framing Notes Are Not Considered To Be A Part Of This Constitution
The Cardano Blockchain was established in 2017. In July 2020 the Cardano Blockchain was expanded to include independent block validators and in September 2024 an on-chain governance system was introduced. This Constitution outlines the rights and responsibilities of governance actors in the decentralized system who represent the owners of ada, the governance token of the Cardano Blockchain. The Cardano Blockchain is presently a decentralized ecosystem of blockchain technology, smart contracts,and community governance.
In approaching this Constitution,the Cardano Community recognizes that it must be remembered that this is not a constitution for only a blockchain but rather; it is a constitution for a blockchain ecosystem - a much more ambitious endeavor: Accordingly,how governance actions are approved, while extremely important, is not the sole focus of this Constitution.Rather;this Constitution provides the basis and fundamental framework through which all participants in the Cardano Community can come together to govern themselves and form radically new approaches to human interaction and collaboration.
By necessity, this Constitution recognizes the role of and empowers the Constitutional Committee,confirms the right of the Cardano Community to participate in collective bodies for collaboration, gives effect to on-chain governance, and empowers DReps to act as the voice of ada owners for on-chain voting.
The Constitution also recognizes the necessity of safeguarding access to and the use of funds of the Cardano treasury through the inclusion of the Cardano Guardrails in this Constitution.
Cardano is a decentralized ecosystem of blockchain technology, smart contracts, and community governance, committed to improving economic, political, and social systems for everyone,everywhere. By offering this foundational infrastructure, Cardano empowers individuals and communities to manage their identity, value and governance, by fostering the emergence of decentralized applications, businesses and network states.
Through unbiased processing of immutable data, we the participants of the Cardano Community,consisting of individuals, organizations, contributors and others, choose to follow in the footsteps of the early Internet and cryptocurrency pioneers, who first forged bonds of community through digital technologies. We are guided by our shared principles and tenets as we exercise our self-governance by balancing decentralized decision-making with accountability and safeguarding the security of the Cardano Blockchain.
Recognizing the need for a more robust and dynamic governance framework, that neither relies nor depends upon traditional nation-state governance systems, but instead relies on self-governance by the Cardano Community, utilizing, wherever possible and beneficial,blockchain technology in the governance process, we hereby establish this Cardano Constitution to govern the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem,ensure the continuity of the Cardano Blockchain,and guard the rights of those who utilize it.
With these purposes in mind, we the Cardano Community affirm our intention to abide by this Constitution in order to participate in the governance of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem.We invite all who share our values to join us but stand not in the way of any who wish to take another path.
These below Tenets shall guide all participants of he Cardano Community, including the Constitutional Committee, and proposed governance actions shall be evaluated in accordance with these Tenets.The order in which the below Tenets appear is not intended to represent a priority among Tenets.
TENET 1 Transactions on the Cardano Blockchain shall not be slowed down or censored and shall be expediently served for their intended purpose.
TENET 2 The cost of transactions on the Cardano Blockchain shall be predictable and not unreasonable.
TENET 3 Anyone desiring to develop and deploy applications on the Cardano Blockchain shall not unreasonably be prevented from developing and deploying such applications as intended.
TENET 4 Contributions by the Cardano Community on the Cardano Blockchain shall be recognized,recorded and assessed fairly through reward sharing with SPOs and DReps,appropriate tokenomics and multi-resource consensus approaches.
TENET 5 The Cardano Blockchain shall not lock in an ada owner's value without an owner's consent.
TENET 6 The Cardano Blockchain shall not unreasonably impede interoperability.
TENET 7 The Cardano Blockchain shall preserve in a safe manner any value and information an ada owner seeks to store on the Cardano Blockchain.
TENET 8 The Cardano Blockchain shall not unreasonably spend resources.
TENET 9 All users of the Cardano Blockchain shall be treated equally, taking into account the collective desires of the Cardano Blockchain Community, consistent with the long-term sustainability and viability of the Cardano Blockchain.
TENET 10 Financial stability shall be maintained and the total supply of ada shall not exceed 45,000,000,000 (45,000,000,000,000,000 lovelace).
The Cardano Blockchain shall operate in accordance with the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails as set forth in the Guardrails Appendix to this Constitution. The Cardano community may from time to time digitally codify certain Cardano Blockchain Guardrails such that such Cardano Blockchain Guardrails are directly programmed and implemented on the Cardano Blockchain using on-chain scripts or built-in ledger rules.
In the event there are inconsistencies between a Cardano Blockchain Guardrail as set forth in the Guardrails Appendix and any such Cardano Blockchain Guardrail that has been programmed and implemented on the Cardano Blockchain, the version of such Cardano Blockchain Guardrail that has been deployed directly on the Cardano Blockchain shall prevail and the Constitutional Committee shall seek to reconcile such inconsistencies through the encouragement of an appropriate on-chain governance action.
No formal membership shall be required to use, participate in and benefit from the Cardano Blockchain. Instead,all owners of ada, all developers of, all those building on, and all those otherwise supporting, maintaining or using the Cardano Blockchain are considered to be participants in the Cardano Community and are therefore recognized as beneficiaries of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem. All participants in the Cardano Community are accordingly beneficiaries of this Constitution, entitled to its rights, privileges and protections and,as such,are expected to support and uphold this Constitution.
Participants in the Cardano Community who own ada are entitled to access and participate in the on-chain decision-making processes of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem, including voting and taking part in on-chain governance actions regarding the Cardano Blockchain.
The Cardano Community has a responsibility to maintain the integrity of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem by following this Constitution,operating the Cardano Blockchain,participating in Cardano Blockchain governance activities, and resolving disputes in a fair and transparent manner.
The Cardano Community is entitled and encouraged through the provisions of this Constitution to collaborate in developing, maintaining and building applications for the Cardano Blockchain,and to form temporary and permanent organizations, associations and other entities as the Cardano Community deems desirable or appropriate in support of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem.
The Cardano Blockchain shall be governed by a decentralized, on-chain governance model,utilizing, to the extent possible and beneficial, smart contracts and other blockchain based tools to facilitate decision-making and ensure transparency. On-chain voting for governance actions shall follow the process outlined in the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails.
Three independent governance bodies shall participate in voting for on-chain governance actions to provide checks and balances for the Cardano Blockchain consisting of Delegated Representatives (DReps), Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) and the Constitutional Committee (CC).
On-chain governance decisions shall be made through a collective decision-making process, with specific consensus threshold requirements as required by the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails. All on-chain governance actions shall be voted upon in accordance with the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails.
All owners of ada shall have the right to vote in on-chain governance action decision-making processes, subject to any restrictions or requirements provided for in this Constitution and the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails. All owners of ada shall have the right to propose changes to the governance structure of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem in accordance with the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails. Owners of ada who use third-party custodians or other designees to hold their ada, may authorize, or may withhold authorization for, such third-parties to vote on their behalf.
A special form of on-chain governance action, an “Info” action, exists to allow community sentiment to be gauged without committing to any on-chain change of the Cardano Blockchain."Info" actions have no on-chain effect other than to record the outcome of such a vote on the Cardano Blockchain.
In order to promote transparency in the process of on-chain governance, prior to being recorded or enacted on-chain, all proposed governance actions are expected to follow a standardized and legible format including a URL and hash linked to documented off-chain content. Sufficient rationale shall be provided to justify the requested change to the Cardano Blockchain. The rationale shall include, at a minimum, a title, abstract, reason for the proposal, and relevant supporting materials.
The content of every on-chain governance action must be identical to the final off-chain version of the proposed action.
“Hard Fork Initiation” and “Protocol Parameter Change” governance actions shall undergo sufficient technical review and scrutiny as mandated by the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails to ensure that the governance action does not endanger the security, functionality, performance or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain. On-chain governance actions should address their expected impact on the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem.
All owners of ada shall have the right to ensure that the process for participating in, submitting and voting on on-chain governance actions is open and transparent and is protected from undue influence and manipulation.
The Cardano Community is expected to support the creation,maintenance and ongoing administration of off-chain governance processes as may be necessary to give effect to this Constitution and to ensure that there is awareness of and an opportunity to debate and shape all future governance actions for the Cardano Blockchain.
The Cardano Community is expected to propose, not less than on an annual basis, a budget for the ongoing maintenance and future development of the Cardano Blockchain. All owners of ada are expected to periodically approve the Cardano Blockchain budget through an on-chain “Info action.”No withdrawals from the Cardano Blockchain treasury shall be permitted unless such withdrawals have been authorized and are being made pursuant to a budget for the Cardano Blockchain that i then in effect as required by the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails, and which has not been determined by the Constitutional Committee to be unconstitutional. Cardano Blockchain budgets shall specify a process for overseeing use of funds from Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawals including designating one or more administrators who shall be responsible for such oversight.
Any governance action requesting ada from the Cardano Blockchain treasury shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada. Contractual obligations governing the use of ada received from the Cardano Blockchain treasury pursuant to a Cardano budget shall include dispute resolution provisions.
In order to participate in governance actions, owners of ada may register as DReps and directly vote on such governance actions or may delegate their voting rights to other registered DReps who shall vote on their behalf.
Any owner of ada shall have the option to register as a DRep. Owners of ada shall be allowed to delegate their voting stake to one or more registered DReps, including themselves. DReps may be individuals or coordinated groups. Owners of ada who use third-party custodians or other designees to hold their ada, may authorize, or may withhold authorization for, such third-parties to delegate the voting rights of the ada owner to registered DReps on the owner's behalf. DReps are entitled to cast votes directly for on-chain governance actions and represent those ada owners delegating their voting rights to them.
This voting system shall enshrine a liquid democracy model where owners of ada can seamlessly select among DReps,register as a DRep, and withdraw or change their delegation at any time.
DReps acting on behalf of other ada owners are expected to periodically adopt, and update as they deem appropriate, codes of conduct governing their activities as DReps and make such codes of conduct publicly available. DReps are encouraged to include ethical guidelines in their codes of conduct.
The Cardano Community is expected to support the creation, maintenance and ongoing administration of tools to enable owners of ada to explore and evaluate DRep candidates, access and evaluate DRep codes of conduct and select DReps on such criteria as they deem relevant.
DReps acting on behalf of other ada owners may be compensated for their efforts. DReps shall ensure that any compensation received in connection with their activities as a DRep is disclosed. DReps may not pay compensation to an ada owner or to an owner's designee in exchange for being appointed a DRep by such ada owner or by its designee or for voting on behalf of such ada owner or its designee.
SPOs shall have a specific role in approving critical on-chain governance actions which require additional oversight and independence, voting separately and independently from DReps as set forth in the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails. SPOs shall participate in hard fork initiation processes as the operators of the nodes that participate in Cardano Blockchain's consensus mechanism.
SPOs shall act as a check on the power of the Constitutional Committee under exceptional circumstances by separately voting on "Motion of no-confidence" and "Update committee/threshold" governance actions, and on “Parameter Update” governance actions that affect security-critical parameters.
SPOs are encouraged to periodically adopt, and update as they deem appropriate, codes of conduct governing their activities as SPOs and make such codes of conduct publicly available.SPOs are encouraged to include ethical guidelines in their codes of conduct.
Owners of ada who are both SPOs and acting as DReps shall publicly disclose that they are participating in on-chain governance actions in both such capacities prior to exercising any on-chain governance rights.
A Constitutional Committee shall be established as the branch of Cardano's on-chain governance process that ensures governance actions to be enacted on-chain are consistent with this Constitution. The Constitutional Committee shall comprise a set of owners of ada that is collectively responsible for ensuring that on-chain governance actions prior to enactment on chain,are constitutional. With limited exceptions as provided in this Constitution,the Constitutional Committee shall be limited to voting on the constitutionality of governance actions to be enacted on-chain. Constitutional Committee members are expected to have appropriate expertise to carry out their required responsibilities,considering their past contributions and involvement in the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem.
The Constitutional Committee shall be composed of such number of members as shall be determined from time to time by owners of ada, as consistent with the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails, and as shall be sufficient to assure the ongoing integrity of the Cardano Blockchain.
Members of the Constitutional Committee shall serve such term lengths as shall be determined from time to time by owners of ada as consistent with the minimum and maximum term lengths as set forth in the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails. To assure continuity in the operation of the Constitutional Committee, the terms for Constitutional Committee members shall be staggered.
The Cardano Community shall establish and make public a process from time to time for election of members of the Constitutional Committee consistent with the requirements of the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails.
No governance action, other than a "Motion of no-confidence," or "Update constitutional committee/threshold" may be implemented on-chain unless a requisite percentage as specified by the Guardrails of the members of the Constitutional Committee shall have first determined and affirmed through an on-chain action that such proposal does not violate this Constitution.
Because “Info” actions have no on-chain effect and, accordingly, are neither constitutional nor unconstitutional,Constitutional Committee members may not prevent “Info” actions from being recorded on-chain. Members of the Constitutional Committee may nevertheless record a vote on-chain regarding an “Info” action in order to express their view on such “Info” action,including wheter the suggested course of action proposed in such “Info”action,would be,in the view of such member, unconstitutional if it were to be enforced by on-chain mechanisms.
In the case of "Info actions” that propose a Cardano Blockchain budget, Constitutional Committee members shall record a vote on-chain that sets forth their opinion as to whether the proposed budget, if it were to be implemented in the form contained in the “Info”action,would violate this Constitution.
In the case of "Info" actions that propose a withdrawal from the Cardano treasury pursuant to a previously approved budget, Constitutional Committee members shall record a vote on-chain that sets forth their opinion as to whether such proposed withdrawal, if made in accordance with such“Info”action, would violate this Constitution.
The Constitutional Committee shall be considered to be in one of the following two states at all times: a state of confidence or a state of no-confidence. In a state of no-confidence, members of the then standing Constitutional Committee must be reinstated or replaced using the "Update committee/threshold" governance action before any other on-chain governance action,other than“Info”actions, may go forward. During a state of no-confidence,“Info”actions other than “Info” actions relating to budget proposals or treasury withdrawal proposals, may continue to be recorded on-chain.
If a member of the Constitutional Committee is not carrying out its responsibilities as required by this Constitution, as so determined by a requisite percentage as specified by the Guardrails of SPOs and DReps, voting separately pursuant to a "Motion of no-confidence" governance action,such member shall be removed from the Constitutional Committee upon the implementation of the governance action. Thereafter, an election shall be held as soon as practical to replace the member so removed.
In the event of a "Motion of no-confidence” governance action to remove all members of the Constitutional Committee at the same time, that is approved by a requisite percentage as specified by the Guardrails of DReps and SPOs, upon implementation of the governance action,the Constitutional Committee shall be considered to be a state of no-confidence until such time as an election has been held either to reinstate the existing Constitutional Committee members in whole or in part, or to elect new Constitutional Committee members.
Constitutional Committee processes shall be transparent. The Constitutional Committee shall publish each decision.When voting that a governance action proposed to be executed on-chain is unconstitutional, the Constitutional Committee collectively, or each member of the Constitutional Committee casting such a vote separately, shall set forth the basis for its decision with reference to specific Articles of this Constitution or provisions of the Guardrails Appendix that are in conflict with a given proposal. Internal deliberation among members of the Constitutional Committee, prior to casting votes, are not required to be publicly disclosed.
The Constitutional Committee shall operate pursuant to a code of conduct periodically adopted and published by the Constitutional Committee. The Constitutional Committee is encouraged to include ethical guidelines in its code of conduct.The Constitutional Committee shall periodically adopt and publish such policies and procedures as the Constitutional Committee shall deem necessary in carrying out its duties.
The Cardano Community is expected to support the creation, maintenance and ongoing administration of tools as may be necessary and appropriate for the Constitutional Committee to perform its required functions.
Constitutional Committee members may be compensated for their efforts as members of the Constitutional Committee. Constitutional Committee members shall ensure that any compensation received in connection with their activities as a member is disclosed. Budgets approved for the Cardano Blockchain may include allocations from the Cardano Blockchain treasury sufficient to compensate Constitutional Committee members in such amounts as may be approved from time to time by ada owners and shall provide for periodic administrative costs of the Constitutional Committee in such amounts as requested from time to time by the Constitutional Committee and as approved by ada owners.
This Constitution should be treated as a living document. Technical advancements, changes in the desires,needs and expectations of the Cardano Community, and unforeseen circumstances may give rise to the need in the future to amend this Constitution. The Cardano Community is encouraged to periodically review and debate the provisions of this Constitution, and when so desired,come together in such forums as the Cardano Community may deem appropriate, to propose amendments to this Constitution. Amendments may be made as provided in this Article VII.
Except as otherwise so provided in the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails Appendix, amendments to this Constitution, including to the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails Appendix,shall be approved by a collective decision-making process, requiring an on-chain governance action by owners of ada satisfying a threshold of not less than 67% of the then active voting stake.
If the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails Appendix sets forth an amendment threshold for a Cardano Blockchain Guardrail that is different than the amendment threshold contained in Section 2 of this Article VII,then the threshold set forth in the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails Appendix for such Cardano Blockchain Guardrail shall apply.
To implement Cardano Blockchain on-chain governance, it is necessary to establish sensible guardrails that will enable the Cardano Blockchain to continue to operate in a secure and sustainable way.
This Appendix sets forth guardrails that must be applied to Cardano Blockchain on-chain governance actions, including changes to the protocol parameters and limits on treasury withdrawals.These guardrails cover both essential, intrinsic limits on settings, and recommendations that are based on experience, measurement and governance objectives.
These guardrails are designed to avoid unexpected problems with the operation of the Cardano Blockchain. They are intended to guide the choice of sensible parameter settings and avoid potential problems with security, performance, functionality or long-term sustainability. As described below, some of these guardrails are automatable and will be enforced via an on-chain script or built-in ledger rules.
These guardrails apply only to the Cardano Blockchain Layer 1 mainnet environment. They are not intended to apply to test environments or to other blockchains that use the Cardano Blockchain software.
Not all parameters for the Cardano Blockchain can be considered independently. Some parameters interact with other settings in an intrinsic way. Where known, these interactions are addressed in this Appendix.
While the guardrails in this Appendix presently reflect the current state of technical insight, this Appendix should be treated as a living document. Implementation improvements,new simulations or performance evaluation results for the Cardano Blockchain may allow some of the restrictions contained in these guardrails to be relaxed (or, in some circumstances, require them to be tightened) in due course.
Additional guardrails may also be needed where, for example,new protocol parameters are introduced.
The guardrails set forth in this Appendix may be amended from time to time pursuant to an on chain governance action that satisfies the applicable voting threshold as set forth in this Appendix. Any such amendment to any guardrails shall require and be deemed to be an amendment to the Constitution itself, including any new guardrails. Each guardrail has a unique label. If the text of a guardrail is amended, the existing guardrail will be deprecated and a new label will be used in this Appendix. Similarly, if a guardrail is completely deprecated, its label will never be reused in the future. In all cases, the guardrails that apply to a governance action will be those in force at the time that the governance action is submitted on chain, regardless of any later amendments.
Should/Should not. Where this Appendix says that a value "should not" be set below or above some value, this means that the guardrail is a recommendation or guideline, and the specific value could be open to discussion or alteration by a suitably expert group recognized by the Cardano community in light of experience with the Cardano Blockchain governance system or the operation of the Cardano Blockchain.
Must/Must not. Where this Appendix says that a value “must” or "must not" be set below or above some value, this means that the guardrail is a requirement that will be enforced by Cardano Blockchain ledger rules, types or other built-in mechanisms where possible, and that if not followed could cause a protocol failure,security breach or other undesirable outcome.
Benchmarking. Benchmarking refers to careful system level performance evaluation that is designed to show a-priori that, for example, 95% of blocks will be diffused across a global network of Cardano Blockchain nodes within the required 5s time interval in all cases. This may require construction of specific test workflows and execution on a large test network of Cardano Blockchain nodes, simulating a global Cardano Blockchain network.
Performance analysis. Performance analysis refers to projecting theoretical performance,empirical benchmarking or simulation results to predict actual system behavior. For example,performance results obtained from tests in a controlled test environment (such as a collection of data centers with known networking properies) may be extrapolated to inform likely performance behavior in a real Cardano Blockchain network environment.
Simulation. Simulation refers to synthetic execution that is designed to inform performance/functionality decisions in a repeatable way. For example, the IOSim Cardano Blockchain module allows the operation of the networking stack to be simulated in a controlled and repeatable way, allowing issues to be detected before code deployment.
Performance Monitoring. Performance monitoring involves measuring the actual behavior of the Cardano Blockchain network, for example, by using timing probes to evaluate round-trip times, or test blocks to assess overall network health. It complements benchmarking and performance analysis by providing information about actual system behavior that cannot be obtained using simulated workloads or theoretical analysis.
Reverting Changes. Where performance monitoring shows that actual network behavior following a change is inconsistent with the performance requirements for the Cardano Blockchain, then the change must be reverted to its previous state if that is possible.For example,if the block size is increased from 100KB to 120KB and 95% of blocks areno longer diffused within 5s, then a change must be made to revert the block size to 100KB. If this is not possible, then one or more alternative changes must be made that will ensure that the performance requirements are met.
Severity Levels. Issues that affect the Cardano Blockchain network are classified by severity level, where:
- Severity 1 is a critical incident or issue with very high impact to the security,performance, functionality or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain network
- Severity 2 is a major incident or issue with significant impact to the security,performance, functionality or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain network
- Severity 3 is a minor incident or issue with low impact to the security,performance,functionality or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain network
Future Performance Requirements. Planned development such as new mechanisms for out of memory storage may impact block diffusion or other times. When changing parameters, it is necessary to consider these future performance requirements as well as the current operation of the Cardano Blockchain. Until development is complete, the requirements will be conservative but may then be relaxed to account for actual timing behavior.
A script hash is associated with the constitution hash when a New Constitution or Guardrails Script governance action is enacted. It acts as an additional safeguard to the ledger rules and types,filtering non-compliant governance actions.
The guardrails script only affects two types of governance actions:
- Parameter Update actions, and
- Treasury Withdrawal actions.
The script is executed when either of these types of governance action is submitted on-chain.This avoids scenarios where, for example, an erroneous script could prevent the chain from ever enacting a Hard Fork action, resulting in deadlock. There are three different situations that apply to script usage.
- (y) The script can be used to enforce the guardrail.
- (x) The script cannot be used to enforce the guardrail.
- (~-reason) The script cannot be used to enforce the guardrail for the reason given,but future ledger changes could enable this.
Guardrails may overlap: in this case, the most restrictive set of guardrails will apply.
Where a parameter is not explicitly listed in this document, then the script must not permits any changes to the parameter.
Conversely,where a parameter is explicitly listed in this document but no checkable guardrails are specified, the script must not imposes any constraints on changes to the parameter.
Below are guardrails and guidelines for changing updatable protocol parameter settings via the protocol parameter update governance action such that the Cardano Blockchain is never in an unrecoverable state as a result of such changes.
Note that, to avoid ambiguity, this Appendix uses the parameter name that is used in protocol parameter update governance actions rather than any other convention.
PARAM-01 (y) Any protocol parameter that is not explicitly named in this document must not be changed by a Parameter update governance action
PARAM-02 (y) Where a protocol parameter is explicitly listed in this document but no checkable guardrails are specified, the guardrails script must not impose any constraints on changes to the parameter. Checkable guardrails are shown by a (y)
The below protocol parameters are critical from a security point of view.
- maximum block body size(maxBlockBodySize)
- maximum transaction size (maxTxSize)
- maximum block header size (maxBlockHeaderSize)
- maximum size of a serialized asset value (maxValueSize)
- maximum script execution/memory units in a single block (maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps/memory])
- minimum fee coefficient(txFeePerByte)
- minimum fee constant(txFeeFixed)
- minimum fee per byte for reference scripts (minFeeRefScriptCoinsPerByte)
- minimum Lovelace deposit per byte of serialized UTxO (utxoCostPerByte)
- governance action deposit (govDeposit)
PARAM-03 (y) Critical protocol parameters require an SPO vote in addition to a DRep vote: SPOs must say "yes" with a collective support of more than 50% of all active block production stake. This is enforced by the guardrails on the stake pool voting threshold.
PARAM-04 (x) At least 3 months should normally pass between the publication of an off-chain proposal to change a critical protocol parameter and the submission of the corresponding on-chain governance action. This guardrail may be relaxed in the event of a Severity 1 or Severity 2 network issue following careful technical discussion and evaluation.
- delegation key Lovelace deposit (stakeAddressDeposit)
- pool registration Lovelace deposit (stakePoolDeposit)
- minimum fixed rewards cut for pools (minPoolCost)
- DRep deposit amount (dRepDeposit)
- minimal Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize)
- maximum term length (in epochs) for the Constitutional Committee members (committeeMaxTermLimit)
PARAM-05 (y) DReps must vote "yes" with a collective support of more than 50% of all active voting stake. This is enforced by the guardrails on the DRep voting thresholds.
PARAM-06 (x) At least 3 months should normally pass between the publication of an off-chain proposal to change a parameter that is critical to the governance system and the submission of the corresponding on-chain governance action. This guardrail may be relaxed in the event of a Severity 1 or Severity 2 network issue following careful technical discussion and evaluation.
The overall goals when managing economic parameters are to:
- Enable long-term economic sustainability for the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem;
- Ensure that stake pools are adequately rewarded for maintaining the Cardano Blockchain;
- Ensure that ada holders are adequately rewarded for using stake in constructive ways,including when delegating ada for block production; and
- Balance economic incentives for different Cardano Blockchain ecosystem stakeholders, including but not limited to Stake Pool Operators, ada holders, DeFi users,infrastructure users, developers (e.g. DApps) and financial intermediaries (e.g.exchanges)
- Significant changes in the fiat value of ada resulting in potential problems with security, performance, functionality or long-term sustainability
- Changes in transaction volumes or types
- Community requests or suggestions
- Emergency situations that require changes to economic parameters
Changes to the economic parameters should not be made in isolation. They need to account for:
- External economic factors
- Network security concerns
- Fiat value of ada resulting in potential problems with security,performance, functionality or long-term sustainability
- Transaction volumes and types
- Number and health of stake pools
- External economic factors
Transaction fee per byte (txFeePerByte) and fixed transaction fee (txFeeFixed)
Defines the cost for basic transactions in Lovelace:
fee(tx) =txFeeFixed+ txFeePerByte x nBytes(tx)
TFPB-01 (y) txFeePerByte must not be lower than 30 (0.000030 ada)
This protects against low-cost denial of service attacks
TFPB-02 (y) txFeePerByte must not exceed 1,000 (0.001 ada)
This ensures that transactions can be paid for
TFPB-03 (y) txFeePerByte must not be negative
TFF-01 (y) txFeeFixed must not be lower than 100,000 (0.1 ada)
This protects against low-cost denial of service attacks
TFF-02 (y) txFeeFixed must not exceed 10,000,000(10 ada)
This ensures that transactions can be paid for
TFF-03 (y) txFeeFixed must not be negative.
TFGEN-01 (x - "should") To maintain a consistent level of protection against denial-of-service attacks, txFeeFixed and txFeePerByte should be adjusted whenever Plutus Execution prices are adjusted (executionUnitPrices[steps/memory]).
TFGEN-02 (x - unquantifiable) Any changes to txFeeFixed or txFeePerByte must consider the implications of reducing the cost of a denial-of-service attack or increasing the maximum transaction fee so that it becomes impossible to construct a transaction.
Defines the deposit (in Lovelace) that is charged for each byte of storage that is held in a UTxO.This deposit is returned when the UTxO is no longer active.
- Sets a minimum threshold on ada that is held within a single UTxO
- Provides protection against low-cost denial of service attack on UTxO storage.
- DoS protection decreases in line with the free node memory (proportional to UTxO growth)
- Helps reduce long term storage costs for node users by providing an incentive to return UTxOs when no longer needed, or to merge UTxOs.
UCPB-01 (y) utxoCostPerByte must not be lower than 3,000 (0.003 ada)
UCPB-02 (y) utxoCostPerByte must not exceed 6,500 (0.0065 ada)
UCPB-03 (y) utxoCostPerByte must not be zero
UCPB-04 (y) utxoCostPerByte must not be negative
UCPB-05a (x -"should") Changes should account for
i) The acceptable cost of attack
ii) The acceptable time for an attack
iii) The acceptable memory configuration for full node users
iv) The sizes of UTxOs and
v) The current total node memory usage
Ensures that stake addresses are retired when no longer needed
- Helps reduce long term storage costs
- Helps limit CPU and memory costs in the ledger
The rationale for the deposit is to incentivize that scarce memory resources are returned when they are no longer required. Reducing the number of active stake addresses also reduces processing and memory costs at the epoch boundary when calculating stake snapshots.
SAD-01 (y) stakeAddressDeposit must not be lower than 1,000,000 (1 ada)
SAD-02 (y) stakeAddressDeposit must not exceed 5,000,000 (5ada)
SAD-03 (y) stakeAddressDeposit must not be negative
Ensures that stake pools are retired by the stake pool operator when no longer needed by them
- Helps reduce long term storage costs
The rationale for the deposit is to incentivize that scarce memory resources are returned when they are no longer required. Rewards and stake snapshot calculations are also impacted by the number of active stake pools.
SPD-01 (y) stakePoolDeposit must not be lower than 250,000,000 (250 ada)
SPD-02 (y) stakePoolDeposit must not exceed 500,000,000 (500 ada)
SPD-03 (y) stakePoolDeposit must not be negative
Part of the rewards mechanism
- The minimum pool cost is transferred to the pool rewards address before any delegator rewards are paid
MPC-01 (y) minPoolCost must not be negative
MPC-02 (y) minPoolCost must not exceed 500,000,000 (500 ada)
MPC-03 (x -"should") minPoolCost should be set in line with the economic cost for operating a pool
Part of the rewards mechanism
The treasury cut portion of the monetary expansion is transferred to the treasury before any pool rewards are paid
- Can be set in the range 0.0-1.0 (0%-100%)
TC-01 (y) treasuryCut must not be lower than 0.1(10%)
TC-02 (y) treasuryCut must not exceed 0.3(30%)
TC-03 (y) treasuryCut must not be negative
TC-04 (y) treasuryCut must not exceed 1.0(100%)
TC-05 (~-no access to change history) treasuryCut must not be changed more than once in any 36 epoch period (approximately 6 months)
Part of the rewards mechanism
- The monetary expansion controls the amount of reserves that is used for rewards each epoch
- Governs the long-term sustainability of Cardano
- The reserves are gradually depleted until no rewards are supplied
ME-01 (y) monetaryExpansionmust not exceed 0.005
ME-02 (y) monetaryExpansion must not be lower than 0.001
ME-03 (y) monetaryExpansion* must not'**be negative
ME-04 (x - "should") monetaryExpansion should not be varied by more than +/- 10% in any 73-epoch period (approximately 12 months)
ME-05 (x- "should") monetaryExpansion should not be changed more than once in any 36-epoch period (approximately 6 months)
Define the fees for executing Plutus scripts
Gives an economic return for Plutus script execution
Provides security against low-cost DoS attacks
EIUP-PS-01 (y) executionUnitPrices[priceSteps] must not exceed 2,000/10,000,000
EIUP-PS-02 (y) executionUnitPrices[priceSteps] must not be lower than 500/10,000,000
EIUP-PM-01 (y) executionUnitPrices[priceMemory] must not exceed 2,000/10,000
EIUP-PM-02 (y) executionUnitPrices[priceMemory] must not be lower than 400 / 10,000.
EIUP-GEN-01 (x - "similar to") The execution prices must be set so that:
i) the cost of executing a transaction with maximum CPU steps is similar to the cost of a maximum sized non-script transaction and
ii) the cost of executing a transaction with maximum memory units is similar to the cost of a maximum sized non-script transaction
EIUP-GEN-02 (x - "should") The execution prices should be adjusted whenever transaction fees are adjusted (txFeeFixed/txFeePerByte). The goal is to ensure that the processing delay is similar for "full" transactions, regardless of their type.
- This helps ensure that the requirements on block diffusion/propagation times are met.
Defines the cost for using Plutus reference scripts in Lovelace
MFRS-01 (y) minFeeRefScriptCoinsPerByte must not exceed 1,000 (0.001 ada).
- This ensures that transactions can be paid for
MFRS-02 (y) minFeeRefScriptCoinsPerByte must not be negative
MFRS-03 (x - "should") To maintain a consistent level of protection against denial-of-service attacks, minFeeRefScriptCoinsPerByte should be adjusted whenever Plutus Execution prices are adjusted (executionUnitPrices[steps/memory]) and whenever txFeeFixed is adjusted
MFRS-04 (x - unquantifiable) Any changes to minFeeRefScriptCoinsPerByte' must consider the implications of reducing the cost of a denial-of-service attack or increasing the maximum transaction fee
The overall goals when managing the Cardano Blockchain network parameters are to:
- Match the available Cardano Blockchain Layer 1 network capacity to current or future traffic demands, including payment transactions, layer 1 DApps, sidechain management and governance needs
- Balance traffic demands for different user groups, including payment transactions,minters of Fungible/Non-Fungible Tokens, Plutus scripts, DeFi developers, Stake Pool Operators and voting transactions
Changes to network parameters may be triggered by:
- Measured changes in traffic demands over a 2-epoch period (10 days)
- Anticipated changes in traffic demands
- Community requests
Changes may need to be reversed and/or should not be enacted in the event of:
- Excessive block propagation delays
- Stake pools being unable to handle traffic volume
- Scripts being unable to complete execution
All decisions on parameter changes should be informed by:
- Block propagation delay profile
- Traffic volume (block size over time)
- Script volume (size of scripts and execution units)
- Script execution cost benchmarks
- Block propagation delay/diffusion benchmarks
Detailed benchmarking results are required to confirm the effect of any changes on mainnet performance or behavior prior to enactment. The effects of different transaction mixes must be analyzed, including normal transactions, Plutus scripts, and governance actions.
NETWORK-01 (x - "should") No individual network parameter should change more than once per two epochs
NETWORK-02 (x - "should") Only one network parameter should be changed per epoch unless they are directly correlated, e.g., per-transaction and per-block memory unit limits
Changes to Specific Network Parameters
The maximum size of a block,in Bytes.
MBBS-01 (y) maxBlockBodySize *must not exceed 122,880 Bytes (120KB)
MBBS-02 (y) maxBlockBodySize must not be lower than 24,576 Bytes (24KB)
MBBS-03a (x-"exceptional circumstances") maxBlockBodySize must not be decreased, other than in exceptional circumstances where there are potential problems with security, performance, functionality or long-term sustainability
MBBS-04 (~ no access to existing parameter values) maxBlockBodySize must be large enough to include at least one transaction (that is, maxBlockBodySize must be at least maxTxSize)
MBBS-05 (x- "should") maxBlockBodySize should be changed by at most 10,240 Bytes (10KB) per epoch (5 days), and preferably by 8,192 Bytes (8KB) or less per epoch
MBBS-06 (x - "should") The block size should not induce an additional Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) round trip. Any increase beyond this must be backed by performance analysis, simulation, and benchmarking.
MBBS-07 (x - "unquantifiable") The impact of any change to maxBlockBodySize must be confirmed by detailed benchmarking/simulation and not exceed the requirements of the block diffusion/propagation time budgets, as described below. Any increase to maxBlockBodySize must also consider future requirements for Plutus script execution (maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps]) against the total block diffusion target of 3s with 95% block propagation within 5s. The limit on maximum block size may be increased in the future if this is supported by benchmarking and monitoring results.
The maximum size of a transaction, in Bytes.
MTS-01 (y) maxTxSize must not exceed 32,768 Bytes (32KB)
MTS-02 (y) maxTxSize must not be negative
MTS-03 (~-no access to existing parameter values) maxTxSize must not be decreased
MTS-04 (~-no access to existing parameter values) maxTxSize must not exceed maxBlockBodySize
MTS-05 (x - "should") maxTxSize should not be increased by more than 2,560 Bytes (2.5KB) in any epoch, and preferably should be increased by 2,048 Bytes (2KB) or less per epoch
MTS-06 (x - "should") maxTxSize should not exceed 1/4 of the block size
The limit on the maximum number of memory units that can be used by Plutus scripts, either per-transaction or per-block.
MTEU-M-01 (y) maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] must not exceed 40,000,000 units
MTEU-M-02 (y) maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] must not be negative
MTEU-M-03 (~ - no access to existing parameter values) maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] must not be decreased
MTEU-M-04 (x-"should") maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] should not be increased by more than 2,500,000 units in any epoch
MBEU-M-01 (y) maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] must not exceed 120,000,000 units
MBEU-M-02 (y) maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] must not be negative
MBEU-M-03 (x - "should") maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] should not be changed (increased or decreased) by more than 10,000,000 units in any epoch
MBEU-M-04a (x - unquantifiable) The impact of any change to maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] must be confirmed by detailed benchmarking/simulation and not exceed the requirements of the diffusion/propagation time budgets, as also impacted by maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps]. Any increase must also consider previously agreed future requirements for the total block size (maxBlockBodySize) measured against the total block diffusion target of 3s with 95% block propagation within 5s. Future Plutus performance improvements may allow the per-block limit to be increased, but must be balanced against the overall diffusion limits as specified in the previous sentence, and future requirements.
MEU-M-01 (~ - no access to existing parameter values) maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] must not be less than maxTxExecutionUnits[memory]
The limit on the maximum number of CPU steps that can be used by Plutus scripts, either per transaction or per-block.
MTEU-S-01 (y) maxTxExecutionUnits[steps] must not exceed 15,000,000,000(15Bn)units
MTEU-S-02 (y) maxTxExecutionUnits[steps] must not be negative
MTEU-S-03 (~- no access to existing parameter values) maxTxExecutionUnits[steps] must not be decreased
MTEU-S-04 (x-"should") maxTxExecutionUnits[steps] should not be increased by more than 500,000,000 (500M) units in any epoch(5 days)
MBEU-S-01 (y) maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps] must not exceed 40,000,000,000(40Bn) units
MBEU-S-02 (y) maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps] must not be negative
MBEU-S-03 (x -"should") maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps] should not be changed (increased or decreased) by more than 2,000,000,000 (2Bn) units in any epoch (5 days)
MBEU-S-04a (x-unquantifiable) The impact of the change to maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps] 1 must be confirmed by detailed benchmarking/simulation and not exceed the requirements of the block diffusion/propagation time budgets, as also impacted by maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] and maxBlockBodySize.Any increase must also consider previously identified future requirements for the total block size (maxBlockBodySize) measured against the total block diffusion target of 3s with 95% block propagation within 5s. Future Plutus performance improvements may allow the per-block step limit to be increased,but must be balanced against the overall diffusion limits as specified in the previous sentence, and future requirements
MEU-S-01 (~-no access to existing parameter values) maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps] must not be less than maxTxExecutionUnits[steps]
The size of the block header.
MBHS-01 (y) maxBlockHeaderSize must not exceed 5,000 Bytes
MBHS-02 (y) maxBlockHeaderSize must not be negative
MBHS-03 (x - "largest valid header" is subject to change) maxBlockHeaderSize must be large enough for the largest valid header.
MBHS-04 (x - "should") maxBlockHeaderSize should only normally be increased if the protocol changes
MBHS-05 (x - "should") maxBlockHeaderSize should be within TCP's initial congestion window (3 or 10 MTUs)
The overall goals when managing the technical/security parameters are:
- Ensure the security of the Cardano network in terms of decentralization, protection against Sybil and 51% attacks and protection against denial of service attacks
- Enable changes to the Plutus language
- Changes in the number of active SPOs
- Changes to the Plutus language
- Security threats
- Community requests
- Economic concerns, e.g. when changing the number of stake pools
- Number of stake pools
- Level of decentralization
Sets the target number of stake pools
- The expected number of pools when the network is in the equilibrium state
- Primarily a security parameter, ensuring decentralization by pool division/replication
- Has an economic effect as well as a security affect-economic advice is also required when changing this parameter
- Large changes in this parameter will trigger mass redelegation events
SPTN-01 (y) stakePoolTargetNum must not be lower than 250
SPTN-02 (y) stakePoolTargetNum must not exceed 2,000
SPTN-03 (y) stakePoolTargetNum must not be negative
SPTN-04 (y) stakePoolTargetNum must not be zero
Enables the pledge protection mechanism
- Provides protection against Sybil attack
- Higher values reward pools that have more pledge and penalize pools that have less pledge
- Has an economic effect as well as technical effect - economic advice is also required
PPI-01 (y) poolPledgeInfluence must not be lower than 0.1
PPI-02 (y) poolPledgeInfluence must not exceed 1.0
PPI-03 (y) poolPledgeInfluence must not be negative
PPI-04 (x-"should") poolPledgeInfluence should not vary by more than +/-10% in any 18-epoch period (approximately 3 months)
Defines the maximum number of epochs notice that a pool can give when planning to retire
PRME-01 (y) poolRetireMaxEpoch must not be negative
PRME-02 (x - "should") poolRetireMaxEpoch should not be lower than 1
Defines how much collateral must be provided when executing a Plutus script as a percentage of the normal execution cost
- Collateral is additional to fee payments
- If a script fails to execute, then the collateral is lost
- The collateral is never lost if a script executes successfully
Provides security against low-cost attacks by making it more expensive rather than less expensive to execute failed scripts
CP-01 (y) collateralPercentage must not be lower than 100
CP-02 (y) collateralPercentage must not exceed 200
CP-03 (y) collateralPercentage must not be negative
CP-04 (y) collateralPercentage must not be zero
Defines the maximum number of inputs that can be used for collateral when executing a Plutus script
MCI-01 (y) maxCollateralInputs must not be lower than 1
The limit on the serialized size of the Value in each output.
MVS-01 (y) max ValueSize must not exceed 12,288 Bytes (12KB)
MVS-02 (y) maxValueSize must not be negative
MVS-03 (~ -no access to existing parameter values) max ValueSize must be less than maxTxSize
MVS-04 (~ - no access to existing parameter values) maxValueSize must not be reduced
MVS-05 (x- "sensible output" is subject to interpretation) maxValueSize must be large enough to allow sensible outputs (e.g. any existing on-chain output or anticipated outputs that could be produced by new ledger rules)
Define the base costs for each Plutus primitive in terms of CPU and memory unit
A different cost model is required for each Plutus version. Each cost model comprises many distinct cost model values. Cost models are defined for each Plutus language version. A new language version may introduce additional cost model values or remove existing cost model values.
PCM-01 (x-unquantifiable) Cost model values must be set by benchmarking on a reference architecture
PCM-02 (x -primitives and language versions aren't introduced in transactions) The cost model must be updated if new primitives are introduced or a new Plutus language version is added
PCM-03a (~- no access to Plutus cost model parameters) Cost model values should not normally be negative. Negative values must be justified against the underlying cost model for the associated primitives
PCM-04 (~ -no access to Plutus cost model parameters) A cost model must be supplied for each Plutus language version that the protocol supports
The overall goals when managing the governance parameters are to:
- Ensure governance stability
- Maintain a representative form of governance
Changes to governance parameters may be triggered by:
- Community requests
- Regulatory requirements
- Unexpected or unwanted governance outcomes
- Entering a state of no confidence
Changes may need to be reversed and/or should not be enacted in the event of:
- Unexpected effects on governance
- Excessive Layer 1 load due to on-chain voting or excessive numbers of governance actions
All decisions on parameter changes should be informed by:
- Governance participation levels
- Governance behaviors and patterns
- Regulatory considerations
- Confidence in the governance system
- The effectiveness of the governance system in managing necessary change
Changes to Specific Governance Parameters
The deposit that is charged when submitting a governance action.
- Helps to limit the number of actions that are submitted
GD-01 (y) govDeposit must not be negative
GD-02 (y) govDeposit must not be lower than 1,000,000 (1 ada)
GD-03 (y) govDeposit must not exceed 10,000,000,000,000 (10 Million ada)
GD-04 (x - "should") govDeposit should be adjusted in line with fiat changes
The deposit that is charged when registering a DRep.
- Helps to limit the number of active DReps
DRD-01 (y) dRepDeposit must not be negative
DRD-02 (y) dRepDeposit must not be lower than 1,000,000 (1 ada)
DRD-03 (y) dRepDeposit must not exceed 100,000,000,000 (100,000 ada)
DRD-04 (x- "should") dRepDeposit should be adjusted in line with fiat changes
The period (as a whole number of epochs) after which a DRep is considered to be inactive for vote calculation purposes, if they do not vote on any proposal.
DRA-01 (y) dRepActivity must not be lower than 13 epochs (2 months)
DRA-02 (y) dRepActivity must not exceed 37 epochs (6 months)
DRA-03 (y) dRepActivity must not be negative
DRA-04 (~- no access to existing parameter values) dRepActivity must be greater than govActionLifetime
DRA-05 (x-"should") dRepActivity should be calculated in human terms (2 months etc)
Thresholds on the active voting stake that is required to ratify a specific type of governance action by either DReps or SPOs.
- Ensures legitimacy of the action
The threshold parameters are listed below:
dRepVotingThresholds:
- dvtCommitteeNoConfidence
- dvtCommitteeNormal
- dvtHardForkInitiation
- dvtMotionNoConfidence
- dvtPPEconomicGroup
- dvtPPGovGroup
- dvtPPNetworkGroup
- dvtPPTechnicalGroup
- dvtTreasuryWithdrawal
- dvtUpdateToConstitution
poolVotingThresholds:
- pvtCommitteeNoConfidence
- pvtCommitteeNormal
- pvtHardForkInitiation
- pvtMotionNoConfidence
- pvtPPSecurityGroup
VT-GEN-01 (y) All thresholds must be greater than 50% and less than or equal to 100%
VT-GEN-02 (y) Economic, network and technical parameter thresholds must be in the range 51%-75%
VT-GEN-03 (y) Governance parameter thresholds must be in the range 75%-90%
VT-HF-01 (y) Hard fork action thresholds must be in the range 51%-80%
VT-CON-01 (y) New Constitution or guardrails script action thresholds must be in the range 65%-90%
VT-CC-01 (y) Update Constitutional Committee action thresholds must be in the range 5%-90%
VT-NC-01(y) No confidence action thresholds must be in the range 51%-75%
The period after which a governance action will expire if it is not enacted - As a whole number of epochs
GAL-01 (y) govActionLifetime must not be lower than 1 epoch (5 days)
GAL-03 (x - "should") govActionLifetime should not be lower than 2 epochs (10 days)
GAL-02 (y) govActionLifetime must not exceed 15 epochs (75 days)
GAL-04 (x -"should") govActionLifetime should be calibrated in human terms (eg 30 days, two weeks), to allow sufficient time for voting etc. to take place
GAL-05 (~ - no access to existing parameter values) govActionLifetime must be less than dRepActivity
The limit on the maximum term length that a committee member may serve
CMTL-01a (y) committeeMaxTermLength must not be zero
CMTL-02a (y) committeeMaxTermLength must not be negative
CMTL-03a (y) committeeMaxTermLength must not be lower than 18 epochs (90 days, or approximately 3 months)
CMTL-04a (y) committeeMaxTermLength must not exceed 293 epochs (approximately 4 years)
CMTL-05a (x -"should") committeeMaxTermLength should not exceed 220 epochs (approximately 3 years)
The least number of members that can be included in a Constitutional Committee following a governance action to change the Constitutional Committee.
CMS-01 (y) committeeMinSize must not be negative
CMS-02 (y) committeeMinSize must not be lower than 3
CMS-03 (y) committeeMinSize must not exceed 10
All network parameter changes must be monitored carefully for no less than 2 epochs (10 days)
- Changes must be reverted as soon as possible if block propagation delays exceed 4.5s for more than 5% of blocks over any 6 hour rolling window
All other parameter changes should be monitored
- The reversion plan should be implemented if the overall effect on performance,security, functionality or long-term sustainability is unacceptable.
A specific reversion/recovery plan must be produced for each parameter change. This plan must include:
- Which parameters need to change and in which ways in order to return to the previous state (or a similar state)
- How to recover the network in the event of disastrous failure
This plan should be followed if problems are observed following the parameter change. Note that not all changes can be reverted. Additional care must be taken when making changes to these parameters.
Some fundamental protocol parameters cannot be changed by the Protocol Parameter Update governance action. These parameters can only be changed in a new Genesis file as part of a hard fork. It is not necessary to provide specific guardrails on updating these parameters.
Treasury withdrawal actions specify the destination and amount of a number of withdrawals from the Cardano treasury.
TREASURY-01a (x) A net change limit for the Cardano Treasury's balance per period of time must be agreed by the DReps via an on-chain governance action with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake
TREASURY-02 (x) The budget for the Cardano Treasury must not exceed the net change limit for the Cardano Treasury's balance per period of time
TREASURY-03 (x) The budget for the Cardano Treasury must be denominated in ada
TREASURY-04 (x) Treasury withdrawals must not be ratified until there is a community approved Cardano budget then in effect pursuant to a previous on-chain governance action agreed by the DReps with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake
The hard fork initiation action requires both a new major and a new minor protocol version to be specified.
- As positive integers
As the result of a hard fork, new updatable protocol parameters may be introduced. Guardrails may be defined for these parameters, which will take effect following the hard fork. Existing updatable protocol parameters may also be deprecated by the hard fork, in which case the guardrails become obsolete for all future changes.
HARDFORK-01 (~- no access to existing parameter values) The major protocol version must be the same as or one greater than the major version that will be enacted immediately prior to this change. If the major protocol version is one greater, then the minor protocol version must be zero
HARDFORK-02a (~- no access to existing parameter values) Unless the major protocol version is also changed, the minor protocol version must be greater than the minor version that will be enacted immediately prior to this change
HARDFORK-03(~-no access to existing parameter values) At least one of the protocol versions (major or minor or both) must change
HARDFORK-04 (x) At least 85% of stake pools by active stake should have upgraded to a Cardano node version that is capable of processing the rules associated with the new protocol version
HARDFORK-05 (x) Any new updatable protocol parameters that are introduced with a hard fork must be included in this Appendix and suitable guardrails defined for those parameters
HARDFORK-06 (x) Settings for any new protocol parameters that are introduced with a hard fork must be included in the appropriate Genesis file
HARDFORK-07 (x) Any deprecated protocol parameters must be indicated in this Appendix
HARDFORK-08 (~- no access to Plutus cost model parameters) New Plutus versions must be supported by a version-specific Plutus cost model that covers each primitive that is available in the new Plutus version
Update Constitutional Committee or Threshold governance actions may change the size,composition or required voting thresholds for the Constitutional Committee.
UPDATE-CC-01a (x) Update Constitutional Committee and/or threshold and/or term governance actions must not be ratified until ada holders have ratified through an on-chain governance action this Constitution
New constitution or guardrails script actions change the hash of the on-chain constitution and the associated guardrails script.
NEW-CONSTITUTION-01a (x) A New Constitution or Guardrails Script governance action must be submitted to define any required guardrails for new parameters that are introduced via a Hard Fork governance action
NEW-CONSTITUTION-02(x) If specified, the new guardrails script must be consistent with this Constitution
No confidence actions signal a state of no confidence in the governance system. No guardrails are imposed on No Confidence actions.
- None
Info actions are not enacted on-chain. No guardrails are imposed on Info actions.
- None
The protocol parameters are grouped by type, allowing different thresholds to be set for each group.
The network group consists of:
- maximum block body size (maxBlockBodySize)
- maximum transaction size(maxTxSize)
- maximum block header size (maxBlockHeaderSize)
- maximum size of a serialized asset value (maxValueSize)
- maximum script execution units in a single transaction (maxTxExecutionUnits[steps])
- maximum script execution units in a single block (maxBlockExecutionUnits[steps])
- maximum number of collateral inputs (maxCollateralInputs)
The economic group consists of:
- minimum fee coefficient (txFeePerByte)
- minimum fee constant (txFeeFixed)
- minimum fee per byte for reference scripts (minFeeRefScriptCoinsPerByte)
- delegation key Lovelace deposit (stakeAddressDeposit)
- pool registration Lovelace deposit(stakePoolDeposit)
- monetary expansion(monetaryExpansion)
- treasury expansion (treasuryCut)
- minimum fixed rewards cut for pools (minPoolCost)
- minimum Lovelace deposit per byte of serialized UTxO (coinsPerUTxOByte)
- rices of Plutus execution units (executionUnitPrices[priceSteps/priceMemory])
The technical group consists of:
- pool pledge influence(poolPledgeInfluence)
- pool retirement maximum epoch (poolRetireMaxEpoch)
- desired number of pools (stakePoolTargetNum)
- Plutus execution cost models (costModels)
- proportion of collateral needed for scripts (collateralPercentage)
The governance group consists of:
- governance voting thresholds (dRepVotingThresholds[...], poolVotingThresholds[...])
- governance action maximum lifetime in epochs (govActionLifetime)
- governance action deposit (govActionDeposit)
- DRep deposit amount (dRepDeposit)
- DRep activity period in epochs (dRepActivity)
- minimal constitutional committee size (committeeMinSize)
- maximum term length (in epochs) for the constitutional committee members (committeeMaxTermLength)