diff --git a/.github/.gitleaks.toml b/.github/.gitleaks.toml index 024b8ce511..cec03cc5c3 100644 --- a/.github/.gitleaks.toml +++ b/.github/.gitleaks.toml @@ -536,11 +536,10 @@ secretGroup = 4 [allowlist] description = "global allow lists" -regexes = ['''219-09-9999''', '''078-05-1120''', '''(9[0-9]{2}|666)-\d{2}-\d{4}''', '''RPM-GPG-KEY.*'''] +regexes = ['''219-09-9999''', '''078-05-1120''', '''(9[0-9]{2}|666)-\d{2}-\d{4}''', '''RPM-GPG-KEY.*''', '''.*:.*StrelkaHexDump.*''', '''.*:.*PLACEHOLDER.*'''] paths = [ '''gitleaks.toml''', '''(.*?)(jpg|gif|doc|pdf|bin|svg|socket)$''', '''(go.mod|go.sum)$''', - '''salt/nginx/files/enterprise-attack.json''' ] diff --git a/DOWNLOAD_AND_VERIFY_ISO.md b/DOWNLOAD_AND_VERIFY_ISO.md index 16641e4cb9..a23d88d4dc 100644 --- a/DOWNLOAD_AND_VERIFY_ISO.md +++ b/DOWNLOAD_AND_VERIFY_ISO.md @@ -1,17 +1,17 @@ -### 2.4.40-20240116 ISO image released on 2024/01/17 +### 2.4.50-20240220 ISO image released on 2024/02/20 ### Download and Verify -2.4.40-20240116 ISO image: -https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-2.4.40-20240116.iso +2.4.50-20240220 ISO image: +https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso -MD5: AC55D027B663F3CE0878FEBDAD9DD78B -SHA1: C2B51723B17F3DC843CC493EB80E93B123E3A3E1 -SHA256: C5F135FCF45A836BBFF58C231F95E1EA0CD894898322187AD5FBFCD24BC2F123 +MD5: BCA6476EF1BF79773D8EFB11700FDE8E +SHA1: 9FF0A304AA368BCD2EF2BE89AD47E65650241927 +SHA256: 49D7695EFFF6F3C4840079BF564F3191B585639816ADE98672A38017F25E9570 Signature for ISO image: -https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/2.4/main/sigs/securityonion-2.4.40-20240116.iso.sig +https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/2.4/main/sigs/securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso.sig Signing key: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/2.4/main/KEYS @@ -25,22 +25,22 @@ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/2. Download the signature file for the ISO: ``` -wget https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/2.4/main/sigs/securityonion-2.4.40-20240116.iso.sig +wget https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/2.4/main/sigs/securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso.sig ``` Download the ISO image: ``` -wget https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-2.4.40-20240116.iso +wget https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso ``` Verify the downloaded ISO image using the signature file: ``` -gpg --verify securityonion-2.4.40-20240116.iso.sig securityonion-2.4.40-20240116.iso +gpg --verify securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso.sig securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso ``` The output should show "Good signature" and the Primary key fingerprint should match what's shown below: ``` -gpg: Signature made Tue 16 Jan 2024 07:34:40 PM EST using RSA key ID FE507013 +gpg: Signature made Fri 16 Feb 2024 11:36:25 AM EST using RSA key ID FE507013 gpg: Good signature from "Security Onion Solutions, LLC " gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION index 29630cd6d5..9cf89c6c7a 100644 --- a/VERSION +++ b/VERSION @@ -1 +1 @@ -2.4.40 +2.4.50 diff --git a/files/salt/master/master b/files/salt/master/master index b93fa93ded..2333a50aa1 100644 --- a/files/salt/master/master +++ b/files/salt/master/master @@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ file_roots: base: - /opt/so/saltstack/local/salt - /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt - + - /nsm/elastic-fleet/artifacts + - /opt/so/rules/nids # The master_roots setting configures a master-only copy of the file_roots dictionary, # used by the state compiler. diff --git a/pillar/top.sls b/pillar/top.sls index ed3e492543..9af62aa0b2 100644 --- a/pillar/top.sls +++ b/pillar/top.sls @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ base: - soctopus.adv_soctopus - minions.{{ grains.id }} - minions.adv_{{ grains.id }} + - stig.soc_stig '*_sensor': - healthcheck.sensor @@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ base: - suricata.adv_suricata - minions.{{ grains.id }} - minions.adv_{{ grains.id }} + - stig.soc_stig + - soc.license '*_eval': - secrets @@ -180,6 +183,7 @@ base: - suricata.adv_suricata - minions.{{ grains.id }} - minions.adv_{{ grains.id }} + - stig.soc_stig '*_heavynode': - elasticsearch.auth @@ -222,6 +226,8 @@ base: - redis.adv_redis - minions.{{ grains.id }} - minions.adv_{{ grains.id }} + - stig.soc_stig + - soc.license '*_receiver': - logstash.nodes diff --git a/salt/allowed_states.map.jinja b/salt/allowed_states.map.jinja index 6585bd96c2..3ead8b26e0 100644 --- a/salt/allowed_states.map.jinja +++ b/salt/allowed_states.map.jinja @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ 'utility', 'schedule', 'soctopus', - 'docker_clean' + 'docker_clean', + 'stig' ], 'so-managersearch': [ 'salt.master', @@ -123,7 +124,8 @@ 'utility', 'schedule', 'soctopus', - 'docker_clean' + 'docker_clean', + 'stig' ], 'so-searchnode': [ 'ssl', @@ -131,7 +133,8 @@ 'telegraf', 'firewall', 'schedule', - 'docker_clean' + 'docker_clean', + 'stig' ], 'so-standalone': [ 'salt.master', @@ -156,7 +159,8 @@ 'schedule', 'soctopus', 'tcpreplay', - 'docker_clean' + 'docker_clean', + 'stig' ], 'so-sensor': [ 'ssl', @@ -168,13 +172,15 @@ 'healthcheck', 'schedule', 'tcpreplay', - 'docker_clean' + 'docker_clean', + 'stig' ], 'so-fleet': [ 'ssl', 'telegraf', 'firewall', 'logstash', + 'nginx', 'healthcheck', 'schedule', 'elasticfleet', diff --git a/salt/common/init.sls b/salt/common/init.sls index 5f13c3893c..51836daf60 100644 --- a/salt/common/init.sls +++ b/salt/common/init.sls @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ {% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %} include: - - common.soup_scripts - common.packages {% if GLOBALS.role in GLOBALS.manager_roles %} - manager.elasticsearch # needed for elastic_curl_config state @@ -134,6 +133,18 @@ common_sbin_jinja: - file_mode: 755 - template: jinja +{% if not GLOBALS.is_manager%} +# prior to 2.4.50 these scripts were in common/tools/sbin on the manager because of soup and distributed to non managers +# these two states remove the scripts from non manager nodes +remove_soup: + file.absent: + - name: /usr/sbin/soup + +remove_so-firewall: + file.absent: + - name: /usr/sbin/so-firewall +{% endif %} + so-status_script: file.managed: - name: /usr/sbin/so-status diff --git a/salt/common/soup_scripts.sls b/salt/common/soup_scripts.sls index 041649200f..fd32b8a286 100644 --- a/salt/common/soup_scripts.sls +++ b/salt/common/soup_scripts.sls @@ -1,23 +1,70 @@ -# Sync some Utilities -soup_scripts: - file.recurse: - - name: /usr/sbin - - user: root - - group: root - - file_mode: 755 - - source: salt://common/tools/sbin - - include_pat: - - so-common - - so-image-common - -soup_manager_scripts: - file.recurse: - - name: /usr/sbin - - user: root - - group: root - - file_mode: 755 - - source: salt://manager/tools/sbin - - include_pat: - - so-firewall - - so-repo-sync - - soup +{% import_yaml '/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/global/soc_global.sls' as SOC_GLOBAL %} +{% if SOC_GLOBAL.global.airgap %} +{% set UPDATE_DIR='/tmp/soagupdate/SecurityOnion' %} +{% else %} +{% set UPDATE_DIR='/tmp/sogh/securityonion' %} +{% endif %} + +remove_common_soup: + file.absent: + - name: /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/common/tools/sbin/soup + +remove_common_so-firewall: + file.absent: + - name: /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-firewall + +copy_so-common_common_tools_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common + - force: True + - preserve: True + +copy_so-image-common_common_tools_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-image-common + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-image-common + - force: True + - preserve: True + +copy_soup_manager_tools_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup + - force: True + - preserve: True + +copy_so-firewall_manager_tools_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-firewall + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-firewall + - force: True + - preserve: True + +copy_so-common_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /usr/sbin/so-common + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common + - force: True + - preserve: True + +copy_so-image-common_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /usr/sbin/so-image-common + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-image-common + - force: True + - preserve: True + +copy_soup_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /usr/sbin/soup + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup + - force: True + - preserve: True + +copy_so-firewall_sbin: + file.copy: + - name: /usr/sbin/so-firewall + - source: {{UPDATE_DIR}}/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-firewall + - force: True + - preserve: True diff --git a/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common b/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common index e09d2c8aec..37adcef994 100755 --- a/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common +++ b/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common @@ -366,6 +366,13 @@ is_feature_enabled() { return 1 } +read_feat() { + if [ -f /opt/so/log/sostatus/lks_enabled ]; then + lic_id=$(cat /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/license.sls | grep license_id: | awk '{print $2}') + echo "$lic_id/$(cat /opt/so/log/sostatus/lks_enabled)/$(cat /opt/so/log/sostatus/fps_enabled)" + fi +} + require_manager() { if is_manager_node; then echo "This is a manager, so we can proceed." @@ -559,6 +566,14 @@ status () { printf "\n=========================================================================\n$(date) | $1\n=========================================================================\n" } +sync_options() { + set_version + set_os + salt_minion_count + + echo "$VERSION/$OS/$(uname -r)/$MINIONCOUNT/$(read_feat)" +} + systemctl_func() { local action=$1 local echo_action=$1 diff --git a/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common-status-check b/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common-status-check index 1e8382a0b4..d713ba6c60 100644 --- a/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common-status-check +++ b/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common-status-check @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import sys import subprocess import os +import json sys.path.append('/opt/saltstack/salt/lib/python3.10/site-packages/') import salt.config @@ -36,17 +37,63 @@ def check_needs_restarted(): with open(outfile, 'w') as f: f.write(val) +def check_for_fps(): + feat = 'fps' + feat_full = feat.replace('ps', 'ips') + fps = 0 + try: + result = subprocess.run([feat_full + '-mode-setup', '--is-enabled'], stdout=subprocess.PIPE) + if result.returncode == 0: + fps = 1 + except FileNotFoundError: + fn = '/proc/sys/crypto/' + feat_full + '_enabled' + with open(fn, 'r') as f: + contents = f.read() + if '1' in contents: + fps = 1 + + with open('/opt/so/log/sostatus/lks_enabled', 'w') as f: + f.write(str(fps)) + +def check_for_lks(): + feat = 'Lks' + feat_full = feat.replace('ks', 'uks') + lks = 0 + result = subprocess.run(['lsblk', '-p', '-J'], check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE) + data = json.loads(result.stdout) + for device in data['blockdevices']: + if 'children' in device: + for gc in device['children']: + if 'children' in gc: + try: + arg = 'is' + feat_full + result = subprocess.run(['cryptsetup', arg, gc['name']], stdout=subprocess.PIPE) + if result.returncode == 0: + lks = 1 + except FileNotFoundError: + for ggc in gc['children']: + if 'crypt' in ggc['type']: + lks = 1 + if lks: + break + with open('/opt/so/log/sostatus/fps_enabled', 'w') as f: + f.write(str(lks)) + def fail(msg): print(msg, file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(1) - def main(): proc = subprocess.run(['id', '-u'], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, encoding="utf-8") if proc.stdout.strip() != "0": fail("This program must be run as root") - + # Ensure that umask is 0022 so that files created by this script have rw-r-r permissions + org_umask = os.umask(0o022) check_needs_restarted() + check_for_fps() + check_for_lks() + # Restore umask to whatever value was set before this script was run. SXIG sets to 0077 rw--- + os.umask(org_umask) if __name__ == "__main__": main() diff --git a/salt/desktop/packages.sls b/salt/desktop/packages.sls index 9a7d533173..b2a028e602 100644 --- a/salt/desktop/packages.sls +++ b/salt/desktop/packages.sls @@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ desktop_packages: - pulseaudio-libs - pulseaudio-libs-glib2 - pulseaudio-utils + - putty - sane-airscan - sane-backends - sane-backends-drivers-cameras diff --git a/salt/docker/defaults.yaml b/salt/docker/defaults.yaml index 9a27843ae1..4bc212fbed 100644 --- a/salt/docker/defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/docker/defaults.yaml @@ -84,6 +84,13 @@ docker: custom_bind_mounts: [] extra_hosts: [] extra_env: [] + 'so-nginx-fleet-node': + final_octet: 31 + port_bindings: + - 8443:8443 + custom_bind_mounts: [] + extra_hosts: [] + extra_env: [] 'so-playbook': final_octet: 32 port_bindings: diff --git a/salt/docker/soc_docker.yaml b/salt/docker/soc_docker.yaml index 850324a9e8..6e0efeb20a 100644 --- a/salt/docker/soc_docker.yaml +++ b/salt/docker/soc_docker.yaml @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ docker: so-logstash: *dockerOptions so-mysql: *dockerOptions so-nginx: *dockerOptions + so-nginx-fleet-node: *dockerOptions so-playbook: *dockerOptions so-redis: *dockerOptions so-sensoroni: *dockerOptions diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/defaults.yaml b/salt/elasticfleet/defaults.yaml index f42a3f4fcb..e4f54ceb0e 100644 --- a/salt/elasticfleet/defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/defaults.yaml @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ elasticfleet: - cisco_ise - cisco_meraki - cisco_umbrella + - citrix_adc + - citrix_waf - cloudflare - crowdstrike - darktrace @@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ elasticfleet: - mimecast - mysql - netflow + - nginx - o365 - okta - osquery_manager @@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ elasticfleet: - udp - vsphere - windows + - winlog - zscaler_zia - zscaler_zpa - 1password diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/enabled.sls b/salt/elasticfleet/enabled.sls index fef85d24cc..50290bf097 100644 --- a/salt/elasticfleet/enabled.sls +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/enabled.sls @@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ include: - elasticfleet.sostatus - ssl +# Wait for Elasticsearch to be ready - no reason to try running Elastic Fleet server if ES is not ready +wait_for_elasticsearch_elasticfleet: + cmd.run: + - name: so-elasticsearch-wait + # If enabled, automatically update Fleet Logstash Outputs {% if ELASTICFLEETMERGED.config.server.enable_auto_configuration and grains.role not in ['so-import', 'so-eval', 'so-fleet'] %} so-elastic-fleet-auto-configure-logstash-outputs: @@ -33,12 +38,26 @@ so-elastic-fleet-auto-configure-server-urls: - retry: True {% endif %} -# Automatically update Fleet Server Elasticsearch URLs +# Automatically update Fleet Server Elasticsearch URLs & Agent Artifact URLs {% if grains.role not in ['so-fleet'] %} so-elastic-fleet-auto-configure-elasticsearch-urls: cmd.run: - name: /usr/sbin/so-elastic-fleet-es-url-update - retry: True + +so-elastic-fleet-auto-configure-artifact-urls: + cmd.run: + - name: /usr/sbin/so-elastic-fleet-artifacts-url-update + - retry: True + +{% endif %} + +# Sync Elastic Agent artifacts to Fleet Node +{% if grains.role in ['so-fleet'] %} +elasticagent_syncartifacts: + file.recurse: + - name: /nsm/elastic-fleet/artifacts/beats + - source: salt://beats {% endif %} {% if SERVICETOKEN != '' %} diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/files/integrations/grid-nodes_general/rita-logs.json b/salt/elasticfleet/files/integrations/grid-nodes_general/rita-logs.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a97faaa5fa --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/files/integrations/grid-nodes_general/rita-logs.json @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +{ + "package": { + "name": "log", + "version": "" + }, + "name": "rita-logs", + "namespace": "so", + "description": "RITA Logs", + "policy_id": "so-grid-nodes_general", + "vars": {}, + "inputs": { + "logs-logfile": { + "enabled": true, + "streams": { + "log.logs": { + "enabled": true, + "vars": { + "paths": [ + "/nsm/rita/beacons.csv", + "/nsm/rita/exploded-dns.csv", + "/nsm/rita/long-connections.csv" + ], + "exclude_files": [], + "ignore_older": "72h", + "data_stream.dataset": "rita", + "tags": [], + "processors": "- dissect:\n tokenizer: \"/nsm/rita/%{pipeline}.csv\"\n field: \"log.file.path\"\n trim_chars: \".csv\"\n target_prefix: \"\"\n- script:\n lang: javascript\n source: >\n function process(event) {\n var pl = event.Get(\"pipeline\").split(\"-\");\n if (pl.length > 1) {\n pl = pl[1];\n }\n else {\n pl = pl[0];\n }\n event.Put(\"@metadata.pipeline\", \"rita.\" + pl);\n }\n- add_fields:\n target: event\n fields:\n category: network\n module: rita", + "custom": "exclude_lines: ['^Score', '^Source', '^Domain', '^No results']" + } + } + } + } + } +} diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-agent-grid-upgrade b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-agent-grid-upgrade index b1ca8c4768..b911f58963 100644 --- a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-agent-grid-upgrade +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-agent-grid-upgrade @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/bash + # Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one # or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0; you may not use # this file except in compliance with the Elastic License 2.0. diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-artifacts-url-update b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-artifacts-url-update new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7215256681 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-artifacts-url-update @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one +# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0; you may not use +# this file except in compliance with the Elastic License 2.0. +{% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %} + +. /usr/sbin/so-common + +# Only run on Managers +if ! is_manager_node; then + printf "Not a Manager Node... Exiting" + exit 0 +fi + +# Function to check if an array contains a value +array_contains () { + local array="$1[@]" + local seeking=$2 + local in=1 + for element in "${!array}"; do + if [[ $element == "$seeking" ]]; then + in=0 + break + fi + done + return $in +} + +# Query for the current Grid Nodes that are running Logstash (which includes Fleet Nodes) +LOGSTASHNODES='{{ salt['pillar.get']('logstash:nodes', {}) | tojson }}' + +# Initialize an array for new hosts from Fleet Nodes +declare -a NEW_LIST=() + +# Query for Fleet Nodes & add them to the list (Hostname) +if grep -q "fleet" <<< "$LOGSTASHNODES"; then + readarray -t FLEETNODES < <(jq -r '.fleet | keys_unsorted[]' <<< "$LOGSTASHNODES") + for NODE in "${FLEETNODES[@]}"; do + URL="http://$NODE:8443/artifacts/" + NAME="FleetServer_$NODE" + NEW_LIST+=("$URL=$NAME") + done +fi + +# Create an array for expected hosts and their names +declare -A expected_urls=( + ["http://{{ GLOBALS.url_base }}:8443/artifacts/"]="FleetServer_{{ GLOBALS.hostname }}" + ["https://artifacts.elastic.co/downloads/"]="Elastic Artifacts" +) + +# Merge NEW_LIST into expected_urls +for entry in "${NEW_LIST[@]}"; do + # Extract URL and Name from each entry + IFS='=' read -r URL NAME <<< "$entry" + # Add to expected_urls, automatically handling URL as key and NAME as value + expected_urls["$URL"]="$NAME" +done + +# Fetch the current hosts from the API +current_urls=$(curl -K /opt/so/conf/elasticsearch/curl.config 'http://localhost:5601/api/fleet/agent_download_sources' | jq -r .items[].host) + +# Convert current hosts to an array +IFS=$'\n' read -rd '' -a current_urls_array <<<"$current_urls" + +# Flag to track if any host was added +any_url_added=0 + +# Check each expected host +for host in "${!expected_urls[@]}"; do + array_contains current_urls_array "$host" || { + echo "$host (${expected_urls[$host]}) is missing. Adding it..." + + # Prepare the JSON payload + JSON_STRING=$( jq -n \ + --arg NAME "${expected_urls[$host]}" \ + --arg URL "$host" \ + '{"name":$NAME,"host":$URL}' ) + + # Create the missing host + curl -K /opt/so/conf/elasticsearch/curl.config -L -X POST "localhost:5601/api/fleet/agent_download_sources" -H 'kbn-xsrf: true' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$JSON_STRING" + + # Flag that an artifact URL was added + any_url_added=1 + } + +done + + +if [[ $any_url_added -eq 0 ]]; then + echo "All expected artifact URLs are present. No updates needed." +fi diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-es-url-update b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-es-url-update index 5d5b7e7e09..3da6b3e784 100644 --- a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-es-url-update +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-es-url-update @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/bash + # Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one # or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0; you may not use # this file except in compliance with the Elastic License 2.0. diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-outputs-update b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-outputs-update index 23a2069219..eb5ccc1ed4 100644 --- a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-outputs-update +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-outputs-update @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/bash + # Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one # or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0; you may not use # this file except in compliance with the Elastic License 2.0. diff --git a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-urls-update b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-urls-update index 31c7becca3..5f7637cd38 100644 --- a/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-urls-update +++ b/salt/elasticfleet/tools/sbin_jinja/so-elastic-fleet-urls-update @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/bash + # Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one # or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0; you may not use # this file except in compliance with the Elastic License 2.0. diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/config.sls b/salt/elasticsearch/config.sls index 23e11a710d..27a8a0fd66 100644 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/config.sls +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/config.sls @@ -118,6 +118,19 @@ esingestconf: - user: 930 - group: 939 +# Auto-generate Elasticsearch ingest node pipelines from pillar +{% for pipeline, config in ELASTICSEARCHMERGED.pipelines.items() %} +es_ingest_conf_{{pipeline}}: + file.managed: + - name: /opt/so/conf/elasticsearch/ingest/{{ pipeline }} + - source: salt://elasticsearch/base-template.json.jinja + - defaults: + TEMPLATE_CONFIG: {{ config }} + - template: jinja + - onchanges_in: + - file: so-pipelines-reload +{% endfor %} + eslog4jfile: file.managed: - name: /opt/so/conf/elasticsearch/log4j2.properties diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/defaults.yaml b/salt/elasticsearch/defaults.yaml index 45b4b7d943..03cd6d5190 100644 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/defaults.yaml @@ -55,6 +55,87 @@ elasticsearch: key: /usr/share/elasticsearch/config/elasticsearch.key verification_mode: none enabled: false + pipelines: + custom001: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom001 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom002: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom002 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom003: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom003 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom004: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom004 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom005: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom005 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom006: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom006 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom007: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom007 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom008: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom008 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom009: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom009 + - pipeline: + name: common + custom010: + description: Custom Pipeline + processors: + - set: + field: tags + value: custom010 + - pipeline: + name: common index_settings: global_overrides: index_template: @@ -2537,6 +2618,270 @@ elasticsearch: set_priority: priority: 50 min_age: 30d + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_interface: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-citrix_adc.interface-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-citrix_adc.interface-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-citrix_adc.interface@package" + - "logs-citrix_adc.interface@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_lbvserver: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-citrix_adc.lbvserver-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-citrix_adc.lbvserver-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-citrix_adc.lbvserver@package" + - "logs-citrix_adc.lbvserver@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_service: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-citrix_adc.service-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-citrix_adc.service-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-citrix_adc.service@package" + - "logs-citrix_adc.service@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_system: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-citrix_adc.system-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-citrix_adc.system-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-citrix_adc.system@package" + - "logs-citrix_adc.system@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_vpn: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-citrix_adc.vpn-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-citrix_adc.vpn-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-citrix_adc.vpn@package" + - "logs-citrix_adc.vpn@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d + so-logs-citrix_waf_x_log: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-citrix_waf.log-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-citrix_waf.log-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-citrix_waf.log@package" + - "logs-citrix_waf.log@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d so-logs-cloudflare_x_audit: index_sorting: false index_template: @@ -3539,6 +3884,62 @@ elasticsearch: set_priority: priority: 50 min_age: 30d + so-logs-endpoint_x_diagnostic_x_collection: + index_sorting: false + index_template: + composed_of: + - event-mappings + - logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@custom + - logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@package + - so-fleet_globals-1 + - so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1 + data_stream: + allow_custom_routing: false + hidden: false + index_patterns: + - logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection-* + priority: 501 + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection-logs + mapping: + total_fields: + limit: 5000 + number_of_replicas: 0 + sort: + field: '@timestamp' + order: desc + policy: + _meta: + managed: true + managed_by: security_onion + package: + name: elastic_agent + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d so-logs-endpoint_x_events_x_api: index_sorting: false index_template: @@ -6659,6 +7060,138 @@ elasticsearch: set_priority: priority: 50 min_age: 30d + so-logs-nginx_x_access: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-nginx.access-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-nginx.access-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-nginx.access@package" + - "logs-nginx.access@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d + so-logs-nginx_x_error: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-nginx.error-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-nginx.error-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-nginx.error@package" + - "logs-nginx.error@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d + so-metrics-nginx_x_stubstatus: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "metrics-nginx.stubstatus-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-metrics-nginx.stubstatus-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "metrics-nginx.stubstatus@package" + - "metrics-nginx.stubstatus@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d so-logs-o365_x_audit: index_sorting: false index_template: @@ -8854,6 +9387,50 @@ elasticsearch: set_priority: priority: 50 min_age: 30d + so-logs-winlog_x_winlog: + index_sorting: False + index_template: + index_patterns: + - "logs-winlog.winlog-*" + template: + settings: + index: + lifecycle: + name: so-logs-winlog.winlog-logs + number_of_replicas: 0 + composed_of: + - "logs-winlog.winlog@package" + - "logs-winlog.winlog@custom" + - "so-fleet_globals-1" + - "so-fleet_agent_id_verification-1" + priority: 501 + data_stream: + hidden: false + allow_custom_routing: false + policy: + phases: + cold: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 0 + min_age: 30d + delete: + actions: + delete: {} + min_age: 365d + hot: + actions: + rollover: + max_age: 30d + max_primary_shard_size: 50gb + set_priority: + priority: 100 + min_age: 0ms + warm: + actions: + set_priority: + priority: 50 + min_age: 30d so-logs-zscaler_zia_x_alerts: index_sorting: false index_template: diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.beacon b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.beacons similarity index 100% rename from salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.beacon rename to salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.beacons diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.connection b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.connections similarity index 100% rename from salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.connection rename to salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/rita.connections diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/strelka.file b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/strelka.file index a74a7c6222..d55e193507 100644 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/strelka.file +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/strelka.file @@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ { "set": { "if": "ctx.scan?.pe?.image_version == '0'", "field": "scan.pe.image_version", "value": "0.0", "override": true } }, { "set": { "field": "observer.name", "value": "{{agent.name}}" }}, { "convert" : { "field" : "scan.exiftool","type": "string", "ignore_missing":true }}, - { "remove": { "field": ["host", "path", "message", "exiftool", "scan.yara.meta"], "ignore_missing": true } }, - { "pipeline": { "name": "common" } } + { "convert" : { "field" : "scan.pe.flags","type": "string", "ignore_missing":true }}, + { "remove": { "field": ["host", "path", "message", "exiftool", "scan.yara.meta"], "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "pipeline": { "name": "common" } } ] } diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.common b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.common index 6b6a03a607..6aec40a2b9 100644 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.common +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.common @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ { "json": { "field": "message", "target_field": "message2", "ignore_failure": true } }, { "rename": { "field": "message2.pkt_src", "target_field": "network.packet_source","ignore_failure": true } }, { "rename": { "field": "message2.proto", "target_field": "network.transport", "ignore_failure": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.in_iface", "target_field": "observer.ingress.interface.name", "ignore_failure": true } }, { "rename": { "field": "message2.flow_id", "target_field": "log.id.uid", "ignore_failure": true } }, { "rename": { "field": "message2.src_ip", "target_field": "source.ip", "ignore_failure": true } }, { "rename": { "field": "message2.src_port", "target_field": "source.port", "ignore_failure": true } }, @@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ { "rename": { "field": "message2.vlan", "target_field": "network.vlan.id", "ignore_failure": true } }, { "rename": { "field": "message2.community_id", "target_field": "network.community_id", "ignore_missing": true } }, { "rename": { "field": "message2.xff", "target_field": "xff.ip", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "lowercase": { "field": "network.transport", "ignore_failure": true } }, { "set": { "field": "event.dataset", "value": "{{ message2.event_type }}" } }, { "set": { "field": "observer.name", "value": "{{agent.name}}" } }, { "set": { "field": "event.ingested", "value": "{{@timestamp}}" } }, diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.ike b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.ike new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..890b99baf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.ike @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +{ + "description" : "suricata.ike", + "processors" : [ + { "rename": { "field": "message2.proto", "target_field": "network.transport", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.app_proto", "target_field": "network.protocol", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.alg_auth", "target_field": "ike.algorithm.authentication", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.alg_enc", "target_field": "ike.algorithm.encryption", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.alg_esn", "target_field": "ike.algorithm.esn", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.alg_dh", "target_field": "ike.algorithm.dh", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.alg_prf", "target_field": "ike.algorithm.prf", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.exchange_type", "target_field": "ike.exchange_type", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.payload", "target_field": "ike.payload", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.role", "target_field": "ike.role", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.init_spi", "target_field": "ike.spi.initiator", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.resp_spi", "target_field": "ike.spi.responder", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.version_major", "target_field": "ike.version.major", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.version_minor", "target_field": "ike.version.minor", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "rename": { "field": "message2.ike.ikev2.errors", "target_field": "ike.ikev2.errors", "ignore_missing": true } }, + { "pipeline": { "name": "common" } } + ] +} diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.ikev2 b/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.ikev2 deleted file mode 100644 index 1916f63691..0000000000 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/files/ingest/suricata.ikev2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -{ - "description" : "suricata.ikev2", - "processors" : [ - { "rename": { "field": "message2.proto", "target_field": "network.transport", "ignore_missing": true } }, - { "rename": { "field": "message2.app_proto", "target_field": "network.protocol", "ignore_missing": true } }, - { "pipeline": { "name": "common" } } - ] -} diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/soc_elasticsearch.yaml b/salt/elasticsearch/soc_elasticsearch.yaml index d66312a017..9a64190b35 100644 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/soc_elasticsearch.yaml +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/soc_elasticsearch.yaml @@ -45,6 +45,28 @@ elasticsearch: description: Max number of boolean clauses per query. global: True helpLink: elasticsearch.html + pipelines: + custom001: &pipelines + description: + description: Description of the ingest node pipeline + global: True + advanced: True + helpLink: elasticsearch.html + processors: + description: Processors for the ingest node pipeline + global: True + advanced: True + multiline: True + helpLink: elasticsearch.html + custom002: *pipelines + custom003: *pipelines + custom004: *pipelines + custom005: *pipelines + custom006: *pipelines + custom007: *pipelines + custom008: *pipelines + custom009: *pipelines + custom010: *pipelines index_settings: global_overrides: index_template: @@ -318,6 +340,7 @@ elasticsearch: so-logs-windows_x_powershell: *indexSettings so-logs-windows_x_powershell_operational: *indexSettings so-logs-windows_x_sysmon_operational: *indexSettings + so-logs-winlog_x_winlog: *indexSettings so-logs-apache_x_access: *indexSettings so-logs-apache_x_error: *indexSettings so-logs-auditd_x_log: *indexSettings @@ -346,6 +369,12 @@ elasticsearch: so-logs-cisco_ftd_x_log: *indexSettings so-logs-cisco_ios_x_log: *indexSettings so-logs-cisco_ise_x_log: *indexSettings + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_interface: *indexSettings + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_lbvserver: *indexSettings + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_service: *indexSettings + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_system: *indexSettings + so-logs-citrix_adc_x_vpn: *indexSettings + so-logs-citrix_waf_x_log: *indexSettings so-logs-cloudflare_x_audit: *indexSettings so-logs-cloudflare_x_logpull: *indexSettings so-logs-crowdstrike_x_falcon: *indexSettings @@ -406,6 +435,8 @@ elasticsearch: so-logs-mysql_x_error: *indexSettings so-logs-mysql_x_slowlog: *indexSettings so-logs-netflow_x_log: *indexSettings + so-logs-nginx_x_access: *indexSettings + so-logs-nginx_x_error: *indexSettings so-logs-o365_x_audit: *indexSettings so-logs-okta_x_system: *indexSettings so-logs-panw_x_panos: *indexSettings @@ -471,6 +502,7 @@ elasticsearch: so-metrics-endpoint_x_metadata: *indexSettings so-metrics-endpoint_x_metrics: *indexSettings so-metrics-endpoint_x_policy: *indexSettings + so-metrics-nginx_x_stubstatus: *indexSettings so-case: *indexSettings so-common: *indexSettings so-endgame: *indexSettings diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-elastic_agent@package.json b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-elastic_agent@package.json index 2390705f37..7bcc34de93 100644 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-elastic_agent@package.json +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-elastic_agent@package.json @@ -1,382 +1,383 @@ - {"template": { - "settings": { - "index": { - "lifecycle": { - "name": "logs" - }, - "codec": "best_compression", - "default_pipeline": "logs-elastic_agent-1.13.1", - "mapping": { - "total_fields": { - "limit": "10000" +{ + "template": { + "settings": { + "index": { + "lifecycle": { + "name": "logs" + }, + "codec": "best_compression", + "default_pipeline": "logs-elastic_agent-1.13.1", + "mapping": { + "total_fields": { + "limit": "10000" + } + }, + "query": { + "default_field": [ + "cloud.account.id", + "cloud.availability_zone", + "cloud.instance.id", + "cloud.instance.name", + "cloud.machine.type", + "cloud.provider", + "cloud.region", + "cloud.project.id", + "cloud.image.id", + "container.id", + "container.image.name", + "container.name", + "host.architecture", + "host.hostname", + "host.id", + "host.mac", + "host.name", + "host.os.family", + "host.os.kernel", + "host.os.name", + "host.os.platform", + "host.os.version", + "host.os.build", + "host.os.codename", + "host.type", + "ecs.version", + "agent.build.original", + "agent.ephemeral_id", + "agent.id", + "agent.name", + "agent.type", + "agent.version", + "log.level", + "message", + "elastic_agent.id", + "elastic_agent.process", + "elastic_agent.version", + "component.id", + "component.type", + "component.binary", + "component.state", + "component.old_state", + "unit.id", + "unit.type", + "unit.state", + "unit.old_state" + ] + } + } + }, + "mappings": { + "dynamic": false, + "dynamic_templates": [ + { + "container.labels": { + "path_match": "container.labels.*", + "mapping": { + "type": "keyword" + }, + "match_mapping_type": "string" + } + } + ], + "properties": { + "container": { + "properties": { + "image": { + "properties": { + "name": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } - }, - "query": { - "default_field": [ - "cloud.account.id", - "cloud.availability_zone", - "cloud.instance.id", - "cloud.instance.name", - "cloud.machine.type", - "cloud.provider", - "cloud.region", - "cloud.project.id", - "cloud.image.id", - "container.id", - "container.image.name", - "container.name", - "host.architecture", - "host.hostname", - "host.id", - "host.mac", - "host.name", - "host.os.family", - "host.os.kernel", - "host.os.name", - "host.os.platform", - "host.os.version", - "host.os.build", - "host.os.codename", - "host.type", - "ecs.version", - "agent.build.original", - "agent.ephemeral_id", - "agent.id", - "agent.name", - "agent.type", - "agent.version", - "log.level", - "message", - "elastic_agent.id", - "elastic_agent.process", - "elastic_agent.version", - "component.id", - "component.type", - "component.binary", - "component.state", - "component.old_state", - "unit.id", - "unit.type", - "unit.state", - "unit.old_state" - ] } + }, + "name": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } - }, - "mappings": { - "dynamic": false, - "dynamic_templates": [ - { - "container.labels": { - "path_match": "container.labels.*", - "mapping": { - "type": "keyword" - }, - "match_mapping_type": "string" + } + }, + "agent": { + "properties": { + "build": { + "properties": { + "original": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } } - ], - "properties": { - "container": { - "properties": { - "image": { - "properties": { - "name": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "name": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "agent": { - "properties": { - "build": { - "properties": { - "original": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "name": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "ephemeral_id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "type": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "version": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "log": { - "properties": { - "level": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "elastic_agent": { - "properties": { - "process": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "version": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "snapshot": { - "type": "boolean" - } - } - }, - "message": { - "type": "text" - }, - "cloud": { - "properties": { - "availability_zone": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "image": { - "properties": { - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "instance": { - "properties": { - "name": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "provider": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "machine": { - "properties": { - "type": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "project": { - "properties": { - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "region": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "account": { - "properties": { - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - } + }, + "name": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "ephemeral_id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "type": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "version": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + } + } + }, + "log": { + "properties": { + "level": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + } + } + }, + "elastic_agent": { + "properties": { + "process": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "version": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "snapshot": { + "type": "boolean" + } + } + }, + "message": { + "type": "text" + }, + "cloud": { + "properties": { + "availability_zone": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "image": { + "properties": { + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } - }, - "component": { - "properties": { - "binary": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "old_state": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "wildcard" - }, - "state": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "type": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } + } + }, + "instance": { + "properties": { + "name": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } - }, - "unit": { - "properties": { - "old_state": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "wildcard" - }, - "state": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "type": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } + } + }, + "provider": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "machine": { + "properties": { + "type": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } - }, - "@timestamp": { - "type": "date" - }, - "ecs": { - "properties": { - "version": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } + } + }, + "project": { + "properties": { + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } - }, - "data_stream": { - "properties": { - "namespace": { - "type": "constant_keyword" - }, - "type": { - "type": "constant_keyword" - }, - "dataset": { - "type": "constant_keyword" - } + } + }, + "region": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "account": { + "properties": { + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } - }, - "host": { - "properties": { - "hostname": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "os": { - "properties": { - "build": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "kernel": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "codename": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "name": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword", - "fields": { - "text": { - "type": "text" - } - } - }, - "family": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "version": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "platform": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } + } + } + } + }, + "component": { + "properties": { + "binary": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "old_state": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "wildcard" + }, + "state": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "type": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + } + } + }, + "unit": { + "properties": { + "old_state": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "wildcard" + }, + "state": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "type": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + } + } + }, + "@timestamp": { + "type": "date" + }, + "ecs": { + "properties": { + "version": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + } + } + }, + "data_stream": { + "properties": { + "namespace": { + "type": "constant_keyword" + }, + "type": { + "type": "constant_keyword" + }, + "dataset": { + "type": "constant_keyword" + } + } + }, + "host": { + "properties": { + "hostname": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "os": { + "properties": { + "build": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "kernel": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "codename": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "name": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword", + "fields": { + "text": { + "type": "text" } - }, - "domain": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "ip": { - "type": "ip" - }, - "containerized": { - "type": "boolean" - }, - "name": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "id": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "type": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "mac": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - }, - "architecture": { - "ignore_above": 1024, - "type": "keyword" - } - } - }, - "event": { - "properties": { - "dataset": { - "type": "constant_keyword" } + }, + "family": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "version": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "platform": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } } + }, + "domain": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "ip": { + "type": "ip" + }, + "containerized": { + "type": "boolean" + }, + "name": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "type": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "mac": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "architecture": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" } } }, - "_meta": { - "package": { - "name": "elastic_agent" - }, - "managed_by": "fleet", - "managed": true + "event": { + "properties": { + "dataset": { + "type": "constant_keyword" + } + } } } + } + }, + "_meta": { + "package": { + "name": "elastic_agent" + }, + "managed_by": "fleet", + "managed": true + } +} diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@custom.json b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@custom.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1bf9313a9f --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@custom.json @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +{ + "template": { + "settings": {} + }, + "_meta": { + "package": { + "name": "endpoint" + }, + "managed_by": "fleet", + "managed": true + } +} diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@package.json b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@package.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf60f2543b --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/elastic-agent/logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection@package.json @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +{ + "template": { + "settings": { + "index": { + "lifecycle": { + "name": "logs-endpoint.collection-diagnostic" + }, + "codec": "best_compression", + "default_pipeline": "logs-endpoint.diagnostic.collection-8.10.2", + "mapping": { + "total_fields": { + "limit": "10000" + }, + "ignore_malformed": "true" + }, + "query": { + "default_field": [ + "ecs.version", + "event.action", + "event.category", + "event.code", + "event.dataset", + "event.hash", + "event.id", + "event.kind", + "event.module", + "event.outcome", + "event.provider", + "event.type" + ] + } + } + }, + "mappings": { + "dynamic": false, + "properties": { + "@timestamp": { + "ignore_malformed": false, + "type": "date" + }, + "ecs": { + "properties": { + "version": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + } + } + }, + "data_stream": { + "properties": { + "namespace": { + "type": "constant_keyword" + }, + "type": { + "type": "constant_keyword" + }, + "dataset": { + "type": "constant_keyword" + } + } + }, + "event": { + "properties": { + "severity": { + "type": "long" + }, + "code": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "created": { + "type": "date" + }, + "kind": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "module": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "type": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "sequence": { + "type": "long" + }, + "ingested": { + "type": "date" + }, + "provider": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "action": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "id": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "category": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "dataset": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "hash": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + }, + "outcome": { + "ignore_above": 1024, + "type": "keyword" + } + } + } + } + } + }, + "_meta": { + "package": { + "name": "endpoint" + }, + "managed_by": "fleet", + "managed": true + } +} diff --git a/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/so/so-scan-mappings.json b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/so/so-scan-mappings.json index 008a6ab10c..2d11acba07 100644 --- a/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/so/so-scan-mappings.json +++ b/salt/elasticsearch/templates/component/so/so-scan-mappings.json @@ -14,16 +14,19 @@ }, "pe": { "properties": { - "sections": { + "flags": { + "type": "text" + }, + "image_version": { + "type": "float" + }, + "sections": { "properties": { "entropy": { "type": "float" } } - }, - "image_version": { - "type": "float" - } + } } }, "elf": { diff --git a/salt/firewall/containers.map.jinja b/salt/firewall/containers.map.jinja index 0ba2389e91..b3ead0f4c9 100644 --- a/salt/firewall/containers.map.jinja +++ b/salt/firewall/containers.map.jinja @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ {% set NODE_CONTAINERS = [ 'so-elastic-fleet', 'so-logstash', + 'so-nginx-fleet-node' ] %} {% elif GLOBALS.role == 'so-sensor' %} diff --git a/salt/idstools/enabled.sls b/salt/idstools/enabled.sls index decc5a5b2a..5e4c4c0669 100644 --- a/salt/idstools/enabled.sls +++ b/salt/idstools/enabled.sls @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ so-idstools: {% endif %} - binds: - /opt/so/conf/idstools/etc:/opt/so/idstools/etc:ro - - /opt/so/rules/nids:/opt/so/rules/nids:rw + - /opt/so/rules/nids/suri:/opt/so/rules/nids/suri:rw - /nsm/rules/:/nsm/rules/:rw {% if DOCKER.containers['so-idstools'].custom_bind_mounts %} {% for BIND in DOCKER.containers['so-idstools'].custom_bind_mounts %} diff --git a/salt/idstools/etc/rulecat.conf b/salt/idstools/etc/rulecat.conf index d6f3d93d80..f7c7844139 100644 --- a/salt/idstools/etc/rulecat.conf +++ b/salt/idstools/etc/rulecat.conf @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ {%- from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS -%} {%- from 'idstools/map.jinja' import IDSTOOLSMERGED -%} ---merged=/opt/so/rules/nids/all.rules ---local=/opt/so/rules/nids/local.rules +--merged=/opt/so/rules/nids/suri/all.rules +--local=/opt/so/rules/nids/suri/local.rules {%- if GLOBALS.md_engine == "SURICATA" %} ---local=/opt/so/rules/nids/extraction.rules ---local=/opt/so/rules/nids/filters.rules +--local=/opt/so/rules/nids/suri/extraction.rules +--local=/opt/so/rules/nids/suri/filters.rules {%- endif %} --url=http://{{ GLOBALS.manager }}:7788/suricata/emerging-all.rules --disable=/opt/so/idstools/etc/disable.conf diff --git a/salt/idstools/sync_files.sls b/salt/idstools/sync_files.sls index 64479e937d..cdacfaa74d 100644 --- a/salt/idstools/sync_files.sls +++ b/salt/idstools/sync_files.sls @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ idstoolsetcsync: rulesdir: file.directory: - - name: /opt/so/rules/nids + - name: /opt/so/rules/nids/suri - user: 939 - group: 939 - makedirs: True @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ rulesdir: # Don't show changes because all.rules can be large synclocalnidsrules: file.recurse: - - name: /opt/so/rules/nids/ + - name: /opt/so/rules/nids/suri/ - source: salt://idstools/rules/ - user: 939 - group: 939 diff --git a/salt/kratos/map.jinja b/salt/kratos/map.jinja index a603d813a9..89112a1f0b 100644 --- a/salt/kratos/map.jinja +++ b/salt/kratos/map.jinja @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ {% set KRATOSMERGED = salt['pillar.get']('kratos', default=KRATOSDEFAULTS.kratos, merge=true) %} -{% if KRATOSMERGED.oidc.enabled and 'oidc' in salt['pillar.get']('features') %} +{% if KRATOSMERGED.oidc.enabled and 'odc' in salt['pillar.get']('features') %} {% do KRATOSMERGED.config.selfservice.methods.update({'oidc': {'enabled': true, 'config': {'providers': [KRATOSMERGED.oidc.config]}}}) %} {% endif %} diff --git a/salt/logstash/config.sls b/salt/logstash/config.sls index 6ff33ff1ae..8a59c83b7e 100644 --- a/salt/logstash/config.sls +++ b/salt/logstash/config.sls @@ -63,6 +63,20 @@ lspipelinedir: - user: 931 - group: 939 +# Auto-generate Logstash pipeline config +{% for pipeline, config in LOGSTASH_MERGED.pipeline_config.items() %} +{% for assigned_pipeline in ASSIGNED_PIPELINES %} +{% set custom_pipeline = 'custom/' + pipeline + '.conf' %} +{% if custom_pipeline in LOGSTASH_MERGED.defined_pipelines[assigned_pipeline] %} +ls_custom_pipeline_conf_{{assigned_pipeline}}_{{pipeline}}: + file.managed: + - name: /opt/so/conf/logstash/pipelines/{{assigned_pipeline}}/{{ pipeline }}.conf + - contents: LOGSTASH_MERGED.pipeline_config.{{pipeline}} +{% endif %} +{% endfor %} +{% endfor %} + + {% for assigned_pipeline in ASSIGNED_PIPELINES %} {% for CONFIGFILE in LOGSTASH_MERGED.defined_pipelines[assigned_pipeline] %} ls_pipeline_{{assigned_pipeline}}_{{CONFIGFILE.split('.')[0] | replace("/","_") }}: diff --git a/salt/logstash/defaults.yaml b/salt/logstash/defaults.yaml index e4c18cc647..348acb6226 100644 --- a/salt/logstash/defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/logstash/defaults.yaml @@ -42,6 +42,24 @@ logstash: custom2: [] custom3: [] custom4: [] + pipeline_config: + custom001: |- + filter { + if [event][module] =~ "zeek" { + mutate { + add_tag => ["network_stuff"] + } + } + } + custom002: PLACEHOLDER + custom003: PLACEHOLDER + custom004: PLACEHOLDER + custom005: PLACEHOLDER + custom006: PLACEHOLDER + custom007: PLACEHOLDER + custom008: PLACEHOLDER + custom009: PLACEHOLDER + custom010: PLACEHOLDER settings: lsheap: 500m config: diff --git a/salt/logstash/soc_logstash.yaml b/salt/logstash/soc_logstash.yaml index bcb99bad55..3172ff7c58 100644 --- a/salt/logstash/soc_logstash.yaml +++ b/salt/logstash/soc_logstash.yaml @@ -31,6 +31,22 @@ logstash: custom2: *defined_pipelines custom3: *defined_pipelines custom4: *defined_pipelines + pipeline_config: + custom001: &pipeline_config + description: Pipeline configuration for Logstash + advanced: True + multiline: True + forcedType: string + helpLink: logstash.html + custom002: *pipeline_config + custom003: *pipeline_config + custom004: *pipeline_config + custom005: *pipeline_config + custom006: *pipeline_config + custom007: *pipeline_config + custom008: *pipeline_config + custom009: *pipeline_config + custom010: *pipeline_config settings: lsheap: description: Heap size to use for logstash diff --git a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-repo-sync b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-repo-sync index 84384fcdfc..a0393a36b0 100644 --- a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-repo-sync +++ b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-repo-sync @@ -7,12 +7,8 @@ NOROOT=1 . /usr/sbin/so-common -set_version -set_os -salt_minion_count - set -e -curl --retry 5 --retry-delay 60 -A "reposync/$VERSION/$OS/$(uname -r)/$MINIONCOUNT" https://sigs.securityonion.net/checkup --output /tmp/checkup +curl --retry 5 --retry-delay 60 -A "reposync/$(sync_options)" https://sigs.securityonion.net/checkup --output /tmp/checkup dnf reposync --norepopath -g --delete -m -c /opt/so/conf/reposync/repodownload.conf --repoid=securityonionsync --download-metadata -p /nsm/repo/ createrepo /nsm/repo diff --git a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-user b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-user index d597cdacb8..69b4fdb508 100755 --- a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-user +++ b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-user @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ function syncElastic() { [[ $? != 0 ]] && fail "Unable to read credential hashes from database" user_data_formatted=$(echo "${userData}" | jq -r '.user + ":" + .data.hashed_password') - if lookup_salt_value "licensed_features" "" "pillar" | grep -x oidc; then + if lookup_salt_value "features" "" "pillar" | grep -x odc; then # generate random placeholder salt/hash for users without passwords random_crypt=$(get_random_value 53) user_data_formatted=$(echo "${user_data_formatted}" | sed -r "s/^(.+:)\$/\\1\$2a\$12${random_crypt}/") diff --git a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml.py b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml.py index 874fc9e0fc..41cab0b23d 100755 --- a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml.py +++ b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml.py @@ -16,12 +16,14 @@ def showUsage(args): print('Usage: {} [ARGS...]'.format(sys.argv[0])) print(' General commands:') + print(' append - Append a list item to a yaml key, if it exists and is a list. Requires KEY and LISTITEM args.') print(' remove - Removes a yaml key, if it exists. Requires KEY arg.') print(' help - Prints this usage information.') print('') print(' Where:') print(' YAML_FILE - Path to the file that will be modified. Ex: /opt/so/conf/service/conf.yaml') print(' KEY - YAML key, does not support \' or " characters at this time. Ex: level1.level2') + print(' LISTITEM - Item to add to the list.') sys.exit(1) @@ -35,6 +37,35 @@ def writeYaml(filename, content): file = open(filename, "w") return yaml.dump(content, file) +def appendItem(content, key, listItem): + pieces = key.split(".", 1) + if len(pieces) > 1: + appendItem(content[pieces[0]], pieces[1], listItem) + else: + try: + content[key].append(listItem) + except AttributeError: + print("The existing value for the given key is not a list. No action was taken on the file.") + return 1 + except KeyError: + print("The key provided does not exist. No action was taken on the file.") + return 1 + +def append(args): + if len(args) != 3: + print('Missing filename, key arg, or list item to append', file=sys.stderr) + showUsage(None) + return + + filename = args[0] + key = args[1] + listItem = args[2] + + content = loadYaml(filename) + appendItem(content, key, listItem) + writeYaml(filename, content) + + return 0 def removeKey(content, key): pieces = key.split(".", 1) @@ -69,6 +100,7 @@ def main(): commands = { "help": showUsage, + "append": append, "remove": remove, } diff --git a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml_test.py b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml_test.py index 7d0ed1a8e7..488877ea19 100644 --- a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml_test.py +++ b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml_test.py @@ -105,3 +105,99 @@ def test_remove_missing_args(self): self.assertEqual(actual, expected) sysmock.assert_called_once_with(1) self.assertIn(mock_stdout.getvalue(), "Missing filename or key arg\n") + + def test_append(self): + filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test-remove.yaml" + file = open(filename, "w") + file.write("{key1: { child1: 123, child2: abc }, key2: false, key3: [a,b,c]}") + file.close() + + soyaml.append([filename, "key3", "d"]) + + file = open(filename, "r") + actual = file.read() + file.close() + expected = "key1:\n child1: 123\n child2: abc\nkey2: false\nkey3:\n- a\n- b\n- c\n- d\n" + self.assertEqual(actual, expected) + + def test_append_nested(self): + filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test-remove.yaml" + file = open(filename, "w") + file.write("{key1: { child1: 123, child2: [a,b,c] }, key2: false, key3: [e,f,g]}") + file.close() + + soyaml.append([filename, "key1.child2", "d"]) + + file = open(filename, "r") + actual = file.read() + file.close() + + expected = "key1:\n child1: 123\n child2:\n - a\n - b\n - c\n - d\nkey2: false\nkey3:\n- e\n- f\n- g\n" + self.assertEqual(actual, expected) + + def test_append_nested_deep(self): + filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test-remove.yaml" + file = open(filename, "w") + file.write("{key1: { child1: 123, child2: { deep1: 45, deep2: [a,b,c] } }, key2: false, key3: [e,f,g]}") + file.close() + + soyaml.append([filename, "key1.child2.deep2", "d"]) + + file = open(filename, "r") + actual = file.read() + file.close() + + expected = "key1:\n child1: 123\n child2:\n deep1: 45\n deep2:\n - a\n - b\n - c\n - d\nkey2: false\nkey3:\n- e\n- f\n- g\n" + self.assertEqual(actual, expected) + + def test_append_key_noexist(self): + filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test-append.yaml" + file = open(filename, "w") + file.write("{key1: { child1: 123, child2: { deep1: 45, deep2: [a,b,c] } }, key2: false, key3: [e,f,g]}") + file.close() + + with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock: + with patch('sys.stdout', new=StringIO()) as mock_stdout: + sys.argv = ["cmd", "append", filename, "key4", "h"] + soyaml.main() + sysmock.assert_called() + self.assertEqual(mock_stdout.getvalue(), "The key provided does not exist. No action was taken on the file.\n") + + def test_append_key_noexist_deep(self): + filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test-append.yaml" + file = open(filename, "w") + file.write("{key1: { child1: 123, child2: { deep1: 45, deep2: [a,b,c] } }, key2: false, key3: [e,f,g]}") + file.close() + + with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock: + with patch('sys.stdout', new=StringIO()) as mock_stdout: + sys.argv = ["cmd", "append", filename, "key1.child2.deep3", "h"] + soyaml.main() + sysmock.assert_called() + self.assertEqual(mock_stdout.getvalue(), "The key provided does not exist. No action was taken on the file.\n") + + def test_append_key_nonlist(self): + filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test-append.yaml" + file = open(filename, "w") + file.write("{key1: { child1: 123, child2: { deep1: 45, deep2: [a,b,c] } }, key2: false, key3: [e,f,g]}") + file.close() + + with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock: + with patch('sys.stdout', new=StringIO()) as mock_stdout: + sys.argv = ["cmd", "append", filename, "key1", "h"] + soyaml.main() + sysmock.assert_called() + self.assertEqual(mock_stdout.getvalue(), "The existing value for the given key is not a list. No action was taken on the file.\n") + + def test_append_key_nonlist_deep(self): + filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test-append.yaml" + file = open(filename, "w") + file.write("{key1: { child1: 123, child2: { deep1: 45, deep2: [a,b,c] } }, key2: false, key3: [e,f,g]}") + file.close() + + with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock: + with patch('sys.stdout', new=StringIO()) as mock_stdout: + sys.argv = ["cmd", "append", filename, "key1.child2.deep1", "h"] + soyaml.main() + sysmock.assert_called() + self.assertEqual(mock_stdout.getvalue(), "The existing value for the given key is not a list. No action was taken on the file.\n") diff --git a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup index f9ce6d0412..8b9d4a6b33 100755 --- a/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup +++ b/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup @@ -372,6 +372,17 @@ enable_highstate() { echo "" } +get_soup_script_hashes() { + CURRENTSOUP=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/soup | awk '{print $1}') + GITSOUP=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup | awk '{print $1}') + CURRENTCMN=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/so-common | awk '{print $1}') + GITCMN=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common | awk '{print $1}') + CURRENTIMGCMN=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/so-image-common | awk '{print $1}') + GITIMGCMN=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-image-common | awk '{print $1}') + CURRENTSOFIREWALL=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/so-firewall | awk '{print $1}') + GITSOFIREWALL=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-firewall | awk '{print $1}') +} + highstate() { # Run a highstate. salt-call state.highstate -l info queue=True @@ -405,6 +416,7 @@ preupgrade_changes() { [[ "$INSTALLEDVERSION" == 2.4.10 ]] && up_to_2.4.20 [[ "$INSTALLEDVERSION" == 2.4.20 ]] && up_to_2.4.30 [[ "$INSTALLEDVERSION" == 2.4.30 ]] && up_to_2.4.40 + [[ "$INSTALLEDVERSION" == 2.4.40 ]] && up_to_2.4.50 true } @@ -419,6 +431,7 @@ postupgrade_changes() { [[ "$POSTVERSION" == 2.4.10 ]] && post_to_2.4.20 [[ "$POSTVERSION" == 2.4.20 ]] && post_to_2.4.30 [[ "$POSTVERSION" == 2.4.30 ]] && post_to_2.4.40 + [[ "$POSTVERSION" == 2.4.40 ]] && post_to_2.4.50 true } @@ -470,6 +483,11 @@ post_to_2.4.40() { POSTVERSION=2.4.40 } +post_to_2.4.50() { + echo "Nothing to apply" + POSTVERSION=2.4.50 +} + repo_sync() { echo "Sync the local repo." su socore -c '/usr/sbin/so-repo-sync' || fail "Unable to complete so-repo-sync." @@ -570,6 +588,35 @@ up_to_2.4.40() { INSTALLEDVERSION=2.4.40 } +up_to_2.4.50() { + echo "Creating additional pillars.." + mkdir -p /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/stig/ + touch /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/stig/adv_stig.sls + touch /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/stig/soc_stig.sls + + # the file_roots need to be update due to salt 3006.6 upgrade not allowing symlinks outside the file_roots + # put new so-yaml in place + echo "Updating so-yaml" + \cp -v "$UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml.py" "$DEFAULT_SALT_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/" + \cp -v "$UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml.py" /usr/sbin/ + echo "Creating a backup of the salt-master config." + # INSTALLEDVERSION is 2.4.40 at this point, but we want the backup to have the version + # so was at prior to starting upgrade. use POSTVERSION here since it doesnt change until + # post upgrade changes. POSTVERSION set to INSTALLEDVERSION at start of soup + cp -v /etc/salt/master "/etc/salt/master.so-$POSTVERSION.bak" + echo "Adding /opt/so/rules to file_roots in /etc/salt/master using so-yaml" + so-yaml.py append /etc/salt/master file_roots.base /opt/so/rules/nids + echo "Moving Suricata rules" + mkdir /opt/so/rules/nids/suri + chown socore:socore /opt/so/rules/nids/suri + mv -v /opt/so/rules/nids/*.rules /opt/so/rules/nids/suri/. + + echo "Adding /nsm/elastic-fleet/artifacts to file_roots in /etc/salt/master using so-yaml" + so-yaml.py append /etc/salt/master file_roots.base /nsm/elastic-fleet/artifacts + + INSTALLEDVERSION=2.4.50 +} + determine_elastic_agent_upgrade() { if [[ $is_airgap -eq 0 ]]; then update_elastic_agent_airgap @@ -742,31 +789,29 @@ upgrade_salt() { } verify_latest_update_script() { - # Check to see if the update scripts match. If not run the new one. - CURRENTSOUP=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/soup | awk '{print $1}') - GITSOUP=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup | awk '{print $1}') - CURRENTCMN=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/so-common | awk '{print $1}') - GITCMN=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common | awk '{print $1}') - CURRENTIMGCMN=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/so-image-common | awk '{print $1}') - GITIMGCMN=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-image-common | awk '{print $1}') - CURRENTSOFIREWALL=$(md5sum /usr/sbin/so-firewall | awk '{print $1}') - GITSOFIREWALL=$(md5sum $UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-firewall | awk '{print $1}') - + get_soup_script_hashes if [[ "$CURRENTSOUP" == "$GITSOUP" && "$CURRENTCMN" == "$GITCMN" && "$CURRENTIMGCMN" == "$GITIMGCMN" && "$CURRENTSOFIREWALL" == "$GITSOFIREWALL" ]]; then echo "This version of the soup script is up to date. Proceeding." else echo "You are not running the latest soup version. Updating soup and its components. This might take multiple runs to complete." - cp $UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup $DEFAULT_SALT_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/ - cp $UPDATE_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-common $DEFAULT_SALT_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/ - cp $UPDATE_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/so-image-common $DEFAULT_SALT_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/ - cp $UPDATE_DIR/salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-firewall $DEFAULT_SALT_DIR/salt/common/tools/sbin/ + salt-call state.apply common.soup_scripts queue=True -linfo --file-root=$UPDATE_DIR/salt --local + + # Verify that soup scripts updated as expected + get_soup_script_hashes + if [[ "$CURRENTSOUP" == "$GITSOUP" && "$CURRENTCMN" == "$GITCMN" && "$CURRENTIMGCMN" == "$GITIMGCMN" && "$CURRENTSOFIREWALL" == "$GITSOFIREWALL" ]]; then + echo "Succesfully updated soup scripts." + else + echo "There was a problem updating soup scripts. Trying to rerun script update." + salt-call state.apply common.soup_scripts queue=True -linfo --file-root=$UPDATE_DIR/salt --local + fi + echo "" echo "The soup script has been modified. Please run soup again to continue the upgrade." exit 0 fi -} +} # Keeping this block in case we need to do a hotfix that requires salt update apply_hotfix() { if [[ "$INSTALLEDVERSION" == "2.4.20" ]] ; then @@ -909,9 +954,6 @@ main() { systemctl_func "stop" "$cron_service_name" - # update mine items prior to stopping salt-minion and salt-master - update_salt_mine - echo "Updating dockers to $NEWVERSION." if [[ $is_airgap -eq 0 ]]; then airgap_update_dockers @@ -987,6 +1029,9 @@ main() { salt-call state.apply salt.minion -l info queue=True echo "" + # ensure the mine is updated and populated before highstates run, following the salt-master restart + update_salt_mine + enable_highstate echo "" diff --git a/salt/nginx/enabled.sls b/salt/nginx/enabled.sls index dda4756554..273fb65beb 100644 --- a/salt/nginx/enabled.sls +++ b/salt/nginx/enabled.sls @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ include: - nginx.config - nginx.sostatus + +{% if grains.role not in ['so-fleet'] %} + {# if the user has selected to replace the crt and key in the ui #} {% if NGINXMERGED.ssl.replace_cert %} @@ -88,6 +91,15 @@ make-rule-dir-nginx: - recurse: - user - group + +{% endif %} + +{# if this is an so-fleet node then we want to use the port bindings, custom bind mounts defined for fleet #} +{% if GLOBALS.role == 'so-fleet' %} +{% set container_config = 'so-nginx-fleet-node' %} +{% else %} +{% set container_config = 'so-nginx' %} +{% endif %} so-nginx: docker_container.running: @@ -95,11 +107,11 @@ so-nginx: - hostname: so-nginx - networks: - sobridge: - - ipv4_address: {{ DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].ip }} + - ipv4_address: {{ DOCKER.containers[container_config].ip }} - extra_hosts: - {{ GLOBALS.manager }}:{{ GLOBALS.manager_ip }} - {% if DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].extra_hosts %} - {% for XTRAHOST in DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].extra_hosts %} + {% if DOCKER.containers[container_config].extra_hosts %} + {% for XTRAHOST in DOCKER.containers[container_config].extra_hosts %} - {{ XTRAHOST }} {% endfor %} {% endif %} @@ -119,20 +131,20 @@ so-nginx: - /nsm/repo:/opt/socore/html/repo:ro - /nsm/rules:/nsm/rules:ro {% endif %} - {% if DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].custom_bind_mounts %} - {% for BIND in DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].custom_bind_mounts %} + {% if DOCKER.containers[container_config].custom_bind_mounts %} + {% for BIND in DOCKER.containers[container_config].custom_bind_mounts %} - {{ BIND }} {% endfor %} {% endif %} - {% if DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].extra_env %} + {% if DOCKER.containers[container_config].extra_env %} - environment: - {% for XTRAENV in DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].extra_env %} + {% for XTRAENV in DOCKER.containers[container_config].extra_env %} - {{ XTRAENV }} {% endfor %} {% endif %} - cap_add: NET_BIND_SERVICE - port_bindings: - {% for BINDING in DOCKER.containers['so-nginx'].port_bindings %} + {% for BINDING in DOCKER.containers[container_config].port_bindings %} - {{ BINDING }} {% endfor %} - watch: diff --git a/salt/nginx/etc/nginx.conf b/salt/nginx/etc/nginx.conf index d5981be77e..236f8da7fa 100644 --- a/salt/nginx/etc/nginx.conf +++ b/salt/nginx/etc/nginx.conf @@ -39,6 +39,26 @@ http { include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf; + {%- if role in ['fleet'] %} + + server { + listen 8443; + server_name {{ GLOBALS.hostname }}; + root /opt/socore/html; + location /artifacts/ { + try_files $uri =206; + proxy_read_timeout 90; + proxy_connect_timeout 90; + proxy_set_header Host $host; + proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr; + proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for; + proxy_set_header Proxy ""; + proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme; + } + } + + {%- endif %} + {%- if role in ['eval', 'managersearch', 'manager', 'standalone', 'import'] %} server { diff --git a/salt/repo/client/files/oracle/yum.conf.jinja b/salt/repo/client/files/oracle/yum.conf.jinja index ecbc124a8e..4b1efb65e5 100644 --- a/salt/repo/client/files/oracle/yum.conf.jinja +++ b/salt/repo/client/files/oracle/yum.conf.jinja @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ logfile=/var/log/yum.log exactarch=1 obsoletes=1 gpgcheck=1 +localpkg_gpgcheck=1 plugins=1 installonly_limit={{ salt['pillar.get']('yum:config:installonly_limit', 2) }} bugtracker_url=http://bugs.centos.org/set_project.php?project_id=23&ref=http://bugs.centos.org/bug_report_page.php?category=yum diff --git a/salt/salt/master.defaults.yaml b/salt/salt/master.defaults.yaml index 1b4d2e63a4..19677f70bd 100644 --- a/salt/salt/master.defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/salt/master.defaults.yaml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ # version cannot be used elsewhere in this pillar as soup is grepping for it to determine if Salt needs to be patched salt: master: - version: 3006.5 + version: 3006.6 diff --git a/salt/salt/minion.defaults.yaml b/salt/salt/minion.defaults.yaml index c159299512..2e4ebc93e5 100644 --- a/salt/salt/minion.defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/salt/minion.defaults.yaml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # version cannot be used elsewhere in this pillar as soup is grepping for it to determine if Salt needs to be patched salt: minion: - version: 3006.5 + version: 3006.6 check_threshold: 3600 # in seconds, threshold used for so-salt-minion-check. any value less than 600 seconds may cause a lot of salt-minion restarts since the job to touch the file occurs every 5-8 minutes by default service_start_delay: 30 # in seconds. diff --git a/salt/soc/defaults.yaml b/salt/soc/defaults.yaml index c1b9470c8f..244a021d38 100644 --- a/salt/soc/defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/soc/defaults.yaml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ soc: icon: fa-crosshairs target: links: - - '/#/hunt?q="{value|escape}" | groupby event.module* event.dataset' + - '/#/hunt?q="{value|escape}" | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' - name: actionAddToCase description: actionAddToCaseHelp icon: fa-briefcase @@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ soc: icon: fab fa-searchengin target: '' links: - - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.fuid}" OR "{:log.id.uid}" OR "{:network.community_id}") | groupby event.module* event.dataset' - - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.fuid}" OR "{:log.id.uid}") | groupby event.module* event.dataset' - - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.fuid}" OR "{:network.community_id}") | groupby event.module* event.dataset' - - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.uid}" OR "{:network.community_id}") | groupby event.module* event.dataset' - - '/#/hunt?q="{:log.id.fuid}" | groupby event.module* event.dataset' - - '/#/hunt?q="{:log.id.uid}" | groupby event.module* event.dataset' - - '/#/hunt?q="{:network.community_id}" | groupby event.module* event.dataset' + - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.fuid}" OR "{:log.id.uid}" OR "{:network.community_id}") | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' + - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.fuid}" OR "{:log.id.uid}") | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' + - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.fuid}" OR "{:network.community_id}") | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' + - '/#/hunt?q=("{:log.id.uid}" OR "{:network.community_id}") | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' + - '/#/hunt?q="{:log.id.fuid}" | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' + - '/#/hunt?q="{:log.id.uid}" | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' + - '/#/hunt?q="{:network.community_id}" | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby file.mime_type | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby ssl.server_name | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' - name: actionPcap description: actionPcapHelp icon: fa-stream @@ -59,12 +59,18 @@ soc: target: _blank links: - 'https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/{value}' - - name: Sublime Platform Email Review - description: Review email in Sublime Platform + - name: actionSublime + description: actionSublimeHelp icon: fa-external-link-alt target: _blank links: - 'https://{:sublime.url}/messages/{:sublime.message_group_id}' + - name: actionProcessAncestors + description: actionProcessAncestorsHelp + icon: fa-people-roof + target: '' + links: + - '/#/hunt?q=(process.entity_id:"{:process.entity_id}" OR process.entity_id:"{:process.Ext.ancestry|processAncestors}") | groupby process.parent.name | groupby -sankey process.parent.name process.name | groupby process.name | groupby event.module event.dataset | table soc_timestamp event.dataset host.name user.name process.parent.name process.name process.working_directory' eventFields: default: - soc_timestamp @@ -1411,7 +1417,7 @@ soc: query: 'event.category: network AND _exists_:process.executable AND (_exists_:dns.question.name OR _exists_:dns.answers.data) | groupby -sankey host.name dns.question.name | groupby event.dataset event.type | groupby host.name | groupby process.executable | groupby dns.question.name | groupby dns.answers.data' - name: Host Process Activity description: Process activity captured on an endpoint - query: 'event.category:process | groupby -sankey host.name user.name* | groupby event.dataset event.action | groupby host.name | groupby user.name | groupby process.working_directory | groupby process.executable | groupby process.command_line | groupby process.parent.executable | groupby process.parent.command_line | groupby -sankey process.parent.executable process.executable' + query: 'event.category:process | groupby -sankey host.name user.name* | groupby event.dataset event.action | groupby host.name | groupby user.name | groupby process.working_directory | groupby process.executable | groupby process.command_line | groupby process.parent.executable | groupby process.parent.command_line | groupby -sankey process.parent.executable process.executable | table soc_timestamp event.dataset host.name user.name process.parent.name process.name process.working_directory' - name: Host File Activity description: File activity captured on an endpoint query: 'event.category: file AND _exists_:process.executable | groupby -sankey host.name process.executable | groupby host.name | groupby event.dataset event.action event.type | groupby file.name | groupby process.executable' @@ -1424,8 +1430,11 @@ soc: - name: Zeek Notice description: Zeek notice logs query: 'event.dataset:zeek.notice | groupby -sankey notice.note destination.ip | groupby notice.note | groupby notice.message | groupby notice.sub_message | groupby source.ip | groupby destination.ip | groupby destination.port | groupby destination_geo.organization_name' - - name: Connections - description: Network connection metadata + - name: Connections and Metadata with community_id + description: Network connections that include community_id + query: '_exists_:network.community_id | groupby event.module* | groupby -sankey event.module* event.dataset | groupby event.dataset | groupby source.ip source.port destination.ip destination.port | groupby network.protocol | groupby source_geo.organization_name source.geo.country_name | groupby destination_geo.organization_name destination.geo.country_name | groupby rule.name rule.category event.severity_label | groupby dns.query.name | groupby http.virtual_host http.uri | groupby notice.note notice.message notice.sub_message | groupby source.ip host.hostname user.name event.action event.type process.executable process.pid' + - name: Connections seen by Zeek or Suricata + description: Network connections logged by Zeek or Suricata query: 'tags:conn | groupby source.ip | groupby destination.ip | groupby destination.port | groupby -sankey destination.port network.protocol | groupby network.protocol | groupby network.transport | groupby connection.history | groupby connection.state | groupby connection.state_description | groupby source.geo.country_name | groupby destination.geo.country_name | groupby client.ip_bytes | groupby server.ip_bytes | groupby client.oui' - name: DCE_RPC description: DCE_RPC (Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Calls) network metadata @@ -1562,6 +1571,9 @@ soc: - name: Firewall description: Firewall logs query: 'observer.type:firewall | groupby -sankey event.action observer.ingress.interface.name | groupby event.action | groupby observer.ingress.interface.name | groupby network.type | groupby network.transport | groupby source.ip | groupby destination.ip | groupby destination.port' + - name: Firewall Auth + description: Firewall authentication logs + query: 'observer.type:firewall AND event.category:authentication | groupby user.name | groupby -sankey user.name source.ip | groupby source.ip | table soc_timestamp user.name source.ip message' - name: VLAN description: VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) tagged logs query: '* AND _exists_:network.vlan.id | groupby network.vlan.id | groupby source.ip | groupby -sankey source.ip destination.ip | groupby destination.ip | groupby destination.port | groupby event.dataset | groupby event.module | groupby observer.name | groupby source.geo.country_name | groupby destination.geo.country_name' diff --git a/salt/ssl/remove.sls b/salt/ssl/remove.sls index 43a2452888..7738490e56 100644 --- a/salt/ssl/remove.sls +++ b/salt/ssl/remove.sls @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ trusttheca: file.absent: - name: /etc/pki/tls/certs/intca.crt +symlinkca: + file.absent: + - name: /etc/ssl/certs/intca.crt + influxdb_key: file.absent: - name: /etc/pki/influxdb.key diff --git a/salt/stig/defaults.yaml b/salt/stig/defaults.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa43b30f96 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/defaults.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +stig: + enabled: False + run_interval: 12 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/salt/stig/disabled.sls b/salt/stig/disabled.sls new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fc63bacad4 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/disabled.sls @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one +# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at +# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the +# Elastic License 2.0. + +{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %} +{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %} + +stig_remediate_schedule: + schedule.absent + +remove_stig_script: + file.absent: + - name: /usr/sbin/so-stig +{% endif %} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/salt/stig/enabled.sls b/salt/stig/enabled.sls new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1f1a064fd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/enabled.sls @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one +# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at +# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the +# Elastic License 2.0. +# +# Note: Per the Elastic License 2.0, the second limitation states: +# +# "You may not move, change, disable, or circumvent the license key functionality +# in the software, and you may not remove or obscure any functionality in the +# software that is protected by the license key." + +{% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %} +{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %} +{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states and GLOBALS.os == 'OEL' %} +{% if 'stg' in salt['pillar.get']('features', []) %} + {% set OSCAP_PROFILE_NAME = 'xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_profile_stig' %} + {% set OSCAP_PROFILE_LOCATION = '/opt/so/conf/stig/sos-oscap.xml' %} + {% set OSCAP_OUTPUT_DIR = '/opt/so/log/stig' %} +oscap_packages: + pkg.installed: + - skip_suggestions: True + - pkgs: + - openscap + - openscap-scanner + - scap-security-guide + +make_some_dirs: + file.directory: + - name: /opt/so/log/stig + - user: socore + - group: socore + - makedirs: True + +make_more_dir: + file.directory: + - name: /opt/so/conf/stig + - user: socore + - group: socore + - makedirs: True + +update_stig_profile: + file.managed: + - name: /opt/so/conf/stig/sos-oscap.xml + - source: salt://stig/files/sos-oscap.xml + - user: socore + - group: socore + - mode: 0644 + +{% if not salt['file.file_exists'](OSCAP_OUTPUT_DIR ~ '/pre-oscap-report.html') %} +run_initial_scan: + module.run: + - name: openscap.xccdf + - params: 'eval --profile {{ OSCAP_PROFILE_NAME }} --results {{ OSCAP_OUTPUT_DIR }}/pre-oscap-results.xml --report {{ OSCAP_OUTPUT_DIR }}/pre-oscap-report.html {{ OSCAP_PROFILE_LOCATION }}' +{% endif %} + +run_remediate: + module.run: + - name: openscap.xccdf + - params: 'eval --remediate --profile {{ OSCAP_PROFILE_NAME }} --results {{ OSCAP_OUTPUT_DIR }}/post-oscap-results.xml --report {{ OSCAP_PROFILE_LOCATION }}' + +{# OSCAP rule id: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_disable_ctrlaltdel_burstaction #} +disable_ctrl_alt_del_action: + file.replace: + - name: /etc/systemd/system.conf + - pattern: '^#CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none' + - repl: 'CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none' + - backup: '.bak' + +{# OSCAP rule id: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_no_empty_passwords #} +remove_nullok_from_password_auth: + file.replace: + - name: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + - pattern: ' nullok' + - repl: '' + - backup: '.bak' + +remove_nullok_from_system_auth_auth: + file.replace: + - name: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - pattern: ' nullok' + - repl: '' + - backup: '.bak' + +run_post_scan: + module.run: + - name: openscap.xccdf + - params: 'eval --profile {{ OSCAP_PROFILE_NAME }} --results {{ OSCAP_OUTPUT_DIR }}/post-oscap-results.xml --report {{ OSCAP_OUTPUT_DIR }}/post-oscap-report.html {{ OSCAP_PROFILE_LOCATION }}' + +{% else %} +{{sls}}_no_license_detected: + test.fail_without_changes: + - name: {{sls}}_no_license_detected + - comment: + - "The application of STIGs is a feature supported only for customers with a valid license. + Contact Security Onion Solutions, LLC via our website at https://securityonionsolutions.com + for more information about purchasing a license to enable this feature." +{% endif %} + +{% else %} +{{sls}}_state_not_allowed: + test.fail_without_changes: + - name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed + +{% endif %} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/salt/stig/files/sos-oscap.xml b/salt/stig/files/sos-oscap.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f78af8c09 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/files/sos-oscap.xml @@ -0,0 +1,244945 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 9 + oval:ssg-installed_OS_is_ol9_family:def:1 + + + + + + draft + Guide to the Secure Configuration of Oracle Linux 9 + This guide presents a catalog of security-relevant +configuration settings for Oracle Linux 9. It is a rendering of +content structured in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) +in order to support security automation. The SCAP content is +is available in the scap-security-guide package which is developed at + + https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide. + +Providing system administrators with such guidance informs them how to securely +configure systems under their control in a variety of network roles. Policy +makers and baseline creators can use this catalog of settings, with its +associated references to higher-level security control catalogs, in order to +assist them in security baseline creation. This guide is a catalog, not a +checklist, and satisfaction of every item is not likely to be possible or +sensible in many operational scenarios. However, the XCCDF format enables +granular selection and adjustment of settings, and their association with OVAL +and OCIL content provides an automated checking capability. Transformations of +this document, and its associated automated checking content, are capable of +providing baselines that meet a diverse set of policy objectives. Some example +XCCDF Profiles, which are selections of items that form checklists and +can be used as baselines, are available with this guide. They can be +processed, in an automated fashion, with tools that support the Security +Content Automation Protocol (SCAP). The DISA STIG, which provides required +settings for US Department of Defense systems, is one example of a baseline +created from this guidance. + + Do not attempt to implement any of the settings in +this guide without first testing them in a non-operational environment. The +creators of this guidance assume no responsibility whatsoever for its use by +other parties, and makes no guarantees, expressed or implied, about its +quality, reliability, or any other characteristic. + + The SCAP Security Guide Project + + https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide + + Red Hat and Red Hat Enterprise Linux are either registered +trademarks or trademarks of Red Hat, Inc. in the United States and other +countries. All other names are registered trademarks or trademarks of their +respective companies. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0.1.69 + + SCAP Security Guide Project + SCAP Security Guide Project + Frank J Cameron (CAM1244) <cameron@ctc.com> + 0x66656c6978 <0x66656c6978@users.noreply.github.com> + Håvard F. Aasen <havard.f.aasen@pfft.no> + Jack Adolph <jack.adolph@gmail.com> + Edgar Aguilar <edgar.aguilar@oracle.com> + Gabe Alford <redhatrises@gmail.com> + Firas AlShafei <firas.alshafei@us.abb.com> + Rodrigo Alvares <ralvares@redhat.com> + Christopher Anderson <cba@fedoraproject.org> + Craig Andrews <candrews@integralblue.com> + angystardust <angystardust@users.noreply.github.com> + anivan-suse <anastasija.ivanovic@suse.com> + anixon-rh <55244503+anixon-rh@users.noreply.github.com> + Ikko Ashimine <eltociear@gmail.com> + Chuck Atkins <chuck.atkins@kitware.com> + Bharath B <bhb@redhat.com> + Ryan Ballanger <root@rballang-admin-2.fastenal.com> + Alex Baranowski <alex@euro-linux.com> + Eduardo Barretto <eduardo.barretto@canonical.com> + Molly Jo Bault <Molly.Jo.Bault@ballardtech.com> + Andrew Becker <A-Beck@users.noreply.github.com> + Gabriel Becker <ggasparb@redhat.com> + Alexander Bergmann <abergmann@suse.com> + Dale Bewley <dale@bewley.net> + Jose Luis BG <bgjoseluis@gmail.com> + binyanling <binyanling@uniontech.com> + Joseph Bisch <joseph.bisch@gmail.com> + Jeff Blank <blank@eclipse.ncsc.mil> + Olivier Bonhomme <ptitoliv@ptitoliv.net> + Lance Bragstad <lbragstad@gmail.com> + Ted Brunell <tbrunell@redhat.com> + Marcus Burghardt <maburgha@redhat.com> + Matthew Burket <mburket@redhat.com> + Blake Burkhart <blake.burkhart@us.af.mil> + Patrick Callahan <pmc@patrickcallahan.com> + George Campbell <gcampbell@palantir.com> + Nick Carboni <ncarboni@redhat.com> + Carlos <64919342+carlosmmatos@users.noreply.github.com> + James Cassell <james.cassell@ll.mit.edu> + Frank Caviggia <fcaviggia@users.noreply.github.com> + Eric Christensen <echriste@redhat.com> + Dan Clark <danclark@redhat.com> + Jayson Cofell <1051437+70k10@users.noreply.github.com> + Caleb Cooper <coopercd@ornl.gov> + cortesana <acortes@redhat.com> + Richard Maciel Costa <richard.maciel.costa@canonical.com> + Xavier Coulon <xavier.coulon@suse.com> + Deric Crago <deric.crago@gmail.com> + crleekwc <crleekwc@gmail.com> + cyarbrough76 <42849651+cyarbrough76@users.noreply.github.com> + Maura Dailey <maura@eclipse.ncsc.mil> + Klaas Demter <demter@atix.de> + denknorr <dennis.knorr@suse.com> + dhanushkar-wso2 <dhanushkar@wso2.com> + Andrew DiPrinzio <andrew.diprinzio@jhuapl.edu> + dom <dominique.blaze@devinci.fr> + Jean-Baptiste Donnette <jean-baptiste.donnette@epita.fr> + Marco De Donno <mdedonno1337@gmail.com> + dperrone <dperrone@redhat.com> + drax <applezip@gmail.com> + Sebastian Dunne <sdunne@redhat.com> + François Duthilleul <francoisduthilleul@gmail.com> + Greg Elin <gregelin@gitmachines.com> + eradot4027 <jrtonmac@gmail.com> + Alexis Facques <alexis.facques@mythalesgroup.io> + Henry Finucane <hfinucane@zscaler.com> + Leah Fisher <lfisher047@gmail.com> + Yavor Georgiev <strandjata@gmail.com> + Alijohn Ghassemlouei <alijohn@secureagc.com> + Swarup Ghosh <swghosh@redhat.com> + ghylock <ghylock@gmail.com> + Andrew Gilmore <agilmore2@gmail.com> + Joshua Glemza <jglemza@nasa.gov> + Nick Gompper <forestgomp@yahoo.com> + David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandezgonzalez@canonical.com> + Loren Gordon <lorengordon@users.noreply.github.com> + Gene Gotimer <otherdevopsgene@portinfo.com> + Patrik Greco <sikevux@sikevux.se> + Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> + guangyee <gyee@suse.com> + Christian Hagenest <christian.hagenest@suse.com> + Marek Haicman <mhaicman@redhat.com> + Vern Hart <vern.hart@canonical.com> + Alex Haydock <alex@alexhaydock.co.uk> + Rebekah Hayes <rhayes@corp.rivierautilities.com> + Trey Henefield <thenefield@gmail.com> + Henning Henkel <henning.henkel@helvetia.ch> + hex2a <hex2a@users.noreply.github.com> + John Hooks <jhooks@starscream.pa.jhbcomputers.com> + Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com> + De Huo <De.Huo@windriver.com> + Robin Price II <robin@redhat.com> + Yasir Imam <yimam@redhat.com> + Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com> + Keith Jackson <keithkjackson@gmail.com> + Marc Jadoul <mgjadoul@laptomatic.auth-o-matic.corp> + Jeremiah Jahn <jeremiah@goodinassociates.com> + Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> + Jessicahfy <Jessicahfy@users.noreply.github.com> + Stephan Joerrens <Stephan.Joerrens@fiduciagad.de> + Hunter Jones <hjones2199@gmail.com> + Jono <jono@ubuntu-18.localdomain> + justchris1 <justchris1@justchris1.email> + Kacper <kacper@kacper.se> + Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com> + Charles Kernstock <charles.kernstock@ultra-ats.com> + Yuli Khodorkovskiy <ykhodorkovskiy@tresys.com> + Sherine Khoury <skhoury@redhat.com> + Nathan Kinder <nkinder@redhat.com> + Lee Kinser <lee.kinser@gmail.com> + Evgeny Kolesnikov <ekolesni@redhat.com> + Peter 'Pessoft' Kolínek <github@pessoft.com> + Luke Kordell <luke.t.kordell@lmco.com> + Malte Kraus <malte.kraus@suse.com> + Seth Kress <seth.kress@dsainc.com> + Felix Krohn <felix.krohn@helvetia.ch> + kspargur <kspargur@kspargur.csb> + Amit Kumar <amitkuma@redhat.com> + Fen Labalme <fen@civicactions.com> + Dexter Le <dexter.le@sap.com> + Ade Lee <alee@redhat.com> + Christopher Lee <Crleekwc@gmail.com> + Ian Lee <lee1001@llnl.gov> + Jarrett Lee <jarrettl@umd.edu> + Joseph Lenox <joseph.lenox@collins.com> + Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@redhat.com> + Markus Linnala <Markus.Linnala@knowit.fi> + Flos Lonicerae <lonicerae@gmail.com> + Simon Lukasik <slukasik@redhat.com> + Milan Lysonek <mlysonek@redhat.com> + Fredrik Lysén <fredrik@pipemore.se> + Caitlin Macleod <caitelatte@gmail.com> + Nick Maludy <nmaludy@gmail.com> + Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@fedoraproject.org> + Matus Marhefka <mmarhefk@redhat.com> + Jamie Lorwey Martin <jlmartin@redhat.com> + Carlos Matos <cmatos@redhat.com> + Robert McAllister <rmcallis@redhat.com> + Karen McCarron <kmccarro@redhat.com> + Michael McConachie <michael@redhat.com> + Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de> + Khary Mendez <kmendez@redhat.com> + Rodney Mercer <rmercer@harris.com> + Matt Micene <nzwulfin@gmail.com> + Brian Millett <bmillett@gmail.com> + Takuya Mishina <tmishina@jp.ibm.com> + Mixer9 <35545791+Mixer9@users.noreply.github.com> + mmosel <mmosel@kde.example.com> + Zbynek Moravec <zmoravec@redhat.com> + Kazuo Moriwaka <moriwaka@users.noreply.github.com> + Michael Moseley <michael@eclipse.ncsc.mil> + Renaud Métrich <rmetrich@redhat.com> + Joe Nall <joe@nall.com> + Neiloy <neiloy@redhat.com> + Axel Nennker <axel@nennker.de> + Michele Newman <mnewman@redhat.com> + nnerdmann <128606223+nnerdmann@users.noreply.github.com> + Sean O'Keeffe <seanokeeffe797@gmail.com> + Jiri Odehnal <jodehnal@redhat.com> + Ilya Okomin <ilya.okomin@oracle.com> + Kaustubh Padegaonkar <theTuxRacer@gmail.com> + Michael Palmiotto <mpalmiotto@tresys.com> + Eryx Paredes <eryxp@lyft.com> + Max R.D. Parmer <maxp@trystero.is> + Arnaud Patard <apatard@hupstream.com> + Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@redhat.com> + pcactr <paul.c.arnold4.ctr@mail.mil> + Kenneth Peeples <kennethwpeeples@gmail.com> + Nathan Peters <Nathaniel.Peters@ca.com> + Frank Lin PIAT <fpiat@klabs.be> + Stefan Pietsch <mail.ipv4v6+gh@gmail.com> + piggyvenus <piggyvenus@gmail.com> + Vojtech Polasek <vpolasek@redhat.com> + Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com> + Nick Poyant <npoyant@redhat.com> + Martin Preisler <mpreisle@redhat.com> + Wesley Ceraso Prudencio <wcerasop@redhat.com> + Raphael Sanchez Prudencio <rsprudencio@redhat.com> + T.O. Radzy Radzykewycz <radzy@windriver.com> + rain-Qing <yangyuqing6@qq.com> + Kenyon Ralph <kenyon@kenyonralph.com> + Mike Ralph <mralph@redhat.com> + Federico Ramirez <federico.r.ramirez@oracle.com> + rchikov <rumen.chikov@suse.com> + Rick Renshaw <Richard_Renshaw@xtoenergy.com> + Chris Reynolds <c.reynolds82@gmail.com> + rhayes <rhayes@rivierautilities.com> + Pat Riehecky <riehecky@fnal.gov> + rlucente-se-jboss <rlucente@redhat.com> + Juan Antonio Osorio Robles <juan.osoriorobles@eu.equinix.com> + Matt Rogers <mrogers@redhat.com> + Jesse Roland <jesse.roland@onyxpoint.com> + Joshua Roys <roysjosh@gmail.com> + rrenshaw <bofh69@yahoo.com> + Chris Ruffalo <chris.ruffalo@gmail.com> + rumch-se <77793453+rumch-se@users.noreply.github.com> + rutvik23 <rutksh@gmail.com> + Ray Shaw (Cont ARL/CISD) rvshaw <rvshaw@esme.arl.army.mil> + Earl Sampson <ESampson@suse.com> + sampsone <esampson@suse.com> + Willy Santos <wsantos@redhat.com> + Nagarjuna Sarvepalli <snagarju@redhat.com> + Anderson Sasaki <33833274+ansasaki@users.noreply.github.com> + Gautam Satish <gautams@hpe.com> + Watson Sato <wsato@redhat.com> + Satoru SATOH <satoru.satoh@gmail.com> + Alexander Scheel <alexander.m.scheel@gmail.com> + Bryan Schneiders <pschneiders@trisept.com> + shaneboulden <shane.boulden@gmail.com> + Vincent Shen <wenshen@redhat.com> + Dhriti Shikhar <dhriti.shikhar.rokz@gmail.com> + Spencer Shimko <sshimko@tresys.com> + Mark Shoger <mshoger@redhat.com> + Shane Siebken <shane.siebken@capellaspace.com> + THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> + Thomas Sjögren <konstruktoid@users.noreply.github.com> + Jindrich Skacel <102800748+jskacel@users.noreply.github.com> + Francisco Slavin <fslavin@tresys.com> + Dave Smith <dsmith@eclipse.ncsc.mil> + David Smith <dsmith@fornax.eclipse.ncsc.mil> + Kevin Spargur <kspargur@redhat.com> + Kenneth Stailey <kstailey.lists@gmail.com> + Leland Steinke <leland.j.steinke.ctr@mail.mil> + Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com> + Brian Stinson <brian@bstinson.com> + Jake Stookey <jakestookey@gmail.com> + Jonathan Sturges <jsturges@redhat.com> + svet-se <svetlin.boychev@suse.com> + teacup-on-rockingchair <315160+teacup-on-rockingchair@users.noreply.github.com> + Ian Tewksbury <itewk@redhat.com> + Philippe Thierry <phil@reseau-libre.net> + Simon THOBY <git@nightmared.fr> + Derek Thurston <thegrit@gmail.com> + tianzhenjia <jiatianzhen@cmss.chinamobile.com> + Greg Tinsley <gtinsley@redhat.com> + Paul Tittle <ptittle@cmf.nrl.navy.mil> + tom <tom@localhost.localdomain> + tomas.hudik <tomas.hudik@embedit.cz> + Jeb Trayer <jeb.d.trayer@uscg.mil> + TrilokGeer <tgeer@redhat.com> + Viktors Trubovics <viktors.trubovics@suse.com> + Nico Truzzolino <nico.truzzolino@gmx.de> + Brian Turek <brian.turek@gmail.com> + Matěj Týč <matyc@redhat.com> + VadimDor <29509093+VadimDor@users.noreply.github.com> + Trevor Vaughan <tvaughan@onyxpoint.com> + vtrubovics <82443408+vtrubovics@users.noreply.github.com> + Samuel Warren <swarren@redhat.com> + wcushen <54533890+wcushen@users.noreply.github.com> + Shawn Wells <shawn@shawndwells.io> + Daniel E. White <linuxdan@users.noreply.github.com> + Bernhard M. Wiedemann <bwiedemann@suse.de> + Roy Williams <roywilli@roywilli.redhat.com> + Willumpie <willumpie@xs4all.nl> + Rob Wilmoth <rwilmoth@redhat.com> + win97pro <win97pro@protonmail.com> + Lucas Yamanishi <lucas.yamanishi@onyxpoint.com> + Xirui Yang <xirui.yang@oracle.com> + yarunachalam <yarunachalam@suse.com> + Guang Yee <guang.yee@suse.com> + Achilleas John Yfantis <ayfantis@redhat.com> + YiLin.Li <YiLin.Li@linux.alibaba.com> + YuQing <yyq0391@163.com> + Kevin Zimmerman <kevin.zimmerman@kitware.com> + Luigi Mario Zuccarelli <luzuccar@redhat.com> + Jan Černý <jcerny@redhat.com> + Michal Šrubař <msrubar@redhat.com> + https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/content/releases/latest + + + [DRAFT] DISA STIG for Oracle Linux 9 - Beta Security Onion Solutions profile + This is a draft profile based on its OL8 version for experimental purposes. +It is not based on the DISA STIG for OL9, because this one was not available at time of +the release. Additionally, the original security profile has been modified by Security Onion Solutions as an experimental implementation of STIGs on a Security Onion grid. + https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/downloads/?_dl_facet_stigs=operating-systems%2Cunix-linux + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Settings + Contains rules that check correct system settings. + + Installing and Maintaining Software + The following sections contain information on +security-relevant choices during the initial operating system +installation process and the setup of software +updates. + + Prefer to use a 64-bit Operating System when supported + Prefer installation of 64-bit operating systems when the CPU supports it. + There is no remediation besides installing a 64-bit operating system. + BP28(R10) + Use of a 64-bit operating system offers a few advantages, like a larger address space range for +Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and systematic presence of No eXecute and Execute Disable (NX/XD) protection bits. + + + + + + + + + System and Software Integrity + System and software integrity can be gained by installing antivirus, increasing +system encryption strength with FIPS, verifying installed software, enabling SELinux, +installing an Intrusion Prevention System, etc. However, installing or enabling integrity +checking tools cannot prevent intrusions, but they can detect that an intrusion +may have occurred. Requirements for integrity checking may be highly dependent on +the environment in which the system will be used. Snapshot-based approaches such +as AIDE may induce considerable overhead in the presence of frequent software updates. + + Software Integrity Checking + Both the AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) +software and the RPM package management system provide +mechanisms for verifying the integrity of installed software. +AIDE uses snapshots of file metadata (such as hashes) and compares these +to current system files in order to detect changes. + +The RPM package management system can conduct integrity +checks by comparing information in its metadata database with +files installed on the system. + + Integrity Scan Notification Email Address + Specify the email address for designated personnel if baseline +configurations are changed in an unauthorized manner. + root@localhost + + + Verify Integrity with RPM + The RPM package management system includes the ability +to verify the integrity of installed packages by comparing the +installed files with information about the files taken from the +package metadata stored in the RPM database. Although an attacker +could corrupt the RPM database (analogous to attacking the AIDE +database as described above), this check can still reveal +modification of important files. To list which files on the system differ from what is expected by the RPM database: +$ rpm -qVa +See the man page for rpm to see a complete explanation of each column. + + Verify File Hashes with RPM + Without cryptographic integrity protections, system +executables and files can be altered by unauthorized users without +detection. +The RPM package management system can check the hashes of +installed software packages, including many that are important to system +security. +To verify that the cryptographic hash of system files and commands matches vendor +values, run the following command to list which files on the system +have hashes that differ from what is expected by the RPM database: +$ rpm -Va --noconfig | grep '^..5' +A "c" in the second column indicates that a file is a configuration file, which +may appropriately be expected to change. If the file was not expected to +change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means. +The package can then be reinstalled to restore the file. +Run the following command to determine which package owns the file: +$ rpm -qf FILENAME +The package can be reinstalled from a yum repository using the command: +$ sudo yum reinstall PACKAGENAME +Alternatively, the package can be reinstalled from trusted media using the command: +$ sudo rpm -Uvh PACKAGENAME + 11 + 2 + 3 + 9 + 5.10.4.1 + APO01.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS06.02 + 3.3.8 + 3.4.1 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001749 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(c)(1) + 164.312(c)(2) + 164.312(e)(2)(i) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-6(d) + CM-6(c) + SI-7 + SI-7(1) + SI-7(6) + AU-9(3) + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + PR.IP-1 + Req-11.5 + 11.5.2 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The hashes of important files like system executables should match the +information given by the RPM database. Executables with erroneous hashes could +be a sign of nefarious activity on the system. + +# Find which files have incorrect hash (not in /etc, because of the system related config files) and then get files names +files_with_incorrect_hash="$(rpm -Va --noconfig | grep -E '^..5' | awk '{print $NF}' )" + +# From files names get package names and change newline to space, because rpm writes each package to new line +packages_to_reinstall="$(rpm -qf $files_with_incorrect_hash | tr '\n' ' ')" + + +yum reinstall -y $packages_to_reinstall + + - name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command (dnf)' + set_fact: + package_manager_reinstall_cmd: dnf reinstall -y + when: ansible_distribution == "Fedora" + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_hashes + +- name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command (yum)' + set_fact: + package_manager_reinstall_cmd: yum reinstall -y + when: (ansible_distribution == "RedHat" or ansible_distribution == "CentOS" or ansible_distribution + == "OracleLinux") + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_hashes + +- name: 'Set fact: Package manager reinstall command (zypper)' + set_fact: + package_manager_reinstall_cmd: zypper in -f -y + when: ansible_distribution == "SLES" + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_hashes + +- name: Read files with incorrect hash + command: rpm -Va --nodeps --nosize --nomtime --nordev --nocaps --nolinkto --nouser + --nogroup --nomode --noghost --noconfig + register: files_with_incorrect_hash + changed_when: false + failed_when: files_with_incorrect_hash.rc > 1 + check_mode: false + when: (package_manager_reinstall_cmd is defined) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_hashes + +- name: Create list of packages + command: rpm -qf "{{ item }}" + with_items: '{{ files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines | map(''regex_findall'', + ''^[.]+[5]+.* (\/.*)'', ''\1'') | map(''join'') | select(''match'', ''(\/.*)'') + | list | unique }}' + register: list_of_packages + changed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines is defined + - (files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines | length > 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_hashes + +- name: Reinstall packages of files with incorrect hash + command: '{{ package_manager_reinstall_cmd }} ''{{ item }}''' + with_items: '{{ list_of_packages.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list + | unique }}' + when: + - files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines is defined + - (package_manager_reinstall_cmd is defined and (files_with_incorrect_hash.stdout_lines + | length > 0)) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_hashes + + + + + + + + + + Verify and Correct Ownership with RPM + The RPM package management system can check file ownership +permissions of installed software packages, including many that are +important to system security. After locating a file with incorrect +permissions, which can be found with +rpm -Va | awk '{ if (substr($0,6,1)=="U" || substr($0,7,1)=="G") print $NF }' +run the following command to determine which package owns it: +$ rpm -qf FILENAME +Next, run the following command to reset its permissions to +the correct values: +$ sudo rpm --setugids PACKAGENAME + Profiles may require that specific files be owned by root while the default owner defined +by the vendor is different. +Such files will be reported as a finding and need to be evaluated according to your policy +and deployment environment. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 9 + 5.10.4.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.8 + 3.4.1 + CCI-001494 + CCI-001496 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-003-8 R6 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CM-6(d) + CM-6(c) + SI-7 + SI-7(1) + SI-7(6) + AU-9(3) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-1 + Req-11.5 + 11.5.2 + SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 + SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 + SRG-OS-000278-GPOS-00108 + Ownership of binaries and configuration files that is incorrect +could allow an unauthorized user to gain privileges that they should +not have. The ownership set by the vendor should be maintained. Any +deviations from this baseline should be investigated. + +# Declare array to hold set of RPM packages we need to correct permissions for +declare -A SETPERMS_RPM_DICT + +# Create a list of files on the system having permissions different from what +# is expected by the RPM database +readarray -t FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS < <(rpm -Va --nofiledigest | awk '{ if (substr($0,6,1)=="U" || substr($0,7,1)=="G") print $NF }') + +for FILE_PATH in "${FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS[@]}" +do + RPM_PACKAGE=$(rpm -qf "$FILE_PATH") + # Use an associative array to store packages as it's keys, not having to care about duplicates. + SETPERMS_RPM_DICT["$RPM_PACKAGE"]=1 +done + +# For each of the RPM packages left in the list -- reset its permissions to the +# correct values +for RPM_PACKAGE in "${!SETPERMS_RPM_DICT[@]}" +do + rpm --setugids "${RPM_PACKAGE}" +done + + - name: Read list of files with incorrect ownership + command: rpm -Va --nodeps --nosignature --nofiledigest --nosize --nomtime --nordev + --nocaps --nolinkto --nomode + register: files_with_incorrect_ownership + failed_when: files_with_incorrect_ownership.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_ownership + +- name: Create list of packages + command: rpm -qf "{{ item }}" + with_items: '{{ files_with_incorrect_ownership.stdout_lines | map(''regex_findall'', + ''^[.]+[U|G]+.* (\/.*)'', ''\1'') | map(''join'') | select(''match'', ''(\/.*)'') + | list | unique }}' + register: list_of_packages + changed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: (files_with_incorrect_ownership.stdout_lines | length > 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_ownership + +- name: Correct file ownership with RPM + command: rpm --setugids '{{ item }}' + with_items: '{{ list_of_packages.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list + | unique }}' + when: (files_with_incorrect_ownership.stdout_lines | length > 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_ownership + + + + + + + + + + Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPM + The RPM package management system can check file access permissions +of installed software packages, including many that are important +to system security. +Verify that the file permissions of system files +and commands match vendor values. Check the file permissions +with the following command: +$ sudo rpm -Va | awk '{ if (substr($0,2,1)=="M") print $NF }' +Output indicates files that do not match vendor defaults. +After locating a file with incorrect permissions, +run the following command to determine which package owns it: +$ rpm -qf FILENAME + +Next, run the following command to reset its permissions to +the correct values: +$ sudo rpm --setperms PACKAGENAME + Profiles may require that specific files have stricter file permissions than defined by the +vendor. +Such files will be reported as a finding and need to be evaluated according to your policy +and deployment environment. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 9 + 5.10.4.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.8 + 3.4.1 + CCI-001493 + CCI-001494 + CCI-001495 + CCI-001496 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(c)(1) + 164.312(c)(2) + 164.312(e)(2)(i) + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-003-8 R6 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CM-6(d) + CM-6(c) + SI-7 + SI-7(1) + SI-7(6) + AU-9(3) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-1 + Req-11.5 + 11.5.2 + SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 + SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 + SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 + SRG-OS-000278-GPOS-00108 + Permissions on system binaries and configuration files that are too generous +could allow an unauthorized user to gain privileges that they should not have. +The permissions set by the vendor should be maintained. Any deviations from +this baseline should be investigated. + +# Declare array to hold set of RPM packages we need to correct permissions for +declare -A SETPERMS_RPM_DICT + +# Create a list of files on the system having permissions different from what +# is expected by the RPM database +readarray -t FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS < <(rpm -Va --nofiledigest | awk '{ if (substr($0,2,1)=="M") print $NF }') + +for FILE_PATH in "${FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS[@]}" +do + # NOTE: some files maybe controlled by more then one package + readarray -t RPM_PACKAGES < <(rpm -qf "${FILE_PATH}") + for RPM_PACKAGE in "${RPM_PACKAGES[@]}" + do + # Use an associative array to store packages as it's keys, not having to care about duplicates. + SETPERMS_RPM_DICT["$RPM_PACKAGE"]=1 + done +done + +# For each of the RPM packages left in the list -- reset its permissions to the +# correct values +for RPM_PACKAGE in "${!SETPERMS_RPM_DICT[@]}" +do + rpm --restore "${RPM_PACKAGE}" +done + + - name: Read list of files with incorrect permissions + command: rpm -Va --nodeps --nosignature --nofiledigest --nosize --nomtime --nordev + --nocaps --nolinkto --nouser --nogroup + register: files_with_incorrect_permissions + failed_when: files_with_incorrect_permissions.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_permissions + +- name: Create list of packages + command: rpm -qf "{{ item }}" + with_items: '{{ files_with_incorrect_permissions.stdout_lines | map(''regex_findall'', + ''^[.]+[M]+.* (\/.*)'', ''\1'') | map(''join'') | select(''match'', ''(\/.*)'') + | list | unique }}' + register: list_of_packages + changed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: (files_with_incorrect_permissions.stdout_lines | length > 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_permissions + +- name: Correct file permissions with RPM + command: rpm --setperms '{{ item }}' + with_items: '{{ list_of_packages.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list + | unique }}' + when: (files_with_incorrect_permissions.stdout_lines | length > 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(d) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(6) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - high_complexity + - high_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rpm_verify_permissions + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Integrity with AIDE + AIDE conducts integrity checks by comparing information about +files with previously-gathered information. Ideally, the AIDE database is +created immediately after initial system configuration, and then again after any +software update. AIDE is highly configurable, with further configuration +information located in /usr/share/doc/aide-VERSION. + + + Install AIDE + The aide package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install aide + BP28(R51) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.3 + APO01.06 + BAI01.06 + BAI02.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS04.07 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + CCI-002696 + CCI-002699 + CCI-001744 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.6 + 1034 + 1288 + 1341 + 1417 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.8.2.3 + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-7 + PR.DS-1 + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + PR.IP-1 + PR.IP-3 + Req-11.5 + 11.5.2 + SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 + The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then + yum install -y "aide" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure aide is installed + package: + name: aide + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_aide_installed + + include install_aide + +class install_aide { + package { 'aide': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=aide + + +[[packages]] +name = "aide" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Build and Test AIDE Database + Run the following command to generate a new database: + +$ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --init + +By default, the database will be written to the file + +/var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz. + +Storing the database, the configuration file /etc/aide.conf, and the binary +/usr/sbin/aide +(or hashes of these files), in a secure location (such as on read-only media) provides additional assurance about their integrity. +The newly-generated database can be installed as follows: + +$ sudo cp /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz + +To initiate a manual check, run the following command: +$ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --check +If this check produces any unexpected output, investigate. + BP28(R51) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.3 + APO01.06 + BAI01.06 + BAI02.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS04.07 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.8.2.3 + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-7 + PR.DS-1 + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + PR.IP-1 + PR.IP-3 + Req-11.5 + 11.5.2 + SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 + For AIDE to be effective, an initial database of "known-good" information about files +must be captured and it should be able to be verified against the installed files. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then + yum install -y "aide" +fi + +/usr/sbin/aide --init +/bin/cp -p /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure AIDE is installed + package: + name: '{{ item }}' + state: present + with_items: + - aide + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_build_database + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Build and Test AIDE Database + command: /usr/sbin/aide --init + changed_when: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_build_database + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check whether the stock AIDE Database exists + stat: + path: /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz + register: aide_database_stat + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_build_database + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Stage AIDE Database + copy: + src: /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz + dest: /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz + backup: true + remote_src: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (aide_database_stat.stat.exists is defined and aide_database_stat.stat.exists) + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_build_database + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify the Audit Tools + The operating system file integrity tool must be configured to protect the integrity of the audit tools. + CCI-001496 + AU-9(3) + AU-9(3).1 + SRG-OS-000278-GPOS-00108 + Protecting the integrity of the tools used for auditing purposes is a +critical step toward ensuring the integrity of audit information. Audit +information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, +and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system +activity. + +Audit tools include but are not limited to vendor-provided and open-source +audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information +system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report +generators. + +It is not uncommon for attackers to replace the audit tools or inject code +into the existing tools to provide the capability to hide or erase system +activity from the audit logs. + +To address this risk, audit tools must be cryptographically signed to +provide the capability to identify when the audit tools have been modified, +manipulated, or replaced. An example is a checksum hash of the file or +files. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then + yum install -y "aide" +fi + + + + + + + + + + +if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/auditctl.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then +sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/auditctl.*#/usr/sbin/auditctl p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf +else +echo "/usr/sbin/auditctl p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf +fi + +if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/auditd.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then +sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/auditd.*#/usr/sbin/auditd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf +else +echo "/usr/sbin/auditd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf +fi + +if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/ausearch.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then +sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/ausearch.*#/usr/sbin/ausearch p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf +else +echo "/usr/sbin/ausearch p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf +fi + +if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/aureport.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then +sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/aureport.*#/usr/sbin/aureport p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf +else +echo "/usr/sbin/aureport p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf +fi + +if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/autrace.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then +sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/autrace.*#/usr/sbin/autrace p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf +else +echo "/usr/sbin/autrace p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf +fi + +if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/augenrules.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then +sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/augenrules.*#/usr/sbin/augenrules p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf +else +echo "/usr/sbin/augenrules p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf +fi + +if grep -i '^.*/usr/sbin/rsyslogd.*$' /etc/aide.conf; then +sed -i "s#.*/usr/sbin/rsyslogd.*#/usr/sbin/rsyslogd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512#" /etc/aide.conf +else +echo "/usr/sbin/rsyslogd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512" >> /etc/aide.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure aide is installed + package: + name: '{{ item }}' + state: present + with_items: + - aide + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 + - aide_check_audit_tools + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set audit_tools fact + set_fact: + audit_tools: + - /usr/sbin/auditctl + - /usr/sbin/auditd + - /usr/sbin/augenrules + - /usr/sbin/aureport + - /usr/sbin/ausearch + - /usr/sbin/autrace + - /usr/sbin/rsyslogd + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 + - aide_check_audit_tools + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure existing AIDE configuration for audit tools are correct + lineinfile: + path: /etc/aide.conf + regexp: ^{{ item }}\s + line: '{{ item }} p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512' + with_items: '{{ audit_tools }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 + - aide_check_audit_tools + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure AIDE to properly protect audit tools + lineinfile: + path: /etc/aide.conf + line: '{{ item }} p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512' + with_items: '{{ audit_tools }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3).1 + - aide_check_audit_tools + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE + At a minimum, AIDE should be configured to run a weekly scan. +To implement a daily execution of AIDE at 4:05am using cron, add the following line to /etc/crontab: +05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check +To implement a weekly execution of AIDE at 4:05am using cron, add the following line to /etc/crontab: +05 4 * * 0 root /usr/sbin/aide --check +AIDE can be executed periodically through other means; this is merely one example. +The usage of cron's special time codes, such as @daily and +@weekly is acceptable. + BP28(R51) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.3 + APO01.06 + BAI01.06 + BAI02.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS04.07 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001744 + CCI-002699 + CCI-002702 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.8.2.3 + SI-7 + SI-7(1) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-7 + PR.DS-1 + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + PR.IP-1 + PR.IP-3 + Req-11.5 + 11.5.2 + SRG-OS-000363-GPOS-00150 + SRG-OS-000446-GPOS-00200 + SRG-OS-000447-GPOS-00201 + By default, AIDE does not install itself for periodic execution. Periodically +running AIDE is necessary to reveal unexpected changes in installed files. + +Unauthorized changes to the baseline configuration could make the system vulnerable +to various attacks or allow unauthorized access to the operating system. Changes to +operating system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may +be relevant to security. + +Detecting such changes and providing an automated response can help avoid unintended, +negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security state of the operating +system. The operating system's Information Management Officer (IMO)/Information System +Security Officer (ISSO) and System Administrators (SAs) must be notified via email and/or +monitoring system trap when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then + yum install -y "aide" +fi + +if ! grep -q "/usr/sbin/aide --check" /etc/crontab ; then + echo "05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check" >> /etc/crontab +else + sed -i '\!^.* --check.*$!d' /etc/crontab + echo "05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check" >> /etc/crontab +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure AIDE is installed + package: + name: '{{ item }}' + state: present + with_items: + - aide + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_periodic_cron_checking + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set cron package name - RedHat + set_fact: + cron_pkg_name: cronie + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_os_family == "RedHat" or ansible_os_family == "Suse" + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_periodic_cron_checking + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set cron package name - Debian + set_fact: + cron_pkg_name: cron + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_os_family == "Debian" + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_periodic_cron_checking + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Install cron + package: + name: '{{ cron_pkg_name }}' + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_periodic_cron_checking + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE + cron: + name: run AIDE check + minute: 5 + hour: 4 + weekday: 0 + user: root + job: /usr/sbin/aide --check + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-11.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-11.5.2 + - aide_periodic_cron_checking + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details + AIDE should notify appropriate personnel of the details of a scan after the scan has been run. +If AIDE has already been configured for periodic execution in /etc/crontab, append the +following line to the existing AIDE line: + | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" root@localhost +Otherwise, add the following line to /etc/crontab: +05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" root@localhost +AIDE can be executed periodically through other means; this is merely one example. + BP28(R51) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 9 + BAI01.06 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + CCI-001744 + CCI-002699 + CCI-002702 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + CM-6(a) + CM-3(5) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.IP-3 + SRG-OS-000363-GPOS-00150 + SRG-OS-000446-GPOS-00200 + SRG-OS-000447-GPOS-00201 + Unauthorized changes to the baseline configuration could make the system vulnerable +to various attacks or allow unauthorized access to the operating system. Changes to +operating system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may +be relevant to security. + +Detecting such changes and providing an automated response can help avoid unintended, +negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security state of the operating +system. The operating system's Information Management Officer (IMO)/Information System +Security Officer (ISSO) and System Administrators (SAs) must be notified via email and/or +monitoring system trap when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then + yum install -y "aide" +fi +var_aide_scan_notification_email='' + + +CRONTAB=/etc/crontab +CRONDIRS='/etc/cron.d /etc/cron.daily /etc/cron.weekly /etc/cron.monthly' + +# NOTE: on some platforms, /etc/crontab may not exist +if [ -f /etc/crontab ]; then + CRONTAB_EXIST=/etc/crontab +fi + +if [ -f /var/spool/cron/root ]; then + VARSPOOL=/var/spool/cron/root +fi + +if ! grep -qR '^.*/usr/sbin/aide\s*\-\-check.*|.*\/bin\/mail\s*-s\s*".*"\s*.*@.*$' $CRONTAB_EXIST $VARSPOOL $CRONDIRS; then + echo "0 5 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s \"\$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check\" $var_aide_scan_notification_email" >> $CRONTAB +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_aide_scan_notification_email # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_aide_scan_notification_email: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure AIDE is installed + package: + name: '{{ item }}' + state: present + with_items: + - aide + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-3(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - aide_scan_notification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details + cron: + name: run AIDE check + minute: 5 + hour: 4 + weekday: 0 + user: root + job: /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" + {{ var_aide_scan_notification_email }} + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-3(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - aide_scan_notification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify Access Control Lists (ACLs) + By default, the acl option is added to the FIPSR ruleset in AIDE. +If using a custom ruleset or the acl option is missing, add acl +to the appropriate ruleset. +For example, add acl to the following line in /etc/aide.conf: +FIPSR = p+i+n+u+g+s+m+c+acl+selinux+xattrs+sha256 +AIDE rules can be configured in multiple ways; this is merely one example that is already +configured by default. + +The remediation provided with this rule adds acl to all rule sets available in +/etc/aide.conf + BP28(R51) + 2 + 3 + APO01.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.4 + SI-7 + SI-7(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + ACLs can provide permissions beyond those permitted through the file mode and must be +verified by the file integrity tools. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then + yum install -y "aide" +fi + +aide_conf="/etc/aide.conf" + +groups=$(LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" $aide_conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u) + +for group in $groups +do + config=$(grep "^$group\s*=" $aide_conf | cut -f2 -d '=' | tr -d ' ') + + if ! [[ $config = *acl* ]] + then + if [[ -z $config ]] + then + config="acl" + else + config=$config"+acl" + fi + fi + sed -i "s/^$group\s*=.*/$group = $config/g" $aide_conf +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather list of packages + package_facts: + manager: auto + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - aide_verify_acls + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Get rules groups + shell: | + set -o pipefail + LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" /etc/aide.conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u || true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' + register: find_rules_groups_results + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - aide_verify_acls + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the acl rule is present when aide is installed. + replace: + path: /etc/aide.conf + regexp: (^\s*{{ item }}\s*=\s*)(?!.*acl)([^\s]*) + replace: \g<1>\g<2>+acl + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' + with_items: '{{ find_rules_groups_results.stdout_lines | map(''trim'') | list }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - aide_verify_acls + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify Extended Attributes + By default, the xattrs option is added to the FIPSR ruleset in AIDE. +If using a custom ruleset or the xattrs option is missing, add xattrs +to the appropriate ruleset. +For example, add xattrs to the following line in /etc/aide.conf: +FIPSR = p+i+n+u+g+s+m+c+acl+selinux+xattrs+sha256 +AIDE rules can be configured in multiple ways; this is merely one example that is already +configured by default. + +The remediation provided with this rule adds xattrs to all rule sets available in +/etc/aide.conf + BP28(R51) + 2 + 3 + APO01.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.4 + SI-7 + SI-7(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Extended attributes in file systems are used to contain arbitrary data and file metadata +with security implications. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "aide" ; then + yum install -y "aide" +fi + +aide_conf="/etc/aide.conf" + +groups=$(LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" $aide_conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u) + +for group in $groups +do + config=$(grep "^$group\s*=" $aide_conf | cut -f2 -d '=' | tr -d ' ') + + if ! [[ $config = *xattrs* ]] + then + if [[ -z $config ]] + then + config="xattrs" + else + config=$config"+xattrs" + fi + fi + sed -i "s/^$group\s*=.*/$group = $config/g" $aide_conf +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather list of packages + package_facts: + manager: auto + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - aide_verify_ext_attributes + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Get rules groups + shell: | + set -o pipefail + LC_ALL=C grep "^[A-Z][A-Za-z_]*" /etc/aide.conf | grep -v "^ALLXTRAHASHES" | cut -f1 -d '=' | tr -d ' ' | sort -u || true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' + register: find_rules_groups_results + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - aide_verify_ext_attributes + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the xattrs rule is present when aide is installed. + replace: + path: /etc/aide.conf + regexp: (^\s*{{ item }}\s*=\s*)(?!.*xattrs)([^\s]*) + replace: \g<1>\g<2>+xattrs + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '''aide'' in ansible_facts.packages' + with_items: '{{ find_rules_groups_results.stdout_lines | map(''trim'') | list }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - NIST-800-53-SI-7(1) + - aide_verify_ext_attributes + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Audit Tools Must Be Group-owned by Root + Oracle Linux 9 systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools, and the corresponding rights the user enjoys, to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. + +Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. + +Audit tools must have the correct group owner. + CCI-001493 + CCI-001494 + CCI-001495 + AU-9 + SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 + SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 + SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 + Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. +Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operations on audit information. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chgrp 0 /sbin/auditctl +chgrp 0 /sbin/aureport +chgrp 0 /sbin/ausearch +chgrp 0 /sbin/autrace +chgrp 0 /sbin/auditd +chgrp 0 /sbin/rsyslogd +chgrp 0 /sbin/augenrules + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl + stat: + path: /sbin/auditctl + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/auditctl + file: + path: /sbin/auditctl + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport + stat: + path: /sbin/aureport + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/aureport + file: + path: /sbin/aureport + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch + stat: + path: /sbin/ausearch + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/ausearch + file: + path: /sbin/ausearch + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace + stat: + path: /sbin/autrace + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/autrace + file: + path: /sbin/autrace + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd + stat: + path: /sbin/auditd + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/auditd + file: + path: /sbin/auditd + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/rsyslogd + stat: + path: /sbin/rsyslogd + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/rsyslogd + file: + path: /sbin/rsyslogd + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules + stat: + path: /sbin/augenrules + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /sbin/augenrules + file: + path: /sbin/augenrules + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_group_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Audit Tools Must Be Owned by Root + Oracle Linux 9 systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools, and the corresponding rights the user enjoys, to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. + +Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. + +Audit tools must have the correct owner. + CCI-001493 + CCI-001494 + CCI-001495 + AU-9 + SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 + SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 + SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 + Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. +Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operations on audit information. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chown 0 /sbin/auditctl +chown 0 /sbin/aureport +chown 0 /sbin/ausearch +chown 0 /sbin/autrace +chown 0 /sbin/auditd +chown 0 /sbin/rsyslogd +chown 0 /sbin/augenrules + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl + stat: + path: /sbin/auditctl + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/auditctl + file: + path: /sbin/auditctl + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport + stat: + path: /sbin/aureport + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/aureport + file: + path: /sbin/aureport + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch + stat: + path: /sbin/ausearch + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/ausearch + file: + path: /sbin/ausearch + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace + stat: + path: /sbin/autrace + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/autrace + file: + path: /sbin/autrace + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd + stat: + path: /sbin/auditd + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/auditd + file: + path: /sbin/auditd + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/rsyslogd + stat: + path: /sbin/rsyslogd + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/rsyslogd + file: + path: /sbin/rsyslogd + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules + stat: + path: /sbin/augenrules + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /sbin/augenrules + file: + path: /sbin/augenrules + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_ownership + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Audit Tools Must Have a Mode of 0755 or Less Permissive + Oracle Linux 9 systems providing tools to interface with audit information will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools, and the corresponding rights the user enjoys, to make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. + +Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. + +Audit tools must have a mode of 0755 or less permissive. + CCI-001493 + AU-9 + SRG-OS-000256-GPOS-00097 + SRG-OS-000257-GPOS-00098 + SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 + Protecting audit information also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. +Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operations on audit information. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/auditctl + +chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/aureport + +chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/ausearch + +chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/autrace + +chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/auditd + +chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/rsyslogd + +chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt /sbin/augenrules + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /sbin/auditctl + stat: + path: /sbin/auditctl + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/auditctl + file: + path: /sbin/auditctl + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/aureport + stat: + path: /sbin/aureport + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/aureport + file: + path: /sbin/aureport + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/ausearch + stat: + path: /sbin/ausearch + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/ausearch + file: + path: /sbin/ausearch + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/autrace + stat: + path: /sbin/autrace + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/autrace + file: + path: /sbin/autrace + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/auditd + stat: + path: /sbin/auditd + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/auditd + file: + path: /sbin/auditd + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/rsyslogd + stat: + path: /sbin/rsyslogd + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/rsyslogd + file: + path: /sbin/rsyslogd + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /sbin/augenrules + stat: + path: /sbin/augenrules + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-s,g-ws,o-wt on /sbin/augenrules + file: + path: /sbin/augenrules + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - configure_strategy + - file_audit_tools_permissions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + + Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) + The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) is a computer security standard which +is developed by the U.S. Government and industry working groups to validate the quality +of cryptographic modules. The FIPS standard provides four security levels to ensure +adequate coverage of different industries, implementation of cryptographic modules, and +organizational sizes and requirements. + +FIPS 140-2 is the current standard for validating that mechanisms used to access cryptographic modules +utilize authentication that meets industry and government requirements. For government systems, this allows +Security Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4 for use on Oracle Linux 9. + +See http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html for more information. + + + Enable Dracut FIPS Module + To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: +fips-mode-setup --enable +To enable FIPS, the system requires that the fips module is added in dracut configuration. +Check if /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf contain add_dracutmodules+=" fips " + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security +systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems +(including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology +Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing +and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are +operated for them under contract. +See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has +undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design +information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source +software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to +this process. + CCI-000068 + CCI-000803 + CCI-002450 + 1446 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + IA-7 + SC-13 + CM-6(a) + SC-12 + FCS_RBG_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223 + Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to +protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher +standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested +and validated. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) ); then + +fips-mode-setup --enable +FIPS_CONF="/etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf" +if ! grep "^add_dracutmodules+=\" fips \"" $FIPS_CONF; then + echo "add_dracutmodules+=\" fips \"" >> $FIPS_CONF +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Check to see the current status of FIPS mode + command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --check + register: is_fips_enabled + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-7 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - enable_dracut_fips_module + - high_severity + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Enable FIPS mode + command: /usr/bin/fips-mode-setup --enable + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) + - is_fips_enabled.stdout.find('FIPS mode is enabled.') == -1 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-7 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - enable_dracut_fips_module + - high_severity + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Enable Dracut FIPS Module + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf + line: add_dracutmodules+=" fips " + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-7 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - enable_dracut_fips_module + - high_severity + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Enable FIPS Mode + +To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: +fips-mode-setup --enable + +The fips-mode-setup command will configure the system in +FIPS mode by automatically configuring the following: +Setting the kernel FIPS mode flag (/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled) to 1Creating /etc/system-fipsSetting the system crypto policy in /etc/crypto-policies/config to Loading the Dracut fips module + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + This rule DOES NOT CHECK if the components of the operating system are FIPS certified. +You can find the list of FIPS certified modules at +https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules/search. +This rule checks if the system is running in FIPS mode. See the rule description for more information about what it means. + CCI-000068 + CCI-000803 + CCI-002450 + 1446 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-3(6) + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + IA-7 + SC-13 + CM-6(a) + SC-12 + FCS_COP.1(1) + FCS_COP.1(2) + FCS_COP.1(3) + FCS_COP.1(4) + FCS_CKM.1 + FCS_CKM.2 + FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 + FCS_RBG_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223 + SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 + Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to +protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher +standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested +and validated. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) ) && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +var_system_crypto_policy='' + + +fips-mode-setup --enable + +stderr_of_call=$(update-crypto-policies --set ${var_system_crypto_policy} 2>&1 > /dev/null) +rc=$? + +if test "$rc" = 127; then + echo "$stderr_of_call" >&2 + echo "Make sure that the script is installed on the remediated system." >&2 + echo "See output of the 'dnf provides update-crypto-policies' command" >&2 + echo "to see what package to (re)install" >&2 + + false # end with an error code +elif test "$rc" != 0; then + echo "Error invoking the update-crypto-policies script: $stderr_of_call" >&2 + false # end with an error code +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure '/etc/system-fips' exists + On a system where FIPS mode is enabled, /etc/system-fips must exist. +To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: +fips-mode-setup --enable + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes +FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use +cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information +in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as +defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform +Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in +designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal +departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under +contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by +a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing +documentation, test results, design information, and independent third +party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is +capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor +submits to this process. + CCI-000068 + CCI-000803 + CCI-002450 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + IA-7 + SC-13 + CM-6(a) + SC-12 + Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to +protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher +standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested +and validated. + + + + + + + + + Set kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' to 1 + System running in FIPS mode is indicated by kernel parameter +'crypto.fips_enabled'. This parameter should be set to 1 in FIPS mode. +To enable FIPS mode, run the following command: +fips-mode-setup --enable + +To enable strict FIPS compliance, the fips=1 kernel option needs to be added to the kernel boot +parameters during system installation so key generation is done with FIPS-approved algorithms +and continuous monitoring tests in place. + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security +systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems +(including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology +Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing +and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are +operated for them under contract. +See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has +undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design +information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source +software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to +this process. + CCI-000068 + CCI-000803 + CCI-000877 + CCI-001453 + CCI-002418 + CCI-002450 + CCI-002890 + CCI-003123 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + IA-7 + SC-13 + CM-6(a) + SC-12 + SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 + SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 + SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 + SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 + SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 + SRG-OS-000478-GPOS-00223 + Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to +protect data. The operating system must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher +standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested +and validated. + + + + + + + + + + + System Cryptographic Policies + Linux has the capability to centrally configure cryptographic polices. The command +update-crypto-policies is used to set the policy applicable for the various +cryptographic back-ends, such as SSL/TLS libraries. The configured cryptographic +policies will be the default policy used by these backends unless the application +user configures them otherwise. When the system has been configured to use the +centralized cryptographic policies, the administrator is assured that any application +that utilizes the supported backends will follow a policy that adheres to the +configured profile. + +Currently the supported backends are: +GnuTLS libraryOpenSSL libraryNSS libraryOpenJDKLibkrb5BINDOpenSSH +Applications and languages which rely on any of these backends will follow the +system policies as well. Examples are apache httpd, nginx, php, and others. + + SSH client RekeyLimit - size + Specify the size component of the rekey limit. This limit signifies amount +of data. After this amount of data is transferred through the connection, +the session key is renegotiated. The number is followed by K, M or G for +kilobytes, megabytes or gigabytes. Note that the RekeyLimit can be also +configured according to elapsed time. + 512M + 512M + 1G + + + SSH client RekeyLimit - time + Specify the time component of the rekey limit. The session key is +renegotiated after the defined amount of time passes. The number is followed +by units such as H or M for hours or minutes. Note that the RekeyLimit can +be also configured according to amount of transfered data. + 1h + 1h + + + The system-provided crypto policies + Specify the crypto policy for the system. + DEFAULT + DEFAULT + DEFAULT:NO-SHA1 + FIPS + FIPS:OSPP + LEGACY + FUTURE + NEXT + + + Install crypto-policies package + The crypto-policies package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install crypto-policies + FCS_COP.1(1) + FCS_COP.1(2) + FCS_COP.1(3) + FCS_COP.1(4) + FCS_CKM.1 + FCS_CKM.2 + FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 + SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 + SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 + Centralized cryptographic policies simplify applying secure ciphers across an operating system and +the applications that run on that operating system. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms +undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "crypto-policies" ; then + yum install -y "crypto-policies" +fi + + - name: Ensure crypto-policies is installed + package: + name: crypto-policies + state: present + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_crypto-policies_installed + + include install_crypto-policies + +class install_crypto-policies { + package { 'crypto-policies': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=crypto-policies + + +[[packages]] +name = "crypto-policies" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Configure BIND to use System Crypto Policy + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +BIND is supported by crypto policy, but the BIND configuration may be +set up to ignore it. + +To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the /etc/named.conf +includes the appropriate configuration: +In the options section of /etc/named.conf, make sure that the following line +is not commented out or superseded by later includes: +include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config"; + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + SC-13 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 + SRG-OS-000426-GPOS-00190 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the BIND service violate expectations, +and makes system configuration more fragmented. + +function remediate_bind_crypto_policy() { + CONFIG_FILE="/etc/named.conf" + if test -f "$CONFIG_FILE"; then + sed -i 's|options {|&\n\tinclude "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";|' "$CONFIG_FILE" + return 0 + else + echo "Aborting remediation as '$CONFIG_FILE' was not even found." >&2 + return 1 + fi +} + +remediate_bind_crypto_policy + + + + + + + + + + Configure System Cryptography Policy + To configure the system cryptography policy to use ciphers only from the +policy, run the following command: +$ sudo update-crypto-policies --set +The rule checks if settings for selected crypto policy are configured as expected. Configuration files in the /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends are either symlinks to correct files provided by Crypto-policies package or they are regular files in case crypto policy customizations are applied. +Crypto policies may be customized by crypto policy modules, in which case it is delimited from the base policy using a colon. + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes +FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use +cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information +in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as +defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform +Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in +designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal +departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under +contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by +a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing +documentation, test results, design information, and independent third +party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is +capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor +submits to this process. + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 1446 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R7.1 + AC-17(a) + AC-17(2) + CM-6(a) + MA-4(6) + SC-13 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + FCS_COP.1(1) + FCS_COP.1(2) + FCS_COP.1(3) + FCS_COP.1(4) + FCS_CKM.1 + FCS_CKM.2 + FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176 + SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 + SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 + Centralized cryptographic policies simplify applying secure ciphers across an operating system and +the applications that run on that operating system. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms +undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. + +var_system_crypto_policy='' + + +stderr_of_call=$(update-crypto-policies --set ${var_system_crypto_policy} 2>&1 > /dev/null) +rc=$? + +if test "$rc" = 127; then + echo "$stderr_of_call" >&2 + echo "Make sure that the script is installed on the remediated system." >&2 + echo "See output of the 'dnf provides update-crypto-policies' command" >&2 + echo "to see what package to (re)install" >&2 + + false # end with an error code +elif test "$rc" != 0; then + echo "Error invoking the update-crypto-policies script: $stderr_of_call" >&2 + false # end with an error code +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_system_crypto_policy # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_system_crypto_policy: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure System Cryptography Policy + lineinfile: + path: /etc/crypto-policies/config + regexp: ^(?!#)(\S+)$ + line: '{{ var_system_crypto_policy }}' + create: true + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - configure_crypto_policy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Verify that Crypto Policy is Set (runtime) + command: /usr/bin/update-crypto-policies --set {{ var_system_crypto_policy }} + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - configure_crypto_policy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +Kerberos is supported by crypto policy, but it's configuration may be +set up to ignore it. +To check that Crypto Policies settings for Kerberos are configured correctly, examine that there is a symlink at +/etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies targeting /etc/cypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config. +If the symlink exists, Kerberos is configured to use the system-wide crypto policy settings. + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + SC-13 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of Kerberos violate expectations, +and makes system configuration more fragmented. + +rm -f /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies +ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies + + - name: Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy + file: + src: /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config + path: /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies + state: link + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - configure_kerberos_crypto_policy + - configure_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +Libreswan is supported by system crypto policy, but the Libreswan configuration may be +set up to ignore it. + +To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the /etc/ipsec.conf +includes the appropriate configuration file. +In /etc/ipsec.conf, make sure that the following line +is not commented out or superseded by later includes: +include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-6(a) + MA-4(6) + SC-13 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 + FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 + Req-2.2 + 2.2 + SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the Libreswan +service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more +fragmented. + +function remediate_libreswan_crypto_policy() { + CONFIG_FILE="/etc/ipsec.conf" + if ! grep -qP "^\s*include\s+/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config\s*(?:#.*)?$" "$CONFIG_FILE" ; then + # the file might not end with a new line + echo -e '\ninclude /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config' >> "$CONFIG_FILE" + fi + return 0 +} + +remediate_libreswan_crypto_policy + + - name: Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ipsec.conf + line: include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config + create: true + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2 + - configure_libreswan_crypto_policy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +OpenSSL is supported by crypto policy, but the OpenSSL configuration may be +set up to ignore it. +To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, you have to examine the OpenSSL config file +available under /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf. +This file has the ini format, and it enables crypto policy support +if there is a [ crypto_policy ] section that contains the .include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config directive. + CCI-001453 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R7.1 + AC-17(a) + AC-17(2) + CM-6(a) + MA-4(6) + SC-13 + SC-12(2) + SC-12(3) + Req-2.2 + 2.2 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the Java runtime violates expectations, +and makes system configuration more fragmented. + +OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION='[ crypto_policy ]' +OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX='\[\s*crypto_policy\s*\]' + +OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION='.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config' + +OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION_REGEX='^\s*\.include\s*(?:=\s*)?/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config$' + + + + + + +function remediate_openssl_crypto_policy() { + CONFIG_FILE=/etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf + if test -f "$CONFIG_FILE"; then + if ! grep -q "^\\s*$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX" "$CONFIG_FILE"; then + printf '\n%s\n\n%s' "$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION" "$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION" >> "$CONFIG_FILE" + return 0 + elif ! grep -q "^\\s*$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION_REGEX" "$CONFIG_FILE"; then + sed -i "s|$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_SECTION_REGEX|&\\n\\n$OPENSSL_CRYPTO_POLICY_INCLUSION\\n|" "$CONFIG_FILE" + return 0 + fi + else + echo "Aborting remediation as '$CONFIG_FILE' was not even found." >&2 + return 1 + fi +} + +remediate_openssl_crypto_policy + + - name: Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy - Search for crypto_policy + Section + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc/pki/tls + patterns: openssl.cnf + contains: ^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*] + register: test_crypto_policy_group + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2 + - configure_openssl_crypto_policy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy - Search for crypto_policy + Section Together With .include Directive + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc/pki/tls + patterns: openssl.cnf + contains: ^\s*\.include\s*(?:=\s*)?/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config$ + register: test_crypto_policy_include_directive + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2 + - configure_openssl_crypto_policy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: '{{ rule_title }} - Add .include Line for opensslcnf.config File in crypto_policy + Section' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + insertafter: ^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*]\s* + line: .include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config + path: /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf + when: + - test_crypto_policy_group.matched > 0 + - test_crypto_policy_include_directive.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2 + - configure_openssl_crypto_policy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy - Add crypto_policy + Section With .include for opensslcnf.config File + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + line: |- + [crypto_policy] + .include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config + path: /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf + when: test_crypto_policy_group.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2 + - configure_openssl_crypto_policy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption + Crypto Policies are means of enforcing certain cryptographic settings for +selected applications including OpenSSL. OpenSSL is by default configured to +modify its configuration based on currently configured Crypto Policy. +Editing the Crypto Policy back-end is not recommended. + +Check the crypto-policies(7) man page and choose a policy that configures TLS +protocol to version 1.2 or higher, for example DEFAULT, FUTURE or FIPS policy. +Or create and apply a custom policy that restricts minimum TLS version to 1.2. + +For example for versions prior to crypto-policies-20210617-1.gitc776d3e.el8.noarch +this is expected: + +$ sudo grep -i MinProtocol /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config + +MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 + + +Or for version crypto-policies-20210617-1.gitc776d3e.el8.noarch and newer this is +expected: + +$ sudo grep -i MinProtocol /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config + +TLS.MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 +DTLS.MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 + This rule doesn't come with a remediation, automatically changing the crypto-policies may be too disruptive. +Ensure the variable xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_value_var_system_crypto_policy is set to a +Crypto Policy that satisfies OpenSSL minimum TLS protocol version 1.2. Custom policies may be applied too. + CCI-001453 + AC-17(2) + SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 + SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 + Without cryptographic integrity protections, information can be altered by +unauthorized users without detection. + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +SSH is supported by crypto policy, but the SSH configuration may be +set up to ignore it. +To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that +the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is either commented or not set at all +in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd. + CCI-001453 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R7.1 + AC-17(a) + AC-17(2) + CM-6(a) + MA-4(6) + SC-13 + FCS_SSH_EXT.1 + FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 + FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 + Req-2.2 + 2.2 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the SSH service violate expectations, +and makes system configuration more fragmented. + +SSH_CONF="/etc/sysconfig/sshd" + +sed -i "/^\s*CRYPTO_POLICY.*$/Id" $SSH_CONF + + - name: Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/sysconfig/sshd + state: absent + regexp: ^\s*(?i)CRYPTO_POLICY.*$ + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2 + - configure_ssh_crypto_policy + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Harden SSH client Crypto Policy + Crypto Policies are means of enforcing certain cryptographic settings for selected applications including OpenSSH client. +To override the system wide crypto policy for Openssh client, place a file in the /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ so that it is loaded before the 05-redhat.conf. In this case it is file named 02-ospp.conf containing parameters which need to be changed with respect to the crypto policy. +This rule checks if the file exists and if it contains required parameters and values which modify the Crypto Policy. +During the parsing process, as soon as Openssh client parses some configuration option and its value, it remembers it and ignores any subsequent overrides. The customization mechanism provided by crypto policies appends eventual customizations at the end of the system wide crypto policy. Therefore, if the crypto policy customization overrides some parameter which is already configured in the system wide crypto policy, the SSH client will not honor that customized parameter. + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R7.1 + AC-17(a) + AC-17(2) + CM-6(a) + MA-4(6) + SC-13 + FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 + SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 + The Common Criteria requirements specify how certain parameters for OpenSSH Client are configured. Particular parameters are RekeyLimit, GSSAPIAuthentication, Ciphers, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, MACs and KexAlgorithms. Currently particular requirements specified by CC are stricter compared to any existing Crypto Policy. + +#the file starts with 02 so that it is loaded before the 05-redhat.conf which activates configuration provided by system vide crypto policy +file="/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf" +echo -e "Match final all\n\ +RekeyLimit 512M 1h\n\ +GSSAPIAuthentication no\n\ +Ciphers aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes128-cbc\n\ +PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256\n\ +MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256\n\ +KexAlgorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1\n" > "$file" + + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: openssh.config + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be +set up incorrectly. + +To check that Crypto Policies settings for ciphers are configured correctly, ensure that +/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config contains the following +line and is not commented out: +Ciphers + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes +FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use +cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information +in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as +defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform +Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in +designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal +departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under +contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by +a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing +documentation, test results, design information, and independent third +party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is +capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor +submits to this process. + CCI-000068 + CCI-000877 + CCI-001453 + CCI-002418 + CCI-002890 + CCI-003123 + AC-17(2) + SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 + SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173 + SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174 + SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH client +violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. By +specifying a cipher list with the order of ciphers being in a “strongest to +weakest” orientation, the system will automatically attempt to use the +strongest cipher for securing SSH connections. + + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be +set up incorrectly. + +To check that Crypto Policies settings for ciphers are configured correctly, ensure that +/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config contains the following +text and is not commented out: +-oCiphers= + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes +FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use +cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information +in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as +defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform +Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in +designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal +departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under +contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by +a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing +documentation, test results, design information, and independent third +party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is +capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor +submits to this process. + CCI-000877 + CCI-001453 + AC-17(2) + SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH server +violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented. By +specifying a cipher list with the order of ciphers being in a “strongest to +weakest” orientation, the system will automatically attempt to use the +strongest cipher for securing SSH connections. + + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: openssh.config + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be +set up incorrectly. + +To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that +/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config contains the following +line and is not commented out: +MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes +FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use +cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information +in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as +defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform +Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in +designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal +departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under +contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by +a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing +documentation, test results, design information, and independent third +party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is +capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor +submits to this process. + CCI-000877 + CCI-001453 + AC-17(2) + SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH +client violate expectations, and makes system configuration more +fragmented. + + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config + Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. +OpenSSH is supported by system crypto policy, but the OpenSSH configuration may be +set up incorrectly. + +To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that +/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config contains the following +text and is not commented out: +-oMACS=hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com + The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect. + System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes +FIPS-140 certifications. +FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use +cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information +in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as +defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform +Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in +designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal +departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under +contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf +To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by +a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing +documentation, test results, design information, and independent third +party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is +capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor +submits to this process. + CCI-000877 + CCI-001453 + AC-17(2) + SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 + SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093 + Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the OpenSSH +server violate expectations, and makes system configuration more +fragmented. + + + + + + + + + + + Operating System Vendor Support and Certification + The assurance of a vendor to provide operating system support and maintenance +for their product is an important criterion to ensure product stability and +security over the life of the product. A certified product that follows the +necessary standards and government certification requirements guarantees that +known software vulnerabilities will be remediated, and proper guidance for +protecting and securing the operating system will be given. + + The Installed Operating System Is Vendor Supported + The installed operating system must be maintained by a vendor. + +Oracle Linux is supported by Oracle Corporation. As the Oracle +Linux vendor, Oracle Corporation is responsible for providing security patches. + There is no remediation besides switching to a different operating system. + 18 + 20 + 4 + APO12.01 + APO12.02 + APO12.03 + APO12.04 + BAI03.10 + DSS05.01 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3 + 4.2.3.12 + 4.2.3.7 + 4.2.3.9 + A.12.6.1 + A.14.2.3 + A.16.1.3 + A.18.2.2 + A.18.2.3 + CM-6(a) + MA-6 + SA-13(a) + ID.RA-1 + PR.IP-12 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + An operating system is considered "supported" if the vendor continues to +provide security patches for the product. With an unsupported release, it +will not be possible to resolve any security issue discovered in the system +software. + + + + + + + + + + Endpoint Protection Software + Endpoint protection security software that is not provided or supported + +by Oracle Corporation can be installed to provide complementary or duplicative + +security capabilities to those provided by the base platform. Add-on +software may not be appropriate for some specialized systems. + + Configure Backups of User Data + The operating system must conduct backups of user data contained +in the operating system. The operating system provides utilities for +automating backups of user data. Commercial and open-source products +are also available. + Operating system backup is a critical step in maintaining data assurance and +availability. User-level information is data generated by information system +and/or application users. Backups shall be consistent with organizational +recovery time and recovery point objectives. + + + + + + Install Intrusion Detection Software + The base Oracle Linux 9 platform already includes a sophisticated auditing system that +can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, which provides host-based +intrusion prevention capabilities by confining privileged programs and user +sessions which may become compromised. + In DoD environments, supplemental intrusion detection and antivirus tools, +such as the McAfee Host-based Security System, are available to integrate with +existing infrastructure. Per DISA guidance, when these supplemental tools interfere +with proper functioning of SELinux, SELinux takes precedence. Should further +clarification be required, DISA contact information is published publicly at +https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/ + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001263 + 4.3.3.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-4 + Req-11.4 + 11.5.1.1 + Host-based intrusion detection tools provide a system-level defense when an +intruder gains access to a system or network. + + + + + + + + + + + McAfee Endpoint Security Software + In DoD environments, McAfee Host-based Security System (HBSS) and +VirusScan Enterprise for Linux (VSEL) is required to be installed on all systems. + + The age of McAfee defintion file before requiring updating + Specify the amount of time (in seconds) before McAfee definition files need to be +updated. + 2592000 + 86400 + 604800 + 2592000 + + + McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) + McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is a suite of software applications +used to monitor, detect, and defend computer networks and systems. + + + Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) + Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux antivirus software +which is provided for DoD systems and uses signatures to search for the +presence of viruses on the filesystem. + +The McAfeeTP package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install McAfeeTP + Due to McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) being 3rd party software, +automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. + CCI-001263 + CCI-000366 + SI-2(2) + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by +computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. + + + + + + + + + Ensure McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running + Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux antivirus software +which is provided for DoD systems and uses signatures to search for the +presence of viruses on the filesystem. + Due to McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) being 3rd party software, +automated remediation is not available for this configuration check. + CCI-001263 + CCI-000366 + SI-2(2) + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by +computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems. + + + + + + + + + + McAfee Host-Based Intrusion Detection Software (HBSS) + McAfee Host-based Security System (HBSS) is a suite of software applications +used to monitor, detect, and defend computer networks and systems. + + Install the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module + Install the McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module if it is absolutely +necessary. If SELinux is enabled, do not install or enable this module. + Installing and enabling this module conflicts with SELinux. +Per DoD/DISA guidance, SELinux takes precedence over this module. + Due to McAfee HIPS being 3rd party software, automated +remediation is not available for this configuration check. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO07.06 + APO08.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.06 + APO12.01 + APO12.02 + APO12.03 + APO12.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + APO13.02 + BAI08.02 + BAI08.04 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.05 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.04 + DSS03.05 + DSS04.05 + DSS05.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.01 + DSS06.02 + MEA03.03 + MEA03.04 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001233 + CCI-001263 + 4.2.3 + 4.2.3.12 + 4.2.3.7 + 4.2.3.9 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.4.5.2 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.3.4.5.9 + 4.4.3.2 + 4.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 3.9 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.14.2.8 + A.15.2.1 + A.16.1.1 + A.16.1.2 + A.16.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.6 + A.16.1.7 + A.18.1.4 + A.18.2.2 + A.18.2.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + Clause 16.1.2 + Clause 7.4 + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.AE-2 + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-4 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-5 + DE.CM-6 + DE.CM-7 + DE.DP-2 + DE.DP-3 + DE.DP-4 + DE.DP-5 + ID.RA-1 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-8 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.CO-3 + Req-11.4 + 11.5.1.1 + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + SRG-OS-000196 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Without a host-based intrusion detection tool, there is no system-level defense +when an intruder gains access to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based +intrusion prevention tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected +intrusion attempts. + + +[[packages]] +name = "MFEhiplsm" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disk Partitioning + To ensure separation and protection of data, there +are top-level system directories which should be placed on their +own physical partition or logical volume. The installer's default +partitioning scheme creates separate logical volumes for +/, /boot, and swap. +If starting with any of the default layouts, check the box to +\"Review and modify partitioning.\" This allows for the easy creation +of additional logical volumes inside the volume group already +created, though it may require making /'s logical volume smaller to +create space. In general, using logical volumes is preferable to +using partitions because they can be more easily adjusted +later.If creating a custom layout, create the partitions mentioned in +the previous paragraph (which the installer will require anyway), +as well as separate ones described in the following sections. +If a system has already been installed, and the default +partitioning +scheme was used, it is possible but nontrivial to +modify it to create separate logical volumes for the directories +listed above. The Logical Volume Manager (LVM) makes this possible. +See the LVM HOWTO at + http://tldp.org/HOWTO/LVM-HOWTO/ +for more detailed information on LVM. + + Encrypt Partitions + Oracle Linux 9 natively supports partition encryption through the +Linux Unified Key Setup-on-disk-format (LUKS) technology. The easiest way to +encrypt a partition is during installation time. + +For manual installations, select the Encrypt checkbox during +partition creation to encrypt the partition. When this +option is selected the system will prompt for a passphrase to use in +decrypting the partition. The passphrase will subsequently need to be entered manually +every time the system boots. + + +For automated/unattended installations, it is possible to use Kickstart by adding +the --encrypted and --passphrase= options to the definition of each partition to be +encrypted. For example, the following line would encrypt the root partition: +part / --fstype=ext4 --size=100 --onpart=hda1 --encrypted --passphrase=PASSPHRASE +Any PASSPHRASE is stored in the Kickstart in plaintext, and the Kickstart +must then be protected accordingly. +Omitting the --passphrase= option from the partition definition will cause the +installer to pause and interactively ask for the passphrase during installation. + +By default, the Anaconda installer uses aes-xts-plain64 cipher +with a minimum 512 bit key size which should be compatible with FIPS enabled. + + +Detailed information on encrypting partitions using LUKS or LUKS ciphers can be found on +the Oracle Linux 9 Documentation web site: + + + https://docs.oracle.com/en/operating-systems/oracle-linux/9/install/install-InstallingOracleLinuxManually.html#system-options +. + 13 + 14 + APO01.06 + BAI02.01 + BAI06.01 + DSS04.07 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.13.16 + CCI-001199 + CCI-002475 + CCI-002476 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.310(d) + 164.312(a)(1) + 164.312(a)(2)(iii) + 164.312(a)(2)(iv) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(c) + 164.314(b)(2)(i) + 164.312(d) + SR 3.4 + SR 4.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-6(a) + SC-28 + SC-28(1) + SC-13 + AU-9(3) + PR.DS-1 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000405-GPOS-00184 + SRG-OS-000185-GPOS-00079 + SRG-OS-000404-GPOS-00183 + The risk of a system's physical compromise, particularly mobile systems such as +laptops, places its data at risk of compromise. Encrypting this data mitigates +the risk of its loss if the system is lost. + + + + + + + Ensure /dev/shm is configured + The /dev/shm is a traditional shared memory concept. +One program will create a memory portion, which other processes +(if permitted) can access. If /dev/shm is not configured, +tmpfs will be mounted to /dev/shm by systemd. + Any user can upload and execute files inside the /dev/shm similar to +the /tmp partition. Configuring /dev/shm allows an administrator +to set the noexec option on the mount, making /dev/shm useless for an attacker to +install executable code. It would also prevent an attacker from establishing a +hardlink to a system setuid program and wait for it to be updated. Once the program +was updated, the hardlink would be broken and the attacker would have his own copy +of the program. If the program happened to have a security vulnerability, the attacker +could continue to exploit the known flaw. + + +part /dev/shm + + + + + + + + + + Ensure /home Located On Separate Partition + If user home directories will be stored locally, create a separate partition +for /home at installation time (or migrate it later using LVM). If +/home will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then +creating a separate partition is not necessary at installation time, and the +mountpoint can instead be configured later. + BP28(R12) + 12 + 15 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001208 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + CM-6(a) + SC-5(2) + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Ensuring that /home is mounted on its own partition enables the +setting of more restrictive mount options, and also helps ensure that +users cannot trivially fill partitions used for log or audit data storage. + + +part /home + + + + + + + + + + Ensure /srv Located On Separate Partition + If a file server (FTP, TFTP...) is hosted locally, create a separate partition +for /srv at installation time (or migrate it later using LVM). If +/srv will be mounted from another system such as an NFS server, then +creating a separate partition is not necessary at installation time, and the +mountpoint can instead be configured later. + BP28(R12) + Srv deserves files for local network file server such as FTP. Ensuring +that /srv is mounted on its own partition enables the setting of +more restrictive mount options, and also helps ensure that +users cannot trivially fill partitions used for log or audit data storage. + + +part /srv + + + + + + + + + + Ensure /tmp Located On Separate Partition + The /tmp directory is a world-writable directory used +for temporary file storage. Ensure it has its own partition or +logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. + BP28(R12) + 12 + 15 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000366 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + CM-6(a) + SC-5(2) + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /tmp partition is used as temporary storage by many programs. +Placing /tmp in its own partition enables the setting of more +restrictive mount options, which can help protect programs which use it. + + +part /tmp + + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var Located On Separate Partition + The /var directory is used by daemons and other system +services to store frequently-changing data. Ensure that /var has its own partition +or logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. + BP28(R12) + 12 + 15 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000366 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + CM-6(a) + SC-5(2) + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Ensuring that /var is mounted on its own partition enables the +setting of more restrictive mount options. This helps protect +system services such as daemons or other programs which use it. +It is not uncommon for the /var directory to contain +world-writable directories installed by other software packages. + + +part /var + + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var/log Located On Separate Partition + System logs are stored in the /var/log directory. + +Ensure that /var/log has its own partition or logical +volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. + BP28(R12) + BP28(R47) + 1 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + CM-6(a) + AU-4 + SC-5(2) + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Placing /var/log in its own partition +enables better separation between log files +and other files in /var/. + + +part /var/log + + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var/log/audit Located On Separate Partition + Audit logs are stored in the /var/log/audit directory. + +Ensure that /var/log/audit has its own partition or logical +volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. +Make absolutely certain that it is large enough to store all +audit logs that will be created by the auditing daemon. + BP28(R43) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001849 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.17.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + CM-6(a) + AU-4 + SC-5(2) + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000341-GPOS-00132 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Placing /var/log/audit in its own partition +enables better separation between audit files +and other files, and helps ensure that +auditing cannot be halted due to the partition running out +of space. + + +part /var/log/audit + + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var/tmp Located On Separate Partition + The /var/tmp directory is a world-writable directory used +for temporary file storage. Ensure it has its own partition or +logical volume at installation time, or migrate it using LVM. + BP28(R12) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /var/tmp partition is used as temporary storage by many programs. +Placing /var/tmp in its own partition enables the setting of more +restrictive mount options, which can help protect programs which use it. + + +part /var/tmp + + + + + + + + + + + GNOME Desktop Environment + GNOME is a graphical desktop environment bundled with many Linux distributions that +allow users to easily interact with the operating system graphically rather than +textually. The GNOME Graphical Display Manager (GDM) provides login, logout, and user +switching contexts as well as display server management. + +GNOME is developed by the GNOME Project and is considered the default + +Oracle Linux Graphical environment. + + +For more information on GNOME and the GNOME Project, see https://www.gnome.org. + + + Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles + By default, DConf uses a binary database as a data backend. +The system-level database is compiled from keyfiles in the /etc/dconf/db/ +directory by the dconf update command. More specifically, content present +in the following directories: +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d +/etc/dconf/db/local.d + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A) + Req-6.2 + 6.3.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Unlike text-based keyfiles, the binary database is impossible to check by OVAL. +Therefore, in order to evaluate dconf configuration, both have to be true at the same time - +configuration files have to be compliant, and the database needs to be more recent than those keyfiles, +which gives confidence that it reflects them. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 + - dconf_db_up_to_date + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Run dconf update + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 + - dconf_db_up_to_date + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure GNOME3 DConf User Profile + By default, DConf provides a standard user profile. This profile contains a list +of DConf configuration databases. The user profile and database always take the +highest priority. As such the DConf User profile should always exist and be +configured correctly. + + +To make sure that the user profile is configured correctly, the /etc/dconf/profile/user +should be set as follows: +user-db:user +system-db:local +system-db:site +system-db:distro + + Failure to have a functional DConf profile prevents GNOME3 configuration settings +from being enforced for all users and allows various security risks. + + + + + + + + + + Configure GNOME Login Screen + In the default GNOME desktop, the login is displayed after system boot +and can display user accounts, allow users to reboot the system, and allow users to +login automatically and/or with a guest account. The login screen should be configured +to prevent such behavior. + + +For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME3 environment using the DConf +configuration system, see http://wiki.gnome.org/dconf and +the man page dconf(1). + + Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons + In the default graphical environment, users logging directly into the +system are greeted with a login screen that allows any user, known or +unknown, the ability the ability to shutdown or restart the system. This +functionality should be disabled by setting +disable-restart-buttons to true. + +To disable, add or edit disable-restart-buttons to +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/login-screen] +disable-restart-buttons=true +Once the setting has been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent +user modification. For example: +/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.2 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + CM-7(b) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A user who is at the console can reboot the system at the login screen. If restart or shutdown buttons +are pressed at the login screen, this can create the risk of short-term loss of availability of systems +due to reboot. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*disable-restart-buttons\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)disable-restart-buttons(\s*=)/#\1disable-restart-buttons\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" +if grep -q "^\\s*disable-restart-buttons\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*disable-restart-buttons\\s*=\\s*.*/disable-restart-buttons=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\disable-restart-buttons=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/login-screen + option: disable-restart-buttons + value: 'true' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME disablement of Login Restart and Shutdown + Buttons + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons + line: /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable the GNOME3 Login User List + In the default graphical environment, users logging directly into the +system are greeted with a login screen that displays all known users. +This functionality should be disabled by setting disable-user-list +to true. + +To disable, add or edit disable-user-list to +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/login-screen] +disable-user-list=true +Once the setting has been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent +user modification. For example: +/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + CM-6(a) + AC-23 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Leaving the user list enabled is a security risk since it allows anyone +with physical access to the system to quickly enumerate known user accounts +without logging in. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)disable-user-list(\s*=)/#\1disable-user-list\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" +if grep -q "^\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=\\s*.*/disable-user-list=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\disable-user-list=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-23 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Disable the GNOME3 Login User List + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/login-screen + option: disable-user-list + value: 'true' + no_extra_spaces: true + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-23 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 disablement of Login User List + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$ + line: /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-23 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-23 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Enable the GNOME3 Screen Locking On Smartcard Removal + In the default graphical environment, screen locking on smartcard removal +can be enabled by setting removal-action +to 'lock-screen'. + +To enable, add or edit removal-action to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard] +removal-action='lock-screen' +Once the setting has been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + CCI-000056 + CCI-000058 + SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 + SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 + Locking the screen automatically when removing the smartcard can +prevent undesired access to system. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*removal-action\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)removal-action(\s*=)/#\1removal-action\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "'lock-screen'")" +if grep -q "^\\s*removal-action\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*removal-action\\s*=\\s*.*/removal-action=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard\\]|a\\removal-action=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Detect if removal-action can be found on /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + find: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + contains: ^\s*removal-action + register: dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Configure removal-action - default file + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d//00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard + option: removal-action + value: '''lock-screen''' + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files.matched + == 0 + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Configure removal-action - existing files + ini_file: + dest: '{{ item.path }}' + section: org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard + option: removal-action + value: '''lock-screen''' + create: true + with_items: '{{ dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files.files + }}' + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_config_files.matched + > 0 + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Detect if lock for removal-action can be found on /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + find: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks + contains: ^\s*removal-action + register: dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification removal-action - default file + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$ + line: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files.matched + == 0 + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification removal-action - existing files + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action$ + line: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action + create: true + with_items: '{{ dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files.files }}' + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files is defined and dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_lock_files.matched + > 0 + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update - removal-action + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable GDM Automatic Login + The GNOME Display Manager (GDM) can allow users to automatically login without +user interaction or credentials. User should always be required to authenticate themselves +to the system that they are authorized to use. To disable user ability to automatically +login to the system, set the AutomaticLoginEnable to false in the +[daemon] section in /etc/gdm/custom.conf. For example: +[daemon] +AutomaticLoginEnable=false + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.1 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + CM-7(b) + PR.IP-1 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 + Failure to restrict system access to authenticated users negatively impacts operating +system security. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +if rpm --quiet -q gdm +then + if ! grep -q "^AutomaticLoginEnable=" /etc/gdm/custom.conf + then + sed -i "/^\[daemon\]/a \ + AutomaticLoginEnable=False" /etc/gdm/custom.conf + else + sed -i "s/^AutomaticLoginEnable=.*/AutomaticLoginEnable=False/g" /etc/gdm/custom.conf + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - gnome_gdm_disable_automatic_login + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Disable GDM Automatic Login + ini_file: + dest: /etc/gdm/custom.conf + section: daemon + option: AutomaticLoginEnable + value: 'false' + no_extra_spaces: true + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - gnome_gdm_disable_automatic_login + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable XDMCP in GDM + XDMCP is an unencrypted protocol, and therefore, presents a security risk, see e.g. +XDMCP Gnome docs. + +To disable XDMCP support in Gnome, set Enable to false under the [xdmcp] configuration section in /etc/gdm/custom.conf. For example: + +[xdmcp] +Enable=false + + XDMCP provides unencrypted remote access through the Gnome Display Manager (GDM) which does +not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the +remote session. If a privileged user were to login using XDMCP, the +privileged user password could be compromised due to typed XEvents +and keystrokes will traversing over the network in clear text. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then + +# Try find '[xdmcp]' and 'Enable' in '/etc/gdm/custom.conf', if it exists, set +# to 'false', if it isn't here, add it, if '[xdmcp]' doesn't exist, add it there +if grep -qzosP '[[:space:]]*\[xdmcp]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*Enable' '/etc/gdm/custom.conf'; then + + sed -i "s/Enable[^(\n)]*/Enable=false/" '/etc/gdm/custom.conf' +elif grep -qs '[[:space:]]*\[xdmcp]' '/etc/gdm/custom.conf'; then + sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[xdmcp]/a Enable=false" '/etc/gdm/custom.conf' +else + if test -d "/etc/gdm"; then + printf '%s\n' '[xdmcp]' "Enable=false" >> '/etc/gdm/custom.conf' + else + echo "Config file directory '/etc/gdm' doesnt exist, not remediating, assuming non-applicability." >&2 + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - gnome_gdm_disable_xdmcp + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Disable XDMCP in GDM + ini_file: + path: /etc/gdm/custom.conf + section: xdmcp + option: Enable + value: 'false' + create: true + mode: 420 + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - gnome_gdm_disable_xdmcp + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + GNOME Media Settings + GNOME media settings that apply to the graphical interface. + + Disable GNOME3 Automount Opening + The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount +devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever +they are inserted into the system. To disable automount-open within GNOME3, add or set +automount-open to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. +For example: +[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling] +automount-open=false +Once the settings have been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 12 + 16 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000778 + CCI-001958 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 + SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Automatically mounting file systems permits easy introduction of unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. +Disabling automatic mounting in GNOME3 can prevent +the introduction of malware via removable media. +It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use +of removable media. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*automount-open\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)automount-open(\s*=)/#\1automount-open\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")" +if grep -q "^\\s*automount-open\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*automount-open\\s*=\\s*.*/automount-open=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\automount-open=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - automount-open + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling + option: automount-open + value: 'false' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - automount-open + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable GNOME3 Automount running + The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount +devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever +they are inserted into the system. To disable autorun-never within GNOME3, add or set +autorun-never to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. +For example: +[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling] +autorun-never=true +Once the settings have been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 12 + 16 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000778 + CCI-001958 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 + SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Automatically mounting file systems permits easy introduction of unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. +Disabling automatic mount running in GNOME3 can prevent +the introduction of malware via removable media. +It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use +of removable media. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*autorun-never\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)autorun-never(\s*=)/#\1autorun-never\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" +if grep -q "^\\s*autorun-never\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*autorun-never\\s*=\\s*.*/autorun-never=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\autorun-never=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - autorun-never + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling + option: autorun-never + value: 'true' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - autorun-never + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + GNOME Network Settings + GNOME network settings that apply to the graphical interface. + + + GNOME Remote Access Settings + GNOME remote access settings that apply to the graphical interface. + + Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 + By default, GNOME does not require credentials when using Vino for +remote access. To configure the system to require remote credentials, add or set +authentication-methods to ['vnc'] in +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/Vino] +authentication-methods=['vnc'] + +Once the settings have been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 3.1.12 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + Username and password prompting is required for remote access. Otherwise, non-authorized +and nefarious users can access the system freely. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*authentication-methods\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)authentication-methods(\s*=)/#\1authentication-methods\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/Vino]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "['vnc']")" +if grep -q "^\\s*authentication-methods\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*authentication-methods\\s*=\\s*.*/authentication-methods=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]|a\\authentication-methods=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/Vino + option: authentication-methods + value: '[''vnc'']' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Credential Prompting for Remote Access + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$ + line: /org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 + By default, GNOME requires encryption when using Vino for remote access. +To prevent remote access encryption from being disabled, add or set +require-encryption to true in +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/Vino] +require-encryption=true + +Once the settings have been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 20 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 9 + BAI03.08 + BAI07.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS03.01 + 3.1.13 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.4 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-6(a) + AC-17(a) + AC-17(2) + DE.AE-1 + PR.DS-7 + PR.IP-1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Open X displays allow an attacker to capture keystrokes and to execute commands +remotely. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*require-encryption\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)require-encryption(\s*=)/#\1require-encryption\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/Vino]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" +if grep -q "^\\s*require-encryption\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*require-encryption\\s*=\\s*.*/require-encryption=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/Vino\\]|a\\require-encryption=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/Vino + option: require-encryption + value: 'true' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Encryption for Remote Access + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$ + line: /org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure GNOME Screen Locking + In the default GNOME3 desktop, the screen can be locked +by selecting the user name in the far right corner of the main panel and +selecting Lock. + +The following sections detail commands to enforce idle activation of the screensaver, +screen locking, a blank-screen screensaver, and an idle activation time. + +Because users should be trained to lock the screen when they +step away from the computer, the automatic locking feature is only +meant as a backup. + +The root account can be screen-locked; however, the root account should +never be used to log into an X Windows environment and should only +be used to for direct login via console in emergency circumstances. + +For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME3 environment using the DConf +configuration system, see http://wiki.gnome.org/dconf and +the man page dconf(1). + + Screensaver Inactivity timeout + Choose allowed duration (in seconds) of inactive graphical sessions + 600 + 900 + 1800 + 300 + 900 + + + Screensaver Lock Delay + Choose allowed duration (in seconds) after a screensaver becomes active before displaying an authentication prompt + 10 + 5 + 0 + 0 + + + Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation + To activate the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop after a period of inactivity, +add or set idle-activation-enabled to true in +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] +idle-activation-enabled=true +Once the setting has been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000057 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + AC-11(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 + A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate +physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. +Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, +GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the +session lock. + +Enabling idle activation of the screensaver ensures the screensaver will +be activated after the idle delay. Applications requiring continuous, +real-time screen display (such as network management products) require the +login session does not have administrator rights and the display station is located in a +controlled-access area. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)idle-activation-enabled(\s*=)/#\1idle-activation-enabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" +if grep -q "^\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*idle-activation-enabled\\s*=\\s*.*/idle-activation-enabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\idle-activation-enabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver + option: idle-activation-enabled + value: 'true' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME idle-activation-enabled + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout + The idle time-out value for inactivity in the GNOME3 desktop is configured via the idle-delay +setting must be set under an appropriate configuration file(s) in the /etc/dconf/db/local.d directory +and locked in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks directory to prevent user modification. + +For example, to configure the system for a 15 minute delay, add the following to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings: +[org/gnome/desktop/session] +idle-delay=uint32 900 + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000057 + CCI-000060 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-11(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 + SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 + A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from +the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the +temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating +system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME3 can be configured to identify when +a user's session has idled and take action to initiate a session lock. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +inactivity_timeout_value='' + + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)idle-delay(\s*=)/#\1idle-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/session]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${inactivity_timeout_value}")" +if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*idle-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/idle-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]|a\\idle-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value inactivity_timeout_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + inactivity_timeout_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/session + option: idle-delay + value: uint32 {{ inactivity_timeout_value }} + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period + To activate the locking delay of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when +the screensaver is activated, add or set lock-delay to uint32 in +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] +lock-delay=uint32 + +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000056 + CCI-000057 + CCI-000060 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-11(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-8.1.8 + SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 + SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 + A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity +of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +var_screensaver_lock_delay='' + + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)lock-delay(\s*=)/#\1lock-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${var_screensaver_lock_delay}")" +if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*lock-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/lock-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\lock-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_screensaver_lock_delay # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_screensaver_lock_delay: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver + option: lock-delay + value: uint32 {{ var_screensaver_lock_delay }} + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + +To activate locking of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when it is activated, +add or set lock-enabled to true in +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] +lock-enabled=true + +Once the settings have been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000056 + CCI-000058 + CCI-000060 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 + SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 + A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity +of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)lock-enabled(\s*=)/#\1lock-enabled\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" +if grep -q "^\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*lock-enabled\\s*=\\s*.*/lock-enabled=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\lock-enabled=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver + option: lock-enabled + value: 'true' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_distribution != 'SLES' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME lock-enabled + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_distribution != 'SLES' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/lockdown + option: disable-lock-screen + value: 'false' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME disable-lock-screen + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/disable-lock-screen$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/lockdown/disable-lock-screen + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Check GNOME3 screenserver disable-lock-screen false + command: gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.lockdown disable-lock-screen + register: cmd_out + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Update GNOME3 screenserver disable-lock-screen false + command: gsettings set org.gnome.desktop.lockdown disable-lock-screen false + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_distribution == 'SLES' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver lock settings +by adding /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled +to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000056 + CCI-000057 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-8.1.8 + SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 + SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 + A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity +of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME Screensaver lock-enabled + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled + create: true + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Implement Blank Screensaver + + + +To set the screensaver mode in the GNOME3 desktop to a blank screen, +add or set picture-uri to string '' in +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver] +picture-uri=string '' + +Once the settings have been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000060 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-11(1) + CM-6(a) + AC-11(1).1 + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 + Setting the screensaver mode to blank-only conceals the +contents of the display from passersby. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*picture-uri\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)picture-uri(\s*=)/#\1picture-uri\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "string ''")" +if grep -q "^\\s*picture-uri\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*picture-uri\\s*=\\s*.*/picture-uri=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\picture-uri=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Implement Blank Screensaver + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver + option: picture-uri + value: string '' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME picture-uri + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.5 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1) + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(1).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Settings + If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver lock settings +by adding /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay +to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000057 + CCI-000060 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 + SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 + A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate +physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. +Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, +GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the +session lock. As such, users should not be allowed to change session settings. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME lock-delay + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Session Idle Settings + If not already configured, ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 session idle settings +by adding /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay +to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000057 + CCI-000060 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 + SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 + A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate +physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. +Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, +GNOME desktops can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the +session lock. As such, users should not be allowed to change session settings. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME Session idle-delay + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$ + line: /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + GNOME System Settings + GNOME provides configuration and functionality to a graphical desktop environment +that changes grahical configurations or allow a user to perform +actions that users normally would not be able to do in non-graphical mode such as +remote access configuration, power policies, Geo-location, etc. +Configuring such settings in GNOME will prevent accidential graphical configuration +changes by users from taking place. + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 + By default, GNOME will reboot the system if the +Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence is pressed. + +To configure the system to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence +from the Graphical User Interface (GUI) instead of rebooting the system, +add or set logout to '' in +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys] +logout='' +Once the settings have been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent +user modification. For example: +/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.2 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + CM-7(b) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A locally logged-in user who presses Ctrl-Alt-Del, when at the console, +can reboot the system. If accidentally pressed, as could happen in +the case of mixed OS environment, this can create the risk of short-term +loss of availability of systems due to unintentional reboot. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*logout\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)logout(\s*=)/#\1logout\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "''")" +if grep -q "^\\s*logout\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*logout\\s*=\\s*.*/logout=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\\]|a\\logout=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys + option: logout + value: '''''' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME disablement of Ctrl-Alt-Del + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$ + line: /org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout + create: true + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: + - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + SAP Specific Requirement + SAP (Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing) is enterprise +software to manage business operations and customer relations. The +following section contains SAP specific requirement that is not part +of standard or common OS setting. + + + Sudo + Sudo, which stands for "su 'do'", provides the ability to delegate authority +to certain users, groups of users, or system administrators. When configured for system +users and/or groups, Sudo can allow a user or group to execute privileged commands +that normally only root is allowed to execute. + +For more information on Sudo and addition Sudo configuration options, see +https://www.sudo.ws. + + Group name dedicated to the use of sudo + Specify the name of the group that should own /usr/bin/sudo. + root + sudogrp + + + Sudo - logfile value + Specify the sudo logfile to use. The default value used here matches the example +location from CIS, which uses /var/log/sudo.log. + /var/log/sudo.log + /var/log/sudo.log + + + Sudo - passwd_timeout value + Defines the number of minutes before the sudo password prompt times out. +Defining 0 means no timeout. The default timeout value is 5 minutes. + 5 + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 5 + + + Sudo - timestamp_timeout value + Defines the number of minutes that can elapse before sudo will ask for a passwd again. +If set to a value less than 0 the user's time stamp will never expire. Defining 0 means always prompt for a +password. The default timeout value is 5 minutes. + 5 + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 15 + + + Sudo - umask value + Specify the sudo umask to use. The actual umask value that is used is the union +of the user's umask and the sudo umask. +The default sudo umask is 0022. This guarantess sudo never lowers the umask when +running a command. + 0022 + 0022 + 0027 + 0077 + + + Install sudo Package + The sudo package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install sudo + BP28(R19) + 1382 + 1384 + 1386 + CM-6(a) + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + 10.2.1.5 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + sudo is a program designed to allow a system administrator to give +limited root privileges to users and log root activity. The basic philosophy +is to give as few privileges as possible but still allow system users to +get their work done. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "sudo" ; then + yum install -y "sudo" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure sudo is installed + package: + name: sudo + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_sudo_installed + + include install_sudo + +class install_sudo { + package { 'sudo': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=sudo + + +[[packages]] +name = "sudo" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Privileged Escalated Commands Cannot Execute Other Commands - sudo NOEXEC + The sudo NOEXEC tag, when specified, prevents user executed +commands from executing other commands, like a shell for example. +This should be enabled by making sure that the NOEXEC tag exists in +/etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets +in /etc/sudoers.d/. + BP28(R58) + Restricting the capability of sudo allowed commands to execute sub-commands +prevents users from running programs with privileges they wouldn't have otherwise. + +if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak + if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\bnoexec\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then + # sudoers file doesn't define Option noexec + echo "Defaults noexec" >> /etc/sudoers + fi + + # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak + if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak + else + echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." + mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers + false + fi +else + echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" + false +fi + + - name: Ensure noexec is enabled in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\bnoexec\b.*$ + line: Defaults noexec + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_add_noexec + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo requiretty + The sudo requiretty tag, when specified, will only execute sudo +commands from users logged in to a real tty. +This should be enabled by making sure that the requiretty tag exists in +/etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets +in /etc/sudoers.d/. + BP28(R58) + Restricting the use cases in which a user is allowed to execute sudo commands +reduces the attack surface. + +if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak + if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\brequiretty\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then + # sudoers file doesn't define Option requiretty + echo "Defaults requiretty" >> /etc/sudoers + fi + + # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak + if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak + else + echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." + mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers + false + fi +else + echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" + false +fi + + - name: Ensure requiretty is enabled in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\brequiretty\b.*$ + line: Defaults requiretty + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_add_requiretty + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo use_pty + The sudo use_pty tag, when specified, will only execute sudo +commands from users logged in to a real tty. +This should be enabled by making sure that the use_pty tag exists in +/etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets +in /etc/sudoers.d/. + BP28(R58) + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + Requiring that sudo commands be run in a pseudo-terminal can prevent an attacker from retaining +access to the user's terminal after the main program has finished executing. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then + +if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak + if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\buse_pty\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then + # sudoers file doesn't define Option use_pty + echo "Defaults use_pty" >> /etc/sudoers + fi + + # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak + if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak + else + echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." + mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers + false + fi +else + echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" + false +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_add_use_pty + +- name: Ensure use_pty is enabled in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\buse_pty\b.*$ + line: Defaults use_pty + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_add_use_pty + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Sudo Logfile Exists - sudo logfile + A custom log sudo file can be configured with the 'logfile' tag. This rule configures +a sudo custom logfile at the default location suggested by CIS, which uses +/var/log/sudo.log. + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + A sudo log file simplifies auditing of sudo commands. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then + +var_sudo_logfile='' + + +if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak + if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\blogfile=("(?:\\"|\\\\|[^"\\\n])*"\B|[^"](?:(?:\\,|\\"|\\ |\\\\|[^", \\\n])*)\b)\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then + # sudoers file doesn't define Option logfile + echo "Defaults logfile=${var_sudo_logfile}" >> /etc/sudoers + else + # sudoers file defines Option logfile, remediate if appropriate value is not set + if ! grep -P "^[\s]*Defaults.*\blogfile=${var_sudo_logfile}\b.*$" /etc/sudoers; then + + escaped_variable=${var_sudo_logfile//$'/'/$'\/'} + sed -Ei "s/(^[\s]*Defaults.*\blogfile=)[-]?.+(\b.*$)/\1$escaped_variable\2/" /etc/sudoers + fi + fi + + # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak + if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak + else + echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." + mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers + false + fi +else + echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" + false +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_custom_logfile +- name: XCCDF Value var_sudo_logfile # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sudo_logfile: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure logfile is enabled with the appropriate value in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s(.*)\blogfile=[-]?.+\b(.*)$ + line: Defaults \1logfile={{ var_sudo_logfile }}\2 + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + backrefs: true + register: edit_sudoers_logfile_option + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_custom_logfile + +- name: Enable logfile option with appropriate value in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + line: Defaults logfile={{ var_sudo_logfile }} + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + when: + - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + - edit_sudoers_logfile_option is defined and not edit_sudoers_logfile_option.changed + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_custom_logfile + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo !authenticate + The sudo !authenticate option, when specified, allows a user to execute commands using +sudo without having to authenticate. This should be disabled by making sure that the +!authenticate option does not exist in /etc/sudoers configuration file or +any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. + BP28(R5) + BP28(R59) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-002038 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-11 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 + Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they +do not have authorization. + +When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it +is critical that the user re-authenticate. + +for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do + if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then + continue + fi + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + # comment out "!authenticate" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + + /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" + fi +done + + - name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sudoers.d/ + register: sudoers + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_remove_no_authenticate + +- name: Remove lines containing !authenticate from sudoers files + replace: + regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$) + replace: '# \g<1>' + path: '{{ item.path }}' + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + with_items: + - path: /etc/sudoers + - '{{ sudoers.files }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_remove_no_authenticate + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo NOPASSWD + The sudo NOPASSWD tag, when specified, allows a user to execute +commands using sudo without having to authenticate. This should be disabled +by making sure that the NOPASSWD tag does not exist in +/etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets +in /etc/sudoers.d/. + BP28(R5) + BP28(R59) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-002038 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-11 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 + Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they +do not have authorization. + +When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it +is critical that the user re-authenticate. + +for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do + if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then + continue + fi + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + # comment out "NOPASSWD" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + + /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" + fi +done + + - name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sudoers.d/ + register: sudoers + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_remove_nopasswd + +- name: Remove lines containing NOPASSWD from sudoers files + replace: + regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$) + replace: '# \g<1>' + path: '{{ item.path }}' + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + with_items: + - path: /etc/sudoers + - '{{ sudoers.files }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_remove_nopasswd + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo + The sudo NOPASSWD and !authenticate option, when +specified, allows a user to execute commands using sudo without having to +authenticate. This should be disabled by making sure that +NOPASSWD and/or !authenticate do not exist in +/etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets +in /etc/sudoers.d/." + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-002038 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-11 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 + Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they +do not have authorization. + +When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it +is critical that the user re-authenticate. + +for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do + if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then + continue + fi + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + # comment out "NOPASSWD" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + + /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" + fi +done + +for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do + if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then + continue + fi + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + # comment out "!authenticate" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + + /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo" + fi +done + + - name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sudoers.d/ + register: sudoers + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_authentication + +- name: Remove lines containing NOPASSWD from sudoers files + replace: + regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$) + replace: '# \g<1>' + path: '{{ item.path }}' + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + with_items: + - path: /etc/sudoers + - '{{ sudoers.files }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_authentication + +- name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sudoers.d/ + register: sudoers + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_authentication + +- name: Remove lines containing !authenticate from sudoers files + replace: + regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$) + replace: '# \g<1>' + path: '{{ item.path }}' + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + with_items: + - path: /etc/sudoers + - '{{ sudoers.files }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_authentication + + + + + + + + + + Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command + The sudo timestamp_timeout tag sets the amount of time sudo password prompt waits. +The default timestamp_timeout value is 5 minutes. +The timestamp_timeout should be configured by making sure that the +timestamp_timeout tag exists in +/etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets +in /etc/sudoers.d/. +If the value is set to an integer less than 0, the user's time stamp will not expire +and the user will not have to re-authenticate for privileged actions until the user's session is terminated. + CCI-002038 + IA-11 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 + Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they +do not have authorization. + +When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it +is critical that the user re-authenticate. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then + +var_sudo_timestamp_timeout='' + + +if grep -Px '^[\s]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[\s]*=.*' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then + find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -Ei "/^[[:blank:]]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[[:blank:]]*=.*/d" {} \; +fi + +if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak + if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*[-]?\w+.*$' /etc/sudoers; then + # sudoers file doesn't define Option timestamp_timeout + echo "Defaults timestamp_timeout=${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}" >> /etc/sudoers + else + # sudoers file defines Option timestamp_timeout, remediate if appropriate value is not set + if ! grep -P "^[\s]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}.*$" /etc/sudoers; then + + sed -Ei "s/(^[[:blank:]]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[[:blank:]]*=)[[:blank:]]*[-]?\w+(.*$)/\1${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}\2/" /etc/sudoers + fi + fi + + # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak + if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then + rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak + else + echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file." + mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers + false + fi +else + echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate" + false +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_reauthentication +- name: XCCDF Value var_sudo_timestamp_timeout # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sudo_timestamp_timeout: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain 'Defaults timestamp_timeout' to + be deduplicated + find: + path: /etc/sudoers.d + patterns: '*' + contains: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=.* + register: sudoers_d_defaults_timestamp_timeout + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_reauthentication + +- name: Remove found occurrences of 'Defaults timestamp_timeout' from /etc/sudoers.d/* + files + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=.* + state: absent + with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults_timestamp_timeout.files }}' + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_reauthentication + +- name: Ensure timestamp_timeout is enabled with the appropriate value in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s(.*)\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*[-]?\w+\b(.*)$ + line: Defaults \1timestamp_timeout={{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout }}\2 + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + backrefs: true + register: edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_reauthentication + +- name: Enable timestamp_timeout option with appropriate value in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + line: Defaults timestamp_timeout={{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout }} + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + when: + - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + - edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option is defined and not edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option.changed + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudo_require_reauthentication + + + + + + + + + + The operating system must restrict privilege elevation to authorized personnel + The sudo command allows a user to execute programs with elevated +(administrator) privileges. It prompts the user for their password +and confirms your request to execute a command by checking a file, +called sudoers. +Restrict privileged actions by removing the following entries from the sudoers file: +ALL ALL=(ALL) ALL +ALL ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL + This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as the exact requirement allows exceptions, +and removing lines from the sudoers file can make the system non-administrable. + CCI-000366 + CM-6(b) + CM-6(iv) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If the "sudoers" file is not configured correctly, any user defined +on the system can initiate privileged actions on the target system. + + + + + + + + + + Only the VDSM User Can Use sudo NOPASSWD + The sudo NOPASSWD tag, when specified, allows a user to execute commands using sudo without having to authenticate. Only the vdsm user should have this capability in any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. + Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they +do not have authorization. + +When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it +is critical that the user re-authenticate. + + + + + + + + + Explicit arguments in sudo specifications + All commands in the sudoers file must strictly specify the arguments allowed to be used for a given user. +If the command is supposed to be executed only without arguments, pass "" as an argument in the corresponding user specification. + This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as absence of arguments in the user spec doesn't mean that the command is intended to be executed with no arguments. + The rule can produce false findings when an argument contains a comma - sudoers syntax allows comma escaping using backslash, but the check doesn't support that. For example, root ALL=(ALL) echo 1\,2 allows root to execute echo 1,2, but the check would interpret it as two commands echo 1\ and 2. + BP28(R63) + Any argument can modify quite significantly the behavior of a program, whether regarding the +realized operation (read, write, delete, etc.) or accessed resources (path in a file system tree). To +avoid any possibility of misuse of a command by a user, the ambiguities must be removed at the +level of its specification. + +For example, on some systems, the kernel messages are only accessible by root. +If a user nevertheless must have the privileges to read them, the argument of the dmesg command has to be restricted +in order to prevent the user from flushing the buffer through the -c option: + +user ALL = dmesg "" + + + + + + + + + + + Don't define allowed commands in sudoers by means of exclusion + Policies applied by sudo through the sudoers file should not involve negation. + +Each user specification in the sudoers file contains a comma-delimited list of command specifications. +The definition can make use glob patterns, as well as of negations. +Indirect definition of those commands by means of exclusion of a set of commands is trivial to bypass, so it is not allowed to use such constructs. + This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as negations indicate design issues with the sudoers user specifications design. Just removing negations doesn't increase the security - you typically have to rethink the definition of allowed commands to fix the issue. + BP28(R61) + Specifying access right using negation is inefficient and can be easily circumvented. +For example, it is expected that a specification like +# To avoid absolutely , this rule can be easily circumvented! +user ALL = ALL ,!/ bin/sh + prevents the execution of the shell +but that’s not the case: just copy the binary /bin/sh to a different name to make it executable +again through the rule keyword ALL. + + + + + + + + + + Don't target root user in the sudoers file + The targeted users of a user specification should be, as much as possible, non privileged users (i.e.: non-root). + +User specifications have to explicitly list the runas spec (i.e. the list of target users that can be impersonated), and ALL or root should not be used. + This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as the exact requirement allows exceptions, and removing lines from the sudoers file can make the system non-administrable. + It is common that the command to be executed does not require superuser rights (editing a file +whose the owner is not root, sending a signal to an unprivileged process,etc.). In order to limit +any attempt of privilege escalation through a command, it is better to apply normal user rights. + + + + + + + + + + Ensure invoking users password for privilege escalation when using sudo + The sudoers security policy requires that users authenticate themselves before they can use sudo. +When sudoers requires authentication, it validates the invoking user's credentials. +The expected output for: + sudo cvtsudoers -f sudoers /etc/sudoers | grep -E '^Defaults !?(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)$' + Defaults !targetpw + Defaults !rootpw + Defaults !runaspw +or if cvtsudoers not supported: + sudo find /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d \( \! -name '*~' -a \! -name '*.*' \) -exec grep -E --with-filename '^[[:blank:]]*Defaults[[:blank:]](.*[[:blank:]])?!?\b(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)' -- {} \; + /etc/sudoers:Defaults !targetpw + /etc/sudoers:Defaults !rootpw + /etc/sudoers:Defaults !runaspw + CCI-000366 + CCI-002227 + CM-6(b) + CM-6.1(iv) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If the rootpw, targetpw, or runaspw flags are defined and not disabled, by default the operating system will prompt +the invoking user for the "root" user password. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then + +if grep -x '^Defaults targetpw$' /etc/sudoers; then + sed -i "/Defaults targetpw/d" /etc/sudoers \; +fi +if grep -x '^Defaults targetpw$' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then + find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -i "/Defaults targetpw/d" {} \; +fi +if grep -x '^Defaults rootpw$' /etc/sudoers; then + sed -i "/Defaults rootpw/d" /etc/sudoers \; +fi +if grep -x '^Defaults rootpw$' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then + find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -i "/Defaults rootpw/d" {} \; +fi +if grep -x '^Defaults runaspw$' /etc/sudoers; then + sed -i "/Defaults runaspw/d" /etc/sudoers \; +fi +if grep -x '^Defaults runaspw$' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then + find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -i "/Defaults runaspw/d" {} \; +fi + +if [ -e "/etc/sudoers" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/Defaults !targetpw/d" "/etc/sudoers" +else + touch "/etc/sudoers" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/sudoers" + +cp "/etc/sudoers" "/etc/sudoers.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "Defaults !targetpw" >> "/etc/sudoers" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/sudoers.bak" +if [ -e "/etc/sudoers" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/Defaults !rootpw/d" "/etc/sudoers" +else + touch "/etc/sudoers" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/sudoers" + +cp "/etc/sudoers" "/etc/sudoers.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "Defaults !rootpw" >> "/etc/sudoers" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/sudoers.bak" +if [ -e "/etc/sudoers" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/Defaults !runaspw/d" "/etc/sudoers" +else + touch "/etc/sudoers" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/sudoers" + +cp "/etc/sudoers" "/etc/sudoers.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "Defaults !runaspw" >> "/etc/sudoers" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/sudoers.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain Defaults targetpw to be deduplicated + find: + path: /etc/sudoers.d + patterns: '*' + contains: ^Defaults targetpw$ + register: sudoers_d_defaults + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Remove found occurrences of Defaults targetpw from /etc/sudoers.d/* files + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^Defaults targetpw$ + state: absent + with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults.files }}' + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain Defaults rootpw to be deduplicated + find: + path: /etc/sudoers.d + patterns: '*' + contains: ^Defaults rootpw$ + register: sudoers_d_defaults + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Remove found occurrences of Defaults rootpw from /etc/sudoers.d/* files + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^Defaults rootpw$ + state: absent + with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults.files }}' + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Find out if /etc/sudoers.d/* files contain Defaults runaspw to be deduplicated + find: + path: /etc/sudoers.d + patterns: '*' + contains: ^Defaults runaspw$ + register: sudoers_d_defaults + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Remove found occurrences of Defaults runaspw from /etc/sudoers.d/* files + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^Defaults runaspw$ + state: absent + with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults.files }}' + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Remove any ocurrences of Defaults targetpw in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^Defaults targetpw$ + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + state: absent + register: sudoers_file_defaults + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Remove any ocurrences of Defaults rootpw in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^Defaults rootpw$ + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + state: absent + register: sudoers_file_defaults + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Remove any ocurrences of Defaults runaspw in /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + regexp: ^Defaults runaspw$ + validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s + state: absent + register: sudoers_file_defaults + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !targetpw$ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !targetpw$ + state: absent + when: + - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + - dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Insert correct line into /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !targetpw$ + line: Defaults !targetpw + state: present + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !rootpw$ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !rootpw$ + state: absent + when: + - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + - dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Insert correct line into /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !rootpw$ + line: Defaults !rootpw + state: present + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !runaspw$ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Deduplicate values from /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !runaspw$ + state: absent + when: + - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + - dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + +- name: Insert correct line into /etc/sudoers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/sudoers + create: false + regexp: ^Defaults !runaspw$ + line: Defaults !runaspw + state: present + when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sudoers_validate_passwd + + + + + + + + + + + System Tooling / Utilities + The following checks evaluate the system for recommended base packages -- both for installation +and removal. + + Ensure gnutls-utils is installed + The gnutls-utils package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install gnutls-utils + FIA_X509_EXT.1 + FIA_X509_EXT.2 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + GnuTLS is a secure communications library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS +protocols and technologies around them. It provides a simple C language +application programming interface (API) to access the secure communications +protocols as well as APIs to parse and write X.509, PKCS #12, OpenPGP and +other required structures. +This package contains command line TLS client and server and certificate +manipulation tools. + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "gnutls-utils" ; then + yum install -y "gnutls-utils" +fi + + - name: Ensure gnutls-utils is installed + package: + name: gnutls-utils + state: present + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_gnutls-utils_installed + + include install_gnutls-utils + +class install_gnutls-utils { + package { 'gnutls-utils': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=gnutls-utils + + +[[packages]] +name = "gnutls-utils" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure nss-tools is installed + The nss-tools package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install nss-tools + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to +support cross-platform development of security-enabled client and +server applications. Install the nss-tools package +to install command-line tools to manipulate the NSS certificate +and key database. + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "nss-tools" ; then + yum install -y "nss-tools" +fi + + - name: Ensure nss-tools is installed + package: + name: nss-tools + state: present + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_nss-tools_installed + + include install_nss-tools + +class install_nss-tools { + package { 'nss-tools': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=nss-tools + + +[[packages]] +name = "nss-tools" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install openscap-scanner Package + The openscap-scanner package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install openscap-scanner + AGD_PRE.1 + AGD_OPE.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + openscap-scanner contains the oscap command line tool. This tool is a +configuration and vulnerability scanner, capable of performing compliance checking using +SCAP content. + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "openscap-scanner" ; then + yum install -y "openscap-scanner" +fi + + - name: Ensure openscap-scanner is installed + package: + name: openscap-scanner + state: present + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_openscap-scanner_installed + + include install_openscap-scanner + +class install_openscap-scanner { + package { 'openscap-scanner': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=openscap-scanner + + +[[packages]] +name = "openscap-scanner" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install rear Package + The rear package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install rear + rear contains the Relax-and-Recover (ReaR) utility. ReaR produces a bootable +image of a system and restores from backup using this image. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( ( ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?ol[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="9.0"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; } ) || ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="9.0"; printf "%s\n%s" "$expected" "$real" | sort -VC; } ) || ( grep -qP "^ID=[\"']?rhel[\"']?$" "/etc/os-release" && { real="$(grep -P "^VERSION_ID=[\"']?[\w.]+[\"']?$" /etc/os-release | sed "s/^VERSION_ID=[\"']\?\([^\"']\+\)[\"']\?$/\1/")"; expected="8.4"; printf "%s\n%s" "$real" "$expected" | sort -VC; } && grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ) ) ); then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "rear" ; then + yum install -y "rear" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure rear is installed + package: + name: rear + state: present + when: not ( ( ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" and ansible_distribution == 'OracleLinux' + and ansible_distribution_version is version('9.0', '>=') ) or ( ansible_architecture + == "aarch64" and ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version + is version('9.0', '>=') ) or ( ansible_distribution == 'RedHat' and ansible_distribution_version + is version('8.4', '<=') and ansible_architecture == "s390x" ) ) ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_rear_installed + + include install_rear + +class install_rear { + package { 'rear': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=rear + + +[[packages]] +name = "rear" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install rng-tools Package + The rng-tools package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install rng-tools + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + rng-tools provides hardware random number generator tools, +such as those used in the formation of x509/PKI certificates. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "rng-tools" ; then + yum install -y "rng-tools" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure rng-tools is installed + package: + name: rng-tools + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_rng-tools_installed + + include install_rng-tools + +class install_rng-tools { + package { 'rng-tools': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=rng-tools + + +[[packages]] +name = "rng-tools" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install scap-security-guide Package + The scap-security-guide package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install scap-security-guide + AGD_PRE.1 + AGD_OPE.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The scap-security-guide package provides a guide for configuration of the system +from the final system's security point of view. The guidance is specified in the Security +Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) format and constitutes a catalog of practical hardening +advice, linked to government requirements where applicable. The SCAP Security Guide project +bridges the gap between generalized policy requirements and specific implementation guidelines. +A system administrator can use the oscap CLI tool from the openscap-scanner +package, or the SCAP Workbench GUI tool from the scap-workbench package, to verify +that the system conforms to provided guidelines. Refer to the scap-security-guide(8) manual +page for futher information. + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "scap-security-guide" ; then + yum install -y "scap-security-guide" +fi + + - name: Ensure scap-security-guide is installed + package: + name: scap-security-guide + state: present + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_scap-security-guide_installed + + include install_scap-security-guide + +class install_scap-security-guide { + package { 'scap-security-guide': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=scap-security-guide + + +[[packages]] +name = "scap-security-guide" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall gssproxy Package + The gssproxy package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase gssproxy + CCI-000381 + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + gssproxy is a proxy for GSS API credential handling. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove gssproxy +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on gssproxy. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "gssproxy" ; then + + yum remove -y "gssproxy" + +fi + + - name: Ensure gssproxy is removed + package: + name: gssproxy + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_gssproxy_removed + + include remove_gssproxy + +class remove_gssproxy { + package { 'gssproxy': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall iprutils Package + The iprutils package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase iprutils + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + iprutils provides a suite of utlilities to manage and configure SCSI devices +supported by the ipr SCSI storage device driver. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove iprutils +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on iprutils. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "iprutils" ; then + + yum remove -y "iprutils" + +fi + + - name: Ensure iprutils is removed + package: + name: iprutils + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_iprutils_removed + + include remove_iprutils + +class remove_iprutils { + package { 'iprutils': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=iprutils + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall krb5-workstation Package + The krb5-workstation package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase krb5-workstation + CCI-000803 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + Kerberos is a network authentication system. The krb5-workstation package contains the basic +Kerberos programs (kinit, klist, kdestroy, kpasswd). + + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove krb5-workstation +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on krb5-workstation. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "krb5-workstation" ; then + + yum remove -y "krb5-workstation" + +fi + + - name: Ensure krb5-workstation is removed + package: + name: krb5-workstation + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_krb5-workstation_removed + + include remove_krb5-workstation + +class remove_krb5-workstation { + package { 'krb5-workstation': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=krb5-workstation + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall tuned Package + The tuned package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase tuned + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + tuned contains a daemon that tunes the system settings dynamically. +It does so by monitoring the usage of several system components periodically. Based +on that information, components will then be put into lower or higher power savings +modes to adapt to the current usage. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove tuned +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on tuned. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "tuned" ; then + + yum remove -y "tuned" + +fi + + - name: Ensure tuned is removed + package: + name: tuned + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_tuned_removed + + include remove_tuned + +class remove_tuned { + package { 'tuned': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=tuned + + + + + + + + + + + Updating Software + The yum command line tool is used to install and +update software packages. The system also provides a graphical +software update tool in the System menu, in the Administration submenu, +called Software Update. + +Oracle Linux 9 systems contain an installed software catalog called +the RPM database, which records metadata of installed packages. Consistently using +yum or the graphical Software Update for all software installation +allows for insight into the current inventory of installed software on the system. + + + Install dnf-automatic Package + The dnf-automatic package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install dnf-automatic + BP28(R8) + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + dnf-automatic is an alternative command line interface (CLI) +to dnf upgrade suitable for automatic, regular execution. + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "dnf-automatic" ; then + yum install -y "dnf-automatic" +fi + + - name: Ensure dnf-automatic is installed + package: + name: dnf-automatic + state: present + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_dnf-automatic_installed + + include install_dnf-automatic + +class install_dnf-automatic { + package { 'dnf-automatic': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=dnf-automatic + + +[[packages]] +name = "dnf-automatic" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure yum Removes Previous Package Versions + yum should be configured to remove previous software components after +new versions have been installed. To configure yum to remove the + +previous software components after updating, set the clean_requirements_on_remove + + +to 1 in /etc/yum.conf. + 18 + 20 + 4 + APO12.01 + APO12.02 + APO12.03 + APO12.04 + BAI03.10 + DSS05.01 + DSS05.02 + 3.4.8 + CCI-002617 + 4.2.3 + 4.2.3.12 + 4.2.3.7 + 4.2.3.9 + A.12.6.1 + A.14.2.3 + A.16.1.3 + A.18.2.2 + A.18.2.3 + SI-2(6) + CM-11(a) + CM-11(b) + CM-6(a) + ID.RA-1 + PR.IP-12 + SRG-OS-000437-GPOS-00194 + Previous versions of software components that are not removed from the information +system after updates have been installed may be exploited by some adversaries. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q yum; then + +if grep --silent ^clean_requirements_on_remove /etc/yum.conf ; then + sed -i "s/^clean_requirements_on_remove.*/clean_requirements_on_remove=1/g" /etc/yum.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Set clean_requirements_on_remove to 1 per security requirements" >> /etc/yum.conf + echo "clean_requirements_on_remove=1" >> /etc/yum.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-2(6) + - clean_components_post_updating + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure YUM Removes Previous Package Versions + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/yum.conf + regexp: ^#?clean_requirements_on_remove + line: clean_requirements_on_remove=1 + insertafter: \[main\] + create: true + when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-2(6) + - clean_components_post_updating + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically + To ensure that the packages comprising the available updates will be automatically installed by dnf-automatic, set apply_updates to yes under [commands] section in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf. + BP28(R8) + 0940 + 1144 + 1467 + 1472 + 1483 + 1493 + 1494 + 1495 + SI-2(5) + CM-6(a) + SI-2(c) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + Installing software updates is a fundamental mitigation against +the exploitation of publicly-known vulnerabilities. If the most +recent security patches and updates are not installed, unauthorized +users may take advantage of weaknesses in the unpatched software. The +lack of prompt attention to patching could result in a system compromise. +The automated installation of updates ensures that recent security patches +are applied in a timely manner. + +found=false + +# set value in all files if they contain section or key +for f in $(echo -n "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf"); do + if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then + continue + fi + + # find key in section and change value + if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*apply_updates" "$f"; then + sed -i "s/apply_updates[^(\n)]*/apply_updates = yes/" "$f" + found=true + + # find section and add key = value to it + elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]" "$f"; then + sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[commands\]/a apply_updates = yes" "$f" + found=true + fi +done + +# if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter +if ! $found ; then + file=$(echo "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" + echo -e "[commands]\napply_updates = yes" >> "$file" +fi + + + + + + + + + + Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates + To configure dnf-automatic to install only security updates +automatically, set upgrade_type to security under +[commands] section in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf. + BP28(R8) + SI-2(5) + CM-6(a) + SI-2(c) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + By default, dnf-automatic installs all available updates. +Reducing the amount of updated packages only to updates that were +issued as a part of a security advisory increases the system stability. + +found=false + +# set value in all files if they contain section or key +for f in $(echo -n "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf"); do + if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then + continue + fi + + # find key in section and change value + if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*upgrade_type" "$f"; then + sed -i "s/upgrade_type[^(\n)]*/upgrade_type = security/" "$f" + found=true + + # find section and add key = value to it + elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[commands\]" "$f"; then + sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[commands\]/a upgrade_type = security" "$f" + found=true + fi +done + +# if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter +if ! $found ; then + file=$(echo "/etc/dnf/automatic.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" + echo -e "[commands]\nupgrade_type = security" >> "$file" +fi + + + + + + + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main yum Configuration + The gpgcheck option controls whether +RPM packages' signatures are always checked prior to installation. +To configure yum to check package signatures before installing +them, ensure the following line appears in /etc/yum.conf in +the [main] section: +gpgcheck=1 + BP28(R15) + 11 + 2 + 3 + 9 + 5.10.4.1 + APO01.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.8 + CCI-001749 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(c)(1) + 164.312(c)(2) + 164.312(e)(2)(i) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-5(3) + SI-7 + SC-12 + SC-12(3) + CM-6(a) + SA-12 + SA-12(10) + CM-11(a) + CM-11(b) + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + PR.IP-1 + FPT_TUD_EXT.1 + FPT_TUD_EXT.2 + Req-6.2 + 6.3.3 + SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 + Changes to any software components can have significant effects on the +overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures the +software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a +trusted vendor. + +Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system +components must be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the +organization. +Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation +validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. +This ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been +provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by +this requirement. Certificates used to verify the software must be from an +approved Certificate Authority (CA). + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q yum; then + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^gpgcheck") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^gpgcheck\\>" "/etc/yum.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^gpgcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/yum.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/yum.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/yum.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/yum.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/yum.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SA-12 + - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 + - configure_strategy + - ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure GPG check is globally activated + ini_file: + dest: /etc/yum.conf + section: main + option: gpgcheck + value: 1 + no_extra_spaces: true + create: false + when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SA-12 + - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 + - configure_strategy + - ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Local Packages + yum should be configured to verify the signature(s) of local packages +prior to installation. To configure yum to verify signatures of local +packages, set the localpkg_gpgcheck to 1 in /etc/yum.conf. + BP28(R15) + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.4.8 + CCI-001749 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(c)(1) + 164.312(c)(2) + 164.312(e)(2)(i) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-11(a) + CM-11(b) + CM-6(a) + CM-5(3) + SA-12 + SA-12(10) + PR.IP-1 + FPT_TUD_EXT.1 + FPT_TUD_EXT.2 + SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 + Changes to any software components can have significant effects to the overall security +of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered and +has been provided by a trusted vendor. + +Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components must +be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q yum; then + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^localpkg_gpgcheck") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^localpkg_gpgcheck\\>" "/etc/yum.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^localpkg_gpgcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/yum.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/yum.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/yum.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/yum.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/yum.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SA-12 + - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) + - ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Ensure GPG check Enabled for Local Packages (yum) + block: + + - name: Check stats of yum + stat: + path: /etc/yum.conf + register: pkg + + - name: Check if config file of yum is a symlink + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pkg_config_file_symlink: '{{ pkg.stat.lnk_target if pkg.stat.lnk_target is match("^/.*") + else "/etc/yum.conf" | dirname ~ "/" ~ pkg.stat.lnk_target }}' + when: pkg.stat.lnk_target is defined + + - name: Ensure GPG check Enabled for Local Packages (yum) + ini_file: + dest: '{{ pkg_config_file_symlink | default("/etc/yum.conf") }}' + section: main + option: localpkg_gpgcheck + value: 1 + no_extra_spaces: true + create: true + when: '"yum" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SA-12 + - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) + - ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for All yum Package Repositories + To ensure signature checking is not disabled for +any repos, remove any lines from files in /etc/yum.repos.d of the form: +gpgcheck=0 + BP28(R15) + 11 + 2 + 3 + 9 + 5.10.4.1 + APO01.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.8 + CCI-001749 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(c)(1) + 164.312(c)(2) + 164.312(e)(2)(i) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-5(3) + SI-7 + SC-12 + SC-12(3) + CM-6(a) + SA-12 + SA-12(10) + CM-11(a) + CM-11(b) + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + PR.IP-1 + FPT_TUD_EXT.1 + FPT_TUD_EXT.2 + Req-6.2 + 6.3.3 + SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 + Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation validates +the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. This ensures +the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a +trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by this +requirement. Certificates used to verify the software must be from an +approved Certificate Authority (CA)." + +sed -i 's/gpgcheck\s*=.*/gpgcheck=1/g' /etc/yum.repos.d/* + + - name: Grep for yum repo section names + shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -HEr '^\[.+\]' -r /etc/yum.repos.d/ + register: repo_grep_results + failed_when: repo_grep_results.rc not in [0, 1] + changed_when: false + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SA-12 + - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 + - enable_strategy + - ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set gpgcheck=1 for each yum repo + ini_file: + path: '{{ item[0] }}' + section: '{{ item[1] }}' + option: gpgcheck + value: '1' + no_extra_spaces: true + loop: '{{ repo_grep_results.stdout | regex_findall( ''(.+\.repo):\[(.+)\]\n?'' ) + }}' + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SA-12 + - NIST-800-53-SA-12(10) + - NIST-800-53-SC-12 + - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-SI-7 + - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 + - enable_strategy + - ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Oracle Linux GPG Key Installed + To ensure the system can cryptographically verify base software +packages come from Oracle (and to connect to the Unbreakable Linux Network to +receive them), the Oracle GPG key must properly be installed. +To install the Oracle GPG key, run: +$ sudo uln_register +If the system is not connected to the Internet, +then install the Oracle GPG key from trusted media such as +the Oracle installation CD-ROM or DVD. Assuming the disc is mounted +in /media/cdrom, use the following command as the root user to import +it into the keyring: +$ sudo rpm --import /media/cdrom/RPM-GPG-KEY-oracle + +Alternatively, the key may be pre-loaded during the Oracle installation. In +such cases, the key can be installed by running the following command: +sudo rpm --import /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-oracle + 11 + 2 + 3 + 9 + APO01.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI06.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001749 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.3 + SR 3.4 + SR 3.8 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.2.1 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-5(3) + SI-7 + SC-12 + SC-12(3) + CM-6(a) + CM-11(a) + CM-11(b) + PR.DS-6 + PR.DS-8 + PR.IP-1 + Req-6.2 + Changes to software components can have significant effects on the +overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures +the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided +by a trusted vendor. The Oracle GPG key is necessary to +cryptographically verify packages are from Oracle. + # OL fingerprints below retrieved from: https://linux.oracle.com/security/gpg/#gpg +readonly OL_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT="3E6D826D3FBAB389C2F38E34BC4D06A08D8B756F" +readonly OL_AUXILIARY_FINGERPRINT="982231759C7467065D0CE9B2A7DD07088B4EFBE6" + +FINGERPRINTS_REGEX="${OL_RELEASE_FINGERPRINT}" + +if [[ -n "$OL_AUXILIARY_FINGERPRINT" ]]; then + FINGERPRINTS_REGEX+="|${OL_AUXILIARY_FINGERPRINT}" +fi + +# Location of the key we would like to import (once it's integrity verified) +readonly OL_RELEASE_KEY="/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-oracle" + +RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS=$(stat -c %a "$(dirname "$OL_RELEASE_KEY")") + +# Verify /etc/pki/rpm-gpg directory permissions are safe +if [ "${RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS}" -le "755" ] +then + # If they are safe, try to obtain fingerprints from the key file + # (to ensure there won't be e.g. CRC error) + + readarray -t GPG_OUT < <(gpg --show-keys --with-fingerprint --with-colons "$OL_RELEASE_KEY" | grep -A1 "^pub" | grep "^fpr" | cut -d ":" -f 10) + + + GPG_RESULT=$? + # No CRC error, safe to proceed + if [ "${GPG_RESULT}" -eq "0" ] + then + # Filter just hexadecimal fingerprints from gpg's output from + # processing of a key file + echo "${GPG_OUT[*]}" | grep -vE "$FINGERPRINTS_REGEX" || { + # If $ OL_RELEASE_KEY file doesn't contain any keys with unknown fingerprint, import it + rpm --import "${OL_RELEASE_KEY}" + } + fi +fi + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Software Patches Installed + +If the system is joined to the ULN +or a yum server, run the following command to install updates: +$ sudo yum update +If the system is not configured to use one of these sources, updates (in the form of RPM packages) +can be manually downloaded from the ULN and installed using rpm. + + +NOTE: U.S. Defense systems are required to be patched within 30 days or sooner as local policy +dictates. + The OVAL feed of Oracle Linux 9 is not a XML file, which may not be understood by all scanners. + BP28(R08) + 18 + 20 + 4 + 5.10.4.1 + APO12.01 + APO12.02 + APO12.03 + APO12.04 + BAI03.10 + DSS05.01 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001227 + 4.2.3 + 4.2.3.12 + 4.2.3.7 + 4.2.3.9 + A.12.6.1 + A.14.2.3 + A.16.1.3 + A.18.2.2 + A.18.2.3 + SI-2(5) + SI-2(c) + CM-6(a) + ID.RA-1 + PR.IP-12 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-6.2 + 6.3.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Installing software updates is a fundamental mitigation against +the exploitation of publicly-known vulnerabilities. If the most +recent security patches and updates are not installed, unauthorized +users may take advantage of weaknesses in the unpatched software. The +lack of prompt attention to patching could result in a system compromise. + + +yum -y update + + - name: Security patches are up to date + package: + name: '*' + state: latest + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.4.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-6.3.3 + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - patch_strategy + - reboot_required + - security_patches_up_to_date + - skip_ansible_lint + + + + + + + Enable dnf-automatic Timer + +The dnf-automatic timer can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable dnf-automatic.timer + BP28(R8) + SI-2(5) + CM-6(a) + SI-2(c) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000191-GPOS-00080 + The dnf-automatic is an alternative command line interface (CLI) to dnf upgrade with specific facilities to make it suitable to be executed automatically and regularly from systemd timers, cron jobs and similar. +The tool is controlled by dnf-automatic.timer SystemD timer. + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'dnf-automatic.timer' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'dnf-automatic.timer' + + - name: Enable timer dnf-automatic + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable timer dnf-automatic + systemd: + name: dnf-automatic.timer + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + when: + - '"dnf-automatic" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-SI-2(c) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - timer_dnf-automatic_enabled + + + + + + + + + + + + Account and Access Control + In traditional Unix security, if an attacker gains +shell access to a certain login account, they can perform any action +or access any file to which that account has access. Therefore, +making it more difficult for unauthorized people to gain shell +access to accounts, particularly to privileged accounts, is a +necessary part of securing a system. This section introduces +mechanisms for restricting access to accounts under +Oracle Linux 9. + + Authselect profile + Specify the authselect profile to select + minimal + minimal + sssd + + + Enable authselect + Configure user authentication setup to use the authselect tool. +If authselect profile is selected, the rule will enable the profile. + If the sudo authselect select command returns an error informing that the chosen +profile cannot be selected, it is probably because PAM files have already been modified by +the administrator. If this is the case, in order to not overwrite the desired changes made +by the administrator, the current PAM settings should be investigated before forcing the +selection of the chosen authselect profile. + BP28(R31) + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + AC-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + FIA_AFL.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Authselect is a successor to authconfig. +It is a tool to select system authentication and identity sources from a list of supported +profiles instead of letting the administrator manually build the PAM stack. + +That way, it avoids potential breakage of configuration, as it ships several tested profiles +that are well tested and supported to solve different use-cases. + +var_authselect_profile='' + + +authselect select "$var_authselect_profile" + +if test "$?" -ne 0; then + if rpm --quiet --verify pam; then + authselect select --force "$var_authselect_profile" + else + echo "Files in the 'pam' package have been altered, so the authselect configuration won't be forced" >&2 + fi +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_authselect_profile # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_authselect_profile: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Enable authselect - Select authselect profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select "{{ var_authselect_profile }}" + register: result_authselect_select + failed_when: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - configure_strategy + - enable_authselect + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Enable authselect - Verify if PAM has been altered + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: rpm -qV pam + register: result_altered_authselect + failed_when: false + when: result_authselect_select.rc != 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - configure_strategy + - enable_authselect + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Enable authselect - Informative message based on the authselect integrity + check + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_altered_authselect is skipped or result_altered_authselect.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - Files in the 'pam' package have been altered, so the authselect configuration + won't be forced. + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - configure_strategy + - enable_authselect + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Enable authselect - Force authselect profile select + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select --force "{{ var_authselect_profile }}" + when: + - result_authselect_select.rc != 0 + - result_altered_authselect is skipped or result_altered_authselect.rc == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - configure_strategy + - enable_authselect + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Warning Banners for System Accesses + Each system should expose as little information about +itself as possible. + +System banners, which are typically displayed just before a +login prompt, give out information about the service or the host's +operating system. This might include the distribution name and the +system kernel version, and the particular version of a network +service. This information can assist intruders in gaining access to +the system as it can reveal whether the system is running +vulnerable software. Most network services can be configured to +limit what information is displayed. + +Many organizations implement security policies that require a +system banner provide notice of the system's ownership, provide +warning to unauthorized users, and remind authorized users of their +consent to monitoring. + + Login Banner Verbiage + Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must +be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. + ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$ + ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ + ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ + ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ + ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ + ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ + ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ + ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ + + + MotD Banner Verbiage + Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must +be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. + ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$ + ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ + ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ + ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ + ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ + ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ + ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ + ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ + + + Remote Login Banner Verbiage + Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must +be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. + ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$ + ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ + ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ + ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ + ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ + ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ + ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ + ^Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.$ + + + Modify the System Login Banner + +To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue. Replace the +default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal +disclaimer. + + +The DoD required text is either: + +You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that +is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes +any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: +-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS +for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC +monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law +enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. +-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. +-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, +are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be +disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. +-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access +controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or +privacy. +-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent +to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of +privileged communications, or work product, related to personal +representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and +their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and +confidential. See User Agreement for details. + +OR: + +I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.9 + CCI-000048 + CCI-000050 + CCI-001384 + CCI-001385 + CCI-001386 + CCI-001387 + CCI-001388 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-8(a) + AC-8(c) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 + SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 + Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting +access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification +verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, +directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. + +System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces +with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not +exist. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections + To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue.net. Replace the +default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal +disclaimer. + +The DoD required text is either: + +You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that +is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes +any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: +-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS +for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC +monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law +enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. +-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. +-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, +are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be +disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. +-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access +controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or +privacy. +-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent +to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of +privileged communications, or work product, related to personal +representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and +their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and +confidential. See User Agreement for details. + +OR: + +I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't. + CCI-000048 + CCI-001384 + CCI-001385 + CCI-001386 + CCI-001387 + CCI-001388 + SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 + SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 + Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting +access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification +verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, +directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. + +System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces +with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not +exist. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Implement a GUI Warning Banner + In the default graphical environment, users logging +directly into the system are greeted with a login screen provided +by the GNOME Display Manager (GDM). The warning banner should be +displayed in this graphical environment for these users. +The following sections describe how to configure the GDM login +banner. + + + Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner + In the default graphical environment, displaying a login warning banner +in the GNOME Display Manager's login screen can be enabled on the login +screen by setting banner-message-enable to true. + +To enable, add or edit banner-message-enable to +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/login-screen] +banner-message-enable=true +Once the setting has been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. +The banner text must also be set. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.9 + CCI-000048 + CCI-000050 + CCI-001384 + CCI-001385 + CCI-001386 + CCI-001387 + CCI-001388 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-8(a) + AC-8(b) + AC-8(c) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 + SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 + Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system +ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, +Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. + +For U.S. Government systems, system use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces +with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)banner-message-enable(\s*=)/#\1banner-message-enable\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")" +if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=\\s*.*/banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/login-screen + option: banner-message-enable + value: 'true' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME banner-message-enabled + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$ + line: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable + create: true + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text + In the default graphical environment, configuring the login warning banner text +in the GNOME Display Manager's login screen can be configured on the login +screen by setting banner-message-text to 'APPROVED_BANNER' +where APPROVED_BANNER is the approved banner for your environment. + +To enable, add or edit banner-message-text to + +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings. For example: +[org/gnome/login-screen] +banner-message-text='APPROVED_BANNER' +Once the setting has been added, add a lock to +/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. +For example: +/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text + +After the settings have been set, run dconf update. +When entering a warning banner that spans several lines, remember +to begin and end the string with ' and use \n for new lines. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.9 + CCI-000048 + CCI-001384 + CCI-001385 + CCI-001386 + CCI-001387 + CCI-001388 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-8(a) + AC-8(c) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 + SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 + An appropriate warning message reinforces policy awareness during the logon +process and facilitates possible legal action against attackers. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then + +login_banner_text='' + + +# Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner +# 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text +login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g') +# 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple +# (dod_banners contains the long and short banner) +login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g') +# 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ") +login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g') +# 3 - Adds newline "tokens". (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "(n)*") +login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/(n)*/g') +# 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example). +login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g') +# 5 - Removes the newline "token." (Transforms them into newline escape sequences "\n"). +# ( Needs to be done after 4, otherwise the escapce sequence will become just "n". +login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/(n)\*/\\n/g') + +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them. +# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain : +readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | cut -d":" -f1) +DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings" +DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d" + +mkdir -p "${DBDIR}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ] +then + if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-text\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + then + + sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)banner-message-text(\s*=)/#\1banner-message-text\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}" + fi +fi + + +[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}" +if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE} +fi + +escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "'${login_banner_text}'")" +if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-text\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}" +then + sed -i "s/\\s*banner-message-text\\s*=\\s*.*/banner-message-text=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}" + else + sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\banner-message-text=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}" +fi + +dconf update +# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories +LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \ + | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|gdm.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1) +LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks" + +mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}" + +# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one +if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]] +then + sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}" +fi + +if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$" /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ +then + echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text" >> "/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock" +fi + +dconf update + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value login_banner_text # promote to variable + set_fact: + login_banner_text: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text + file: + path: /etc/dconf/db/{{ item }} + owner: root + group: root + mode: 493 + state: directory + with_items: + - gdm.d + - gdm.d/locks + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text + file: + path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/{{ item }} + owner: root + group: root + mode: 420 + state: touch + with_items: + - 00-security-settings + - locks/00-security-settings-lock + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text + ini_file: + dest: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/00-security-settings + section: org/gnome/login-screen + option: banner-message-text + value: '''{{ login_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$", + "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)", + "(n)*") | regex_replace("\\", "") | regex_replace("\(n\)\*", "\\n") }}''' + create: true + no_extra_spaces: true + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Prevent user modification of the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text + lineinfile: + path: /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock + regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$ + line: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text + create: true + state: present + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + +- name: Dconf Update + command: dconf update + when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - dconf_gnome_login_banner_text + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + + Protect Accounts by Configuring PAM + PAM, or Pluggable Authentication Modules, is a system +which implements modular authentication for Linux programs. PAM provides +a flexible and configurable architecture for authentication, and it should be configured +to minimize exposure to unnecessary risk. This section contains +guidance on how to accomplish that. + +PAM is implemented as a set of shared objects which are +loaded and invoked whenever an application wishes to authenticate a +user. Typically, the application must be running as root in order +to take advantage of PAM, because PAM's modules often need to be able +to access sensitive stores of account information, such as /etc/shadow. +Traditional privileged network listeners +(e.g. sshd) or SUID programs (e.g. sudo) already meet this +requirement. An SUID root application, userhelper, is provided so +that programs which are not SUID or privileged themselves can still +take advantage of PAM. + +PAM looks in the directory /etc/pam.d for +application-specific configuration information. For instance, if +the program login attempts to authenticate a user, then PAM's +libraries follow the instructions in the file /etc/pam.d/login +to determine what actions should be taken. + +One very important file in /etc/pam.d is +/etc/pam.d/system-auth. This file, which is included by +many other PAM configuration files, defines 'default' system authentication +measures. Modifying this file is a good way to make far-reaching +authentication changes, for instance when implementing a +centralized authentication service. + Be careful when making changes to PAM's configuration files. +The syntax for these files is complex, and modifications can +have unexpected consequences. The default configurations shipped +with applications should be sufficient for most users. + Running authconfig or system-config-authentication +will re-write the PAM configuration files, destroying any manually +made changes and replacing them with a series of system defaults. +One reference to the configuration file syntax can be found at + +https://fossies.org/linux/Linux-PAM-docs/doc/sag/Linux-PAM_SAG.pdf. + + Password Hashing algorithm + Specify the system default encryption algorithm for encrypting passwords. +Defines the value set as ENCRYPT_METHOD in /etc/login.defs. + SHA512 + SHA512 + SHA256 + yescrypt + + + remember + The last n passwords for each user are saved in +/etc/security/opasswd in order to force password change history and +keep the user from alternating between the same password too +frequently. + 0 + 10 + 24 + 2 + 4 + 5 + 5 + + + Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation + Verify the operating system is not configured to bypass password requirements for privilege +escalation. Check the configuration of the "/etc/pam.d/sudo" file with the following command: +$ sudo grep pam_succeed_if /etc/pam.d/sudo +If any occurrences of "pam_succeed_if" is returned from the command, this is a finding. + CCI-002038 + IA-11 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158 + Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not +have authorization. When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional +capability, it is critical the user re-authenticate. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +sed -i '/pam_succeed_if/d' /etc/pam.d/sudo + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - disallow_bypass_password_sudo + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check for pam_succeed_if entry + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/sudo + create: false + regexp: pam_succeed_if + state: absent + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-11 + - disallow_bypass_password_sudo + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification + To configure the system to notify users of last logon/access +using pam_lastlog, add or correct the pam_lastlog +settings in +/etc/pam.d/postlogin to read as follows: +session required pam_lastlog.so showfailed +And make sure that the silent option is not set for +pam_lastlog module. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.2 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000052 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + 0582 + 0584 + 05885 + 0586 + 0846 + 0957 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-9 + AC-9(1) + PR.AC-7 + Req-10.2.4 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Users need to be aware of activity that occurs regarding +their account. Providing users with information regarding the number +of unsuccessful attempts that were made to login to their account +allows the user to determine if any unauthorized activity has occurred +and gives them an opportunity to notify administrators. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/postlogin" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/postlogin" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/postlogin") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*session\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*session\s+).*(\bpam_lastlog.so.*)/\1'"required"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks '1i session '"required"' pam_lastlog.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*session\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*\sshowfailed\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*session\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so.*/ s/$/ showfailed/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/postlogin was not found" >&2 +fi +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/postlogin" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/postlogin" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/postlogin") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*session\s.*\bpam_lastlog.so\s.*\bsilent\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*session.*pam_lastlog.so.*)\bsilent\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/postlogin was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - configure_strategy + - display_login_attempts + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if /etc/pam.d/postlogin + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/postlogin + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - configure_strategy + - display_login_attempts + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/postlogin + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect custom + profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check integrity of + authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Get authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the new authselect + custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Get authselect current + features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Change the PAM file + to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if expected PAM + module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*session\s+required\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Include or update the + PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if required + PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*session\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the correct + control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*session\s+).*(\bpam_lastlog.so.*) + replace: \1required \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the required + PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + insertafter: BOF + line: session required pam_lastlog.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if the required + PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*session\s+required\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*\sshowfailed\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_showfailed_option_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the "showfailed" + PAM option for "pam_lastlog.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*session\s+required\s+pam_lastlog.so.*) + line: \1 showfailed + state: present + register: result_pam_showfailed_add + when: + - result_pam_module_showfailed_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_showfailed_add is defined and result_pam_showfailed_add.changed) + or (result_pam_showfailed_edit is defined and result_pam_showfailed_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - configure_strategy + - display_login_attempts + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if /etc/pam.d/postlogin + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/postlogin + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - configure_strategy + - display_login_attempts + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/postlogin + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect custom + profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check integrity of + authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Get authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Define the new authselect + custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Get authselect current + features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Change the PAM file + to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure the "silent" + option from "pam_lastlog.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*session.*pam_lastlog.so.*)\bsilent\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - configure_strategy + - display_login_attempts + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts + The pam_faillock PAM module provides the capability to +lock out user accounts after a number of failed login attempts. Its +documentation is available in +/usr/share/doc/pam-VERSION/txts/README.pam_faillock. + + Locking out user accounts presents the +risk of a denial-of-service attack. The lockout policy +must weigh whether the risk of such a +denial-of-service attack outweighs the benefits of thwarting +password guessing attacks. + + fail_deny + Number of failed login attempts before account lockout + 10 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 8 + 3 + + + faillock directory + The directory where the user files with the failure records are kept + /var/log/faillock + /var/log/faillock + + + fail_interval + Interval for counting failed login attempts before account lockout + 100000000 + 1800 + 3600 + 86400 + 900 + 900 + + + fail_unlock_time + Seconds before automatic unlocking or permanently locking after excessive failed logins + 1800 + 3600 + 600 + 604800 + 86400 + 900 + 0 + 0 + + + tally2_unlock_time + Seconds before automatic unlocking or permanently locking after excessive failed logins + 1800 + 3600 + 600 + 604800 + 86400 + 900 + 0 + 0 + + + faildelay_delay + Delay next login attempt after a failed login + 0 + 4000000 + 4000000 + + + pwhistory_remember + Prevent password re-use using password history lookup + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5 + + + PAM pwhistory remember - control flag + 'Specify the control flag required for password remember requirement. If multiple +values are allowed write them separated by commas as in "required,requisite", +for remediations the first value will be taken' + required + optional + requisite + sufficient + binding + required,requisite + requisite,required + requisite + + + tally2 + Number of failed login attempts + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 3 + + + Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/password-auth File. + The pam_faillock.so module must be loaded in preauth in /etc/pam.d/password-auth. + CCI-000044 + AC-7 (a) + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + If the pam_faillock.so module is not loaded the system will not correctly lockout accounts to prevent +password guessing attacks. + + + + + + Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/system-auth File. + The pam_faillock.so module must be loaded in preauth in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. + CCI-000044 + AC-7 (a) + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + If the pam_faillock.so module is not loaded the system will not correctly lockout accounts to prevent +password guessing attacks. + + + + + + An SELinux Context must be configured for the pam_faillock.so records directory + The dir configuration option in PAM pam_faillock.so module defines where the lockout +records is stored. The configured directory must have the correct SELinux context. + CCI-000044 + AC-7 (a) + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + Not having the correct SELinux context on the pam_faillock.so records directory may lead to +unauthorized access to the directory. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +#!/bin/bash + +FAILLOCK_CONF_FILES="/etc/security/faillock.conf /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/pam.d/password-auth" +faillock_dirs=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?:auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)?dir\s*=\s*(\S+)" $FAILLOCK_CONF_FILES \ + | sed -r 's/.*=\s*(\S+)/\1/') + +if [ -n "$faillock_dirs" ]; then + for dir in $faillock_dirs; do + if ! semanage fcontext -a -t faillog_t "$dir(/.*)?"; then + semanage fcontext -m -t faillog_t "$dir(/.*)?" + fi + if [ ! -e $dir ]; then + mkdir -p $dir + fi + restorecon -R -v $dir + done +else +echo " +The pam_faillock.so dir option is not set in the system. +If this is not expected, make sure pam_faillock.so is properly configured." +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + PAM faillock locks an account due to excessive password failures, this event must be logged. + This rule is deprecated in favor of the accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit rule. +Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive +updates as of version 0.1.65. + CCI-000044 + AC-7 (a) + Without auditing of these events it may be harder or impossible to identify what an attacker did after an attack. + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature with-faillock + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") +for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" +do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" + fi + sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" +done + +fi + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + +FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" +if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*audit" + line="audit" + if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then + echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF + fi + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\baudit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 + fi + done +else + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit' "$pam_file"; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ audit/' "$pam_file" + fi + done +fi + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled + using authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is not + present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing + PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth + insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing + PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail + insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so account section + editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: account required pam_faillock.so + insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + when: not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf + file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + register: result_faillock_conf_check + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter + in /etc/security/faillock.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + regexp: ^\s*audit + line: audit + state: present + when: result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter + not in PAM files + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is + present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as + a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect + tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is + used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to + also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the + same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in + the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" + is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file + is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as + a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect + tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is + used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to + also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the + same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in + the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" + is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter + in PAM files + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so audit parameter + is already enabled in pam files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so + preauth audit parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) + line: \1required\3 audit + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + when: not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Account Lockouts Must Persist + By setting a `dir` in the faillock configuration account lockouts will persist across reboots. + This rule is deprecated in favor of the accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir rule. +Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive +updates as of version 0.1.65. + CCI-000044 + AC-7 (ia) + Having lockouts persist across reboots ensures that account is only unlocked by an administrator. +If the lockouts did not persist across reboots an attack could simply reboot the system to continue brute force attacks against the accounts on the system. + + + + + + + Limit Password Reuse: password-auth + Do not allow users to reuse recent passwords. This can be accomplished by using the +remember option for the pam_pwhistory PAM module. + + +On systems with newer versions of authselect, the pam_pwhistory PAM module +can be enabled via authselect feature: +authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + +Otherwise, it should be enabled using an authselect custom profile. + +Newer systems also have the /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file for setting +pam_pwhistory module options. This file should be used whenever available. +Otherwise, the pam_pwhistory module options can be set in PAM files. + +The value for remember option must be equal or greater than + + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. + Newer versions of authselect contain an authselect feature to easily and properly +enable pam_pwhistory.so module. If this feature is not yet available in your +system, an authselect custom profile must be used to avoid integrity issues in PAM files. +If a custom profile was created and used in the system before this authselect feature was +available, the new feature can't be used with this custom profile and the +remediation will fail. In this case, the custom profile should be recreated or manually +updated. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.8 + CCI-000200 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(e) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.5 + SRG-OS-000077-GPOS-00045 + Preventing re-use of previous passwords helps ensure that a compromised password is not +re-used by a user. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_remember='' +var_password_pam_remember_control_flag='' + + +var_password_pam_remember_control_flag="$(echo $var_password_pam_remember_control_flag | cut -d \, -f 1)" + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if authselect list-features minimal | grep -q with-pwhistory; then + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + + authselect apply-changes -b + else + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + fi + fi +else + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + else + echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + fi + fi + fi +fi + +PWHISTORY_CONF="/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" +if [ -f $PWHISTORY_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*remember\s*=" + line="remember = $var_password_pam_remember" + if ! grep -q $regex $PWHISTORY_CONF; then + echo $line >> $PWHISTORY_CONF + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(remember\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_password_pam_remember"'|g' $PWHISTORY_CONF + fi + if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwhistory.so\s.*\bremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 + fi +else + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*/ s/$/ remember='"$var_password_pam_remember"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)('"remember"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_remember"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_remember: !!str + tags: + - always +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember_control_flag # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_remember_control_flag: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Collect the available authselect features' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect list-features minimal + register: result_authselect_available_features + changed_when: false + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so using authselect + feature' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current + profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on the + authselect integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure "with-pwhistory" feature is + enabled using authselect tool' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_authselect_available_features.stdout is search("with-pwhistory") + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so in appropriate + PAM files' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile + is used if authselect is present' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current + profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on the + authselect integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the new authselect custom + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features + to also enable them in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if any custom profile with + the same name was already created' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Restore the authselect features + in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited + according to the custom authselect profile' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if expected PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] + }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Include or update the PAM module + line in {{ pam_file_path }}' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if required PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the correct control for + the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) + replace: \1{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }} \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the required PAM module + line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + insertafter: ^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so + line: password {{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] + }} pam_pwhistory.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - | + (result_authselect_available_features.stdout is defined and result_authselect_available_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory")) or result_authselect_available_features is not defined + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check the presence of /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + file' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + register: result_pwhistory_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured + in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember + parameter in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + regexp: ^\s*remember\s*= + line: remember = {{ var_password_pam_remember }} + state: present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember + parameter is removed from PAM files' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth + file is present' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check the proper remediation for + the system' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile + is used if authselect is present' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect + current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on + the authselect integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile + was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect + tool is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the current authselect + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the new authselect custom + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features + to also enable them in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if any custom profile + with the same name was already created' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Create an authselect custom + profile based on the current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are + applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom + profile is selected' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Restore the authselect features + in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are + applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited + according to the custom authselect profile' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the "remember" option + from "pam_pwhistory.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are + applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured + in PAM files' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile + is used if authselect is present' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check integrity of authselect current + profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Informative message based on the + authselect integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Define the new authselect custom + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Get authselect current features + to also enable them in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if any custom profile with + the same name was already created' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Restore the authselect features + in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited + according to the custom authselect profile' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if expected PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Include or update the PAM module + line in {{ pam_file_path }}' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if required PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the correct control for + the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) + replace: \1requisite \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the required PAM module + line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Check if the required PAM module + option is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_remember_option_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the "remember" PAM option + for "pam_pwhistory.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*) + line: \1 remember={{ var_password_pam_remember }} + state: present + register: result_pam_remember_add + when: + - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure the required value for "remember" + PAM option from "pam_pwhistory.so" in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)(remember)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) + line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_remember }} \3 + register: result_pam_remember_edit + when: + - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found > 0 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: password-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - (result_pam_remember_add is defined and result_pam_remember_add.changed) or + (result_pam_remember_edit is defined and result_pam_remember_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Password Reuse: system-auth + Do not allow users to reuse recent passwords. This can be accomplished by using the +remember option for the pam_pwhistory PAM module. + + +On systems with newer versions of authselect, the pam_pwhistory PAM module +can be enabled via authselect feature: +authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + +Otherwise, it should be enabled using an authselect custom profile. + +Newer systems also have the /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file for setting +pam_pwhistory module options. This file should be used whenever available. +Otherwise, the pam_pwhistory module options can be set in PAM files. + +The value for remember option must be equal or greater than + + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. + Newer versions of authselect contain an authselect feature to easily and properly +enable pam_pwhistory.so module. If this feature is not yet available in your +system, an authselect custom profile must be used to avoid integrity issues in PAM files. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.8 + CCI-000200 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(e) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.5 + SRG-OS-000077-GPOS-00045 + Preventing re-use of previous passwords helps ensure that a compromised password is not +re-used by a user. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_remember='' +var_password_pam_remember_control_flag='' + + +var_password_pam_remember_control_flag="$(echo $var_password_pam_remember_control_flag | cut -d \, -f 1)" + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if authselect list-features minimal | grep -q with-pwhistory; then + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + + authselect apply-changes -b + else + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + fi + fi +else + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + else + echo 'password '"$var_password_pam_remember_control_flag"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + fi + fi + fi +fi + +PWHISTORY_CONF="/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" +if [ -f $PWHISTORY_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*remember\s*=" + line="remember = $var_password_pam_remember" + if ! grep -q $regex $PWHISTORY_CONF; then + echo $line >> $PWHISTORY_CONF + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(remember\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_password_pam_remember"'|g' $PWHISTORY_CONF + fi + if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwhistory.so\s.*\bremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 + fi +else + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*/ s/$/ remember='"$var_password_pam_remember"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)('"remember"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_remember"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_remember: !!str + tags: + - always +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_remember_control_flag # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_remember_control_flag: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Collect the available authselect features' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect list-features minimal + register: result_authselect_available_features + changed_when: false + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so using authselect + feature' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current + profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure "with-pwhistory" feature is + enabled using authselect tool' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_authselect_available_features.stdout is search("with-pwhistory") + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Enable pam_pwhistory.so in appropriate + PAM files' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as + a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is + used if authselect is present' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current + profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on the + authselect integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the new authselect custom + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features to + also enable them in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if any custom profile with + the same name was already created' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Restore the authselect features in + the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited + according to the custom authselect profile' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is + present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] + }}\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Include or update the PAM module line + in {{ pam_file_path }}' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if required PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the correct control for the + required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) + replace: \1{{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] }} \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line + is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + insertafter: ^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so + line: password {{ var_password_pam_remember_control_flag.split(",")[0] + }} pam_pwhistory.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - | + (result_authselect_available_features.stdout is defined and result_authselect_available_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory")) or result_authselect_available_features is not defined + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check the presence of /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + file' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + register: result_pwhistory_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured + in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf file' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember + parameter in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + regexp: ^\s*remember\s*= + line: remember = {{ var_password_pam_remember }} + state: present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember + parameter is removed from PAM files' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file + is present' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check the proper remediation for + the system' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile + is used if authselect is present' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect + current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on + the authselect integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile + was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect + tool is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the current authselect + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the new authselect custom + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features + to also enable them in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if any custom profile with + the same name was already created' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are + applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom + profile is selected' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Restore the authselect features + in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are + applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited + according to the custom authselect profile' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the "remember" option from + "pam_pwhistory.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured + in PAM files' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the PAM file to be edited as + a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if system relies on authselect + tool' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect custom profile is + used if authselect is present' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check integrity of authselect current + profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Informative message based on the + authselect integrity check result' + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Define the new authselect custom + profile as a local fact' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Get authselect current features to + also enable them in the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if any custom profile with + the same name was already created' + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Restore the authselect features in + the custom profile' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Change the PAM file to be edited + according to the custom authselect profile' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if expected PAM module line is + present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Include or update the PAM module line + in {{ pam_file_path }}' + block: + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if required PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the correct control for the + required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) + replace: \1requisite \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the required PAM module line + is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Check if the required PAM module option + is present in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_remember_option_present + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the "remember" PAM option for + "pam_pwhistory.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*) + line: \1 remember={{ var_password_pam_remember }} + state: present + register: result_pam_remember_add + when: + - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure the required value for "remember" + PAM option from "pam_pwhistory.so" in {{ pam_file_path }}' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)(remember)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) + line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_remember }} \3 + register: result_pam_remember_edit + when: + - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found > 0 + + - name: 'Limit Password Reuse: system-auth - Ensure authselect changes are applied' + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - (result_pam_remember_add is defined and result_pam_remember_add.changed) or + (result_pam_remember_edit is defined and result_pam_remember_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Password Reuse + Do not allow users to reuse recent passwords. This can be accomplished by using the +remember option for the pam_unix or pam_pwhistory PAM modules. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. + Newer versions of authselect contain an authselect feature to easily and properly +enable pam_pwhistory.so module. If this feature is not yet available in your +system, an authselect custom profile must be used to avoid integrity issues in PAM files. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.8 + CCI-000200 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(e) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.5 + 8.3.7 + SRG-OS-000077-GPOS-00045 + Preventing re-use of previous passwords helps ensure that a compromised password is not +re-used by a user. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_unix_remember='' + + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if authselect list-features minimal | grep -q with-pwhistory; then + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + + authselect apply-changes -b + else + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + fi + fi +else + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so" "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + else + echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + fi + fi + fi +fi + +PWHISTORY_CONF="/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" +if [ -f $PWHISTORY_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*remember\s*=" + line="remember = $var_password_pam_unix_remember" + if ! grep -q $regex $PWHISTORY_CONF; then + echo $line >> $PWHISTORY_CONF + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(remember\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_password_pam_unix_remember"'|g' $PWHISTORY_CONF + fi + if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwhistory.so\s.*\bremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 + fi +else + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwhistory.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*/ s/$/ remember='"$var_password_pam_unix_remember"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)('"remember"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_unix_remember"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_unix_remember # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_unix_remember: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Limit Password Reuse - Collect the available authselect features + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect list-features minimal + register: result_authselect_available_features + changed_when: false + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Limit Password Reuse - Enable pam_pwhistory.so using authselect feature + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect integrity + check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure "with-pwhistory" feature is enabled using + authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-pwhistory + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_authselect_available_features.stdout is search("with-pwhistory") + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Limit Password Reuse - Enable pam_pwhistory.so in appropriate PAM files + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect + is present + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect integrity + check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the current authselect profile as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features to also enable + them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if any custom profile with the same name + was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Create an authselect custom profile based on the + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the + custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ + pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path + }} + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if required PAM module line is present in + {{ pam_file_path }} with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM + module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) + replace: \1requisite \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the required PAM module line is included + in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + insertafter: ^password.*requisite.*pam_pwquality\.so + line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - | + (result_authselect_available_features.stdout is defined and result_authselect_available_features.stdout is not search("with-pwhistory")) or result_authselect_available_features is not defined + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Limit Password Reuse - Check the presence of /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + register: result_pwhistory_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Limit Password Reuse - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + file + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter in + /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/pwhistory.conf + regexp: ^\s*remember\s*= + line: remember = {{ var_password_pam_unix_remember }} + state: present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the pam_pwhistory.so remember parameter is + removed from PAM files + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect + is present + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile + was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect + tool is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the current authselect profile as a + local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the new authselect custom profile as + a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features to also enable + them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if any custom profile with the same name + was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Create an authselect custom profile based on + the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Restore the authselect features in the custom + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the "remember" option from "pam_pwhistory.so" + is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwhistory.so.*)\bremember\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Limit Password Reuse - pam_pwhistory.so parameters are configured in PAM files + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect + is present + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Informative message based on the authselect integrity + check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the current authselect profile as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Get authselect current features to also enable + them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if any custom profile with the same name + was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Create an authselect custom profile based on the + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the + custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if expected PAM module line is present in {{ + pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Include or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path + }} + block: + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if required PAM module line is present in + {{ pam_file_path }} with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the correct control for the required PAM + module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwhistory.so.*) + replace: \1requisite \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the required PAM module line is included + in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + line: password requisite pam_pwhistory.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Check if the required PAM module option is present + in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s*.*\sremember\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_remember_option_present + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the "remember" PAM option for "pam_pwhistory.so" + is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so.*) + line: \1 remember={{ var_password_pam_unix_remember }} + state: present + register: result_pam_remember_add + when: + - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure the required value for "remember" PAM option + from "pam_pwhistory.so" in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwhistory.so\s+.*)(remember)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) + line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_unix_remember }} \3 + register: result_pam_remember_edit + when: + - result_pam_module_remember_option_present.found > 0 + + - name: Limit Password Reuse - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - (result_pam_remember_add is defined and result_pam_remember_add.changed) or + (result_pam_remember_edit is defined and result_pam_remember_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_pwhistory_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(e) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.7 + - accounts_password_pam_unix_remember + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + PAM faillock locks an account due to excessive password failures, this event must be logged. + CCI-000044 + AC-7 (a) + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + Without auditing of these events it may be harder or impossible to identify what an attacker did after an attack. + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature with-faillock + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") +for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" +do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" + fi + sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" +done + +fi + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + +FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" +if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*audit" + line="audit" + if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then + echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF + fi + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\baudit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 + fi + done +else + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit' "$pam_file"; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ audit/' "$pam_file" + fi + done +fi + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled + using authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Remediation where authselect tool is not + present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing + PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth + insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing + PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail + insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Enable pam_faillock.so account section + editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: account required pam_faillock.so + insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + when: not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf + file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + register: result_faillock_conf_check + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter + in /etc/security/faillock.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + regexp: ^\s*audit + line: audit + state: present + when: result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter + not in PAM files + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is + present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as + a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect + tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is + used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to + also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the + same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in + the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" + is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file + is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the PAM file to be edited as + a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if system relies on authselect + tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect custom profile is + used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Define the new authselect custom profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Get authselect current features to + also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if any custom profile with the + same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Restore the authselect features in + the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the "audit" option from "pam_faillock.so" + is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\baudit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the pam_faillock.so audit parameter + in PAM files + block: + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Check if pam_faillock.so audit parameter + is already enabled in pam files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*audit + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present + + - name: Account Lockouts Must Be Logged - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so + preauth audit parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) + line: \1required\3 audit + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_audit_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + when: not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7 (a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts + This rule configures the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login attempts +using pam_faillock.so. +pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully +defined to work as expected. + +Ensure that the file /etc/security/faillock.conf contains the following entry: +deny = <count> +Where count should be less than or equal to + and greater than 0. + + +In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is +recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, +depending on the OS version. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. +If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock +parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.3 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.8 + CCI-000044 + CCI-002236 + CCI-002237 + CCI-002238 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + AC-7(a) + PR.AC-7 + FIA_AFL.1 + Req-8.1.6 + 8.3.4 + SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via +user password guessing, also known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking +the account. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny='' + + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature with-faillock + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") +for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" +do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" + fi + sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" +done + +fi + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + +FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" +if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*deny\s*=" + line="deny = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" + if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then + echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(deny\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF + fi + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bdeny\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 + fi + done +else + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*deny' "$pam_file"; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ deny='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ deny='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'/' "$pam_file" + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"deny"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'\3/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"deny"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny"'\3/' "$pam_file" + fi + done +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on authselect + tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect + tool is present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based + on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature + is enabled using authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect + tool is not present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + is already enabled + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth + editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth + insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail + editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail + insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account + section editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: account required pam_faillock.so + insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf + file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + register: result_faillock_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + deny parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + regexp: ^\s*deny\s*= + line: deny = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }} + state: present + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + deny parameter not in PAM files + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to + be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom + profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based + on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect + profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect + custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile + with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to + be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "deny" option + from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to + be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom + profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based + on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect + profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect + custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom profile + with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file to + be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "deny" option + from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdeny\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + deny parameter in PAM files + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + deny parameter is already enabled in pam files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*deny + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so + preauth deny parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) + line: \1required\3 deny={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so + authfail deny parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) + line: \1required\3 deny={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value + for pam_faillock.so preauth deny parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(deny)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value + for pam_faillock.so authfail deny parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(deny)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_deny_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts + This rule configures the system to lock out the root account after a number of +incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. + +pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully +defined to work as expected. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is +recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, +depending on the OS version. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. +If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock +parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + CCI-002238 + CCI-000044 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + AC-7(b) + IA-5(c) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via +user password guessing, also known as brute-forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking +the account. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature with-faillock + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") +for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" +do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" + fi + sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" +done + +fi + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + +FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" +if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*even_deny_root" + line="even_deny_root" + if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then + echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF + fi + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\beven_deny_root\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 + fi + done +else + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*even_deny_root' "$pam_file"; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ even_deny_root/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ even_deny_root/' "$pam_file" + fi + done +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system + relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where + authselect tool is present + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" + feature is enabled using authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where + authselect tool is not present + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + is already enabled + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so + preauth editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth + insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so + authfail editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail + insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so + account section editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: account required pam_faillock.so + insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence + of /etc/security/faillock.conf file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + register: result_faillock_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + even_deny_root parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + regexp: ^\s*even_deny_root + line: even_deny_root + state: present + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + even_deny_root parameter not in PAM files + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper + remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM + file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system + relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative + message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the + current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the + new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any + custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Create an + authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the + authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the + authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Change the + PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "even_deny_root" + option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper + remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM + file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system + relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Informative + message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the + current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Define the + new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any + custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Create an + authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the + authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the + authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Change the + PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "even_deny_root" + option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\beven_deny_root\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + even_deny_root parameter in PAM files + block: + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + even_deny_root parameter is already enabled in pam files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*even_deny_root + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion + of pam_faillock.so preauth even_deny_root parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) + line: \1required\3 even_deny_root + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion + of pam_faillock.so authfail even_deny_root parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) + line: \1required\3 even_deny_root + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_even_deny_root_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Lock Accounts Must Persist + This rule ensures that the system lock out accounts using pam_faillock.so persist +after system reboot. From "pam_faillock" man pages: +Note that the default directory that "pam_faillock" uses is usually cleared on system +boot so the access will be reenabled after system reboot. If that is undesirable, a different +tally directory must be set with the "dir" option. + +pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully +defined to work as expected. In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is +recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, +depending on the OS version. + +The chosen profile expects the directory to be . + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. +If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock +parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. + CCI-000044 + CCI-002238 + AC-7(b) + AC-7(a) + AC-7.1(ii) + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 + Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts prevents direct password +guessing attacks. In combination with the silent option, user enumeration attacks +are also mitigated. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir='' + + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature with-faillock + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") +for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" +do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" + fi + sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" +done + +fi + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + +FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" +if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*dir\s*=" + line="dir = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir" + if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then + echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(dir\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF + fi + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bdir\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdir\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 + fi + done +else + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*dir' "$pam_file"; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ dir='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ dir='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'/' "$pam_file" + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"dir"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'\3/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"dir"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir"'\3/' "$pam_file" + fi + done +fi + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-libselinux" ; then + yum install -y "python3-libselinux" +fi +if ! rpm -q --quiet "python3-policycoreutils" ; then + yum install -y "python3-policycoreutils" +fi +if ! rpm -q --quiet "policycoreutils-python-utils" ; then + yum install -y "policycoreutils-python-utils" +fi + +mkdir -p "$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir" +semanage fcontext -a -t faillog_t "$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir(/.*)?" +restorecon -R -v "$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Remediation where authselect tool is present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure "with-faillock" feature is enabled using + authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Remediation where authselect tool is not present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if pam_faillock.so is already enabled + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth editing PAM + files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth + insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail editing PAM + files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail + insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Enable pam_faillock.so account section editing + PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: account required pam_faillock.so + insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf + file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + register: result_faillock_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the pam_faillock.so dir parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + regexp: ^\s*dir\s*= + line: dir = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} + state: present + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the pam_faillock.so dir parameter not + in PAM files + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect custom profile is used + if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the current authselect profile as + a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the new authselect custom profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current features to also + enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if any custom profile with the same + name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Create an authselect custom profile based + on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the authselect custom profile is + selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Restore the authselect features in the + custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the "dir" option from "pam_faillock.so" + is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdir\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect custom profile is used + if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the current authselect profile as + a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Define the new authselect custom profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Get authselect current features to also + enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if any custom profile with the same + name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Create an authselect custom profile based + on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the authselect custom profile is + selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Restore the authselect features in the + custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the "dir" option from "pam_faillock.so" + is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bdir\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the pam_faillock.so dir parameter in PAM + files + block: + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Check if pam_faillock.so dir parameter is already + enabled in pam files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*dir + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so preauth + dir parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) + line: \1required\3 dir={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the inclusion of pam_faillock.so authfail + dir parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) + line: \1required\3 dir={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so + preauth dir parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(dir)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + + - name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure the desired value for pam_faillock.so + authfail dir parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(dir)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure necessary SELinux packages are installed + ansible.builtin.package: + name: '{{ item }}' + state: present + with_items: + - python3-libselinux + - python3-policycoreutils + - policycoreutils-python-utils + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Create the tally directory if it does not exist + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}' + state: directory + setype: faillog_t + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure SELinux file context is permanently set + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: semanage fcontext -a -t faillog_t "{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + }}(/.*)?" + register: result_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_semanage + ignore_errors: true + changed_when: + - result_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_semanage.rc == 0 + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Lock Accounts Must Persist - Ensure SELinux file context is applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: restorecon -R "{{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir }}" + register: result_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_restorecon + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-7.1(ii) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts + Utilizing pam_faillock.so, the fail_interval directive configures the system +to lock out an account after a number of incorrect login attempts within a specified time +period. + +Ensure that the file /etc/security/faillock.conf contains the following entry: +fail_interval = <interval-in-seconds> where interval-in-seconds is or greater. + + +In order to avoid errors when manually editing these files, it is +recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, +depending on the OS version. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. +If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock +parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000044 + CCI-002236 + CCI-002237 + CCI-002238 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + AC-7(a) + PR.AC-7 + FIA_AFL.1 + SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + By limiting the number of failed logon attempts the risk of unauthorized system +access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute-forcing, is reduced. +Limits are imposed by locking the account. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval='' + + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature with-faillock + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") +for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" +do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" + fi + sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" +done + +fi + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + +FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" +if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*fail_interval\s*=" + line="fail_interval = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" + if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then + echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(fail_interval\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF + fi + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bfail_interval\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 + fi + done +else + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*fail_interval' "$pam_file"; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ fail_interval='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ fail_interval='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'/' "$pam_file" + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"fail_interval"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'\3/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"fail_interval"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval"'\3/' "$pam_file" + fi + done +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect + tool is present + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of + authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" + feature is enabled using authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect + tool is not present + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + is already enabled + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so + preauth editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth + insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so + authfail editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail + insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so + account section editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: account required pam_faillock.so + insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of + /etc/security/faillock.conf file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + register: result_faillock_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + fail_interval parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + regexp: ^\s*fail_interval\s*= + line: fail_interval = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }} + state: present + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + fail_interval parameter not in PAM files + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the new + authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM + file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "fail_interval" + option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Define the new + authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM + file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "fail_interval" + option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bfail_interval\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + fail_interval parameter in PAM files + block: + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + fail_interval parameter is already enabled in pam files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*fail_interval + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion + of pam_faillock.so preauth fail_interval parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) + line: \1required\3 fail_interval={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval + }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion + of pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) + line: \1required\3 fail_interval={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval + }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired + value for pam_faillock.so preauth fail_interval parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(fail_interval)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + + - name: Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired + value for pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(fail_interval)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_fail_interval_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts + This rule configures the system to lock out accounts during a specified time period after a +number of incorrect login attempts using pam_faillock.so. + + +Ensure that the file /etc/security/faillock.conf contains the following entry: +unlock_time=<interval-in-seconds> where +interval-in-seconds is or greater. + + +pam_faillock.so module requires multiple entries in pam files. These entries must be carefully +defined to work as expected. In order to avoid any errors when manually editing these files, +it is recommended to use the appropriate tools, such as authselect or authconfig, +depending on the OS version. + +If unlock_time is set to 0, manual intervention by an administrator is required +to unlock a user. This should be done using the faillock tool. + If the system supports the new /etc/security/faillock.conf file but the +pam_faillock.so parameters are defined directly in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and +/etc/pam.d/password-auth, the remediation will migrate the unlock_time parameter +to /etc/security/faillock.conf to ensure compatibility with authselect tool. +The parameters deny and fail_interval, if used, also have to be migrated +by their respective remediation. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. +If the system supports the /etc/security/faillock.conf file, the pam_faillock +parameters should be defined in faillock.conf file. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.3 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.8 + CCI-000044 + CCI-002236 + CCI-002237 + CCI-002238 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + AC-7(b) + PR.AC-7 + FIA_AFL.1 + Req-8.1.7 + 8.3.4 + SRG-OS-000329-GPOS-00128 + SRG-OS-000021-GPOS-00005 + By limiting the number of failed logon attempts the risk of unauthorized system +access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute-forcing, is reduced. +Limits are imposed by locking the account. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time='' + + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature with-faillock + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") +for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" +do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth\s+required\s+pam_faillock\.so\s+(preauth silent|authfail).*$' "$pam_file" ; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so authfail' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.*/i account required pam_faillock.so' "$pam_file" + fi + sed -Ei 's/(auth.*)(\[default=die\])(.*pam_faillock\.so)/\1required \3/g' "$pam_file" +done + +fi + +AUTH_FILES=("/etc/pam.d/system-auth" "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + +FAILLOCK_CONF="/etc/security/faillock.conf" +if [ -f $FAILLOCK_CONF ]; then + regex="^\s*unlock_time\s*=" + line="unlock_time = $var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" + if ! grep -q $regex $FAILLOCK_CONF; then + echo $line >> $FAILLOCK_CONF + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's|^\s*\(unlock_time\s*=\s*\)\(\S\+\)|\1'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'|g' $FAILLOCK_CONF + fi + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if [ -e "$pam_file" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="$pam_file" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$pam_file") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + + if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s.*\bpam_faillock.so\s.*\bunlock_time\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + else + echo "$pam_file was not found" >&2 + fi + done +else + for pam_file in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}" + do + if ! grep -qE '^\s*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*unlock_time' "$pam_file"; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ unlock_time='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks '/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ unlock_time='"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'/' "$pam_file" + else + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\('"unlock_time"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'\3/' "$pam_file" + sed -i --follow-symlinks 's/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock\.so.*authfail.*\)\('"unlock_time"'=\)[0-9]\+\(.*\)/\1\2'"$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time"'\3/' "$pam_file" + fi + done +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies on + authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect + tool is present + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message based + on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure "with-faillock" feature + is enabled using authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-faillock + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-faillock") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Remediation where authselect + tool is not present + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + is already enabled + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail) + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_is_enabled + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so preauth + editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so preauth + insertbefore: ^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so authfail + editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: auth required pam_faillock.so authfail + insertbefore: ^auth.*required.*pam_deny\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Enable pam_faillock.so account + section editing PAM files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + line: account required pam_faillock.so + insertbefore: ^account.*required.*pam_unix\.so.* + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_is_enabled.found == 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the presence of /etc/security/faillock.conf + file + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + register: result_faillock_conf_check + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + unlock_time parameter in /etc/security/faillock.conf + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/faillock.conf + regexp: ^\s*unlock_time\s*= + line: unlock_time = {{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }} + state: present + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + unlock_time parameter not in PAM files + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to + be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom + profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect + profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect + custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file + to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "unlock_time" + option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the PAM file to + be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect custom + profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check integrity of authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the current authselect + profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Define the new authselect + custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Get authselect current + features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Change the PAM file + to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the "unlock_time" + option from "pam_faillock.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*auth.*pam_faillock.so.*)\bunlock_time\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the pam_faillock.so + unlock_time parameter in PAM files + block: + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Check if pam_faillock.so + unlock_time parameter is already enabled in pam files + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: .*auth.*pam_faillock\.so (preauth|authfail).*unlock_time + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of + pam_faillock.so preauth unlock_time parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*) + line: \1required\3 unlock_time={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the inclusion of + pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*) + line: \1required\3 unlock_time={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + }} + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value + for pam_faillock.so preauth unlock_time parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so preauth.*)(unlock_time)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + + - name: Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts - Ensure the desired value + for pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time parameter in auth section + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: (^\s*auth\s+)([\w\[].*\b)(\s+pam_faillock.so authfail.*)(unlock_time)=[0-9]+(.*) + line: \1required\3\4={{ var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time }}\5 + state: present + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - result_pam_faillock_unlock_time_parameter_is_present.found > 0 + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - not result_faillock_conf_check.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4 + - accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Quality Requirements + The default pam_pwquality PAM module provides strength +checking for passwords. It performs a number of checks, such as +making sure passwords are not similar to dictionary words, are of +at least a certain length, are not the previous password reversed, +and are not simply a change of case from the previous password. It +can also require passwords to be in certain character classes. The +pam_pwquality module is the preferred way of configuring +password requirements. + +The man pages pam_pwquality(8) +provide information on the capabilities and configuration of +each. + + Set Password Quality Requirements, if using +pam_cracklib + The pam_cracklib PAM module can be configured to meet +requirements for a variety of policies. + +For example, to configure pam_cracklib to require at least one uppercase +character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special) +character, locate the following line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: +password requisite pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3 +and then alter it to read: +password required pam_cracklib.so try_first_pass retry=3 maxrepeat=3 minlen=14 dcredit=-1 ucredit=-1 ocredit=-1 lcredit=-1 difok=4 +If no such line exists, add one as the first line of the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. +The arguments can be modified to ensure compliance with +your organization's security policy. Discussion of each parameter follows. + Note that the password quality requirements are not enforced for the +root account for some reason. + + + Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwquality + The pam_pwquality PAM module can be configured to meet +requirements for a variety of policies. + +For example, to configure pam_pwquality to require at least one uppercase +character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special) +character, make sure that pam_pwquality exists in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: +password requisite pam_pwquality.so try_first_pass local_users_only retry=3 authtok_type= +If no such line exists, add one as the first line of the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. +Next, modify the settings in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to match the following: +difok = 4 +minlen = 14 +dcredit = -1 +ucredit = -1 +lcredit = -1 +ocredit = -1 +maxrepeat = 3 +The arguments can be modified to ensure compliance with +your organization's security policy. Discussion of each parameter follows. + + dcredit + Minimum number of digits in password + 0 + -1 + -2 + -1 + + + dictcheck + Prevent the use of dictionary words for passwords. + 1 + 1 + + + difok + Minimum number of characters not present in old +password + 15 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 8 + + + lcredit + Minimum number of lower case in password + 0 + -1 + -2 + -1 + + + maxclassrepeat + Maximum Number of Consecutive Repeating Characters in a Password From the Same Character Class + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 4 + + + maxrepeat + Maximum Number of Consecutive Repeating Characters in a Password + 1 + 2 + 3 + 3 + + + minclass + Minimum number of categories of characters that must exist in a password + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 3 + + + minlen + Minimum number of characters in password + 10 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 18 + 20 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 15 + + + ocredit + Minimum number of other (special characters) in +password + 0 + -1 + -2 + -1 + + + retry + Number of retry attempts before erroring out + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 3 + + + ucredit + Minimum number of upper case in password + 0 + -1 + -2 + -1 + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters + The pam_pwquality module's dcredit parameter controls requirements for +usage of digits in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to +contain that many digits. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional +length credit for each digit. Modify the dcredit setting in +/etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a digit in passwords. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000194 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + Req-8.2.3 + 8.3.6 + 8.3.9 + SRG-OS-000071-GPOS-00039 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required +to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of +the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force +attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes +to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of +possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. +Requiring digits makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger +search space. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_dcredit='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bdcredit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bdcredit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^dcredit") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_dcredit" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^dcredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^dcredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_dcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_dcredit # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_dcredit: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Check + if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_dcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Check + the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Define + the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Check + if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Ensure + authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - + Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Ensure + the "dcredit" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path + }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bdcredit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_dcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters - Ensure + PAM variable dcredit is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*dcredit + line: dcredit = {{ var_password_pam_dcredit }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_dcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary Words + The pam_pwquality module's dictcheck check if passwords contains dictionary words. When +dictcheck is set to 1 passwords will be checked for dictionary words. + CCI-000366 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00225 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. +Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at +guessing and brute-force attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more +complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the +password is compromised. + +Passwords with dictionary words may be more vulnerable to password-guessing attacks. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_dictcheck='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bdictcheck\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bdictcheck\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^dictcheck") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_dictcheck" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^dictcheck\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^dictcheck\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_dictcheck + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_dictcheck # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_dictcheck: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_dictcheck + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect + profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Ensure the "dictcheck" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present + in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bdictcheck\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_dictcheck + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary + Words - Ensure PAM variable dictcheck is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*dictcheck + line: dictcheck = {{ var_password_pam_dictcheck }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_dictcheck + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + The pam_pwquality module's difok parameter sets the number of characters +in a password that must not be present in and old password during a password change. + +Modify the difok setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf +to equal to require differing characters +when changing passwords. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000195 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(b) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources +required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, +is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts +at guessing and brute–force attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long +it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the +greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested +before the password is compromised. + +Requiring a minimum number of different characters during password changes ensures that +newly changed passwords should not resemble previously compromised ones. +Note that passwords which are changed on compromised systems will still be compromised, however. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_difok='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bdifok\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bdifok\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^difok") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_difok" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^difok\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^difok\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_difok + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_difok # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_difok: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters - + Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_difok + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters - + Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Ensure the "difok" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path + }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bdifok\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_difok + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters - + Ensure PAM variable difok is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*difok + line: difok = {{ var_password_pam_difok }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_difok + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User + The pam_pwquality module's enforce_for_root parameter controls requirements for +enforcing password complexity for the root user. Enable the enforce_for_root +setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the root user +to use complex passwords. + CCI-000194 + CCI-000193 + CCI-001619 + CCI-000205 + CCI-000195 + CCI-000192 + CCI-000366 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 + SRG-OS-000071-GPOS-00039 + SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 + SRG-OS-000266-GPOS-00101 + SRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00225 + SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise +the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a +password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a +password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations +that need to be tested before the password is compromised. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +if [ -e "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*enforce_for_root/Id" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + touch "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + +cp "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "enforce_for_root" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/security/pwquality.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_enforce_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User + lineinfile: + path: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + create: true + line: enforce_for_root + state: present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_enforce_root + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + The pam_pwquality module's lcredit parameter controls requirements for +usage of lowercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to +contain that many lowercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional +length credit for each lowercase character. Modify the lcredit setting in +/etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a lowercase character in passwords. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000193 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + Req-8.2.3 + 8.3.6 + 8.3.9 + SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required +to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of +the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force +attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes +to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of +possble combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. +Requiring a minimum number of lowercase characters makes password guessing attacks +more difficult by ensuring a larger search space. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_lcredit='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\blcredit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\blcredit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^lcredit") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_lcredit" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^lcredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^lcredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_lcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_lcredit # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_lcredit: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters - + Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_lcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters - + Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Ensure the "lcredit" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path + }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\blcredit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_lcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters - + Ensure PAM variable lcredit is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*lcredit + line: lcredit = {{ var_password_pam_lcredit }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_lcredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters from Same Character Class + The pam_pwquality module's maxclassrepeat parameter controls requirements for +consecutive repeating characters from the same character class. When set to a positive number, it will reject passwords +which contain more than that number of consecutive characters from the same character class. Modify the +maxclassrepeat setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal +to prevent a run of ( + 1) or more identical characters. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000195 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. +Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting +attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The +more complex a password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the +password is compromised. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bmaxclassrepeat\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bmaxclassrepeat\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^maxclassrepeat") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^maxclassrepeat\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^maxclassrepeat\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is + present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Define the PAM file to be edited as a + local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Check if system relies on authselect + tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure authselect custom profile is used + if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Define the new authselect custom profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Get authselect current features to + also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Check if any custom profile with the + same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Restore the authselect features in + the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Change the PAM file to be edited according + to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure the "maxclassrepeat" option from + "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bmaxclassrepeat\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating + Characters from Same Character Class - Ensure PAM variable maxclassrepeat is set + accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*maxclassrepeat + line: maxclassrepeat = {{ var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters + The pam_pwquality module's maxrepeat parameter controls requirements for +consecutive repeating characters. When set to a positive number, it will reject passwords +which contain more than that number of consecutive characters. Modify the maxrepeat setting +in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal to prevent a +run of ( + 1) or more identical characters. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000195 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. +Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at +guessing and brute-force attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more +complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the +password is compromised. + +Passwords with excessive repeating characters may be more vulnerable to password-guessing attacks. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_maxrepeat='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bmaxrepeat\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bmaxrepeat\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^maxrepeat") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_maxrepeat" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^maxrepeat\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^maxrepeat\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_maxrepeat # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_maxrepeat: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Check if system + relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Define the new + authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Change the PAM + file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure the "maxrepeat" + option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bmaxrepeat\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters - Ensure PAM variable + maxrepeat is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*maxrepeat + line: maxrepeat = {{ var_password_pam_maxrepeat }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + The pam_pwquality module's minclass parameter controls +requirements for usage of different character classes, or types, of character +that must exist in a password before it is considered valid. For example, +setting this value to three (3) requires that any password must have characters +from at least three different categories in order to be approved. The default +value is zero (0), meaning there are no required classes. There are four +categories available: + +* Upper-case characters +* Lower-case characters +* Digits +* Special characters (for example, punctuation) + +Modify the minclass setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf entry +to require +differing categories of characters when changing passwords. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000195 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. +Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts +at guessing and brute-force attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The +more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before +the password is compromised. + +Requiring a minimum number of character categories makes password guessing attacks more difficult +by ensuring a larger search space. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_minclass='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bminclass\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bminclass\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^minclass") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_minclass" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^minclass\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^minclass\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_minclass + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_minclass # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_minclass: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories - + Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_minclass + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories - + Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Ensure the "minclass" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ + pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bminclass\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_minclass + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories - + Ensure PAM variable minclass is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*minclass + line: minclass = {{ var_password_pam_minclass }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_minclass + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length + The pam_pwquality module's minlen parameter controls requirements for +minimum characters required in a password. Add minlen= +after pam_pwquality to set minimum password length requirements. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000205 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + Req-8.2.3 + 8.3.6 + 8.3.9 + SRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046 + The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations +that need to be tested before the password is compromised. + +Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a +password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. +Password length is one factor of several that helps to determine strength +and how long it takes to crack a password. Use of more characters in a password +helps to exponentially increase the time and/or resources required to +compromise the password. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_minlen='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bminlen\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bminlen\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^minlen") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_minlen" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^minlen\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^minlen\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_minlen + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_minlen # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_minlen: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_minlen + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Check the proper + remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Define the + PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Check if system + relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Informative + message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Define the + current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Define the + new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Check if + any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Create an + authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure the + authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Restore the + authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Change the + PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure the + "minlen" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bminlen\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_minlen + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure PAM variable + minlen is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*minlen + line: minlen = {{ var_password_pam_minlen }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_minlen + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + The pam_pwquality module's ocredit= parameter controls requirements for +usage of special (or "other") characters in a password. When set to a negative number, +any password will be required to contain that many special characters. +When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 +additional length credit for each special character. Modify the ocredit setting +in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal +to require use of a special character in passwords. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-001619 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000266-GPOS-00101 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required +to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of +the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force +attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes +to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of +possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. +Requiring a minimum number of special characters makes password guessing attacks +more difficult by ensuring a larger search space. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_ocredit='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bocredit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bocredit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ocredit") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_ocredit" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ocredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^ocredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_ocredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_ocredit # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_ocredit: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - Check + if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_ocredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - Check + the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - + Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - + Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - + Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - + Ensure the "ocredit" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path + }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bocredit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - + Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_ocredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters - Ensure + PAM variable ocredit is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*ocredit + line: ocredit = {{ var_password_pam_ocredit }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - accounts_password_pam_ocredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth + To enable PAM password complexity in password-auth file: +Edit the password section in +/etc/pam.d/password-auth to show +password requisite pam_pwquality.so. + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 + SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Enabling PAM password complexity permits to enforce strong passwords and consequently +makes the system less prone to dictionary attacks. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check + if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check + the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Define + the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check + if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check + integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Informative + message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Get + authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Define + the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Define + the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Get + authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check + if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Create + an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Restore + the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Change + the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check + if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Include + or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Check + if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different + control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*) + replace: \1requisite \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + insertafter: ^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so + line: password requisite pam_pwquality.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam__add is defined and result_pam__add.changed) + or (result_pam__edit is defined and result_pam__edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth + To enable PAM password complexity in system-auth file: +Edit the password section in +/etc/pam.d/system-auth to show +password requisite pam_pwquality.so. + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Enabling PAM password complexity permits to enforce strong passwords and consequently +makes the system less prone to dictionary attacks. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"requisite"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*)/\1'"requisite"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + LAST_MATCH_LINE=$(grep -nP "^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" | tail -n 1 | cut -d: -f 1) + if [ ! -z $LAST_MATCH_LINE ]; then + sed -i --follow-symlinks $LAST_MATCH_LINE' a password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"requisite"' pam_pwquality.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check if + /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check the + proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Define + the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check + if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check + integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Informative + message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Get + authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Define + the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Define + the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Get + authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check + if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Create + an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Restore + the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Change + the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check + if expected PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+requisite\s+pam_pwquality.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Include + or update the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Check + if required PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different + control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_pwquality.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + the correct control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_pwquality.so.*) + replace: \1requisite \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + the required PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + insertafter: ^account.*required.*pam_permit\.so + line: password requisite pam_pwquality.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth - Ensure + authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam__add is defined and result_pam__add.changed) + or (result_pam__edit is defined and result_pam__edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session + To configure the number of retry prompts that are permitted per-session: + +Edit the /etc/security/pwquality.conf to include + +retry=, or a lower value if site +policy is more restrictive. The DoD requirement is a maximum of 3 prompts +per session. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 9 + 5.5.3 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000192 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + AC-7(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.IP-1 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Setting the password retry prompts that are permitted on a per-session basis to a low value +requires some software, such as SSH, to re-connect. This can slow down and +draw additional attention to some types of password-guessing attacks. Note that this +is different from account lockout, which is provided by the pam_faillock module. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_retry='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^retry") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_retry" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^retry\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^retry\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + + if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'".*"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s.*\bretry\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'".*"'.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\sretry=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'".*"'\s+pam_pwquality.so\s.*\bretry\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'".*"'.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\sretry=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - accounts_password_pam_retry + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_retry # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_retry: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM variable retry is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^\s*retry + line: retry = {{ var_password_pam_retry }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - accounts_password_pam_retry + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted + Per-Session - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - accounts_password_pam_retry + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted + Per-Session - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect + is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Informative message based on the authselect integrity + check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current features to also enable them + in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Check if any custom profile with the same name was + already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the + custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the "retry" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is + not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*.*.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - accounts_password_pam_retry + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted + Per-Session - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - accounts_password_pam_retry + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted + Per-Session - Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect + is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Informative message based on the authselect integrity + check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local + fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current features to also enable them + in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Check if any custom profile with the same name was + already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the + custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the "retry" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is + not present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*.*.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts + Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - accounts_password_pam_retry + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + The pam_pwquality module's ucredit= parameter controls requirements for +usage of uppercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to +contain that many uppercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional +length credit for each uppercase character. Modify the ucredit setting in +/etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of an uppercase character in passwords. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000192 + CCI-000193 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(4) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + Req-8.2.3 + 8.3.6 + 8.3.9 + SRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037 + SRG-OS-000070-GPOS-00038 + Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. +Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts +at guessing and brute-force attacks. + +Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more +complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before +the password is compromised. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_ucredit='' + + + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bucredit\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bucredit\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ucredit") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_ucredit" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ucredit\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^ucredit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_ucredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_ucredit # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_ucredit: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters - + Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_ucredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters - + Check the proper remediation for the system + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Check if system relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Informative message based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Get authselect current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Check if any custom profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Ensure the "ucredit" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is not present in {{ pam_file_path + }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bucredit\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*) + replace: \1\2 + register: result_pam_option_removal + + - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - result_pam_option_removal is changed + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_ucredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters - + Ensure PAM variable ucredit is set accordingly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf + regexp: ^#?\s*ucredit + line: ucredit = {{ var_password_pam_ucredit }} + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_pam_ucredit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Hashing Algorithm + The system's default algorithm for storing password hashes in +/etc/shadow is SHA-512. This can be configured in several +locations. + + Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf + In /etc/libuser.conf, add or correct the following line in its +[defaults] section to ensure the system will use the SHA-512 +algorithm for password hashing: +crypt_style = sha512 + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.2 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.13.11 + CCI-000196 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(c) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.1 + 8.3.2 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard +method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can +be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that +are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are +kepy in plain text. + +This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are +configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. +Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option ensures the use +of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more +difficult. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q libuser; then + +LIBUSER_CONF="/etc/libuser.conf" +CRYPT_STYLE_REGEX='[[:space:]]*\[defaults](.*(\n)+)+?[[:space:]]*crypt_style[[:space:]]*' + +# Try find crypt_style in [defaults] section. If it is here, then change algorithm to sha512. +# If it isn't here, then add it to [defaults] section. +if grep -qzosP $CRYPT_STYLE_REGEX $LIBUSER_CONF ; then + sed -i "s/\(crypt_style[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*\).*/\1sha512/g" $LIBUSER_CONF +elif grep -qs "\[defaults]" $LIBUSER_CONF ; then + sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[defaults]/a crypt_style = sha512" $LIBUSER_CONF +else + echo -e "[defaults]\ncrypt_style = sha512" >> $LIBUSER_CONF +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_libuserconf + +- name: Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/libuser.conf + insertafter: ^\s*\[defaults] + regexp: ^#?crypt_style + line: crypt_style = sha512 + state: present + create: true + when: '"libuser" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_libuserconf + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs + In /etc/login.defs, add or correct the following line to ensure +the system will use as the hashing algorithm: +ENCRYPT_METHOD + BP28(R32) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.2 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.13.11 + CCI-000196 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(c) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.1 + 8.3.2 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. +If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords +that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kept in plain text. + +Using a stronger hashing algorithm makes password cracking attacks more difficult. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_password_hashing_algorithm='' + + +if grep --silent ^ENCRYPT_METHOD /etc/login.defs ; then + sed -i "s/^ENCRYPT_METHOD .*/ENCRYPT_METHOD $var_password_hashing_algorithm/g" /etc/login.defs +else + echo "" >> /etc/login.defs + echo "ENCRYPT_METHOD $var_password_hashing_algorithm" >> /etc/login.defs +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_hashing_algorithm # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_hashing_algorithm: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^#?ENCRYPT_METHOD + line: ENCRYPT_METHOD {{ var_password_hashing_algorithm }} + state: present + create: true + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs + + + + + + + + + + + Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth + The PAM system service can be configured to only store encrypted +representations of passwords. In +/etc/pam.d/password-auth, +the +password section of the file controls which PAM modules execute +during a password change. Set the pam_unix.so module in the +password section to include the argument sha512, as shown +below: + +password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 other arguments... + +This will help ensure when local users change their passwords, hashes for +the new passwords will be generated using the SHA-512 algorithm. This is +the default. + BP28(R32) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.2 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.13.11 + CCI-000196 + CCI-000803 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(c) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.1 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard +method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can +be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that +are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are +kepy in plain text. + +This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are +configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. +Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option ensures the use +of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more +difficult. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ sha512/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth + +- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth + +- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the new + authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Change the PAM + file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if expected + PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Include or update + the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + block: + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if required + PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the correct + control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) + replace: \1sufficient \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the required + PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + line: password sufficient pam_unix.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if the required + PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_sha512_option_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the "sha512" + PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so.*) + line: \1 sha512 + state: present + register: result_pam_sha512_add + when: + - result_pam_module_sha512_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_sha512_add is defined and result_pam_sha512_add.changed) + or (result_pam_sha512_edit is defined and result_pam_sha512_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth + + + + + + + + + + Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm + The PAM system service can be configured to only store encrypted +representations of passwords. In "/etc/pam.d/system-auth", the +password section of the file controls which PAM modules execute +during a password change. Set the pam_unix.so module in the +password section to include the argument sha512, as shown +below: + + +password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 other arguments... + + +This will help ensure when local users change their passwords, hashes for +the new passwords will be generated using the SHA-512 algorithm. This is +the default. + BP28(R32) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.2 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.13.11 + CCI-000196 + CCI-000803 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(c) + IA-5(1)(c) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.1 + 8.3.2 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard +method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can +be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that +are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are +kepy in plain text. + +This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are +configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. +Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option ensures the use +of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more +difficult. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ sha512/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth + +- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file + is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth + +- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check the proper remediation for the + system + block: + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the PAM file to be edited + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if system relies on authselect + tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect custom profile + is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check integrity of authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Informative message based on the + authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the current authselect profile + as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the new authselect custom + profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current features + to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if any custom profile with + the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Create an authselect custom profile + based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the authselect custom profile + is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Restore the authselect features + in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Change the PAM file to be edited + according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if expected PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Include or update the PAM module + line in {{ pam_file_path }} + block: + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if required PAM module line + is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the correct control for + the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) + replace: \1sufficient \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the required PAM module + line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + line: password sufficient pam_unix.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if the required PAM module + option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\ssha512\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_sha512_option_present + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the "sha512" PAM option for + "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so.*) + line: \1 sha512 + state: present + register: result_pam_sha512_add + when: + - result_pam_module_sha512_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_sha512_add is defined and result_pam_sha512_add.changed) + or (result_pam_sha512_edit is defined and result_pam_sha512_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs + In /etc/login.defs, ensure SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS and +SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS has the minimum value of 5000. +For example: +SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000 +SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000 +Notice that if neither are set, they already have the default value of 5000. +If either is set, they must have the minimum value of 5000. + BP28(R68) + CCI-000196 + CCI-000803 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard +method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can +be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords +that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if +they are kept in plain text. + +Using more hashing rounds makes password cracking attacks more difficult. + +if [ -e "/etc/login.defs" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s*/Id" "/etc/login.defs" +else + printf '%s\n' "Path '/etc/login.defs' wasn't found on this system. Refusing to continue." >&2 + return 1 +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/login.defs" + +cp "/etc/login.defs" "/etc/login.defs.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000" >> "/etc/login.defs" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/login.defs.bak" + + - name: Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs - Ensure SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS + has Minimum Value of 5000 + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: /etc/login.defs + regexp: (^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s+)(?!(?:[5-9]\d{3,}|\d{5,}))\S*(\s*$) + replace: \g<1>5000\g<2> + backup: false + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - set_password_hashing_min_rounds_logindefs + +- name: Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs - Ensure SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS + has Minimum Value of 5000 + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: /etc/login.defs + regexp: (^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS\s+)(?!(?:[5-9]\d{3,}|\d{5,}))\S*(\s*$) + replace: \g<1>5000\g<2> + backup: false + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - set_password_hashing_min_rounds_logindefs + + + + + + + + + + + + Protect Physical Console Access + It is impossible to fully protect a system from an +attacker with physical access, so securing the space in which the +system is located should be considered a necessary step. However, +there are some steps which, if taken, make it more difficult for an +attacker to quickly or undetectably modify a system from its +console. + + + Login timeout for idle sessions + Specify duration of allowed idle time. + 600 + 7200 + 840 + 900 + 1800 + 300 + 3600 + 300 + + + Disable debug-shell SystemD Service + SystemD's debug-shell service is intended to +diagnose SystemD related boot issues with various systemctl +commands. Once enabled and following a system reboot, the root shell +will be available on tty9 which is access by pressing +CTRL-ALT-F9. The debug-shell service should only be used +for SystemD related issues and should otherwise be disabled. + +By default, the debug-shell SystemD service is already disabled. + +The debug-shell service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now debug-shell.service + 3.4.5 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + CM-6 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security +on the machine through valid troubleshooting configurations and gaining root +access when the system is rebooted. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'debug-shell.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'debug-shell.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'debug-shell.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files debug-shell.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'debug-shell.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'debug-shell.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'debug-shell.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service debug-shell + block: + + - name: Disable service debug-shell + block: + + - name: Disable service debug-shell + systemd: + name: debug-shell.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service debug-shell' failure, + service was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_debug-shell_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - debug-shell.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files debug-shell.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_debug-shell_disabled + +- name: Disable socket debug-shell + systemd: + name: debug-shell.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("debug-shell.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_debug-shell_disabled + + include disable_debug-shell + +class disable_debug-shell { + service {'debug-shell': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["debug-shell"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action + By default, SystemD will reboot the system if the Ctrl-Alt-Del +key sequence is pressed Ctrl-Alt-Delete more than 7 times in 2 seconds. + +To configure the system to ignore the CtrlAltDelBurstAction + +setting, add or modify the following to /etc/systemd/system.conf: +CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none + Disabling the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence +in /etc/init/control-alt-delete.conf DOES NOT disable the Ctrl-Alt-Del +key sequence if running in runlevel 6 (e.g. in GNOME, KDE, etc.)! The +Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence will only be disabled if running in +the non-graphical runlevel 3. + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + FAU_GEN.1.2 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A locally logged-in user who presses Ctrl-Alt-Del, when at the console, +can reboot the system. If accidentally pressed, as could happen in +the case of mixed OS environment, this can create the risk of short-term +loss of availability of systems due to unintentional reboot. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q systemd; }; then + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^CtrlAltDelBurstAction=") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s=%s" "$stripped_key" "none" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^CtrlAltDelBurstAction=\\>" "/etc/systemd/system.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^CtrlAltDelBurstAction=\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/systemd/system.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/systemd/system.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/systemd/system.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/systemd/system.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/systemd/system.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_ctrlaltdel_burstaction + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/systemd/system.conf + state: present + regexp: ^CtrlAltDelBurstAction + line: CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none + create: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_ctrlaltdel_burstaction + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation + By default, SystemD will reboot the system if the Ctrl-Alt-Del +key sequence is pressed. + +To configure the system to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence from the + +command line instead of rebooting the system, do either of the following: +ln -sf /dev/null /etc/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.target +or +systemctl mask ctrl-alt-del.target + +Do not simply delete the /usr/lib/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.service file, +as this file may be restored during future system updates. + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + FAU_GEN.1.2 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A locally logged-in user who presses Ctrl-Alt-Del, when at the console, +can reboot the system. If accidentally pressed, as could happen in +the case of mixed OS environment, this can create the risk of short-term +loss of availability of systems due to unintentional reboot. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +systemctl disable --now ctrl-alt-del.target +systemctl mask --now ctrl-alt-del.target + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation + systemd: + name: ctrl-alt-del.target + force: true + masked: true + state: stopped + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled + Oracle Linux 9 systems support an "interactive boot" option that can +be used to prevent services from being started. On a Oracle Linux 9 +system, interactive boot can be enabled by providing a 1, +yes, true, or on value to the +systemd.confirm_spawn kernel argument in /etc/default/grub. +Remove any instance of systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on) from +the kernel arguments in that file to disable interactive boot. +Recovery booting must also be disabled. Confirm that +GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true is set in /etc/default/grub. +It is also required to change the runtime configuration, run: + +/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn" + +grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.2 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + SC-2(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Using interactive or recovery boot, the console user could disable auditing, firewalls, +or other services, weakening system security. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then + +# Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled in /etc/default/grub +CONFIRM_SPAWN_YES="systemd.confirm_spawn\(=\(1\|yes\|true\|on\)\|\b\)" +CONFIRM_SPAWN_NO="systemd.confirm_spawn=no" + +if grep -q "\(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX\|GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT\)" /etc/default/grub +then + sed -i "s/${CONFIRM_SPAWN_YES}/${CONFIRM_SPAWN_NO}/" /etc/default/grub +fi + +# make sure GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true +if grep -q '^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*' '/etc/default/grub' ; then + # modify the GRUB command-line if an GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY= arg already exists + sed -i 's/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true/' /etc/default/grub +else + # no GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=arg is present, append it to file + echo "GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true" >> '/etc/default/grub' +fi + + + +# Remove 'systemd.confirm_spawn' kernel argument also from runtime settings +/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn" + + +#Regen grub.cfg handle updated GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY and confirm_spawn +grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) + - grub2_disable_interactive_boot + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Verify GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true + lineinfile: + path: /etc/default/grub + regexp: ^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.* + line: GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) + - grub2_disable_interactive_boot + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled in /etc/default/grub + replace: + dest: /etc/default/grub + regexp: systemd.confirm_spawn(=(1|yes|true|on)|\b) + replace: systemd.confirm_spawn=no + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) + - grub2_disable_interactive_boot + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled (runtime) + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn" + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) + - grub2_disable_interactive_boot + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Regen grub.cfg handle updated GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY and confirm_spawn + command: grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-2(1) + - grub2_disable_interactive_boot + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Require Authentication for Emergency Systemd Target + Emergency mode is intended as a system recovery +method, providing a single user root access to the system +during a failed boot sequence. + +By default, Emergency mode is protected by requiring a password and is set +in /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.1 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + IA-2 + AC-3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 + This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security +on the machine and gaining root access. Such accesses are further prevented +by configuring the bootloader password. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +service_file="/usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service" + + +sulogin="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell emergency" + + +if grep "^ExecStart=.*" "$service_file" ; then + sed -i "s%^ExecStart=.*%ExecStart=-$sulogin%" "$service_file" +else + echo "ExecStart=-$sulogin" >> "$service_file" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Require emergency mode password + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service + regexp: ^#?ExecStart= + line: ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell emergency + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - require_emergency_target_auth + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Require Authentication for Single User Mode + Single-user mode is intended as a system recovery +method, providing a single user root access to the system by +providing a boot option at startup. + +By default, single-user mode is protected by requiring a password and is set +in /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.1 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + IA-2 + AC-3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 + This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security +on the machine and gaining root access. Such accesses are further prevented +by configuring the bootloader password. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +service_file="/usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service" + +sulogin="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue" + +if grep "^ExecStart=.*" "$service_file" ; then + sed -i "s%^ExecStart=.*%ExecStart=-$sulogin%" "$service_file" +else + echo "ExecStart=-$sulogin" >> "$service_file" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Require single user mode password + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service + regexp: ^#?ExecStart= + line: ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - require_singleuser_auth + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure Screen Locking + When a user must temporarily leave an account +logged-in, screen locking should be employed to prevent passersby +from abusing the account. User education and training is +particularly important for screen locking to be effective, and policies +can be implemented to reinforce this. + +Automatic screen locking is only meant as a safeguard for +those cases where a user forgot to lock the screen. + + Configure Console Screen Locking + A console screen locking mechanism is a temporary action taken when a user +stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the +information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of +the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their +operation system session prior to vacating the vicinity, operating systems +need to be able to identify when a user's session has idled and take action +to initiate the session lock. + + Install the tmux Package + To enable console screen locking, install the tmux package. +A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to log out because of the temporary nature of the absence. +The session lock is implemented at the point where session activity can be determined. +Rather than be forced to wait for a period of time to expire before the user session can be locked, Oracle Linux 9 needs to provide users with the ability to manually invoke a session lock so users can secure their session if it is necessary to temporarily vacate the immediate physical vicinity. +Instruct users to begin new terminal sessions with the following command: +$ tmux +The console can now be locked with the following key combination: +ctrl+b :lock-session + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.10 + CCI-000058 + CCI-000056 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + FTA_SSL.1 + SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 + SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 + A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate +physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. +Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operation system session prior to vacating the vicinity, +operating systems need to be able to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the +session lock. + +The tmux package allows for a session lock to be implemented and configured. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "tmux" ; then + yum install -y "tmux" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure tmux is installed + package: + name: tmux + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_tmux_installed + + include install_tmux + +class install_tmux { + package { 'tmux': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=tmux + + +[[packages]] +name = "tmux" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Support session locking with tmux + The tmux terminal multiplexer is used to implement +automatic session locking. It should be started from +/etc/bashrc or drop-in files within /etc/profile.d/. + CCI-000056 + CCI-000058 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + FTA_SSL.1 + SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 + SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 + SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 + Unlike bash itself, the tmux terminal multiplexer +provides a mechanism to lock sessions after period of inactivity. +A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the +immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to +log out because of the temporary nature of the absence. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q tmux; }; then + +if ! grep -x ' case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac' /etc/bashrc; then + cat >> /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh <<'EOF' +if [ "$PS1" ]; then + parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) + name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) + case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac +fi +EOF + chmod 0644 /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Support session locking with tmux: Determine If the Tmux Launch Script Is + Present in /etc/bashrc' + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc + patterns: bashrc + contains: .*case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac.* + register: tmux_in_bashrc + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Support session locking with tmux: Determine If the Tmux Launch Script Is + Present in /etc/profile.d/*.sh' + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc/profile.d + patterns: '*.sh' + contains: .*case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac.* + register: tmux_in_profile_d + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Support session locking with tmux: Insert the Correct Script into /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh' + ansible.builtin.blockinfile: + path: /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh + block: | + if [ "$PS1" ]; then + parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) + name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) + case "$name" in sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac + fi + create: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"tmux" in ansible_facts.packages' + - tmux_in_bashrc is defined and tmux_in_bashrc.matched == 0 + - tmux_in_profile_d is defined and tmux_in_profile_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - configure_bashrc_exec_tmux + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity + To enable console screen locking in tmux terminal multiplexer +after a period of inactivity, +the lock-after-time option has to be set to a value greater than 0 and less than +or equal to 900 in /etc/tmux.conf. + CCI-000057 + CCI-000060 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + FTA_SSL.1 + SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 + SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012 + Locking the session after a period of inactivity limits the +potential exposure if the session is left unattended. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +tmux_conf="/etc/tmux.conf" + +if grep -qP '^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-after-time' "$tmux_conf" ; then + sed -i 's/^\s*set\s\+-g\s\+lock-after-time.*$/set -g lock-after-time 900/' "$tmux_conf" +else + echo "set -g lock-after-time 900" >> "$tmux_conf" +fi +chmod 0644 "$tmux_conf" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/tmux.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-after-time\s+ + mode: '0644' + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/tmux.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/tmux.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-after-time\s+ + mode: '0644' + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/tmux.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/tmux.conf + create: true + regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-after-time\s+ + mode: '0644' + line: set -g lock-after-time 900 + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_tmux_lock_after_time + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure the tmux Lock Command + To enable console screen locking in tmux terminal multiplexer, +the vlock command must be configured to be used as a locking +mechanism. +Add the following line to /etc/tmux.conf: +set -g lock-command vlock. +The console can now be locked with the following key combination: +ctrl+b :lock-session + CCI-000056 + CCI-000058 + AC-11(a) + AC-11(b) + CM-6(a) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + FTA_SSL.1 + SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 + SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 + The tmux package allows for a session lock to be implemented and configured. +However, the session lock is implemented by an external command. The tmux +default configuration does not contain an effective session lock. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +tmux_conf="/etc/tmux.conf" + +if grep -qP '^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-command' "$tmux_conf" ; then + sed -i 's/^\s*set\s\+-g\s\+lock-command.*$/set -g lock-command vlock/' "$tmux_conf" +else + echo "set -g lock-command vlock" >> "$tmux_conf" +fi +chmod 0644 "$tmux_conf" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Configure the tmux Lock Command + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/tmux.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-command\s+ + mode: '0644' + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/tmux.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/tmux.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-command\s+ + mode: '0644' + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/tmux.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/tmux.conf + create: true + regexp: ^\s*set -g lock-command\s+ + mode: '0644' + line: set -g lock-command vlock + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-11(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_tmux_lock_command + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Prevent user from disabling the screen lock + The tmux terminal multiplexer is used to implement +automatic session locking. It should not be listed in +/etc/shells. + CCI-000056 + CCI-000058 + CM-6 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + FTA_SSL.1 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + SRG-OS-000028-GPOS-00009 + SRG-OS-000030-GPOS-00011 + Not listing tmux among permitted shells +prevents malicious program running as user +from lowering security by disabling the screen lock. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if grep -q 'tmux\s*$' /etc/shells ; then + sed -i '/tmux\s*$/d' /etc/shells +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + + Hardware Tokens for Authentication + The use of hardware tokens such as smart cards for system login +provides stronger, two-factor authentication than using a username and password. + +In Oracle Linux 9 servers, hardware token login + +is not enabled by default and must be enabled in the system settings. + + OpenSC Smart Card Drivers + Choose the Smart Card Driver in use by your organization. +For DoD, choose the cac driver. +If your driver is not listed and you don't want to use the +default driver, use the other option and +manually specify your driver. + default + acos5 + akis + asepcos + atrust-acos + authentic + belpic + cac + cardos + coolkey + cyberflex + dnie + entersafe + epass2003 + flex + gemsafeV1 + gids + gpk + iasecc + incrypto34 + isoApplet + itacns + jpki + MaskTech + mcrd + muscle + myeid + npa + oberthur + openpgp + None + PIV-II + rutoken_ecp + rutoken + sc-hsm + setcos + starcos + tcos + westcos + + + Install the opensc Package For Multifactor Authentication + +The opensc package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install opensc + CCI-001954 + CCI-001953 + 1382 + 1384 + 1386 + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 + SRG-OS-000376-GPOS-00161 + Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from +the information system, ensures that even if the information system is +compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the +authentication device. + +Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from +information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens +providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such +as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common +Access Card. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "opensc" ; then + yum install -y "opensc" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure opensc is installed + package: + name: opensc + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_opensc_installed + + include install_opensc + +class install_opensc { + package { 'opensc': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=opensc + + +[[packages]] +name = "opensc" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install the pcsc-lite package + The pcsc-lite package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install pcsc-lite + CCI-001954 + 1382 + 1384 + 1386 + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 + The pcsc-lite package must be installed if it is to be available for +multifactor authentication using smartcards. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "pcsc-lite" ; then + yum install -y "pcsc-lite" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure pcsc-lite is installed + package: + name: pcsc-lite + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_pcsc-lite_installed + + include install_pcsc-lite + +class install_pcsc-lite { + package { 'pcsc-lite': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=pcsc-lite + + +[[packages]] +name = "pcsc-lite" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install Smart Card Packages For Multifactor Authentication + Configure the operating system to implement multifactor authentication by +installing the required package with the following command: + +The openssl-pkcs11 package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install openssl-pkcs11 + CCI-000765 + CCI-001948 + CCI-001953 + CCI-001954 + CM-6(a) + Req-8.3 + 8.4 + SRG-OS-000105-GPOS-00052 + SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 + SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00161 + SRG-OS-000377-GPOS-00162 + Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from +the information system, ensures that even if the information system is +compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the +authentication device. + +Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from +information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens +providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such +as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common +Access Card. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease; }; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "openssl-pkcs11" ; then + yum install -y "openssl-pkcs11" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure openssl-pkcs11 is installed + package: + name: openssl-pkcs11 + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture != "s390x" + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - enable_strategy + - install_smartcard_packages + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + include install_openssl-pkcs11 + +class install_openssl-pkcs11 { + package { 'openssl-pkcs11': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=openssl-pkcs11 + + +[[packages]] +name = "openssl-pkcs11" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Enable the pcscd Service + +The pcscd service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable pcscd.service + CCI-001954 + 1382 + 1384 + 1386 + IA-2(1) + IA-2(2) + IA-2(3) + IA-2(4) + IA-2(6) + IA-2(7) + IA-2(11) + CM-6(a) + Req-8.3 + 8.4 + SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 + Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from +the information system, ensures that even if the information system is +compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the +authentication device. + +Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from +information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens +providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such +as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common +Access Card. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'pcscd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'pcscd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'pcscd.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service pcscd + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Start service pcscd + systemd: + name: pcscd + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"pcsc-lite" in ansible_facts.packages' + + - name: Enable service pcscd + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: systemctl enable pcscd + when: + - '"pcsc-lite" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_pcscd_enabled + + include enable_pcscd + +class enable_pcscd { + service {'pcscd': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["pcscd"] + + + + + + + + + + Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers + The OpenSC smart card tool can auto-detect smart card drivers; however, +setting the smart card drivers in use by your organization helps to prevent +users from using unauthorized smart cards. The default smart card driver for this +profile is . +To configure the OpenSC driver, edit the /etc/opensc.conf +and add the following line into the file in the app default block, +so it will look like: + + +app default { + ... + card_drivers = ; +} + + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000765 + CCI-000766 + CCI-000767 + CCI-000768 + CCI-000771 + CCI-000772 + CCI-000884 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 1382 + 1384 + 1386 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-2(1) + IA-2(2) + IA-2(3) + IA-2(4) + IA-2(6) + IA-2(7) + IA-2(11) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.3 + 8.4 + SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 + SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 + SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 + SRG-OS-000109-GPOS-00056 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00057 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00058 + Smart card login provides two-factor authentication stronger than +that provided by a username and password combination. Smart cards leverage PKI +(public key infrastructure) in order to provide and verify credentials. +Configuring the smart card driver in use by your organization helps to prevent +users from using unauthorized smart cards. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_smartcard_drivers='' + + +OPENSC_TOOL="/usr/bin/opensc-tool" + +if [ -f "${OPENSC_TOOL}" ]; then + ${OPENSC_TOOL} -S app:default:card_drivers:$var_smartcard_drivers +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_smartcard_drivers # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_smartcard_drivers: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Check existence of opensc conf + stat: + path: /etc/opensc-{{ ansible_architecture }}.conf + register: opensc_conf_cd + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_opensc_card_drivers + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Configure smartcard driver block + block: + + - name: Check if card_drivers is defined + command: /usr/bin/opensc-tool -G app:default:card_drivers + changed_when: false + register: card_drivers + + - name: Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers + command: | + /usr/bin/opensc-tool -S app:default:card_drivers:{{ var_smartcard_drivers }} + when: + - card_drivers.stdout != var_smartcard_drivers + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - opensc_conf_cd.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_opensc_card_drivers + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver + The OpenSC smart card middleware can auto-detect smart card drivers; however by +forcing the smart card driver in use by your organization, opensc will no longer +autodetect or use other drivers unless specified. This helps to prevent +users from using unauthorized smart cards. The default smart card driver for this +profile is . +To force the OpenSC driver, edit the /etc/opensc.conf. +Look for a line similar to: +# force_card_driver = customcos; +and change it to: +force_card_driver = ; + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000765 + CCI-000766 + CCI-000767 + CCI-000768 + CCI-000771 + CCI-000772 + CCI-000884 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 1382 + 1384 + 1386 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-2(1) + IA-2(2) + IA-2(3) + IA-2(4) + IA-2(6) + IA-2(7) + IA-2(11) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.3 + 8.4 + SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 + SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 + SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 + SRG-OS-000109-GPOS-00056 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00057 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00058 + Smart card login provides two-factor authentication stronger than +that provided by a username and password combination. Smart cards leverage PKI +(public key infrastructure) in order to provide and verify credentials. +Forcing the smart card driver in use by your organization helps to prevent +users from using unauthorized smart cards. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_smartcard_drivers='' + + +OPENSC_TOOL="/usr/bin/opensc-tool" + +if [ -f "${OPENSC_TOOL}" ]; then + ${OPENSC_TOOL} -S app:default:force_card_driver:$var_smartcard_drivers +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_smartcard_drivers # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_smartcard_drivers: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Check existence of opensc conf + stat: + path: /etc/opensc-{{ ansible_architecture }}.conf + register: opensc_conf_fcd + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - force_opensc_card_drivers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Force smartcard driver block + block: + + - name: Check if force_card_driver is defined + command: /usr/bin/opensc-tool -G app:default:force_card_driver + changed_when: false + register: force_card_driver + + - name: Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver + command: | + /usr/bin/opensc-tool -S app:default:force_card_driver:{{ var_smartcard_drivers }} + when: + - force_card_driver.stdout != var_smartcard_drivers + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - opensc_conf_fcd.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(1) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(2) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(3) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(7) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - force_opensc_card_drivers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Login + Conventionally, Unix shell accounts are accessed by +providing a username and password to a login program, which tests +these values for correctness using the /etc/passwd and +/etc/shadow files. Password-based login is vulnerable to +guessing of weak passwords, and to sniffing and man-in-the-middle +attacks against passwords entered over a network or at an insecure +console. Therefore, mechanisms for accessing accounts by entering +usernames and passwords should be restricted to those which are +operationally necessary. + + Accounts Authorized Local Users on the Operating System + List the user accounts that are authorized locally on the operating system. This list +includes both users requried by the operating system and by the installed applications. +Depending on the Operating System distribution, version, software groups and applications, +the user list is different and can be customized with scap-workbench. +OVAL regular expression is used for the user list. +The list starts with '^' and ends with '$' so that it matches exactly the +username, not any string that includes the username. Users are separated with '|'. +For example, three users: bin, oracle and sapadm are allowed, then the list is +^(bin|oracle|sapadm)$. The user root is the only user that is hard coded +in OVAL that is always allowed on the operating system. + ^(abrt|adm|avahi|bin|chrony|clevis|cockpit-ws|cockpit-wsinstance|colord|daemon|dbus|dnsmasq|flatpak|ftp|games|gdm|geoclue|gluster|gnome-initial-setup|halt|libstoragemgmt|lp|mail|nfsnobody|nobody|ntp|operator|oprofile|oracle|pcp|pegasus|pipewire|polkitd|postfix|pulse|qemu|radvd|rngd|root|rpc|rpcuser|rtkit|saned|saslauth|setroubleshoot|shutdown|sshd|sssd|sync|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-coredump|systemd-network|systemd-resolve|tcpdump|tss|unbound|usbmuxd$|uuidd)$ + ^(abrt|adm|avahi|bin|chrony|clevis|cockpit-ws|cockpit-wsinstance|colord|daemon|dbus|dnsmasq|flatpak|ftp|games|gdm|geoclue|gluster|gnome-initial-setup|halt|libstoragemgmt|lp|mail|nfsnobody|nobody|ntp|operator|oprofile|oracle|pcp|pegasus|pipewire|polkitd|postfix|pulse|qemu|radvd|rngd|root|rpc|rpcuser|rtkit|saned|saslauth|setroubleshoot|shutdown|sshd|sssd|sync|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-coredump|systemd-network|systemd-resolve|tcpdump|tss|unbound|usbmuxd$|uuidd)$ + ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd)$ + ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd)$ + ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd)$ + ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd|man|systemd-timesync|scard|hacluster|statd|at|dockremap|vnc)$ + ^(root|bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody|pegasus|systemd-bus-proxy|systemd-network|dbus|polkitd|abrt|unbound|tss|libstoragemgmt|rpc|colord|usbmuxd$|pcp|saslauth|geoclue|setroubleshoot|rtkit|chrony|qemu|radvd|rpcuser|nfsnobody|pulse|gdm|gnome-initial-setup|postfix|avahi|ntp|sshd|tcpdump|oprofile|uuidd|systemd-resolve|systemd-coredump|sssd|rngd|man|systemd-timesync|scard|hacluster|statd|at|dockremap|vnc|messagebus|nscd)$ + + + Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique User IDs + Change user IDs (UIDs), or delete accounts, so each has a unique name. + Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to unique requirements of each +system. + CCI-000135 + CCI-000764 + CCI-000804 + Req-8.1.1 + 8.2.1 + SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 + SRG-OS-000121-GPOS-00062 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + To assure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, interactive users must be identified and authenticated to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. + + + + + + + + + + Only Authorized Local User Accounts Exist on Operating System + Enterprise Application tends to use the server or virtual machine exclusively. +Besides the default operating system user, there should be only authorized local +users required by the installed software groups and applications that exist on +the operating system. The authorized user list can be customized in the refine +value variable var_accounts_authorized_local_users_regex. +OVAL regular expression is used for the user list. +Configure the system so all accounts on the system are assigned to an active system, +application, or user account. Remove accounts that do not support approved system +activities or that allow for a normal user to perform administrative-level actions. +To remove unauthorized system accounts, use the following command: +$ sudo userdel unauthorized_user + Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to the unique +requirements of each system. + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Accounts providing no operational purpose provide additional opportunities for +system compromise. Unnecessary accounts include user accounts for individuals not +requiring access to the system and application accounts for applications not installed +on the system. + + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group ID + Change the group name or delete groups, so each has a unique id. + Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to the unique requirements of each system. + CCI-000764 + 8.2.1 + SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 + To assure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, groups must be identified uniquely to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. + + + + + + + + + Set Account Expiration Parameters + Accounts can be configured to be automatically disabled +after a certain time period, +meaning that they will require administrator interaction to become usable again. +Expiration of accounts after inactivity can be set for all accounts by default +and also on a per-account basis, such as for accounts that are known to be temporary. +To configure automatic expiration of an account following +the expiration of its password (that is, after the password has expired and not been changed), +run the following command, substituting NUM_DAYS and USER appropriately: +$ sudo chage -I NUM_DAYS USER +Accounts, such as temporary accounts, can also be configured to expire on an explicitly-set date with the +-E option. +The file /etc/default/useradd controls +default settings for all newly-created accounts created with the system's +normal command line utilities. + This will only apply to newly created accounts + + number of days after the last login of the user when the user will be locked out + 'This option is specific for the auth or account phase. It specifies the number of days after +the last login of the user when the user will be locked out by the pam_lastlog module.' + 0 + 180 + 30 + 35 + 40 + 60 + 90 + 35 + + + number of days after a password expires until the account is permanently disabled + The number of days to wait after a password expires, until the account will be permanently disabled. + 0 + 180 + 30 + 35 + 40 + 60 + 90 + 35 + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity in password-auth + Verify the account identifiers (individuals, groups, roles, and devices) are disabled after + or less days of inactivity by +checking the account inactivity value with the following command: +grep 'inactive\|pam_unix' /etc/pam.d/password-auth | grep -w auth + +auth required pam_lastlog.so inactive=35 +auth sufficient pam_unix.so +The line with the inactive parameter should be placed before pam_unix.so module as in +the example output. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. + CCI-000795 + IA-4(e) + SRG-OS-000118-GPOS-00060 + Inactive identifiers pose a risk to systems and applications because attackers may exploit an +inactive identifier and potentially obtain undetected access to the system. Owners of inactive +accounts will not notice if unauthorized access to their user account has been obtained. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-pam_lastlog.so-inactive.backup +fi +if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_lastlog.so.*)/\1'"required"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'auth '"required"' pam_lastlog.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi +fi +# Check the option +if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*\sinactive\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so.*/ s/$/ inactive='"35"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +else + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s+.*)('"inactive"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"35"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi +if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'auth '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi +fi +# Ensure pam_unix.so is configured after pam_lastlog.so +if ! grep -Pz \ + "auth\s*required\s*pam_lastlog\.so[^#]*inactive=35[\s\S]*\n\s*auth\s*sufficient\s*pam_unix\.so"\ + "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ; then + PAM_LASTLOG_LINE="$(grep -oP '^\s*auth.*pam_lastlog\.so.*' $PAM_FILE_PATH)" + sed -i "0,/^\s*auth.*pam_unix\.so.*/i$PAM_LASTLOG_LINE" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-pam_lastlog.so-inactive.backup +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity in system-auth + Verify the account identifiers (individuals, groups, roles, and devices) are disabled after + or less days of inactivity by +checking the account inactivity value with the following command: +grep 'inactive\|pam_unix' /etc/pam.d/password-auth | grep -w auth + +auth required pam_lastlog.so inactive=35 +auth sufficient pam_unix.so +The line with the inactive parameter should be placed before pam_unix.so module as in +the example output. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. + CCI-000795 + IA-4(e) + SRG-OS-000118-GPOS-00060 + Inactive identifiers pose a risk to systems and applications because attackers may exploit an +inactive identifier and potentially obtain undetected access to the system. Owners of inactive +accounts will not notice if unauthorized access to their user account has been obtained. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-pam_lastlog.so-inactive.backup +fi +if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_lastlog.so.*)/\1'"required"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'auth '"required"' pam_lastlog.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi +fi +# Check the option +if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s*.*\sinactive\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so.*/ s/$/ inactive='"35"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +else + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*auth\s+'"required"'\s+pam_lastlog.so\s+.*)('"inactive"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"35"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi +if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'auth '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi +fi +# Ensure pam_unix.so is configured after pam_lastlog.so +if ! grep -Pz \ + "auth\s*required\s*pam_lastlog\.so[^#]*inactive=35[\s\S]*\n\s*auth\s*sufficient\s*pam_unix\.so"\ + "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ; then + PAM_LASTLOG_LINE="$(grep -oP '^\s*auth.*pam_lastlog\.so.*' $PAM_FILE_PATH)" + sed -i "0,/^\s*auth.*pam_unix\.so.*/i$PAM_LASTLOG_LINE" "$PAM_FILE_PATH" +fi +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-pam_lastlog.so-inactive.backup +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity + To specify the number of days after a password expires (which +signifies inactivity) until an account is permanently disabled, add or correct +the following line in /etc/default/useradd: +INACTIVE= +If a password is currently on the verge of expiration, then + +day(s) remain(s) until the account is automatically +disabled. However, if the password will not expire for another 60 days, then 60 +days plus day(s) could +elapse until the account would be automatically disabled. See the +useradd man page for more information. + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 5.6.2.1.1 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.6 + CCI-000017 + CCI-000795 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + IA-4(e) + AC-2(3) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.1.4 + 8.2.6 + SRG-OS-000118-GPOS-00060 + Inactive identifiers pose a risk to systems and applications because attackers may exploit an inactive identifier and potentially obtain undetected access to the system. +Disabling inactive accounts ensures that accounts which may not have been responsibly removed are not available to attackers who may have compromised their credentials. +Owners of inactive accounts will not notice if unauthorized access to their user account has been obtained. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^INACTIVE") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s=%s" "$stripped_key" "$var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^INACTIVE\\>" "/etc/default/useradd"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^INACTIVE\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/default/useradd" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/default/useradd" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/default/useradd" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/default/useradd" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/default/useradd" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-4(e) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.6 + - account_disable_post_pw_expiration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/default/useradd + regexp: ^INACTIVE + line: INACTIVE={{ var_account_disable_post_pw_expiration }} + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-4(e) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.6 + - account_disable_post_pw_expiration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Assign Expiration Date to Emergency Accounts + Emergency accounts are privileged accounts established in response to +crisis situations where the need for rapid account activation is required. +In the event emergency accounts are required, configure the system to +terminate them after a documented time period. For every emergency account, +run the following command to set an expiration date on it, substituting +ACCOUNT_NAME and YYYY-MM-DD +appropriately: +$ sudo chage -E YYYY-MM-DD ACCOUNT_NAME +YYYY-MM-DD indicates the documented expiration date for the +account. For U.S. Government systems, the operating system must be +configured to automatically terminate these types of accounts after a +period of 72 hours. + Due to the unique requirements of each system, automated +remediation is not available for this configuration check. + This rule is deprecated in favor of the account_temp_expire_date rule. +Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive +updates as of version 0.1.69. + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + CCI-000016 + CCI-001682 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-2(2) + AC-2(3) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + SRG-OS-000123-GPOS-00064 + SRG-OS-000002-GPOS-00002 + If emergency user accounts remain active when no longer needed or for +an excessive period, these accounts may be used to gain unauthorized access. +To mitigate this risk, automated termination of all emergency accounts +must be set upon account creation. + + + + + + + Assign Expiration Date to Temporary Accounts + Temporary accounts are established as part of normal account activation +procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts. In the event +temporary accounts are required, configure the system to +terminate them after a documented time period. For every temporary account, run the following command to set an expiration date on +it, substituting USER and YYYY-MM-DD +appropriately: +$ sudo chage -E YYYY-MM-DD USER +YYYY-MM-DD indicates the documented expiration date for the +account. For U.S. Government systems, the operating system must be +configured to automatically terminate these types of accounts after a +period of 72 hours. + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + CCI-000016 + CCI-001682 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-2(2) + AC-2(3) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + SRG-OS-000123-GPOS-00064 + SRG-OS-000002-GPOS-00002 + If temporary user accounts remain active when no longer needed or for +an excessive period, these accounts may be used to gain unauthorized access. +To mitigate this risk, automated termination of all temporary accounts +must be set upon account creation. + + + + + + + Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique Names + Ensure accounts on the system have unique names. + +To ensure all accounts have unique names, run the following command: +$ sudo getent passwd | awk -F: '{ print $1}' | uniq -d +If a username is returned, change or delete the username. + 5.5.2 + CCI-000770 + CCI-000804 + Req-8.1.1 + 8.2.1 + Unique usernames allow for accountability on the system. + + + + + + + + + Use Centralized and Automated Authentication + Implement an automated system for managing user accounts that minimizes the +risk of errors, either intentional or deliberate. This system +should integrate with an existing enterprise user management system, such as +one based on Identity Management tools such as Active Directory, Kerberos, +Directory Server, etc. + A comprehensive account management process that includes automation helps to +ensure the accounts designated as requiring attention are consistently and +promptly addressed. Enterprise environments make user account management +challenging and complex. A user management process requiring administrators to +manually address account management functions adds risk of potential +oversight. + + + + + + + Set Password Expiration Parameters + The file /etc/login.defs controls several +password-related settings. Programs such as passwd, +su, and +login consult /etc/login.defs to determine +behavior with regard to password aging, expiration warnings, +and length. See the man page login.defs(5) for more information. + +Users should be forced to change their passwords, in order to +decrease the utility of compromised passwords. However, the need to +change passwords often should be balanced against the risk that +users will reuse or write down passwords if forced to change them +too often. Forcing password changes every 90-360 days, depending on +the environment, is recommended. Set the appropriate value as +PASS_MAX_DAYS and apply it to existing accounts with the +-M flag. + +The PASS_MIN_DAYS (-m) setting prevents password +changes for 7 days after the first change, to discourage password +cycling. If you use this setting, train users to contact an administrator +for an emergency password change in case a new password becomes +compromised. The PASS_WARN_AGE (-W) setting gives +users 7 days of warnings at login time that their passwords are about to expire. + +For example, for each existing human user USER, expiration parameters +could be adjusted to a 180 day maximum password age, 7 day minimum password +age, and 7 day warning period with the following command: +$ sudo chage -M 180 -m 7 -W 7 USER + + maximum password age + Maximum age of password in days + 365 + 120 + 180 + 90 + 60 + 45 + 60 + + + minimum password age + Minimum age of password in days + 0 + 1 + 2 + 5 + 7 + 7 + + + minimum password length + Minimum number of characters in password + This will only check new passwords + 10 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 18 + 20 + 6 + 8 + 15 + + + warning days before password expires + The number of days' warning given before a password expires. + This will only apply to newly created accounts + 0 + 14 + 10 + 7 + 7 + + + Set Password Maximum Age + To specify password maximum age for new accounts, +edit the file /etc/login.defs +and add or correct the following line: +PASS_MAX_DAYS +A value of 180 days is sufficient for many environments. +The DoD requirement is 60. +The profile requirement is . + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.6 + CCI-000199 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(d) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.4 + 8.3.10.1 + SRG-OS-000076-GPOS-00044 + Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. Therefore, passwords +need to be changed periodically. If the operating system does not limit the lifetime +of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the +operating system passwords could be compromised. + +Setting the password maximum age ensures users are required to +periodically change their passwords. Requiring shorter password lifetimes +increases the risk of users writing down the password in a convenient +location subject to physical compromise. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs='' + + +grep -q ^PASS_MAX_DAYS /etc/login.defs && \ + sed -i "s/PASS_MAX_DAYS.*/PASS_MAX_DAYS $var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs/g" /etc/login.defs +if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "PASS_MAX_DAYS $var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" >> /etc/login.defs +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.10.1 + - accounts_maximum_age_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Password Maximum Age + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^#?PASS_MAX_DAYS + line: PASS_MAX_DAYS {{ var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs }} + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.10.1 + - accounts_maximum_age_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Minimum Age + To specify password minimum age for new accounts, +edit the file /etc/login.defs +and add or correct the following line: +PASS_MIN_DAYS +A value of 1 day is considered sufficient for many +environments. The DoD requirement is 1. +The profile requirement is . + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.8 + CCI-000198 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(d) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + 8.3.9 + SRG-OS-000075-GPOS-00043 + Enforcing a minimum password lifetime helps to prevent repeated password +changes to defeat the password reuse or history enforcement requirement. If +users are allowed to immediately and continually change their password, +then the password could be repeatedly changed in a short period of time to +defeat the organization's policy regarding password reuse. + +Setting the minimum password age protects against users cycling back to a +favorite password after satisfying the password reuse requirement. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs='' + + +grep -q ^PASS_MIN_DAYS /etc/login.defs && \ + sed -i "s/PASS_MIN_DAYS.*/PASS_MIN_DAYS $var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs/g" /etc/login.defs +if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "PASS_MIN_DAYS $var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" >> /etc/login.defs +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_minimum_age_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Password Minimum Age + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^#?PASS_MIN_DAYS + line: PASS_MIN_DAYS {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_minimum_age_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs + To specify password length requirements for new accounts, edit the file +/etc/login.defs and add or correct the following line: +PASS_MIN_LEN + +The DoD requirement is 15. +The FISMA requirement is 12. +The profile requirement is +. +If a program consults /etc/login.defs and also another PAM module +(such as pam_pwquality) during a password change operation, then +the most restrictive must be satisfied. See PAM section for more +information about enforcing password quality requirements. + BP28(R18) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.6.2.1 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.7 + CCI-000205 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046 + Requiring a minimum password length makes password +cracking attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger +search space. However, any security benefit from an onerous requirement +must be carefully weighed against usability problems, support costs, or counterproductive +behavior that may result. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs='' + + +grep -q ^PASS_MIN_LEN /etc/login.defs && \ +sed -i "s/PASS_MIN_LEN.*/PASS_MIN_LEN\t$var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs/g" /etc/login.defs +if ! [ $? -eq 0 ] +then + echo -e "PASS_MIN_LEN\t$var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs" >> /etc/login.defs +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - accounts_password_minlen_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^PASS_MIN_LEN *[0-9]* + state: present + line: PASS_MIN_LEN {{ var_accounts_password_minlen_login_defs }} + create: true + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.6.2.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - accounts_password_minlen_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age + Configure non-compliant accounts to enforce a -day maximum password lifetime +restriction by running the following command: +$ sudo chage -M USER + CCI-000199 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(d) + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000076-GPOS-00044 + Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. Therefore, +passwords need to be changed periodically. If the operating system does +not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their +passwords, there is the risk that the operating system passwords could be +compromised. + +var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs='' + + +while IFS= read -r i; do + + chage -M $var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs $i + +done < <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" -F: '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($5 > var || $5 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow) + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Existing Passwords Minimum Age + Configure non-compliant accounts to enforce a 24 hours/1 day minimum password +lifetime by running the following command: +$ sudo chage -m 1 USER + CCI-000198 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(d) + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000075-GPOS-00043 + Enforcing a minimum password lifetime helps to prevent repeated password +changes to defeat the password reuse or history enforcement requirement. If +users are allowed to immediately and continually change their password, the +password could be repeatedly changed in a short period of time to defeat the +organization's policy regarding password reuse. + +var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs='' + + +while IFS= read -r i; do + + chage -m $var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs $i + +done < <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" -F: '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($4 < var || $4 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow) + + - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Collect users with not correct minimum time period between password changes + command: | + awk -F':' '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($4 < {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} || $4 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow + register: user_names + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - accounts_password_set_min_life_existing + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Change the minimum time period between password changes + command: | + chage -m {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} {{ item }} + with_items: '{{ user_names.stdout_lines }}' + when: user_names.stdout_lines | length > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - accounts_password_set_min_life_existing + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Warning Age + To specify how many days prior to password +expiration that a warning will be issued to users, +edit the file /etc/login.defs and add or correct + the following line: +PASS_WARN_AGE +The DoD requirement is 7. +The profile requirement is . + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.8 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + IA-5(f) + IA-5(1)(d) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.4 + 8.3.9 + Setting the password warning age enables users to +make the change at a practical time. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs='' + + +grep -q ^PASS_WARN_AGE /etc/login.defs && \ +sed -i "s/PASS_WARN_AGE.*/PASS_WARN_AGE\t$var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs/g" /etc/login.defs +if ! [ $? -eq 0 ] +then + echo -e "PASS_WARN_AGE\t$var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs" >> /etc/login.defs +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set Password Warning Age + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^PASS_WARN_AGE *[0-9]* + state: present + line: PASS_WARN_AGE {{ var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs }} + create: true + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.5.8 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password +Hashes + By default, password hashes for local accounts are stored +in the second field (colon-separated) in +/etc/shadow. This file should be readable only by +processes running with root credentials, preventing users from +casually accessing others' password hashes and attempting +to crack them. +However, it remains possible to misconfigure the system +and store password hashes +in world-readable files such as /etc/passwd, or +to even store passwords themselves in plaintext on the system. +Using system-provided tools for password change/creation +should allow administrators to avoid such misconfiguration. + + Password Hashing algorithm + Specify the number of SHA rounds for the system password encryption algorithm. +Defines the value set in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth + 5000 + 5000 + 65536 + + + Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed + If any password hashes are stored in /etc/passwd (in the second field, +instead of an x or *), the cause of this misconfiguration should be +investigated. The account should have its password reset and the hash should be +properly stored, or the account should be deleted entirely. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.5.2 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.5.10 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + 1410 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + IA-5(h) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.2.1 + 8.3.2 + The hashes for all user account passwords should be stored in +the file /etc/shadow and never in /etc/passwd, +which is readable by all users. + + + + + + + + + + Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed with SHA512 + Verify the operating system requires the shadow password suite +configuration be set to encrypt interactive user passwords using a strong +cryptographic hash. +Check that the interactive user account passwords are using a strong +password hash with the following command: +$ sudo cut -d: -f2 /etc/shadow +$6$kcOnRq/5$NUEYPuyL.wghQwWssXRcLRFiiru7f5JPV6GaJhNC2aK5F3PZpE/BCCtwrxRc/AInKMNX3CdMw11m9STiql12f/ +Password hashes ! or * indicate inactive accounts not +available for logon and are not evaluated. +If any interactive user password hash does not begin with $6, +this is a finding. + CCI-000196 + CCI-000803 + IA-5(1)(c) + IA-5(1).1(v) + IA-7 + IA-7.1 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for +protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read +(i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. + + + + + + + + + Ensure all users last password change date is in the past + All users should have a password change date in the past. + Automatic remediation is not available, in order to avoid any system disruption. + If a user recorded password change date is in the future then they could +bypass any set password expiration. + + + + + + + + + + Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth + Configure the number or rounds for the password hashing algorithm. This can be +accomplished by using the rounds option for the pam_unix PAM module. + +In file /etc/pam.d/password-auth append rounds= +to the pam_unix.so entry, as shown below: +password sufficient pam_unix.so ...existing_options... rounds= +The system's default number of rounds is 5000. + Setting a high number of hashing rounds makes it more difficult to brute force the password, +but requires more CPU resources to authenticate users. + BP28(R68) + CCI-000196 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + Using a higher number of rounds makes password cracking attacks more difficult. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_unix_rounds='' + + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ rounds='"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)('"rounds"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_unix_rounds # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_unix_rounds: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if system + relies on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Get authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Define the new + authselect custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Get authselect + current features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Change the PAM + file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if expected + PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Include or update + the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + block: + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if required + PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the correct + control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) + replace: \1sufficient \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the required + PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + line: password sufficient pam_unix.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Check if the required + PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_rounds_option_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the "rounds" + PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so.*) + line: \1 rounds={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} + state: present + register: result_pam_rounds_add + when: + - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure the required + value for "rounds" PAM option from "pam_unix.so" in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)(rounds)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) + line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} \3 + register: result_pam_rounds_edit + when: + - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found > 0 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_rounds_add is defined and result_pam_rounds_add.changed) + or (result_pam_rounds_edit is defined and result_pam_rounds_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth + Configure the number or rounds for the password hashing algorithm. This can be +accomplished by using the rounds option for the pam_unix PAM module. + +In file /etc/pam.d/system-auth append rounds= +to the pam_unix.so entry, as shown below: +password sufficient pam_unix.so ...existing_options... rounds= +The system's default number of rounds is 5000. + Setting a high number of hashing rounds makes it more difficult to brute force the password, +but requires more CPU resources to authenticate users. + BP28(R68) + CCI-000196 + SRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041 + Using a higher number of rounds makes password cracking attacks more difficult. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_password_pam_unix_rounds='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + + CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features. + if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then + ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }') + authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE + CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening" + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE + for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do + authselect enable-feature $feature; + done + + authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + fi + PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth") + PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME" + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + echo 'password '"sufficient"' pam_unix.so' >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b' "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ rounds='"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"'/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + else + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)('"rounds"'=)[[:alnum:]]+\s*(.*)/\1\2'"$var_password_pam_unix_rounds"' \3/' "$PAM_FILE_PATH" + fi + if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_unix_rounds # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_password_pam_unix_rounds: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth + file is present + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + register: result_pam_file_present + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check the proper remediation + for the system + block: + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Define the PAM file + to be edited as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if system relies + on authselect tool + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect + custom profile is used if authselect is present + block: + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check integrity + of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Informative message + based on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was + not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific + demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Get authselect current + profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_authselect_profile + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Define the current + authselect profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Define the new authselect + custom profile as a local fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}' + authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Get authselect current + features to also enable them in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if any custom + profile with the same name was already created + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present + changed_when: false + when: + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Create an authselect + custom profile based on the current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile + }} + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the authselect + custom profile is selected + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }} + register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/") + - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile) + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Restore the authselect + features in the custom profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }} + loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}' + register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features + when: + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_authselect_features is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_profile is not skipped + - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Change the PAM file + to be edited according to the custom authselect profile + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path + | basename }} + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if expected + PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Include or update + the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + block: + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if required + PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the correct + control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*) + replace: \1sufficient \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the required + PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + line: password sufficient pam_unix.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Check if the required + PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + regexp: ^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\srounds\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_rounds_option_present + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the "rounds" + PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so.*) + line: \1 rounds={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} + state: present + register: result_pam_rounds_add + when: + - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure the required + value for "rounds" PAM option from "pam_unix.so" in {{ pam_file_path }} + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ pam_file_path }}' + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*)(rounds)=[0-9a-zA-Z]+\s*(.*) + line: \1\2={{ var_password_pam_unix_rounds }} \3 + register: result_pam_rounds_edit + when: + - result_pam_module_rounds_option_present.found > 0 + + - name: Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth - Ensure authselect + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_rounds_add is defined and result_pam_rounds_add.changed) + or (result_pam_rounds_edit is defined and result_pam_rounds_edit.changed) + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists + tags: + - accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group + Add a group to the system for each GID referenced without a corresponding group. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 5.5.2 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000764 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + IA-2 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + Req-8.5.a + 8.2.2 + SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051 + If a user is assigned the Group Identifier (GID) of a group not existing on the system, and a group +with the Group Identifier (GID) is subsequently created, the user may have unintended rights to +any files associated with the group. + + + + + + + + + Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password + If an account is configured for password authentication +but does not have an assigned password, it may be possible to log +into the account without authentication. Remove any instances of the +nullok in + +/etc/pam.d/system-auth and +/etc/pam.d/password-auth + +to prevent logins with empty passwords. + If the system relies on authselect tool to manage PAM settings, the remediation +will also use authselect tool. However, if any manual modification was made in +PAM files, the authselect integrity check will fail and the remediation will be +aborted in order to preserve intentional changes. In this case, an informative message will +be shown in the remediation report. +Note that this rule is not applicable for systems running within a +container. Having user with empty password within a container is not +considered a risk, because it should not be possible to directly login into +a container anyway. + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.1 + 3.1.5 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + IA-5(1)(a) + IA-5(c) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.DS-5 + FIA_UAU.1 + Req-8.2.3 + 8.3.6 + 8.3.9 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If an account has an empty password, anyone could log in and +run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with +empty passwords should never be used in operational environments. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if ! authselect check; then +echo " +authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! +This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. +It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. +In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." +exit 1 +fi +authselect enable-feature without-nullok + +authselect apply-changes -b +else + +if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" +fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" +fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*auth.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" +fi + +if grep -qP '^\s*password\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\bnullok\b' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/(.*password.*'"sufficient"'.*pam_unix.so.*)\snullok=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g' "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" +fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Check if system relies on + authselect + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - configure_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_empty_passwords + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Remediate using authselect + block: + + - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Check integrity of authselect + current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Informative message based + on the authselect integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Ensure "without-nullok" + feature is enabled using authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature without-nullok + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("without-nullok") + + - name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Ensure authselect changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - configure_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_empty_passwords + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password - Remediate directly editing + PAM files + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ item }}' + regexp: nullok + loop: + - /etc/pam.d/system-auth + - /etc/pam.d/password-auth + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9 + - configure_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - no_empty_passwords + - no_reboot_needed + + --- +apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 +kind: MachineConfig +spec: + config: + ignition: + version: 3.1.0 + storage: + files: + - contents: + source: data:,%23%20Generated%20by%20authselect%20on%20Sat%20Oct%2027%2014%3A59%3A36%202018%0A%23%20Do%20not%20modify%20this%20file%20manually.%0A%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_env.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_faildelay.so%20delay%3D2000000%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_fprintd.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20try_first_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet_success%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20forward_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3C%201000%20quiet%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3Dbad%20success%3Dok%20user_unknown%3Dignore%5D%20pam_sss.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_permit.so%0A%0Apassword%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_pwquality.so%20try_first_pass%20local_users_only%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20sha512%20shadow%20try_first_pass%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_keyinit.so%20revoke%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_limits.so%0A-session%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_systemd.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20%5Bsuccess%3D1%20default%3Dignore%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20service%20in%20crond%20quiet%20use_uid%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%0A + mode: 0644 + path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth + overwrite: true + - contents: + source: data:,%23%20Generated%20by%20authselect%20on%20Sat%20Oct%2027%2014%3A59%3A36%202018%0A%23%20Do%20not%20modify%20this%20file%20manually.%0A%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_env.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_faildelay.so%20delay%3D2000000%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_fprintd.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3D1%20ignore%3Dignore%20success%3Dok%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20try_first_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3E%3D%201000%20quiet_success%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20forward_pass%0Aauth%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_localuser.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20uid%20%3C%201000%20quiet%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20%5Bdefault%3Dbad%20success%3Dok%20user_unknown%3Dignore%5D%20pam_sss.so%0Aaccount%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_permit.so%0A%0Apassword%20%20%20%20requisite%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_pwquality.so%20try_first_pass%20local_users_only%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%20sha512%20shadow%20try_first_pass%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20sufficient%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%20use_authtok%0Apassword%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_deny.so%0A%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_keyinit.so%20revoke%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_limits.so%0A-session%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_systemd.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20%5Bsuccess%3D1%20default%3Dignore%5D%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_succeed_if.so%20service%20in%20crond%20quiet%20use_uid%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20required%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_unix.so%0Asession%20%20%20%20%20optional%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20pam_sss.so%0A + mode: 0644 + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + overwrite: true + + + + + + + + + + Ensure There Are No Accounts With Blank or Null Passwords + Check the "/etc/shadow" file for blank passwords with the +following command: +$ sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow +If the command returns any results, this is a finding. +Configure all accounts on the system to have a password or lock +the account with the following commands: +Perform a password reset: +$ sudo passwd [username] +Lock an account: +$ sudo passwd -l [username] + Note that this rule is not applicable for systems running within a container. Having user with empty password within a container is not considered a risk, because it should not be possible to directly login into a container anyway. + CCI-000366 + CM-6(b) + CM-6.1(iv) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If an account has an empty password, anyone could log in and +run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with +empty passwords should never be used in operational environments. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +readarray -t users_with_empty_pass < <(sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow) + +for user_with_empty_pass in "${users_with_empty_pass[@]}" +do + passwd -l $user_with_empty_pass +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Collect users with no password + command: | + awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow + register: users_nopasswd + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock users with no password + command: | + passwd -l {{ item }} + with_items: '{{ users_nopasswd.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - users_nopasswd.stdout_lines | length > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Verify No netrc Files Exist + The .netrc files contain login information +used to auto-login into FTP servers and reside in the user's home +directory. These files may contain unencrypted passwords to +remote FTP servers making them susceptible to access by unauthorized +users and should not be used. Any .netrc files should be removed. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000196 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R1.3 + CIP-003-8 R3 + CIP-003-8 R3.1 + CIP-003-8 R3.2 + CIP-003-8 R3.3 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + IA-5(h) + IA-5(1)(c) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(7) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.PT-3 + Unencrypted passwords for remote FTP servers may be stored in .netrc +files. + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Root Logins + Direct root logins should be allowed only for emergency use. +In normal situations, the administrator should access the system +via a unique unprivileged account, and then use su or sudo to execute +privileged commands. Discouraging administrators from accessing the +root account directly ensures an audit trail in organizations with +multiple administrators. Locking down the channels through which +root can connect directly also reduces opportunities for +password-guessing against the root account. The login program +uses the file /etc/securetty to determine which interfaces +should allow root logins. + +The virtual devices /dev/console +and /dev/tty* represent the system consoles (accessible via +the Ctrl-Alt-F1 through Ctrl-Alt-F6 keyboard sequences on a default +installation). The default securetty file also contains /dev/vc/*. +These are likely to be deprecated in most environments, but may be retained +for compatibility. Root should also be prohibited from connecting +via network protocols. Other sections of this document +include guidance describing how to prevent root from logging in via SSH. + + Group Name Used by pam_wheel Group Parameter + pam_wheel module has a parameter called group, which controls which groups +can access the su command. +This variable holds the valid value for the parameter. + + sugroup + + + Verify Only Root Has UID 0 + If any account other than root has a UID of 0, this misconfiguration should +be investigated and the accounts other than root should be removed or have +their UID changed. + +If the account is associated with system commands or applications the UID +should be changed to one greater than "0" but less than "1000." +Otherwise assign a UID greater than "1000" that has not already been +assigned. + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.1 + 3.1.5 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + IA-2 + AC-6(5) + IA-4(b) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.5 + 8.2.2 + 8.2.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + An account has root authority if it has a UID of 0. Multiple accounts +with a UID of 0 afford more opportunity for potential intruders to +guess a password for a privileged account. Proper configuration of +sudo is recommended to afford multiple system administrators +access to root privileges in an accountable manner. + awk -F: '$3 == 0 && $1 != "root" { print $1 }' /etc/passwd | xargs --no-run-if-empty --max-lines=1 passwd -l + + - name: Get all /etc/passwd file entries + getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(5) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-4(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.3 + - accounts_no_uid_except_zero + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Lock the password of the user accounts other than root with uid 0 + command: passwd -l {{ item.key }} + loop: '{{ getent_passwd | dict2items | rejectattr(''key'', ''search'', ''root'') + | list }}' + when: item.value.1 == '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(5) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-4(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.3 + - accounts_no_uid_except_zero + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Verify Root Has A Primary GID 0 + The root user should have a primary group of 0. + Req-8.1.1 + 8.2.1 + To help ensure that root-owned files are not inadvertently exposed to other users. + + + + + + + + + Direct root Logins Not Allowed + To further limit access to the root account, administrators +can disable root logins at the console by editing the /etc/securetty file. +This file lists all devices the root user is allowed to login to. If the file does +not exist at all, the root user can login through any communication device on the +system, whether via the console or via a raw network interface. This is dangerous +as user can login to the system as root via Telnet, which sends the password in +plain text over the network. By default, Oracle Linux 9's +/etc/securetty file only allows the root user to login at the console +physically attached to the system. To prevent root from logging in, remove the +contents of this file. To prevent direct root logins, remove the contents of this +file by typing the following command: + +$ sudo echo > /etc/securetty + + This rule only checks the /etc/securetty file existence and its content. +If you need to restrict user access using the /etc/securetty file, make sure +the pam_securetty.so PAM module is properly enabled in relevant PAM files. + BP28(R19) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.1 + 3.1.6 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + IA-2 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + 8.6.1 + Disabling direct root logins ensures proper accountability and multifactor +authentication to privileged accounts. Users will first login, then escalate +to privileged (root) access via su / sudo. This is required for FISMA Low +and FISMA Moderate systems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +echo > /etc/securetty + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Direct root Logins Not Allowed + copy: + dest: /etc/securetty + content: '' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_direct_root_logins + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked + Some accounts are not associated with a human user of the system, and exist to perform some +administrative functions. An attacker should not be able to log into these accounts. + +System accounts are those user accounts with a user ID less than 1000. +If any system account other than root, halt, sync, shutdown +and nfsnobody has an unlocked password, disable it with the command: +$ sudo usermod -L account + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6 + CM-6(a) + Disabling authentication for default system accounts makes it more difficult for attackers +to make use of them to compromise a system. + +readarray -t systemaccounts < <(awk -F: \ + '($3 < 1000 && $3 != root && $3 != halt && $3 != sync && $3 != shutdown \ + && $3 != nfsnobody) { print $1 }' /etc/passwd) + +for systemaccount in "${systemaccounts[@]}"; do + usermod -L "$systemaccount" +done + + - name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Get All Local Users From /etc/passwd + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Create local_users Variable From + getent_passwd Facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd | dict2items }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Lock System Accounts + ansible.builtin.user: + name: '{{ item.key }}' + password_lock: true + loop: '{{ local_users }}' + when: + - item.value[1]|int < 1000 + - item.key not in ['root', 'halt', 'sync', 'shutdown', 'nfsnobody'] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login + Some accounts are not associated with a human user of the system, and exist to perform some +administrative functions. Should an attacker be able to log into these accounts, they should +not be granted access to a shell. + +The login shell for each local account is stored in the last field of each line in +/etc/passwd. System accounts are those user accounts with a user ID less than +1000. The user ID is stored in the third field. If any system account +other than root has a login shell, disable it with the command: +$ sudo usermod -s /sbin/nologin account + Do not perform the steps in this section on the root account. Doing so might cause the +system to become inaccessible. + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + 1491 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-6 + CM-6(a) + CM-6(b) + CM-6.1(iv) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + 8.6.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Ensuring shells are not given to system accounts upon login makes it more difficult for +attackers to make use of system accounts. + +readarray -t systemaccounts < <(awk -F: '($3 < 1000 && $3 != root \ + && $7 != "\/sbin\/shutdown" && $7 != "\/sbin\/halt" && $7 != "\/bin\/sync") \ + { print $1 }' /etc/passwd) + +for systemaccount in "${systemaccounts[@]}"; do + usermod -s /sbin/nologin "$systemaccount" +done + + - name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Get All Local + Users From /etc/passwd + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Create local_users + Variable From getent_passwd Facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd | dict2items }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Disable Login + Shell for System Accounts + ansible.builtin.user: + name: '{{ item.key }}' + shell: /sbin/nologin + loop: '{{ local_users }}' + when: + - item.key not in ['root'] + - item.value[1]|int < 1000 + - item.value[5] not in ['/sbin/shutdown', '/sbin/halt', '/bin/sync'] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Serial Port Root Logins + To restrict root logins on serial ports, +ensure lines of this form do not appear in /etc/securetty: +ttyS0 +ttyS1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.1 + 3.1.5 + CCI-000770 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Preventing direct root login to serial port interfaces +helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the systems +using the root account. + sed -i '/ttyS/d' /etc/securetty + + - name: Restrict Serial Port Root Logins + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/securetty + regexp: ttyS[0-9] + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_serial_port_logins + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins + To restrict root logins through the (deprecated) virtual console devices, +ensure lines of this form do not appear in /etc/securetty: +vc/1 +vc/2 +vc/3 +vc/4 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.1 + 3.1.5 + CCI-000770 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 8.6.1 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + Preventing direct root login to virtual console devices +helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the system +using the root account. + sed -i '/^vc\//d' /etc/securetty + + - name: Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/securetty + regexp: ^vc + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - securetty_root_login_console_only + + + + + + + + + + Enforce usage of pam_wheel for su authentication + To ensure that only users who are members of the wheel group can +run commands with altered privileges through the su command, make +sure that the following line exists in the file /etc/pam.d/su: +auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid + Members of "wheel" or GID 0 groups are checked by default if the group option is not set +for pam_wheel.so module. Therefore, members of these groups should be manually checked or +a different group should be informed according to the site policy. + FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 + 8.6.1 + SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156 + SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00123 + The su program allows to run commands with a substitute user and +group ID. It is commonly used to run commands as the root user. Limiting +access to such command is considered a good security practice. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +# uncomment the option if commented + sed '/^[[:space:]]*#[[:space:]]*auth[[:space:]]\+required[[:space:]]\+pam_wheel\.so[[:space:]]\+use_uid$/s/^[[:space:]]*#//' -i /etc/pam.d/su + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - use_pam_wheel_for_su + +- name: Restrict usage of su command only to members of wheel group + replace: + path: /etc/pam.d/su + regexp: ^[\s]*#[\s]*auth[\s]+required[\s]+pam_wheel\.so[\s]+use_uid$ + replace: auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - use_pam_wheel_for_su + + + + + + + + + + + + Secure Session Configuration Files for Login Accounts + When a user logs into a Unix account, the system +configures the user's session by reading a number of files. Many of +these files are located in the user's home directory, and may have +weak permissions as a result of user error or misconfiguration. If +an attacker can modify or even read certain types of account +configuration information, they can often gain full access to the +affected user's account. Therefore, it is important to test and +correct configuration file permissions for interactive accounts, +particularly those of privileged users such as root or system +administrators. + + Maximum login attempts delay + Maximum time in seconds between fail login attempts before re-prompting. + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 4 + + + Maximum concurrent login sessions + Maximum number of concurrent sessions by a user + 1 + 10 + 15 + 20 + 3 + 5 + 1 + + + Account Inactivity Timeout (seconds) + In an interactive shell, the value is interpreted as the +number of seconds to wait for input after issuing the primary prompt. +Bash terminates after waiting for that number of seconds if input does +not arrive. + 1800 + 600 + 900 + 300 + 600 + + + Interactive users initialization files + 'A regular expression describing a list of file names +for files that are sourced at login time for interactive users' + ^(\.bashrc|\.zshrc|\.cshrc|\.profile|\.bash_login|\.bash_profile)$ + ^\.[\w\- ]+$ + + + Ensure Home Directories are Created for New Users + All local interactive user accounts, upon creation, should be assigned a home directory. + +Configure the operating system to assign home directories to all new local interactive users by setting the CREATE_HOME +parameter in /etc/login.defs to yes as follows: + +CREATE_HOME yes + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If local interactive users are not assigned a valid home directory, there is no place +for the storage and control of files they should own. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +if [ -e "/etc/login.defs" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*CREATE_HOME\s\+/Id" "/etc/login.defs" +else + touch "/etc/login.defs" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/login.defs" + +cp "/etc/login.defs" "/etc/login.defs.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^\s*CREATE_HOME'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^\s*CREATE_HOME" "/etc/login.defs.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^\s*CREATE_HOME', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "CREATE_HOME yes" >> "/etc/login.defs" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/login.defs.bak" > "/etc/login.defs" + printf '%s\n' "CREATE_HOME yes" >> "/etc/login.defs" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/login.defs.bak" >> "/etc/login.defs" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/login.defs.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - accounts_have_homedir_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure new users receive home directories + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/login.defs + create: false + regexp: ^\s*CREATE_HOME\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/login.defs + lineinfile: + path: /etc/login.defs + create: false + regexp: ^\s*CREATE_HOME\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/login.defs + lineinfile: + path: /etc/login.defs + create: true + regexp: ^\s*CREATE_HOME\s+ + line: CREATE_HOME yes + state: present + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - accounts_have_homedir_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Logon Failure Delay is Set Correctly in login.defs + To ensure the logon failure delay controlled by /etc/login.defs is set properly, +add or correct the FAIL_DELAY setting in /etc/login.defs to read as follows: +FAIL_DELAY + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + AC-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00226 + Increasing the time between a failed authentication attempt and re-prompting to +enter credentials helps to slow a single-threaded brute force attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_accounts_fail_delay='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^FAIL_DELAY") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_fail_delay" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^FAIL_DELAY\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^FAIL_DELAY\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_logon_fail_delay + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_fail_delay # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_fail_delay: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set accounts logon fail delay + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^FAIL_DELAY + line: FAIL_DELAY {{ var_accounts_fail_delay }} + create: true + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_logon_fail_delay + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User + Limiting the number of allowed users and sessions per user can limit risks related to Denial of +Service attacks. This addresses concurrent sessions for a single account and does not address +concurrent sessions by a single user via multiple accounts. To set the number of concurrent +sessions per user add the following line in /etc/security/limits.conf or +a file under /etc/security/limits.d/: +* hard maxlogins + 14 + 15 + 18 + 9 + 5.5.2.2 + DSS01.05 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000054 + 4.3.3.4 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.8 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-10 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-5 + SRG-OS-000027-GPOS-00008 + Limiting simultaneous user logins can insulate the system from denial of service +problems caused by excessive logins. Automated login processes operating improperly or +maliciously may result in an exceptional number of simultaneous login sessions. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions='' + + +if grep -q '^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>' /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf; then + sed -i "/^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>/ s/maxlogins.*/maxlogins $var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions/" /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf +elif grep -q '^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>' /etc/security/limits.conf; then + sed -i "/^[^#]*\<maxlogins\>/ s/maxlogins.*/maxlogins $var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions/" /etc/security/limits.conf +else + echo "* hard maxlogins $var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions" >> /etc/security/limits.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find /etc/security/limits.d files containing maxlogins configuration + find: + paths: /etc/security/limits.d + contains: ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins + patterns: '*.conf' + register: maxlogins + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User in files from + limits.d + replace: + dest: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^#?\*.*maxlogins.* + replace: '* hard maxlogins {{ var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions + }}' + with_items: + - '{{ maxlogins.files }}' + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User + lineinfile: + state: present + dest: /etc/security/limits.conf + insertbefore: ^# End of file + regexp: ^#?\*.*maxlogins + line: '* hard maxlogins {{ var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions + }}' + create: true + when: + - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + - maxlogins.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-10 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Polyinstantiation of /tmp Directories + To configure polyinstantiated /tmp directories, first create the parent directories +which will hold the polyinstantiation child directories. Use the following command: +$ sudo mkdir --mode 000 /tmp/tmp-inst +Then, add the following entry to /etc/security/namespace.conf: +/tmp /tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm + BP28(R39) + Polyinstantiation of temporary directories is a proactive security measure +which reduces chances of attacks that are made possible by /tmp +directories being world-writable. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ); then + +#!/bin/bash + +# shellcheck disable=SC2174 +mkdir -p --mode 000 /tmp/tmp-inst +chmod 000 /tmp/tmp-inst +chcon --reference=/tmp /tmp/tmp-inst + +if ! grep -Eq '^\s*/tmp\s+/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then + if grep -Eq '^\s*/tmp\s+' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then + sed -i '/^\s*\/tmp/d' /etc/security/namespace.conf + fi + echo "/tmp /tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm" >> /etc/security/namespace.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Configure Polyinstantiation of /var/tmp Directories + To configure polyinstantiated /tmp directories, first create the parent directories +which will hold the polyinstantiation child directories. Use the following command: +$ sudo mkdir --mode 000 /var/tmp/tmp-inst +Then, add the following entry to /etc/security/namespace.conf: +/var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm + BP28(R39) + Polyinstantiation of temporary directories is a proactive security measure +which reduces chances of attacks that are made possible by /var/tmp +directories being world-writable. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ); then + +#!/bin/bash + +# shellcheck disable=SC2174 +mkdir -p --mode 000 /var/tmp/tmp-inst +chmod 000 /var/tmp/tmp-inst +chcon --reference=/var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst + +if ! grep -Eq '^\s*/var/tmp\s+/var/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then + if grep -Eq '^\s*/var/tmp\s+' /etc/security/namespace.conf ; then + sed -i '/^\s*\/var\/tmp/d' /etc/security/namespace.conf + fi + echo "/var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm" >> /etc/security/namespace.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Set Interactive Session Timeout + Setting the TMOUT option in /etc/profile ensures that +all user sessions will terminate based on inactivity. +The value of TMOUT should be exported and read only. +The TMOUT + +setting in a file loaded by /etc/profile, e.g. +/etc/profile.d/tmout.sh should read as follows: +declare -xr TMOUT= + BP28(R29) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.11 + CCI-000057 + CCI-001133 + CCI-002361 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + AC-12 + SC-10 + AC-2(5) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + 8.6.1 + SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 + SRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010 + Terminating an idle session within a short time period reduces +the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a +management session enabled on the console or console port that has been +left unattended. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_accounts_tmout='' + + +# if 0, no occurence of tmout found, if 1, occurence found +tmout_found=0 + + +for f in /etc/profile /etc/profile.d/*.sh; do + + if grep --silent '^[^#].*TMOUT' $f; then + sed -i -E "s/^(.*)TMOUT\s*=\s*(\w|\$)*(.*)$/declare -xr TMOUT=$var_accounts_tmout\3/g" $f + tmout_found=1 + fi +done + +if [ $tmout_found -eq 0 ]; then + echo -e "\n# Set TMOUT to $var_accounts_tmout per security requirements" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh + echo "declare -xr TMOUT=$var_accounts_tmout" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh + echo "readonly TMOUT" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh + echo "export TMOUT" >> /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_tmout # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_tmout: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Correct any occurrence of TMOUT in /etc/profile + replace: + path: /etc/profile + regexp: ^[^#].*TMOUT=.* + replace: declare -xr TMOUT={{ var_accounts_tmout }} + register: profile_replaced + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_tmout + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set Interactive Session Timeout + lineinfile: + path: /etc/profile.d/tmout.sh + create: true + regexp: TMOUT= + line: declare -xr TMOUT={{ var_accounts_tmout }} + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_tmout + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + User Initialization Files Must Not Run World-Writable Programs + Set the mode on files being executed by the user initialization files with the +following command: +$ sudo chmod o-w FILE + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If user start-up files execute world-writable programs, especially in +unprotected directories, they could be maliciously modified to destroy user +files or otherwise compromise the system at the user level. If the system is +compromised at the user level, it is easier to elevate privileges to eventually +compromise the system at the root and network level. + +readarray -t world_writable_files < <(find / -xdev -type f -perm -0002 2> /dev/null) +readarray -t interactive_home_dirs < <(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6 }' /etc/passwd) + +for world_writable in "${world_writable_files[@]}"; do + for homedir in "${interactive_home_dirs[@]}"; do + if grep -q -d skip "$world_writable" "$homedir"/.*; then + chmod o-w $world_writable + break + fi + done +done + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure that Users Path Contains Only Local Directories + Ensure that all interactive user initialization files executable search +path statements do not contain statements that will reference a working +directory other than the users home directory. + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The executable search path (typically the PATH environment variable) contains a +list of directories for the shell to search to find executables. If this path +includes the current working directory (other than the users home directory), +executables in these directories may be executed instead of system commands. +This variable is formatted as a colon-separated list of directories. If there is +an empty entry, such as a leading or trailing colon or two consecutive colons, +this is interpreted as the current working directory. If deviations from the +default system search path for the local interactive user are required, they +must be documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO). + + + + + + All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined + Assign home directories to all interactive users that currently do not +have a home directory assigned. + +This rule checks if the home directory is properly defined in a folder which has +at least one parent folder, like "user" in "/home/user" or "/remote/users/user". +Therefore, this rule will report a finding for home directories like /users, +/tmp or /. + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If local interactive users are not assigned a valid home directory, there is no +place for the storage and control of files they should own. + +for user in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $1 }' /etc/passwd); do + # This follows the same logic of evaluation of home directories as used in OVAL. + if ! grep -q $user /etc/passwd | cut -d: -f6 | grep '^\/\w*\/\w\{1,\}'; then + sed -i "s/\($user:x:[0-9]*:[0-9]*:.*:\).*\(:.*\)$/\1\/home\/$user\2/g" /etc/passwd; + fi +done + + - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Create local_users variable from the getent output + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' + tags: + - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure interactive users have an exclusive home directory defined + ansible.builtin.user: + name: '{{ item.key }}' + home: /home/{{ item.key }} + create_home: false + loop: '{{ local_users }}' + when: + - item.value[2]|int >= 1000 + - item.value[2]|int != 65534 + - not item.value[4] | regex_search('^\/\w*\/\w{1,}') + tags: + - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist + Create home directories to all local interactive users that currently do not +have a home directory assigned. Use the following commands to create the user +home directory assigned in /etc/passwd: +$ sudo mkdir /home/USER + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If a local interactive user has a home directory defined that does not exist, +the user may be given access to the / directory as the current working directory +upon logon. This could create a Denial of Service because the user would not be +able to access their logon configuration files, and it may give them visibility +to system files they normally would not be able to access. + +for user in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $1}' /etc/passwd); do + mkhomedir_helper $user 0077; +done + + - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Create local_users variable from the getent output + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' + tags: + - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure interactive users have a home directory exists + ansible.builtin.user: + name: '{{ item.key }}' + create_home: true + loop: '{{ local_users }}' + when: + - item.value[2]|int >= 1000 + - item.value[2]|int != 65534 + tags: + - accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group + Change the group owner of interactive users home directory to the +group found in /etc/passwd. To change the group owner of +interactive users home directory, use the following command: +$ sudo chgrp USER_GROUP /home/USER + +This rule ensures every home directory related to an interactive user is +group-owned by an interactive user. It also ensures that interactive users +are group-owners of one and only one home directory. + Due to OVAL limitation, this rule can report a false negative in a +specific situation where two interactive users swap the group-ownership +of their respective home directories. + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If the Group Identifier (GID) of a local interactive users home directory is +not the same as the primary GID of the user, this would allow unauthorized +access to the users files, and users that share the same group may not be +able to access files that they legitimately should. + +awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) system("chgrp -f " $4" "$6) }' /etc/passwd + + - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - file_groupownership_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Create local_users variable from the getent output + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' + tags: + - file_groupownership_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Test for existence of home directories to avoid creating them, but only fixing + group ownership + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' + register: path_exists + loop: '{{ local_users }}' + when: + - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 + - item.value[1]|int != 65534 + tags: + - file_groupownership_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure interactive local users are the group-owners of their respective home + directories + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' + group: '{{ item.0.value[2] }}' + loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' + when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists + tags: + - file_groupownership_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive + Set the mode of the user initialization files to 0740 with the +following command: +$ sudo chmod 0740 /home/USER/.INIT_FILE + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Local initialization files are used to configure the user's shell environment +upon logon. Malicious modification of these files could compromise accounts upon +logon. + +var_user_initialization_files_regex='' + + +readarray -t interactive_users < <(awk -F: '$3>=1000 {print $1}' /etc/passwd) +readarray -t interactive_users_home < <(awk -F: '$3>=1000 {print $6}' /etc/passwd) +readarray -t interactive_users_shell < <(awk -F: '$3>=1000 {print $7}' /etc/passwd) + +USERS_IGNORED_REGEX='nobody|nfsnobody' + +for (( i=0; i<"${#interactive_users[@]}"; i++ )); do + if ! grep -qP "$USERS_IGNORED_REGEX" <<< "${interactive_users[$i]}" && \ + [ "${interactive_users_shell[$i]}" != "/sbin/nologin" ]; then + + readarray -t init_files < <(find "${interactive_users_home[$i]}" -maxdepth 1 \ + -exec basename {} \; | grep -P "$var_user_initialization_files_regex") + for file in "${init_files[@]}"; do + chmod u-s,g-wxs,o= "${interactive_users_home[$i]}/$file" + done + fi +done + + - name: XCCDF Value var_user_initialization_files_regex # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_user_initialization_files_regex: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive - Gather + User Info + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + tags: + - file_permission_user_init_files + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive - Find + Init Files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: '{{ item.value[4] }}' + pattern: '{{ var_user_initialization_files_regex }}' + hidden: true + use_regex: true + with_dict: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd }}' + when: + - item.value[4] != "/sbin/nologin" + - item.key not in ["nobody", "nfsnobody"] + - item.value[1] | int >= 1000 + register: found_init_files + tags: + - file_permission_user_init_files + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive - Fix + Init Files Permissions + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item.1.path }}' + mode: u-s,g-wxs,o= + loop: '{{ q(''ansible.builtin.subelements'', found_init_files.results, ''files'', + {''skip_missing'': True}) }}' + tags: + - file_permission_user_init_files + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive + Change the mode of interactive users home directories to 0750. To +change the mode of interactive users home directory, use the +following command: +$ sudo chmod 0750 /home/USER + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Excessive permissions on local interactive user home directories may allow +unauthorized access to user files by other users. + +for home_dir in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6 }' /etc/passwd); do + # Only update the permissions when necessary. This will avoid changing the inode timestamp when + # the permission is already defined as expected, therefore not impacting in possible integrity + # check systems that also check inodes timestamps. + find "$home_dir" -maxdepth 0 -perm /7027 -exec chmod u-s,g-w-s,o=- {} \; +done + + - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - file_permissions_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Create local_users variable from the getent output + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' + tags: + - file_permissions_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Test for existence home directories to avoid creating them. + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' + register: path_exists + loop: '{{ local_users }}' + when: + - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 + - item.value[1]|int != 65534 + tags: + - file_permissions_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure interactive local users have proper permissions on their respective + home directories + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' + mode: u-s,g-w-s,o=- + follow: false + recurse: false + loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' + when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists + tags: + - file_permissions_home_directories + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable + For each human user of the system, view the +permissions of the user's home directory: +# ls -ld /home/USER +Ensure that the directory is not group-writable and that it +is not world-readable. If necessary, repair the permissions: +# chmod g-w /home/USER +# chmod o-rwx /home/USER + This action may involve modifying user home directories. +Notify your user community, and solicit input if appropriate, +before making this type of change. + This rule is deprecated in favor of the file_permissions_home_directories rule. +Please consider replacing this rule in your files as it is not expected to receive +updates as of version 0.1.62. + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000225 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + User home directories contain many configuration files which +affect the behavior of a user's account. No user should ever have +write permission to another user's home directory. Group shared +directories can be configured in sub-directories or elsewhere in the +filesystem if they are needed. Typically, user home directories +should not be world-readable, as it would disclose file names +to other users. If a subset of users need read access +to one another's home directories, this can be provided using +groups or ACLs. + +for home_dir in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6 }' /etc/passwd); do + # Only update the permissions when necessary. This will avoid changing the inode timestamp when + # the permission is already defined as expected, therefore not impacting in possible integrity + # check systems that also check inodes timestamps. + find "$home_dir" -maxdepth 0 -perm /7027 -exec chmod u-s,g-w-s,o=- {} \; +done + + - name: Get all local users from /etc/passwd + ansible.builtin.getent: + database: passwd + split: ':' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_permissions_home_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Create local_users variable from the getent output + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd|dict2items }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_permissions_home_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Test for existence home directories to avoid creating them. + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: '{{ item.value[4] }}' + register: path_exists + loop: '{{ local_users }}' + when: + - item.value[1]|int >= 1000 + - item.value[1]|int != 65534 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_permissions_home_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure interactive local users have proper permissions on their respective + home directories + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item.0.value[4] }}' + mode: u-s,g-w-s,o=- + follow: false + recurse: false + loop: '{{ local_users|zip(path_exists.results)|list }}' + when: item.1.stat is defined and item.1.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_permissions_home_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure that No Dangerous Directories Exist in Root's Path + The active path of the root account can be obtained by +starting a new root shell and running: +# echo $PATH +This will produce a colon-separated list of +directories in the path. + +Certain path elements could be considered dangerous, as they could lead +to root executing unknown or +untrusted programs, which could contain malicious +code. +Since root may sometimes work inside +untrusted directories, the . character, which represents the +current directory, should never be in the root path, nor should any +directory which can be written to by an unprivileged or +semi-privileged (system) user. + +It is a good practice for administrators to always execute +privileged commands by typing the full path to the +command. + + Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include World or Group-Writable Directories + For each element in root's path, run: +# ls -ld DIR +and ensure that write permissions are disabled for group and +other. + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-6(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + Such entries increase the risk that root could +execute code provided by unprivileged users, +and potentially malicious code. + - name: Get root paths which are not symbolic links + stat: + path: '{{ item }}' + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + register: root_paths + with_items: '{{ ansible_env.PATH.split('':'') }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_root_path_dirs_no_write + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Disable writability to root directories + file: + path: '{{ item.item }}' + mode: g-w,o-w + with_items: '{{ root_paths.results }}' + when: + - root_paths.results is defined + - item.stat.exists + - not item.stat.islnk + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_root_path_dirs_no_write + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include Relative Paths or Null Directories + Ensure that none of the directories in root's path is equal to a single +. character, or +that it contains any instances that lead to relative path traversal, such as +.. or beginning a path without the slash (/) character. +Also ensure that there are no "empty" elements in the path, such as in these examples: +PATH=:/bin +PATH=/bin: +PATH=/bin::/sbin +These empty elements have the same effect as a single . character. + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-6(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + Including these entries increases the risk that root could +execute code from an untrusted location. + + + + + + + Ensure that Users Have Sensible Umask Values + The umask setting controls the default permissions +for the creation of new files. +With a default umask setting of 077, files and directories +created by users will not be readable by any other user on the +system. Users who wish to make specific files group- or +world-readable can accomplish this by using the chmod command. +Additionally, users can make all their files readable to their +group by default by setting a umask of 027 in their shell +configuration files. If default per-user groups exist (that is, if +every user has a default group whose name is the same as that +user's username and whose only member is the user), then it may +even be safe for users to select a umask of 007, making it very +easy to intentionally share files with groups of which the user is +a member. + + + Sensible umask + Enter default user umask + 007 + 022 + 027 + 077 + 027 + + + Ensure the Default Bash Umask is Set Correctly + To ensure the default umask for users of the Bash shell is set properly, +add or correct the umask setting in /etc/bashrc to read +as follows: +umask + BP28(R35) + 18 + APO13.01 + BAI03.01 + BAI03.02 + BAI03.03 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.3 + A.14.1.1 + A.14.2.1 + A.14.2.5 + A.6.1.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-2 + 8.6.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. +A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read or +written to by unauthorized users. + +var_accounts_user_umask='' + + + + + + +grep -q "^\s*umask" /etc/bashrc && \ + sed -i -E -e "s/^(\s*umask).*/\1 $var_accounts_user_umask/g" /etc/bashrc +if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "umask $var_accounts_user_umask" >> /etc/bashrc +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_user_umask: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Check if umask in /etc/bashrc is already set + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/bashrc + regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: umask_replace + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_bashrc + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Replace user umask in /etc/bashrc + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: /etc/bashrc + regexp: ^(\s*)umask(\s+).* + replace: \g<1>umask\g<2>{{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + when: umask_replace.found > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_bashrc + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the Default umask is Appended Correctly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + path: /etc/bashrc + line: umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + when: umask_replace.found == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_bashrc + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default C Shell Umask is Set Correctly + To ensure the default umask for users of the C shell is set properly, +add or correct the umask setting in /etc/csh.cshrc to read as follows: +umask + 18 + APO13.01 + BAI03.01 + BAI03.02 + BAI03.03 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.3 + A.14.1.1 + A.14.2.1 + A.14.2.5 + A.6.1.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-2 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. +A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read or +written to by unauthorized users. + +var_accounts_user_umask='' + + +grep -q "^\s*umask" /etc/csh.cshrc && \ + sed -i -E -e "s/^(\s*umask).*/\1 $var_accounts_user_umask/g" /etc/csh.cshrc +if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "umask $var_accounts_user_umask" >> /etc/csh.cshrc +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_user_umask: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Check if umask in /etc/csh.cshrc is already set + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/csh.cshrc + regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: umask_replace + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Replace user umask in /etc/csh.cshrc + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: /etc/csh.cshrc + regexp: ^(\s*)umask(\s+).* + replace: \g<1>umask\g<2>{{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + when: umask_replace.found > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the Default umask is Appended Correctly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + path: /etc/csh.cshrc + line: umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + when: umask_replace.found == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in login.defs + To ensure the default umask controlled by /etc/login.defs is set properly, +add or correct the UMASK setting in /etc/login.defs to read as follows: +UMASK + BP28(R35) + 11 + 18 + 3 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI03.01 + BAI03.02 + BAI03.03 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.1.1 + A.14.2.1 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.14.2.5 + A.6.1.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.IP-2 + 8.6.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 + The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. +A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read and +written to by unauthorized users. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then + +var_accounts_user_umask='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^UMASK") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_accounts_user_umask" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^UMASK\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^UMASK\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_user_umask: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Check if UMASK is already set + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^(\s*)UMASK\s+.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_umask_is_set + when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Replace user UMASK in /etc/login.defs + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: /etc/login.defs + regexp: ^(\s*)UMASK(\s+).* + replace: \g<1>UMASK\g<2>{{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + when: + - '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_umask_is_set.found > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the Default UMASK is Appended Correctly + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + path: /etc/login.defs + line: UMASK {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + when: + - '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_umask_is_set.found == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_login_defs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile + To ensure the default umask controlled by /etc/profile is set properly, +add or correct the umask setting in /etc/profile to read as follows: +umask + +Note that /etc/profile also reads scrips within /etc/profile.d directory. +These scripts are also valid files to set umask value. Therefore, they should also be +considered during the check and properly remediated, if necessary. + BP28(R35) + 18 + APO13.01 + BAI03.01 + BAI03.02 + BAI03.03 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.3 + A.14.1.1 + A.14.2.1 + A.14.2.5 + A.6.1.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6(1) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-2 + 8.6.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The umask value influences the permissions assigned to files when they are created. +A misconfigured umask value could result in files with excessive permissions that can be read or +written to by unauthorized users. + +var_accounts_user_umask='' + + +readarray -t profile_files < <(find /etc/profile.d/ -type f -name '*.sh' -or -name 'sh.local') + +for file in "${profile_files[@]}" /etc/profile; do + grep -qE '^[^#]*umask' "$file" && sed -i -E "s/^(\s*umask\s*)[0-7]+/\1$var_accounts_user_umask/g" "$file" +done + +if ! grep -qrE '^[^#]*umask' /etc/profile*; then + echo "umask $var_accounts_user_umask" >> /etc/profile +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_user_umask # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_accounts_user_umask: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Locate Profile + Configuration Files Where umask Is Defined + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: + - /etc/profile.d + patterns: + - sh.local + - '*.sh' + contains: ^[\s]*umask\s+\d+ + register: result_profile_d_files + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_profile + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Replace Existing + umask Value in Files From /etc/profile.d + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+\d+ + replace: \1umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + loop: '{{ result_profile_d_files.files }}' + register: result_umask_replaced_profile_d + when: result_profile_d_files.matched + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_profile + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Ensure umask Is + Set in /etc/profile if Not Already Set Elsewhere + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + mode: 420 + path: /etc/profile + line: umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + when: not result_profile_d_files.matched + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_profile + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile - Ensure umask Value + For All Existing umask Definition in /etc/profile + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: /etc/profile + regexp: ^(\s*)umask\s+\d+ + replace: \1umask {{ var_accounts_user_umask }} + register: result_umask_replaced_profile + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.6.1 + - accounts_umask_etc_profile + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users + Remove the UMASK environment variable from all interactive users initialization files. + CCI-000366 + CCI-001814 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00228 + The umask controls the default access mode assigned to newly created files. A +umask of 077 limits new files to mode 700 or less permissive. Although umask can +be represented as a four-digit number, the first digit representing special +access modes is typically ignored or required to be 0. This requirement +applies to the globally configured system defaults and the local interactive +user defaults for each account on the system. + +while IFS= read -r dir; do + while IFS= read -r -d '' file; do + if [ "$(basename $file)" != ".bash_history" ]; then + sed -i 's/^\(\s*umask\s*\)/#\1/g' "$file" + fi + done < <(find $dir -maxdepth 1 -type f -name ".*" -print0) +done < <(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd) + + - name: Ensure interactive local users are the owners of their respective initialization + files + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: |- + for dir in $(awk -F':' '{ if ($3 >= 1000 && $3 != 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd); do + for file in $(find $dir -maxdepth 1 -type f -name ".*"); do + if [ "$(basename $file)" != ".bash_history" ]; then + sed -i 's/^\(\s*umask\s*\)/#\1/g' $file + fi + done + done + tags: + - accounts_umask_interactive_users + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Accounting with auditd + The audit service provides substantial capabilities +for recording system activities. By default, the service audits about +SELinux AVC denials and certain types of security-relevant events +such as system logins, account modifications, and authentication +events performed by programs such as sudo. +Under its default configuration, auditd has modest disk space +requirements, and should not noticeably impact system performance. + +NOTE: The Linux Audit daemon auditd can be configured to use +the augenrules program to read audit rules files (*.rules) +located in /etc/audit/rules.d location and compile them to create +the resulting form of the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file +during the daemon startup (default configuration). Alternatively, the auditd +daemon can use the auditctl utility to read audit rules from the +/etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during daemon startup, +and load them into the kernel. The expected behavior is configured via the +appropriate ExecStartPost directive setting in the +/usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. +To instruct the auditd daemon to use the augenrules program +to read audit rules (default configuration), use the following setting: + ExecStartPost=-/sbin/augenrules --load +in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. +In order to instruct the auditd daemon to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules, use the following setting: + ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl -R /etc/audit/audit.rules +in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. +Refer to [Service] section of the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service +configuration file for further details. + +Government networks often have substantial auditing +requirements and auditd can be configured to meet these +requirements. +Examining some example audit records demonstrates how the Linux audit system +satisfies common requirements. +The following example from Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Documentation available at +https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html-single/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/index#sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Fixing_Problems-Raw_Audit_Messages +shows the substantial amount of information captured in a +two typical "raw" audit messages, followed by a breakdown of the most important +fields. In this example the message is SELinux-related and reports an AVC +denial (and the associated system call) that occurred when the Apache HTTP +Server attempted to access the /var/www/html/file1 file (labeled with +the samba_share_t type): +type=AVC msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=2465 comm="httpd" +path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0 ino=284133 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 +tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file + +type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): arch=40000003 syscall=196 success=no exit=-13 +a0=b98df198 a1=bfec85dc a2=54dff4 a3=2008171 items=0 ppid=2463 pid=2465 auid=502 uid=48 +gid=48 euid=48 suid=48 fsuid=48 egid=48 sgid=48 fsgid=48 tty=(none) ses=6 comm="httpd" +exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 key=(null) + +msg=audit(1226874073.147:96)The number in parentheses is the unformatted time stamp (Epoch time) +for the event, which can be converted to standard time by using the +date command. +{ getattr }The item in braces indicates the permission that was denied. getattr +indicates the source process was trying to read the target file's status information. +This occurs before reading files. This action is denied due to the file being +accessed having the wrong label. Commonly seen permissions include getattr, +read, and write.comm="httpd"The executable that launched the process. The full path of the executable is +found in the exe= section of the system call (SYSCALL) message, +which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd". +path="/var/www/html/file1"The path to the object (target) the process attempted to access. +scontext="unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0"The SELinux context of the process that attempted the denied action. In +this case, it is the SELinux context of the Apache HTTP Server, which is running +in the httpd_t domain. +tcontext="unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0"The SELinux context of the object (target) the process attempted to access. +In this case, it is the SELinux context of file1. Note: the samba_share_t +type is not accessible to processes running in the httpd_t domain. From the system call (SYSCALL) message, two items are of interest: +success=no: indicates whether the denial (AVC) was enforced or not. +success=no indicates the system call was not successful (SELinux denied +access). success=yes indicates the system call was successful - this can +be seen for permissive domains or unconfined domains, such as initrc_t +and kernel_t. +exe="/usr/sbin/httpd": the full path to the executable that launched +the process, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd". + + + + + Install audispd-plugins Package + The audispd-plugins package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install audispd-plugins + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + audispd-plugins provides plugins for the real-time interface to the +audit subsystem, audispd. These plugins can do things like relay events +to remote machines or analyze events for suspicious behavior. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "audispd-plugins" ; then + yum install -y "audispd-plugins" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure audispd-plugins is installed + package: + name: audispd-plugins + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_audispd-plugins_installed + + include install_audispd-plugins + +class install_audispd-plugins { + package { 'audispd-plugins': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=audispd-plugins + + +[[packages]] +name = "audispd-plugins" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the default plugins for the audit dispatcher are Installed + The audit-audispd-plugins package should be installed. + CCI-001851 + Req-10.5.3 + 10.3.3 + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration. Off-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "audit-audispd-plugins" ; then + yum install -y "audit-audispd-plugins" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure audit-audispd-plugins is installed + package: + name: audit-audispd-plugins + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.3 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_audit-audispd-plugins_installed + + include install_audit-audispd-plugins + +class install_audit-audispd-plugins { + package { 'audit-audispd-plugins': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=audit-audispd-plugins + + +[[packages]] +name = "audit-audispd-plugins" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the audit Subsystem is Installed + The audit package should be installed. + BP28(R50) + CCI-000130 + CCI-000131 + CCI-000132 + CCI-000133 + CCI-000134 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000154 + CCI-000158 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001464 + CCI-001487 + CCI-001814 + CCI-001875 + CCI-001876 + CCI-001877 + CCI-001878 + CCI-001879 + CCI-001880 + CCI-001881 + CCI-001882 + CCI-001889 + CCI-001914 + CCI-002884 + CCI-000169 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AC-7(a) + AU-7(1) + AU-7(2) + AU-14 + AU-12(2) + AU-2(a) + CM-6(a) + FAU_GEN.1 + Req-10.1 + 10.2.1 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000038-GPOS-00016 + SRG-OS-000039-GPOS-00017 + SRG-OS-000040-GPOS-00018 + SRG-OS-000041-GPOS-00019 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00021 + SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 + SRG-OS-000054-GPOS-00025 + SRG-OS-000122-GPOS-00063 + SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 + SRG-OS-000255-GPOS-00096 + SRG-OS-000337-GPOS-00129 + SRG-OS-000348-GPOS-00136 + SRG-OS-000349-GPOS-00137 + SRG-OS-000350-GPOS-00138 + SRG-OS-000351-GPOS-00139 + SRG-OS-000352-GPOS-00140 + SRG-OS-000353-GPOS-00141 + SRG-OS-000354-GPOS-00142 + SRG-OS-000358-GPOS-00145 + SRG-OS-000365-GPOS-00152 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + The auditd service is an access monitoring and accounting daemon, watching system calls to audit any access, in comparison with potential local access control policy such as SELinux policy. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "audit" ; then + yum install -y "audit" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure audit is installed + package: + name: audit + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-14 + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(2) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_audit_installed + + include install_audit + +class install_audit { + package { 'audit': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=audit + + +[[packages]] +name = "audit" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Enable auditd Service + The auditd service is an essential userspace component of +the Linux Auditing System, as it is responsible for writing audit records to +disk. + +The auditd service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable auditd.service + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + 3.3.2 + 3.3.6 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000131 + CCI-000132 + CCI-000133 + CCI-000134 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000154 + CCI-000158 + CCI-000172 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001464 + CCI-001487 + CCI-001814 + CCI-001875 + CCI-001876 + CCI-001877 + CCI-002884 + CCI-001878 + CCI-001879 + CCI-001880 + CCI-001881 + CCI-001882 + CCI-001889 + CCI-001914 + CCI-000169 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.310(a)(2)(iv) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 164.312(b) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AC-2(g) + AU-3 + AU-10 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AU-14(1) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + SI-4(23) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1 + Req-10.1 + 10.2.1 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000038-GPOS-00016 + SRG-OS-000039-GPOS-00017 + SRG-OS-000040-GPOS-00018 + SRG-OS-000041-GPOS-00019 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00021 + SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 + SRG-OS-000054-GPOS-00025 + SRG-OS-000122-GPOS-00063 + SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 + SRG-OS-000255-GPOS-00096 + SRG-OS-000337-GPOS-00129 + SRG-OS-000348-GPOS-00136 + SRG-OS-000349-GPOS-00137 + SRG-OS-000350-GPOS-00138 + SRG-OS-000351-GPOS-00139 + SRG-OS-000352-GPOS-00140 + SRG-OS-000353-GPOS-00141 + SRG-OS-000354-GPOS-00142 + SRG-OS-000358-GPOS-00145 + SRG-OS-000365-GPOS-00152 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + Without establishing what type of events occurred, it would be difficult +to establish, correlate, and investigate the events leading up to an outage or attack. +Ensuring the auditd service is active ensures audit records +generated by the kernel are appropriately recorded. + +Additionally, a properly configured audit subsystem ensures that actions of +individual system users can be uniquely traced to those users so they +can be held accountable for their actions. + + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q audit; }; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'auditd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'auditd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'auditd.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(g) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-10 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-4(23) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_auditd_enabled + +- name: Enable service auditd + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service auditd + systemd: + name: auditd + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(g) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-10 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-4(23) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_auditd_enabled + + include enable_auditd + +class enable_auditd { + service {'auditd': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + --- +apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 +kind: MachineConfig +spec: + config: + ignition: + version: 3.1.0 + systemd: + units: + - name: auditd.service + enabled: true + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["auditd"] + + + + + + + + + + Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemon + To ensure all processes can be audited, even those which start +prior to the audit daemon, add the argument audit=1 to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that audit=1 is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add audit=1 to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... audit=1 ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1" + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-001464 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.310(a)(2)(iv) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 164.312(b) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AC-17(1) + AU-14(1) + AU-10 + CM-6(a) + IR-5(1) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1 + Req-10.3 + 10.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 + SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 + Each process on the system carries an "auditable" flag which indicates whether +its activities can be audited. Although auditd takes care of enabling +this for all processes which launch after it does, adding the kernel argument +ensures it is set for every process during boot. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=audit=1 + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-10 + - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IR-5(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.7 + - grub2_audit_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1" + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-10 + - NIST-800-53-AU-14(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IR-5(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.7 + - grub2_audit_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "audit=1" + + + + + + + + + + Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon + To improve the kernel capacity to queue all log events, even those which occurred +prior to the audit daemon, add the argument audit_backlog_limit=8192 to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that audit_backlog_limit=8192 is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add audit_backlog_limit=8192 to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... audit_backlog_limit=8192 ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit_backlog_limit=8192" + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001849 + CCI-002884 + CM-6(a) + FAU_STG.1 + FAU_STG.3 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095 + SRG-OS-000341-GPOS-00132 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + audit_backlog_limit sets the queue length for audit events awaiting transfer +to the audit daemon. Until the audit daemon is up and running, all log messages +are stored in this queue. If the queue is overrun during boot process, the action +defined by audit failure flag is taken. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=audit_backlog_limit=8192 + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - grub2_audit_backlog_limit_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit_backlog_limit=8192" + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - grub2_audit_backlog_limit_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "audit_backlog_limit=8192" + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditing + The auditd program can perform comprehensive +monitoring of system activity. This section describes recommended +configuration settings for comprehensive auditing, but a full +description of the auditing system's capabilities is beyond the +scope of this guide. The mailing list linux-audit@redhat.com exists +to facilitate community discussion of the auditing system. + +The audit subsystem supports extensive collection of events, including: + +Tracing of arbitrary system calls (identified by name or number) +on entry or exit.Filtering by PID, UID, call success, system call argument (with +some limitations), etc.Monitoring of specific files for modifications to the file's +contents or metadata. + +Auditing rules at startup are controlled by the file /etc/audit/audit.rules. +Add rules to it to meet the auditing requirements for your organization. +Each line in /etc/audit/audit.rules represents a series of arguments +that can be passed to auditctl and can be individually tested +during runtime. See documentation in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION and +in the related man pages for more details. + +If copying any example audit rulesets from /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION, +be sure to comment out the +lines containing arch= which are not appropriate for your system's +architecture. Then review and understand the following rules, +ensuring rules are activated as needed for the appropriate +architecture. + +After reviewing all the rules, reading the following sections, and +editing as needed, the new rules can be activated as follows: +$ sudo service auditd restart + + + Audit failure mode + This variable is the setting for the -f option in Audit configuration which sets the failure mode of audit. +This option lets you determine how you want the kernel to handle critical errors. +Possible values are: 0=silent, 1=printk, 2=panic. +If the value is set to "2", the system is configured to panic (shut down) in the event of an auditing failure. +If the value is set to "1", the system is configured to only send information to the kernel log regarding the failure. + 2 + 0 + 1 + 2 + + + Make the auditd Configuration Immutable + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to make the auditd configuration +immutable: +-e 2 +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to make the auditd configuration +immutable: +-e 2 +With this setting, a reboot will be required to change any audit rules. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + 3.4.3 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(iv) + 164.312(d) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5.2 + 10.3.2 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + Making the audit configuration immutable prevents accidental as +well as malicious modification of the audit rules, although it may be +problematic if legitimate changes are needed during system +operation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Traverse all of: +# +# /etc/audit/audit.rules, (for auditctl case) +# /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules (for augenrules case) +# +# files to check if '-e .*' setting is present in that '*.rules' file already. +# If found, delete such occurrence since auditctl(8) manual page instructs the +# '-e 2' rule should be placed as the last rule in the configuration +find /etc/audit /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.rules' -exec sed -i '/-e[[:space:]]\+.*/d' {} ';' + +# Append '-e 2' requirement at the end of both: +# * /etc/audit/audit.rules file (for auditctl case) +# * /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules (for augenrules case) + +for AUDIT_FILE in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" "/etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules" +do + echo '' >> $AUDIT_FILE + echo '# Set the audit.rules configuration immutable per security requirements' >> $AUDIT_FILE + echo '# Reboot is required to change audit rules once this setting is applied' >> $AUDIT_FILE + echo '-e 2' >> $AUDIT_FILE + chmod o-rwx $AUDIT_FILE +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - audit_rules_immutable + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Collect all files from /etc/audit/rules.d with .rules extension + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d/ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - audit_rules_immutable + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove the -e option from all Audit config files + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^\s*(?:-e)\s+.*$ + state: absent + loop: '{{ find_rules_d.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + [''/etc/audit/audit.rules''] + }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - audit_rules_immutable + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add Audit -e option into /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules and /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + create: true + line: -e 2 + mode: o-rwx + loop: + - /etc/audit/audit.rules + - /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - audit_rules_immutable + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.8 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + The system's mandatory access policy (SELinux) should not be +arbitrarily changed by anything other than administrator action. All changes to +MAC policy should be audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules" + # If the MAC-policy.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key MAC-policy + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)MAC-policy$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/selinux/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/selinux/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_mac_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls in usr/share + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.8 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + The system's mandatory access policy (SELinux) should not be +arbitrarily changed by anything other than administrator action. All changes to +MAC policy should be audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules" + # If the MAC-policy.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/usr/share/selinux/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/usr/share/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key MAC-policy + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)MAC-policy$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/MAC-policy.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/usr/share/selinux/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /usr/share/selinux/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /usr/share/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.8 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful) + At a minimum, the audit system should collect media exportation +events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to +use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup +(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in +the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=export +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=export + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + The unauthorized exportation of data to external media could result in an information leak +where classified information, Privacy Act information, and intellectual property could be lost. An audit +trail should be created each time a filesystem is mounted to help identify and guard against information +loss. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="mount" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_media_export + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit mount tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_media_export + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for mount for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - mount + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - mount + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_media_export + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for mount for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - mount + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - mount + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_media_export + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification +-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + The network environment should not be modified by anything other +than administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be +audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="" + SYSCALL="sethostname setdomainname" + KEY="audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="sethostname setdomainname" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +# Then perform the remediations for the watch rules +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue.net" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue.net" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/issue.net" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/issue.net$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/hosts" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/hosts" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/hosts" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/hosts$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sysconfig/network$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remediate audit rules for network configuration for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + syscall_grouping: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + + - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + syscall_grouping: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + + - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remediate audit rules for network configuration for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + syscall_grouping: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + + - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + syscall_grouping: + - sethostname + - setdomainname + + - name: Check existence of sethostname, setdomainname in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the + recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue.net already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue.net\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the + recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue.net in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/issue.net already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/issue.net\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/issue.net in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/hosts already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/hosts\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the + recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/hosts in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/hosts already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/hosts\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/hosts in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sysconfig/network\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_networkconfig_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules as the + recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_networkconfig_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sysconfig/network\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sysconfig/network in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_networkconfig_modification + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information + The audit system already collects process information for all +users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual +edits of files involved in storing such process information: +-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session +-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session +-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for attempted manual +edits of files involved in storing such process information: +-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session +-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session +-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + 0582 + 0584 + 05885 + 0586 + 0846 + 0957 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.3 + 10.2.1.3 + Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such +as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules" + # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules" + # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules" + # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/run/utmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/run/utmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/run/utmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/run/utmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/btmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/btmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/btmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/btmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/wtmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/wtmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/wtmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/wtmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_session_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers + At a minimum, the audit system should collect administrator actions +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), +add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory +/etc/audit/rules.d: +-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-001404 + CCI-002130 + CCI-002132 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record +of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes. +Editing the sudoers file may be sign of an attacker trying to +establish persistent methods to a system, auditing the editing of the sudoers +files mitigates this risk. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" + # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers.d/ + At a minimum, the audit system should collect administrator actions +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), +add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory +/etc/audit/rules.d: +-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-001404 + CCI-002130 + CCI-002132 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record +of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes. +Editing the sudoers file may be sign of an attacker trying to +establish persistent methods to a system, auditing the editing of the sudoers +files mitigates this risk. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" + # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - audit_rules_sudoers_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events When Privileged Executables Are Run + Verify the system generates an audit record when privileged functions are executed. + +If audit is using the "auditctl" tool to load the rules, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep execve /etc/audit/audit.rules + +If audit is using the "augenrules" tool to load the rules, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r execve /etc/audit/rules.d + + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid + + +If both the "b32" and "b64" audit rules for "SUID" files are not defined, this is a finding. +If both the "b32" and "b64" audit rules for "SGID" files are not defined, this is a finding. + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. + CCI-001814 + CCI-001882 + CCI-001889 + CCI-001880 + CCI-001881 + CCI-001878 + CCI-001879 + CCI-001875 + CCI-001877 + CCI-001914 + CCI-002233 + CCI-002234 + CM-5(1) + AU-7(a) + AU-7(b) + AU-8(b) + AU-12(3) + AC-6(9) + SRG-OS-000326-GPOS-00126 + SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127 + SRG-APP-000343-CTR-000780 + SRG-APP-000381-CTR-000905 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have +compromised information system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern +and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use +of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the +risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + + OTHER_FILTERS="-C uid!=euid -F euid=0" + + AUID_FILTERS="" + SYSCALL="execve" + KEY="setuid" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + + OTHER_FILTERS="-C gid!=egid -F egid=0" + + AUID_FILTERS="" + SYSCALL="execve" + KEY="setgid" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) + - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Service facts + ansible.builtin.service_facts: null + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) + - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check the rules script being used + ansible.builtin.command: grep '^ExecStartPost' /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service + register: check_rules_scripts_result + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) + - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set suid_audit_rules fact + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + suid_audit_rules: + - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid + regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid + regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid + regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + - rule: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid + regex: ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) + - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules to audit privileged functions + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + line: '{{ item.rule }}' + regexp: '{{ item.regex }}' + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"auditd.service" in ansible_facts.services' + - '"augenrules" in check_rules_scripts_result.stdout' + register: augenrules_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result + with_items: '{{ suid_audit_rules }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) + - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update Update /etc/audit/audit.rules to audit privileged functions + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/audit.rules + line: '{{ item.rule }}' + regexp: '{{ item.regex }}' + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"auditd.service" in ansible_facts.services' + - '"auditctl" in check_rules_scripts_result.stdout' + register: auditctl_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result + with_items: '{{ suid_audit_rules }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) + - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Restart Auditd + ansible.builtin.command: /usr/sbin/service auditd restart + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (augenrules_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result.changed or auditctl_audit_rules_privilege_function_update_result.changed) + - ansible_facts.services["auditd.service"].state == "running" + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(3) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(1) + - audit_rules_suid_privilege_function + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions + At a minimum, the audit system should collect administrator actions +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), +add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory +/etc/audit/rules.d: +-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions +-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions +-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-2(7)(b) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.2 + Req-10.2.5.b + 10.2.1.5 + 10.2.2 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + SRG-APP-000026-CTR-000070 + SRG-APP-000027-CTR-000075 + SRG-APP-000028-CTR-000080 + SRG-APP-000291-CTR-000675 + SRG-APP-000292-CTR-000680 + SRG-APP-000293-CTR-000685 + SRG-APP-000294-CTR-000690 + SRG-APP-000319-CTR-000745 + SRG-APP-000320-CTR-000750 + SRG-APP-000509-CTR-001305 + The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record +of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" + # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules" + # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.2 + - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Shutdown System When Auditing Failures Occur + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to to the bottom of a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-f +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to the +bottom of the /etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-f + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + 3.3.4 + CCI-000139 + CCI-000140 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + AU-5(b) + SC-24 + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 + SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 + It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system +is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without this +notification, the security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of +the audit capability, and system operation may be adversely affected. + +Audit processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the +audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or +exceeded. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_audit_failure_mode='' + + +# Traverse all of: +# +# /etc/audit/audit.rules, (for auditctl case) +# /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules (for augenrules case) +find /etc/audit /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.rules' -exec sed -i '/-f[[:space:]]\+.*/d' {} ';' + +for AUDIT_FILE in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" "/etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules" +do + echo '' >> $AUDIT_FILE + echo '# Set the audit.rules configuration to halt system upon audit failure per security requirements' >> $AUDIT_FILE + echo "-f $var_audit_failure_mode" >> $AUDIT_FILE +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-24 + - audit_rules_system_shutdown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_audit_failure_mode # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_audit_failure_mode: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Collect all files from /etc/audit/rules.d with .rules extension + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d/ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-24 + - audit_rules_system_shutdown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove the -f option from all Audit config files + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^\s*(?:-f)\s+.*$ + state: absent + loop: '{{ find_rules_d.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list + [''/etc/audit/audit.rules''] + }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-24 + - audit_rules_system_shutdown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add Audit -f option into /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules and /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + create: true + line: -f {{ var_audit_failure_mode }} + loop: + - /etc/audit/audit.rules + - /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.4 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-24 + - audit_rules_system_shutdown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: +-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: +-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification +-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to account changes; +it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a +separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: +audit_rules_usergroup_modification_groupaudit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadowaudit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-002130 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + SRG-APP-000026-CTR-000070 + SRG-APP-000027-CTR-000075 + SRG-APP-000028-CTR-000080 + SRG-APP-000291-CTR-000675 + SRG-APP-000292-CTR-000680 + SRG-APP-000293-CTR-000685 + SRG-APP-000294-CTR-000690 + SRG-APP-000319-CTR-000745 + SRG-APP-000320-CTR-000750 + SRG-APP-000509-CTR-001305 + In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches +will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected +users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/group + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-001404 + CCI-001405 + CCI-001683 + CCI-001684 + CCI-001685 + CCI-001686 + CCI-002130 + CCI-002132 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches +will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected +users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/group already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/group\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient + for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/group in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/group already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/group\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/group in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/gshadow + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-001404 + CCI-001405 + CCI-001683 + CCI-001684 + CCI-001685 + CCI-001686 + CCI-002130 + CCI-002132 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches +will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected +users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/gshadow already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/gshadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient + for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/gshadow in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/gshadow already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/gshadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/gshadow in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/security/opasswd + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-001404 + CCI-001405 + CCI-001683 + CCI-001684 + CCI-001685 + CCI-001686 + CCI-002130 + CCI-002132 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches +will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected +users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/security/opasswd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient + for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/security/opasswd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/passwd + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-001404 + CCI-001405 + CCI-001683 + CCI-001684 + CCI-001685 + CCI-001686 + CCI-002130 + CCI-002132 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + SRG-OS-000274-GPOS-00104 + SRG-OS-000275-GPOS-00105 + SRG-OS-000276-GPOS-00106 + SRG-OS-000277-GPOS-00107 + In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches +will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected +users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/passwd already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/passwd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient + for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/passwd in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/passwd already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/passwd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/passwd in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/shadow + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify +account changes: + +-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000018 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-001403 + CCI-001404 + CCI-001405 + CCI-001683 + CCI-001684 + CCI-001685 + CCI-001686 + CCI-002130 + CCI-002132 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.5 + 10.2.1.5 + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches +will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected +users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules" + # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/shadow already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/shadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient + for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/shadow in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/shadow already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/shadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/shadow in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5 + - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Access Events to Audit Log Directory + The audit system should collect access events to read audit log directory. +The following audit rule will assure that access to audit log directory are +collected. +-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules +program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the +rule to a file with suffix .rules in the directory +/etc/audit/rules.d. +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the rule to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file. + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Attempts to read the logs should be recorded, suspicious access to audit log files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. +Auditing these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise.' + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="access-audit-trail" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - directory_access_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /var/log/audit + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access-audit-trail.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access-audit-trail.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - directory_access_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root + All audit directories must be group owned by root user. By default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. + +To properly set the group owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /var/log/audit + +If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root +group account, change the group ownership of the audit directories to this specific group. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + CCI-001314 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + AU-9(4) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to +attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') +else + GROUP=root +fi +if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + DIR=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ' | rev | cut -d"/" -f2- | rev) +else + DIR="/var/log/audit" +fi + + +find ${DIR} -type d -exec chgrp ${GROUP} {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root + All audit directories must be owned by root user. By default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. + +To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + CCI-001314 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + AU-9(4) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to +attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') + LOGPATH="$(dirname "$FILE")" + chown root $LOGPATH +else + chown root /var/log/audit +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0750 or Less Permissive + +If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root +group account, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command: +$ sudo chmod 0750 /var/log/audit + +Otherwise, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command: +$ sudo chmod 0700 /var/log/audit + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + AU-9 + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + DIR=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ' | rev | cut -d"/" -f2- | rev) +else + DIR="/var/log/audit" +fi + + +if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') + if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then + chmod 0750 $DIR + else + chmod 0700 $DIR + fi +else + chmod 0700 $DIR +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Group Owned By Root + All audit logs must be group owned by root user. The path for audit log can +be configured via log_file parameter in /etc/audit/auditd.conf +or, by default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. + +To properly set the group owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /var/log/audit/* + +If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other +than the root group account, change the group ownership of the audit logs +to this specific group. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + CCI-001314 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + AU-9(4) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to +attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') +else + FILE="/var/log/audit/audit.log" +fi + + +if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') + if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ]; then + chgrp ${GROUP} $FILE* + else + chgrp root $FILE* + fi +else + chgrp root $FILE* +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Group root + All audit configuration files must be owned by group root. +chown :root /etc/audit/audit*.{rules,conf} /etc/audit/rules.d/* + CCI-000171 + SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 + Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can +select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able +to prevent the auditing of critical events. +Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by +overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more +difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating +to an incident or identify those responsible for one. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +find /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +find /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*\.rules$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ + command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner on /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ + command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*\.rules$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner on /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Root + All audit configuration files must be owned by root user. + +To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/audit/ + +To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/audit/rules.d/ + CCI-000171 + SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 + Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can +select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able +to prevent the auditing of critical events. +Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by +overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more +difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating +to an incident or identify those responsible for one. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +find /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + +find /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*\.rules$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ + command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ + command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*\.rules$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root + All audit logs must be owned by root user and group. By default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. + +To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit + +To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit/* + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + CCI-001314 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + AU-9(4) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5.1 + 10.3.1 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 + Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to +attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') + if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then + chown root:${GROUP} /var/log/audit + chown root:${GROUP} /var/log/audit/audit.log* + else + chown root:root /var/log/audit + chown root:root /var/log/audit/audit.log* + fi +else + chown root:root /var/log/audit + chown root:root /var/log/audit/audit.log* +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root + All audit logs must be owned by root user. The path for audit log can be +configured via log_file parameter in /etc/audit/auditd.conf +or by default, the path for audit log is /var/log/audit/. + +To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit/* + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + CCI-001314 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + AU-9(4) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to +attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') + chown root $FILE* +else + chown root /var/log/audit/audit.log* +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Audit Configuration Files Permissions are 640 or More Restrictive + All audit configuration files permissions must be 640 or more restrictive. +chmod 0640 /etc/audit/audit*.{rules,conf} /etc/audit/rules.d/* + Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can +select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able +to prevent the auditing of critical events. +Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by +overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more +difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating +to an incident or identify those responsible for one. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '.*audit\(\.rules\|d\.conf\)$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; + +find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '.*\.rules$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) + command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex + ".*audit\(\.rules\|d\.conf\)$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) + command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type + f -regex ".*\.rules$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_audit_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissive + +Determine where the audit logs are stored with the following command: +$ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf +log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log +Configure the audit log to be protected from unauthorized read access by setting the correct +permissive mode with the following command: +$ sudo chmod 0600 audit_log_file +By default, audit_log_file is "/var/log/audit/audit.log". + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + CCI-001314 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 6.1 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + AU-9(4) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.5 + 10.3.1 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 + If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then + FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ') +else + FILE="/var/log/audit/audit.log" +fi + + +chmod 0600 $FILE + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - file_permissions_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Get audit log files + command: grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf + failed_when: false + register: log_file_exists + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - file_permissions_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Parse log file line + command: awk -F '=' '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf + register: log_file_line + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (log_file_exists.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - file_permissions_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set default log_file if not set + set_fact: + log_file: /var/log/audit/audit.log + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (log_file_exists is undefined) or (log_file_exists.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - file_permissions_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set log_file from log_file_line if not set already + set_fact: + log_file: '{{ log_file_line.stdout | trim }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (log_file_line.stdout is defined) and (log_file_line.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - file_permissions_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Apply mode to log file + file: + path: '{{ log_file }}' + mode: 384 + failed_when: false + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - file_permissions_var_log_audit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be +present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for +auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system +calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while +still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls +could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient. +Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the +arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to +use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup +(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in +the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="chmod" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit chmod tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to +use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup +(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in +the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="chown" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit chown tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - chown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to +use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup +(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in +the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="fchmod" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit fchmod tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmod + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to +use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup +(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in +the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="fchmodat" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit fchmodat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmodat + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmodat + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmodat + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchmodat + syscall_grouping: + - chmod + - fchmod + - fchmodat + + - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="fchown" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit fchown tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownat + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="fchownat" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit fchownat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchownat + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchownat + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchownat + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fchownat + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattr + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. + +If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="fremovexattr" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit fremovexattr tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattr + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="fsetxattr" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit fsetxattr tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - fsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchown + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="lchown" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit lchown tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lchown + syscall_grouping: + - chown + - fchown + - fchownat + - lchown + + - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattr + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. + +If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="lremovexattr" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit lremovexattr tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lremovexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattr + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="lsetxattr" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit lsetxattr tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - lsetxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattr + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules +program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the +following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="removexattr" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit removexattr tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - removexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - removexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - removexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - removexattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattr + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission +changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.5 + 10.3.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="setxattr" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit setxattr tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - setxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - setxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - setxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - setxattr + syscall_grouping: + - fremovexattr + - lremovexattr + - removexattr + - fsetxattr + - lsetxattr + - setxattr + + - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4 + - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file system umount +changes. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + CCI-000130 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=b32" +OTHER_FILTERS="" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="umount" +KEY="perm_mod" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for umount for x86 platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - umount + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of umount in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - umount + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of umount in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount2 + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file system umount2 +changes. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S umount2 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + CCI-000130 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to +gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications +can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and +unauthorized users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="umount2" + KEY="perm_mod" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="" + + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit umount2 tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for umount2 for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - umount2 + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - umount2 + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for umount2 for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - umount2 + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - umount2 + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of umount2 in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Record Execution Attempts to Run ACL Privileged Commands + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +ACL privileged commands for all users and root. + + Record Any Attempts to Run chacl + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the chacl command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and +mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, +correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify +those responsible for one. +Audit records can be generated from various components within the +information system (e.g., module or policy filter). + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_execution_chacl + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chacl + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_execution_chacl + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setfacl + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the setfacl command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and +mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, +correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify +those responsible for one. +Audit records can be generated from various components within the +information system (e.g., module or policy filter). + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_execution_setfacl + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/setfacl + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_execution_setfacl + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Record Execution Attempts to Run SELinux Privileged Commands + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +SELinux privileged commands for all users and root. + + Record Any Attempts to Run chcon + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the chcon command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_chcon + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chcon + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_chcon + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run restorecon + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the restorecon command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_restorecon + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/restorecon + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_restorecon + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run semanage + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the semanage command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_semanage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/semanage + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_semanage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setfiles + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the setfiles command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_setfiles + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/setfiles + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_setfiles + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setsebool + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the setsebool command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_setsebool + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/setsebool + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_setsebool + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run seunshare + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the seunshare command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000172 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_seunshare + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/seunshare + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_execution_seunshare + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Record File Deletion Events by User + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User + At a minimum the audit system should collect file deletion events +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir,unlink,unlinkat,rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to file deletion; +it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a +separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: +audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdiraudit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkaudit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed +from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting +malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="rmdir unlink unlinkat rename renameat" + KEY="delete" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="rmdir unlink unlinkat rename renameat" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rename + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rename -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rename -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.1.1 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.MA-2 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed +from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting +malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="rename" + KEY="delete" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit rename tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - renameat + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.1.1 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.MA-2 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed +from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting +malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="renameat" + KEY="delete" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit renameat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rmdir + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.1.1 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.MA-2 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed +from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting +malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="rmdir" + KEY="delete" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit rmdir tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rmdir for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rmdir + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rmdir + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rmdir for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rmdir + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rmdir + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of rmdir in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlink + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlink -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlink -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.1.1 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.MA-2 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed +from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting +malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="unlink" + KEY="delete" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit unlink tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlinkat + At a minimum, the audit system should collect file deletion events +for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlinkat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as +appropriate for your system: +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S unlinkat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.1.1 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.MA-2 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000467-GPOS-00211 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed +from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting +malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="unlinkat" + KEY="delete" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="unlink unlinkat rename renameat rmdir" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit unlinkat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/delete.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - unlink + - unlinkat + - rename + - renameat + - rmdir + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=delete + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unauthorized Access Attempts Events to Files (unsuccessful) + At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be +present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for +auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system +calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while +still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls +could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient. +Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the +arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + + Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful) + At a minimum the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat,open,openat,open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to unsuccessful file modification; +it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a +separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: +audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openaudit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncateaudit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + 0582 + 0584 + 05885 + 0586 + 0846 + 0957 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + + # First fix the -EACCES requirement + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" + KEY="access" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + + # Then fix the -EPERM requirement + # No need to change content of $GROUP variable - it's the same as for -EACCES case above + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + SYSCALL="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" + KEY="access" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat open openat open_by_handle_at truncate ftruncate" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - creat + At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="creat" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit creat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for creat EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - creat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of creat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate + At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="ftruncate" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit ftruncate tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for ftruncate EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - ftruncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of ftruncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open + At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="open" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit open tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at + At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at,truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="open_by_handle_at" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit open_by_handle_at tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EACCES for 32bit + platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EACCES for 64bit + platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for open_by_handle_at EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - open_by_handle_at + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of open_by_handle_at in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - openat + At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="openat" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit openat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for openat EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - openat + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of openat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - rename + The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion +attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related +to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="rename" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit rename tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for rename EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - rename + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of rename in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat + +The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion +attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related +to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="renameat" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit renameat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for renameat EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - renameat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of renameat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - truncate + At a minimum, the audit system should collect unauthorized file +accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system +calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="truncate" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="creat ftruncate truncate open openat open_by_handle_at" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit truncate tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for truncate EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - truncate + syscall_grouping: + - creat + - ftruncate + - truncate + - open + - openat + - open_by_handle_at + + - name: Check existence of truncate in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink + +The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion +attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related +to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="unlink" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit unlink tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlink EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlink + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlink in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat + +The audit system should collect unsuccessful file deletion +attempts for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured +to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon +startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + Note that these rules can be configured in a +number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls +have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping system calls related +to the same event is more efficient. See the following example: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-delete + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.4 + Req-10.2.1 + 10.2.1.1 + 10.2.1.4 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Unsuccessful attempts to delete files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing +these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="unlinkat" +KEY="access" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="rename renameat unlink unlinkat" + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EACCES" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F exit=-EPERM" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit unlinkat tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EACCES for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EACCES for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EACCES + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EPERM for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for unlinkat EPERM for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/access.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - unlinkat + syscall_grouping: + - rename + - renameat + - unlink + - unlinkat + + - name: Check existence of unlinkat in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F exit=-EPERM + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.4 + - audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Record Information on Kernel Modules Loading and Unloading + To capture kernel module loading and unloading events, use following lines, setting ARCH to +either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: + +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module,delete_module -F key=modules + + +Place to add the lines depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured +to use the augenrules program (the default), add the lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, +add the lines to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading + To capture kernel module loading and unloading events, use following lines, setting ARCH to +either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: + +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module,finit_module,delete_module -F key=modules + + +The place to add the lines depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured +to use the augenrules program (the default), add the lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, +add the lines to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + The addition/removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of +the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important +to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +# Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => +# it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence +# of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. +# (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + + SYSCALL="init_module finit_module delete_module" + KEY="modules" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="init_module finit_module delete_module" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for kernel module loading for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for kernel module loading for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/modules.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - delete_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module, delete_module, finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - delete_module + To capture kernel module unloading events, use following line, setting ARCH to +either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: + +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S delete_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + + +Place to add the line depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured +to use the augenrules program (the default), add the line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, +add the line to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + The removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of +the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important +to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +# Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => +# it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence +# of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. +# (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + + SYSCALL="delete_module" + KEY="modules" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="delete_module" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set architecture for audit delete_module tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for delete_module for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - delete_module + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - delete_module + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for delete_module for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - delete_module + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - delete_module + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of delete_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - finit_module + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program +to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file +with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d to capture kernel module +loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: + +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S finit_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit +rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file +in order to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or +b64 as appropriate for your system: + +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S finit_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + The addition/removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of +the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important +to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +# Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => +# it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence +# of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. +# (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + + SYSCALL="finit_module" + KEY="modules" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="init_module finit_module" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set architecture for audit finit_module tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for finit_module for x86 platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for finit_module for x86_64 platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - finit_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of finit_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading - init_module + To capture kernel module loading events, use following line, setting ARCH to +either b32 for 32-bit system, or having two lines for both b32 and b64 in case your system is 64-bit: + +-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=modules + + +Place to add the line depends on a way auditd daemon is configured. If it is configured +to use the augenrules program (the default), add the line to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility, +add the line to file /etc/audit/audit.rules. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.7 + 10.2.1.7 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + The addition of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of +the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important +to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +# Note: 32-bit and 64-bit kernel syscall numbers not always line up => +# it's required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence +# of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. +# (See `man 7 audit.rules` for details ) +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="" + + AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" + + SYSCALL="init_module" + KEY="modules" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="init_module finit_module" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set architecture for audit init_module tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for init_module for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for init_module for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/module-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - init_module + syscall_grouping: + - init_module + - finit_module + + - name: Check existence of init_module in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F + key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset -F key=module-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7 + - audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events + The audit system already collects login information for all users +and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events + The audit system already collects login information for all users +and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins +-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins + This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to login events; +it was written with DISA STIG in mind. Other policies should use a +separate rule for each syscall that needs to be checked. For example: +audit_rules_login_events_tallylogaudit_rules_login_events_faillockaudit_rules_login_events_lastlog + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.2.3 + 10.2.1.3 + Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such +as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" + # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/faillock" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/faillock" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" + # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/faillock" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" + # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - faillock + The audit system already collects login information for all users +and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.3 + 10.2.1.3 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 + Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such +as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/faillock" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/faillock" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" + # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/faillock" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/faillock$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/faillock already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/faillock\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/faillock in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/faillock already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/faillock\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/faillock in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_faillock + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - lastlog + The audit system already collects login information for all users +and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000126 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.3 + 10.2.1.3 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such +as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" + # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/lastlog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/lastlog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/lastlog already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/lastlog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/lastlog in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/lastlog already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/lastlog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/lastlog in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_lastlog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - tallylog + The audit system already collects login information for all users +and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual +edits of files involved in storing logon events: +-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + CCI-000126 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.2.3 + 10.2.1.3 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214 + SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218 + Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such +as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules" + # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/tallylog" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/tallylog$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/tallylog already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/tallylog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/tallylog in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/tallylog already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/tallylog\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/tallylog in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3 + - audit_rules_login_events_tallylog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Record Information on the Use of Privileged Commands + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - init + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000172 + AU-12(c) + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + Misuse of the init command may cause availability issues for the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_init + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/init + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/init -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_init + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - poweroff + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000172 + AU-12(c) + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + Misuse of the poweroff command may cause availability issues for the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_poweroff + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/poweroff + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/poweroff -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_poweroff + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - reboot + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000172 + AU-12(c) + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + Misuse of the reboot command may cause availability issues for the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_reboot + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/reboot + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/reboot -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_reboot + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - shutdown + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000172 + AU-12(c) + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + Misuse of the shutdown command may cause availability issues for the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_shutdown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/shutdown + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/shutdown -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - audit_privileged_commands_shutdown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands + The audit system should collect information about usage of privileged commands for all users. +These are commands with suid or sgid bits on and they are specially risky in local block +device partitions not mounted with noexec and nosuid options. Therefore, these partitions +should be first identified by the following command: +findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid" + +For all partitions listed by the previous command, it is necessary to search for +setuid / setgid programs using the following command: +$ sudo find PARTITION -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null + +For each setuid / setgid program identified by the previous command, an audit rule must be +present in the appropriate place using the following line structure: +-a always,exit -F path=PROG_PATH -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read +audit rules during daemon startup, add the line to a file with suffix .rules in the +/etc/audit/rules.d directory, replacing the PROG_PATH part with the full path +of that setuid / setgid identified program. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility instead, add +the line to the /etc/audit/audit.rules file, also replacing the PROG_PATH part +with the full path of that setuid / setgid identified program. + This rule checks for multiple syscalls related to privileged commands. If needed to check +specific privileged commands, other more specific rules should be considered. For example: +audit_rules_privileged_commands_suaudit_rules_privileged_commands_umountaudit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd + Note that OVAL check and Bash / Ansible remediation of this rule +explicitly excludes file systems mounted at /proc directory +and its subdirectories. It is a virtual file system and it doesn't +contain executable applications. At the same time, interacting with this +file system during check or remediation caused undesirable errors. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO08.04 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.05 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-002234 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.5 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.3.4.5.9 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 3.9 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + 0582 + 0584 + 05885 + 0586 + 0846 + 0957 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.1 + A.16.1.2 + A.16.1.3 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.1.3 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-2 + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + DE.DP-4 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + RS.CO-2 + Req-10.2.2 + 10.2.1.2 + SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, +or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and +ongoing concern that can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify the +risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, which attempt to subvert +their normal role of providing some necessary but limited capability. As such, motivation +exists to monitor these programs for unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" + +FILTER_NODEV=$(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) +PARTITIONS=$(findmnt -n -l -k -it $FILTER_NODEV | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid|/proc($|/.*$)" | awk '{ print $1 }') +for PARTITION in $PARTITIONS; do + PRIV_CMDS=$(find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null) + for PRIV_CMD in $PRIV_CMDS; do + OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=$PRIV_CMD -F perm=x" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined + # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection + # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection + default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it + # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched + readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet + if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] + then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi + fi + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + + # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' + # file to the list of files to be inspected + default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi + done +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 + - audit_rules_privileged_commands + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Set + List of Mount Points Which Permits Execution of Privileged Commands + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + privileged_mount_points: '{{(ansible_facts.mounts | rejectattr(''options'', ''search'', + ''noexec|nosuid'') | rejectattr(''mount'', ''match'', ''/proc($|/.*$)'') | map(attribute=''mount'') + | list ) }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 + - audit_rules_privileged_commands + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Search + for Privileged Commands in Eligible Mount Points + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null + register: result_privileged_commands_search + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + with_items: '{{ privileged_mount_points }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 + - audit_rules_privileged_commands + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Set + List of Privileged Commands Found in Eligible Mount Points + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + privileged_commands: '{{( result_privileged_commands_search.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') + | select() | list )[-1] }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 + - audit_rules_privileged_commands + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Privileged + Commands are Present in the System + block: + + - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Ensure + Rules for All Privileged Commands in augenrules Format + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + line: -a always,exit -F path={{ item }} -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + -F key=privileged + regexp: ^.*path={{ item | regex_escape() }} .*$ + create: true + with_items: + - '{{ privileged_commands }}' + + - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Ensure + Rules for All Privileged Commands in auditctl Format + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/audit.rules + line: -a always,exit -F path={{ item }} -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + -F key=privileged + regexp: ^.*path={{ item | regex_escape() }} .*$ + create: true + with_items: + - '{{ privileged_commands }}' + + - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Search + for Duplicated Rules in Other Files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + recurse: false + contains: ^-a always,exit -F path={{ item }} .*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + with_items: + - '{{ privileged_commands }}' + register: result_augenrules_files + + - name: Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - Ensure + Rules for Privileged Commands are Defined Only in One File + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.1.path }}' + regexp: ^-a always,exit -F path={{ item.0.item }} .*$ + state: absent + with_subelements: + - '{{ result_augenrules_files.results }}' + - files + when: + - item.1.path != '/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - privileged_commands is defined + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.2 + - audit_rules_privileged_commands + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - at + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000172 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/at + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_at + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chage + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chage + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chsh + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chsh + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/chsh + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_chsh + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - crontab + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/crontab + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - gpasswd + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_gpasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/gpasswd + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_gpasswd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - kmod + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-w /usr/bin/kmod -p x -k modules +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-w /usr/bin/kmod -p x -k modules + BP28(R73) + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + AU-3 + AU-3.1 + AU-12(a) + AU-12.1(ii) + AU-12.1(iv)AU-12(c) + MA-4(1)(a) + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and +mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, +correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify +those responsible for one. + +Audit records can be generated from various components within the +information system (e.g., module or policy filter). + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv)AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_kmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/kmod + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv)AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_kmod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - mount + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_mount + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/mount + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_mount + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgrp + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgrp + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/newgrp + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgrp + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pam_timestamp_check + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check +-F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check +-F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pam_timestamp_check + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pam_timestamp_check + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - passwd + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/passwd + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postdrop + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postdrop + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/postdrop + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postdrop -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postdrop + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postqueue + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postqueue + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/postqueue + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/postqueue -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_postqueue + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pt_chown + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pt_chown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/libexec/pt_chown + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_pt_chown + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run ssh-agent + At a minimum, the audit system should collect any execution attempt +of the ssh-agent command for all users and root. If the auditd +daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules +during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix +.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-agent +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-agent + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and +mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, +correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify +those responsible for one. + +Audit records can be generated from various components within the +information system (e.g., module or policy filter). + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_agent + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/ssh-agent + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_agent + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - ssh-keysign + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_keysign + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_keysign + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - su + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-0003 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_su + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/su + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 + -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k + |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_su + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudo + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + BP28(R19) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudo + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/sudo + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudo + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudoedit + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudoedit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/sudoedit + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudoedit + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - umount + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_umount + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/bin/umount + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F + auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_umount + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_chkpwd + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-3 + AU-3.1 + AU-12(a) + AU-12(c) + AU-12.1(ii) + AU-12.1(iv) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + MA-4(1)(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000029-CTR-000085 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_chkpwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(ii) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-AU-3.1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(1)(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_chkpwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_update + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_update + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/unix_update + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_update + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_update + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - userhelper + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_userhelper + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/userhelper + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_userhelper + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usermod + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000130 + CCI-000135 + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + CCI-002884 + SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015 + SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usermod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/usermod + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F + perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usermod + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usernetctl + At a minimum, the audit system should collect the execution of +privileged commands for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is +configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during +daemon startup (the default), add a line of the following form to a file with +suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following +form to /etc/audit/audit.rules: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + CCI-000172 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + AC-2(4) + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by +authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, +is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. +Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify +the risk from insider and advanced persistent threats. + +Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks, +which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but +limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for +unusual activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit" +OTHER_FILTERS="-F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x" +AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset" +SYSCALL="" +KEY="privileged" +SYSCALL_GROUPING="" +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usernetctl + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for /usr/sbin/usernetctl + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x + -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: [] + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S |,)\w+)* -F + path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( + -S |,)\w+)+)( -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset + (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit{{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl + -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - audit_rules_privileged_commands_usernetctl + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Records Events that Modify Date and Time Information + Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate +nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that +are highly dependent upon an accurate system time. All changes to the system +time should be audited. + + Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -F key=audit_time_rules +The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be +used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple +system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is +not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-001487 + CCI-000169 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.4.2.b + 10.6.3 + Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate +nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that +are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes +to the system time should be audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture + if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ] + then + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output) + # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited + SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday stime" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday stime" + elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ] + then + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output) + # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited + SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday" + fi + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="" + KEY="audit_time_rules" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined + # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection + # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection + default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it + # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched + readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet + if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] + then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi + fi + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + + # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' + # file to the list of files to be inspected + default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_adjtimex + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_adjtimex + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for adjtimex for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - adjtimex + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - adjtimex + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_adjtimex + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for adjtimex for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - adjtimex + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + + - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - adjtimex + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of adjtimex in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_adjtimex + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settime + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change +The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can +be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. +Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if +desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-001487 + CCI-000169 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.4.2.b + 10.6.3 + Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate +nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that +are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes +to the system time should be audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + OTHER_FILTERS="-F a0=0x0" + AUID_FILTERS="" + SYSCALL="clock_settime" + KEY="time-change" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection +# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection +default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" +# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it +# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched +readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) +# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet +if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] +then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi +fi + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi + unset syscall_a +unset syscall_grouping +unset syscall_string +unset syscall +unset file_to_edit +unset rule_to_edit +unset rule_syscalls_to_edit +unset other_string +unset auid_string +unset full_rule + +# Load macro arguments into arrays +read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL +read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +files_to_inspect=() + + + +# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# file to the list of files to be inspected +default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + +# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead +skip=1 + +for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi +done + +if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi +fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_clock_settime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_clock_settime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for clock_settime for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - clock_settime + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F + key=time-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - clock_settime + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F + key=time-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_clock_settime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for clock_settime for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - clock_settime + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/time-change.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F + key=time-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - clock_settime + syscall_grouping: [] + + - name: Check existence of clock_settime in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* -F a0=0x0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F a0=0x0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F a0=0x0 -F + key=time-change + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_clock_settime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules +If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules +The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be +used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple +system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is +not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-001487 + CCI-000169 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.4.2.b + 10.6.3 + Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate +nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that +are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes +to the system time should be audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture + if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ] + then + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output) + # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited + SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday stime" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday stime" + elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ] + then + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output) + # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited + SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday" + fi + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="" + KEY="audit_time_rules" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined + # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection + # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection + default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it + # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched + readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet + if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] + then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi + fi + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + + # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' + # file to the list of files to be inspected + default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_settimeofday + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set architecture for audit tasks + set_fact: + audit_arch: b64 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture + == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_settimeofday + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for settimeofday for 32bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - settimeofday + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - settimeofday + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_settimeofday + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for settimeofday for 64bit platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - settimeofday + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - settimeofday + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of settimeofday in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - audit_arch == "b64" + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_settimeofday + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stime + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the +default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the +directory /etc/audit/rules.d for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -F key=audit_time_rules +Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit +lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected +to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule +form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). If the +auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to +read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems: +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -F key=audit_time_rules +Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit +lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected +to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule +form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). The -k option +allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for +better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system +calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not +required. See an example of multiple combined system calls: +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=audit_time_rules + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-001487 + CCI-000169 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.4.2.b + 10.6.3 + Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate +nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that +are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes +to the system time should be audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system +[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64") + +for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}" +do + # Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture + if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ] + then + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + # stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output) + # so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited + SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday stime" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday stime" + elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ] + then + ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH" + # stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output) + # therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited + SYSCALL="adjtimex settimeofday" + SYSCALL_GROUPING="adjtimex settimeofday" + fi + OTHER_FILTERS="" + AUID_FILTERS="" + KEY="audit_time_rules" + # Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + # If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined + # If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection + # If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection + default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + # As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it + # The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched + readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + # Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet + if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ] + then + file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules" + files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect") + if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ] + then + touch "$file_to_inspect" + chmod 0640 "$file_to_inspect" + fi + fi + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi + unset syscall_a + unset syscall_grouping + unset syscall_string + unset syscall + unset file_to_edit + unset rule_to_edit + unset rule_syscalls_to_edit + unset other_string + unset auid_string + unset full_rule + + # Load macro arguments into arrays + read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL + read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING + + # Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness + # of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: + # + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | + # augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | + # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + # + files_to_inspect=() + + + + # If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' + # file to the list of files to be inspected + default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' ) + + # After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead + skip=1 + + for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" + do + # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern, + # i.e, collect rules that match: + # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument) + # * the other filters, (3-rd argument) + # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument) + readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file") + + candidate_rules=() + # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope + for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}" + do + # Strip all the options and fields we know of, + # than check if there was any field left over + extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//" -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule") + grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule") + done + + if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]] + then + # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules + for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}" + do + rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs) + all_syscalls_found=0 + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + all_syscalls_found=1 + } + done + if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]] + then + # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro + skip=0 + break + fi + + # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it + for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}" + do + if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" + then + file_to_edit=${audit_file} + rule_to_edit=${rule} + rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls} + fi + done + done + else + # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro + if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + skip=0 + fi + fi + + if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then + break + fi + done + + if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then + # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid) + # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group + # the syscall together with an exsiting rule + + # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule + if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ] + then + # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty + if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ] + then + syscall_string="" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + syscall_string+=" -S $syscall" + done + fi + other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true + auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true + full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true + echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file" + chmod o-rwx ${default_file} + else + # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or + # as multiple -S parameters + if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + then + delimiter="," + else + delimiter=" -S " + fi + new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" + for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}" + do + grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || { + # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule + new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}" + } + done + + # Group the syscall in the rule + sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit" + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_stime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for stime syscall for x86 platform + block: + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - stime + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of stime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Reset syscalls found per file + set_fact: + syscalls_per_file: {} + found_paths_dict: {} + + - name: Declare syscalls found per file + set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path + :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}' + + - name: Declare files where syscalls were found + set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten + | map(attribute='path') | list }}" + + - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths + set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item, + 0) }) }}" + loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'') + | list }}' + + - name: Get path with most syscalls + set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value') + | last).key }}" + when: found_paths | length >= 1 + + - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" + when: found_paths | length == 0 + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file] + | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + + - name: Declare list of syscalls + set_fact: + syscalls: + - stime + syscall_grouping: + - adjtimex + - settimeofday + - stime + + - name: Check existence of stime in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit + contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S + |,)\w+)* (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_command + loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}' + + - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules + set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules" + + - name: Declare found syscalls + set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item') + | list }}" + + - name: Declare missing syscalls + set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}" + + - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found | + join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( (?:-k |-F key=)\w+) + line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4 + backrefs: true + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0 + + - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }} + lineinfile: + path: '{{ audit_file }}' + line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F key=audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: o-rwx + state: present + when: syscalls_found | length == 0 + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_stime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter the localtime File + If the auditd daemon is configured to use the +augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), +add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory +/etc/audit/rules.d: +-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl +utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to +/etc/audit/audit.rules file: +-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules +The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can +be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport and +should always be used. + BP28(R73) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.4.1.1 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.7 + CCI-001487 + CCI-000169 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + AU-2(d) + AU-12(c) + AC-6(9) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.4.2.b + 10.6.3 + 10.6.3 + Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate +nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that +are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes +to the system time should be audited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules' +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + + +# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules' +# into the list of files to be inspected +files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules') + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/localtime" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done +# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness +# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows: +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | +# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules | +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +files_to_inspect=() + +# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined +# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection. +# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules' to list of files for inspection. +readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/localtime" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules) + +# For each of the matched entries +for match in "${matches[@]}" +do + # Extract filepath from the match + rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':') + # Append that path into list of files for inspection + files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file") +done +# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet +if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ] +then + # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules' into list of files for inspection + key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules" + # If the audit_time_rules.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions + if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ] + then + touch "$key_rule_file" + chmod 0640 "$key_rule_file" + fi + files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file") +fi + +# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule +# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection +for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}" +do + # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present + if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/localtime" "$audit_rules_file" + then + # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains + # all of the required access type bits + + # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut + sp="[[:space:]]" + # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule + current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file") + # Split required access bits string into characters array + # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time) + for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .) + do + # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check + # if they are already present in current access bits for rule. + # If not, append that bit at the end + if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits" + then + # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit + current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit" + fi + done + # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required + # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule + sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/localtime$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file" + else + # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file + # with proper key + + echo "-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules" >> "$audit_rules_file" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/localtime already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/localtime\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_existing_watch_rules_d + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_time_rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/rules.d + contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_time_rules$ + patterns: '*.rules' + register: find_watch_key + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_time_rules.rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule + set_fact: + all_files: + - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/localtime in /etc/audit/rules.d/ + lineinfile: + path: '{{ all_files[0] }}' + line: -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/localtime already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules + find: + paths: /etc/audit/ + contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/localtime\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+ + patterns: audit.rules + register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Add watch rule for /etc/localtime in /etc/audit/audit.rules + lineinfile: + line: -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules + state: present + dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules + create: true + mode: '0640' + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched + == 0 + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9) + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c) + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.2.b + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3 + - audit_rules_time_watch_localtime + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Data Retention + The audit system writes data to /var/log/audit/audit.log. By default, +auditd rotates 5 logs by size (6MB), retaining a maximum of 30MB of +data in total, and refuses to write entries when the disk is too +full. This minimizes the risk of audit data filling its partition +and impacting other services. This also minimizes the risk of the audit +daemon temporarily disabling the system if it cannot write audit log (which +it can be configured to do). + +For a busy +system or a system which is thoroughly auditing system activity, the default settings +for data retention may be + insufficient. The log file size needed will depend heavily on what types +of events are being audited. First configure auditing to log all the events of +interest. Then monitor the log size manually for awhile to determine what file +size will allow you to keep the required data for the correct time period. + +Using a dedicated partition for /var/log/audit prevents the +auditd logs from disrupting system functionality if they fill, and, +more importantly, prevents other activity in /var from filling the +partition and stopping the audit trail. (The audit logs are size-limited and +therefore unlikely to grow without bound unless configured to do so.) Some +machines may have requirements that no actions occur which cannot be audited. +If this is the case, then auditd can be configured to halt the machine +if it runs out of space. Note: Since older logs are rotated, +configuring auditd this way does not prevent older logs from being +rotated away before they can be viewed. + +If your system is configured to halt when logging cannot be performed, make +sure this can never happen under normal circumstances! Ensure that +/var/log/audit is on its own partition, and that this partition is +larger than the maximum amount of data auditd will retain +normally. + + + Action for audispd to take when disk is full + The setting for disk_full_action in /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf + single + exec + halt + single + suspend + syslog + warn_once + stop + + + Action for audispd to take when network fails + The setting for network_failure_action in /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf + single + exec + halt + single + suspend + syslog + warn_once + stop + ignore + + + Remote server for audispd to send audit records + +The setting for remote_server in /etc/audisp/audisp-remote.conf + logcollector + + + Account for auditd to send email when actions occurs + The setting for action_mail_acct in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + admin + root + root + + + Action for auditd to take when disk space is low + The setting for admin_space_left_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + single + email + exec + halt + single + suspend + syslog + rotate + ignore + + + The percentage remaining in disk space before prompting admin_space_left_action + The setting for admin_space_left as a percentage in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + 5 + 25 + 50 + 75 + 5 + + + Action for auditd to take when disk errors + 'The setting for disk_error_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, if multiple +values are allowed write them separated by pipes as in "syslog|single|halt", +for remediations the first value will be taken' + single + exec + halt + single + suspend + syslog + ignore + syslog|single|halt + syslog|single|halt + + + Action for auditd to take when disk is full + 'The setting for disk_full_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, if multiple +values are allowed write them separated by pipes as in "syslog|single|halt", +for remediations the first value will be taken' + single + exec + halt + single + suspend + syslog + ignore + rotate + syslog|single|halt + syslog|single|halt + + + Auditd priority for flushing data to disk + The setting for flush in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + data + data + incremental + incremental_async + none + sync + + + Number of Record to Retain Before Flushing to Disk + The setting for freq in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + 50 + 100 + 50 + + + Maximum audit log file size for auditd + The setting for max_log_file in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + 1 + 10 + 20 + 5 + 6 + 6 + + + Action for auditd to take when log files reach their maximum size + The setting for max_log_file_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. The following options are available: +ignore - audit daemon does nothing. +syslog - audit daemon will issue a warning to syslog. +suspend - audit daemon will stop writing records to the disk. +rotate - audit daemon will rotate logs in the same convention used by logrotate. +keep_logs - similar to rotate but prevents audit logs to be overwritten. May trigger space_left_action if volume is full. + rotate + keep_logs + rotate + suspend + syslog + ignore + + + Number of log files for auditd to retain + The setting for num_logs in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 10 + 20 + 50 + 100 + 5 + + + Size remaining in disk space before prompting space_left_action + The setting for space_left (MB) in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + 1000 + 100 + 250 + 500 + 750 + 100 + + + Action for auditd to take when disk space just starts to run low + The setting for space_left_action in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + email + email + exec + halt + single + suspend + syslog + rotate + ignore + + + The percentage remaining in disk space before prompting space_left_action + The setting for space_left as a percentage in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + 25 + 50 + 75 + 25 + + + Configure a Sufficiently Large Partition for Audit Logs + The Oracle Linux 9 operating system must allocate audit record storage +capacity to store at least one weeks worth of audit records when audit +records are not immediately sent to a central audit record storage +facility. + +The partition size needed to capture a week's worth of audit records is +based on the activity level of the system and the total storage capacity +available. In normal circumstances, 10.0 GB of storage space for audit +records will be sufficient. + +Determine which partition the audit records are being written to with the +following command: + +$ sudo grep log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf +log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log + +Check the size of the partition that audit records are written to with the +following command: + +$ sudo df -h /var/log/audit/ +/dev/sda2 24G 10.4G 13.6G 43% /var/log/audit + CCI-001849 + SRG-OS-000341-GPOS-00132 + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental +deletion or alteration. Off-loading is a common process in information +systems with limited audit storage capacity. + + + + + + + Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog plugin + To configure the auditd service to use the +syslog plug-in of the audispd audit event multiplexor, set +the active line in /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf to yes. +Restart the auditd service: +$ sudo service auditd restart + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000136 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.308(a)(6)(ii) + 164.308(a)(8) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 164.312(b) + 164.314(a)(2)(i)(C) + 164.314(a)(2)(iii) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + AU-4(1) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + Req-10.5.3 + 10.3.3 + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + The auditd service does not include the ability to send audit +records to a centralized server for management directly. It does, however, +include a plug-in for audit event multiplexor (audispd) to pass audit records +to the local syslog server. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_syslog_active="yes" + +AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG=/etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^active") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_syslog_active" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^active\\>" "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^active\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" +else + if [[ -s "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDISP_SYSLOGCONFIG" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.3 + - auditd_audispd_syslog_plugin_activated + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Enable syslog plugin + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf + regexp: ^active + line: active = yes + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.3 + - auditd_audispd_syslog_plugin_activated + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when there is a disk error. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, +substituting ACTION appropriately: +disk_error_action = ACTION +Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user +mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, +exec, single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability +outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be +determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the +auditd.conf man page. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000140 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 + Taking appropriate action in case of disk errors will minimize the possibility of +losing audit records. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_disk_error_action='' + + +# +# If disk_error_action present in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, change value +# to var_auditd_disk_error_action, else +# add "disk_error_action = $var_auditd_disk_error_action" to /etc/audit/auditd.conf +# +var_auditd_disk_error_action="$(echo $var_auditd_disk_error_action | cut -d \| -f 1)" + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_error_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_error_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_error_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_error_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_error_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_error_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_disk_error_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: disk_error_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_error_action.split('|')[0] }} + regexp: ^\s*disk_error_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_error_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when there is a disk error. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, +substituting ACTION appropriately: +disk_error_action = ACTION +Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user +mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, +exec, single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability +outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be +determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the +auditd.conf man page. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000140 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 + Taking appropriate action in case of disk errors will minimize the possibility of +losing audit records. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_disk_error_action='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_error_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_error_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_error_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_error_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_error_action_stig + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_error_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_disk_error_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: disk_error_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_error_action }} + regexp: ^\s*disk_error_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_error_action_stig + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, +substituting ACTION appropriately: +disk_full_action = ACTION +Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user +mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, + +exec, + +single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability +outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be +determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the +auditd.conf man page. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000140 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 + Taking appropriate action in case of a filled audit storage volume will minimize +the possibility of losing audit records. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_disk_full_action='' + + +var_auditd_disk_full_action="$(echo $var_auditd_disk_full_action | cut -d \| -f 1)" + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_full_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_full_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_full_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_full_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_full_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_full_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_disk_full_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: disk_full_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_full_action.split('|')[0] }} + regexp: ^\s*disk_full_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_full_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, +substituting ACTION appropriately: +disk_full_action = ACTION +Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single-user +mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include syslog, +single, and halt. For certain systems, the need for availability +outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be +determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the +auditd.conf man page. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000140 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 + Taking appropriate action in case of a filled audit storage volume will minimize +the possibility of losing audit records. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_disk_full_action='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^disk_full_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_disk_full_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^disk_full_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^disk_full_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_full_action_stig + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_disk_full_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_disk_full_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: disk_full_action = {{ var_auditd_disk_full_action }} + regexp: ^\s*disk_full_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_disk_full_action_stig + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space + The auditd service can be configured to send email to +a designated account in certain situations. Add or correct the following line +in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to ensure that administrators are notified +via email for those situations: +action_mail_acct = + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000139 + CCI-001855 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + CIP-003-8 R1.3 + CIP-003-8 R3 + CIP-003-8 R3.1 + CIP-003-8 R3.2 + CIP-003-8 R3.3 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + IA-5(1) + AU-5(a) + AU-5(2) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7.a + 10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 + SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 + Email sent to the root account is typically aliased to the +administrators of the system, who can take appropriate action. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_action_mail_acct='' + + +AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^action_mail_acct") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_action_mail_acct" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^action_mail_acct\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^action_mail_acct\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" +else + if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7.a + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_action_mail_acct + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_action_mail_acct # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_action_mail_acct: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: action_mail_acct = {{ var_auditd_action_mail_acct }} + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7.a + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_action_mail_acct + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, +substituting ACTION appropriately: +admin_space_left_action = ACTION +Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single user +mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include suspend and +halt. For certain systems, the need for availability +outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be +determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the +auditd.conf man page. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-000140 + CCI-001343 + CCI-001855 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + 10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 + Administrators should be made aware of an inability to record +audit records. If a separate partition or logical volume of adequate size +is used, running low on space for audit records should never occur. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_admin_space_left_action='' + + +AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^admin_space_left_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_admin_space_left_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^admin_space_left_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^admin_space_left_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" +else + if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_admin_space_left_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_admin_space_left_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: admin_space_left_action = {{ var_auditd_admin_space_left_action }} + regexp: ^\s*admin_space_left_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, +substituting PERCENTAGE appropriately: +admin_space_left = PERCENTAGE% +Set this value to +to cause the system to perform an action. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-001855 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 + Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may allow them to +take corrective action prior to any disruption. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage='' + + +grep -q "^admin_space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$" /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \ + sed -i "s/^admin_space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$/admin_space_left = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage%/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf || \ + echo "admin_space_left = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage%" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_percentage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: admin_space_left = {{ var_auditd_admin_space_left_percentage }}% + regexp: ^\s*admin_space_left\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_percentage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd flush priority + The auditd service can be configured to +synchronously write audit event data to disk. Add or correct the following +line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to ensure that audit event data is +fully synchronized with the log files on the disk: +flush = + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-001576 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.312(a)(2)(i) + 164.312(b) + 164.312(d) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AU-11 + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Audit data should be synchronously written to disk to ensure +log integrity. These parameters assure that all audit event data is fully +synchronized with the log files on the disk. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_flush='' + + +AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf + +# if flush is present, flush param edited to var_auditd_flush +# else flush param is defined by var_auditd_flush +# +# the freq param is only used for values 'incremental' and 'incremental_async' and will be +# commented out if flush != incremental or flush != incremental_async +# +# if flush == incremental or flush == incremental_async && freq param is not defined, it +# will be defined as the package-default value of 20 + +grep -q ^flush $AUDITCONFIG && \ + sed -i 's/^flush.*/flush = '"$var_auditd_flush"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG +if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "flush = $var_auditd_flush" >> $AUDITCONFIG +fi + +if ! [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental" ] && ! [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental_async" ]; then + sed -i 's/^freq/##freq/g' $AUDITCONFIG +elif [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental" ] || [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental_async" ]; then + grep -q freq $AUDITCONFIG && \ + sed -i 's/^#\+freq/freq/g' $AUDITCONFIG + if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "freq = 20" >> $AUDITCONFIG + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_retention_flush + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_flush # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_flush: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd Flush Priority + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + regexp: ^\s*flush\s*=\s*.*$ + line: flush = {{ var_auditd_flush }} + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - auditd_data_retention_flush + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Max Log File Size + Determine the amount of audit data (in megabytes) +which should be retained in each log file. Edit the file +/etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, substituting +the correct value of for STOREMB: +max_log_file = STOREMB +Set the value to 6 (MB) or higher for general-purpose systems. +Larger values, of course, +support retention of even more audit data. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AU-11 + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + 10.5.1 + The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain +log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum +log file size and the number of logs retained. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_max_log_file='' + + +AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^max_log_file") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_max_log_file" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^max_log_file\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^max_log_file\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" +else + if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_max_log_file # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_max_log_file: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd Max Log File Size + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + regexp: ^\s*max_log_file\s*=\s*.*$ + line: max_log_file = {{ var_auditd_max_log_file }} + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size +is to rotate the log files, discarding the oldest one. To configure the action taken +by auditd, add or correct the line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf: +max_log_file_action = ACTION +Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man +page. These include: +ignoresyslogsuspendrotatekeep_logs +Set the ACTION to rotate to ensure log rotation +occurs. This is the default. The setting is case-insensitive. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000140 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + 10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 + Automatically rotating logs (by setting this to rotate) +minimizes the chances of the system unexpectedly running out of disk space by +being overwhelmed with log data. However, for systems that must never discard +log data, or which use external processes to transfer it and reclaim space, +keep_logs can be employed. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_max_log_file_action='' + + +AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^max_log_file_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_max_log_file_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^max_log_file_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^max_log_file_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" +else + if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_max_log_file_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_max_log_file_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: max_log_file_action = {{ var_auditd_max_log_file_action }} + regexp: ^\s*max_log_file_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size +is to rotate the log files, discarding the oldest one. To configure the action taken +by auditd, add or correct the line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf: +max_log_file_action = ACTION +Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man +page. These include: +ignoresyslogsuspendrotatekeep_logs +Set the ACTION to rotate to ensure log rotation +occurs. This is the default. The setting is case-insensitive. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000140 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + 10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023 + Automatically rotating logs (by setting this to rotate) +minimizes the chances of the system unexpectedly running out of disk space by +being overwhelmed with log data. However, for systems that must never discard +log data, or which use external processes to transfer it and reclaim space, +keep_logs can be employed. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_max_log_file_action='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^max_log_file_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_max_log_file_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^max_log_file_action\\>" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^max_log_file_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_stig + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_max_log_file_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_max_log_file_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: max_log_file_action = {{ var_auditd_max_log_file_action }} + regexp: ^\s*max_log_file_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_stig + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained + Determine how many log files +auditd should retain when it rotates logs. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following +line, substituting NUMLOGS with the correct value of : +num_logs = NUMLOGS +Set the value to 5 for general-purpose systems. +Note that values less than 2 result in no log rotation. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + BAI03.05 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AU-11 + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + 10.5.1 + The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain +log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum log +file size and the number of logs retained. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_num_logs='' + + +AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^num_logs") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_num_logs" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^num_logs\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^num_logs\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" +else + if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_num_logs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_num_logs # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_num_logs: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: num_logs = {{ var_auditd_num_logs }} + regexp: ^\s*num_logs\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-11 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_num_logs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when disk space starts to run low. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Modify the following line, +substituting ACTION appropriately: +space_left_action = ACTION +Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. +These include: +syslogemailexecsuspendsinglehalt +Set this to email (instead of the default, +which is suspend) as it is more likely to get prompt attention. Acceptable values +also include suspend, single, and halt. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 5.4.1.1 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 3.3.1 + CCI-001855 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + 10.5.1 + SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 + Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may +allow them to take corrective action prior to any disruption. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_space_left_action='' + + +# +# If space_left_action present in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, change value +# to var_auditd_space_left_action, else +# add "space_left_action = $var_auditd_space_left_action" to /etc/audit/auditd.conf +# + +AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^space_left_action") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_space_left_action" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^space_left_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^space_left_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG" +else + if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_space_left_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_space_left_action # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_space_left_action: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: space_left_action = {{ var_auditd_space_left_action }} + regexp: ^\s*space_left_action\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.4.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.3.1 + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - auditd_data_retention_space_left_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space + The auditd service can be configured to take an action +when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely. +Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Add or modify the following line, +substituting PERCENTAGE appropriately: +space_left = PERCENTAGE% +Set this value to at least 25 to cause the system to +notify the user of an issue. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 19 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + APO11.04 + APO12.06 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + BAI08.02 + DSS02.02 + DSS02.04 + DSS02.07 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-001855 + 4.2.3.10 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.3.4.5.6 + 4.3.4.5.7 + 4.3.4.5.8 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.16.1.4 + A.16.1.5 + A.16.1.7 + A.17.2.1 + AU-5(b) + AU-5(2) + AU-5(1) + AU-5(4) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-3 + DE.AE-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + RS.AN-1 + RS.AN-4 + Req-10.7 + SRG-OS-000343-GPOS-00134 + Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may allow them to +take corrective action prior to any disruption. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +var_auditd_space_left_percentage='' + + +grep -q "^space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$" /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \ + sed -i "s/^space_left[[:space:]]*=.*$/space_left = $var_auditd_space_left_percentage%/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf || \ + echo "space_left = $var_auditd_space_left_percentage%" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - auditd_data_retention_space_left_percentage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_space_left_percentage # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_auditd_space_left_percentage: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + line: space_left = {{ var_auditd_space_left_percentage }}% + regexp: ^\s*space_left\s*=\s*.*$ + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - auditd_data_retention_space_left_percentage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs + To configure Audit daemon to issue an explicit flush to disk command +after writing records, set freq to +in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. + CM-6 + FAU_GEN.1 + SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 + If option freq isn't set to , the flush to disk +may happen after higher number of records, increasing the danger +of audit loss. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*freq\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + +cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "freq = 50" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_freq + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*freq\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*freq\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*freq\s*=\s* + line: freq = 50 + state: present + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_freq + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Include Local Events in Audit Logs + To configure Audit daemon to include local events in Audit logs, set +local_events to yes in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. +This is the default setting. + CCI-000366 + CM-6 + FAU_GEN.1 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If option local_events isn't set to yes only events from +network will be aggregated. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*local_events\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + +cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "local_events = yes" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_local_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Include Local Events in Audit Logs + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*local_events\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*local_events\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*local_events\s*=\s* + line: local_events = yes + state: present + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_local_events + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Resolve information before writing to audit logs + To configure Audit daemon to resolve all uid, gid, syscall, +architecture, and socket address information before writing the +events to disk, set log_format to ENRICHED +in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. + CCI-000366 + CM-6 + AU-3 + FAU_GEN.1.2 + SRG-OS-000255-GPOS-00096 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If option log_format isn't set to ENRICHED, the +audit records will be stored in a format exactly as the kernel sends them. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*log_format\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + +cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "log_format = ENRICHED" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_log_format + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Resolve information before writing to audit logs + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*log_format\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*log_format\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*log_format\s*=\s* + line: log_format = ENRICHED + state: present + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_log_format + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Set hostname as computer node name in audit logs + To configure Audit daemon to use value returned by gethostname +syscall as computer node name in the audit events, +set name_format to hostname +in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. + CCI-001851 + CM-6 + AU-3 + FAU_GEN.1.2 + SRG-OS-000039-GPOS-00017 + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + If option name_format is left at its default value of +none, audit events from different computers may be hard +to distinguish. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*name_format\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + +cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "name_format = hostname" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_name_format + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set hostname as computer node name in audit logs + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*name_format\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*name_format\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*name_format\s*=\s* + line: name_format = hostname + state: present + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_name_format + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full + The audit system should have an action setup in the event the internal event queue becomes full. +To setup an overflow action edit /etc/audit/auditd.conf. Set overflow_action +to one of the following values: syslog, single, halt. + CCI-001851 + AU-4(1) + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + The audit system should have an action setup in the event the internal event queue becomes full +so that no data is lost. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + +cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "overflow_action = syslog" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - auditd_overflow_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*overflow_action\s*=\s* + line: overflow_action = syslog + state: present + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - auditd_overflow_action + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Write Audit Logs to the Disk + To configure Audit daemon to write Audit logs to the disk, set +write_logs to yes in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. +This is the default setting. + CM-6 + FAU_STG.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If write_logs isn't set to yes, the Audit logs will +not be written to the disk. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q audit; then + +if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*write_logs\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +else + touch "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" + +cp "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "write_logs = yes" >> "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/audit/auditd.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_write_logs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Write Audit Logs to the Disk + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*write_logs\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*write_logs\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/audit/auditd.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*write_logs\s*=\s* + line: write_logs = yes + state: present + when: + - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - auditd_write_logs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + System Accounting with auditd + The auditd program can perform comprehensive +monitoring of system activity. This section makes use of recommended +configuration settings for specific policies or use cases. +The rules in this section make use of rules defined in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION/rules. + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file accesses + Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to access a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + 0582 + 0584 + 05885 + 0586 + 0846 + 0957 + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful attempts to access a file might be signs of malicious activity happening within the system. Auditing of such activities helps in their monitoring and investigation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules +## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules + content: | + ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_access_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_access_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file accesses + Ensure that successful attempts to access a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + 0582 + 0584 + 05885 + 0586 + 0846 + 0957 + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Auditing of successful attempts to access a file helps in investigation of activities performed on the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules +## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules + content: | + ## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. + ## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_access_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_access_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure basic parameters of Audit system + Perform basic configuration of Audit system. +Make sure that any previously defined rules are cleared, the auditing system is configured to handle sudden bursts of events, and in cases of failure, messages are configured to be directed to system log. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## First rule - delete all +-D + +## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. +## Make this bigger for busy systems +-b 8192 + +## This determine how long to wait in burst of events +--backlog_wait_time 60000 + +## Set failure mode to syslog +-f 1 + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + It might happen that Audit buffer configured by this rule is not large enough for certain use cases. If that is the case, the buffer size can be overridden by placing -b larger_buffer_size into a file within /etc/audit/rules.d directory, replacing larger_file_size with the desired value. The file name should start with a number higher than 10 and lower than 99. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1 + SRG-OS-000365-GPOS-00152 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + Without basic configurations, audit may not perform as expected. It may not be able to correctly handle events under stressful conditions, or log events in case of failure. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules +## First rule - delete all +-D + +## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. +## Make this bigger for busy systems +-b 8192 + +## This determine how long to wait in burst of events +--backlog_wait_time 60000 + +## Set failure mode to syslog +-f 1 + +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules + content: |+ + ## First rule - delete all + -D + + ## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. + ## Make this bigger for busy systems + -b 8192 + + ## This determine how long to wait in burst of events + --backlog_wait_time 60000 + + ## Set failure mode to syslog + -f 1 + + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_basic_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_basic_configuration + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file creations + Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to create a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful file creations might be a sign of a malicious action being performed on the system. Keeping log of such events helps in monitoring and investigation of such actions. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules +## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules + content: | + ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_create_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_create_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file creations + Ensure that successful attempts to create a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Auditing of successful attempts to create a file helps in investigation of actions which happened on the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules +## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules + content: | + ## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_create_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_create_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file deletions + Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to delete a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Unsuccessful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Unsuccessful attempts to delete a file might be signs of malicious activities. Auditing of such events help in monitoring and investigating of such activities. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules +## Unsuccessful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules + content: | + ## Unsuccessful file delete + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_delete_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_delete_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file deletions + Ensure that successful attempts to delete a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Successful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212 + Auditing of successful attempts to delete a file may help in monitoring and investigation of activities performed on the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules +## Successful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules + content: | + ## Successful file delete + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_delete_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_delete_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure immutable Audit login UIDs + Configure kernel to prevent modification of login UIDs once they are set. +Changing login UIDs while this configuration is enforced requires special capabilities which +are not available to unprivileged users. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. +--loginuid-immutable + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + CCI-000162 + CCI-000163 + CCI-000164 + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.2 + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027 + SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028 + SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029 + If modification of login UIDs is not prevented, they can be changed by unprivileged users and +make auditing complicated or impossible. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules +## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. +--loginuid-immutable + +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules + content: |+ + ## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. + --loginuid-immutable + + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_immutable_login_uids + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_immutable_login_uids + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file modifications + Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to modify a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Unsuccessful file modifications might be a sign of a malicious action being performed on the system. Auditing of such events helps in detection and investigation of such actions. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules +## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules + content: | + ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_modify_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_modify_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file modifications + Ensure that successful attempts to modify a file are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205 + Auditing of successful attempts to modify a file helps in investigation of actions which happened on the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules +## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules according + to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules + content: | + ## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_modify_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_modify_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of loading and unloading of kernel modules + Ensure that loading and unloading of kernel modules is audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring +## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216 + SRG-OS-000477-GPOS-00222 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + Loading of a malicious kernel module introduces a risk to the system, as the module has access to sensitive data and perform actions at the operating system kernel level. Having such events audited helps in monitoring and investigating of malicious activities. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules +## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring +## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules + content: | + ## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring + ## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_module_load + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_module_load + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Perform general configuration of Audit for OSPP + Configure some basic Audit parameters specific for OSPP profile. +In particular, configure Audit to watch for direct modification of files storing system user and group information, and usage of applications with special rights which can change system configuration. +Further audited events include access to audit log it self, attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information, and attempts to modify MAC controls. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating +## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having +## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: +## +## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules +## +## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ + + +## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and +## shadow for writes +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + +## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and +## gshadow for writes +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify + + +## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid +## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because +## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + +## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes + +## Audit log access +-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail +## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information +-a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session + +## Attempts to modify MAC controls +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy + +## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. + +## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd + +## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules + +## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement +## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to +## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by +## that daemon. + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004 + SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091 + SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221 + SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089 + SRG-OS-000274-GPOS-00104 + SRG-OS-000275-GPOS-00105 + SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120 + SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121 + Auditing of events listed in the description provides data for monitoring and investigation of potentially malicious events e.g. tampering with Audit logs, malicious access to files storing information about system users and groups etc. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules +## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating +## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having +## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: +## +## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules +## +## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ + + +## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and +## shadow for writes +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + +## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and +## gshadow for writes +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify + + +## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid +## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because +## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + +## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes + +## Audit log access +-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail +## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information +-a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session + +## Attempts to modify MAC controls +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy + +## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. + +## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd + +## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules + +## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement +## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to +## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by +## that daemon. + +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules + content: |+ + ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating + ## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having + ## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: + ## + ## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, + ## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules + ## + ## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ + + + ## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could + ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and + ## shadow for writes + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + + ## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. + + ## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could + ## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and + ## gshadow for writes + -a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + -a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify + -a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify + + + ## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid + ## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because + ## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + + ## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. + + ## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. + -a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes + -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes + + ## Audit log access + -a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail + ## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information + -a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session + -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session + -a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session + + ## Attempts to modify MAC controls + -a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy + + ## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. + + ## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd + + ## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules + + ## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement + ## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to + ## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by + ## that daemon. + + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_ospp_general + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_ospp_general + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful ownership changes + Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to change an ownership of files or directories are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Unsuccessful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + Unsuccessful attempts to change an ownership of files or directories might be signs of a malicious activity. Having such events audited helps in monitoring and investigation of such activities. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules +## Unsuccessful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules + according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules + content: | + ## Unsuccessful ownership change + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_owner_change_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_owner_change_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful ownership changes + Ensure that successful attempts to change an ownership of files or directories are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Successful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + Auditing of successful ownership changes of files or directories helps in monitoring or investingating of activities performed on the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules +## Successful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules + according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules + content: | + ## Successful ownership change + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_owner_change_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_owner_change_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful permission changes + Ensure that unsuccessful attempts to change file or directory permissions are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Unsuccessful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + Unsuccessful attempts to change permissions of files or directories might be signs of malicious activity. Having such events audited helps in monitoring and investigation of such activities. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules +## Unsuccessful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules + according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules + content: | + ## Unsuccessful permission change + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_perm_change_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_perm_change_failed + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful permission changes + Ensure that successful attempts to modify permissions of files or directories are audited. + +The following rules configure audit as described above: +## Successful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change + +Load new Audit rules into kernel by running: +augenrules --load + +Note: This rule uses a special set of Audit rules to comply with OSPP 4.2.1. You may reuse this rule in different profiles. If you decide to do so, it is recommended that you inspect contents of the file closely and make sure that they are alligned with your needs. + AU-2(a) + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206 + SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207 + SRG-OS-000465-GPOS-00209 + SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219 + SRG-OS-000475-GPOS-00220 + SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210 + SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033 + Auditing successful file or directory permission changes helps in monitoring and investigating of activities performed on the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +cat << 'EOF' > /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules +## Successful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change +EOF + +chmod o-rwx /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules + +augenrules --load + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Put contents into /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules + according to policy + copy: + dest: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules + content: | + ## Successful permission change + -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change + -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_perm_change_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove any permissions from other group + file: + path: /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules + mode: o-rwx + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-2(a) + - audit_perm_change_success + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + AppArmor + Many security vulnerabilities result from bugs in trusted programs. A trusted +program runs with privileges that attackers want to possess. The program fails +to keep that trust if there is a bug in the program that allows the attacker to +acquire said privilege. + +AppArmor® is an application security solution designed specifically to apply +privilege confinement to suspect programs. AppArmor allows the administrator to +specify the domain of activities the program can perform by developing a +security profile. A security profile is a listing of files that the program may +access and the operations the program may perform. AppArmor secures +applications by enforcing good application behavior without relying on attack +signatures, so it can prevent attacks even if previously unknown +vulnerabilities are being exploited. + + + AppArmor profiles mode + enforce - Set all AppArmor profiles to enforce mode +complain - Set all AppArmor profiles to complain mode + enforce + complain + enforce + + + + GRUB2 bootloader configuration + During the boot process, the boot loader is +responsible for starting the execution of the kernel and passing +options to it. The boot loader allows for the selection of +different kernels - possibly on different partitions or media. +The default Oracle Linux 9 boot loader for x86 systems is called GRUB2. +Options it can pass to the kernel include single-user mode, which +provides root access without any authentication, and the ability to +disable SELinux. To prevent local users from modifying the boot +parameters and endangering security, protect the boot loader configuration +with a password and ensure its configuration file's permissions +are set properly. + + + L1TF vulnerability mitigation + Defines the L1TF vulneratility mitigations to employ. + flush + full + full,force + flush + flush,nosmt + flush,nowarn + + + MDS vulnerability mitigation + Defines the MDS vulneratility mitigation to employ. + full + full + full,nosmt + + + Confidence level on Hardware Random Number Generator + Defines the level of trust on the hardware random number generators available in the +system and the percentage of entropy to credit. + 500 + 500 + 512 + 1000 + + + Spec Store Bypass Mitigation + This controls how the Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) vulnerability is mitigated. + prctl + on + auto + prctl + seccomp + + + Disable Recovery Booting + Oracle Linux 9 systems support an "recovery boot" option that can be used +to prevent services from being started. The GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY +configuration option in /etc/default/grub should be set to +true to disable the generation of recovery mode menu entries. It is +also required to change the runtime configuration, run: +$ sudo grubby --update-kernel=ALL + FIA_UAU.1 + Using recovery boot, the console user could disable auditing, firewalls, +or other services, weakening system security. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; then + +if grep -q '^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*' '/etc/default/grub' ; then + sed -i 's/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.*/GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true/' "/etc/default/grub" +else + echo "GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true" >> '/etc/default/grub' +fi + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_disable_recovery + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Verify GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true + lineinfile: + path: /etc/default/grub + regexp: ^GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=.* + line: GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true + state: present + when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - grub2_disable_recovery + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL + when: '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - grub2_disable_recovery + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + IOMMU configuration directive + On x86 architecture supporting VT-d, the IOMMU manages the access control policy between the hardware devices and some + of the system critical units such as the memory. +To ensure that iommu=force is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add iommu=force to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... iommu=force ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="iommu=force" + Depending on the hardware, devices and operating system used, enabling IOMMU can cause hardware instabilities. Proper function and stability should be assessed before applying remediation to production systems. + BP28(R11) + On x86 architectures, activating the I/OMMU prevents the system from arbitrary accesses potentially made by + hardware devices. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=iommu=force + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_enable_iommu_force + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + - unknown_severity + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="iommu=force" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_enable_iommu_force + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + - unknown_severity + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "iommu=force" + + + + + + + + + + Configure kernel to zero out memory before allocation + To configure the kernel to zero out memory before allocating it, add the +init_on_alloc=1 argument to the default GRUB 2 command line. +To ensure that init_on_alloc=1 is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add init_on_alloc=1 to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... init_on_alloc=1 ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="init_on_alloc=1" + When the kernel configuration option init_on_alloc is enabled, +all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, +eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, effectively +preventing data leaks. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=init_on_alloc=1 + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_init_on_alloc_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="init_on_alloc=1" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_init_on_alloc_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "init_on_alloc=1" + + + + + + + + + + Configure L1 Terminal Fault mitigations + L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged +speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache when +the page table entry isn't present. + +Select the appropriate mitigation by adding the argument +l1tf= to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that l1tf= is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add l1tf= to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... l1tf= ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="l1tf=" + +Since Linux Kernel 4.19 you can check the L1TF vulnerability state with the +following command: +cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf + Enabling L1TF mitigations may impact performance of the system. + BP28(R8) + The L1TF vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass memory access security controls imposed +by the system or hypervisor. The L1TF vulnerability allows read access to any physical memory +location that is cached in the L1 Data Cache. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +var_l1tf_options='' + + + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=l1tf=$var_l1tf_options + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_l1tf_argument + - high_severity + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_l1tf_options # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_l1tf_options: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="l1tf={{ var_l1tf_options }}" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_l1tf_argument + - high_severity + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "l1tf=" + + + + + + + + + + + Force kernel panic on uncorrected MCEs + A Machine Check Exception is an error generated by the CPU itdetects an error +in itself, memory or I/O devices. +These errors may be corrected and generate a check log entry, if an error +cannot be corrected the kernel may panic or SIGBUS. + +To force the kernel to panic on any uncorrected error reported by Machine Check +set the MCE tolerance to zero by adding mce=0 +to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that mce=0 is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add mce=0 to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... mce=0 ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="mce=0" + BP28(R8) + Allowing uncorrected errors to result on a SIGBUS may allow an attacker to continue +trying to exploit a vulnerability such as Rowhammer. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=mce=0 + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_mce_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="mce=0" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_mce_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "mce=0" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SMAP is not disabled during boot + The SMAP is used to prevent the supervisor mode from unintentionally reading/writing into +memory pages in the user space, it is enabled by default since Linux kernel 3.7. +But it could be disabled through kernel boot parameters. + +Ensure that Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is not disabled by +the nosmap boot paramenter option. + +Check that the line GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="..." within /etc/default/grub +doesn't contain the argument nosmap. +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels: +# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmap" + BP28(R1) + Disabling SMAP can facilitate exploitation of vulnerabilities caused by unintended access and +manipulation of data in the user space. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args=nosmap + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_nosmap_argument_absent + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmap" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_nosmap_argument_absent + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SMEP is not disabled during boot + The SMEP is used to prevent the supervisor mode from executing user space code, +it is enabled by default since Linux kernel 3.0. But it could be disabled through +kernel boot parameters. + +Ensure that Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP) is not disabled by +the nosmep boot paramenter option. + +Check that the line GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="..." within /etc/default/grub +doesn't contain the argument nosmep. +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels: +# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmep" + BP28(R1) + Disabling SMEP can facilitate exploitation of certain vulnerabilities because it allows +the kernel to unintentionally execute code in less privileged memory space. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args=nosmep + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_nosmep_argument_absent + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="nosmep" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_nosmep_argument_absent + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Enable randomization of the page allocator + To enable randomization of the page allocator in the kernel, add the +page_alloc.shuffle=1 argument to the default GRUB 2 command line. +To ensure that page_alloc.shuffle=1 is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add page_alloc.shuffle=1 to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... page_alloc.shuffle=1 ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_alloc.shuffle=1" + The CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR config option is primarily +focused on improving the average utilization of a direct-mapped +memory-side-cache. Aside of this performance effect, it also reduces +predictability of page allocations in situations when the bad actor can +crash the system and somehow leverage knowledge of (page) allocation order +right after a fresh reboot, or can control the timing between a +hot-pluggable memory node (as in NUMA node) and applications allocating +memory ouf of that node. The page_alloc.shuffle=1 kernel command +line parameter then forces this functionality irrespectively of memory cache +architecture. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=page_alloc.shuffle=1 + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_page_alloc_shuffle_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_alloc.shuffle=1" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_page_alloc_shuffle_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "page_alloc.shuffle=1" + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) + To enable Kernel page-table isolation, +add the argument pti=on to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that pti=on is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add pti=on to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... pti=on ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="pti=on" + BP28(R8) + CCI-000381 + SI-16 + SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00193 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + Kernel page-table isolation is a kernel feature that mitigates +the Meltdown security vulnerability and hardens the kernel +against attempts to bypass kernel address space layout +randomization (KASLR). + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=pti=on + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SI-16 + - grub2_pti_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="pti=on" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SI-16 + - grub2_pti_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "pti=on" + + + + + + + + + + Configure the confidence in TPM for entropy + The TPM security chip that is available in most modern systems has a hardware RNG. +It is also used to feed the entropy pool, but generally not credited entropy. + +Use rng_core.default_quality in the kernel command line to set the trust +level on the hardware generators. The trust level defines the amount of entropy to credit. +A value of 0 tells the system not to trust the hardware random number generators +available, and doesn't credit any entropy to the pool. +A value of 1000 assigns full confidence in the generators, and credits all the +entropy it provides to the pool. + +Note that the value of rng_core.default_quality is global, affecting the trust +on all hardware random number generators. + +Select the appropriate confidence by adding the argument +rng_core.default_quality= to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that rng_core.default_quality= is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add rng_core.default_quality= to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... rng_core.default_quality= ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="rng_core.default_quality=" + BP28(R8) + A system may struggle to initialize its entropy pool and end up starving. Crediting entropy +from the hardware number generators available in the system helps fill up the entropy pool. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +var_rng_core_default_quality='' + + + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=rng_core.default_quality=$var_rng_core_default_quality + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_rng_core_default_quality_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_rng_core_default_quality # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_rng_core_default_quality: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="rng_core.default_quality={{ var_rng_core_default_quality + }}" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_rng_core_default_quality_argument + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "rng_core.default_quality=" + + + + + + + + + + + Disable merging of slabs with similar size + The kernel may merge similar slabs together to reduce overhead and increase +cache hotness of objects. +Disabling merging of slabs keeps the slabs separate and reduces the risk of +kernel heap overflows overwriting objects in merged caches. + +To disable merging of slabs in the Kernel add the argument slab_nomerge=yes +to the default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that slab_nomerge=yes is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add slab_nomerge=yes to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... slab_nomerge=yes ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slab_nomerge=yes" + Disabling merge of slabs will slightly increase kernel memory utilization. + BP28(R8) + Disabling the merge of slabs of similar sizes prevents the kernel from +merging a seemingly useless but vulnerable slab with a useful and valuable slab. +This increase the risk that a heap overflow could overwrite objects from merged caches, +with unmerged caches the heap overflow would only affect the objects in the same cache. +Overall, this reduces the kernel attack surface area by isolating slabs from each other. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=slab_nomerge=yes + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_slab_nomerge_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slab_nomerge=yes" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_slab_nomerge_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "slab_nomerge=yes" + + + + + + + + + + Configure Speculative Store Bypass Mitigation + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a common wide industry wide performance +optimization known as Speculative Store Bypass (SSB). + +In such cases, recent stores to the same memory location cannot always be observed by later +loads during speculative execution. However, such stores are unlikely and thus they can be +detected prior to instruction retirement at the end of a particular speculation execution +window. + +Since Linux Kernel 4.17 you can check the SSB mitigation state with the following command: +cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass + +Select the appropriate SSB state by adding the argument +spec_store_bypass_disable= to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that spec_store_bypass_disable= is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add spec_store_bypass_disable= to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... spec_store_bypass_disable= ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spec_store_bypass_disable=" + Disabling Speculative Store Bypass may impact performance of the system. + BP28(R8) + In vulnerable processsors, the speculatively forwarded store can be used in a cache side channel +attack. An example of this is reading memory to which the attacker does not directly have access, +for example inside the sandboxed code. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options='' + + + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=spec_store_bypass_disable=$var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_spec_store_bypass_disable_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spec_store_bypass_disable={{ var_spec_store_bypass_disable_options + }}" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_spec_store_bypass_disable_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "spec_store_bypass_disable=" + + + + + + + + + + + Enforce Spectre v2 mitigation + Spectre V2 is an indirect branch poisoning attack that can lead to data leakage. +An exploit for Spectre V2 tricks the indirect branch predictor into executing +code from a future indirect branch chosen by the attacker, even if the privilege +level is different. + +Since Linux Kernel 4.15 you can check the Spectre V2 mitigation state with the following command: +cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 + +Enforce the Spectre V2 mitigation by adding the argument +spectre_v2=on to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that spectre_v2=on) is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add spectre_v2=on) to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... spectre_v2=on) ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spectre_v2=on)" + BP28(R8) + The Spectre V2 vulnerability allows an attacker to read memory that he should not have +access to. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=spectre_v2=on + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_spectre_v2_argument + - high_severity + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="spectre_v2=on" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_spectre_v2_argument + - high_severity + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "spectre_v2=on" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled during boot + systemd's debug-shell service is intended to +diagnose systemd related boot issues with various systemctl +commands. Once enabled and following a system reboot, the root shell +will be available on tty9 which is access by pressing +CTRL-ALT-F9. The debug-shell service should only be used +for systemd related issues and should otherwise be disabled. + +By default, the debug-shell systemd service is already disabled. + +Ensure the debug-shell is not enabled by the systemd.debug-shel=1 +boot paramenter option. + +Check that the line GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="..." within /etc/default/grub +doesn't contain the argument systemd.debug-shell=1. +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels: +# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.debug-shell" + FIA_UAU.1 + This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security +on the machine through valid troubleshooting configurations and gaining root +access when the system is rebooted. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args=systemd.debug-shell + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - grub2_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.debug-shell" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - grub2_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable vsyscalls + To disable use of virtual syscalls, +add the argument vsyscall=none to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that vsyscall=none is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add vsyscall=none to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... vsyscall=none ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="vsyscall=none" + CCI-001084 + CM-7(a) + FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 + Virtual Syscalls provide an opportunity of attack for a user who has control +of the return instruction pointer. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=vsyscall=none + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - grub2_vsyscall_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="vsyscall=none" + when: + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - grub2_vsyscall_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "vsyscall=none" + + + + + + + + + + Non-UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration + Non-UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration + + + Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Group Ownership + The file /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should +be group-owned by the root group to prevent +destruction or modification of the file. + +To properly set the group owner of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000225 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-7.1 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this +file should not have any access privileges anyway. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +chgrp 0 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + stat: + path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + register: file_exists + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + file: + path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + group: '0' + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership + The file /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be group-owned by the root +group to prevent reading or modification of the file. + +To properly set the group owner of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /boot/grub2/user.cfg + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000225 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-7.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this +file should not have any access privileges anyway. Non-root users who read the boot parameters +may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +chgrp 0 /boot/grub2/user.cfg + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg + stat: + path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg + register: file_exists + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/grub2/user.cfg + file: + path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg + group: '0' + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg User Ownership + The file /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should +be owned by the root user to prevent destruction +or modification of the file. + +To properly set the owner of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000225 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-7.1 + 2.2.6 + Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +chown 0 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_grub2_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + stat: + path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + register: file_exists + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_grub2_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + file: + path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + owner: '0' + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_grub2_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg User Ownership + The file /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be owned by the root +user to prevent reading or modification of the file. + +To properly set the owner of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /boot/grub2/user.cfg + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000225 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-7.1 + Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters. Also, non-root users who read +the boot parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to +exploit them. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +chown 0 /boot/grub2/user.cfg + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg + stat: + path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg + register: file_exists + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/grub2/user.cfg + file: + path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg + owner: '0' + when: + - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Set the Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value + The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password +protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. + +To maximize the protection, select a password-protected superuser account with unique name, and modify the +/etc/grub.d/01_users configuration file to reflect the account name change. + +Do not to use common administrator account names like root, +admin, or administrator for the grub2 superuser account. + +Change the superuser to a different username (The default is 'root'). +$ sed -i 's/\(set superusers=\).*/\1"<unique user ID>"/g' /etc/grub.d/01_users + +Once the superuser account has been added, +update the +grub.cfg file by running: +grubby --update-kernel=ALL + To prevent hard-coded admin usernames, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation +must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. + +Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the +grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. + BP28(R17) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 + Having a non-default grub superuser username makes password-guessing attacks less effective. + + + + + + + + + + Set Boot Loader Password in grub2 + The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password +protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. + +Since plaintext passwords are a security risk, generate a hash for the password +by running the following command: + +# grub2-setpassword + +When prompted, enter the password that was selected. + + To prevent hard-coded passwords, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation +must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. + +Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the +grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. + BP28(R17) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 + Password protection on the boot loader configuration ensures +users with physical access cannot trivially alter +important bootloader settings. These include which kernel to use, +and whether to enter single-user mode. + + + + + + + + + + + UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration + UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration + UEFI generally uses vfat file systems, which does not support Unix-style permissions +managed by chmod command. In this case, in order to change file permissions for files +within /boot/efi it is necessary to update the mount options in /etc/fstab file and +reboot the system. + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership + The file /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be group-owned by the +root group to prevent reading or modification of the file. + +To properly set the group owner of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /boot/grub2/user.cfg + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000225 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-7.1 + The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this +file should not have any access privileges anyway. Non-root users who read the boot parameters +may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +chgrp 0 /boot/grub2/user.cfg + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg + stat: + path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg + register: file_exists + when: + - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/grub2/user.cfg + file: + path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg + group: '0' + when: + - '"/boot/efi" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list' + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Set the UEFI Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value + The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password +protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. + +To maximize the protection, select a password-protected superuser account with unique name, and modify the +/etc/grub.d/01_users configuration file to reflect the account name change. + +It is highly suggested not to use common administrator account names like root, +admin, or administrator for the grub2 superuser account. + +Change the superuser to a different username (The default is 'root'). +$ sed -i 's/\(set superusers=\).*/\1"<unique user ID>"/g' /etc/grub.d/01_users + +Once the superuser account has been added, +update the +grub.cfg file by running: +grubby --update-kernel=ALL + To prevent hard-coded admin usernames, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation +must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. + +Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the +grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. + BP28(R17) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 + Having a non-default grub superuser username makes password-guessing attacks less effective. + + + + + + + + + + Set the UEFI Boot Loader Password + The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password +protection enabled to protect boot-time settings. + +Since plaintext passwords are a security risk, generate a hash for the password +by running the following command: + +# grub2-setpassword + +When prompted, enter the password that was selected. + + To prevent hard-coded passwords, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation +must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. + +Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the +grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file. + BP28(R17) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + 3.4.5 + CCI-000213 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(7)(i) + 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) + 164.310(a)(1) + 164.310(a)(2)(i) + 164.310(a)(2)(ii) + 164.310(a)(2)(iii) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048 + Password protection on the boot loader configuration ensures +users with physical access cannot trivially alter +important bootloader settings. These include which kernel to use, +and whether to enter single-user mode. + + + + + + + + + + + + zIPL bootloader configuration + During the boot process, the bootloader is +responsible for starting the execution of the kernel and passing +options to it. +The default Oracle Linux 9 boot loader for s390x systems is called zIPL. + + + + Protect Random-Number Entropy Pool + The I/O operations of the Linux kernel block layer due to their inherently +unpredictable execution times have been traditionally considered as a reliable +source to contribute to random-number entropy pool of the Linux kernel. This +has changed with introduction of solid-state storage devices (SSDs) though. + + + Ensure Solid State Drives Do Not Contribute To Random-Number Entropy Pool + For each solid-state drive on the system, run: + # echo 0 > /sys/block/DRIVE/queue/add_random + In contrast to traditional electromechanical magnetic disks, containing +spinning disks and / or movable read / write heads, the solid-state storage +devices (SSDs) do not contain moving / mechanical components. Therefore the +I/O operation completion times are much more predictable for them. + + + + Kernel Configuration + Contains rules that check the kernel configuration that was used to build it. + + + Hash function for kernel module signing + The hash function to use when signing modules during kernel build process. + sha512 + sha1 + sha224 + sha256 + sha384 + sha512 + + + Key and certificate for kernel module signing + The private key and certificate to use when signing modules during kernel build process. +On systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is functional — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by RFC7512 +In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should reference both a certificate and a private key. + certs/signing_key.pem + certs/signing_key.pem + + + Kernel panic timeout + The time, in seconds, to wait until a reboot occurs. +If the value is 0 the system never reboots. +If the value is less than 0 the system reboots immediately. + 0 + 0 + 300 + 60 + -1 + + + Do not allow ACPI methods to be inserted/replaced at run time + This debug facility allows ACPI AML methods to be inserted and/or replaced without rebooting +the system. +This configuration is available from kernel 3.0. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + Enabling this feature allows arbitrary kernel memory to be written to by root (uid=0) users, +allowing them to bypass certain security measures + + + + + + + + + Disable kernel support for MISC binaries + Enabling CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC makes it possible to plug wrapper-driven binary formats +into the kernel. This is specially useful for programs that need an interpreter to run like +Java, Python and DOS emulators. Once you have registered such a binary class with the kernel, +you can start one of those programs simply by typing in its name at a shell prompt. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R23) + This disables arbitrary binary format support and helps reduce attack surface. + + + + + + + + + Enable support for BUG() + Disabling this option eliminates support for BUG and WARN, reducing the size of your kernel +image and potentially quietly ignoring numerous fatal conditions. You should only consider +disabling this option for embedded systems with no facilities for reporting errors. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_BUG, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_BUG /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R19) + Not setting this variable may hide a number of critical errors. + + + + + + + + + Disable compatibility with brk() + Enabling compatiliby with brk() allows legacy binaries to run (i.e. those linked +against libc5). But this compatibility comes at the cost of not being able to randomize +the heap placement (ASLR). + +Unless legacy binaries need to run on the system, set CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK to "n". + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R17) + Enabling compatibility with brk() disables support for ASLR. + + + + + + + + + Disable the 32-bit vDSO + Certain buggy versions of glibc (2.3.3) will crash if they are presented with a 32-bit vDSO +that is not mapped at the address indicated in its segment table. +Setting CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO to y turns off the 32-bit VDSO and works +aroud the glibc bug. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + Enabling VDSO compatibility hurts performance and disables ASLR. + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on credential management + Enable this to turn on some debug checking for credential management. The additional code keeps +track of the number of pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see +that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct. + +Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, this also checks that the security pointer in the cred +struct is never seen to be invalid. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R16) + This adds sanity checks and validations to credential data structures. + + + + + + + + + Disable kernel debugfs + debugfs is a virtual file system that kernel developers use to put debugging files +into. Enable this option to be able to read and write to these files. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_FS, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_DEBUG_FS /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + To reduce the attack surface, this file system should be disabled if not in use. + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on linked list manipulation + Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list walking routines. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R16) + This add sanity checks to manipulation of linked lists structures in the kernel and may +prevent exploits such as CVE-2017-1661, where a race condition and simultaneos operations +caused a list to corrupt. + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on notifier call chains + Enable this to turn on sanity checking for notifier call chains. This is most useful for kernel +developers to make sure that modules properly unregister themselves from notifier chains. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R16) + This provides validation of notifier chains, it checks whether the notifiers are from the +kernel or a module that is still loaded prior to being invoked. + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on scatter-gather (SG) table operations + Scatter-gather tables are mechanism used for high performance I/O on DMA devices. +Enable this to turn on checks on scatter-gather tables. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEBUG_SG, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_DEBUG_SG /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R16) + This can help find problems with drivers that do not properly initialize their SG tables. + + + + + + + + + Configure low address space to protect from user allocation + This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected from userspace allocation. +This configuration is available from kernel 3.14, but may be available if backported +by distros. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "65536" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R25) + Keeping a user from writing to low pages can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. + + + + + + + + + Disable /dev/kmem virtual device support + Disable support for the /dev/kmem device. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_DEVKMEM, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_DEVKMEM /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + The /dev/kmem device is rarely used, but can be used for certain kind of kernel debugging +operations. + + + + + + + + + Disable hibernation + Enable the suspend to disk (STD) functionality, which is usually called "hibernation" in user +interfaces. STD checkpoints the system and powers it off; and restores that checkpoint on +reboot. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_HIBERNATION, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_HIBERNATION /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R23) + Suspending to disk allows one to replace the running kernel. + + + + + + + + + Disable IA32 emulation + Disables support for legacy 32-bit programs under a 64-bit kernel. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + Only disable support for 32-bit programs if you are sure you don't need any 32-bit program. + BP28(R25) + Disabling 32-bit backwards compatibility helps reduce the attack surface. + + + + + + + + + Disable the IPv6 protocol + Disable support for IP version 6 (IPv6). + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_IPV6, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_IPV6 /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R22) + Any unnecessary network stacks, including IPv6, should be disabled to reduce +the vulnerability to exploitation. + + + + + + + + + Disable kexec system call + kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your current kernel, +and to start another kernel. It is like a reboot but it is independent of the system firmware. +And like a reboot you can start any kernel with it, not just Linux. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_KEXEC, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_KEXEC /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R23) + Prohibits the execution of a new kernel image after reboot. + + + + + + + + + Disable legacy (BSD) PTY support + Disable the Linux traditional BSD-like terminal names /dev/ptyxx for masters and /dev/ttyxx for +slaves of pseudo terminals, and use only the modern ptys (devpts) interface. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R23) + The legacy scheme has a number of security problems. + + + + + + + + + Enable module signature verification + Check modules for valid signatures upon load. +Note that this option adds the OpenSSL development packages as a kernel build dependency so +that the signing tool can use its crypto library. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R18) + Loaded modules must be signed. + + + + + + + + + Enable automatic signing of all modules + Sign all modules during make modules_install. Without this option, modules must be signed +manually, using the scripts/sign-file tool. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R18) + This ensures the modules are signed during install process. + + + + + + + + + Require modules to be validly signed + Reject unsigned modules or signed modules with an unknown key. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R18) + Prevent loading modules that are unsigned or signed with an unknown key. + + + + + + + + + Specify the hash to use when signing modules + This configures the kernel to build and sign modules using + as the hash function. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R18) + Use of strong hash function is important to secure the module against counterfeit signatures. + + + + + + + + + + Specify module signing key to use + Setting this option to something other than its default of certs/signing_key.pem will +disable the autogeneration of signing keys and allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key +of your choosing. + +The string provided should identify a file containing both a private key and +its corresponding X.509 certificate in PEM form, or — on systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 +is functional — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by RFC7512. In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should +reference both a certificate and a private key. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R18) + A key and certificate is required to sign the built modules. + + + + + + + + + + Sign kernel modules with SHA-512 + This configures the kernel to build and sign modules using SHA512 as the hash function. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R18) + Use of strong hash function is important to secure the module against counterfeit signatures. + + + + + + + + + Enable poison without sanity check + Skip the sanity checking on alloc, only fill the pages with poison on free. This reduces some +of the overhead of the poisoning feature. +This configuration is available from kernel 4.6. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R17) + This configuration helps alleviates the performance impact of poisonining. + + + + + + + + + Use zero for poisoning instead of debugging value + Instead of using the existing poison value, fill the pages with zeros. This makes it harder to +detect when errors are occurring due to sanitization but the zeroing at free means that it is +no longer necessary to write zeros when GFP_ZERO is used on allocation. +This configuration is available from kernel 4.19. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R17) + This configuration helps alleviates the performance impact of poisonining. + + + + + + + + + Remove the kernel mapping in user mode + This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by ensuring that the majority of +kernel addresses are not mapped into userspace. +This configuration is available from kernel 4.15, but may be available if backported +by distros. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R25) + This is a countermeasure to the Meltdown attack. + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic oops + Enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. +This has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command line. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R19) + This feature ensures that the kernel does not do anything erroneous after an oops which +could result in data corruption or other issues. + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic timeout + Set the timeout value (in seconds) until a reboot occurs when the kernel panics. +A timeout of 0 configures the system to wait forever. With a timeout value greater than 0, +the system will wait the specified amount of seconds before rebooting. While a timeout value +less than 0 makes the system reboot immediately. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R19) + This is required to enable protection against Spectre v2. + + + + + + + + + + Disable support for /proc/kkcore + Provides a virtual ELF core file of the live kernel. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_PROC_KCORE, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_PROC_KCORE /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + This feature exposes the memory to the userspace and can assist an attacker in discovering +attack vectors. + + + + + + + + + Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) + In support of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR), this randomizes the physical +address at which the kernel image is decompressed and the virtual address where the kernel +image is mapped. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R25) + BP28(R27) + An unpredictable kernel address makes it more difficult to succeed with exploits that rely on +knowledge of the location of kernel code internals. + + + + + + + + + Randomize the kernel memory sections + Randomizes the base virtual address of kernel memory sections (physical memory mapping, +vmalloc & vmemmap). +This configuration is available from kernel 4.8, but may be available if backported +by distros. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R25) + This security feature makes exploits relying on predictable memory locations less reliable. + + + + + + + + + Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel + Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against kernel-to-user data leaks +by avoiding speculative indirect branches. +Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern support for full protection. +The kernel may run slower. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_RETPOLINE, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_RETPOLINE /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + This is required to enable protection against Spectre v2. + + + + + + + + + Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications that may need to compute +untrusted bytecode during their execution. By using pipes or other transports made available +to the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write syscalls, it's possible to isolate +those applications in their own address space using seccomp. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECCOMP, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SECCOMP /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R20) + seccomp enables the ability to filter system calls made by an application, effectively +isolating the system's resources from it. + + + + + + + + + Enable use of Berkeley Packet Filter with seccomp + Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter +programs which implement task-defined system call filtering polices. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R20) + Use of BPF filters allows for expressive filtering of system calls using a filter program +language with a long history of being exposed to userland. + + + + + + + + + Enable different security models + This allows you to choose different security modules to be configured into your kernel. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SECURITY /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R20) + This is enables kernel security primitives required by the LSM framework. + + + + + + + + + Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog + Enforce restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel syslog via dmesg(8). + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + Prevents unprivileged users from retrieving kernel addresses with dmesg. + + + + + + + + + Disable mutable hooks + Ensure kernel structures associated with LSMs are always mapped as read-only after system boot. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R20) + If CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS is enabled, then hooks can be loaded at runtime and +being able to manipulate hooks is a way to bypass all LSMs. + + + + + + + + + Enable Yama support + This enables support for LSM module Yama, which extends DAC support with additional system-wide +security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary access controls. The module will limit the +use of the system call ptrace(). + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R20) + Unrestricted usage of ptrace allows compromised binaries to run ptrace +on another processes of the user. + + + + + + + + + Enable SLUB debugging support + SLUB has extensive debug support features and this allows the allocator validation checking to +be enabled. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R17) + This activates the checking of the memory allocator structures and resets to zero the zones +allocated when they are released. + + + + + + + + + Enable TCP/IP syncookie support + Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as SYN flooding. +It is denial-of-service attack that prevents legitimate remote users from being able to connect +to your computer during an ongoing attack. + +When enabled the TCP/IP stack will use a cryptographic challenge protocol known as SYN cookies +to enable legitimate users to continue to connect, even when your machine is under attack. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R22) + SYN cookies provide protection against SYN flooding attacks. + + + + + + + + + Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka KAISER) + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can be used to bypass MMU +permission checks and leak kernel data to userspace. This can be defended against by unmapping +the kernel when running in userspace, mapping it back in on exception entry via a trampoline +page in the vector table. +This configuration is available from kernel 4.16, but may be available if backported +by distros. +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 /boot/config-* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R27) + This is a countermeasure to the Meltdown attack. + + + + + + + + + + Disable x86 vsyscall emulation + Disabling it is roughly equivalent to booting with vsyscall=none, except that it will also +disable the helpful warning if a program tries to use a vsyscall. With this option set to N, +offending programs will just segfault, citing addresses of the form 0xffffffffff600?00. +This configuration is available from kernel 3.19. + +The configuration that was used to build kernel is available at /boot/config-*. + To check the configuration value for CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION, run the following command: + grep CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION /boot/config-* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + There is no remediation for this besides re-compiling the kernel with the appropriate value for the config. + BP28(R15) + The vsyscall table is no longer required and is a potential source of ROP gadgets. + + + + + + + + + Kernel GCC plugin configuration + Contains rules that check the configuration of GCC plugins used by the compiler + + + + + Configure Syslog + The syslog service has been the default Unix logging mechanism for +many years. It has a number of downsides, including inconsistent log format, +lack of authentication for received messages, and lack of authentication, +encryption, or reliable transport for messages sent over a network. However, +due to its long history, syslog is a de facto standard which is supported by +almost all Unix applications. + + +In Oracle Linux 9, rsyslog has replaced ksyslogd as the +syslog daemon of choice, and it includes some additional security features +such as reliable, connection-oriented (i.e. TCP) transmission of logs, the +option to log to database formats, and the encryption of log data en route to +a central logging server. +This section discusses how to configure rsyslog for +best effect, and how to use tools provided with the system to maintain and +monitor logs. + + + Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed + TLS protocol support for rsyslog is installed. + +The rsyslog-gnutls package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install rsyslog-gnutls + BP28(R43) + CCI-000366 + FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + The rsyslog-gnutls package provides Transport Layer Security (TLS) support +for the rsyslog daemon, which enables secure remote logging. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "rsyslog-gnutls" ; then + yum install -y "rsyslog-gnutls" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed + package: + name: rsyslog-gnutls + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_rsyslog-gnutls_installed + + include install_rsyslog-gnutls + +class install_rsyslog-gnutls { + package { 'rsyslog-gnutls': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=rsyslog-gnutls + + +[[packages]] +name = "rsyslog-gnutls" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure rsyslog is Installed + Rsyslog is installed by default. The rsyslog package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install rsyslog + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-001311 + CCI-001312 + CCI-000366 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-1 + FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + SRG-OS-000051-GPOS-00024 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The rsyslog package provides the rsyslog daemon, which provides +system logging services. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "rsyslog" ; then + yum install -y "rsyslog" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure rsyslog is installed + package: + name: rsyslog + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_rsyslog_installed + + include install_rsyslog + +class install_rsyslog { + package { 'rsyslog': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=rsyslog + + +[[packages]] +name = "rsyslog" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Enable rsyslog Service + The rsyslog service provides syslog-style logging by default on Oracle Linux 9. + +The rsyslog service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable rsyslog.service + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + CCI-001311 + CCI-001312 + CCI-001557 + CCI-001851 + CCI-000366 + 164.312(a)(2)(ii) + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.17.2.1 + CM-6(a) + AU-4(1) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The rsyslog service must be running in order to provide +logging services, which are essential to system administration. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'rsyslog.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'rsyslog.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'rsyslog.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service rsyslog + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service rsyslog + systemd: + name: rsyslog + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"rsyslog" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rsyslog_enabled + + include enable_rsyslog + +class enable_rsyslog { + service {'rsyslog': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["rsyslog"] + + + + + + + + + + Configure Logwatch on the Central Log Server + Is this system the central log server? If so, edit the file /etc/logwatch/conf/logwatch.conf as shown below. + + + Ensure Proper Configuration of Log Files + The file /etc/rsyslog.conf controls where log message are written. +These are controlled by lines called rules, which consist of a +selector and an action. +These rules are often customized depending on the role of the system, the +requirements of the environment, and whatever may enable +the administrator to most effectively make use of log data. +The default rules in Oracle Linux 9 are: +*.info;mail.none;authpriv.none;cron.none /var/log/messages +authpriv.* /var/log/secure +mail.* -/var/log/maillog +cron.* /var/log/cron +*.emerg * +uucp,news.crit /var/log/spooler +local7.* /var/log/boot.log +See the man page rsyslog.conf(5) for more information. +Note that the rsyslog daemon can be configured to use a timestamp format that +some log processing programs may not understand. If this occurs, +edit the file /etc/rsyslog.conf and add or edit the following line: +$ ActionFileDefaultTemplate RSYSLOG_TraditionalFileFormat + + User who owns log files + Specify user owner of all logfiles specified in +/etc/rsyslog.conf. + root + adm + root + syslog + + + Ensure cron Is Logging To Rsyslog + Cron logging must be implemented to spot intrusions or trace +cron job status. If cron is not logging to rsyslog, it +can be implemented by adding the following to the RULES section of +/etc/rsyslog.conf: +cron.* /var/log/cron + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + 0988 + 1405 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + CM-6(a) + ID.SC-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Cron logging can be used to trace the successful or unsuccessful execution +of cron jobs. It can also be used to spot intrusions into the use of the cron +facility by unauthorized and malicious users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! grep -s "^\s*cron\.\*\s*/var/log/cron$" /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf; then + mkdir -p /etc/rsyslog.d + echo "cron.* /var/log/cron" >> /etc/rsyslog.d/cron.conf +fi + +systemctl restart rsyslog.service + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records + Rsyslogd is a system utility providing support for message logging. Support +for both internet and UNIX domain sockets enables this utility to support both local +and remote logging. Couple this utility with gnutls (which is a secure communications +library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS protocols), and you have a method to securely +encrypt and off-load auditing. + +When using rsyslogd to off-load logs the remote system must be authenticated. + CCI-001851 + AU-4(1) + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + The audit records generated by Rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system +configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Audit records should be +protected from unauthorized access. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +sed -i '/^.*\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode.*/d' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf 2> /dev/null + +if [ -e "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode /Id" "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" +else + touch "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" + +cp "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name" >> "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/rsyslog.d/stream_driver_auth.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records + block: + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/rsyslog.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/rsyslog.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s + state: absent + + - name: Check if /etc/rsyslog.d exists + stat: + path: /etc/rsyslog.d + register: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists + + - name: Check if the parameter $ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode is present in /etc/rsyslog.d + find: + paths: /etc/rsyslog.d + recurse: 'yes' + follow: 'no' + contains: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s + register: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter + when: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir + + - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/rsyslog.d + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + create: false + regexp: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s + state: absent + with_items: '{{ _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.files }}' + when: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.matched + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/rsyslog.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/rsyslog.conf + create: true + regexp: ^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode"| regex_escape }}\s + line: $ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdriverauthmode + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + Rsyslogd is a system utility providing support for message logging. Support +for both internet and UNIX domain sockets enables this utility to support both local +and remote logging. Couple this utility with gnutls (which is a secure communications +library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS protocols), and you have a method to securely +encrypt and off-load auditing. + +When using rsyslogd to off-load logs off a encrpytion system must be used. + CCI-001851 + AU-4(1) + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + The audit records generated by Rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system +configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Audit records should be +protected from unauthorized access. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if [ -e "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode /Id" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" +else + touch "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" + +cp "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1" >> "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + block: + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/rsyslog.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/rsyslog.conf + create: false + regexp: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' + state: absent + + - name: Check if /etc/rsyslog.d exists + stat: + path: /etc/rsyslog.d + register: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists + + - name: Check if the parameter $ActionSendStreamDriverMode is present in /etc/rsyslog.d + find: + paths: /etc/rsyslog.d + recurse: 'yes' + follow: 'no' + contains: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' + register: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter + when: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir + + - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/rsyslog.d + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + create: false + regexp: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' + state: absent + with_items: '{{ _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.files }}' + when: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.matched + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/rsyslog.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/rsyslog.conf + create: true + regexp: '^\s*{{ "$ActionSendStreamDriverMode"| regex_escape }} ' + line: $ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1 + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdrivermode + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + Rsyslogd is a system utility providing support for message logging. Support +for both internet and UNIX domain sockets enables this utility to support both local +and remote logging. Couple this utility with gnutls (which is a secure communications +library implementing the SSL, TLS and DTLS protocols), and you have a method to securely +encrypt and off-load auditing. + +When using rsyslogd to off-load logs off an encryption system must be used. + CCI-001851 + AU-4(1) + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + The audit records generated by Rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system +configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Audit records should be +protected from unauthorized access. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if [ -e "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*\$DefaultNetstreamDriver /Id" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" +else + touch "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" + +cp "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "\$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls" >> "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/rsyslog.d/encrypt.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + block: + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/rsyslog.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/rsyslog.conf + create: false + regexp: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' + state: absent + + - name: Check if /etc/rsyslog.d exists + stat: + path: /etc/rsyslog.d + register: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists + + - name: Check if the parameter $DefaultNetstreamDriver is present in /etc/rsyslog.d + find: + paths: /etc/rsyslog.d + recurse: 'yes' + follow: 'no' + contains: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' + register: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter + when: _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_rsyslog_d_exists.stat.isdir + + - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/rsyslog.d + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + create: false + regexp: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' + state: absent + with_items: '{{ _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.files }}' + when: _etc_rsyslog_d_has_parameter.matched + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/rsyslog.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/rsyslog.conf + create: true + regexp: '^\s*{{ "$DefaultNetstreamDriver"| regex_escape }} ' + line: $DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_encrypt_offload_defaultnetstreamdriver + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group + The group-owner of all log files written by +rsyslog should be + +root. + +These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in +/etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. +For each log file LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, +run the following command to inspect the file's group owner: +$ ls -l LOGFILE +If the owner is not + +root, + +run the following command to +correct this: + +$ sudo chgrp root LOGFILE + BP28(R46) + BP28(R5) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001314 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + 0988 + 1405 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-10.5.1 + Req-10.5.2 + 10.3.1 + 10.3.2 + The log files generated by rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system +configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Log files should be +protected from unauthorized access. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# List of log file paths to be inspected for correct permissions +# * Primarily inspect log file paths listed in /etc/rsyslog.conf +RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG="/etc/rsyslog.conf" +# * And also the log file paths listed after rsyslog's $IncludeConfig directive +# (store the result into array for the case there's shell glob used as value of IncludeConfig) +readarray -t OLD_INC < <(grep -e "\$IncludeConfig[[:space:]]\+[^[:space:];]\+" /etc/rsyslog.conf | cut -d ' ' -f 2) +readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG < <(for INCPATH in "${OLD_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) +readarray -t NEW_INC < <(awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' /etc/rsyslog.conf) +readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE < <(for INCPATH in "${NEW_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) + +# Declare an array to hold the final list of different log file paths +declare -a LOG_FILE_PATHS + +# Array to hold all rsyslog config entries +RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=() +RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=("${RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG[@]}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE[@]}") + +# Get full list of files to be checked +# RSYSLOG_CONFIGS may contain globs such as +# /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.frule +# So, loop over the entries in RSYSLOG_CONFIGS and use find to get the list of included files. +RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES=() +for ENTRY in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIGS[@]}" +do + # If directory, rsyslog will search for config files in recursively. + # However, files in hidden sub-directories or hidden files will be ignored. + if [ -d "${ENTRY}" ] + then + readarray -t FINDOUT < <(find "${ENTRY}" -not -path '*/.*' -type f) + RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${FINDOUT[@]}") + elif [ -f "${ENTRY}" ] + then + RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${ENTRY}") + else + echo "Invalid include object: ${ENTRY}" + fi +done + +# Browse each file selected above as containing paths of log files +# ('/etc/rsyslog.conf' and '/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf' in the default configuration) +for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" +do + # From each of these files extract just particular log file path(s), thus: + # * Ignore lines starting with space (' '), comment ('#"), or variable syntax ('$') characters, + # * Ignore empty lines, + # * Strip quotes and closing brackets from paths. + # * Ignore paths that match /dev|/etc.*\.conf, as those are paths, but likely not log files + # * From the remaining valid rows select only fields constituting a log file path + # Text file column is understood to represent a log file path if and only if all of the + # following are met: + # * it contains at least one slash '/' character, + # * it is preceded by space + # * it doesn't contain space (' '), colon (':'), and semicolon (';') characters + # Search log file for path(s) only in case it exists! + if [[ -f "${LOG_FILE}" ]] + then + NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES=$(sed -e "/^[#|$]/d" "${LOG_FILE}") + LINES_WITH_PATHS=$(grep '[^/]*\s\+\S*/\S\+$' <<< "${NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES}") + FILTERED_PATHS=$(awk '{if(NF>=2&&($NF~/^\//||$NF~/^-\//)){sub(/^-\//,"/",$NF);print $NF}}' <<< "${LINES_WITH_PATHS}") + CLEANED_PATHS=$(sed -e "s/[\"')]//g; /\\/etc.*\.conf/d; /\\/dev\\//d" <<< "${FILTERED_PATHS}") + MATCHED_ITEMS=$(sed -e "/^$/d" <<< "${CLEANED_PATHS}") + # Since above sed command might return more than one item (delimited by newline), split + # the particular matches entries into new array specific for this log file + readarray -t ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE <<< "$MATCHED_ITEMS" + # Concatenate the two arrays - previous content of $LOG_FILE_PATHS array with + # items from newly created array for this log file + LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("${ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE[@]}") + # Delete the temporary array + unset ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE + fi +done + +# Check for RainerScript action log format which might be also multiline so grep regex is a bit +# curly: +# extract possibly multiline action omfile expressions +# extract File="logfile" expression +# match only "logfile" expression +for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" +do + ACTION_OMFILE_LINES=$(grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" "${LOG_FILE}") + OMFILE_LINES=$(echo "${ACTION_OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)") + LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("$(echo "${OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\""|tr -d "\"")") +done + +# Ensure the correct attribute if file exists +FILE_CMD="chgrp" +for LOG_FILE_PATH in "${LOG_FILE_PATHS[@]}" +do + # Sanity check - if particular $LOG_FILE_PATH is empty string, skip it from further processing + if [ -z "$LOG_FILE_PATH" ] + then + continue + fi + $FILE_CMD "0" "$LOG_FILE_PATH" +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Set rsyslog logfile configuration + facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_etc_config: /etc/rsyslog.conf + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Get IncludeConfig directive + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -e '$IncludeConfig' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} | cut -d ' ' -f 2 || true + register: rsyslog_old_inc + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Get include files directives + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} || true + register: rsyslog_new_inc + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Aggregate rsyslog includes + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + include_config_output: '{{ rsyslog_old_inc.stdout_lines + rsyslog_new_inc.stdout_lines + }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - List all config files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: '{{ item | dirname }}' + patterns: '{{ item | basename }}' + hidden: false + follow: true + loop: '{{ include_config_output | list + [rsyslog_etc_config] }}' + register: rsyslog_config_files + failed_when: false + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Extract log files old format + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -oP '^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+-?(/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*$' {{ item.1.path }} | \ + awk '{print $NF}' | \ + sed -e 's/^-//' || true + loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | subelements(''files'') }}' + register: log_files_old + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Extract log files new format + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" {{ item.1.path }} | \ + grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)" | \ + grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"" | \ + tr -d "\""|| true + loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | subelements(''files'') }}' + register: log_files_new + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group - Sum all log files found + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + log_files: '{{ log_files_new.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list + | flatten | unique + log_files_old.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') + | list | flatten | unique }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group -Setup log files attribute + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + loop: '{{ log_files | list | flatten | unique }}' + failed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_groupownership + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User + The owner of all log files written by +rsyslog should be + +root. + +These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in +/etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. +For each log file LOGFILE referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, +run the following command to inspect the file's owner: +$ ls -l LOGFILE +If the owner is not + +root, + +run the following command to +correct this: + +$ sudo chown root LOGFILE + BP28(R46) + BP28(R5) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001314 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + 0988 + 1405 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-10.5.1 + Req-10.5.2 + 10.3.1 + 10.3.2 + The log files generated by rsyslog contain valuable information regarding system +configuration, user authentication, and other such information. Log files should be +protected from unauthorized access. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# List of log file paths to be inspected for correct permissions +# * Primarily inspect log file paths listed in /etc/rsyslog.conf +RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG="/etc/rsyslog.conf" +# * And also the log file paths listed after rsyslog's $IncludeConfig directive +# (store the result into array for the case there's shell glob used as value of IncludeConfig) +readarray -t OLD_INC < <(grep -e "\$IncludeConfig[[:space:]]\+[^[:space:];]\+" /etc/rsyslog.conf | cut -d ' ' -f 2) +readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG < <(for INCPATH in "${OLD_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) +readarray -t NEW_INC < <(awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' /etc/rsyslog.conf) +readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE < <(for INCPATH in "${NEW_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) + +# Declare an array to hold the final list of different log file paths +declare -a LOG_FILE_PATHS + +# Array to hold all rsyslog config entries +RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=() +RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=("${RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG[@]}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE[@]}") + +# Get full list of files to be checked +# RSYSLOG_CONFIGS may contain globs such as +# /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.frule +# So, loop over the entries in RSYSLOG_CONFIGS and use find to get the list of included files. +RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES=() +for ENTRY in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIGS[@]}" +do + # If directory, rsyslog will search for config files in recursively. + # However, files in hidden sub-directories or hidden files will be ignored. + if [ -d "${ENTRY}" ] + then + readarray -t FINDOUT < <(find "${ENTRY}" -not -path '*/.*' -type f) + RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${FINDOUT[@]}") + elif [ -f "${ENTRY}" ] + then + RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${ENTRY}") + else + echo "Invalid include object: ${ENTRY}" + fi +done + +# Browse each file selected above as containing paths of log files +# ('/etc/rsyslog.conf' and '/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf' in the default configuration) +for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" +do + # From each of these files extract just particular log file path(s), thus: + # * Ignore lines starting with space (' '), comment ('#"), or variable syntax ('$') characters, + # * Ignore empty lines, + # * Strip quotes and closing brackets from paths. + # * Ignore paths that match /dev|/etc.*\.conf, as those are paths, but likely not log files + # * From the remaining valid rows select only fields constituting a log file path + # Text file column is understood to represent a log file path if and only if all of the + # following are met: + # * it contains at least one slash '/' character, + # * it is preceded by space + # * it doesn't contain space (' '), colon (':'), and semicolon (';') characters + # Search log file for path(s) only in case it exists! + if [[ -f "${LOG_FILE}" ]] + then + NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES=$(sed -e "/^[#|$]/d" "${LOG_FILE}") + LINES_WITH_PATHS=$(grep '[^/]*\s\+\S*/\S\+$' <<< "${NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES}") + FILTERED_PATHS=$(awk '{if(NF>=2&&($NF~/^\//||$NF~/^-\//)){sub(/^-\//,"/",$NF);print $NF}}' <<< "${LINES_WITH_PATHS}") + CLEANED_PATHS=$(sed -e "s/[\"')]//g; /\\/etc.*\.conf/d; /\\/dev\\//d" <<< "${FILTERED_PATHS}") + MATCHED_ITEMS=$(sed -e "/^$/d" <<< "${CLEANED_PATHS}") + # Since above sed command might return more than one item (delimited by newline), split + # the particular matches entries into new array specific for this log file + readarray -t ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE <<< "$MATCHED_ITEMS" + # Concatenate the two arrays - previous content of $LOG_FILE_PATHS array with + # items from newly created array for this log file + LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("${ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE[@]}") + # Delete the temporary array + unset ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE + fi +done + +# Check for RainerScript action log format which might be also multiline so grep regex is a bit +# curly: +# extract possibly multiline action omfile expressions +# extract File="logfile" expression +# match only "logfile" expression +for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" +do + ACTION_OMFILE_LINES=$(grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" "${LOG_FILE}") + OMFILE_LINES=$(echo "${ACTION_OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)") + LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("$(echo "${OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\""|tr -d "\"")") +done + +# Ensure the correct attribute if file exists +FILE_CMD="chown" +for LOG_FILE_PATH in "${LOG_FILE_PATHS[@]}" +do + # Sanity check - if particular $LOG_FILE_PATH is empty string, skip it from further processing + if [ -z "$LOG_FILE_PATH" ] + then + continue + fi + $FILE_CMD "0" "$LOG_FILE_PATH" +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Set rsyslog logfile configuration + facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_etc_config: /etc/rsyslog.conf + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Get IncludeConfig directive + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -e '$IncludeConfig' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} | cut -d ' ' -f 2 || true + register: rsyslog_old_inc + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Get include files directives + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} || true + register: rsyslog_new_inc + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Aggregate rsyslog includes + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + include_config_output: '{{ rsyslog_old_inc.stdout_lines + rsyslog_new_inc.stdout_lines + }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - List all config files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: '{{ item | dirname }}' + patterns: '{{ item | basename }}' + hidden: false + follow: true + loop: '{{ include_config_output | list + [rsyslog_etc_config] }}' + register: rsyslog_config_files + failed_when: false + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Extract log files old format + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -oP '^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+-?(/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*$' {{ item.1.path }} | \ + awk '{print $NF}' | \ + sed -e 's/^-//' || true + loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | subelements(''files'') }}' + register: log_files_old + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Extract log files new format + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" {{ item.1.path }} | \ + grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)" | \ + grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"" | \ + tr -d "\""|| true + loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | subelements(''files'') }}' + register: log_files_new + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User - Sum all log files found + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + log_files: '{{ log_files_new.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list + | flatten | unique + log_files_old.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') + | list | flatten | unique }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + +- name: Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User -Setup log files attribute + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + loop: '{{ log_files | list | flatten | unique }}' + failed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_ownership + + + + + + + + + + Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions + The file permissions for all log files written by rsyslog should +be set to 640, or more restrictive. These log files are determined by the +second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically +all appear in /var/log. For each log file LOGFILE +referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf, run the following command to +inspect the file's permissions: +$ ls -l LOGFILE +If the permissions are not 640 or more restrictive, run the following +command to correct this: +$ sudo chmod 640 LOGFILE" + BP28(R36) + CCI-001314 + 0988 + 1405 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + Req-10.5.1 + Req-10.5.2 + 10.3.1 + 10.3.2 + Log files can contain valuable information regarding system +configuration. If the system log files are not protected unauthorized +users could change the logged data, eliminating their forensic value. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# List of log file paths to be inspected for correct permissions +# * Primarily inspect log file paths listed in /etc/rsyslog.conf +RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG="/etc/rsyslog.conf" +# * And also the log file paths listed after rsyslog's $IncludeConfig directive +# (store the result into array for the case there's shell glob used as value of IncludeConfig) +readarray -t OLD_INC < <(grep -e "\$IncludeConfig[[:space:]]\+[^[:space:];]\+" /etc/rsyslog.conf | cut -d ' ' -f 2) +readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG < <(for INCPATH in "${OLD_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) +readarray -t NEW_INC < <(awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' /etc/rsyslog.conf) +readarray -t RSYSLOG_INCLUDE < <(for INCPATH in "${NEW_INC[@]}"; do eval printf '%s\\n' "${INCPATH}"; done) + +# Declare an array to hold the final list of different log file paths +declare -a LOG_FILE_PATHS + +# Array to hold all rsyslog config entries +RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=() +RSYSLOG_CONFIGS=("${RSYSLOG_ETC_CONFIG}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE_CONFIG[@]}" "${RSYSLOG_INCLUDE[@]}") + +# Get full list of files to be checked +# RSYSLOG_CONFIGS may contain globs such as +# /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.frule +# So, loop over the entries in RSYSLOG_CONFIGS and use find to get the list of included files. +RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES=() +for ENTRY in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIGS[@]}" +do + # If directory, rsyslog will search for config files in recursively. + # However, files in hidden sub-directories or hidden files will be ignored. + if [ -d "${ENTRY}" ] + then + readarray -t FINDOUT < <(find "${ENTRY}" -not -path '*/.*' -type f) + RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${FINDOUT[@]}") + elif [ -f "${ENTRY}" ] + then + RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES+=("${ENTRY}") + else + echo "Invalid include object: ${ENTRY}" + fi +done + +# Browse each file selected above as containing paths of log files +# ('/etc/rsyslog.conf' and '/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf' in the default configuration) +for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" +do + # From each of these files extract just particular log file path(s), thus: + # * Ignore lines starting with space (' '), comment ('#"), or variable syntax ('$') characters, + # * Ignore empty lines, + # * Strip quotes and closing brackets from paths. + # * Ignore paths that match /dev|/etc.*\.conf, as those are paths, but likely not log files + # * From the remaining valid rows select only fields constituting a log file path + # Text file column is understood to represent a log file path if and only if all of the + # following are met: + # * it contains at least one slash '/' character, + # * it is preceded by space + # * it doesn't contain space (' '), colon (':'), and semicolon (';') characters + # Search log file for path(s) only in case it exists! + if [[ -f "${LOG_FILE}" ]] + then + NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES=$(sed -e "/^[#|$]/d" "${LOG_FILE}") + LINES_WITH_PATHS=$(grep '[^/]*\s\+\S*/\S\+$' <<< "${NORMALIZED_CONFIG_FILE_LINES}") + FILTERED_PATHS=$(awk '{if(NF>=2&&($NF~/^\//||$NF~/^-\//)){sub(/^-\//,"/",$NF);print $NF}}' <<< "${LINES_WITH_PATHS}") + CLEANED_PATHS=$(sed -e "s/[\"')]//g; /\\/etc.*\.conf/d; /\\/dev\\//d" <<< "${FILTERED_PATHS}") + MATCHED_ITEMS=$(sed -e "/^$/d" <<< "${CLEANED_PATHS}") + # Since above sed command might return more than one item (delimited by newline), split + # the particular matches entries into new array specific for this log file + readarray -t ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE <<< "$MATCHED_ITEMS" + # Concatenate the two arrays - previous content of $LOG_FILE_PATHS array with + # items from newly created array for this log file + LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("${ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE[@]}") + # Delete the temporary array + unset ARRAY_FOR_LOG_FILE + fi +done + +# Check for RainerScript action log format which might be also multiline so grep regex is a bit +# curly: +# extract possibly multiline action omfile expressions +# extract File="logfile" expression +# match only "logfile" expression +for LOG_FILE in "${RSYSLOG_CONFIG_FILES[@]}" +do + ACTION_OMFILE_LINES=$(grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" "${LOG_FILE}") + OMFILE_LINES=$(echo "${ACTION_OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)") + LOG_FILE_PATHS+=("$(echo "${OMFILE_LINES}"| grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\""|tr -d "\"")") +done + +# Ensure the correct attribute if file exists +FILE_CMD="chmod" +for LOG_FILE_PATH in "${LOG_FILE_PATHS[@]}" +do + # Sanity check - if particular $LOG_FILE_PATH is empty string, skip it from further processing + if [ -z "$LOG_FILE_PATH" ] + then + continue + fi + $FILE_CMD "0640" "$LOG_FILE_PATH" +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Set rsyslog logfile configuration + facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_etc_config: /etc/rsyslog.conf + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Get IncludeConfig directive + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -e '$IncludeConfig' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} | cut -d ' ' -f 2 || true + register: rsyslog_old_inc + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Get include files directives + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + awk '/)/{f=0} /include\(/{f=1} f{nf=gensub("^(include\\(|\\s*)file=\"(\\S+)\".*","\\2",1); if($0!=nf){print nf}}' {{ rsyslog_etc_config }} || true + register: rsyslog_new_inc + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Aggregate rsyslog includes + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + include_config_output: '{{ rsyslog_old_inc.stdout_lines + rsyslog_new_inc.stdout_lines + }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - List all config files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: '{{ item | dirname }}' + patterns: '{{ item | basename }}' + hidden: false + follow: true + loop: '{{ include_config_output | list + [rsyslog_etc_config] }}' + register: rsyslog_config_files + failed_when: false + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Extract log files old format + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -oP '^[^(\s|#|\$)]+[\s]+.*[\s]+-?(/+[^:;\s]+);*\.*$' {{ item.1.path }} | \ + awk '{print $NF}' | \ + sed -e 's/^-//' || true + loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | subelements(''files'') }}' + register: log_files_old + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Extract log files new format + ansible.builtin.shell: | + set -o pipefail + grep -ozP "action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*\"omfile\"[^\)]*\)" {{ item.1.path }} | \ + grep -aoP "File\s*=\s*\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"\s*\)" | \ + grep -oE "\"([/[:alnum:][:punct:]]*)\"" | \ + tr -d "\""|| true + loop: '{{ rsyslog_config_files.results | subelements(''files'') }}' + register: log_files_new + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions - Sum all log files found + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + log_files: '{{ log_files_new.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') | list + | flatten | unique + log_files_old.results | map(attribute=''stdout_lines'') + | list | flatten | unique }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + +- name: Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions -Setup log files attribute + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: '0640' + state: file + loop: '{{ log_files | list | flatten | unique }}' + failed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_files_permissions + + + + + + + + + + Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog + Logging of remote access methods must be implemented to help identify cyber +attacks and ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies are being +audited and upheld. An examples of a remote access method is the use of the +Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) from an external, non-organization controlled +network. The /etc/rsyslog.conf or +/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf file should contain a match for the following +selectors: auth.*, authpriv.*, and daemon.*. If +not, use the following as an example configuration: +auth.*;authpriv.*;daemon.* /var/log/secure + CCI-000067 + AC-17(1) + SRG-OS-000032-GPOS-00013 + Logging remote access methods can be used to trace the decrease the risks +associated with remote user access management. It can also be used to spot +cyber attacks and ensure ongoing compliance with organizational policies +surrounding the use of remote access methods. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +declare -A REMOTE_METHODS=( ['auth.*']='^[^#]*auth\.\*.*$' ['authpriv.*']='^[^#]*authpriv\.\*.*$' ['daemon.*']='^[^#]*daemon\.\*.*$' ) + +if [[ ! -f /etc/rsyslog.conf ]]; then + # Something is not right, create the file + touch /etc/rsyslog.conf +fi + +APPEND_LINE=$(sed -rn '/^\S+\s+\/var\/log\/secure$/p' /etc/rsyslog.conf) + +# Loop through the remote methods associative array +for K in "${!REMOTE_METHODS[@]}" +do + # Check to see if selector/value exists + if ! grep -rq "${REMOTE_METHODS[$K]}" /etc/rsyslog.*; then + # Make sure we have a line to insert after, otherwise append to end + if [[ ! -z ${APPEND_LINE} ]]; then + # Add selector to file + sed -r -i "0,/^(\S+\s+\/var\/log\/secure$)/s//\1\n${K} \/var\/log\/secure/" /etc/rsyslog.conf + else + echo "${K} /var/log/secure" >> /etc/rsyslog.conf + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Set facts' + set_fact: + conf_files: + - /etc/rsyslog.conf + remote_methods: + - selector: auth.* + regexp: ^.*auth\.\*.*$ + - selector: authpriv.* + regexp: ^.*authpriv\.\*.*$ + - selector: daemon.* + regexp: ^.*daemon\.\*.*$ + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring + +- name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Ensure rsyslog.conf + exists' + file: + path: '{{ conf_files.0 }}' + state: touch + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring + +- name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Gather conf.d files' + find: + patterns: + - '*.conf' + paths: + - /etc/rsyslog.d + register: rsyslogd + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring + +- name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Set conf file(s)' + set_fact: + conf_files: '{{ conf_files + [item.path] }}' + loop: '{{ rsyslogd.files }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - rsyslogd.matched > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring + +- name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Check for existing + values' + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item.1 }}' + regexp: '{{ item.0.regexp }}' + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: remote_method_values + loop: '{{ remote_methods|product(conf_files)|list }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring + +- name: 'Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog: Configure' + lineinfile: + path: /etc/rsyslog.conf + line: '{{ item.item.0.selector }} /var/log/secure' + insertafter: ^.*\/var\/log\/secure.*$ + create: true + loop: '{{ remote_method_values.results }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - item.found == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring + + + + + + + + + + + systemd-journald + systemd-journald is a system service that collects and stores +logging data. It creates and maintains structured, indexed +journals based on logging information that is received from a +variety of sources. + +For more information on systemd-journald and additional systemd-journald configuration options, see +https://systemd.io/. + + Enable systemd-journald Service + The systemd-journald service is an essential component of +systemd. + +The systemd-journald service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable systemd-journald.service + CCI-001665 + SC-24 + SRG-OS-000269-GPOS-00103 + In the event of a system failure, Oracle Linux 9 must preserve any information necessary to determine cause of failure and any information necessary to return to operations with least disruption to system processes. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'systemd-journald.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'systemd-journald.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'systemd-journald.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service systemd-journald + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service systemd-journald + systemd: + name: systemd-journald + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-24 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_systemd-journald_enabled + + include enable_systemd-journald + +class enable_systemd-journald { + service {'systemd-journald': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["systemd-journald"] + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Logs are Rotated by logrotate + +Edit the file /etc/logrotate.d/syslog. Find the first + +line, which should look like this (wrapped for clarity): +/var/log/messages /var/log/secure /var/log/maillog /var/log/spooler \ + /var/log/boot.log /var/log/cron { +Edit this line so that it contains a one-space-separated +listing of each log file referenced in /etc/rsyslog.conf. + +All logs in use on a system must be rotated regularly, or the +log files will consume disk space over time, eventually interfering +with system operation. The file /etc/logrotate.d/syslog is the +configuration file used by the logrotate program to maintain all +log files written by syslog. By default, it rotates logs weekly and +stores four archival copies of each log. These settings can be +modified by editing /etc/logrotate.conf, but the defaults are +sufficient for purposes of this guide. + +Note that logrotate is run nightly by the cron job +/etc/cron.daily/logrotate. If particularly active logs need to be +rotated more often than once a day, some other mechanism must be +used. + + Ensure logrotate is Installed + logrotate is installed by default. The logrotate package can be installed with the following command: $ sudo yum install logrotate + BP28(R43) + NT12(R18) + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.7 + The logrotate package provides the logrotate services. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "logrotate" ; then + yum install -y "logrotate" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure logrotate is installed + package: + name: logrotate + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_logrotate_installed + + include install_logrotate + +class install_logrotate { + package { 'logrotate': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=logrotate + + +[[packages]] +name = "logrotate" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Logrotate Runs Periodically + The logrotate utility allows for the automatic rotation of +log files. The frequency of rotation is specified in /etc/logrotate.conf, +which triggers a cron task or a timer. To configure logrotate to run daily, add or correct +the following line in /etc/logrotate.conf: +# rotate log files frequency +daily + BP28(R43) + NT12(R18) + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.7 + 10.5.1 + Log files that are not properly rotated run the risk of growing so large +that they fill up the /var/log partition. Valuable logging information could be lost +if the /var/log partition becomes full. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE="/etc/logrotate.conf" + +CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE="/etc/cron.daily/logrotate" + + +# daily rotation is configured +grep -q "^daily$" $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE|| echo "daily" >> $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE + +# remove any line configuring weekly, monthly or yearly rotation +sed -i '/^\s*\(weekly\|monthly\|yearly\).*$/d' $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE + + +# configure cron.daily if not already +if ! grep -q "^[[:space:]]*/usr/sbin/logrotate[[:alnum:][:blank:][:punct:]]*$LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE$" $CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE; then + echo '#!/bin/sh' > $CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE + echo "/usr/sbin/logrotate $LOGROTATE_CONF_FILE" >> $CRON_DAILY_LOGROTATE_FILE +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Configure daily log rotation in /etc/logrotate.conf + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/logrotate.conf + regexp: ^daily$ + line: daily + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - configure_strategy + - ensure_logrotate_activated + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Make sure daily log rotation setting is not overriden in /etc/logrotate.conf + lineinfile: + create: false + dest: /etc/logrotate.conf + regexp: ^[\s]*(weekly|monthly|yearly)$ + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - configure_strategy + - ensure_logrotate_activated + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Configure cron.daily if not already + block: + + - name: Add shebang + lineinfile: + path: /etc/cron.daily/logrotate + line: '#!/bin/sh' + insertbefore: BOF + create: true + + - name: Add logrotate call + lineinfile: + path: /etc/cron.daily/logrotate + line: /usr/sbin/logrotate /etc/logrotate.conf + regexp: ^[\s]*/usr/sbin/logrotate[\s\S]*/etc/logrotate.conf$ + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.5.1 + - configure_strategy + - ensure_logrotate_activated + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Enable logrotate Timer + +The logrotate timer can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable logrotate.timer + BP28(R43) + NT12(R18) + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.7 + Log files that are not properly rotated run the risk of growing so large +that they fill up the /var/log partition. Valuable logging information could be lost +if the /var/log partition becomes full. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'logrotate.timer' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'logrotate.timer' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable timer logrotate + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable timer logrotate + systemd: + name: logrotate.timer + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + when: + - '"logrotate" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - timer_logrotate_enabled + + + + + + + + + + + Configure rsyslogd to Accept Remote Messages If Acting as a Log Server + By default, rsyslog does not listen over the network +for log messages. If needed, modules can be enabled to allow +the rsyslog daemon to receive messages from other systems and for the system +thus to act as a log server. +If the system is not a log server, then lines concerning these modules +should remain commented out. + + + Ensure syslog-ng is Installed + syslog-ng can be installed in replacement of rsyslog. +The syslog-ng-core package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install syslog-ng-core + BP28(R46) + BP28(R5) + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-001311 + CCI-001312 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-1 + The syslog-ng-core package provides the syslog-ng daemon, which provides +system logging services. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "syslog-ng" ; then + yum install -y "syslog-ng" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure syslog-ng is installed + package: + name: syslog-ng + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_syslogng_installed + + include install_syslog-ng + +class install_syslog-ng { + package { 'syslog-ng': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=syslog-ng + + +[[packages]] +name = "syslog-ng" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Enable syslog-ng Service + The syslog-ng service (in replacement of rsyslog) provides syslog-style logging by default on Debian. + +The syslog-ng service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable syslog-ng.service + BP28(R46) + BP28(R5) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO10.01 + APO10.03 + APO10.04 + APO10.05 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + MEA01.01 + MEA01.02 + MEA01.03 + MEA01.04 + MEA01.05 + MEA02.01 + CCI-001311 + CCI-001312 + CCI-001557 + CCI-001851 + 4.3.2.6.7 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 6.1 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.14.2.7 + A.15.2.1 + A.15.2.2 + A.17.2.1 + CM-6(a) + AU-4(1) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + DE.CM-7 + ID.SC-4 + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + The syslog-ng service must be running in order to provide +logging services, which are essential to system administration. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'syslog-ng.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'syslog-ng.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'syslog-ng.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service syslog-ng + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service syslog-ng + systemd: + name: syslog-ng + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"syslog-ng" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_syslogng_enabled + + include enable_syslog-ng + +class enable_syslog-ng { + service {'syslog-ng': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["syslog-ng"] + + + + + + + + + + Enable rsyslog to Accept Messages via TCP, if Acting As Log Server + The rsyslog daemon should not accept remote messages +unless the system acts as a log server. +If the system needs to act as a central log server, add the following lines to +/etc/rsyslog.conf to enable reception of messages over TCP: +$ModLoad imtcp +$InputTCPServerRun 514 + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + CM-6(a) + AU-6(3) + AU-6(4) + PR.PT-1 + If the system needs to act as a log server, this ensures that it can receive +messages over a reliable TCP connection. + + + Enable rsyslog to Accept Messages via UDP, if Acting As Log Server + The rsyslog daemon should not accept remote messages +unless the system acts as a log server. +If the system needs to act as a central log server, add the following lines to +/etc/rsyslog.conf to enable reception of messages over UDP: +$ModLoad imudp +$UDPServerRun 514 + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.2 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + CM-6(a) + AU-6(3) + AU-6(4) + PR.PT-1 + Many devices, such as switches, routers, and other Unix-like systems, may only support +the traditional syslog transmission over UDP. If the system must act as a log server, +this enables it to receive their messages as well. + + + Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + The rsyslog daemon should not accept remote messages unless the system acts as a log +server. To ensure that it is not listening on the network, ensure any of the following lines +are not found in rsyslog configuration files. + +If using legacy syntax: +$ModLoad imtcp +$InputTCPServerRun port +$ModLoad imudp +$UDPServerRun port +$ModLoad imrelp +$InputRELPServerRun port + +If using RainerScript syntax: +module(load="imtcp") +module(load="imudp") +input(type="imtcp" port="514") +input(type="imudp" port="514") + + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000318 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000368 + CCI-001812 + CCI-001813 + CCI-001814 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + 0988 + 1405 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Any process which receives messages from the network incurs some risk of receiving malicious +messages. This risk can be eliminated for rsyslog by configuring it not to listen on the +network. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +legacy_regex='^\s*\$(((Input(TCP|RELP)|UDP)ServerRun)|ModLoad\s+(imtcp|imudp|imrelp))' +rainer_regex='^\s*(module|input)\((load|type)="(imtcp|imudp)".*$' + +readarray -t legacy_targets < <(grep -l -E -r "${legacy_regex[@]}" /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/) +readarray -t rainer_targets < <(grep -l -E -r "${rainer_regex[@]}" /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/) + +config_changed=false +if [ ${#legacy_targets[@]} -gt 0 ]; then + for target in "${legacy_targets[@]}"; do + sed -E -i "/$legacy_regex/ s/^/# /" "$target" + done + config_changed=true +fi + +if [ ${#rainer_targets[@]} -gt 0 ]; then + for target in "${rainer_targets[@]}"; do + sed -E -i "/$rainer_regex/ s/^/# /" "$target" + done + config_changed=true +fi + +if $config_changed; then + systemctl restart rsyslog.service +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Define Rsyslog Config Lines Regex in Legacy Syntax + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex: ^\s*\$(((Input(TCP|RELP)|UDP)ServerRun)|ModLoad\s+(imtcp|imudp|imrelp)) + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Search for Legacy Config Lines in Rsyslog Main Config File + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc + pattern: rsyslog.conf + contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex }}' + register: rsyslog_listen_legacy_main_file + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Search for Legacy Config Lines in Rsyslog Include Files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc/rsyslog.d/ + pattern: '*.conf' + contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex }}' + register: rsyslog_listen_legacy_include_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Assemble List of Config Files With Listen Lines in Legacy Syntax + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_legacy_remote_listen_files: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_main_file.files + | map(attribute=''path'') | list + rsyslog_listen_legacy_include_files.files + | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Comment Listen Config Lines Wherever Defined Using Legacy Syntax + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: '{{ rsyslog_listen_legacy_regex }}' + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ rsyslog_legacy_remote_listen_files }}' + register: rsyslog_listen_legacy_comment + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - rsyslog_legacy_remote_listen_files | length > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Define Rsyslog Config Lines Regex in RainerScript Syntax + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex: ^\s*(module|input)\((load|type)="(imtcp|imudp)".*$ + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Search for RainerScript Config Lines in Rsyslog Main Config File + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc + pattern: rsyslog.conf + contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex }}' + register: rsyslog_rainer_remote_main_file + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Search for RainerScript Config Lines in Rsyslog Include Files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc/rsyslog.d/ + pattern: '*.conf' + contains: '{{ rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex }}' + register: rsyslog_rainer_remote_include_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Assemble List of Config Files With Listen Lines in RainerScript + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_rainer_remote_listen_files: '{{ rsyslog_rainer_remote_main_file.files + | map(attribute=''path'') | list + rsyslog_rainer_remote_include_files.files + | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Comment Listen Config Lines Wherever Defined Using RainerScript + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: '{{ rsyslog_listen_rainer_regex }}' + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ rsyslog_rainer_remote_listen_files }}' + register: rsyslog_listen_rainer_comment + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - rsyslog_rainer_remote_listen_files | length > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + +- name: Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + - Restart Rsyslog if Any Line Were Commented Out + ansible.builtin.service: + name: rsyslog + state: restarted + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - rsyslog_listen_legacy_comment is changed or rsyslog_listen_rainer_comment is changed + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_nolisten + + + + + + + + + + + Rsyslog Logs Sent To Remote Host + If system logs are to be useful in detecting malicious +activities, it is necessary to send logs to a remote server. An +intruder who has compromised the root account on a system may +delete the log entries which indicate that the system was attacked +before they are seen by an administrator. + +However, it is recommended that logs be stored on the local +host in addition to being sent to the loghost, especially if +rsyslog has been configured to use the UDP protocol to send +messages over a network. UDP does not guarantee reliable delivery, +and moderately busy sites will lose log messages occasionally, +especially in periods of high traffic which may be the result of an +attack. In addition, remote rsyslog messages are not +authenticated in any way by default, so it is easy for an attacker to +introduce spurious messages to the central log server. Also, some +problems cause loss of network connectivity, which will prevent the +sending of messages to the central server. For all of these reasons, it is +better to store log messages both centrally and on each host, so +that they can be correlated if necessary. + + Remote Log Server + Specify an URI or IP address of a remote host where the log messages will be sent and stored. + logcollector + + + Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Host + To configure rsyslog to send logs to a remote log server, +open /etc/rsyslog.conf and read and understand the last section of the file, +which describes the multiple directives necessary to activate remote +logging. +Along with these other directives, the system can be configured +to forward its logs to a particular log server by +adding or correcting one of the following lines, +substituting appropriately. +The choice of protocol depends on the environment of the system; +although TCP and RELP provide more reliable message delivery, +they may not be supported in all environments. + +To use UDP for log message delivery: +*.* @ + +To use TCP for log message delivery: +*.* @@ + +To use RELP for log message delivery: +*.* :omrelp: + +There must be a resolvable DNS CNAME or Alias record set to "" for logs to be sent correctly to the centralized logging utility. + It is important to configure queues in case the client is sending log +messages to a remote server. If queues are not configured, +the system will stop functioning when the connection +to the remote server is not available. Please consult Rsyslog +documentation for more information about configuration of queues. The +example configuration which should go into /etc/rsyslog.conf +can look like the following lines: + +$ActionQueueType LinkedList +$ActionQueueFileName queuefilename +$ActionQueueMaxDiskSpace 1g +$ActionQueueSaveOnShutdown on +$ActionResumeRetryCount -1 + + BP28(R7) + NT28(R43) + NT12(R5) + 1 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + BAI04.04 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001348 + CCI-000136 + CCI-001851 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) + 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) + 164.308(a)(6)(ii) + 164.308(a)(8) + 164.310(d)(2)(iii) + 164.312(b) + 164.314(a)(2)(i)(C) + 164.314(a)(2)(iii) + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + 0988 + 1405 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.17.2.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.2 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CM-6(a) + AU-4(1) + AU-9(2) + PR.DS-4 + PR.PT-1 + FAU_GEN.1.1.c + SRG-OS-000479-GPOS-00224 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000342-GPOS-00133 + A log server (loghost) receives syslog messages from one or more +systems. This data can be used as an additional log source in the event a +system is compromised and its local logs are suspect. Forwarding log messages +to a remote loghost also provides system administrators with a centralized +place to view the status of multiple hosts within the enterprise. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +rsyslog_remote_loghost_address='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^\*\.\*") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "@@$rsyslog_remote_loghost_address" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^\*\.\*\\>" "/etc/rsyslog.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^\*\.\*\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/rsyslog.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/rsyslog.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/rsyslog.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/rsyslog.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/rsyslog.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value rsyslog_remote_loghost_address # promote to variable + set_fact: + rsyslog_remote_loghost_address: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Set rsyslog remote loghost + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/rsyslog.conf + regexp: ^\*\.\* + line: '*.* @@{{ rsyslog_remote_loghost_address }}' + create: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-4(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(2) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - rsyslog_remote_loghost + + + + + + + + + + Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging + Configure rsyslog to use Transport Layer +Security (TLS) support for logging to remote server +for the Forwarding Output Module in /etc/rsyslog.conf +using action. You can use the following command: +echo 'action(type="omfwd" protocol="tcp" Target="<remote system>" port="6514" + StreamDriver="gtls" StreamDriverMode="1" StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name" streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose="on")' >> /etc/rsyslog.conf + +Replace the <remote system> in the above command with an IP address or a host name of the remote logging server. + BP28(R43) + 0988 + 1405 + AU-9(3) + CM-6(a) + FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 + FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 + FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + For protection of data being logged, the connection to the +remote logging server needs to be authenticated and encrypted. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +rsyslog_remote_loghost_address='' + +params_to_add_if_missing=("protocol" "target" "port" "StreamDriver" "StreamDriverMode" "StreamDriverAuthMode" "streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose") +values_to_add_if_missing=("tcp" "$rsyslog_remote_loghost_address" "6514" "gtls" "1" "x509/name" "on") +params_to_replace_if_wrong_value=("protocol" "StreamDriver" "StreamDriverMode" "StreamDriverAuthMode" "streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose") +values_to_replace_if_wrong_value=("tcp" "gtls" "1" "x509/name" "on") + +files_containing_omfwd=("$(grep -ilE '^[^#]*\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd".*' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf)") +if [ -n "${files_containing_omfwd[*]}" ]; then + for file in "${files_containing_omfwd[@]}"; do + for ((i=0; i<${#params_to_replace_if_wrong_value[@]}; i++)); do + sed -i -E -e 'H;$!d;x;s/^\n//' -e "s|(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*[\"]omfwd[\"].*?)${params_to_replace_if_wrong_value[$i]}\s*=\s*[\"]\S*[\"](.*\))|\1${params_to_replace_if_wrong_value[$i]}=\"${values_to_replace_if_wrong_value[$i]}\"\2|gI" "$file" + done + for ((i=0; i<${#params_to_add_if_missing[@]}; i++)); do + if ! grep -qPzi "(?s)\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*[\"]omfwd[\"].*?${params_to_add_if_missing[$i]}.*?\).*" "$file"; then + sed -i -E -e 'H;$!d;x;s/^\n//' -e "s|(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*[\"]omfwd[\"])|\1\n${params_to_add_if_missing[$i]}=\"${values_to_add_if_missing[$i]}\"|gI" "$file" + fi + done + done +else + echo "action(type=\"omfwd\" protocol=\"tcp\" Target=\"$rsyslog_remote_loghost_address\" port=\"6514\" StreamDriver=\"gtls\" StreamDriverMode=\"1\" StreamDriverAuthMode=\"x509/name\" streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose=\"on\")" >> /etc/rsyslog.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value rsyslog_remote_loghost_address # promote to variable + set_fact: + rsyslog_remote_loghost_address: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: search for omfwd action directive + in rsyslog include files' + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc/rsyslog.d/ + pattern: '*.conf' + contains: ^\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd".* + register: rsyslog_includes_with_directive + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: search for omfwd action directive + in rsyslog main config file' + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: /etc + pattern: rsyslog.conf + contains: ^\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd".* + register: rsyslog_main_file_with_directive + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option parameters + to be inserted if entirely missing' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_parameters_to_add_if_missing: + - protocol + - target + - port + - StreamDriver + - StreamDriverMode + - StreamDriverAuthMode + - streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option values to + be inserted if entirely missing' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_values_to_add_if_missing: + - tcp + - '{{ rsyslog_remote_loghost_address }}' + - '6514' + - gtls + - '1' + - x509/name + - 'on' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option parameters + to be replaced if defined with wrong values' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_parameters_to_replace_if_wrong_value: + - protocol + - StreamDriver + - StreamDriverMode + - StreamDriverAuthMode + - streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: declare Rsyslog option values to + be replaced when having wrong value' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_values_to_replace_if_wrong_value: + - tcp + - gtls + - '1' + - x509/name + - 'on' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: assemble list of files with existing + directives' + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + rsyslog_files: '{{ rsyslog_includes_with_directive.files | map(attribute=''path'') + | list + rsyslog_main_file_with_directive.files | map(attribute=''path'') | + list }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: try to fix existing directives' + block: + + - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: Fix existing omfwd directives + by adjusting the value' + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: '{{ item[0] }}' + regexp: (?i)^(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd"[\s\S]*)({{ item[1][0] | regex_escape() + }}\s*=\s*"\S*")([\s\S]*\))$ + replace: \1{{ item[1][0] }}="{{ item[1][1] }}"\3 + loop: '{{ rsyslog_files | product (rsyslog_parameters_to_replace_if_wrong_value + | zip(rsyslog_values_to_replace_if_wrong_value)) | list }}' + + - name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: Fix existing omfwd directives + by adding parameter and value' + ansible.builtin.replace: + path: '{{ item[0] }}' + regexp: (?i)^(\s*action\s*\(\s*type\s*=\s*"omfwd"(?:[\s\S](?!{{ item[1][0] | + regex_escape() }}))*.)(\))$ + replace: \1 {{ item[1][0] }}="{{ item[1][1] }}" \2 + loop: '{{ rsyslog_files | product (rsyslog_parameters_to_add_if_missing | zip(rsyslog_values_to_add_if_missing)) + | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - rsyslog_includes_with_directive.matched or rsyslog_main_file_with_directive.matched + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + +- name: 'Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging: Add missing rsyslog directive' + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: /etc/rsyslog.conf + line: action(type="omfwd" protocol="tcp" Target="{{ rsyslog_remote_loghost_address + }}" port="6514" StreamDriver="gtls" StreamDriverMode="1" StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name" + streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose="on") + create: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not rsyslog_includes_with_directive.matched and not rsyslog_main_file_with_directive.matched + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-9(3) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - rsyslog_remote_tls + + + + + + + + + + Configure CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging + Configure CA certificate for rsyslog logging +to remote server using Transport Layer Security (TLS) +using correct path for the DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile +global option in /etc/rsyslog.conf, for example with the following command: +echo 'global(DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile="/etc/pki/tls/cert.pem")' >> /etc/rsyslog.conf +Replace the /etc/pki/tls/cert.pem in the above command with the path to the file with CA certificate generated for the purpose of remote logging. + Automatic remediation is not available as each organization has unique requirements. + BP28(R43) + 0988 + 1405 + FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The CA certificate needs to be set or rsyslog.service +fails to start with +error: ca certificate is not set, cannot continue + + + + + + + + + + + Network Configuration and Firewalls + Most systems must be connected to a network of some +sort, and this brings with it the substantial risk of network +attack. This section discusses the security impact of decisions +about networking which must be made when configuring a system. + +This section also discusses firewalls, network access +controls, and other network security frameworks, which allow +system-level rules to be written that can limit an attackers' ability +to connect to your system. These rules can specify that network +traffic should be allowed or denied from certain IP addresses, +hosts, and networks. The rules can also specify which of the +system's network services are available to particular hosts or +networks. + + Configure Multiple DNS Servers in /etc/resolv.conf + +Determine whether the system is using local or DNS name resolution with the +following command: +$ sudo grep hosts /etc/nsswitch.conf +hosts: files dns +If the DNS entry is missing from the host's line in the "/etc/nsswitch.conf" +file, the "/etc/resolv.conf" file must be empty. +Verify the "/etc/resolv.conf" file is empty with the following command: +$ sudo ls -al /etc/resolv.conf +-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Aug 19 08:31 resolv.conf +If the DNS entry is found on the host's line of the "/etc/nsswitch.conf" file, +then verify the following: + +Multiple Domain Name System (DNS) Servers should be configured +in /etc/resolv.conf. This provides redundant name resolution services +in the event that a domain server crashes. To configure the system to contain +as least 2 DNS servers, add a corresponding nameserver +ip_address entry in /etc/resolv.conf for each DNS +server where ip_address is the IP address of a valid DNS server. +For example: +search example.com +nameserver 192.168.0.1 +nameserver 192.168.0.2 + 12 + 15 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000366 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + SC-20(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + To provide availability for name resolution services, multiple redundant +name servers are mandated. A failure in name resolution could lead to the +failure of security functions requiring name resolution, which may include +time synchronization, centralized authentication, and remote system logging. + + + + + + + + + Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer + The system should not be acting as a network sniffer, which can +capture all traffic on the network to which it is connected. Run the following +to determine if any interface is running in promiscuous mode: +$ ip link | grep PROMISC +Promiscuous mode of an interface can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo ip link set dev device_name multicast off promisc off + 1 + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + APO11.06 + APO12.06 + BAI03.10 + BAI09.01 + BAI09.02 + BAI09.03 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.05 + DSS04.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.3.7 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + SR 7.8 + A.11.1.2 + A.11.2.4 + A.11.2.5 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.16.1.6 + A.8.1.1 + A.8.1.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + CM-7(2) + MA-3 + DE.DP-5 + ID.AM-1 + PR.IP-1 + PR.MA-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Network interfaces in promiscuous mode allow for the capture of all network traffic +visible to the system. If unauthorized individuals can access these applications, it +may allow them to collect information such as logon IDs, passwords, and key exchanges +between systems. + +If the system is being used to perform a network troubleshooting function, the use of these +tools must be documented with the Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) and restricted +to only authorized personnel. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +for interface in $(ip link show | grep -E '^[0-9]' | cut -d ":" -f 2); do + ip link set dev $interface multicast off promisc off +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer - Gather network interfaces + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: ip link show + register: network_interfaces + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(2) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MA-3 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - network_sniffer_disabled + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer - Disable promiscuous mode + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: ip link set dev {{ item.split(':')[1] }} multicast off promisc off + loop: '{{ network_interfaces.stdout_lines }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - item.split(':') | length == 3 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(2) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MA-3 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - network_sniffer_disabled + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + firewalld + The dynamic firewall daemon firewalld provides a +dynamically managed firewall with support for network “zones” to assign +a level of trust to a network and its associated connections and interfaces. +It has support for IPv4 and IPv6 firewall settings. It supports Ethernet +bridges and has a separation of runtime and permanent configuration options. +It also has an interface for services or applications to add firewall rules +directly. + +A graphical configuration tool, firewall-config, is used to configure +firewalld, which in turn uses iptables tool to communicate +with Netfilter in the kernel which implements packet filtering. + +The firewall service provided by firewalld is dynamic rather than +static because changes to the configuration can be made at anytime and are +immediately implemented. There is no need to save or apply the changes. No +unintended disruption of existing network connections occurs as no part of +the firewall has to be reloaded. + + + Configure Firewalld to Use the Nftables Backend + Firewalld can be configured with many backends, such as nftables. + CCI-002385 + SC-5 + SRG-OS-000420-GPOS-00186 + Nftables is modern kernel module for controling network connections coming into a system. +Utilizing the limit statement in "nftables" can help to mitigate DoS attacks. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q firewalld; }; then + +if [ -e "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*FirewallBackend\s*=\s*/d" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" +else + touch "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" + +cp "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^#\s*FirewallBackend'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^#\s*FirewallBackend" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^#\s*FirewallBackend', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "FirewallBackend=nftables" >> "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" > "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" + printf '%s\n' "FirewallBackend=nftables" >> "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" >> "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - firewalld-backend + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Setting unquoted shell-style assignment of 'FirewallBackend' to 'nftables' + in '/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf' + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*FirewallBackend= + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*FirewallBackend= + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + create: true + regexp: ^\s*FirewallBackend= + line: FirewallBackend=nftables + state: present + insertbefore: ^# FirewallBackend + validate: /usr/bin/bash -n %s + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - firewalld-backend + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Inspect and Activate Default firewalld Rules + Firewalls can be used to separate networks into different zones +based on the level of trust the user has decided to place on the devices and +traffic within that network. NetworkManager informs firewalld to which +zone an interface belongs. An interface's assigned zone can be changed by +NetworkManager or via the firewall-config tool. + +The zone settings in /etc/firewalld/ are a range of preset settings +which can be quickly applied to a network interface. These are the zones +provided by firewalld sorted according to the default trust level of the +zones from untrusted to trusted: +dropAny incoming network packets are dropped, there is no +reply. Only outgoing network connections are possible.blockAny incoming network connections are rejected with an +icmp-host-prohibited message for IPv4 and icmp6-adm-prohibited +for IPv6. Only network connections initiated from within the system are +possible.publicFor use in public areas. You do not trust the other +computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming +connections are accepted.externalFor use on external networks with masquerading enabled +especially for routers. You do not trust the other computers on the network to +not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.dmzFor computers in your demilitarized zone that are +publicly-accessible with limited access to your internal network. Only selected +incoming connections are accepted.workFor use in work areas. You mostly trust the other computers +on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are +accepted.homeFor use in home areas. You mostly trust the other computers +on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are +accepted.internalFor use on internal networks. You mostly trust the +other computers on the networks to not harm your computer. Only selected +incoming connections are accepted.trustedAll network connections are accepted. + +It is possible to designate one of these zones to be the default zone. When +interface connections are added to NetworkManager, they are assigned +to the default zone. On installation, the default zone in firewalld is set to +be the public zone. + +To find out all the settings of a zone, for example the public zone, +enter the following command as root: +# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all +Example output of this command might look like the following: + +# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all +public + interfaces: + services: mdns dhcpv6-client ssh + ports: + forward-ports: + icmp-blocks: source-quench + +To view the network zones currently active, enter the following command as root: +# firewall-cmd --get-service +The following listing displays the result of this command +on common Oracle Linux 9 system: + +# firewall-cmd --get-service +amanda-client bacula bacula-client dhcp dhcpv6 dhcpv6-client dns ftp +high-availability http https imaps ipp ipp-client ipsec kerberos kpasswd +ldap ldaps libvirt libvirt-tls mdns mountd ms-wbt mysql nfs ntp openvpn +pmcd pmproxy pmwebapi pmwebapis pop3s postgresql proxy-dhcp radius rpc-bind +samba samba-client smtp ssh telnet tftp tftp-client transmission-client +vnc-server wbem-https + +Finally to view the network zones that will be active after the next firewalld +service reload, enter the following command as root: +# firewall-cmd --get-service --permanent + + Install firewalld Package + The firewalld package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install firewalld + CCI-002314 + CM-6(a) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 + SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 + SRG-OS-000298-GPOS-00116 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232 + "Firewalld" provides an easy and effective way to block/limit remote access to the system via ports, services, and protocols. + +Remote access services, such as those providing remote access to network devices and information systems, which lack automated control capabilities, increase risk and make remote user access management difficult at best. + +Remote access is access to DoD nonpublic information systems by an authorized user (or an information system) communicating through an external, non-organization-controlled network. Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. + +Oracle Linux 9 functionality (e.g., SSH) must be capable of taking enforcement action if the audit reveals unauthorized activity. +Automated control of remote access sessions allows organizations to ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies by enforcing connection rules of remote access applications on a variety of information system components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smartphones, and tablets)." + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "firewalld" ; then + yum install -y "firewalld" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure firewalld is installed + package: + name: firewalld + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_firewalld_installed + + include install_firewalld + +class install_firewalld { + package { 'firewalld': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=firewalld + + +[[packages]] +name = "firewalld" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Verify firewalld Enabled + +The firewalld service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable firewalld.service + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.3 + 3.4.7 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000382 + CCI-002314 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CIP-003-8 R4 + CIP-003-8 R5 + CIP-004-6 R3 + AC-4 + CM-7(b) + CA-3(5) + SC-7(21) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 + SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00231 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232 + Access control methods provide the ability to enhance system security posture +by restricting services and known good IP addresses and address ranges. This +prevents connections from unknown hosts and protocols. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q firewalld; }; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'firewalld.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'firewalld.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'firewalld.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-4 + - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_firewalld_enabled + +- name: Enable service firewalld + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service firewalld + systemd: + name: firewalld + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-AC-4 + - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_firewalld_enabled + + include enable_firewalld + +class enable_firewalld { + service {'firewalld': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["firewalld"] + + + + + + + + + + + Strengthen the Default Ruleset + The default rules can be strengthened. The system +scripts that activate the firewall rules expect them to be defined +in configuration files under the /etc/firewalld/services +and /etc/firewalld/zones directories. + +The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the +default ruleset configuration file. An alternative to editing this +configuration file is to create a shell script that makes calls to +the firewall-cmd program to load in rules under the /etc/firewalld/services +and /etc/firewalld/zones directories. + +Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address +conventions for regular firewalld rules are used throughout this section. + The program firewall-config +allows additional services to penetrate the default firewall rules +and automatically adjusts the firewalld ruleset(s). + + Configure the Firewalld Ports + Configure the firewalld ports to allow approved services to have access to the system. +To configure firewalld to open ports, run the following command: +firewall-cmd --permanent --add-port=port_number/tcp +To configure firewalld to allow access for pre-defined services, run the following +command: +firewall-cmd --permanent --add-service=service_name + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000382 + CCI-002314 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + 1416 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + AC-4 + CM-7(b) + CA-3(5) + SC-7(21) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 + SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 + In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, +or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must +disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information +systems. + +Operating systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. +Some of the functions and services provided by default may not be necessary to support +essential organizational operations. +Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component +(e.g., VPN and IPS); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by +one component. + +To support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the operating system must +support the organizational requirements, providing only essential capabilities and limiting the +use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to +conduct official business. + + + + + + Firewalld Must Employ a Deny-all, Allow-by-exception Policy for Allowing Connections to Other Systems + Oracle Linux 9 incorporates the "firewalld" daemon, which allows for many different configurations. One of these configurations is zones. +Zones can be utilized to a deny-all, allow-by-exception approach. +The default "drop" zone will drop all incoming network packets unless it is explicitly allowed by the configuration file or is related to an outgoing network connection. + CCI-002314 + AC-17 (1) + SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 + Failure to restrict network connectivity only to authorized systems permits inbound connections from malicious systems. +It also permits outbound connections that may facilitate exfiltration of data. + + + + + + Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packets + To set the default zone to drop for +the built-in default zone which processes incoming IPv4 and IPv6 packets, +modify the following line in +/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf to be: +DefaultZone=drop + To prevent denying any access to the system, automatic remediation +of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as +a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined +above. + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + 5.10.1 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.3 + 3.4.7 + 3.13.6 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + 1416 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CA-3(5) + CM-7(b) + SC-7(23) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + FMT_MOF_EXT.1 + Req-1.4 + 1.5.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + In firewalld the default zone is applied only after all +the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the +default zone to drop implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. +any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be +accepted. + + + + + + + + + + + + IPSec Support + Support for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) +is provided with Libreswan. + + Install libreswan Package + The libreswan package provides an implementation of IPsec +and IKE, which permits the creation of secure tunnels over +untrusted networks. The libreswan package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install libreswan + 12 + 15 + 3 + 5 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + CCI-001130 + CCI-001131 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.6 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.4 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.15.1.1 + A.15.2.1 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.MA-2 + PR.PT-4 + Req-4.1 + 4.2.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061 + Providing the ability for remote users or systems +to initiate a secure VPN connection protects information when it is +transmitted over a wide area network. + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "libreswan" ; then + yum install -y "libreswan" +fi + + - name: Ensure libreswan is installed + package: + name: libreswan + state: present + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-4.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-4.2.1 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_libreswan_installed + + include install_libreswan + +class install_libreswan { + package { 'libreswan': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=libreswan + + +[[packages]] +name = "libreswan" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Verify Any Configured IPSec Tunnel Connections + Libreswan provides an implementation of IPsec +and IKE, which permits the creation of secure tunnels over +untrusted networks. As such, IPsec can be used to circumvent certain +network requirements such as filtering. Verify that if any IPsec connection +(conn) configured in /etc/ipsec.conf and /etc/ipsec.d +exists is an approved organizational connection. + Automatic remediation of this control is not available due to the unique +requirements of each system. + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 4 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000336 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-17(a) + MA-4(6) + CM-6(a) + AC-4 + SC-8 + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + IP tunneling mechanisms can be used to bypass network filtering. + + + + + + + iptables and ip6tables + A host-based firewall called netfilter is included as +part of the Linux kernel distributed with the system. It is +activated by default. This firewall is controlled by the program +iptables, and the entire capability is frequently referred to by +this name. An analogous program called ip6tables handles filtering +for IPv6. + +Unlike TCP Wrappers, which depends on the network server +program to support and respect the rules written, netfilter +filtering occurs at the kernel level, before a program can even +process the data from the network packet. As such, any program on +the system is affected by the rules written. + +This section provides basic information about strengthening +the iptables and ip6tables configurations included with the system. +For more complete information that may allow the construction of a +sophisticated ruleset tailored to your environment, please consult +the references at the end of this section. + + Inspect and Activate Default Rules + View the currently-enforced iptables rules by running +the command: +$ sudo iptables -nL --line-numbers +The command is analogous for ip6tables. + +If the firewall does not appear to be active (i.e., no rules +appear), activate it and ensure that it starts at boot by issuing +the following commands (and analogously for ip6tables): +$ sudo service iptables restart +The default iptables rules are: +Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) +num target prot opt source destination +1 ACCEPT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED +2 ACCEPT icmp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 +3 ACCEPT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 +4 ACCEPT tcp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state NEW tcp dpt:22 +5 REJECT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 reject-with icmp-host-prohibited + +Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) +num target prot opt source destination +1 REJECT all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 reject-with icmp-host-prohibited + +Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) +num target prot opt source destination +The ip6tables default rules are essentially the same. + + Verify ip6tables Enabled if Using IPv6 + +The ip6tables service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable ip6tables.service + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R4 + CIP-003-8 R5 + CIP-004-6 R3 + AC-4 + CM-7(b) + CA-3(5) + SC-7(21) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + The ip6tables service provides the system's host-based firewalling +capability for IPv6 and ICMPv6. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ip6tables.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ip6tables.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ip6tables.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service ip6tables + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service ip6tables + systemd: + name: ip6tables + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"iptables-ipv6" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-4 + - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ip6tables_enabled + + include enable_ip6tables + +class enable_ip6tables { + service {'ip6tables': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["ip6tables"] + + + + + + + + + + Verify iptables Enabled + +The iptables service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable iptables.service + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R4 + CIP-003-8 R5 + CIP-004-6 R3 + AC-4 + CM-7(b) + CA-3(5) + SC-7(21) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + The iptables service provides the system's host-based firewalling +capability for IPv4 and ICMP. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'iptables.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'iptables.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'iptables.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service iptables + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service iptables + systemd: + name: iptables + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"iptables" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-4 + - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_iptables_enabled + + include enable_iptables + +class enable_iptables { + service {'iptables': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["iptables"] + + + + + + + + + + Set Default ip6tables Policy for Incoming Packets + To set the default policy to DROP (instead of ACCEPT) for +the built-in INPUT chain which processes incoming packets, +add or correct the following line in +/etc/sysconfig/ip6tables: +:INPUT DROP [0:0] +If changes were required, reload the ip6tables rules: +$ sudo service ip6tables reload + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R4 + CIP-003-8 R5 + CIP-004-6 R3 + AC-4 + CM-7(b) + CA-3(5) + SC-7(21) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 1.4.1 + In ip6tables, the default policy is applied only after all +the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the +default policy to DROP implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. +any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be +accepted. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( ! ( rpm --quiet -q nftables ) && ! ( rpm --quiet -q ufw ) && rpm --quiet -q iptables ); then + +sed -i 's/^:INPUT ACCEPT.*/:INPUT DROP [0:0]/g' /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + Set configuration for IPv6 loopback traffic + Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. +Configure all other interfaces to deny traffic to the loopback +network. + Changing firewall settings while connected over network can +result in being locked out of the system. + Req-1.3 + 1.4.1 + Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is +typically critical to operation of the system. The loopback interface +is the only place that loopback network traffic should be seen, +all other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network as an +anti-spoofing measure. + + + + + + + Set configuration for loopback traffic + Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. +Configure all other interfaces to deny traffic to the loopback +network. + Changing firewall settings while connected over network can +result in being locked out of the system. + Req-1.3 + 1.4.1 + Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is +typically critical to operation of the system. The loopback interface +is the only place that loopback network traffic should be seen, all +other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network as an +anti-spoofing measure. + + + + + + + + Strengthen the Default Ruleset + The default rules can be strengthened. The system +scripts that activate the firewall rules expect them to be defined +in the configuration files iptables and ip6tables in the directory +/etc/sysconfig. Many of the lines in these files are similar +to the command line arguments that would be provided to the programs +/sbin/iptables or /sbin/ip6tables - but some are quite +different. + +The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the +default ruleset configuration file. An alternative to editing this +configuration file is to create a shell script that makes calls to +the iptables program to load in rules, and then invokes service +iptables save to write those loaded rules to +/etc/sysconfig/iptables. + +The following alterations can be made directly to +/etc/sysconfig/iptables and /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables. +Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address +conventions for regular iptables are used throughout this section; +configuration for ip6tables will be either analogous or explicitly +covered. + The program system-config-securitylevel +allows additional services to penetrate the default firewall rules +and automatically adjusts /etc/sysconfig/iptables. This program +is only useful if the default ruleset meets your security +requirements. Otherwise, this program should not be used to make +changes to the firewall configuration because it re-writes the +saved configuration file. + + Set Default iptables Policy for Incoming Packets + To set the default policy to DROP (instead of ACCEPT) for +the built-in INPUT chain which processes incoming packets, +add or correct the following line in +/etc/sysconfig/iptables: +:INPUT DROP [0:0] + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CA-3(5) + CM-7(b) + SC-7(23) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + In iptables the default policy is applied only after all +the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the +default policy to DROP implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. +any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be +accepted. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( ! ( rpm --quiet -q nftables ) && ! ( rpm --quiet -q ufw ) ); then + +sed -i 's/^:INPUT ACCEPT.*/:INPUT DROP [0:0]/g' /etc/sysconfig/iptables + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + Set Default iptables Policy for Forwarded Packets + To set the default policy to DROP (instead of ACCEPT) for +the built-in FORWARD chain which processes packets that will be forwarded from +one interface to another, +add or correct the following line in +/etc/sysconfig/iptables: +:FORWARD DROP [0:0] + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CA-3(5) + CM-7(b) + SC-7(23) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + In iptables, the default policy is applied only after all +the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the +default policy to DROP implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. +any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be +accepted. + sed -i 's/^:FORWARD ACCEPT.*/:FORWARD DROP [0:0]/g' /etc/sysconfig/iptables + + + + + + + Restrict ICMP Message Types + In /etc/sysconfig/iptables, the accepted ICMP messages +types can be restricted. To accept only ICMP echo reply, destination +unreachable, and time exceeded messages, remove the line: +-A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type any -j ACCEPT +and insert the lines: +-A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT +-A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT +-A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT +To allow the system to respond to pings, also insert the following line: +-A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT +Ping responses can also be limited to certain networks or hosts by using the -s +option in the previous rule. Because IPv6 depends so heavily on ICMPv6, it is +preferable to deny the ICMPv6 packets you know you don't need (e.g. ping +requests) in /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables, while letting everything else +through: +-A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type echo-request -j DROP +If you are going to statically configure the system's address, it should +ignore Router Advertisements which could add another IPv6 address to the +interface or alter important network settings: +-A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type router-advertisement -j DROP +Restricting ICMPv6 message types in /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables is not +recommended because the operation of IPv6 depends heavily on ICMPv6. Thus, great +care must be taken if any other ICMPv6 types are blocked. + + + Log and Drop Packets with Suspicious Source Addresses + Packets with non-routable source addresses should be rejected, as they may indicate spoofing. Because the +modified policy will reject non-matching packets, you only need to add these rules if you are interested in also +logging these spoofing or suspicious attempts before they are dropped. If you do choose to log various suspicious +traffic, add identical rules with a target of DROP after each LOG. +To log and then drop these IPv4 packets, insert the following rules in /etc/sysconfig/iptables (excepting +any that are intentionally used): +-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF A: " +-A INPUT -s 172.16.0.0/12 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF B: " +-A INPUT -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF C: " +-A INPUT -s 224.0.0.0/4 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP MULTICAST D: " +-A INPUT -s 240.0.0.0/5 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP SPOOF E: " +-A INPUT -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP LOOPBACK: " +Similarly, you might wish to log packets containing some IPv6 reserved addresses if they are not expected +on your network: +-A INPUT -i eth0 -s ::1 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 DROP LOOPBACK: " +-A INPUT -s 2002:E000::/20 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " +-A INPUT -s 2002:7F00::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " +-A INPUT -s 2002:0000::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " +-A INPUT -s 2002:FF00::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " +-A INPUT -s 2002:0A00::/24 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " +-A INPUT -s 2002:AC10::/28 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " +-A INPUT -s 2002:C0A8::/32 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 TRAFFIC: " +If you are not expecting to see site-local multicast or auto-tunneled traffic, you can log those: +-A INPUT -s FF05::/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 SITE-LOCAL MULTICAST: " +-A INPUT -s ::0.0.0.0/96 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv4 COMPATIBLE IPv6 ADDR: " +If you wish to block multicasts to all link-local nodes (e.g. if you are not using router auto-configuration and +do not plan to have any services that multicast to the entire local network), you can block the link-local +all-nodes multicast address (before accepting incoming ICMPv6): +-A INPUT -d FF02::1 -j LOG --log-prefix "Link-local All-Nodes Multicast: " +However, if you're going to allow IPv4 compatible IPv6 addresses (of the form ::0.0.0.0/96), you should +then consider logging the non-routable IPv4-compatible addresses: +-A INPUT -s ::0.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP NON-ROUTABLE ADDR: " +-A INPUT -s ::127.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP LOOPBACK: " +-A INPUT -s ::224.0.0.0.0/100 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP DROP MULTICAST D: " +-A INPUT -s ::255.0.0.0/104 -j LOG --log-prefix "IP BROADCAST: " +If you are not expecting to see any IPv4 (or IPv4-compatible) traffic on your network, consider logging it before it gets dropped: +-A INPUT -s ::FFFF:0.0.0.0/96 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv4 MAPPED IPv6 ADDR: " +-A INPUT -s 2002::/16 -j LOG --log-prefix "IPv6 6to4 ADDR: " +The following rule will log all traffic originating from a site-local address, which is deprecated address space: +-A INPUT -s FEC0::/10 -j LOG --log-prefix "SITE-LOCAL ADDRESS TRAFFIC: " + + + + + IPv6 + The system includes support for Internet Protocol +version 6. A major and often-mentioned improvement over IPv4 is its +enormous increase in the number of available addresses. Another +important feature is its support for automatic configuration of +many network settings. + + Disable Support for IPv6 Unless Needed + Despite configuration that suggests support for IPv6 has +been disabled, link-local IPv6 address auto-configuration occurs +even when only an IPv4 address is assigned. The only way to +effectively prevent execution of the IPv6 networking stack is to +instruct the system not to activate the IPv6 kernel module. + + Disable IPv6 Networking Support Automatic Loading + To prevent the IPv6 kernel module (ipv6) from binding to the +IPv6 networking stack, add the following line to +/etc/modprobe.d/disabled.conf (or another file in +/etc/modprobe.d): +options ipv6 disable=1 +This permits the IPv6 module to be loaded (and thus satisfy other modules that +depend on it), while disabling support for the IPv6 protocol. + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Any unnecessary network stacks - including IPv6 - should be disabled, to reduce +the vulnerability to exploitation. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Prevent the IPv6 kernel module (ipv6) from loading the IPv6 networking stack +echo "options ipv6 disable=1" > /etc/modprobe.d/ipv6.conf + +# Since according to: https://access.redhat.com/solutions/72733 +# "ipv6 disable=1" options doesn't always disable the IPv6 networking stack from +# loading, instruct also sysctl configuration to disable IPv6 according to: +# https://access.redhat.com/solutions/8709#rhel6disable + +declare -a IPV6_SETTINGS=("net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6" "net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6") + +for setting in "${IPV6_SETTINGS[@]}" +do + # Set runtime =1 for setting + /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w "$setting=1" + + # If setting is present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" + # else, add "$setting = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf + if grep -q ^"$setting" /etc/sysctl.conf ; then + sed -i "s/^$setting.*/$setting = 1/g" /etc/sysctl.conf + else + echo "" >> /etc/sysctl.conf + echo "# Set $setting = 1 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf + echo "$setting = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.conf + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Disable IPv6 Networking kernel module + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/ipv6.conf + regexp: ^options\s+ipv6\s+disable=\d + line: options ipv6 disable=1 + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_ipv6_option_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure disable_ipv6 (all and default) is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: '{{ item }}' + value: '1' + state: present + reload: true + with_items: + - net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 + - net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_ipv6_option_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces + To disable support for (ipv6) addressing on all interface add the following line to +/etc/sysctl.d/ipv6.conf (or another file in /etc/sysctl.d): +net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1 +This disables IPv6 on all network interfaces as other services and system +functionality require the IPv6 stack loaded to work. + BP28(R13) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-001551 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Any unnecessary network stacks - including IPv6 - should be disabled, to reduce +the vulnerability to exploitation. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6="1" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6 + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6 + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6 + + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + To disable support for (ipv6) addressing on interfaces by default add the following line to +/etc/sysctl.d/ipv6.conf (or another file in /etc/sysctl.d): +net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1 +This disables IPv6 on network interfaces by default as other services and system +functionality require the IPv6 stack loaded to work. + BP28(R13) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-001551 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Any unnecessary network stacks - including IPv6 - should be disabled, to reduce +the vulnerability to exploitation. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6="1" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6 + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6 + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6 + + + + + + + + + + + Configure IPv6 Settings if Necessary + A major feature of IPv6 is the extent to which systems +implementing it can automatically configure their networking +devices using information from the network. From a security +perspective, manually configuring important configuration +information is preferable to accepting it from the network +in an unauthenticated fashion. + + + IPV6_AUTOCONF + Toggle global IPv6 auto-configuration (only, if global +forwarding is disabled) + no + no + yes + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr + Accept default router in router advertisements? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo + Accept prefix information in router advertisements? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref + Accept router preference in router advertisements? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra + Accept all router advertisements? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects + Toggle ICMP Redirect Acceptance + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route + Trackers could be using source-routed packets to +generate traffic that seems to be intra-net, but actually was +created outside and has been redirected. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf + Enable auto configuration on IPv6 interfaces + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding + Toggle IPv6 Forwarding + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses + Maximum number of autoconfigured IPv6 addresses + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations + Accept all router solicitations? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr + Accept default router in router advertisements? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo + Accept prefix information in router advertisements? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref + Accept router preference in router advertisements? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra + Accept default router advertisements by default? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects + Toggle ICMP Redirect Acceptance By Default + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route + Trackers could be using source-routed packets to +generate traffic that seems to be intra-net, but actually was +created outside and has been redirected. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf + Enable auto configuration on IPv6 interfaces + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.forwarding + Toggle IPv6 default Forwarding + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses + Maximum number of autoconfigured IPv6 addresses + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations + Accept all router solicitations by default? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = 0 + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001551 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + CM-6(b) + CM-6.1(iv) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 4 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers +forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can +be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the +forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv6 forwarding is enabled and +the system is functioning as a router. + +Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv6 protocol has few legitimate +uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0 + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + CM-6(b) + CM-6.1(iv) + DE.CM-1 + PR.DS-4 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + IP forwarding permits the kernel to forward packets from one network +interface to another. The ability to forward packets between two networks is +only appropriate for systems acting as routers. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses = 1 + BP28(R22) + The number of global unicast IPv6 addresses for each interface should be limited exactly to the number of statically configured addresses. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations = 0 + BP28(R22) + To prevent discovery of the system by other systems, router solicitation requests should be denied. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = 0 + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001551 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 4 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + CM-6(b) + CM-6.1(iv) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.4.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers +forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can +be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the +forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv6 forwarding is enabled and +the system is functioning as a router. + +Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv6 protocol has few legitimate +uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0 + BP28(R22) + An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 1 + BP28(R22) + The number of global unicast IPv6 addresses for each interface should be limited exactly to the number of statically configured addresses. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0 + BP28(R22) + To prevent discovery of the system by other systems, router solicitation requests should be denied. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value" + +# +# If net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations + from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations + replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Network-Transmitted Configuration if Using Static IPv6 Addresses + To limit the configuration information requested from other +systems and accepted from the network on a system that uses +statically-configured IPv6 addresses, add the following lines to +/etc/sysctl.conf: +net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations = 0 +net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref = 0 +net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo = 0 +net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr = 0 +net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf = 0 +net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits = 0 +net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses = 1 +The router_solicitations setting determines how many router +solicitations are sent when bringing up the interface. If addresses are +statically assigned, there is no need to send any solicitations. + +The accept_ra_pinfo setting controls whether the system will accept +prefix info from the router. + +The accept_ra_defrtr setting controls whether the system will accept +Hop Limit settings from a router advertisement. Setting it to 0 prevents a +router from changing your default IPv6 Hop Limit for outgoing packets. + +The autoconf setting controls whether router advertisements can cause +the system to assign a global unicast address to an interface. + +The dad_transmits setting determines how many neighbor solicitations +to send out per address (global and link-local) when bringing up an interface +to ensure the desired address is unique on the network. + +The max_addresses setting determines how many global unicast IPv6 +addresses can be assigned to each interface. The default is 16, but it should +be set to exactly the number of statically configured global addresses +required. + + + + + Kernel Parameters Which Affect Networking + The sysctl utility is used to set +parameters which affect the operation of the Linux kernel. Kernel parameters +which affect networking and have security implications are described here. + + Network Related Kernel Runtime Parameters for Hosts and Routers + Certain kernel parameters should be set for systems which are +acting as either hosts or routers to improve the system's ability defend +against certain types of IPv4 protocol attacks. + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects + Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route + Trackers could be using source-routed packets to +generate traffic that seems to be intra-net, but actually was +created outside and has been redirected. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_filter + Controls whether the ARP filter is enabled or not. + +1 - Allows you to have multiple network interfaces on the same subnet, and have the ARPs for each +interface be answered based on whether or not the kernel would route a packet from the ARP’d IP out that interface. +In other words it allows control of which cards (usually 1) will respond to an ARP request. + +0 - (default) The kernel can respond to arp requests with addresses from other interfaces. +This may seem wrong but it usually makes sense, because it increases the chance of successful communication. +IP addresses are owned by the complete host on Linux, not by particular interfaces. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_ignore + Control the response modes for ARP queries that resolve local target IP addresses: + +0 - (default): reply for any local target IP address, configured on any interface +1 - reply only if the target IP address is local address configured on the incoming interface +2 - reply only if the target IP address is local address configured on the incoming interface and both with the sender’s IP address are part from same subnet on this interface +3 - do not reply for local addresses configured with scope host, only resolutions for global and link addresses are replied +4-7 - reserved +8 - do not reply for all local addresses + 0 + 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 8 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding + Toggle IPv4 Forwarding + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians + Disable so you don't Log Spoofed Packets, Source +Routed Packets, Redirect Packets + 1 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter + Enable to enforce sanity checking, also called ingress +filtering or egress filtering. The point is to drop a packet if the +source and destination IP addresses in the IP header do not make +sense when considered in light of the physical interface on which +it arrived. + 1 + 1 + 2 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects + Enable to prevent hijacking of routing path by only +allowing redirects from gateways known in routing +table. Disable to refuse acceptance of secure ICMP redirected packets on all interfaces. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media + Controls whether the system can send (router) or accept (host) RFC1620 shared media redirects. +shared_media for the interface will be enabled if at least one of conf/{all,interface}/shared_media +is set to TRUE, it will be disabled otherwise. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects + Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route + Disable IP source routing? + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians + Disable so you don't Log Spoofed Packets, Source +Routed Packets, Redirect Packets + 1 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter + Enables source route verification + 1 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects + Enable to prevent hijacking of routing path by only +allowing redirects from gateways known in routing +table. Disable to refuse acceptance of secure ICMP redirected packages by default. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media + Controls whether the system can send(router) or accept(host) RFC1620 shared media redirects. +shared_media for the interface will be enabled if at least one of conf/{all,interface}/shared_media +is set to TRUE, it will be disabled otherwise. + 0 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts + Ignore all ICMP ECHO and TIMESTAMP requests sent to it +via broadcast/multicast + 1 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + Enable to prevent unnecessary logging + 1 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit + Configure the maximal rate for sending duplicate acknowledgments in +response to incoming invalid TCP packets. + 500 + 1000 + 500 + 250 + 100 + + + net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 + Enable to enable TCP behavior conformant with RFC 1337 + 1 + 0 + 1 + + + net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies + Enable to turn on TCP SYN Cookie +Protection + 1 + 0 + 1 + + + Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local = 0 + BP28(R12) + Configure net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local=0 to consider as invalid the packets +received from outside whose source is the 127.0.0.0/8 address block. +In combination with suitable routing, this can be used to direct packets between two +local interfaces over the wire and have them accepted properly. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local="0" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.1 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001503 + CCI-001551 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.CM-1 + PR.DS-4 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more +direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the +host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect +message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. + +This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be +disabled unless absolutely required." + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers +forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, +which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement +applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv4 +forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router. + +Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate +uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route + + + + + + + + + + + Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter= +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = + This behaviour may cause problems to system on a high availability or load balancing configuration. + BP28(R12) + Prevents the Linux Kernel from handling the ARP table globally. +By default, the kernel may respond to an ARP request from a certain interface with information +from another interface. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore= +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore = + The ARP response mode may impact behaviour of workloads and firewalls on the system. + BP28(R12) + Avoids ARP Flux on system that have more than one interface on the same subnet. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore + + + + + + + + + + + Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp = 1 + This can cause problems if ARP proxies are used in the network. + BP28(R12) + Drop Gratuitous ARP frames to prevent ARP poisoning. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp="1" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1 + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000126 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5(3)(a) + DE.CM-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.DS-4 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The presence of "martian" packets (which have impossible addresses) +as well as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects could be a +sign of nefarious network activity. Logging these packets enables this activity +to be detected. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet = 0 + BP28(R12) + Refuse the routing of packets whose source or destination address is the local loopback. +This prohibits the use of network 127/8 for local routing purposes. +Enabling route_localnet can expose applications listening on localhost to external traffic. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet="0" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001551 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.4.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses +that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were +received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for +complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small +networks. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-001503 + CCI-001551 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.4.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as +default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is +absolutely required. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media= +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media = + BP28(R12) + This setting should be aligned with net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects because it overrides it. +If shared_media is enabled for an interface secure_redirects will be enabled too. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001551 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.4.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more +direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the +host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect +message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack. +This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should +be disabled unless absolutely required. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001551 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers +forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, +which can be used to bypass network security measures. + +Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate +uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required, such as when +IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is legitimately functioning as a +router. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1 + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.04 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000126 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5(3)(a) + DE.CM-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.DS-4 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The presence of "martian" packets (which have impossible addresses) +as well as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects could be a +sign of nefarious network activity. Logging these packets enables this activity +to be detected. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses +that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were +received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for +complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small +networks. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-001551 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as +default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is +absolutely required. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects from + config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media= +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media = + BP28(R12) + This setting should be aligned with net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects because it overrides it. +If shared_media is enabled for an interface secure_redirects will be enabled too. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1 + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.4.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Responding to broadcast (ICMP) echoes facilitates network mapping +and provides a vector for amplification attacks. + +Ignoring ICMP echo requests (pings) sent to broadcast or multicast +addresses makes the system slightly more difficult to enumerate on the network. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts="$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts + replace: '#net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + DE.CM-1 + PR.DS-4 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Req-1.4.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Ignoring bogus ICMP error responses reduces +log size, although some activity would not be logged. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses="$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + - unknown_severity + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + replace: '#net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + - unknown_severity +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + - unknown_severity + + + + + + + + + + + Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range=32768 65535 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 32768 65535 + BP28(R22) + This setting defines the local port range that is used by TCP and UDP to +choose the local port. The first number is the first, the second the last +local port number. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="32768 65535" + +# +# If net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "32768 65535" +# else, add "net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 32768 65535" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "32768 65535" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range + replace: '#net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range is set to 32768 65535 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range + value: 32768 65535 + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments + Make sure that the system is configured to limit the maximal rate for sending +duplicate acknowledgments in response to incoming TCP packets that are for +an existing connection but that are invalid due to any of these reasons: + +(a) out-of-window sequence number, (b) out-of-window acknowledgment number, +or (c) PAWS (Protection Against Wrapped Sequence numbers) check failure +This measure protects against or limits effects of DoS attacks against the system. +Set the system to implement rate-limiting measures by adding the following line to +/etc/sysctl.conf or a configuration file in the /etc/sysctl.d/ directory +(or modify the line to have the required value): +net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit = +Issue the following command to make the changes take effect: +# sysctl --system + CCI-002385 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + SC-5 + SRG-OS-000420-GPOS-00186 + Denial of Service (DoS) is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When +this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must +operate at degraded capacity. + +This can help mitigate simple “ack loop” DoS attacks, wherein a buggy or +malicious middlebox or man-in-the-middle can rewrite TCP header fields in +manner that causes each endpoint to think that the other is sending invalid +TCP segments, thus causing each side to send an unterminating stream of +duplicate acknowledgments for invalid segments. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit="$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit + replace: '#net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1 + BP28(R22) + Enable TCP behavior conformant with RFC 1337. When disabled, if a RST is +received in TIME_WAIT state, we close the socket immediately without waiting +for the end of the TIME_WAIT period. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337="$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337 + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 + replace: '#net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337 +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337 + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001095 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5(1) + SC-5(2) + SC-5(3)(a) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.4.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000420-GPOS-00186 + SRG-OS-000142-GPOS-00071 + A TCP SYN flood attack can cause a denial of service by filling a +system's TCP connection table with connections in the SYN_RCVD state. +Syncookies can be used to track a connection when a subsequent ACK is received, +verifying the initiator is attempting a valid connection and is not a flood +source. This feature is activated when a flood condition is detected, and +enables the system to continue servicing valid connection requests. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies="$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value" + +# +# If net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies + replace: '#net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies is set + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies + value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies + + + + + + + + + + + + Network Parameters for Hosts Only + If the system is not going to be used as a router, then setting certain +kernel parameters ensure that the host will not perform routing +of network traffic. + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + 1.4.2 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more +direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information +from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology. + +The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects="0" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0 + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 5.10.1.1 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.AE-1 + DE.CM-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more +direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information +from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology. + +The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects="0" + +# +# If net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects + replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces + To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_forward kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0 + Certain technologies such as virtual machines, containers, etc. rely on IPv4 forwarding to enable and use networking. +Disabling IPv4 forwarding would cause those technologies to stop working. Therefore, this rule should not be used in +profiles or benchmarks that target usage of IPv4 forwarding. + BP28(R22) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 3 + 7 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.20 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.17.2.1 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R4 + CIP-007-3 R4.1 + CIP-007-3 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SC-5 + CM-6(a) + SC-7(a) + DE.CM-1 + PR.DS-4 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.3.1 + Req-1.3.2 + 1.4.2 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Routing protocol daemons are typically used on routers to exchange +network topology information with other routers. If this capability is used when +not required, system network information may be unnecessarily transmitted across +the network. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_forward from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.ipv4.ip_forward" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.ipv4.ip_forward +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.ip_forward="0" + +# +# If net.ipv4.ip_forward present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.ip_forward") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.ip_forward\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.ip_forward\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_forward from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward + replace: '#net.ipv4.ip_forward' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: net.ipv4.ip_forward + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.20 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-SC-5 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward + + + + + + + + + + + + nftables + If firewalld or iptables are being used in your environment, please follow the guidance in their +respective section and pass-over the guidance in this section. +nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of network +packets/datagrams/frames and is the successor to iptables. The biggest change with the +successor nftables is its simplicity. With iptables, we have to configure every single rule and +use the syntax which can be compared with normal commands. With nftables, the simpler +syntax, much like BPF (Berkely Packet Filter) means shorter lines and less repetition. +Support for nftables should also be compiled into the kernel, together with the related +nftables modules. + +It is available in Linux kernels >= 3.13. Please ensure that your kernel +supports nftables before choosing this option. + + Nftables Base Chain Hooks + The possible hooks which can be used to configure the base chain are: +ingress (only in netdev family since Linux kernel 4.2, and inet family since Linux kernel 5.10): +sees packets immediately after they are passed up from the NIC driver, before even prerouting. +prerouting sees all incoming packets, before any routing decision has been made. +Packets may be addressed to the local or remote systems. +input sees incoming packets that are addressed to and have now been routed +to the local system and processes running there. +forward sees incoming packets that are not addressed to the local system. +output sees packets that originated from processes in the local machine. +postrouting sees all packets after routing, just before they leave the +local system. + input,forward,output + ingress + prerouting + input + forward + output + postrouting + input,forward,output + + + Nftables Chain Names + The rules in nftables are attached to chains. Unlike in iptables, +there are no predefined chains like INPUT, OUTPUT, etc. Instead, +to filter packets at a particular processing step, a base chain with a +chosen name should be created, and attached it to the appropriate +Netfilter hook. + + input,forward,output + input + output + forward + input,forward,output + + + Nftables Base Chain Policies + This is the default verdict that will be applied to packets reaching the end of the chain +(i.e, no more rules to be evaluated against). +Currently there are 2 policies: +accept this verdict means that the packet will keep traversing the network stack. +drop this verdict means that the packet is discarded if the packet reaches the end +of the base chain. + accept,accept,accept + accept + drop + accept,accept,accept + + + Nftables Base Chain Priorities + Each nftables base chain is assigned a priority that defines its ordering +among other base chains, flowtables, and Netfilter internal operations at +the same hook. For example, a chain on the prerouting hook with priority +-300 will be placed before connection tracking operations. +Netfilter Internal Priority for inet, ip, ip6: +NF_IP_PRI_RAW_BEFORE_DEFRAG Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a +NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_DEFRAG Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Packet defragmentation / datagram reassembly +NF_IP_PRI_RAW Typical hooks: all; nft Keyword: raw; Description: Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Traditional priority of +the raw table placed before connection tracking operation +NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST Typical hooks: n/a; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: SELinux operations +NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK Typical hooks: prerouting, output;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Connection tracking processes run early in prerouting and +output hooks to associate packets with tracked connections. +NF_IP_PRI_MANGLE Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: mangle; Description: Mangle operation +NF_IP_PRI_NAT_DST Typical hooks: prerouting;nft Keyword: dstnat; Description: Destination NAT +NF_IP_PRI_FILTER Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: filter; Description: Filtering operation, the filter table +NF_IP_PRI_SECURITY Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: security; Description: Place of security table, where secmark can be set for example +NF_IP_PRI_NAT_SRC Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: srcnat; Description: Source NAT +NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: SELinux at packet exit +NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_HELPER Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Connection tracking helpers, which identify expected and +related packets. +NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_CONFIRM Typical hooks: input,postrouting;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: Connection tracking adds new tracked connections +at final step in input and postrouting hooks. +Netfilter Internal Priority for bridge: +NF_BR_PRI_NAT_DST_BRIDGED Typical hooks: prerouting; nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a +NF_BR_PRI_FILTER_BRIDGED Typical hooks: all;nft Keyword: filter; Description: n/a +NF_BR_PRI_BRNF Typical hooks: n/a;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a +NF_BR_PRI_NAT_DST_OTHER Typical hooks: output;nft Keyword: out; Description: n/a +NF_BR_PRI_FILTER_OTHER Typical hooks: n/a;nft Keyword: n/a; Description: n/a +NF_BR_PRI_NAT_SRC Typical hooks: postrouting;nft Keyword: srcnat; Description: n/a + 0,0,0 + -450 + -400 + -300 + -225 + -200 + -150 + -100 + 0 + 50 + 100 + 225 + 300 + 2147483647 + -300 + -200 + 0 + 100 + 200 + 300 + 0,0,0 + + + Nftables Base Chain Types + Base chains are those that are registered into the Netfilter hooks, +i.e. these chains see packets flowing through the Linux TCP/IP stack. +The possible chain types are: +filter, which is used to filter packets. This is supported by +the arp, bridge, ip, ip6 and inet table families. +route, which is used to reroute packets if any relevant IP +header field or the packet mark is modified. This chain type provides +equivalent semantics to the mangle table but only for the output hook +(for other hooks use type filter instead). This is supported by the +ip, ip6 and inet table families. +nat, which is used to perform Networking Address Translation (NAT). +Only the first packet of a given flow hits this chain; subsequent packets bypass it. +This chain should be never used for filtering. The nat chain type +is supported by the ip, ip6 and inet table families. + + filter,filter,filter + filter + route + nat + filter,filter,filter + + + Nftables Families + Netfilter enables filtering at multiple networking levels. With iptables there +is a separate tool for each level: iptables, ip6tables, arptables, ebtables. +With nftables the multiple networking levels are abstracted into families, +all of which are served by the single tool nft. +ipTables of this family see IPv4 traffic/packets. +ip6Tables of this family see IPv6 traffic/packets. +inetTables of this family see both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic/packets, +simplifying dual stack support. +arpTables of this family see ARP-level (i.e, L2) traffic, before +any L3 handling is done by the kernel. +bridgeTables of this family see traffic/packets traversing bridges +(i.e. switching). No assumptions are made about L3 protocols. +netdevThe netdev family is different from the others in that it +is used to create base chains attached to a single network interface. Such +base chains see all network traffic on the specified interface, with no +assumptions about L2 or L3 protocols. Therefore you can filter ARP traffic from here. + inet + ip + ip6 + inet + arp + bridge + netdev + + + Nftables Master configuration file + The file which contains top level configuration for nftables service, and with which, +the service is started. + /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf + /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf + /etc/nftables.conf + + + Nftables Tables + Tables in nftables hold chains. Each table only has one address family and only applies +to packets of this family. Tables can have one of six families. + + filter + filter + firewalld + + + + SuSEfirewall2 + The SuSEfirewall2 provides a managed firewall. + + + Uncomplicated Firewall (ufw) + The Linux kernel in Ubuntu provides a packet filtering system called +netfilter, and the traditional interface for manipulating netfilter are +the iptables suite of commands. iptables provide a complete firewall +solution that is both highly configurable and highly flexible. + +Becoming proficient in iptables takes time, and getting started with +netfilter firewalling using only iptables can be a daunting task. As a +result, many frontends for iptables have been created over the years, +each trying to achieve a different result and targeting a different +audience. + +The Uncomplicated Firewall (ufw) is a frontend for iptables and is +particularly well-suited for host-based firewalls. ufw provides a +framework for managing netfilter, as well as a command-line interface +for manipulating the firewall. ufw aims to provide an easy to use +interface for people unfamiliar with firewall concepts, while at the +same time simplifies complicated iptables commands to help an +administrator who knows what he or she is doing. ufw is an upstream +for other distributions and graphical frontends. + + + Verify ufw Enabled + +The ufw service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable ufw.service + CCI-002314 + SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115 + The ufw service must be enabled and running in order for ufw to protect the system + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q ufw ); }; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ufw.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ufw.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ufw.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ufw_enabled + +- name: Enable service ufw + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service ufw + systemd: + name: ufw + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"ufw" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "ufw" in ansible_facts.packages ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ufw_enabled + + include enable_ufw + +class enable_ufw { + service {'ufw': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["ufw"] + + + + + + + + + + + Uncommon Network Protocols + The system includes support for several network protocols which are not commonly used. +Although security vulnerabilities in kernel networking code are not frequently discovered, +the consequences can be dramatic. Ensuring uncommon network protocols are disabled +reduces the system's risk to attacks targeted at its implementation of those protocols. + Although these protocols are not commonly used, avoid disruption +in your network environment by ensuring they are not needed +prior to disabling them. + + + Disable ATM Support + The Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is a protocol operating on +network, data link, and physical layers, based on virtual circuits +and virtual paths. + +To configure the system to prevent the atm +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf: +install atm /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the atm from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf: +blacklist atm + CCI-000381 + CCI-000366 + AC-18 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Disabling ATM protects the system against exploitation of any +flaws in its implementation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install atm" /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install atm.*#install atm /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf + echo "install atm /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist atm$" /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf ; then + echo "blacklist atm" >> /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'atm' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf + regexp: install\s+atm + line: install atm /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-18 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_atm_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'atm' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/atm.conf + regexp: ^blacklist atm$ + line: blacklist atm + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-18 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_atm_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable CAN Support + The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a serial communications +protocol which was initially developed for automotive and +is now also used in marine, industrial, and medical applications. + +To configure the system to prevent the can +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf: +install can /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the can from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf: +blacklist can + CCI-000381 + CCI-000366 + AC-18 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Disabling CAN protects the system against exploitation of any +flaws in its implementation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install can" /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install can.*#install can /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf + echo "install can /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist can$" /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf ; then + echo "blacklist can" >> /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'can' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf + regexp: install\s+can + line: install can /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-18 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_can_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'can' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/can.conf + regexp: ^blacklist can$ + line: blacklist can + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-18 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_can_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable IEEE 1394 (FireWire) Support + The IEEE 1394 (FireWire) is a serial bus standard for +high-speed real-time communication. + +To configure the system to prevent the firewire-core +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf: +install firewire-core /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the firewire-core from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf: +blacklist firewire-core + CCI-000381 + AC-18 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + Disabling FireWire protects the system against exploitation of any +flaws in its implementation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install firewire-core" /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install firewire-core.*#install firewire-core /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf + echo "install firewire-core /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist firewire-core$" /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf ; then + echo "blacklist firewire-core" >> /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'firewire-core' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf + regexp: install\s+firewire-core + line: install firewire-core /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-18 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_firewire-core_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'firewire-core' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/firewire-core.conf + regexp: ^blacklist firewire-core$ + line: blacklist firewire-core + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-18 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_firewire-core_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable RDS Support + The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) protocol is a transport +layer protocol designed to provide reliable high-bandwidth, +low-latency communications between nodes in a cluster. + +To configure the system to prevent the rds +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf: +install rds /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the rds from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf: +blacklist rds + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Disabling RDS protects +the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install rds" /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install rds.*#install rds /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf + echo "install rds /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist rds$" /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf ; then + echo "blacklist rds" >> /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'rds' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf + regexp: install\s+rds + line: install rds /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_rds_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'rds' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/rds.conf + regexp: ^blacklist rds$ + line: blacklist rds + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_rds_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable SCTP Support + The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a +transport layer protocol, designed to support the idea of +message-oriented communication, with several streams of messages +within one connection. + +To configure the system to prevent the sctp +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf: +install sctp /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the sctp from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf: +blacklist sctp + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + 5.10.1 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.4.6 + CCI-000381 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Req-1.4.2 + 1.4.2 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Disabling SCTP protects +the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install sctp" /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install sctp.*#install sctp /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf + echo "install sctp /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist sctp$" /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf ; then + echo "blacklist sctp" >> /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'sctp' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf + regexp: install\s+sctp + line: install sctp /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_sctp_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'sctp' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/sctp.conf + regexp: ^blacklist sctp$ + line: blacklist sctp + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.10.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_sctp_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable TIPC Support + The Transparent Inter-Process Communication (TIPC) protocol +is designed to provide communications between nodes in a +cluster. + +To configure the system to prevent the tipc +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf: +install tipc /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the tipc from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf: +blacklist tipc + This configuration baseline was created to deploy the base operating system for general purpose +workloads. When the operating system is configured for certain purposes, such as +a node in High Performance Computing cluster, it is expected that +the tipc kernel module will be loaded. + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000381 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + Disabling TIPC protects +the system against exploitation of any flaws in its implementation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install tipc" /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install tipc.*#install tipc /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf + echo "install tipc /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist tipc$" /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf ; then + echo "blacklist tipc" >> /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'tipc' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf + regexp: install\s+tipc + line: install tipc /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_tipc_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'tipc' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/tipc.conf + regexp: ^blacklist tipc$ + line: blacklist tipc + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_tipc_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + + Wireless Networking + Wireless networking, such as 802.11 +(WiFi) and Bluetooth, can present a security risk to sensitive or +classified systems and networks. Wireless networking hardware is +much more likely to be included in laptop or portable systems than +in desktops or servers. + +Removal of hardware provides the greatest assurance that the wireless +capability remains disabled. Acquisition policies often include provisions to +prevent the purchase of equipment that will be used in sensitive spaces and +includes wireless capabilities. If it is impractical to remove the wireless +hardware, and policy permits the device to enter sensitive spaces as long +as wireless is disabled, efforts should instead focus on disabling wireless capability +via software. + + Disable Wireless Through Software Configuration + If it is impossible to remove the wireless hardware +from the device in question, disable as much of it as possible +through software. The following methods can disable software +support for wireless networking, but note that these methods do not +prevent malicious software or careless users from re-activating the +devices. + + Disable Bluetooth Kernel Module + The kernel's module loading system can be configured to prevent +loading of the Bluetooth module. Add the following to +the appropriate /etc/modprobe.d configuration file +to prevent the loading of the Bluetooth module: +install bluetooth /bin/true + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + 5.13.1.3 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.16 + CCI-000085 + CCI-001443 + CCI-001444 + CCI-001551 + CCI-002418 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + AC-18(a) + AC-18(3) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + MP-7 + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000300-GPOS-00118 + If Bluetooth functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel +from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its +activation. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install bluetooth" /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install bluetooth.*#install bluetooth /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf + echo "install bluetooth /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist bluetooth$" /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf ; then + echo "blacklist bluetooth" >> /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'bluetooth' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf + regexp: install\s+bluetooth + line: install bluetooth /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.13.1.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_bluetooth_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'bluetooth' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf + regexp: ^blacklist bluetooth$ + line: blacklist bluetooth + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.13.1.3 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_bluetooth_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces + Deactivating wireless network interfaces should prevent normal usage of the wireless +capability. + + +Configure the system to disable all wireless network interfaces with the following command: +$ sudo nmcli radio all off + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.16 + CCI-000085 + CCI-002418 + CCI-002421 + CCI-001443 + CCI-001444 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + 1315 + 1319 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + AC-18(a) + AC-18(3) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + MP-7 + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Req-1.3.3 + 1.4.3 + SRG-OS-000299-GPOS-00117 + SRG-OS-000300-GPOS-00118 + SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 + SRG-OS-000481-GPOS-000481 + The use of wireless networking can introduce many different attack vectors into +the organization's network. Common attack vectors such as malicious association +and ad hoc networks will allow an attacker to spoof a wireless access point +(AP), allowing validated systems to connect to the malicious AP and enabling the +attacker to monitor and record network traffic. These malicious APs can also +serve to create a man-in-the-middle attack or be used to create a denial of +service to valid network resources. + + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "NetworkManager" ; then + yum install -y "NetworkManager" +fi + +nmcli radio all off + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + - wireless_disable_interfaces + +- name: Ensure NetworkManager is installed + ansible.builtin.package: + name: '{{ item }}' + state: present + with_items: + - NetworkManager + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + - wireless_disable_interfaces + +- name: Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces + command: nmcli radio wifi off + when: '''NetworkManager'' in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.16 + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(3) + - NIST-800-53-AC-18(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3 + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_strategy + - wireless_disable_interfaces + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Unused Interfaces + Network interfaces expand the attack surface of the +system. Unused interfaces are not monitored or controlled, and +should be disabled. + +If the system does not require network communications but still +needs to use the loopback interface, remove all files of the form +ifcfg-interface except for ifcfg-lo from +/etc/sysconfig/network-scripts: +$ sudo rm /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface +If the system is a standalone machine with no need for network access or even +communication over the loopback device, then disable this service. + +The network service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now network.service + + + Transport Layer Security Support + Support for Transport Layer Security (TLS), and its predecessor, the Secure +Sockets Layer (SSL), is included in Red Hat Enterprise Linux in the OpenSSL software (RPM package +openssl). TLS provides encrypted and authenticated network +communications, and many network services include support for it. TLS or SSL +can be leveraged to avoid any plaintext transmission of sensitive data. + +For information on how to use OpenSSL, see +http://www.openssl.org/docs/. Information on FIPS validation +of OpenSSL is available at http://www.openssl.org/docs/fips.html +and http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm. + + + + File Permissions and Masks + Traditional Unix security relies heavily on file and +directory permissions to prevent unauthorized users from reading or +modifying files to which they should not have access. + +Several of the commands in this section search filesystems +for files or directories with certain characteristics, and are +intended to be run on every local partition on a given system. +When the variable PART appears in one of the commands below, +it means that the command is intended to be run repeatedly, with the +name of each local partition substituted for PART in turn. + +The following command prints a list of all xfs partitions on the local +system, which is the default filesystem for Oracle Linux 9 +installations: +$ mount -t xfs | awk '{print $3}' +For any systems that use a different +local filesystem type, modify this command as appropriate. + + Verify Permissions on Important Files and +Directories + Permissions for many files on a system must be set +restrictively to ensure sensitive information is properly protected. +This section discusses important +permission restrictions which can be verified +to ensure that no harmful discrepancies have +arisen. + + Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User + All directories in local partitions which are world-writable should be owned by root. +If any world-writable directories are not owned by root, this should be investigated. +Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to root user. + BP28(R40) + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 + Allowing a user account to own a world-writable directory is undesirable because it allows the +owner of that directory to remove or replace any files that may be placed in the directory by +other users. + +# At least under containerized env /proc can have files w/o possilibity to +# modify even as root. And touching /proc is not good idea anyways. +find / -path /proc -prune -o \ + -not -fstype afs -not -fstype ceph -not -fstype cifs -not -fstype smb3 -not -fstype smbfs \ + -not -fstype sshfs -not -fstype ncpfs -not -fstype ncp -not -fstype nfs -not -fstype nfs4 \ + -not -fstype gfs -not -fstype gfs2 -not -fstype glusterfs -not -fstype gpfs \ + -not -fstype pvfs2 -not -fstype ocfs2 -not -fstype lustre -not -fstype davfs \ + -not -fstype fuse.sshfs -type d -perm -0002 -uid +0 -exec chown root {} \; + + - name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Define Excluded + (Non-Local) File Systems and Paths + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + excluded_fstypes: + - afs + - ceph + - cifs + - smb3 + - smbfs + - sshfs + - ncpfs + - ncp + - nfs + - nfs4 + - gfs + - gfs2 + - glusterfs + - gpfs + - pvfs2 + - ocfs2 + - lustre + - davfs + - fuse.sshfs + excluded_paths: + - dev + - proc + - run + - sys + search_paths: [] + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Find Relevant + Root Directories Ignoring Pre-Defined Excluded Paths + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: / + file_type: directory + excludes: '{{ excluded_paths }}' + hidden: true + recurse: false + register: result_relevant_root_dirs + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Include Relevant + Root Directories in a List of Paths to be Searched + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.path]) }}' + loop: '{{ result_relevant_root_dirs.files }}' + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Increment Search + Paths List with Local Partitions Mount Points + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.mount]) }}' + loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' + when: + - item.fstype not in excluded_fstypes + - item.mount != '/' + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Increment Search + Paths List with Local NFS File System Targets + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.device.split('':'')[1]]) }}' + loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' + when: item.device is search("localhost:") + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Define Rule + Specific Facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + world_writable_dirs: [] + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Find All Uncompliant + Directories in Local File Systems + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +0 + loop: '{{ search_paths }}' + changed_when: false + register: result_found_dirs + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Create List + of World Writable Directories Not Owned by root + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + world_writable_dirs: '{{ world_writable_dirs | union(item.stdout_lines) | list + }}' + loop: '{{ result_found_dirs.results }}' + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User - Ensure root + Ownership on Local World Writable Directories + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: root + loop: '{{ world_writable_dirs }}' + tags: + - dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set + When the so-called 'sticky bit' is set on a directory, +only the owner of a given file may remove that file from the +directory. Without the sticky bit, any user with write access to a +directory may remove any file in the directory. Setting the sticky +bit prevents users from removing each other's files. In cases where +there is no reason for a directory to be world-writable, a better +solution is to remove that permission rather than to set the sticky +bit. However, if a directory is used by a particular application, +consult that application's documentation instead of blindly +changing modes. + +To set the sticky bit on a world-writable directory DIR, run the +following command: +$ sudo chmod +t DIR + BP28(R40) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001090 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 + Failing to set the sticky bit on public directories allows unauthorized +users to delete files in the directory structure. + +The only authorized public directories are those temporary directories +supplied with the system, or those designed to be temporary file +repositories. The setting is normally reserved for directories used by the +system, by users for temporary file storage (such as /tmp), and +for directories requiring global read/write access. + df --local -P | awk '{if (NR!=1) print $6}' \ +| xargs -I '$6' find '$6' -xdev -type d \ +\( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) 2>/dev/null \ +-exec chmod a+t {} + + + - name: Get all world-writable directories with no sticky bits set + shell: | + set -o pipefail + df --local -P | awk '{if (NR!=1) print $6}' | xargs -I '{}' find '{}' -xdev -type d \( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) 2>/dev/null + register: dir_output + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure sticky bit is set + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: a+t + with_items: + - '{{ dir_output.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/auditd.conf, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/auditd.conf + CCI-000171 + AU-12(b) + SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 + Without the capability to restrict the roles and individuals that can select which events +are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical +events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming +the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, +correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify +those responsible for one. + + + + + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + - name: Test for existence /etc/audit/auditd.conf + stat: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_audit_auditd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt on /etc/audit/auditd.conf + file: + path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_audit_auditd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules + CCI-000171 + AU-12(b) + SRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032 + Without the capability to restrict the roles and individuals that can select which events +are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical +events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming +the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, +correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify +those responsible for one. + + + + + +find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type f -regex '^.*rules$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \; + + - name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) + command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt -type + f -regex "^.*rules$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_audit_rulesd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(b) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_audit_rulesd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that local System.map file (if exists) is readable only by root + Files containing sensitive informations should be protected by restrictive + permissions. Most of the time, there is no need that these files need to be read by any non-root user + +To properly set the permissions of /boot/System.map-*, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0600 /boot/System.map-* + BP28(R13) + The System.map file contains information about kernel symbols and + can give some hints to generate local exploitation. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All SGID Executables Are Authorized + The SGID (set group id) bit should be set only on files that were +installed via authorized means. A straightforward means of identifying +unauthorized SGID files is determine if any were not installed as part of an +RPM package, which is cryptographically verified. Investigate the origin +of any unpackaged SGID files. +This configuration check considers authorized SGID files which were installed via RPM. +It is assumed that when an individual has sudo access to install an RPM +and all packages are signed with an organizationally-recognized GPG key, +the software should be considered an approved package on the system. +Any SGID file not deployed through an RPM will be flagged for further review. + BP28(R37) + BP28(R38) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Executable files with the SGID permission run with the privileges of +the owner of the file. SGID files of uncertain provenance could allow for +unprivileged users to elevate privileges. The presence of these files should be +strictly controlled on the system. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All SUID Executables Are Authorized + The SUID (set user id) bit should be set only on files that were +installed via authorized means. A straightforward means of identifying +unauthorized SUID files is determine if any were not installed as part of an +RPM package, which is cryptographically verified. Investigate the origin +of any unpackaged SUID files. +This configuration check considers authorized SUID files which were installed via RPM. +It is assumed that when an individual has sudo access to install an RPM +and all packages are signed with an organizationally-recognized GPG key, +the software should be considered an approved package on the system. +Any SUID file not deployed through an RPM will be flagged for further review. + BP28(R37) + BP28(R38) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Executable files with the SUID permission run with the privileges of +the owner of the file. SUID files of uncertain provenance could allow for +unprivileged users to elevate privileges. The presence of these files should be +strictly controlled on the system. + + + + + + + + + Ensure No World-Writable Files Exist + It is generally a good idea to remove global (other) write +access to a file when it is discovered. However, check with +documentation for specific applications before making changes. +Also, monitor for recurring world-writable files, as these may be +symptoms of a misconfigured application or user account. Finally, +this applies to real files and not virtual files that are a part of +pseudo file systems such as sysfs or procfs. + BP28(R40) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + Data in world-writable files can be modified by any +user on the system. In almost all circumstances, files can be +configured using a combination of user and group permissions to +support whatever legitimate access is needed without the risk +caused by world-writable files. + +find / -xdev -type f -perm -002 -exec chmod o-w {} \; + + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Group + If any files are not owned by a group, then the +cause of their lack of group-ownership should be investigated. +Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an +appropriate group. The following command will discover and print +any files on local partitions which do not belong to a valid group: +$ df --local -P | awk '{if (NR!=1) print $6}' | sudo xargs -I '{}' find '{}' -xdev -nogroup +To search all filesystems on a system including network mounted +filesystems the following command can be run manually for each partition: +$ sudo find PARTITION -xdev -nogroup + This rule only considers local groups. +If you have your groups defined outside /etc/group, the rule won't consider those. + BP28(R55) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002165 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally +a sign that something is amiss. They may +be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or +draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging +to a deleted account. The files should be repaired so they +will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future, +and the cause should be discovered and addressed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Files Are Owned by a User + If any files are not owned by a user, then the +cause of their lack of ownership should be investigated. +Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an +appropriate user. The following command will discover and print +any files on local partitions which do not belong to a valid user: +$ df --local -P | awk {'if (NR!=1) print $6'} | sudo xargs -I '{}' find '{}' -xdev -nouser +To search all filesystems on a system including network mounted +filesystems the following command can be run manually for each partition: +$ sudo find PARTITION -xdev -nouser + For this rule to evaluate centralized user accounts, getent must be working properly +so that running the command getent passwd returns a list of all users in your organization. +If using the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD), enumerate = true must be configured +in your organization's domain to return a complete list of users + Enabling this rule will result in slower scan times depending on the size of your organization +and number of centralized users. + BP28(R55) + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 9 + APO01.06 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002165 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 5.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally +a sign that something is amiss. They may +be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or +draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging +to a deleted account. The files should be repaired so they +will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future, +and the cause should be discovered and addressed. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks + To set the runtime status of the fs.protected_hardlinks kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w fs.protected_hardlinks=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: fs.protected_hardlinks = 1 + BP28(R23) + CCI-002165 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00122 + SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00123 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + By enabling this kernel parameter, users can no longer create soft or hard links to +files which they do not own. Disallowing such hardlinks mitigate vulnerabilities +based on insecure file system accessed by privileged programs, avoiding an +exploitation vector exploiting unsafe use of open() or creat(). + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_hardlinks from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "fs.protected_hardlinks" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for fs.protected_hardlinks +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w fs.protected_hardlinks="1" + +# +# If fs.protected_hardlinks present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "fs.protected_hardlinks = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^fs.protected_hardlinks") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^fs.protected_hardlinks\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^fs.protected_hardlinks\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_hardlinks from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*fs.protected_hardlinks + replace: '#fs.protected_hardlinks' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks + +- name: Ensure sysctl fs.protected_hardlinks is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: fs.protected_hardlinks + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks + To set the runtime status of the fs.protected_symlinks kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w fs.protected_symlinks=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: fs.protected_symlinks = 1 + BP28(R23) + CCI-002165 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00122 + SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00123 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + By enabling this kernel parameter, symbolic links are permitted to be followed +only when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the UID of the +link and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. +Disallowing such symlinks helps mitigate vulnerabilities based on insecure file system +accessed by privileged programs, avoiding an exploitation vector exploiting unsafe use of +open() or creat(). + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_symlinks from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "fs.protected_symlinks" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for fs.protected_symlinks +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w fs.protected_symlinks="1" + +# +# If fs.protected_symlinks present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "fs.protected_symlinks = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^fs.protected_symlinks") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^fs.protected_symlinks\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^fs.protected_symlinks\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of fs.protected_symlinks from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*fs.protected_symlinks + replace: '#fs.protected_symlinks' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks + +- name: Ensure sysctl fs.protected_symlinks is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: fs.protected_symlinks + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Files with Local Account Information and Credentials + The default restrictive permissions for files which act as +important security databases such as passwd, shadow, +group, and gshadow files must be maintained. Many utilities +need read access to the passwd file in order to function properly, but +read access to the shadow file allows malicious attacks against system +passwords, and should never be enabled. + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup group File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/group-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/group- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7 + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/group- file is a backup file of /etc/group, and as such, +it contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. +Protection of this file is important for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/group- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/group- + stat: + path: /etc/group- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/group- + file: + path: /etc/group- + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup gshadow File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/gshadow- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7 + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/gshadow- file is a backup of /etc/gshadow, and as such, +it contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/gshadow- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow- + stat: + path: /etc/gshadow- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/gshadow- + file: + path: /etc/gshadow- + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup passwd File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/passwd- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7 + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/passwd- file is a backup file of /etc/passwd, and as such, +it contains information about the users that are configured on the system. +Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/passwd- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd- + stat: + path: /etc/passwd- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/passwd- + file: + path: /etc/passwd- + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup shadow File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/shadow- + Req-8.7 + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/shadow- file is a backup file of /etc/shadow, and as such, +it contains the list of local system accounts and password hashes. +Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/shadow- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow- + stat: + path: /etc/shadow- + register: file_exists + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/shadow- + file: + path: /etc/shadow- + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns group File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/group, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/group + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured +on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/group + + - name: Test for existence /etc/group + stat: + path: /etc/group + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/group + file: + path: /etc/group + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns gshadow File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/gshadow + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file +is critical for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/gshadow + + - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow + stat: + path: /etc/gshadow + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/gshadow + file: + path: /etc/gshadow + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns passwd File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/passwd + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/passwd file contains information about the users that are configured on +the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/passwd + + - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd + stat: + path: /etc/passwd + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/passwd + file: + path: /etc/passwd + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns shadow File + To properly set the group owner of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /etc/shadow + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/shadow file stores password hashes. Protection of this file is +critical for system security. + chgrp 0 /etc/shadow + + - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow + stat: + path: /etc/shadow + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/shadow + file: + path: /etc/shadow + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup group File + To properly set the owner of /etc/group-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/group- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/group- file is a backup file of /etc/group, and as such, +it contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. +Protection of this file is important for system security. + chown 0 /etc/group- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/group- + stat: + path: /etc/group- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/group- + file: + path: /etc/group- + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup gshadow File + To properly set the owner of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/gshadow- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7 + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/gshadow- file is a backup of /etc/gshadow, and as such, +it contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chown 0 /etc/gshadow- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow- + stat: + path: /etc/gshadow- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/gshadow- + file: + path: /etc/gshadow- + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7 + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup passwd File + To properly set the owner of /etc/passwd-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/passwd- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/passwd- file is a backup file of /etc/passwd, and as such, +it contains information about the users that are configured on the system. +Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chown 0 /etc/passwd- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd- + stat: + path: /etc/passwd- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/passwd- + file: + path: /etc/passwd- + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup shadow File + To properly set the owner of /etc/shadow-, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/shadow- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/shadow- file is a backup file of /etc/shadow, and as such, +it contains the list of local system accounts and password hashes. +Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chown 0 /etc/shadow- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow- + stat: + path: /etc/shadow- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/shadow- + file: + path: /etc/shadow- + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_backup_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns group File + To properly set the owner of /etc/group, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/group + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured +on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. + chown 0 /etc/group + + - name: Test for existence /etc/group + stat: + path: /etc/group + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/group + file: + path: /etc/group + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns gshadow File + To properly set the owner of /etc/gshadow, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/gshadow + BP28(R36) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file +is critical for system security. + chown 0 /etc/gshadow + + - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow + stat: + path: /etc/gshadow + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/gshadow + file: + path: /etc/gshadow + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns passwd File + To properly set the owner of /etc/passwd, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/passwd + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/passwd file contains information about the users that are configured on +the system. Protection of this file is critical for system security. + chown 0 /etc/passwd + + - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd + stat: + path: /etc/passwd + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/passwd + file: + path: /etc/passwd + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns shadow File + To properly set the owner of /etc/shadow, run the command: $ sudo chown root /etc/shadow + BP28(R36) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/shadow file contains the list of local +system accounts and stores password hashes. Protection of this file is +critical for system security. Failure to give ownership of this file +to root provides the designated owner with access to sensitive information +which could weaken the system security posture. + chown 0 /etc/shadow + + - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow + stat: + path: /etc/shadow + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/shadow + file: + path: /etc/shadow + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup group File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/group-, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/group- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/group- file is a backup file of /etc/group, and as such, +it contains information regarding groups that are configured on the system. +Protection of this file is important for system security. + + + + + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/group- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/group- + stat: + path: /etc/group- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/group- + file: + path: /etc/group- + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup gshadow File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/gshadow-, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/gshadow- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/gshadow- file is a backup of /etc/gshadow, and as such, +it contains group password hashes. Protection of this file is critical for system security. + + + + + +chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/gshadow- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow- + stat: + path: /etc/gshadow- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/gshadow- + file: + path: /etc/gshadow- + mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup passwd File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/passwd-, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/passwd- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/passwd- file is a backup file of /etc/passwd, and as such, +it contains information about the users that are configured on the system. +Protection of this file is critical for system security. + + + + + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/passwd- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd- + stat: + path: /etc/passwd- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/passwd- + file: + path: /etc/passwd- + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup shadow File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/shadow-, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/shadow- + CCI-002223 + AC-6 (1) + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/shadow- file is a backup file of /etc/shadow, and as such, +it contains the list of local system accounts and password hashes. +Protection of this file is critical for system security. + + + + + +chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/shadow- + + - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow- + stat: + path: /etc/shadow- + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/shadow- + file: + path: /etc/shadow- + mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 (1) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_backup_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on group File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/passwd, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/passwd + BP28(R36) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/group file contains information regarding groups that are configured +on the system. Protection of this file is important for system security. + + + + + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/group + + - name: Test for existence /etc/group + stat: + path: /etc/group + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/group + file: + path: /etc/group + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_group + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on gshadow File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/gshadow, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/gshadow + BP28(R36) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/gshadow file contains group password hashes. Protection of this file +is critical for system security. + + + + + +chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/gshadow + + - name: Test for existence /etc/gshadow + stat: + path: /etc/gshadow + register: file_exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/gshadow + file: + path: /etc/gshadow + mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_gshadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on passwd File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/passwd, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/passwd + BP28(R36) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If the /etc/passwd file is writable by a group-owner or the +world the risk of its compromise is increased. The file contains the list of +accounts on the system and associated information, and protection of this file +is critical for system security. + + + + + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt /etc/passwd + + - name: Test for existence /etc/passwd + stat: + path: /etc/passwd + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt on /etc/passwd + file: + path: /etc/passwd + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_passwd + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on shadow File + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/shadow, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0000 /etc/shadow + BP28(R36) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.2.2 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-002223 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-8.7.c + 7.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /etc/shadow file contains the list of local +system accounts and stores password hashes. Protection of this file is +critical for system security. Failure to give ownership of this file +to root provides the designated owner with access to sensitive information +which could weaken the system security posture. + + + + + +chmod u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/shadow + + - name: Test for existence /etc/shadow + stat: + path: /etc/shadow + register: file_exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/shadow + file: + path: /etc/shadow + mode: u-xwrs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.2.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.7.c + - PCI-DSSv4-7.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_etc_shadow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Files within /var/log Directory + The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error +messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized +personnel. + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log Directory + To properly set the group owner of /var/log, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /var/log + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 + The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error +messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized +personnel. + find -H /var/log/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + + - name: Ensure group owner on /var/log/ + file: + path: /var/log/ + state: directory + group: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_var_log + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/messages File + To properly set the group owner of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ sudo chgrp root /var/log/messages + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + The /var/log/messages file contains logs of error messages in +the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. + chgrp 0 /var/log/messages + + - name: Test for existence /var/log/messages + stat: + path: /var/log/messages + register: file_exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_var_log_messages + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /var/log/messages + file: + path: /var/log/messages + group: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_var_log_messages + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/syslog File + To properly set the group owner of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ sudo chgrp adm /var/log/syslog + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + The /var/log/syslog file contains logs of error messages in +the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. + chgrp 4 /var/log/syslog + + - name: Test for existence /var/log/syslog + stat: + path: /var/log/syslog + register: file_exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_var_log_syslog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 4 on /var/log/syslog + file: + path: /var/log/syslog + group: '4' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_var_log_syslog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log Directory + To properly set the owner of /var/log, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 + The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error +messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized +personnel. + find -H /var/log/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /var/log/ + file: + path: /var/log/ + state: directory + owner: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_var_log + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log/messages File + To properly set the owner of /var/log/messages, run the command: $ sudo chown root /var/log/messages + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + The /var/log/messages file contains logs of error messages in +the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. + chown 0 /var/log/messages + + - name: Test for existence /var/log/messages + stat: + path: /var/log/messages + register: file_exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_var_log_messages + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /var/log/messages + file: + path: /var/log/messages + owner: '0' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_var_log_messages + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log/syslog File + To properly set the owner of /var/log/syslog, run the command: $ sudo chown syslog /var/log/syslog + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + The /var/log/syslog file contains logs of error messages in +the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. + chown 104 /var/log/syslog + + - name: Test for existence /var/log/syslog + stat: + path: /var/log/syslog + register: file_exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_var_log_syslog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 104 on /var/log/syslog + file: + path: /var/log/syslog + owner: '104' + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_var_log_syslog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log Directory + +To properly set the permissions of /var/log, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0755 /var/log + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + SRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240 + The /var/log directory contains files with logs of error +messages in the system and should only be accessed by authorized +personnel. + + + + + +find -H /var/log/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; + + - name: Set permissions for /var/log/ + file: + path: /var/log/ + state: directory + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_var_log + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log/messages File + +To properly set the permissions of /var/log/messages, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0640 /var/log/messages + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + The /var/log/messages file contains logs of error messages in +the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. + + + + + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt /var/log/messages + + - name: Test for existence /var/log/messages + stat: + path: /var/log/messages + register: file_exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_var_log_messages + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt on /var/log/messages + file: + path: /var/log/messages + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_var_log_messages + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log/syslog File + +To properly set the permissions of /var/log/syslog, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0640 /var/log/syslog + CCI-001314 + SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084 + The /var/log/syslog file contains logs of error messages in +the system and should only be accessed by authorized personnel. + + + + + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt /var/log/syslog + + - name: Test for existence /var/log/syslog + stat: + path: /var/log/syslog + register: file_exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_var_log_syslog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt on /var/log/syslog + file: + path: /var/log/syslog + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + when: file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_var_log_syslog + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Verify File Permissions Within Some Important Directories + Some directories contain files whose confidentiality or integrity +is notably important and may also be susceptible to misconfiguration over time, particularly if +unpackaged software is installed. As such, +an argument exists to verify that files' permissions within these directories remain +configured correctly and restrictively. + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Group Ownership + System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables +during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories +by default: +/lib +/lib64 +/usr/lib +/usr/lib64 + +Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are also +stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should be +group-owned by the root user. If the directories, is found to be owned +by a user other than root correct its +ownership with the following command: +$ sudo chgrp root DIR + CCI-001499 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address +space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at +runtime. Proper ownership of library directories is necessary to protect +the integrity of the system. + find -H /lib/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; +find -H /lib64/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/lib/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/lib64/ -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + + - name: Ensure group owner on /lib/ recursively + file: + path: /lib/ + state: directory + recurse: true + group: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner on /lib64/ recursively + file: + path: /lib64/ + state: directory + recurse: true + group: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/lib/ + state: directory + recurse: true + group: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib64/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/lib64/ + state: directory + recurse: true + group: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_group_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executable Have Root Ownership + /bin +/sbin +/usr/bin +/usr/sbin +/usr/local/bin +/usr/local/sbin +All these directories should be owned by the root user. +If any directory DIR in these directories is found +to be owned by a user other than root, correct its ownership with the +following command: +$ sudo chown root DIR + CCI-001495 + SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 + System binaries are executed by privileged users as well as system services, +and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure that their +execution of these programs cannot be co-opted. + find -H /bin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /sbin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/bin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/sbin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/local/bin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/local/sbin/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /bin/ recursively + file: + path: /bin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /sbin/ recursively + file: + path: /sbin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/bin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/bin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/sbin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/sbin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/local/bin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/local/bin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/local/sbin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/local/sbin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Ownership + System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables +during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories +by default: +/lib +/lib64 +/usr/lib +/usr/lib64 + +Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are also +stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should be +owned by the root user. If the directories, is found to be owned +by a user other than root correct its +ownership with the following command: +$ sudo chown root DIR + CCI-001499 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address +space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at +runtime. Proper ownership of library directories is necessary to protect +the integrity of the system. + find -H /lib/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /lib64/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/lib/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; +find -H /usr/lib64/ -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /lib/ recursively + file: + path: /lib/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /lib64/ recursively + file: + path: /lib64/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/lib/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/lib/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on directory /usr/lib64/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/lib64/ + state: directory + recurse: true + owner: '0' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executable Directories Have Restrictive Permissions + System executables are stored in the following directories by default: +/bin +/sbin +/usr/bin +/usr/sbin +/usr/local/bin +/usr/local/sbin +These directories should not be group-writable or world-writable. +If any directory DIR in these directories is found to be +group-writable or world-writable, correct its permission with the +following command: +$ sudo chmod go-w DIR + CCI-001495 + SRG-OS-000258-GPOS-00099 + System binaries are executed by privileged users, as well as system services, +and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure execution of these programs +cannot be co-opted. + + + + + +find -H /bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; + +find -H /sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; + +find -H /usr/bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; + +find -H /usr/sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; + +find -H /usr/local/bin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; + +find -H /usr/local/sbin/ -perm /u+s,g+ws,o+wt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-ws,o-wt {} \; + + - name: Set permissions for /bin/ recursively + file: + path: /bin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /sbin/ recursively + file: + path: /sbin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/bin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/bin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/sbin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/sbin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/local/bin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/local/bin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/local/sbin/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/local/sbin/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: u-s,g-ws,o-wt + tags: + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_binary_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Restrictive Permissions + System-wide shared library directories, which contain are linked to executables +during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories +by default: +/lib +/lib64 +/usr/lib +/usr/lib64 + +Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are +stored in /lib/modules. All sub-directories in these directories +should not be group-writable or world-writable. If any file in these +directories is found to be group-writable or world-writable, correct +its permission with the following command: +$ sudo chmod go-w DIR + CCI-001499 + CIP-003-8 R6 + CM-5 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + If the operating system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, +then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing +and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. + +This requirement applies to operating systems with software libraries that are accessible +and configurable, as in the case of interpreted languages. Software libraries also include +privileged programs which execute with escalated privileges. Only qualified and authorized +individuals must be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes +of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. + + + + + +find -H /lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + +find -H /lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + +find -H /usr/lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + +find -H /usr/lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type d -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + + - name: Set permissions for /lib/ recursively + file: + path: /lib/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: g-w,o-w + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /lib64/ recursively + file: + path: /lib64/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: g-w,o-w + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/lib/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/lib/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: g-w,o-w + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/lib64/ recursively + file: + path: /usr/lib64/ + state: directory + recurse: true + mode: g-w,o-w + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5 + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - dir_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that system commands files are group owned by root or a system account + System commands files are stored in the following directories by default: +/bin +/sbin +/usr/bin +/usr/sbin +/usr/local/bin +/usr/local/sbin + +All files in these directories should be owned by the root group, +or a system account. +If the directory, or any file in these directories, is found to be owned +by a group other than root or a a system account correct its ownership +with the following command: +$ sudo chgrp root FILE + CCI-001499 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + If the operating system allows any user to make changes to software +libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the +appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management +process. +This requirement applies to operating systems with software libraries +that are accessible and configurable, as in the case of interpreted languages. +Software libraries also include privileged programs which execute with +escalated privileges. Only qualified and authorized individuals must be +allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes +of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. + +for SYSCMDFILES in /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin +do + find -L $SYSCMDFILES \! -group root -type f -exec chgrp root '{}' \; +done + + - name: Retrieve the system command files and set their group ownership to root + command: find -L {{ item }} ! -group root -type f -exec chgrp root '{}' \; + with_items: + - /bin + - /sbin + - /usr/bin + - /usr/sbin + - /usr/local/bin + - /usr/local/sbin + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - file_groupownership_system_commands_dirs + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executables Have Root Ownership + System executables are stored in the following directories by default: +/bin +/sbin +/usr/bin +/usr/libexec +/usr/local/bin +/usr/local/sbin +/usr/sbin +All files in these directories should be owned by the root user. +If any file FILE in these directories is found +to be owned by a user other than root, correct its ownership with the +following command: +$ sudo chown root FILE + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001499 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + System binaries are executed by privileged users as well as system services, +and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure that their +execution of these programs cannot be co-opted. + find /bin/ \ +/usr/bin/ \ +/usr/local/bin/ \ +/sbin/ \ +/usr/sbin/ \ +/usr/local/sbin/ \ +/usr/libexec \ +\! -user root -execdir chown root {} \; + + - name: Read list of system executables without root ownership + command: find /bin/ /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ /sbin/ /usr/sbin/ /usr/local/sbin/ + /usr/libexec \! -user root + register: no_root_system_executables + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_ownership_binary_dirs + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set ownership to root of system executables + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: root + with_items: '{{ no_root_system_executables.stdout_lines }}' + when: no_root_system_executables.stdout_lines | length > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_ownership_binary_dirs + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Files Have Root Ownership + System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables +during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories +by default: +/lib +/lib64 +/usr/lib +/usr/lib64 + +Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are also +stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories should be +owned by the root user. If the directory, or any file in these +directories, is found to be owned by a user other than root correct its +ownership with the following command: +$ sudo chown root FILE + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001499 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address +space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at +runtime. Proper ownership is necessary to protect the integrity of the system. + +find /lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + +find /lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + +find /usr/lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + +find /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + + - name: Find /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /usr/lib/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executables Have Restrictive Permissions + System executables are stored in the following directories by default: +/bin +/sbin +/usr/bin +/usr/libexec +/usr/local/bin +/usr/local/sbin +/usr/sbin +All files in these directories should not be group-writable or world-writable. +If any file FILE in these directories is found +to be group-writable or world-writable, correct its permission with the +following command: +$ sudo chmod go-w FILE + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001499 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + System binaries are executed by privileged users, as well as system services, +and restrictive permissions are necessary to ensure execution of these programs +cannot be co-opted. + DIRS="/bin /usr/bin /usr/local/bin /sbin /usr/sbin /usr/local/sbin /usr/libexec" +for dirPath in $DIRS; do + find "$dirPath" -perm /022 -exec chmod go-w '{}' \; +done + + - name: Read list of world and group writable system executables + ansible.builtin.command: find /bin /usr/bin /usr/local/bin /sbin /usr/sbin /usr/local/sbin + /usr/libexec -perm /022 -type f + register: world_writable_library_files + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_permissions_binary_dirs + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove world/group writability of system executables + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: go-w + state: file + with_items: '{{ world_writable_library_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: world_writable_library_files.stdout_lines | length > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - file_permissions_binary_dirs + - medium_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Files Have Restrictive Permissions + System-wide shared library files, which are linked to executables +during process load time or run time, are stored in the following directories +by default: +/lib +/lib64 +/usr/lib +/usr/lib64 + +Kernel modules, which can be added to the kernel during runtime, are +stored in /lib/modules. All files in these directories +should not be group-writable or world-writable. If any file in these +directories is found to be group-writable or world-writable, correct +its permission with the following command: +$ sudo chmod go-w FILE + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-001499 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + Files from shared library directories are loaded into the address +space of processes (including privileged ones) or of the kernel itself at +runtime. Restrictive permissions are necessary to protect the integrity of the system. + + + + + +find -H /lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + +find -H /lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + +find -H /usr/lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + +find -H /usr/lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex '^.*$' -exec chmod g-w,o-w {} \; + + - name: Find /lib/ file(s) recursively + command: find -H /lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /lib/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: g-w,o-w + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /lib64/ file(s) recursively + command: find -H /lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /lib64/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: g-w,o-w + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /usr/lib/ file(s) recursively + command: find -H /usr/lib/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/lib/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: g-w,o-w + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find /usr/lib64/ file(s) recursively + command: find -H /usr/lib64/ -perm /g+w,o+w -type f -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /usr/lib64/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: g-w,o-w + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_library_dirs + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify the system-wide library files in directories +"/lib", "/lib64", "/usr/lib/" and "/usr/lib64" are group-owned by root. + System-wide library files are stored in the following directories +by default: +/lib +/lib64 +/usr/lib +/usr/lib64 + +All system-wide shared library files should be protected from unauthorised +access. If any of these files is not group-owned by root, correct its group-owner with +the following command: +$ sudo chgrp root FILE + CCI-001499 + CM-5(6) + CM-5(6).1 + SRG-OS-000259-GPOS-00100 + If the operating system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, +then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and +approvals that are part of a robust change management process. + +This requirement applies to operating systems with software libraries that are +accessible and configurable, as in the case of interpreted languages. Software libraries +also include privileged programs which execute with escalated privileges. Only qualified +and authorized individuals must be allowed to obtain access to information system components +for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. + +find /lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +find /lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +find /usr/lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +find /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + + - name: Find /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + +- name: Ensure group owner on /lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + +- name: Find /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + +- name: Ensure group owner on /lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + +- name: Find /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /usr/lib/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + +- name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + +- name: Find /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ recursively + command: find -H /usr/lib64/ -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + +- name: Ensure group owner on /usr/lib64/ file(s) matching ^.*$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6) + - NIST-800-53-CM-5(6).1 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - root_permissions_syslibrary_files + + + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of +Filesystems + Linux includes a number of facilities for the automated addition +and removal of filesystems on a running system. These facilities may be +necessary in many environments, but this capability also carries some risk -- whether direct +risk from allowing users to introduce arbitrary filesystems, +or risk that software flaws in the automated mount facility itself could +allow an attacker to compromise the system. + +This command can be used to list the types of filesystems that are +available to the currently executing kernel: +$ find /lib/modules/`uname -r`/kernel/fs -type f -name '*.ko' +If these filesystems are not required then they can be explicitly disabled +in a configuratio file in /etc/modprobe.d. + + Disable the Automounter + The autofs daemon mounts and unmounts filesystems, such as user +home directories shared via NFS, on demand. In addition, autofs can be used to handle +removable media, and the default configuration provides the cdrom device as /misc/cd. +However, this method of providing access to removable media is not common, so autofs +can almost always be disabled if NFS is not in use. Even if NFS is required, it may be +possible to configure filesystem mounts statically by editing /etc/fstab +rather than relying on the automounter. + + +The autofs service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now autofs.service + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.4.6 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000778 + CCI-001958 + 164.308(a)(3)(i) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2) + 164.312(a)(1) + 164.312(a)(2)(iv) + 164.312(b) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + MP-7 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 + SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Disabling the automounter permits the administrator to +statically control filesystem mounting through /etc/fstab. + +Additionally, automatically mounting filesystems permits easy introduction of +unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'autofs.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'autofs.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'autofs.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files autofs.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'autofs.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'autofs.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'autofs.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service autofs + block: + + - name: Disable service autofs + block: + + - name: Disable service autofs + systemd: + name: autofs.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service autofs' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_autofs_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - autofs.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files autofs.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_autofs_disabled + +- name: Disable socket autofs + systemd: + name: autofs.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("autofs.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_autofs_disabled + + include disable_autofs + +class disable_autofs { + service {'autofs': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["autofs"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable Mounting of cramfs + +To configure the system to prevent the cramfs +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf: +install cramfs /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the cramfs from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf: +blacklist cramfs + +This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. + +The cramfs filesystem type is a compressed read-only +Linux filesystem embedded in small footprint systems. A +cramfs image can be used without having to first +decompress the image. + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.4.6 + CCI-000381 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface +of the server. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install cramfs" /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install cramfs.*#install cramfs /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf + echo "install cramfs /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist cramfs$" /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf ; then + echo "blacklist cramfs" >> /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'cramfs' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf + regexp: install\s+cramfs + line: install cramfs /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_cramfs_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'cramfs' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/cramfs.conf + regexp: ^blacklist cramfs$ + line: blacklist cramfs + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_cramfs_disabled + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver + To prevent USB storage devices from being used, configure the kernel module loading system +to prevent automatic loading of the USB storage driver. + +To configure the system to prevent the usb-storage +kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf: +install usb-storage /bin/true + +To configure the system to prevent the usb-storage from being used, +add the following line to file /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf: +blacklist usb-storage + +This will prevent the modprobe program from loading the usb-storage +module, but will not prevent an administrator (or another program) from using the +insmod program to load the module manually. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.21 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000778 + CCI-001958 + 164.308(a)(3)(i) + 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) + 164.310(d)(1) + 164.310(d)(2) + 164.312(a)(1) + 164.312(a)(2)(iv) + 164.312(b) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + MP-7 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 + SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + USB storage devices such as thumb drives can be used to introduce +malicious software. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install usb-storage" /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install usb-storage.*#install usb-storage /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf + echo "install usb-storage /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist usb-storage$" /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf ; then + echo "blacklist usb-storage" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'usb-storage' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf + regexp: install\s+usb-storage + line: install usb-storage /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.21 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'usb-storage' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf + regexp: ^blacklist usb-storage$ + line: blacklist usb-storage + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.21 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Partition Mount Options + System partitions can be mounted with certain options +that limit what files on those partitions can do. These options +are set in the /etc/fstab configuration file, and can be +used to make certain types of malicious behavior more difficult. + + Value for hidepid option + The hidepid mount option is applicable to /proc and is used to control who can access +the information in /proc/[pid] directories. The option can have one of the following +values: +0: Everybody may access all /proc/[pid] directories. +1: Users may not access files and subdirectories inside any /proc/[pid] directories + but their own. The /proc/[pid] directories themselves remain visible. +2: Same as for mode 1, but in addition the /proc/[pid] directories belonging to other + users become invisible. + 0 + 1 + 2 + 2 + + + Removable Partition + This value is used by the checks mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions, mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions, +and mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions to ensure that the correct mount options are set on partitions mounted from +removable media such as CD-ROMs, USB keys, and floppy drives. This value should be modified to reflect any removable +partitions that are required on the local system. + /dev/cdrom + + + Add nodev Option to /boot + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from +being created in /boot. +Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in +the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot +jails built for system services. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/boot. + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/boot' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /boot defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/boot"; then + if mountpoint -q "/boot"; then + mount -o remount --target "/boot" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/boot' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: If /boot not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /boot + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /boot + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /boot: Ensure /boot is mounted with nodev option' + mount: + path: /boot + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /boot --mountoptions="nodev" + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /boot + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being +executed out of /boot. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/boot. + BP28(R12) + The /boot partition contains the kernel and the bootloader. No +binaries should be executed from this partition after the booting process +finishes. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/boot' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /boot defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/boot"; then + if mountpoint -q "/boot"; then + mount -o remount --target "/boot" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/boot' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: If /boot not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /boot + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /boot + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' + }) }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /boot: Ensure /boot is mounted with noexec option' + mount: + path: /boot + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /boot --mountoptions="noexec" + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /boot + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /boot. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required on the boot partition. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/boot. + BP28(R12) + CCI-000366 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users +should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from boot partitions. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/boot")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/boot' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /boot in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /boot)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /boot defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/boot"; then + if mountpoint -q "/boot"; then + mount -o remount --target "/boot" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/boot' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: If /boot not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /boot + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /boot + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /boot: Ensure /boot is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /boot + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_boot_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /boot --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /dev/shm + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent creation of device +files in /dev/shm. Legitimate character and block devices should +not exist within temporary directories like /dev/shm. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/dev/shm. + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001764 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation { + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /dev/shm)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="tmpfs" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo "tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/dev/shm"; then + if mountpoint -q "/dev/shm"; then + mount -o remount --target "/dev/shm" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt '/dev/shm' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: If /dev/shm not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /dev/shm + - tmpfs + - tmpfs + - defaults + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ("" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /dev/shm + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /dev/shm: Ensure /dev/shm is mounted with nodev option' + mount: + path: /dev/shm + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("" | + length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /dev/shm + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries +from being executed out of /dev/shm. +It can be dangerous to allow the execution of binaries +from world-writable temporary storage directories such as /dev/shm. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/dev/shm. + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001764 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories +such as /dev/shm can expose the system to potential compromise. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation { + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /dev/shm)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="tmpfs" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo "tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/dev/shm"; then + if mountpoint -q "/dev/shm"; then + mount -o remount --target "/dev/shm" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt '/dev/shm' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: If /dev/shm not mounted, craft mount_info + manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /dev/shm + - tmpfs + - tmpfs + - defaults + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ("" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Make sure noexec option is part of the to + /dev/shm options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' + }) }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /dev/shm: Ensure /dev/shm is mounted with noexec option' + mount: + path: /dev/shm + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("" | + length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent execution +of setuid programs in /dev/shm. The SUID and SGID permissions should not +be required in these world-writable directories. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/dev/shm. + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001764 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users +should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation { + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /dev/shm)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="tmpfs" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo "tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/dev/shm"; then + if mountpoint -q "/dev/shm"; then + mount -o remount --target "/dev/shm" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt '/dev/shm' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: If /dev/shm not mounted, craft mount_info + manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /dev/shm + - tmpfs + - tmpfs + - defaults + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ("" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to + /dev/shm options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm: Ensure /dev/shm is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /dev/shm + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("" | + length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Add grpquota Option to /home + The grpquota mount option allows for the filesystem to have disk quotas configured. +Add the grpquota option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/home. + The quota options for XFS file systems can only be activated when mounting the partition. +It is not possible to enable them by remounting an already mounted partition. Therefore, +if the desired options were not defined before mounting the partition, dismount and mount +it again to apply the quota options. + OVAL looks for partitions whose mount point is a substring of any interactive user's home +directory and validates that grpquota option is there. Because of this, there could be +false negatives when several partitions share a base substring. For example, if there is a +home directory in /var/tmp/user1 and there are partitions mounted in +/var and /var/tmp. The grpquota option is only expected in +/var/tmp, but OVAL will check both. +Bash remediation uses the df command to find out the partition where the home +directory is mounted. However, if the directory doesn't exist the remediation won't be +applied. + CM-6(b) + To ensure the availability of disk space on /home, it is important to limit the impact a +single user or group can cause for other users (or the wider system) by intentionally or +accidentally filling up the partition. Quotas can also be applied to inodes for filesystems +where inode exhaustion is a concern. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation (){ + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" $1)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|grpquota)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " $1 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}grpquota 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "grpquota"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,grpquota|" /etc/fstab + fi + + if mkdir -p "$1"; then + if mountpoint -q "$1"; then + mount -o remount --target "$1" + fi + fi +} + +readarray -t home_directories < \ + <(awk -F':' '{if ($3>=1000 && $3!= 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd ) + + +for home_directory in "${home_directories[@]}" +do + if [ -d $home_directory ]; then + fstab_mount_point=$(df $home_directory | awk '/^\/dev/ {print $6}') + if ! grep -qP "^/$|^/lib$|^/opt$|^/usr$|^/bin$|^/sbin$|^/boot$|^/dev$|^/proc$" <<< $fstab_mount_point + then + perform_remediation "$fstab_mount_point" + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /home + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from +being created in /home. +Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in +the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot +jails built for system services. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/home. + BP28(R12) + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/home" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/home" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/home")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/home' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /home in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /home)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /home defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/home"; then + if mountpoint -q "/home"; then + mount -o remount --target "/home" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/home' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_home_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_home_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: If /home not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /home + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_home_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /home + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_home_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /home: Ensure /home is mounted with nodev option' + mount: + path: /home + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/home" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_home_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + + +part /home --mountoptions="nodev" + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /home + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being +executed out of /home. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/home. + OVAL looks for partitions whose mount point is a substring of any interactive user's home +directory and validates that noexec option is there. Because of this, there could be false +negatives when several partitions share a base substring. For example, if there is a home +directory in /var/tmp/user1 and there are partitions mounted in /var and +/var/tmp. The noexec option is only expected in /var/tmp, but OVAL will +check both. +Bash remediation uses the df command to find out the partition where the home +directory is mounted. However, if the directory doesn't exist the remediation won't be +applied. + BP28(R12) + CCI-000366 + CM-6(b) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The /home directory contains data of individual users. Binaries in +this directory should not be considered as trusted and users should not be +able to execute them. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation (){ + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" $1)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " $1 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + if mkdir -p "$1"; then + if mountpoint -q "$1"; then + mount -o remount --target "$1" + fi + fi +} + +readarray -t home_directories < \ + <(awk -F':' '{if ($3>=1000 && $3!= 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd ) + + +for home_directory in "${home_directories[@]}" +do + if [ -d $home_directory ]; then + fstab_mount_point=$(df $home_directory | awk '/^\/dev/ {print $6}') + if ! grep -qP "^/$|^/lib$|^/opt$|^/usr$|^/bin$|^/sbin$|^/boot$|^/dev$|^/proc$" <<< $fstab_mount_point + then + perform_remediation "$fstab_mount_point" + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /home + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /home. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required in these user data directories. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/home. + OVAL looks for partitions whose mount point is a substring of any interactive user's home +directory and validates that noexec option is there. Because of this, there could be false +negatives when several partitions share a base substring. For example, if there is a home +directory in /var/tmp/user1 and there are partitions mounted in /var and +/var/tmp. The noexec option is only expected in /var/tmp, but OVAL will +check both. +Bash remediation uses the df command to find out the partition where the home +directory is mounted. However, if the directory doesn't exist the remediation won't be +applied. + BP28(R28) + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users +should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from user home directory partitions. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation (){ + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" $1)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " $1 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + if mkdir -p "$1"; then + if mountpoint -q "$1"; then + mount -o remount --target "$1" + fi + fi +} + +readarray -t home_directories < \ + <(awk -F':' '{if ($3>=1000 && $3!= 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd ) + + +for home_directory in "${home_directories[@]}" +do + if [ -d $home_directory ]; then + fstab_mount_point=$(df $home_directory | awk '/^\/dev/ {print $6}') + if ! grep -qP "^/$|^/lib$|^/opt$|^/usr$|^/bin$|^/sbin$|^/boot$|^/dev$|^/proc$" <<< $fstab_mount_point + then + perform_remediation "$fstab_mount_point" + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Add usrquota Option to /home + The usrquota mount option allows for the filesystem to have disk quotas configured. +Add the usrquota option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/home. + The quota options for XFS file systems can only be activated when mounting the partition. +It is not possible to enable them by remounting an already mounted partition. Therefore, +if the desired options were not defined before mounting the partition, dismount and mount +it again to apply the quota options. + OVAL looks for partitions whose mount point is a substring of any interactive user's home +directory and validates that usrquota option is there. Because of this, there could be +false negatives when several partitions share a base substring. For example, if there is a +home directory in /var/tmp/user1 and there are partitions mounted in +/var and /var/tmp. The usrquota option is only expected in +/var/tmp, but OVAL will check both. +Bash remediation uses the df command to find out the partition where the home +directory is mounted. However, if the directory doesn't exist the remediation won't be +applied. + CM-6(b) + To ensure the availability of disk space on /home, it is important to limit the impact a +single user or group can cause for other users (or the wider system) by intentionally or +accidentally filling up the partition. Quotas can also be applied to inodes for filesystems +where inode exhaustion is a concern. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation (){ + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" $1)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|usrquota)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " $1 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}usrquota 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "usrquota"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,usrquota|" /etc/fstab + fi + + if mkdir -p "$1"; then + if mountpoint -q "$1"; then + mount -o remount --target "$1" + fi + fi +} + +readarray -t home_directories < \ + <(awk -F':' '{if ($3>=1000 && $3!= 65534) print $6}' /etc/passwd ) + + +for home_directory in "${home_directories[@]}" +do + if [ -d $home_directory ]; then + fstab_mount_point=$(df $home_directory | awk '/^\/dev/ {print $6}') + if ! grep -qP "^/$|^/lib$|^/opt$|^/usr$|^/bin$|^/sbin$|^/boot$|^/dev$|^/proc$" <<< $fstab_mount_point + then + perform_remediation "$fstab_mount_point" + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions + The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted as +character or block devices. Legitimate character and block devices should +exist only in the /dev directory on the root partition or within +chroot jails built for system services. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of + + any non-root local partitions. + BP28(R12) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The nodev mount option prevents files from being +interpreted as character or block devices. The only legitimate location +for device files is the /dev directory located on the root partition. +The only exception to this is chroot jails, for which it is not advised +to set nodev on these filesystems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +MOUNT_OPTION="nodev" +# Create array of local non-root partitions +readarray -t partitions_records < <(findmnt --mtab --raw --evaluate | grep "^/\w" | grep "\s/dev/\w") + +# Create array of polyinstantiated directories, in case one of them is found in mtab +readarray -t polyinstantiated_dirs < \ + <(grep -oP "^\s*[^#\s]+\s+\S+" /etc/security/namespace.conf | grep -oP "(?<=\s)\S+?(?=/?\$)") + + +for partition_record in "${partitions_records[@]}"; do + # Get all important information for fstab + mount_point="$(echo ${partition_record} | cut -d " " -f1)" + device="$(echo ${partition_record} | cut -d " " -f2)" + device_type="$(echo ${partition_record} | cut -d " " -f3)" + if ! printf '%s\0' "${polyinstantiated_dirs[@]}" | grep -qxzF "$mount_point"; then + # device and device_type will be used only in case when the device doesn't have fstab record + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" $mount_point)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|$MOUNT_OPTION)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="$device_type" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo "$device $mount_point $device_type defaults,${previous_mount_opts}$MOUNT_OPTION 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "$MOUNT_OPTION"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,$MOUNT_OPTION|" /etc/fstab + fi + if mkdir -p "$mount_point"; then + if mountpoint -q "$mount_point"; then + mount -o remount --target "$mount_point" + fi + fi + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure non-root local partitions are mounted with nodev option + mount: + path: '{{ item.mount }}' + src: '{{ item.device }}' + opts: '{{ item.options }},nodev' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ item.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - item.mount is match('/\w') + - item.options is not search('nodev') + with_items: + - '{{ ansible_facts.mounts }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_nodev_nonroot_local_partitions + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to Removable Media Partitions + The nodev mount option prevents files from being +interpreted as character or block devices. +Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in +the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot +jails built for system services. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of + + any removable media partitions. + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 16 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. An exception to this is chroot jails, and it is +not advised to set nodev on partitions which contain their root +filesystems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_removable_partition='' + + +device_regex="^\s*$var_removable_partition\s\+" +mount_option="nodev" + +if grep -q $device_regex /etc/fstab ; then + previous_opts=$(grep $device_regex /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\($device_regex.*$previous_opts\)|\1,$mount_option|" /etc/fstab +else + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of $var_removable_partition in /etc/fstab" >&2 + return 1 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_removable_partition # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_removable_partition: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure permission nodev are set on var_removable_partition + lineinfile: + path: /etc/fstab + regexp: ^\s*({{ var_removable_partition }})\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)(.*)$ + backrefs: true + line: \1 \2 \3 \4,nodev \5 + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to Removable Media Partitions + The noexec mount option prevents the direct execution of binaries +on the mounted filesystem. Preventing the direct execution of binaries from +removable media (such as a USB key) provides a defense against malicious +software that may be present on such untrusted media. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of + + any removable media partitions. + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 16 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000087 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Allowing users to execute binaries from removable media such as USB keys exposes +the system to potential compromise. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_removable_partition='' + + +device_regex="^\s*$var_removable_partition\s\+" +mount_option="noexec" + +if grep -q $device_regex /etc/fstab ; then + previous_opts=$(grep $device_regex /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\($device_regex.*$previous_opts\)|\1,$mount_option|" /etc/fstab +else + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of $var_removable_partition in /etc/fstab" >&2 + return 1 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_removable_partition # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_removable_partition: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure permission noexec are set on var_removable_partition + lineinfile: + path: /etc/fstab + regexp: ^\s*({{ var_removable_partition }})\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)(.*)$ + backrefs: true + line: \1 \2 \3 \4,noexec \5 + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_noexec_removable_partitions + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to Removable Media Partitions + The nosuid mount option prevents set-user-identifier (SUID) +and set-group-identifier (SGID) permissions from taking effect. These permissions +allow users to execute binaries with the same permissions as the owner and group +of the file respectively. Users should not be allowed to introduce SUID and SGID +files into the system via partitions mounted from removeable media. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of + + any removable media partitions. + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 5.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.11.2.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Allowing +users to introduce SUID or SGID binaries from partitions mounted off of +removable media would allow them to introduce their own highly-privileged programs. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_removable_partition='' + + +device_regex="^\s*$var_removable_partition\s\+" +mount_option="nosuid" + +if grep -q $device_regex /etc/fstab ; then + previous_opts=$(grep $device_regex /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\($device_regex.*$previous_opts\)|\1,$mount_option|" /etc/fstab +else + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of $var_removable_partition in /etc/fstab" >&2 + return 1 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_removable_partition # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_removable_partition: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure permission nosuid are set on var_removable_partition + lineinfile: + path: /etc/fstab + regexp: ^\s*({{ var_removable_partition }})\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)\s+([^\s]*)(.*)$ + backrefs: true + line: \1 \2 \3 \4,nosuid \5 + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_nosuid_removable_partitions + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /opt + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /opt. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required in this directory. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/opt. + BP28(R12) + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. The +/opt directory contains additional software packages. Users should +not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from this directory. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/opt" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/opt" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/opt")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/opt' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /opt in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /opt)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /opt defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/opt"; then + if mountpoint -q "/opt"; then + mount -o remount --target "/opt" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/opt' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_opt_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_opt_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: If /opt not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /opt + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_opt_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /opt + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_opt_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /opt: Ensure /opt is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /opt + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/opt" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_opt_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /opt --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /srv + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /srv. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required in this directory. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/srv. + BP28(R12) + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. The +/srv directory contains files served by various network services such as FTP. Users should +not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from this directory. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/srv" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/srv" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/srv")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/srv' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /srv in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /srv)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /srv defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/srv"; then + if mountpoint -q "/srv"; then + mount -o remount --target "/srv" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/srv' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_srv_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_srv_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: If /srv not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /srv + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_srv_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /srv + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_srv_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /srv: Ensure /srv is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /srv + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/srv" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_srv_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /srv --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /tmp + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from +being created in /tmp. Legitimate character and block devices +should not exist within temporary directories like /tmp. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/tmp. + BP28(R12) + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001764 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/tmp" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/tmp")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /tmp)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/tmp"; then + if mountpoint -q "/tmp"; then + mount -o remount --target "/tmp" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/tmp' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: If /tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /tmp + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /tmp options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /tmp: Ensure /tmp is mounted with nodev option' + mount: + path: /tmp + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /tmp --mountoptions="nodev" + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /tmp + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries +from being executed out of /tmp. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/tmp. + BP28(R12) + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001764 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories +such as /tmp should never be necessary in normal operation and +can expose the system to potential compromise. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/tmp" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/tmp")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /tmp)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/tmp"; then + if mountpoint -q "/tmp"; then + mount -o remount --target "/tmp" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/tmp' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: If /tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /tmp + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /tmp + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /tmp: Ensure /tmp is mounted with noexec option' + mount: + path: /tmp + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /tmp --mountoptions="noexec" + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /tmp + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /tmp. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required in these world-writable directories. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/tmp. + BP28(R12) + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001764 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users +should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/tmp" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/tmp")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /tmp)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/tmp"; then + if mountpoint -q "/tmp"; then + mount -o remount --target "/tmp" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/tmp' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: If /tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /tmp + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /tmp + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /tmp: Ensure /tmp is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /tmp + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /tmp --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from +being created in /var/log/audit. +Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in +the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot +jails built for system services. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/log/audit. + CCI-001764 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log/audit")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/log/audit' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log/audit in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log/audit)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/log/audit defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/log/audit"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/log/audit"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/log/audit" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log/audit' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | + list ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: If /var/log/audit not mounted, craft + mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/log/audit + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Make sure nodev option is part of the + to /var/log/audit options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit: Ensure /var/log/audit is mounted with + nodev option' + mount: + path: /var/log/audit + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/log/audit --mountoptions="nodev" + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries +from being executed out of /var/log/audit. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/log/audit. + CCI-001764 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + Allowing users to execute binaries from directories containing audit log files +such as /var/log/audit should never be necessary in normal operation and +can expose the system to potential compromise. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log/audit")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/log/audit' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log/audit in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log/audit)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/log/audit defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/log/audit"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/log/audit"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/log/audit" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log/audit' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | + list ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: If /var/log/audit not mounted, craft + mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/log/audit + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Make sure noexec option is part of the + to /var/log/audit options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit: Ensure /var/log/audit is mounted with + noexec option' + mount: + path: /var/log/audit + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/log/audit --mountoptions="noexec" + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /var/log/audit. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required in directories containing audit log files. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/log/audit. + CCI-001764 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users +should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from partitions +designated for audit log files. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log/audit" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log/audit")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/log/audit' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log/audit in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log/audit)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/log/audit defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/log/audit"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/log/audit"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/log/audit" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log/audit' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | + list ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: If /var/log/audit not mounted, craft + mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/log/audit + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Make sure nosuid option is part of the + to /var/log/audit options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit: Ensure /var/log/audit is mounted with + nosuid option' + mount: + path: /var/log/audit + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log/audit" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/log/audit --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/log + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from +being created in /var/log. +Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in +the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot +jails built for system services. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/log. + CCI-001764 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/log' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/log defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/log"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/log"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/log" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list + ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: If /var/log not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/log + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /var/log + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/log: Ensure /var/log is mounted with nodev option' + mount: + path: /var/log + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/log --mountoptions="nodev" + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/log + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries +from being executed out of /var/log. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/log. + BP28(R12) + CCI-001764 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + Allowing users to execute binaries from directories containing log files +such as /var/log should never be necessary in normal operation and +can expose the system to potential compromise. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/log' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/log defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/log"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/log"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/log" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list + ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: If /var/log not mounted, craft mount_info + manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/log + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Make sure noexec option is part of the to + /var/log options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/log: Ensure /var/log is mounted with noexec option' + mount: + path: /var/log + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/log --mountoptions="noexec" + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/log + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /var/log. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required in directories containing log files. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/log. + BP28(R12) + CCI-001764 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users +should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from partitions +designated for log files. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/log" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/log" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/log")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/log' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/log in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/log)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/log defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/log"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/log"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/log" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/log' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list + ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: If /var/log not mounted, craft mount_info + manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/log + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to + /var/log options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/log: Ensure /var/log is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /var/log + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/log" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_log_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/log --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from +being created in /var. +Legitimate character and block devices should exist only in +the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot +jails built for system services. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var. + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + MP-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: If /var not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /var options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var: Ensure /var is mounted with nodev option' + mount: + path: /var + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-MP-7 + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var --mountoptions="nodev" + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries from being +executed out of /var. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var. + BP28(R12) + The /var directory contains variable system data such as logs, +mails and caches. No binaries should be executed from this directory. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: If /var not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Make sure noexec option is part of the to /var + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var: Ensure /var is mounted with noexec option' + mount: + path: /var + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var --mountoptions="noexec" + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /var. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required for this directory. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var. + BP28(R12) + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_var_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_var_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: If /var not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_var_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to /var + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_var_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var: Ensure /var is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /var + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - mount_option_var_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + - unknown_severity + + +part /var --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/tmp + The nodev mount option can be used to prevent device files from +being created in /var/tmp. Legitimate character and block devices +should not exist within temporary directories like /var/tmp. +Add the nodev option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/tmp. + BP28(R12) + CCI-001764 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The only legitimate location for device files is the /dev directory +located on the root partition. The only exception to this is chroot jails. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/tmp" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/tmp")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/tmp)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/tmp"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/tmp"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/tmp" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/tmp' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list + ) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: If /var/tmp not mounted, craft mount_info manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/tmp + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Make sure nodev option is part of the to /var/tmp + options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nodev'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nodev" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nodev Option to /var/tmp: Ensure /var/tmp is mounted with nodev option' + mount: + path: /var/tmp + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nodev + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/tmp --mountoptions="nodev" + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/tmp + The noexec mount option can be used to prevent binaries +from being executed out of /var/tmp. +Add the noexec option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/tmp. + BP28(R12) + CCI-001764 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + Allowing users to execute binaries from world-writable directories +such as /var/tmp should never be necessary in normal operation and +can expose the system to potential compromise. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/tmp" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/tmp")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/tmp)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/tmp"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/tmp"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/tmp" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/tmp' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list + ) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: If /var/tmp not mounted, craft mount_info + manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/tmp + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Make sure noexec option is part of the to + /var/tmp options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',noexec'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "noexec" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add noexec Option to /var/tmp: Ensure /var/tmp is mounted with noexec option' + mount: + path: /var/tmp + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_noexec + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/tmp --mountoptions="noexec" + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp + The nosuid mount option can be used to prevent +execution of setuid programs in /var/tmp. The SUID and SGID permissions +should not be required in these world-writable directories. +Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of +/etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +/var/tmp. + BP28(R12) + CCI-001764 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + The presence of SUID and SGID executables should be tightly controlled. Users +should not be able to execute SUID or SGID binaries from temporary storage partitions. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && findmnt --kernel "/var/tmp" > /dev/null || findmnt --fstab "/var/tmp" > /dev/null ); then + +function perform_remediation { + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" "/var/tmp")" + + grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" -q /etc/fstab \ + || { echo "The mount point '/var/tmp' is not even in /etc/fstab, so we can't set up mount options" >&2; + echo "Not remediating, because there is no record of /var/tmp in /etc/fstab" >&2; return 1; } + + + + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" /var/tmp)" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " /var/tmp defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi + + + if mkdir -p "/var/tmp"; then + if mountpoint -q "/var/tmp"; then + mount -o remount --target "/var/tmp" + fi + fi +} + +perform_remediation + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Check information associated to mountpoint' + command: findmnt --fstab '/var/tmp' + register: device_name + failed_when: device_name.rc > 1 + changed_when: false + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list + ) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Create mount_info dictionary variable' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[0].split() | list | lower }}' + - '{{ device_name.stdout_lines[1].split() | list }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - device_name.stdout is defined and device_name.stdout_lines is defined + - (device_name.stdout | length > 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: If /var/tmp not mounted, craft mount_info + manually' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info|default({})|combine({item.0: item.1}) }}' + with_together: + - - target + - source + - fstype + - options + - - /var/tmp + - '' + - '' + - defaults + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - ("--fstab" | length == 0) + - (device_name.stdout | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Make sure nosuid option is part of the to + /var/tmp options' + set_fact: + mount_info: '{{ mount_info | combine( {''options'':''''~mount_info.options~'',nosuid'' + }) }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - mount_info is defined and "nosuid" not in mount_info.options + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: 'Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp: Ensure /var/tmp is mounted with nosuid option' + mount: + path: /var/tmp + src: '{{ mount_info.source }}' + opts: '{{ mount_info.options }}' + state: mounted + fstype: '{{ mount_info.fstype }}' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and "/var/tmp" in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list ) + - (device_name.stdout is defined and (device_name.stdout | length > 0)) or ("--fstab" + | length == 0) + tags: + - configure_strategy + - high_disruption + - low_complexity + - medium_severity + - mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid + - no_reboot_needed + + +part /var/tmp --mountoptions="nosuid" + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Important Files and +Directories Are Configured in /etc/permissions.local + Permissions for many files on a system must be set +restrictively to ensure sensitive information is properly protected. +This section discusses the /etc/permissions.local file, where +expected permissions can be configured to be checked and fixed through +usage of the chkstat command. + + + Restrict Programs from Dangerous Execution Patterns + The recommendations in this section are designed to +ensure that the system's features to protect against potentially +dangerous program execution are activated. +These protections are applied at the system initialization or +kernel level, and defend against certain types of badly-configured +or compromised programs. + + kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled + Prevent unprivileged processes from using the bpf() syscall. + 2 + 1 + 2 + + + Disable the uvcvideo module + If the device contains a camera it should be covered or disabled when not in use. + CCI-000381 + CM-7 (a) + CM-7 (5) (b) + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 + Failing to disconnect from collaborative computing devices (i.e., cameras) can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. +Providing easy methods to physically disconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session helps to ensure participants actually carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through complex and tedious procedures. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install uvcvideo" /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf ; then + + sed -i 's#^install uvcvideo.*#install uvcvideo /bin/true#g' /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf +else + echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf + echo "install uvcvideo /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf +fi + +if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist uvcvideo$" /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf ; then + echo "blacklist uvcvideo" >> /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure kernel module 'uvcvideo' is disabled + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf + regexp: install\s+uvcvideo + line: install uvcvideo /bin/true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (5) (b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (a) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_uvcvideo_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + +- name: Ensure kernel module 'uvcvideo' is blacklisted + lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modprobe.d/uvcvideo.conf + regexp: ^blacklist uvcvideo$ + line: blacklist uvcvideo + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (5) (b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7 (a) + - disable_strategy + - kernel_module_uvcvideo_disabled + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + + + + + + + + + + Disable storing core dumps + To set the runtime status of the kernel.core_pattern kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.core_pattern=|/bin/false +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.core_pattern = |/bin/false + CCI-000366 + SC-7(10) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system +terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data and is generally useful +only for developers trying to debug problems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_pattern from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.core_pattern.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.core_pattern" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.core_pattern +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.core_pattern="|/bin/false" + +# +# If kernel.core_pattern present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "|/bin/false" +# else, add "kernel.core_pattern = |/bin/false" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.core_pattern") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "|/bin/false" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.core_pattern\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.core_pattern\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_core_pattern + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_pattern from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.core_pattern + replace: '#kernel.core_pattern' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_core_pattern + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.core_pattern is set to |/bin/false + sysctl: + name: kernel.core_pattern + value: '|/bin/false' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_core_pattern + + + + + + + + + + Configure file name of core dumps + To set the runtime status of the kernel.core_uses_pid kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.core_uses_pid=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.core_uses_pid = 0 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + The default coredump filename is core. By setting +core_uses_pid to 1, the coredump filename becomes +core.PID. If core_pattern does not include +%p (default does not) and core_uses_pid is set, then +.PID will be appended to the filename. +When combined with kernel.core_pattern = "" configuration, it +is ensured that no core dumps are generated and also no confusing error +messages are printed by a shell. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_uses_pid from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.core_uses_pid" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.core_uses_pid +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.core_uses_pid="0" + +# +# If kernel.core_uses_pid present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "kernel.core_uses_pid = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.core_uses_pid") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.core_uses_pid\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.core_uses_pid\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.core_uses_pid from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.core_uses_pid + replace: '#kernel.core_uses_pid' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.core_uses_pid is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: kernel.core_uses_pid + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer + To set the runtime status of the kernel.dmesg_restrict kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.dmesg_restrict=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1 + BP28(R23) + 3.1.5 + CCI-001090 + CCI-001314 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + SI-11(a) + SI-11(b) + SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 + SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 + SRG-APP-000243-CTR-000600 + Unprivileged access to the kernel syslog can expose sensitive kernel +address information. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.dmesg_restrict from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.dmesg_restrict" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.dmesg_restrict +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.dmesg_restrict="1" + +# +# If kernel.dmesg_restrict present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.dmesg_restrict") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.dmesg_restrict\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.dmesg_restrict\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.dmesg_restrict from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict + replace: '#kernel.dmesg_restrict' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.dmesg_restrict is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.dmesg_restrict + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Image Loading + To set the runtime status of the kernel.kexec_load_disabled kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1 + CCI-001749 + CM-6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000366-GPOS-00153 + Disabling kexec_load allows greater control of the kernel memory. +It makes it impossible to load another kernel image after it has been disabled. + + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kexec_load_disabled from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.kexec_load_disabled" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.kexec_load_disabled +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.kexec_load_disabled="1" + +# +# If kernel.kexec_load_disabled present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.kexec_load_disabled") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.kexec_load_disabled\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.kexec_load_disabled\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kexec_load_disabled from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled + replace: '#kernel.kexec_load_disabled' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.kexec_load_disabled is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.kexec_load_disabled + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled + + + + + + + + + + Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules + To set the runtime status of the kernel.modules_disabled kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.modules_disabled=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.modules_disabled = 1 + This rule doesn't come with Bash remediation. Remediating this rule during the installation process disrupts the install and boot process. + BP28(R24) + Malicious kernel modules can have a significant impact on system security and +availability. Disabling loading of kernel modules prevents this threat. Note +that once this option has been set, it cannot be reverted without doing a +system reboot. Make sure that all needed kernel modules are loaded before +setting this option. + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.modules_disabled from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled + replace: '#kernel.modules_disabled' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.modules_disabled is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.modules_disabled + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled + + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic on oops + To set the runtime status of the kernel.panic_on_oops kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.panic_on_oops=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.panic_on_oops = 1 + The system may start to panic when it normally wouldn't. A non-catastrophic error that +would have allowed the system to continue operating will now result in a panic. + BP28(R9) + An attacker trying to exploit the kernel may trigger kernel OOPSes, +panicking the system will impede them from continuing. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.panic_on_oops from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.panic_on_oops" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.panic_on_oops +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.panic_on_oops="1" + +# +# If kernel.panic_on_oops present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "kernel.panic_on_oops = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.panic_on_oops") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.panic_on_oops\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.panic_on_oops\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.panic_on_oops from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops + replace: '#kernel.panic_on_oops' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.panic_on_oops is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.panic_on_oops + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops + + + + + + + + + + Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system + To set the runtime status of the kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent = 1 + BP28(R23) + The kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent configures a treshold of +maximum percentile of CPU that can be used by Perf system. Restricting usage +of Perf system decreases risk of potential availability problems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent="1" + +# +# If kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent + replace: '#kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent + + + + + + + + + + Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system + To set the runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate = 1 + BP28(R23) + The kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate parameter configures maximum +frequency of collecting of samples for the Perf system. It is expressed in +samples per second. Restricting usage of Perf system decreases risk +of potential availability problems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate="1" + +# +# If kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate + replace: '#kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate + + + + + + + + + + Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users + To set the runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_paranoid kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.perf_event_paranoid=2 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 2 + BP28(R23) + CCI-001090 + AC-6 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 + SRG-OS-000138-GPOS-00069 + SRG-APP-000243-CTR-000600 + Kernel profiling can reveal sensitive information about kernel behaviour. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_paranoid from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.perf_event_paranoid" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.perf_event_paranoid +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.perf_event_paranoid="2" + +# +# If kernel.perf_event_paranoid present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "2" +# else, add "kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 2" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.perf_event_paranoid") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "2" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.perf_event_paranoid\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.perf_event_paranoid\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.perf_event_paranoid from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid + replace: '#kernel.perf_event_paranoid' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.perf_event_paranoid is set to 2 + sysctl: + name: kernel.perf_event_paranoid + value: '2' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_severity + - medium_disruption + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid + + + + + + + + + + Configure maximum number of process identifiers + To set the runtime status of the kernel.pid_max kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.pid_max=65536 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.pid_max = 65536 + BP28(R23) + The kernel.pid_max parameter configures upper limit on process +identifiers (PID). If this number is not high enough, it might happen that +forking of new processes is not possible, because all available PIDs are +exhausted. Increasing this number enhances availability. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.pid_max from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.pid_max.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.pid_max" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.pid_max +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.pid_max="65536" + +# +# If kernel.pid_max present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "65536" +# else, add "kernel.pid_max = 65536" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.pid_max") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "65536" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.pid_max\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.pid_max\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_pid_max + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.pid_max from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max + replace: '#kernel.pid_max' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_pid_max + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.pid_max is set to 65536 + sysctl: + name: kernel.pid_max + value: '65536' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_pid_max + + + + + + + + + + Disallow magic SysRq key + To set the runtime status of the kernel.sysrq kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.sysrq=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.sysrq = 0 + BP28(R23) + The Magic SysRq key allows sending certain commands directly to the running +kernel. It can dump various system and process information, potentially +revealing sensitive information. It can also reboot or shutdown the machine, +disturbing its availability. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.sysrq from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.sysrq.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.sysrq" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.sysrq +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.sysrq="0" + +# +# If kernel.sysrq present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "kernel.sysrq = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.sysrq") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.sysrq\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.sysrq\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_sysrq + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.sysrq from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq + replace: '#kernel.sysrq' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_sysrq + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.sysrq is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: kernel.sysrq + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_sysrq + + + + + + + + + + Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes + To set the runtime status of the kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1 + BP28(R9) + CCI-000366 + AC-6 + SC-7(10) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Loading and accessing the packet filters programs and maps using the bpf() +syscall has the potential of revealing sensitive information about the kernel state. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled="1" + +# +# If kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled from config + files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled + replace: '#kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled + + + + + + + + + + Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes + To set the runtime status of the kernel.yama.ptrace_scope kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=1 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1 + BP28(R25) + CCI-000366 + SC-7(10) + SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Unrestricted usage of ptrace allows compromised binaries to run ptrace +on another processes of the user. Like this, the attacker can steal +sensitive information from the target processes (e.g. SSH sessions, web browser, ...) +without any additional assistance from the user (i.e. without resorting to phishing). + + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.yama.ptrace_scope from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.yama.ptrace_scope" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.yama.ptrace_scope +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.yama.ptrace_scope="1" + +# +# If kernel.yama.ptrace_scope present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1" +# else, add "kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.yama.ptrace_scope") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "1" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.yama.ptrace_scope\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.yama.ptrace_scope\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.yama.ptrace_scope from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope + replace: '#kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.yama.ptrace_scope is set to 1 + sysctl: + name: kernel.yama.ptrace_scope + value: '1' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope + + + + + + + + + + Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler + To set the runtime status of the net.core.bpf_jit_harden kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2 + BP28(R12) + CCI-000366 + CM-6 + SC-7(10) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + When hardened, the extended Berkeley Packet Filter just-in-time compiler +will randomize any kernel addresses in the BPF programs and maps, +and will not expose the JIT addresses in /proc/kallsyms. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of net.core.bpf_jit_harden from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "net.core.bpf_jit_harden" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for net.core.bpf_jit_harden +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.core.bpf_jit_harden="2" + +# +# If net.core.bpf_jit_harden present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "2" +# else, add "net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.core.bpf_jit_harden") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "2" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.core.bpf_jit_harden\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.core.bpf_jit_harden\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.core.bpf_jit_harden from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden + replace: '#net.core.bpf_jit_harden' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden + +- name: Ensure sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_harden is set to 2 + sysctl: + name: net.core.bpf_jit_harden + value: '2' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden + + + + + + + + + + Disable the use of user namespaces + To set the runtime status of the user.max_user_namespaces kernel parameter, +run the following command: +$ sudo sysctl -w user.max_user_namespaces=0 + +To make sure that the setting is persistent, +add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: +user.max_user_namespaces = 0 +When containers are deployed on the machine, the value should be set +to large non-zero value. + This configuration baseline was created to deploy the base operating system for general purpose +workloads. When the operating system is configured for certain purposes, such as to host Linux Containers, +it is expected that user.max_user_namespaces will be enabled. + CCI-000366 + SC-39 + CM-6(a) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + It is detrimental for operating systems to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or system objectives. +These unnecessary capabilities or services are often overlooked and therefore may remain unsecured. +They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional attack vectors. +User namespaces are used primarily for Linux containers. The value 0 +disallows the use of user namespaces. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of user.max_user_namespaces from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "user.max_user_namespaces" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for user.max_user_namespaces +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w user.max_user_namespaces="0" + +# +# If user.max_user_namespaces present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "user.max_user_namespaces = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^user.max_user_namespaces") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^user.max_user_namespaces\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^user.max_user_namespaces\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-39 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of user.max_user_namespaces from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces + replace: '#user.max_user_namespaces' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-39 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces + +- name: Ensure sysctl user.max_user_namespaces is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: user.max_user_namespaces + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-39 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces + + + + + + + + + + Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory + To set the runtime status of the vm.mmap_min_addr kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w vm.mmap_min_addr=65536 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: vm.mmap_min_addr = 65536 + BP28(R23) + The vm.mmap_min_addr parameter specifies the minimum virtual +address that a process is allowed to mmap. Allowing a process to mmap low +portion of virtual memory can have security implications such as such as +heightened risk of kernel null pointer dereference defects. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of vm.mmap_min_addr from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "vm.mmap_min_addr" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for vm.mmap_min_addr +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w vm.mmap_min_addr="65536" + +# +# If vm.mmap_min_addr present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "65536" +# else, add "vm.mmap_min_addr = 65536" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^vm.mmap_min_addr") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "65536" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^vm.mmap_min_addr\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^vm.mmap_min_addr\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of vm.mmap_min_addr from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr + replace: '#vm.mmap_min_addr' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr + +- name: Ensure sysctl vm.mmap_min_addr is set to 65536 + sysctl: + name: vm.mmap_min_addr + value: '65536' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr + + + + + + + + + + Disable Core Dumps + A core dump file is the memory image of an executable +program when it was terminated by the operating system due to +errant behavior. In most cases, only software developers +legitimately need to access these files. The core dump files may +also contain sensitive information, or unnecessarily occupy large +amounts of disk space. + +Once a hard limit is set in /etc/security/limits.conf, or +to a file within the /etc/security/limits.d/ directory, a +user cannot increase that limit within his or her own session. If access +to core dumps is required, consider restricting them to only +certain users or groups. See the limits.conf man page for more +information. + +The core dumps of setuid programs are further protected. The +sysctl variable fs.suid_dumpable controls whether +the kernel allows core dumps from these programs at all. The default +value of 0 is recommended. + + Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps + The systemd-coredump.socket unit is a socket activation of +the systemd-coredump@.service which processes core dumps. +By masking the unit, core dump processing is disabled. + CCI-000366 + SC-7(10) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system +terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data +and is generally useful only for developers trying to debug problems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SOCKET_NAME="systemd-coredump.socket" +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' + +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files --type socket | grep -q "$SOCKET_NAME"; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop "$SOCKET_NAME" + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask "$SOCKET_NAME" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps - Collect systemd Socket + Units Present in the System + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: systemctl -q list-unit-files --type socket + register: result_systemd_unit_files + changed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_systemd-coredump_disabled + +- name: Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps - Ensure systemd-coredump.socket + is Masked + ansible.builtin.systemd: + name: systemd-coredump.socket + state: stopped + enabled: false + masked: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - result_systemd_unit_files.stdout_lines is search("systemd-coredump.socket") + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_systemd-coredump_disabled + + + + + + + + + + Disable core dump backtraces + The ProcessSizeMax option in [Coredump] section +of /etc/systemd/coredump.conf +specifies the maximum size in bytes of a core which will be processed. +Core dumps exceeding this size may be stored, but the backtrace will not +be generated. + If the /etc/systemd/coredump.conf file +does not already contain the [Coredump] section, +the value will not be configured correctly. + CCI-000366 + CM-6 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + Req-3.2 + 3.3.1.1 + 3.3.1.2 + 3.3.1.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system +terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data +and is generally useful only for developers or system operators trying to +debug problems. + +Enabling core dumps on production systems is not recommended, +however there may be overriding operational requirements to enable advanced +debuging. Permitting temporary enablement of core dumps during such situations +should be reviewed through local needs and policy. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q systemd; then + +if [ -e "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" +else + touch "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" + +cp "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "ProcessSizeMax=0" >> "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - coredump_disable_backtraces + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Disable core dump backtraces + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s* + line: ProcessSizeMax=0 + state: present + when: '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - coredump_disable_backtraces + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable storing core dump + The Storage option in [Coredump] sectionof /etc/systemd/coredump.conf +can be set to none to disable storing core dumps permanently. + If the /etc/systemd/coredump.conf file +does not already contain the [Coredump] section, +the value will not be configured correctly. + CCI-000366 + CM-6 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + Req-3.2 + 3.3.1.1 + 3.3.1.2 + 3.3.1.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system +terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data +and is generally useful only for developers or system operators trying to +debug problems. Enabling core dumps on production systems is not recommended, +however there may be overriding operational requirements to enable advanced +debuging. Permitting temporary enablement of core dumps during such situations +should be reviewed through local needs and policy. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q systemd; then + +if [ -e "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Storage\s*=\s*/Id" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" +else + touch "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" + +cp "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "Storage=none" >> "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/systemd/coredump.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - coredump_disable_storage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Disable storing core dump + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*Storage\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*Storage\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*Storage\s*=\s* + line: Storage=none + state: present + when: '"systemd" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - PCI-DSS-Req-3.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - coredump_disable_storage + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable Core Dumps for All Users + To disable core dumps for all users, add the following line to +/etc/security/limits.conf, or to a file within the +/etc/security/limits.d/ directory: +* hard core 0 + 1 + 12 + 13 + 15 + 16 + 2 + 7 + 8 + APO13.01 + BAI04.04 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.07 + CCI-000366 + SR 6.2 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.2 + A.12.1.3 + A.17.2.1 + CM-6 + SC-7(10) + DE.CM-1 + PR.DS-4 + 3.3.1.1 + 3.3.1.2 + 3.3.1.3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + A core dump includes a memory image taken at the time the operating system +terminates an application. The memory image could contain sensitive data and is generally useful +only for developers trying to debug problems. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q pam; then + +SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE="/etc/security/limits.conf" + +if grep -qE '^\s*\*\s+hard\s+core' $SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE; then + sed -ri 's/(hard\s+core\s+)[[:digit:]]+/\1 0/' $SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE +else + echo "* hard core 0" >> $SECURITY_LIMITS_FILE +fi + +if ls /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf > /dev/null; then + sed -ri '/^\s*\*\s+hard\s+core/d' /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - disable_users_coredumps + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Disable core dumps with limits + lineinfile: + dest: /etc/security/limits.conf + regexp: ^[^#].*core + line: '* hard core 0' + create: true + when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(10) + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - disable_users_coredumps + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs + To set the runtime status of the fs.suid_dumpable kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w fs.suid_dumpable=0 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: fs.suid_dumpable = 0 + BP28(R23) + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + SI-11(a) + SI-11(b) + 3.3.1.1 + 3.3.1.2 + 3.3.1.3 + The core dump of a setuid program is more likely to contain +sensitive data, as the program itself runs with greater privileges than the +user who initiated execution of the program. Disabling the ability for any +setuid program to write a core file decreases the risk of unauthorized access +of such data. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of fs.suid_dumpable from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "fs.suid_dumpable" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for fs.suid_dumpable +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w fs.suid_dumpable="0" + +# +# If fs.suid_dumpable present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0" +# else, add "fs.suid_dumpable = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^fs.suid_dumpable") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^fs.suid_dumpable\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^fs.suid_dumpable\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of fs.suid_dumpable from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable + replace: '#fs.suid_dumpable' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable + +- name: Ensure sysctl fs.suid_dumpable is set to 0 + sysctl: + name: fs.suid_dumpable + value: '0' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable + + + + + + + + + + + Daemon Umask + The umask is a per-process setting which limits +the default permissions for creation of new files and directories. +The system includes initialization scripts which set the default umask +for system daemons. + + daemon umask + Enter umask for daemons + 022 + 027 + 022 + + + + Enable ExecShield + ExecShield describes kernel features that provide +protection against exploitation of memory corruption errors such as buffer +overflows. These features include random placement of the stack and other +memory regions, prevention of execution in memory that should only hold data, +and special handling of text buffers. These protections are enabled by default +on 32-bit systems and controlled through sysctl variables +kernel.exec-shield and kernel.randomize_va_space. On the latest +64-bit systems, kernel.exec-shield cannot be enabled or disabled with +sysctl. + + kernel.kptr_restrict + Configure exposition of kernel pointer addresses + 1 + 1 + 2 + + + Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access + To set the runtime status of the kernel.kptr_restrict kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.kptr_restrict= +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.kptr_restrict = + BP28(R23) + CCI-002824 + CCI-000366 + CIP-002-5 R1.1 + CIP-002-5 R1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 4.1 + CIP-004-6 4.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.4 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-004-6 R4 + CIP-005-6 R1 + CIP-005-6 R1.1 + CIP-005-6 R1.2 + CIP-007-3 R3 + CIP-007-3 R3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R8.4 + CIP-009-6 R.1.1 + CIP-009-6 R4 + SC-30 + SC-30(2) + SC-30(5) + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000132-GPOS-00067 + SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Exposing kernel pointers (through procfs or seq_printf()) exposes kernel +writeable structures which may contain functions pointers. If a write vulnerability +occurs in the kernel, allowing write access to any of this structure, the kernel can +be compromised. This option disallow any program without the CAP_SYSLOG capability +to get the addresses of kernel pointers by replacing them with 0. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kptr_restrict from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.kptr_restrict" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + +sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value='' + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.kptr_restrict +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.kptr_restrict="$sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value" + +# +# If kernel.kptr_restrict present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value +# else, add "kernel.kptr_restrict = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.kptr_restrict") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.kptr_restrict\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.kptr_restrict\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30 + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(5) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.kptr_restrict from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict + replace: '#kernel.kptr_restrict' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30 + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(5) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict +- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict is set + sysctl: + name: kernel.kptr_restrict + value: '{{ sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_value }}' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30 + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(5) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict + + + + + + + + + + Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space + To set the runtime status of the kernel.randomize_va_space kernel parameter, run the following command: $ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2 +To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 + BP28(R23) + 3.1.7 + CCI-000366 + CCI-002824 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + CIP-002-5 R1.1 + CIP-002-5 R1.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 4.1 + CIP-004-6 4.2 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.4 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-004-6 R4 + CIP-005-6 R1 + CIP-005-6 R1.1 + CIP-005-6 R1.2 + CIP-007-3 R3 + CIP-007-3 R3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R8.4 + CIP-009-6 R.1.1 + CIP-009-6 R4 + SC-30 + SC-30(2) + CM-6(a) + Req-2.2.1 + 2.2.3 + SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00193 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-APP-000450-CTR-001105 + Address space layout randomization (ASLR) makes it more difficult for an +attacker to predict the location of attack code they have introduced into a +process's address space during an attempt at exploitation. Additionally, +ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to know the location of +existing code in order to re-purpose it using return oriented programming +(ROP) techniques. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Comment out any occurrences of kernel.randomize_va_space from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + +for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do + + matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space.*$' $f | uniq ) + if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then + while IFS= read -r entry; do + escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry") + # comment out "kernel.randomize_va_space" matches to preserve user data + sed -i "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f + done <<< "$matching_list" + fi +done + +# +# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value +# + +SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf" + + +# +# Set runtime for kernel.randomize_va_space +# +/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w kernel.randomize_va_space="2" + +# +# If kernel.randomize_va_space present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "2" +# else, add "kernel.randomize_va_space = 2" to /etc/sysctl.conf +# + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^kernel.randomize_va_space") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "2" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^kernel.randomize_va_space\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^kernel.randomize_va_space\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +else + if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files + find: + paths: + - /etc/sysctl.d/ + - /run/sysctl.d/ + - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space.*$ + patterns: '*.conf' + file_type: any + register: find_sysctl_d + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30 + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space + +- name: Comment out any occurrences of kernel.randomize_va_space from config files + replace: + path: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space + replace: '#kernel.randomize_va_space' + loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30 + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space + +- name: Ensure sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space is set to 2 + sysctl: + name: kernel.randomize_va_space + value: '2' + sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf + state: present + reload: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-30 + - NIST-800-53-SC-30(2) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.1 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.3 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Execute Disable (XD) or No Execute (NX) Support on +x86 Systems + Recent processors in the x86 family support the +ability to prevent code execution on a per memory page basis. +Generically and on AMD processors, this ability is called No +Execute (NX), while on Intel processors it is called Execute +Disable (XD). This ability can help prevent exploitation of buffer +overflow vulnerabilities and should be activated whenever possible. +Extra steps must be taken to ensure that this protection is +enabled, particularly on 32-bit x86 systems. Other processors, such +as Itanium and POWER, have included such support since inception +and the standard kernel for those platforms supports the +feature. This is enabled by default on the latest Oracle Linux, Red Hat and +Fedora systems if supported by the hardware. + + Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOS + Reboot the system and enter the BIOS or Setup configuration menu. +Navigate the BIOS configuration menu and make sure that the option is enabled. The setting may be located +under a Security section. Look for Execute Disable (XD) on Intel-based systems and No Execute (NX) +on AMD-based systems. + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.7 + CCI-002824 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + SC-39 + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + 2.2.1 + SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 + SRG-APP-000450-CTR-001105 + Computers with the ability to prevent this type of code execution frequently put an option in the BIOS that will +allow users to turn the feature on or off at will. + + + + + + + + + + + Memory Poisoning + Memory Poisoning consists of writing a special value to uninitialized or freed memory. +Poisoning can be used as a mechanism to prevent leak of information and detection of +corrupted memory. + + + slub_debug - debug options + Defines the debug options to use in slub_debug kernel command line argument. + P + F + Z + P + FZ + FZP + + + Enable page allocator poisoning + To enable poisoning of free pages, +add the argument page_poison=1 to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that page_poison=1 is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add page_poison=1 to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... page_poison=1 ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_poison=1" + BP28(R8) + CCI-001084 + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 + Poisoning writes an arbitrary value to freed pages, so any modification or +reference to that page after being freed or before being initialized will be +detected and prevented. +This prevents many types of use-after-free vulnerabilities at little performance cost. +Also prevents leak of data and detection of corrupted memory. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=page_poison=1 + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - grub2_page_poison_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="page_poison=1" + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - grub2_page_poison_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "page_poison=1" + + + + + + + + + + Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning + To enable poisoning of SLUB/SLAB objects, +add the argument slub_debug= to the default +GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system. +To ensure that slub_debug= is added as a kernel command line +argument to newly installed kernels, add slub_debug= to the +default Grub2 command line for Linux operating systems. Modify the line within +/etc/default/grub as shown below: +GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... slub_debug= ..." +Run the following command to update command line for already installed kernels:# grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slub_debug=" + BP28(R8) + CCI-001084 + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000433-GPOS-00192 + SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 + Poisoning writes an arbitrary value to freed objects, so any modification or +reference to that object after being freed or before being initialized will be +detected and prevented. +This prevents many types of use-after-free vulnerabilities at little performance cost. +Also prevents leak of data and detection of corrupted memory. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then + +var_slub_debug_options='' + + + +grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args=slub_debug=$var_slub_debug_options + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - grub2_slub_debug_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_slub_debug_options # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_slub_debug_options: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Update grub defaults and the bootloader menu + command: /sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="slub_debug={{ var_slub_debug_options + }}" + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - grub2_slub_debug_argument + - low_disruption + - medium_complexity + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + + [customizations.kernel] +append = "slub_debug=" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + SELinux + SELinux is a feature of the Linux kernel which can be +used to guard against misconfigured or compromised programs. +SELinux enforces the idea that programs should be limited in what +files they can access and what actions they can take. + +The default SELinux policy, as configured on Oracle Linux 9, has been +sufficiently developed and debugged that it should be usable on +almost any system with minimal configuration and a small +amount of system administrator training. This policy prevents +system services - including most of the common network-visible +services such as mail servers, FTP servers, and DNS servers - from +accessing files which those services have no valid reason to +access. This action alone prevents a huge amount of possible damage +from network attacks against services, from trojaned software, and +so forth. + +This guide recommends that SELinux be enabled using the +default (targeted) policy on every Oracle Linux 9 system, unless that +system has unusual requirements which make a stronger policy +appropriate. + +For more information on SELinux, see https://docs.oracle.com/en/operating-systems/oracle-linux/selinux/. + + + SELinux policy + Type of policy in use. Possible values are: +targeted - Only targeted network daemons are protected. +strict - Full SELinux protection. +mls - Multiple levels of security + targeted + mls + targeted + + + SELinux state + enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced. +permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing. +disabled - SELinux is fully disabled. + enforcing + disabled + enforcing + permissive + + + Install policycoreutils-python-utils package + The policycoreutils-python-utils package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install policycoreutils-python-utils + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + This package is required to operate and manage an SELinux environment and its policies. +It provides utilities such as semanage, audit2allow, audit2why, chcat and sandbox. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "policycoreutils-python-utils" ; then + yum install -y "policycoreutils-python-utils" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure policycoreutils-python-utils is installed + package: + name: policycoreutils-python-utils + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_policycoreutils-python-utils_installed + + include install_policycoreutils-python-utils + +class install_policycoreutils-python-utils { + package { 'policycoreutils-python-utils': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=policycoreutils-python-utils + + +[[packages]] +name = "policycoreutils-python-utils" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install policycoreutils Package + The policycoreutils package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install policycoreutils + CCI-001084 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 + Security-enhanced Linux is a feature of the Linux kernel and a number of utilities +with enhanced security functionality designed to add mandatory access controls to Linux. +The Security-enhanced Linux kernel contains new architectural components originally +developed to improve security of the Flask operating system. These architectural components +provide general support for the enforcement of many kinds of mandatory access control +policies, including those based on the concepts of Type Enforcement, Role-based Access +Control, and Multi-level Security. + +policycoreutils contains the policy core utilities that are required for +basic operation of an SELinux-enabled system. These utilities include load_policy +to load SELinux policies, setfiles to label filesystems, newrole to +switch roles, and so on. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "policycoreutils" ; then + yum install -y "policycoreutils" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure policycoreutils is installed + package: + name: policycoreutils + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_policycoreutils_installed + + include install_policycoreutils + +class install_policycoreutils { + package { 'policycoreutils': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=policycoreutils + + +[[packages]] +name = "policycoreutils" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot-plugins Package + The SETroubleshoot plugins are used to analyze SELinux AVC data. The service provides information around configuration errors, +unauthorized intrusions, and other potential errors. +The setroubleshoot-plugins package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase setroubleshoot-plugins + BP28(R68) + The SETroubleshoot service is an unnecessary daemon to +have running on a server. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove setroubleshoot-plugins +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on setroubleshoot-plugins. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "setroubleshoot-plugins" ; then + + yum remove -y "setroubleshoot-plugins" + +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure setroubleshoot-plugins is removed + package: + name: setroubleshoot-plugins + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_setroubleshoot-plugins_removed + + include remove_setroubleshoot-plugins + +class remove_setroubleshoot-plugins { + package { 'setroubleshoot-plugins': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=setroubleshoot-plugins + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot-server Package + The SETroubleshoot service notifies desktop users of SELinux +denials. The service provides information around configuration errors, +unauthorized intrusions, and other potential errors. +The setroubleshoot-server package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase setroubleshoot-server + BP28(R68) + The SETroubleshoot service is an unnecessary daemon to have +running on a server. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove setroubleshoot-server +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on setroubleshoot-server. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "setroubleshoot-server" ; then + + yum remove -y "setroubleshoot-server" + +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure setroubleshoot-server is removed + package: + name: setroubleshoot-server + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_setroubleshoot-server_removed + + include remove_setroubleshoot-server + +class remove_setroubleshoot-server { + package { 'setroubleshoot-server': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=setroubleshoot-server + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot Package + The SETroubleshoot service notifies desktop users of SELinux +denials. The service provides information around configuration errors, +unauthorized intrusions, and other potential errors. +The setroubleshoot package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase setroubleshoot + BP28(R68) + The SETroubleshoot service is an unnecessary daemon to +have running on a server, especially if +X Windows is removed or disabled. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove setroubleshoot +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on setroubleshoot. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "setroubleshoot" ; then + + yum remove -y "setroubleshoot" + +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure setroubleshoot is removed + package: + name: setroubleshoot + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_setroubleshoot_removed + + include remove_setroubleshoot + +class remove_setroubleshoot { + package { 'setroubleshoot': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=setroubleshoot + + + + + + + Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub + SELinux can be disabled at boot time by an argument in +/etc/default/grub. +Remove any instances of selinux=0 from the kernel arguments in that +file to prevent SELinux from being disabled at boot. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.2 + 3.7.2 + CCI-000022 + CCI-000032 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + AC-3 + AC-3(3)(a) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-5 + PR.AC-6 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Disabling a major host protection feature, such as SELinux, at boot time prevents +it from confining system services at boot time. Further, it increases +the chances that it will remain off during system operation. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then + +sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/selinux=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/* +sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/enforcing=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/* + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - grub2_enable_selinux + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Find /etc/grub.d/ files + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: + - /etc/grub.d/ + follow: true + register: result_grub_d + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - grub2_enable_selinux + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled + in /etc/grub.d/ files + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: '{{ item.path }}' + regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0 + with_items: + - '{{ result_grub_d.files }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - grub2_enable_selinux + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Check if /etc/grub2.cfg + exists + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/grub2.cfg + register: result_grub2_cfg_present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - grub2_enable_selinux + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Check if /etc/default/grub + exists + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /etc/default/grub + register: result_default_grub_present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - grub2_enable_selinux + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled + in /etc/grub2.cfg + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: /etc/grub2.cfg + regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0 + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_grub2_cfg_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - grub2_enable_selinux + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled + in /etc/default/grub + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: /etc/default/grub + regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0 + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - result_default_grub_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - grub2_enable_selinux + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinux + Daemons for which the SELinux policy does not contain rules will inherit the +context of the parent process. Because daemons are launched during +startup and descend from the init process, they inherit the unconfined_service_t context. + + +To check for unconfined daemons, run the following command: +$ sudo ps -eZ | grep "unconfined_service_t" +It should produce no output in a well-configured system. + Automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation +can be achieved by amending SELinux policy or stopping the unconfined +daemons as outlined above. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.2 + 3.1.5 + 3.7.2 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 5.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-3(3)(a) + AC-6 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-3 + Daemons which run with the unconfined_service_t context may cause AVC denials, +or allow privileges that the daemon does not require. + + + + + + + + + Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled + The SELinux state should be set to enforcing or permissive at system boot +time. In the file /etc/selinux/config, add or correct the following line to configure +the system to boot into enforcing or permissive mode: +SELINUX=enforcing +OR +SELINUX=permissive + In case the SELinux is "disabled", the automated remediation will adopt a more +conservative approach and set it to "permissive" in order to avoid any system disruption +and give the administrator the opportunity to assess the impact and necessary efforts +before setting it to "enforcing", which is strongly recommended. + Running SELinux in disabled mode is strongly discouraged. It prevents enforcing the SELinux +controls without a system reboot. It also avoids labeling any persistent objects such as +files, making it difficult to enable SELinux in the future. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUX=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config" +else + touch "/etc/selinux/config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config" + +cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "SELINUX=permissive" >> "/etc/selinux/config" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak" + +fixfiles onboot +fixfiles -f relabel + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: false + regexp: ^SELINUX= + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: false + regexp: ^SELINUX= + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: true + regexp: ^SELINUX= + line: SELINUX=permissive + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + - selinux_not_disabled + + + + + + + + + + Configure SELinux Policy + The SELinux targeted policy is appropriate for +general-purpose desktops and servers, as well as systems in many other roles. +To configure the system to use this policy, add or correct the following line +in /etc/selinux/config: +SELINUXTYPE= +Other policies, such as mls, provide additional security labeling +and greater confinement but are not compatible with many general-purpose +use cases. + BP28(R66) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.2 + 3.7.2 + CCI-002165 + CCI-002696 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AC-3 + AC-3(3)(a) + AU-9 + SC-7(21) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-5 + PR.AC-6 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 + SRG-APP-000233-CTR-000585 + Setting the SELinux policy to targeted or a more specialized policy +ensures the system will confine processes that are likely to be +targeted for exploitation, such as network or system services. + +Note: During the development or debugging of SELinux modules, it is common to +temporarily place non-production systems in permissive mode. In such +temporary cases, SELinux policies should be developed, and once work +is completed, the system should be reconfigured to +. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_selinux_policy_name='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUXTYPE=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config" +else + touch "/etc/selinux/config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config" + +cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "SELINUXTYPE=$var_selinux_policy_name" >> "/etc/selinux/config" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_selinux_policy_name # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_selinux_policy_name: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure SELinux Policy + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: false + regexp: ^SELINUXTYPE= + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: false + regexp: ^SELINUXTYPE= + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: true + regexp: ^SELINUXTYPE= + line: SELINUXTYPE={{ var_selinux_policy_name }} + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + - selinux_policytype + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing + The SELinux state should be set to at +system boot time. In the file /etc/selinux/config, add or correct the +following line to configure the system to boot into enforcing mode: +SELINUX= + BP28(R4) + BP28(R66) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO11.04 + APO13.01 + BAI03.05 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + MEA02.01 + 3.1.2 + 3.7.2 + CCI-001084 + CCI-002165 + CCI-002696 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.2 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-004-6 R3.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + CIP-007-3 R6.5 + AC-3 + AC-3(3)(a) + AU-9 + SC-7(21) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-5 + PR.AC-6 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199 + SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068 + Setting the SELinux state to enforcing ensures SELinux is able to confine +potentially compromised processes to the security policy, which is designed to +prevent them from causing damage to the system or further elevating their +privileges. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_selinux_state='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUX=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config" +else + touch "/etc/selinux/config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config" + +cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "SELINUX=$var_selinux_state" >> "/etc/selinux/config" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak" + +fixfiles onboot +fixfiles -f relabel + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_selinux_state # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_selinux_state: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: false + regexp: ^SELINUX= + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: false + regexp: ^SELINUX= + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/selinux/config + create: true + regexp: ^SELINUX= + line: SELINUX={{ var_selinux_state }} + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.2 + - NIST-800-171-3.7.2 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-9 + - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - selinux_state + + + + + + + + + + + SELinux - Booleans + Enable or Disable runtime customization of SELinux system policies +without having to reload or recompile the SELinux policy. + + + abrt_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + abrt_handle_event SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + abrt_upload_watch_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + antivirus_can_scan_system SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + antivirus_use_jit SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + auditadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + authlogin_radius SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + authlogin_yubikey SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + awstats_purge_apache_log_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + boinc_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + cdrecord_read_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cluster_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cluster_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cluster_use_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cobbler_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cobbler_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cobbler_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cobbler_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + collectd_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + condor_tcp_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + conman_can_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + container_connect_any SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cron_can_relabel SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cron_system_cronjob_use_shares SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cron_userdomain_transition SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + cups_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + cvs_read_shadow SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + daemons_dump_core SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + daemons_enable_cluster_mode SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + daemons_use_tcp_wrapper SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + daemons_use_tty SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + dbadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + dbadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + dbadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + deny_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + deny_ptrace SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + dhcpc_exec_iptables SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + dhcpd_use_ldap SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + domain_fd_use SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + domain_kernel_load_modules SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + entropyd_use_audio SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + exim_can_connect_db SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + exim_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + exim_read_user_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + fcron_crond SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + fenced_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + fenced_can_ssh SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + fips_mode SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + ftpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ftpd_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ftpd_connect_db SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ftpd_full_access SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ftpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ftpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ftpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ftpd_use_passive_mode SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_cgi_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_cgi_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_cgi_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_session_users SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_system_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_system_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + git_system_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + gitosis_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + glance_api_can_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + glance_use_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + glance_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + global_ssp SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + gluster_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + gluster_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + gluster_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + gpg_web_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + gssd_read_tmp SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + guest_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + haproxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_builtin_scripting SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + httpd_can_check_spam SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_connect_ftp SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_connect_ldap SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_connect_mythtv SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_connect_zabbix SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_network_connect_db SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_network_memcache SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_dbus_avahi SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_dbus_sssd SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_dontaudit_search_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_enable_cgi SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + httpd_enable_ftp_server SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_graceful_shutdown SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + httpd_manage_ipa SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_mod_auth_pam SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_read_user_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_run_ipa SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_run_preupgrade SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_run_stickshift SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_serve_cobbler_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_setrlimit SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_ssi_exec SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_sys_script_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_tmp_exec SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_tty_comm SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_unified SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_use_gpg SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_use_openstack SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_use_sasl SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + httpd_verify_dns SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + icecast_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + irc_use_any_tcp_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + irssi_use_full_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + kdumpgui_run_bootloader SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + kerberos_enabled SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + ksmtuned_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ksmtuned_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + logadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + logging_syslogd_can_sendmail SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + logging_syslogd_run_nagios_plugins SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + logging_syslogd_use_tty SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + login_console_enabled SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + logrotate_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + logwatch_can_network_connect_mail SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + lsmd_plugin_connect_any SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mailman_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mcelog_client SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mcelog_exec_scripts SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + mcelog_foreground SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mcelog_server SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + minidlna_read_generic_user_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mmap_low_allowed SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mock_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mount_anyfile SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + mozilla_plugin_bind_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mozilla_plugin_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mozilla_plugin_use_bluejeans SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mozilla_plugin_use_gps SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mozilla_plugin_use_spice SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mozilla_read_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mpd_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mpd_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mpd_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mplayer_execstack SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + mysql_connect_any SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + nagios_run_pnp4nagios SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + nagios_run_sudo SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + named_tcp_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + named_write_master_zones SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + neutron_can_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + nfs_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + nfs_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + nfsd_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + nis_enabled SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + nscd_use_shm SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + openshift_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + openvpn_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + openvpn_enable_homedirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + openvpn_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + pcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + pcp_read_generic_logs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + piranha_lvs_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + polipo_connect_all_unreserved SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + polipo_session_users SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + polipo_use_cifs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + polipo_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + postfix_local_write_mail_spool SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + postgresql_can_rsync SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + postgresql_selinux_transmit_client_label SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + postgresql_selinux_unconfined_dbadm SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + postgresql_selinux_users_ddl SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + pppd_can_insmod SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + pppd_for_user SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + privoxy_connect_any SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + prosody_bind_http_port SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + puppetagent_manage_all_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + puppetmaster_use_db SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + racoon_read_shadow SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + rsync_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + rsync_client SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + rsync_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + rsync_full_access SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_create_home_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_domain_controller SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_export_all_ro SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_export_all_rw SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_load_libgfapi SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_portmapper SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_run_unconfined SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_share_fusefs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + samba_share_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + sanlock_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + sanlock_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + sanlock_use_samba SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + saslauthd_read_shadow SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + secadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + secure_mode SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + secure_mode_policyload SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_direct_dri_enabled SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_mysql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_ping SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + selinuxuser_postgresql_connect_enabled SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_rw_noexattrfile SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + selinuxuser_share_music SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_tcp_server SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_udp_server SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + selinuxuser_use_ssh_chroot SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + sge_domain_can_network_connect SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + sge_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + smartmon_3ware SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + smbd_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + spamassassin_can_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + spamd_enable_home_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + squid_connect_any SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + squid_use_tproxy SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ssh_keysign SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + staff_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + staff_use_svirt SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + swift_can_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + sysadm_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + telepathy_connect_all_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + tftp_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + tftp_home_dir SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + tmpreaper_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + tmpreaper_use_samba SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + tor_can_network_relay SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + unconfined_login SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + unprivuser_use_svirt SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + use_ecryptfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + use_fusefs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + use_lpd_server SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + use_nfs_home_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + use_samba_home_dirs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + user_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + varnishd_connect_any SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_read_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_rw_qemu_ga_data SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_sandbox_use_all_caps SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + virt_sandbox_use_audit SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + virt_sandbox_use_mknod SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_sandbox_use_netlink SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_sandbox_use_sys_admin SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_transition_userdomain SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_comm SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_fusefs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_rawip SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_samba SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_sanlock SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + virt_use_usb SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + virt_use_xserver SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + webadm_manage_user_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + webadm_read_user_files SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + wine_mmap_zero_ignore SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xdm_bind_vnc_tcp_port SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xdm_exec_bootloader SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xdm_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xdm_write_home SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xen_use_nfs SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xend_run_blktap SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + xend_run_qemu SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + xguest_connect_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + xguest_exec_content SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + xguest_mount_media SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + xguest_use_bluetooth SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + true + false + true + + + xserver_clients_write_xshm SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xserver_execmem SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + xserver_object_manager SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + zabbix_can_network SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + zarafa_setrlimit SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + zebra_write_config SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + zoneminder_anon_write SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + zoneminder_run_sudo SELinux Boolean + default - Default SELinux boolean setting. +on - SELinux boolean is enabled. +off - SELinux boolean is disabled. + false + false + true + + + Configure the deny_execmem SELinux Boolean + By default, the SELinux boolean deny_execmem is disabled. +This setting should be configured to . + +To set the deny_execmem SELinux boolean, run the following command: +$ sudo setsebool -P deny_execmem + This rule doesn't come with a remediation, as enabling this SELinux boolean can cause +applications to malfunction, for example Graphical login managers and Firefox. + Proper function and stability should be assessed before applying enabling the SELinux +boolean in production systems. + BP28(R67) + Allowing user domain applications to map a memory region as both writable and +executable makes them more susceptible to data execution attacks. + + + + + + + + + + Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean + By default, the SELinux boolean polyinstantiation_enabled is disabled. +This setting should be configured to . + +To set the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux boolean, run the following command: +$ sudo setsebool -P polyinstantiation_enabled + BP28(R39) + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) && [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_polyinstantiation_enabled='' + + +setsebool -P polyinstantiation_enabled $var_polyinstantiation_enabled + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_polyinstantiation_enabled # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_polyinstantiation_enabled: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure python3-libsemanage installed + package: + name: python3-libsemanage + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_polyinstantiation_enabled + +- name: Set SELinux boolean polyinstantiation_enabled accordingly + seboolean: + name: polyinstantiation_enabled + state: '{{ var_polyinstantiation_enabled }}' + persistent: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_polyinstantiation_enabled + + + + + + + + + + + Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean + By default, the SELinux boolean secure_mode_insmod is disabled. +This setting should be configured to . + +To set the secure_mode_insmod SELinux boolean, run the following command: +$ sudo setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod + BP28(R67) + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) && [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_secure_mode_insmod='' + +setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod $var_secure_mode_insmod + +# Preload vfat in initramfs, otherwise the system fails to reboot +echo "vfat" >> /etc/modules-load.d/vfat.conf +dracut -f --regenerate-all + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_secure_mode_insmod # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_secure_mode_insmod: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean - Ensure libsemanage-python + installed + ansible.builtin.package: + name: libsemanage-python + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_secure_mode_insmod + +- name: Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean - Set SELinux boolean secure_mode_insmod + accordingly + ansible.posix.seboolean: + name: secure_mode_insmod + state: '{{ var_secure_mode_insmod }}' + persistent: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_secure_mode_insmod + +- name: Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean - Add vfat to static kernel + module list + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + create: true + dest: /etc/modules-load.d/vfat.conf + regexp: ^\s*\bvfat\b + line: vfat + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_secure_mode_insmod + +- name: Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean - Regenerate initramfs + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: dracut -f --regenerate-all + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_secure_mode_insmod + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean + By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execheap is disabled. +When enabled this boolean is enabled it allows selinuxusers to execute code from the heap. +If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. + +To disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux boolean, run the following command: +$ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap off + BP28(R67) + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + Disabling code execution from the heap blocks buffer overflow attacks. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) && [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_selinuxuser_execheap='' + + +setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap $var_selinuxuser_execheap + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_execheap # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_selinuxuser_execheap: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure python3-libsemanage installed + package: + name: python3-libsemanage + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_selinuxuser_execheap + +- name: Set SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execheap accordingly + seboolean: + name: selinuxuser_execheap + state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_execheap }}' + persistent: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_selinuxuser_execheap + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean + By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execmod is enabled. +If this setting is disabled, it should be enabled. + +To enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux boolean, run the following command: +$ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod on + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) && [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_selinuxuser_execmod='' + + +setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod $var_selinuxuser_execmod + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_execmod # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_selinuxuser_execmod: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure python3-libsemanage installed + package: + name: python3-libsemanage + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_selinuxuser_execmod + +- name: Set SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execmod accordingly + seboolean: + name: selinuxuser_execmod + state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_execmod }}' + persistent: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_selinuxuser_execmod + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean + By default, the SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execstack is enabled. +This setting should be disabled as unconfined executables should not be able +to make their stack executable. + +To disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux boolean, run the following command: +$ sudo setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack off + BP28(R67) + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + Disabling code execution from the stack blocks buffer overflow attacks. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) && [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_selinuxuser_execstack='' + + +setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack $var_selinuxuser_execstack + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_selinuxuser_execstack # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_selinuxuser_execstack: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure python3-libsemanage installed + package: + name: python3-libsemanage + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_selinuxuser_execstack + +- name: Set SELinux boolean selinuxuser_execstack accordingly + seboolean: + name: selinuxuser_execstack + state: '{{ var_selinuxuser_execstack }}' + persistent: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_selinuxuser_execstack + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean + By default, the SELinux boolean ssh_sysadm_login is disabled. +If this setting is enabled, it should be disabled. + +To disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux boolean, run the following command: +$ sudo setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login off + BP28(R67) + CCI-002165 + CCI-002235 + SRG-OS-000324-GPOS-00125 + Preventing non-privileged users from executing privileged functions mitigates +the risk that unauthorized individuals or processes may gain unnecessary access +to information or privileges. + +Privileged functions include, for example, establishing accounts, performing +system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management +activities. Non-privileged users are individuals who do not possess appropriate +authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or +malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that +require protection from non-privileged users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ! ( [ "${container:-}" == "bwrap-osbuild" ] ) && [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_ssh_sysadm_login='' + + +setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login $var_ssh_sysadm_login + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_sysadm_login # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_ssh_sysadm_login: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure python3-libsemanage installed + package: + name: python3-libsemanage + state: present + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_ssh_sysadm_login + +- name: Set SELinux boolean ssh_sysadm_login accordingly + seboolean: + name: ssh_sysadm_login + state: '{{ var_ssh_sysadm_login }}' + persistent: true + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not ( lookup("env", "container") == "bwrap-osbuild" ) + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sebool_ssh_sysadm_login + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Services + The best protection against vulnerable software is running less software. This section describes how to review +the software which Oracle Linux 9 installs on a system and disable software which is not needed. It +then enumerates the software packages installed on a default Oracle Linux 9 system and provides guidance about which +ones can be safely disabled. + +Oracle Linux 9 provides a convenient minimal install option that essentially installs the bare necessities for a functional +system. When building Oracle Linux 9 systems, it is highly recommended to select the minimal packages and then build up +the system from there. + + Apport Service + The Apport service provides debugging and crash reporting +features on Ubuntu distributions. + + + APT service configuration + The apt service manage the package management and update of the whole system. Its configuration need to be properly defined to ensure efficient security updates, packages and repository authentication and proper lifecycle management. + + + Avahi Server + The Avahi daemon implements the DNS Service Discovery +and Multicast DNS protocols, which provide service and host +discovery on a network. It allows a system to automatically +identify resources on the network, such as printers or web servers. +This capability is also known as mDNSresponder and is a major part +of Zeroconf networking. + + Configure Avahi if Necessary + If your system requires the Avahi daemon, its configuration can be restricted +to improve security. The Avahi daemon configuration file is +/etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf. The following security recommendations +should be applied to this file: +See the avahi-daemon.conf(5) man page, or documentation at + + http://www.avahi.org, for more detailed information +about the configuration options. + + Disable Avahi Publishing + To prevent Avahi from publishing its records, edit /etc/avahi/avahi-daemon.conf +and ensure the following line appears in the [publish] section: +disable-publishing=yes + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + This helps ensure that no record will be published by Avahi. + + + + Disable Avahi Server if Possible + Because the Avahi daemon service keeps an open network +port, it is subject to network attacks. +Disabling it can reduce the system's vulnerability to such attacks. + + Disable Avahi Server Software + +The avahi-daemon service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now avahi-daemon.service + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.4 + Because the Avahi daemon service keeps an open network +port, it is subject to network attacks. Its functionality +is convenient but is only appropriate if the local network +can be trusted. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'avahi-daemon.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'avahi-daemon.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'avahi-daemon.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files avahi-daemon.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'avahi-daemon.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'avahi-daemon.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'avahi-daemon.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service avahi-daemon + block: + + - name: Disable service avahi-daemon + block: + + - name: Disable service avahi-daemon + systemd: + name: avahi-daemon.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service avahi-daemon' failure, + service was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_avahi-daemon_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - avahi-daemon.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files avahi-daemon.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_avahi-daemon_disabled + +- name: Disable socket avahi-daemon + systemd: + name: avahi-daemon.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("avahi-daemon.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_avahi-daemon_disabled + + include disable_avahi-daemon + +class disable_avahi-daemon { + service {'avahi-daemon': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["avahi-daemon"] + + + + + + + + + + + + Base Services + This section addresses the base services that are installed on a +Oracle Linux 9 default installation which are not covered in other +sections. Some of these services listen on the network and +should be treated with particular discretion. Other services are local +system utilities that may or may not be extraneous. In general, system services +should be disabled if not required. + + Disable Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) + The Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) daemon collects +and reports crash data when an application crash is detected. Using a variety +of plugins, abrtd can email crash reports to system administrators, log crash +reports to files, or forward crash reports to a centralized issue tracking +system such as RHTSupport. + +The abrtd service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now abrtd.service + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Mishandling crash data could expose sensitive information about +vulnerabilities in software executing on the system, as well as sensitive +information from within a process's address space or registers. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'abrtd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'abrtd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'abrtd.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files abrtd.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'abrtd.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'abrtd.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'abrtd.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service abrtd + block: + + - name: Disable service abrtd + block: + + - name: Disable service abrtd + systemd: + name: abrtd.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service abrtd' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_abrtd_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - abrtd.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files abrtd.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_abrtd_disabled + +- name: Disable socket abrtd + systemd: + name: abrtd.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("abrtd.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_abrtd_disabled + + include disable_abrtd + +class disable_abrtd { + service {'abrtd': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["abrtd"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable KDump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump) + The kdump service provides a kernel crash dump analyzer. It uses the kexec +system call to boot a secondary kernel ("capture" kernel) following a system +crash, which can load information from the crashed kernel for analysis. + +The kdump service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now kdump.service + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + CCI-001665 + 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) + 164.308(a)(3) + 164.308(a)(4) + 164.310(b) + 164.310(c) + 164.312(a) + 164.312(e) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 + SRG-OS-000269-GPOS-00103 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Kernel core dumps may contain the full contents of system memory at the +time of the crash. Kernel core dumps consume a considerable amount of disk +space and may result in denial of service by exhausting the available space +on the target file system partition. Unless the system is used for kernel +development or testing, there is little need to run the kdump service. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'kdump.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'kdump.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'kdump.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files kdump.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'kdump.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'kdump.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'kdump.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service kdump + block: + + - name: Disable service kdump + block: + + - name: Disable service kdump + systemd: + name: kdump.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service kdump' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_kdump_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - kdump.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files kdump.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_kdump_disabled + +- name: Disable socket kdump + systemd: + name: kdump.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("kdump.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_kdump_disabled + + include disable_kdump + +class disable_kdump { + service {'kdump': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +kdump --disable + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["kdump"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable ntpdate Service (ntpdate) + The ntpdate service sets the local hardware clock by polling NTP servers +when the system boots. It synchronizes to the NTP servers listed in +/etc/ntp/step-tickers or /etc/ntp.conf +and then sets the local hardware clock to the newly synchronized +system time. + +The ntpdate service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now ntpdate.service + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000382 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + The ntpdate service may only be suitable for systems which +are rebooted frequently enough that clock drift does not cause problems between +reboots. In any event, the functionality of the ntpdate service is now +available in the ntpd program and should be considered deprecated. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ntpdate.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'ntpdate.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ntpdate.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files ntpdate.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'ntpdate.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'ntpdate.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'ntpdate.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service ntpdate + block: + + - name: Disable service ntpdate + block: + + - name: Disable service ntpdate + systemd: + name: ntpdate.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service ntpdate' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ntpdate_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - ntpdate.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files ntpdate.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ntpdate_disabled + +- name: Disable socket ntpdate + systemd: + name: ntpdate.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("ntpdate.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ntpdate_disabled + + include disable_ntpdate + +class disable_ntpdate { + service {'ntpdate': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["ntpdate"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable Odd Job Daemon (oddjobd) + The oddjobd service exists to provide an interface and +access control mechanism through which +specified privileged tasks can run tasks for unprivileged client +applications. Communication with oddjobd through the system message bus. + +The oddjobd service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now oddjobd.service + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000381 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + The oddjobd service may provide necessary functionality in +some environments, and can be disabled if it is not needed. Execution of +tasks by privileged programs, on behalf of unprivileged ones, has traditionally +been a source of privilege escalation security issues. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'oddjobd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'oddjobd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'oddjobd.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files oddjobd.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'oddjobd.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'oddjobd.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'oddjobd.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service oddjobd + block: + + - name: Disable service oddjobd + block: + + - name: Disable service oddjobd + systemd: + name: oddjobd.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service oddjobd' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_oddjobd_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - oddjobd.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files oddjobd.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_oddjobd_disabled + +- name: Disable socket oddjobd + systemd: + name: oddjobd.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("oddjobd.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_oddjobd_disabled + + include disable_oddjobd + +class disable_oddjobd { + service {'oddjobd': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["oddjobd"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable Apache Qpid (qpidd) + The qpidd service provides high speed, secure, +guaranteed delivery services. It is an implementation of the Advanced Message +Queuing Protocol. By default the qpidd service will bind to port 5672 and +listen for connection attempts. + +The qpidd service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now qpidd.service + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000382 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + The qpidd service is automatically installed when the base package +selection is selected during installation. The qpidd service listens for +network connections, which increases the attack surface of the system. If +the system is not intended to receive AMQP traffic, then the qpidd +service is not needed and should be disabled or removed. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'qpidd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'qpidd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'qpidd.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files qpidd.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'qpidd.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'qpidd.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'qpidd.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service qpidd + block: + + - name: Disable service qpidd + block: + + - name: Disable service qpidd + systemd: + name: qpidd.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service qpidd' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_qpidd_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - qpidd.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files qpidd.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_qpidd_disabled + +- name: Disable socket qpidd + systemd: + name: qpidd.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("qpidd.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_qpidd_disabled + + include disable_qpidd + +class disable_qpidd { + service {'qpidd': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["qpidd"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable Network Router Discovery Daemon (rdisc) + The rdisc service implements the client side of the ICMP +Internet Router Discovery Protocol (IRDP), which allows discovery of routers on +the local subnet. If a router is discovered then the local routing table is +updated with a corresponding default route. By default this daemon is disabled. + +The rdisc service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now rdisc.service + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS01.05 + DSS03.01 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000382 + 4.2.3.4 + 4.3.3.4 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.2 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-4 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + DE.AE-1 + ID.AM-3 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-5 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + General-purpose systems typically have their network and routing +information configured statically by a system administrator. Workstations or +some special-purpose systems often use DHCP (instead of IRDP) to retrieve +dynamic network configuration information. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rdisc.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rdisc.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rdisc.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rdisc.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rdisc.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rdisc.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rdisc.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service rdisc + block: + + - name: Disable service rdisc + block: + + - name: Disable service rdisc + systemd: + name: rdisc.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rdisc' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-4 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rdisc_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - rdisc.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rdisc.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-4 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rdisc_disabled + +- name: Disable socket rdisc + systemd: + name: rdisc.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rdisc.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-4 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rdisc_disabled + + include disable_rdisc + +class disable_rdisc { + service {'rdisc': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["rdisc"] + + + + + + + + + + + Cron and At Daemons + The cron and at services are used to allow commands to +be executed at a later time. The cron service is required by almost +all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, while at may or +may not be required on a given system. Both daemons should be +configured defensively. + + + Install the cron service + The Cron service should be installed. + BP28(R50) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + The cron service allow periodic job execution, needed for almost all administrative tasks and services (software update, log rotating, etc.). Access to cron service should be restricted to administrative accounts only. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "cron" ; then + yum install -y "cron" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure cron is installed + package: + name: cron + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_cron_installed + + include install_cron + +class install_cron { + package { 'cron': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=cron + + +[[packages]] +name = "cron" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Enable cron Service + The crond service is used to execute commands at +preconfigured times. It is required by almost all systems to perform necessary +maintenance tasks, such as notifying root of system activity. + +The cron service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable cron.service + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.6 + Due to its usage for maintenance and security-supporting tasks, +enabling the cron daemon is essential. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'cron.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'cron.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'cron.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service cron + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service cron + systemd: + name: cron + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"cron" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_cron_enabled + + include enable_cron + +class enable_cron { + service {'cron': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["cron"] + + + + + + + + + + Enable cron Service + The crond service is used to execute commands at +preconfigured times. It is required by almost all systems to perform necessary +maintenance tasks, such as notifying root of system activity. + +The crond service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable crond.service + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Due to its usage for maintenance and security-supporting tasks, +enabling the cron daemon is essential. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'crond.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'crond.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'crond.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service crond + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service crond + systemd: + name: crond + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"cronie" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_crond_enabled + + include enable_crond + +class enable_crond { + service {'crond': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["crond"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable At Service (atd) + The at and batch commands can be used to +schedule tasks that are meant to be executed only once. This allows delayed +execution in a manner similar to cron, except that it is not +recurring. The daemon atd keeps track of tasks scheduled via +at and batch, and executes them at the specified time. + +The atd service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now atd.service + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000381 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + The atd service could be used by an unsophisticated insider to carry +out activities outside of a normal login session, which could complicate +accountability. Furthermore, the need to schedule tasks with at or +batch is not common. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'atd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'atd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'atd.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files atd.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'atd.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'atd.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'atd.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service atd + block: + + - name: Disable service atd + block: + + - name: Disable service atd + systemd: + name: atd.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service atd' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_atd_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - atd.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files atd.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_atd_disabled + +- name: Disable socket atd + systemd: + name: atd.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("atd.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_atd_disabled + + include disable_atd + +class disable_atd { + service {'atd': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["atd"] + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.d + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.d, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.d + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.d/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.d/ + state: directory + group: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_cron_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.daily + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.daily + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.daily/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.daily/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.daily/ + state: directory + group: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_cron_daily + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.hourly + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.hourly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.hourly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.hourly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.hourly/ + state: directory + group: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_cron_hourly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.monthly + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.monthly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.monthly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.monthly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.monthly/ + state: directory + group: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_cron_monthly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.weekly + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.weekly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.weekly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure group owner on /etc/cron.weekly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.weekly/ + state: directory + group: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_cron_weekly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Crontab + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/crontab, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/crontab + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chgrp 0 /etc/crontab + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/crontab + stat: + path: /etc/crontab + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/crontab + file: + path: /etc/crontab + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.d + +To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.d, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/cron.d + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.d/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.d/ + state: directory + owner: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_cron_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.daily + +To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/cron.daily + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.daily/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.daily/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.daily/ + state: directory + owner: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_cron_daily + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.hourly + +To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/cron.hourly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.hourly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.hourly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.hourly/ + state: directory + owner: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_cron_hourly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.monthly + +To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/cron.monthly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.monthly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.monthly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.monthly/ + state: directory + owner: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_cron_monthly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.weekly + +To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/cron.weekly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.weekly/ -maxdepth 1 -type d -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure owner on directory /etc/cron.weekly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.weekly/ + state: directory + owner: '0' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_cron_weekly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on crontab + +To properly set the owner of /etc/crontab, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/crontab + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct user to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chown 0 /etc/crontab + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/crontab + stat: + path: /etc/crontab + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/crontab + file: + path: /etc/crontab + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.d + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.d, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.d + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the +correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.d/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.d/ + state: directory + mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_cron_d + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.daily + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.daily, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.daily + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the +correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.daily/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.daily/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.daily/ + state: directory + mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_cron_daily + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.hourly + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.hourly, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.hourly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the +correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.hourly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.hourly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.hourly/ + state: directory + mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_cron_hourly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.monthly + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.monthly, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.monthly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the +correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.monthly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.monthly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.monthly/ + state: directory + mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_cron_monthly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.weekly + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.weekly, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0700 /etc/cron.weekly + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the +correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/cron.weekly/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+s,g+xwrs,o+xwrt -type d -exec chmod u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Set permissions for /etc/cron.weekly/ + file: + path: /etc/cron.weekly/ + state: directory + mode: u-s,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_cron_weekly + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on crontab + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/crontab, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/crontab + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective services that if configured incorrectly +can lead to insecure and vulnerable configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should have the +correct access rights to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/crontab + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/crontab + stat: + path: /etc/crontab + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/crontab + file: + path: /etc/crontab + mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_crontab + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Restrict at and cron to Authorized Users if Necessary + The /etc/cron.allow and /etc/at.allow files contain lists of +users who are allowed to use cron and at to delay execution of +processes. If these files exist and if the corresponding files +/etc/cron.deny and /etc/at.deny do not exist, then only users +listed in the relevant allow files can run the crontab and at commands +to submit jobs to be run at scheduled intervals. On many systems, only the +system administrator needs the ability to schedule jobs. Note that even if a +given user is not listed in cron.allow, cron jobs can still be run as +that user. The cron.allow file controls only administrative access +to the crontab command for scheduling and modifying cron jobs. + + +To restrict at and cron to only authorized users: +Remove the cron.deny file:$ sudo rm /etc/cron.denyEdit /etc/cron.allow, adding one line for each user allowed to use +the crontab command to create cron jobs.Remove the at.deny file:$ sudo rm /etc/at.denyEdit /etc/at.allow, adding one line for each user allowed to use +the at command to create at jobs. + + Verify Group Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file + If /etc/cron.allow exists, it must be group-owned by root. + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/cron.allow + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If the owner of the cron.allow file is not set to root, the possibility exists for an +unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chgrp 0 /etc/cron.allow + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/cron.allow + stat: + path: /etc/cron.allow + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_cron_allow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/cron.allow + file: + path: /etc/cron.allow + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_cron_allow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file + If /etc/cron.allow exists, it must be owned by root. + +To properly set the owner of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/cron.allow + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If the owner of the cron.allow file is not set to root, the possibility exists for an +unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chown 0 /etc/cron.allow + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/cron.allow + stat: + path: /etc/cron.allow + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_cron_allow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/cron.allow + file: + path: /etc/cron.allow + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_cron_allow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/cron.allow file + If /etc/cron.allow exists, it must have permissions 0640 +or more restrictive. + + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/cron.allow, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/cron.allow + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If the permissions of the cron.allow file are not set to 0640 or more restrictive, +the possibility exists for an unauthorized user to view or edit sensitive information. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt /etc/cron.allow + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/cron.allow + stat: + path: /etc/cron.allow + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_cron_allow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt on /etc/cron.allow + file: + path: /etc/cron.allow + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_cron_allow + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + + Deprecated services + Some deprecated software services impact the overall system security due to their behavior (leak of +confidentiality in network exchange, usage as uncontrolled communication channel, risk associated with the service due to its old age, etc. + + Uninstall the inet-based telnet server + The inet-based telnet daemon should be uninstalled. + NT007(R03) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + telnet allows clear text communications, and does not protect any +data transmission between client and server. Any confidential data can be +listened and no integrity checking is made. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove inetutils-telnetd +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on inetutils-telnetd. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "inetutils-telnetd" ; then + + yum remove -y "inetutils-telnetd" + +fi + + - name: Ensure inetutils-telnetd is removed + package: + name: inetutils-telnetd + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_inetutils-telnetd_removed + + include remove_inetutils-telnetd + +class remove_inetutils-telnetd { + package { 'inetutils-telnetd': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=inetutils-telnetd + + + + + + + Uninstall the nis package + The support for Yellowpages should not be installed unless it is required. + NIS is the historical SUN service for central account management, more and more replaced by LDAP. +NIS does not support efficiently security constraints, ACL, etc. and should not be used. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove nis +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on nis. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "nis" ; then + + yum remove -y "nis" + +fi + + - name: Ensure nis is removed + package: + name: nis + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_nis_removed + + include remove_nis + +class remove_nis { + package { 'nis': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=nis + + + + + + + Uninstall the ntpdate package + ntpdate is a historical ntp synchronization client for unixes. It sould be uninstalled. + ntpdate is an old not security-compliant ntp client. It should be replaced by modern ntp clients such as ntpd, able to use cryptographic mechanisms integrated in NTP. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove ntpdate +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on ntpdate. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "ntpdate" ; then + + yum remove -y "ntpdate" + +fi + + - name: Ensure ntpdate is removed + package: + name: ntpdate + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_ntpdate_removed + + include remove_ntpdate + +class remove_ntpdate { + package { 'ntpdate': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=ntpdate + + + + + + + Uninstall the ssl compliant telnet server + The telnet daemon, even with ssl support, should be uninstalled. + NT007(R02) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + telnet, even with ssl support, should not be installed. +When remote shell is required, up-to-date ssh daemon can be used. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnetd-ssl +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on telnetd-ssl. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "telnetd-ssl" ; then + + yum remove -y "telnetd-ssl" + +fi + + - name: Ensure telnetd-ssl is removed + package: + name: telnetd-ssl + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_telnetd-ssl_removed + + include remove_telnetd-ssl + +class remove_telnetd-ssl { + package { 'telnetd-ssl': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=telnetd-ssl + + + + + + + Uninstall the telnet server + The telnet daemon should be uninstalled. + BP28(R1) + NT007(R03) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + telnet allows clear text communications, and does not protect +any data transmission between client and server. Any confidential data +can be listened and no integrity checking is made.' + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnetd +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on telnetd. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "telnetd" ; then + + yum remove -y "telnetd" + +fi + + - name: Ensure telnetd is removed + package: + name: telnetd + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_telnetd_removed + + include remove_telnetd + +class remove_telnetd { + package { 'telnetd': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=telnetd + + + + + + + + DHCP + The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) allows +systems to request and obtain an IP address and other configuration +parameters from a server. + +This guide recommends configuring networking on clients by manually editing +the appropriate files under /etc/sysconfig. Use of DHCP can make client +systems vulnerable to compromise by rogue DHCP servers, and should be avoided +unless necessary. If using DHCP is necessary, however, there are best practices +that should be followed to minimize security risk. + + Configure DHCP Client if Necessary + If DHCP must be used, then certain configuration changes can +minimize the amount of information it receives and applies from the network, +and thus the amount of incorrect information a rogue DHCP server could +successfully distribute. For more information on configuring dhclient, see the +dhclient(8) and dhclient.conf(5) man pages. + + Minimize the DHCP-Configured Options + Create the file /etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf, and add an +appropriate setting for each of the ten configuration settings which can be +obtained via DHCP. For each setting, do one of the following: + +If the setting should not be configured remotely by the DHCP server, +select an appropriate static value, and add the line: +supersede setting value; +If the setting should be configured remotely by the DHCP server, add the lines: +request setting; +require setting; +For example, suppose the DHCP server should provide only the IP address itself +and the subnet mask. Then the entire file should look like: +supersede domain-name "example.com"; +supersede domain-name-servers 192.168.1.2; +supersede nis-domain ""; +supersede nis-servers ""; +supersede ntp-servers "ntp.example.com "; +supersede routers 192.168.1.1; +supersede time-offset -18000; +request subnet-mask; +require subnet-mask; + In this example, the options nis-servers and +nis-domain are set to empty strings, on the assumption that the deprecated NIS +protocol is not in use. It is necessary to supersede settings for unused +services so that they cannot be set by a hostile DHCP server. If an option is +set to an empty string, dhclient will typically not attempt to configure the +service. + By default, the DHCP client program, dhclient, requests and applies +ten configuration options (in addition to the IP address) from the DHCP server. +subnet-mask, broadcast-address, time-offset, routers, domain-name, +domain-name-servers, host-name, nis-domain, nis-servers, and ntp-servers. Many +of the options requested and applied by dhclient may be the same for every +system on a network. It is recommended that almost all configuration options be +assigned statically, and only options which must vary on a host-by-host basis +be assigned via DHCP. This limits the damage which can be done by a rogue DHCP +server. If appropriate for your site, it is also possible to supersede the +host-name directive in /etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf, establishing a static +hostname for the system. However, dhclient does not use the host name option +provided by the DHCP server (instead using the value provided by a reverse DNS +lookup). + + + + Configure DHCP Server + If the system must act as a DHCP server, the configuration +information it serves should be minimized. Also, support for other protocols +and DNS-updating schemes should be explicitly disabled unless needed. The +configuration file for dhcpd is called /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf. The file +begins with a number of global configuration options. The remainder of the file +is divided into sections, one for each block of addresses offered by dhcpd, +each of which contains configuration options specific to that address +block. + + Minimize Served Information + Edit /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf. Examine each address range section within +the file, and ensure that the following options are not defined unless there is +an operational need to provide this information via DHCP: +option domain-name +option domain-name-servers +option nis-domain +option nis-servers +option ntp-servers +option routers +option time-offset + By default, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux client installation uses DHCP +to request much of the above information from the DHCP server. In particular, +domain-name, domain-name-servers, and routers are configured via DHCP. These +settings are typically necessary for proper network functionality, but are also +usually static across systems at a given site. + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + Because the configuration information provided by the DHCP server +could be maliciously provided to clients by a rogue DHCP server, the amount of +information provided via DHCP should be minimized. Remove these definitions +from the DHCP server configuration to ensure that legitimate clients do not +unnecessarily rely on DHCP for this information. + + + + Disable DHCP Client + DHCP is the default network configuration method provided by the system +installer, and common on many networks. Nevertheless, manual management +of IP addresses for systems implies a greater degree of management and +accountability for network activity. + + + Disable DHCP Server + The DHCP server dhcpd is not installed or activated by +default. If the software was installed and activated, but the +system does not need to act as a DHCP server, it should be disabled +and removed. + + Uninstall DHCP Server Package + If the system does not need to act as a DHCP server, +the dhcp package can be uninstalled. + +The dhcp-server package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase dhcp-server + BP28(R1) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.4 + Removing the DHCP server ensures that it cannot be easily or +accidentally reactivated and disrupt network operation. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove dhcp +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on dhcp. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "dhcp" ; then + + yum remove -y "dhcp" + +fi + + - name: Ensure dhcp is removed + package: + name: dhcp + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_dhcp_removed + + include remove_dhcp + +class remove_dhcp { + package { 'dhcp': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=dhcp + + + + + + + + + + + + DNS Server + Most organizations have an operational need to run at +least one nameserver. However, there are many common attacks +involving DNS server software, and this server software should +be disabled on any system +on which it is not needed. + + Disable DNS Server + DNS software should be disabled on any systems which does not +need to be a nameserver. Note that the BIND DNS server software is +not installed on Oracle Linux 9 by default. The remainder of this section +discusses secure configuration of systems which must be +nameservers. + + Uninstall bind Package + The named service is provided by the bind package. +The bind package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase bind + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.4 + If there is no need to make DNS server software available, +removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove bind +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on bind. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "bind" ; then + + yum remove -y "bind" + +fi + + - name: Ensure bind is removed + package: + name: bind + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_bind_removed + + include remove_bind + +class remove_bind { + package { 'bind': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=bind + + + + + + + + + + + Isolate DNS from Other Services + This section discusses mechanisms for preventing the DNS server +from interfering with other services. This is done both to protect the +remainder of the network should a nameserver be compromised, and to make direct +attacks on nameservers more difficult. + + Run DNS Software in a chroot Jail + Install the bind-chroot package: +$ sudo yum install bind-chroot +Place a valid named.conf file inside the chroot jail: +$ sudo cp /etc/named.conf /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf +$ sudo chown root:root /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf +$ sudo chmod 644 /var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf +Create and populate an appropriate zone directory within the jail, based on the +options directive. If your named.conf includes: +options { +directory "/path/to/DIRNAME "; +... +} +then copy that directory and its contents from the original zone directory: +$ sudo cp -r /path/to/DIRNAME /var/named/chroot/DIRNAME +Add or correct the following line within /etc/sysconfig/named: +ROOTDIR=/var/named/chroot + If you are running BIND in a chroot jail, then you +should use the jailed named.conf as the primary nameserver +configuration file. That is, when this guide recommends editing +/etc/named.conf, you should instead edit +/var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf. + + + Run DNS Software on Dedicated Servers + Since DNS is +a high-risk service which must frequently be made available to the entire +Internet, it is strongly recommended that no other services be offered by +systems which act as organizational DNS servers. + + + + Protect DNS Data from Tampering or Attack + This section discusses DNS configuration options which make it +more difficult for attackers to gain access to private DNS data or to modify +DNS data. + + Use Views to Partition External and Internal Information + If it is not possible to run external and internal nameservers on +separate physical systems, run BIND9 and simulate this feature using views. +Edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the following directives (where +SUBNET is the numerical IP representation of your organization in the form +xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx): +acl internal { + SUBNET ; + localhost; +}; +view "internal-view" { + match-clients { internal; }; + zone "." IN { + type hint; + file "db.cache"; + }; + zone "internal.example.com " IN { + ... + }; +}; + +view "external-view" { + match-clients { any; }; + recursion no; + zone "example.com " IN { + ... + }; +}; + As shown in the example, database files which are +required for recursion, such as the root hints file, must be available to any +clients which are allowed to make recursive queries. Under typical +circumstances, this includes only the internal clients which are allowed to use +this server as a general-purpose nameserver. + + + Run Separate DNS Servers for External and Internal Queries + Is it possible to run external and internal nameservers on +separate systems? If so, follow the configuration guidance in this section. On +the external nameserver, edit /etc/named.conf to add or correct the +following directives: +options { + allow-query { any; }; + recursion no; + ... +}; +zone "example.com " IN { + ... +}; +On the internal nameserver, edit /etc/named.conf. Add or correct the +following directives, where SUBNET is the numerical IP representation of your +organization in the form xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx: +acl internal { + SUBNET ; + localhost; +}; +options { + allow-query { internal; }; + ... +}; +zone "internal.example.com " IN { + ... +}; + + + + + Docker Service + The docker service is necessary to create containers, which are + self-sufficient and self-contained applications using the resource + isolation features of the kernel. + + + Application Whitelisting Daemon + Fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon) implements application whitelisting +to decide file access rights. Applications that are known via a reputation +source are allowed access while unknown applications are not. The daemon +makes use of the kernel's fanotify interface to determine file access rights. + + + Install fapolicyd Package + The fapolicyd package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install fapolicyd + CCI-001764 + CCI-001774 + CM-6(a) + SI-4(22) + SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00230 + fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon) +implements application whitelisting to decide file access rights. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "fapolicyd" ; then + yum install -y "fapolicyd" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure fapolicyd is installed + package: + name: fapolicyd + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-4(22) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_fapolicyd_installed + + include install_fapolicyd + +class install_fapolicyd { + package { 'fapolicyd': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=fapolicyd + + +[[packages]] +name = "fapolicyd" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Enable the File Access Policy Service + The File Access Policy service should be enabled. + +The fapolicyd service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable fapolicyd.service + CCI-001764 + CCI-001774 + CM-6(a) + SI-4(22) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00230 + The fapolicyd service (File Access Policy Daemon) +implements application whitelisting to decide file access rights. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'fapolicyd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'fapolicyd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'fapolicyd.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service fapolicyd + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service fapolicyd + systemd: + name: fapolicyd + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"fapolicyd" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SI-4(22) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_fapolicyd_enabled + + include enable_fapolicyd + +class enable_fapolicyd { + service {'fapolicyd': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["fapolicyd"] + + + + + + + + + + Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. + The Fapolicy module must be configured to employ a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs and to prevent unauthorized software from running. + This rule doesn't come with a remediation. Before remediating the system administrator needs to create an allowlist of authorized software. + CCI-001764 + CM-7 (2) + CM-7 (5) (b) + CM-6 b + SRG-OS-000368-GPOS-00154 + SRG-OS-000370-GPOS-00155 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232 + Utilizing a whitelist provides a configuration management method for allowing the execution of only authorized software. +Using only authorized software decreases risk by limiting the number of potential vulnerabilities. Verification of whitelisted software occurs prior to execution or at system startup. + +Proceed with caution with enforcing the use of this daemon. +Improper configuration may render the system non-functional. +The "fapolicyd" API is not namespace aware and can cause issues when launching or running containers. + + + + + + + + + fapolicyd Must be Configured to Limit Access to Users Home Folders + fapolicyd needs be configured so that users cannot give access to their home folders to other users. + This rule is deprecated and there is no replacement at this time. +Previous versions of this rule provided fixtext that would cause fapolicyd not to start. + CCI-000366 + CM-6 b + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00230 + Users' home directories/folders may contain information of a sensitive nature. +Non-privileged users should coordinate any sharing of information with a System Administrator (SA) through shared resources. +fapolicyd can confine users to their home directory, not allowing them to make any changes outside of their own home directories. +Confining users to their home directory will minimize the risk of sharing information. + + + + FTP Server + FTP is a common method for allowing remote access to +files. Like telnet, the FTP protocol is unencrypted, which means +that passwords and other data transmitted during the session can be +captured and that the session is vulnerable to hijacking. +Therefore, running the FTP server software is not recommended. + +However, there are some FTP server configurations which may +be appropriate for some environments, particularly those which +allow only read-only anonymous access as a means of downloading +data available to the public. + + Disable vsftpd if Possible + To minimize attack surface, disable vsftpd if at all +possible. + + Uninstall vsftpd Package + The vsftpd package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase vsftpd + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000197 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000381 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(1)(c) + IA-5(1).1(v) + CM-7 + CM-7.1(ii) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.4 + SRG-OS-000074-GPOS-00042 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Removing the vsftpd package decreases the risk of its +accidental activation. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove vsftpd +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on vsftpd. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "vsftpd" ; then + + yum remove -y "vsftpd" + +fi + + - name: Ensure vsftpd is removed + package: + name: vsftpd + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7.1(ii) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1).1(v) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_vsftpd_removed + + include remove_vsftpd + +class remove_vsftpd { + package { 'vsftpd': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=vsftpd + + + + + + + + + + + Configure vsftpd to Provide FTP Service if Necessary + The primary vsftpd configuration file is +/etc/vsftpd.conf, if that file exists, or +/etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf if it does not. + + Configure Firewalls to Protect the FTP Server + +By default, iptables +blocks access to the ports used by the web server. + +To configure iptables to allow port 21 traffic, one must edit +/etc/sysconfig/iptables and +/etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). +Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the final LOG and DROP lines for the INPUT chain: +-A INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 21 -j ACCEPT +Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/iptables-config. Ensure that the space-separated list of modules contains +the FTP connection tracking module: +IPTABLES_MODULES="ip_conntrack_ftp" + These settings configure the firewall to allow connections to an FTP server. + + +The first line allows initial connections to the FTP server port. +FTP is an older protocol which is not very compatible with firewalls. During the initial FTP dialogue, the client +and server negotiate an arbitrary port to be used for data transfer. The ip_conntrack_ftp module is used by +iptables to listen to that dialogue and allow connections to the data ports which FTP negotiates. This allows an +FTP server to operate on a system which is running a firewall. + + + Restrict the Set of Users Allowed to Access FTP + This section describes how to disable non-anonymous (password-based) FTP logins, or, if it is not possible to +do this entirely due to legacy applications, how to restrict insecure FTP login to only those users who have an +identified need for this access. + + Limit Users Allowed FTP Access if Necessary + If there is a mission-critical reason for users to access their accounts via the insecure FTP protocol, limit the set of users who are allowed this access. Edit the vsftpd configuration file. Add or correct the following configuration options: +userlist_enable=YES +userlist_file=/etc/vsftp.ftpusers +userlist_deny=NO +Edit the file /etc/vsftp.ftpusers. For each user USERNAME who should be allowed to access the system via FTP, add a line containing that user's name: +USERNAME +If anonymous access is also required, add the anonymous usernames to /etc/vsftp.ftpusers as well. +anonymous +ftp + Historically, the file /etc/ftpusers contained a list of users who were not allowed to access the system via FTP. It was used to prevent system users such as the root user from logging in via the insecure FTP protocol. However, when the configuration option userlist deny=NO is set, vsftpd interprets ftpusers as the set of users who are allowed to login via FTP. Since it should be possible for most users to access their accounts via secure protocols, it is recommended that this setting be used, so that non-anonymous FTP access can be limited to legacy users who have been explicitly identified. + + + + + Use vsftpd to Provide FTP Service if Necessary + If your use-case requires FTP service, install and +set-up vsftpd to provide it. + + + + Web Server + The web server is responsible for providing access to +content via the HTTP protocol. Web servers represent a significant +security risk because: + +The HTTP port is commonly probed by malicious sourcesWeb server software is very complex, and includes a long +history of vulnerabilitiesThe HTTP protocol is unencrypted and vulnerable to passive +monitoring + +The system's default web server software is Apache 2 and is +provided in the RPM package httpd. + + Disable Apache if Possible + If Apache was installed and activated, but the system +does not need to act as a web server, then it should be disabled +and removed from the system. + + + Disable NGINX if Possible + If NGINX was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a web server, +then it should be removed from the system. + + + Install Apache if Necessary + If httpd was not installed and activated, but the system +needs to act as a web server, then it should be installed on the system. Follow these +guidelines to install it defensively. The httpd package can be installed with +the following command: +$ sudo yum install httpd +This method of installation is recommended over installing the "Web Server" +package group during the system installation process. The Web Server package +group includes many packages which are likely extraneous, while the +command-line method installs only the required httpd package itself. + + Confirm Minimal Built-in Modules Installed + The default httpd installation minimizes the number of +modules that are compiled directly into the binary (core prefork http_core +mod_so). This minimizes risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by the +web server. + +Query the set of compiled-in modules using the following command: +$ httpd -l +If the number of compiled-in modules is significantly larger than the +aforementioned set, this guide recommends re-installing httpd with a +reduced configuration. Minimizing the number of modules that are compiled into +the httpd binary, reduces risk by limiting the capabilities allowed by +the webserver. + + + + Secure Apache Configuration + The httpd configuration file is +/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf. Apply the recommendations in the remainder +of this section to this file. + + HTTPD Log Level + The setting for LogLevel in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf + alert + crit + warn + emerg + error + warn + + + Maximum KeepAlive Requests for HTTPD + The setting for MaxKeepAliveRequests in httpd.conf + 100 + 1000 + 10000 + 100000 + 500 + 100 + + + Configure Operating System to Protect Web Server + The following configuration steps should be taken on the system which hosts the +web server, in order to provide as safe an environment as possible for the web server. + + Run httpd in a chroot Jail if Practical + Running httpd inside a chroot jail is designed to isolate the +web server process to a small section of the filesystem, limiting the damage if +it is compromised. Versions of Apache greater than 2.2.10 (such as the one +included with Oracle Linux 9) provide the ChrootDir directive. To run Apache +inside a chroot jail in /chroot/apache, add the following line to +/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: ChrootDir /chroot/apache This +necessitates placing all files required by httpd inside +/chroot/apache , including httpd's binaries, modules, +configuration files, and served web pages. The details of this configuration +are beyond the scope of this guide. This may also require additional SELinux +configuration. + + + Restrict File and Directory Access + Minimize access to critical httpd files and directories. + + + + Configure PERL Securely + PERL (Practical Extraction and Report Language) is an interpreted language +optimized for scanning arbitrary text files, extracting information from those +text files, and printing reports based on that information. The language is +often used in shell scripting and is intended to be practical, easy to use, and +efficient means of generating interactive web pages for the user. + + + Configure PHP Securely + PHP is a widely-used and often misconfigured server-side scripting language. It should +be used with caution, but configured appropriately when needed. + +Review /etc/php.ini and make the following changes if possible: +# Do not expose PHP error messages to external users +display_errors = Off + +# Enable safe mode +safe_mode = On + +# Only allow access to executables in isolated directory +safe_mode_exec_dir = php-required-executables-path + +# Limit external access to PHP environment +safe_mode_allowed_env_vars = PHP_ + +# Restrict PHP information leakage +expose_php = Off + +# Log all errors +log_errors = On + +# Do not register globals for input data +register_globals = Off + +# Minimize allowable PHP post size +post_max_size = 1K + +# Ensure PHP redirects appropriately +cgi.force_redirect = 0 + +# Disallow uploading unless necessary +file_uploads = Off + +# Disallow treatment of file requests as fopen calls +allow_url_fopen = Off + +# Enable SQL safe mode +sql.safe_mode = On + + + + Directory Restrictions + The Directory tags in the web server configuration file allow finer grained access +control for a specified directory. All web directories should be configured on a +case-by-case basis, allowing access only where needed. + + + Minimize Web Server Loadable Modules + A default installation of httpd includes a plethora of dynamically shared objects (DSO) +that are loaded at run-time. Unlike the aforementioned compiled-in modules, a DSO can be +disabled in the configuration file by removing the corresponding LoadModule directive. + +Note: A DSO only provides additional functionality if associated directives are included +in the httpd configuration file. It should also be noted that removing a DSO will produce +errors on httpd startup if the configuration file contains directives that apply to that +module. Refer to http://httpd.apache.org/docs/ for details on which directives +are associated with each DSO. + +Following each DSO removal, the configuration can be tested with the following command +to check if everything still works: +$ sudo service httpd configtest +The purpose of each of the modules loaded by default will now be addressed one at a time. +If none of a module's directives are being used, remove it. + + httpd Core Modules + These modules comprise a basic subset of modules that are likely needed for base httpd +functionality; ensure they are not commented out in /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: +LoadModule auth_basic_module modules/mod_auth_basic.so +LoadModule authn_default_module modules/mod_authn_default.so +LoadModule authz_host_module modules/mod_authz_host.so +LoadModule authz_user_module modules/mod_authz_user.so +LoadModule authz_groupfile_module modules/mod_authz_groupfile.so +LoadModule authz_default_module modules/mod_authz_default.so +LoadModule log_config_module modules/mod_log_config.so +LoadModule logio_module modules/mod_logio.so +LoadModule setenvif_module modules/mod_setenvif.so +LoadModule mime_module modules/mod_mome.so +LoadModule autoindex_module modules/mod_autoindex.so +LoadModule negotiation_module modules/mod_negotiation.so +LoadModule dir_module modules/mod_dir.so +LoadModule alias_module modules/mod_alias.so +Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk +by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. + + Minimize Modules for HTTP Basic Authentication + The following modules are necessary if this web server will provide content that will +be restricted by a password. + +Authentication can be performed using local plain text password files (authn_file), +local DBM password files (authn_dbm) or an LDAP directory. The only module required by +the web server depends on your choice of authentication. Comment out the modules you don't +need from the following: +LoadModule authn_file_module modules/mod_authn_file.so +LoadModule authn_dbm_module modules/mod_authn_dbm.so +authn_alias allows for authentication based on aliases. authn_anon +allows anonymous authentication similar to that of anonymous ftp sites. authz_owner +allows authorization based on file ownership. authz_dbm allows for authorization +based on group membership if the web server is using DBM authentication. + +If the above functionality is unnecessary, comment out the related module: +#LoadModule authn_alias_module modules/mod_authn_alias.so +#LoadModule authn_anon_module modules/mod_authn_anon.so +#LoadModule authz_owner_module modules/mod_authz_owner.so +#LoadModule authz_dbm_module modules/mod_authz_dbm.so + + + Minimize Configuration Files Included + The Include directive directs httpd to load supplementary configuration files +from a provided path. The default configuration loads all files that end in .conf +from the /etc/httpd/conf.d directory. + +To restrict excess configuration, the following line should be commented out and +replaced with Include directives that only reference required configuration files: +#Include conf.d/*.conf +If the above change was made, ensure that the SSL encryption remains loaded by +explicitly including the corresponding configuration file: +Include conf.d/ssl.conf +If PHP is necessary, a similar alteration must be made: +Include conf.d/php.conf + +Explicitly listing the configuration files to be loaded during web server start-up avoids +the possibility of unwanted or malicious configuration files to be automatically included as +part of the server's running configuration. + + + Minimize Various Optional Components + The following modules perform very specific tasks, sometimes providing access to +just a few additional directives. If such functionality is not required (or if you +are not using these directives), comment out the associated module: +External filtering (response passed through external program prior to client delivery) +#LoadModule ext_filter_module modules/mod_ext_filter.soUser-specified Cache Control and Expiration +#LoadModule expires_module modules/mod_expires.soCompression Output Filter (provides content compression prior to client delivery) +#LoadModule deflate_module modules/mod_deflate.soHTTP Response/Request Header Customization +#LoadModule headers_module modules/mod_headers.soUser activity monitoring via cookies +#LoadModule usertrack_module modules/mod_usertrack.soDynamically configured mass virtual hosting +#LoadModule vhost_alias_module modules/mod_vhost_alias.so +Minimizing the number of loadable modules available to the web server reduces risk +by limiting the capabilities allowed by the web server. + + + + + Use Appropriate Modules to Improve httpd's Security + Among the modules available for httpd are several whose use may improve the +security of the web server installation. This section recommends and discusses +the deployment of security-relevant modules. + + Deploy mod_security + The security module provides an application level firewall for httpd. +Following its installation with the base ruleset, specific configuration advice can be found at + + http://www.modsecurity.org/ to design a policy that best matches the security needs of +the web applications. Usage of mod_security is highly recommended for some environments, +but it should be noted this module does not ship with Red Hat Enterprise Linux itself, +and instead is provided via Extra Packages for Enterprise Linux (EPEL). +For more information on EPEL please refer to + http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/EPEL. + + + Deploy mod_ssl + Because HTTP is a plain text protocol, all traffic is susceptible to passive +monitoring. If there is a need for confidentiality, SSL should be configured +and enabled to encrypt content. + +Note: mod_nss is a FIPS 140-2 certified alternative to mod_ssl. +The modules share a considerable amount of code and should be nearly identical +in functionality. If FIPS 140-2 validation is required, then mod_nss should +be used. If it provides some feature or its greater compatibility is required, +then mod_ssl should be used. + + + + Restrict Web Server Information Leakage + The ServerTokens and ServerSignature directives determine how +much information the web server discloses about the configuration of the +system. + + + Configure HTTPD-Served Web Content Securely + Running httpd inside a chroot jail is designed to isolate the +web server process to a small section of the filesystem, limiting the damage if +it is compromised. Versions of Apache greater than 2.2.10 (such as the one +included with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7) provide the ChrootDir directive. To run Apache +inside a chroot jail in /chroot/apache, add the following line to +/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf: ChrootDir /chroot/apache This +necessitates placing all files required by httpd inside +/chroot/apache , including httpd's binaries, modules, +configuration files, and served web pages. The details of this configuration +are beyond the scope of this guide. This may also require additional SELinux +configuration. + + Web Login Banner Verbiage + Enter an appropriate login banner for your organization. Please note that new lines must +be expressed by the '\n' character and special characters like parentheses and quotation marks must be escaped with '\\'. + ^(You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.|I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.)$ + ^You[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+accessing[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+\(USG\)[\s\n]+Information[\s\n]+System[\s\n]+\(IS\)[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+By[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+\(which[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+device[\s\n]+attached[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\),[\s\n]+you[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+following[\s\n]+conditions\:(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-The[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+routinely[\s\n]+intercepts[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+monitors[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+purposes[\s\n]+including,[\s\n]+but[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+limited[\s\n]+to,[\s\n]+penetration[\s\n]+testing,[\s\n]+COMSEC[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+network[\s\n]+operations[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+defense,[\s\n]+personnel[\s\n]+misconduct[\s\n]+\(PM\),[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+\(LE\),[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+counterintelligence[\s\n]+\(CI\)[\s\n]+investigations\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-At[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+time,[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+inspect[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+seize[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Communications[\s\n]+using,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+data[\s\n]+stored[\s\n]+on,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+private,[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+routine[\s\n]+monitoring,[\s\n]+interception,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+search,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+disclosed[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+used[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+USG\-authorized[\s\n]+purpose\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-This[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+includes[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+measures[\s\n]+\(e\.g\.,[\s\n]+authentication[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+access[\s\n]+controls\)[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+protect[\s\n]+USG[\s\n]+interests\-\-not[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+your[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+benefit[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+privacy\.(?:[\n]+|(?:\\n)+)\-Notwithstanding[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+above,[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+does[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+constitute[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+PM,[\s\n]+LE[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+CI[\s\n]+investigative[\s\n]+searching[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+content[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privileged[\s\n]+communications,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product,[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+representation[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+services[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+attorneys,[\s\n]+psychotherapists,[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+clergy,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+assistants\.[\s\n]+Such[\s\n]+communications[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+work[\s\n]+product[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+private[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+confidential\.[\s\n]+See[\s\n]+User[\s\n]+Agreement[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+details\.$ + ^I've[\s\n]+read[\s\n]+\&[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+terms[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+IS[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+agreem't\.$ + ^Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+intended[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+communication,[\s\n]+transmission,[\s\n]+processing,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+storage[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+official[\s\n]+U\.S\.[\s\n]+Government[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+ensure[\s\n]+proper[\s\n]+functioning[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+equipment[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+devices[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+systems,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+prevent[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+statutes[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations,[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+deter[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity,[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+similar[\s\n]+purposes\.[\s\n]+Any[\s\n]+user[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+a[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+should[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+aware[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+placed[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+not[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+expectation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+privacy\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+violation[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+statutes,[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+related[\s\n]+information,[\s\n]+including[\s\n]+identification[\s\n]+information[\s\n]+about[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+user,[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+provided[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.[\s\n]+If[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+violations[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use,[\s\n]+employees[\s\n]+who[\s\n]+violate[\s\n]+security[\s\n]+regulations[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+make[\s\n]+unauthorized[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+systems[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+appropriate[\s\n]+disciplinary[\s\n]+action\.[\s\n]+Use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+any[\s\n]+other[\s\n]+DoD[\s\n]+interest[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+constitutes[\s\n]+consent[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+at[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+times\.$ + ^\-\-[\s\n]+WARNING[\s\n]+\-\-[\s\n]+This[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+for[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+use[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+Individuals[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+computer[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+without[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+or[\s\n]+in[\s\n]+excess[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+authority[\s\n]+are[\s\n]+subject[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+having[\s\n]+all[\s\n]+their[\s\n]+activities[\s\n]+on[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+recorded[\s\n]+by[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personnel\.[\s\n]+Anyone[\s\n]+using[\s\n]+this[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+expressly[\s\n]+consents[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+is[\s\n]+advised[\s\n]+that[\s\n]+if[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+reveals[\s\n]+possible[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+criminal[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+system[\s\n]+personal[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+provide[\s\n]+the[\s\n]+evidence[\s\n]+of[\s\n]+such[\s\n]+monitoring[\s\n]+to[\s\n]+law[\s\n]+enforcement[\s\n]+officials\.$ + + + + Use Denial-of-Service Protection Modules + Denial-of-service attacks are difficult to detect and prevent while maintaining +acceptable access to authorized users. However, some traffic-shaping +modules can be used to address the problem. Well-known DoS protection modules include: +mod_cband mod_bwshare mod_limitipconn mod_evasive +Denial-of-service prevention should be implemented for a web server if such a threat exists. +However, specific configuration details are very dependent on the environment and often best left +at the discretion of the administrator. + + + + + IMAP and POP3 Server + Dovecot provides IMAP and POP3 services. It is not +installed by default. The project page at + http://www.dovecot.org +contains more detailed information about Dovecot +configuration. + + Configure Dovecot if Necessary + If the system will operate as an IMAP or +POP3 server, the dovecot software should be configured securely by following +the recommendations below. + + Allow IMAP Clients to Access the Server + +The default iptables configuration does not allow inbound access to any services. +This modification will allow remote hosts to initiate connections to the IMAP daemon, +while keeping all other ports on the server in their default protected state. +To configure iptables to allow port 143 traffic, one must edit +/etc/sysconfig/iptables and +/etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). +Add the following line, ensuring that it appears before the final LOG and DROP lines for the INPUT chain: +-A INPUT -m state --state NEW -p tcp --dport 143 -j ACCEPT + + + Enable SSL Support + SSL should be used to encrypt network traffic between the +Dovecot server and its clients. Users must authenticate to the Dovecot +server in order to read their mail, and passwords should never be +transmitted in clear text. In addition, protecting mail as it is +downloaded is a privacy measure, and clients may use SSL certificates +to authenticate the server, preventing another system from impersonating +the server. + + + Support Only the Necessary Protocols + Dovecot supports the IMAP and POP3 protocols, as well as +SSL-protected versions of those protocols. Configure the Dovecot server +to support only the protocols needed by your site. Edit /etc/dovecot/dovecot.conf. +Add or correct the following lines, replacing PROTOCOL with +only the subset of protocols (imap, imaps, +pop3, pop3s) required: +protocols = PROTOCOL +If possible, require SSL protection for all transactions. The SSL +protocol variants listen on alternate ports (995 instead of 110 for +pop3s, and 993 instead of 143 for imaps), and require SSL-aware clients. +An alternate approach is to listen on the standard port and require the +client to use the STARTTLS command before authenticating. + + + + Disable Cyrus IMAP + If the system does not need to operate as an IMAP or +POP3 server, the Cyrus IMAP software should be removed. + + + Disable Dovecot + If the system does not need to operate as an IMAP or +POP3 server, the dovecot software should be disabled and removed. + + + + Kerberos + The Kerberos protocol is used for authentication across +non-secure network. Authentication can happen between +various types of principals -- users, service, or hosts. +Their identity and encryption keys can be stored in keytab +files. + + + + LDAP + LDAP is a popular directory service, that is, a +standardized way of looking up information from a central database. +Oracle Linux 9 includes software that enables a system to act as both +an LDAP client and server. + + Configure OpenLDAP Clients + This section provides information on which security settings are +important to configure in OpenLDAP clients by manually editing the appropriate +configuration files. Oracle Linux 9 provides an automated configuration tool called +authconfig and a graphical wrapper for authconfig called +system-config-authentication. However, these tools do not provide as +much control over configuration as manual editing of configuration files. The +authconfig tools do not allow you to specify locations of SSL certificate +files, which is useful when trying to use SSL cleanly across several protocols. +Installation and configuration of OpenLDAP on Oracle Linux 9 is available at + Before configuring any system to be an +LDAP client, ensure that a working LDAP server is present on the +network. + + + Configure OpenLDAP Server + This section details some security-relevant settings +for an OpenLDAP server. + + Install and Protect LDAP Certificate Files + Create the PKI directory for LDAP certificates if it does not already exist: +$ sudo mkdir /etc/pki/tls/ldap +$ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/ldap +$ sudo chmod 755 /etc/pki/tls/ldap +Using removable media or some other secure transmission format, install the certificate files +onto the LDAP server: +/etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem: the private key ldapserverkey.pem/etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem: the certificate file ldapservercert.pem +Verify the ownership and permissions of these files: +$ sudo chown root:ldap /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem +$ sudo chown root:ldap /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem +$ sudo chmod 640 /etc/pki/tls/ldap/serverkey.pem +$ sudo chmod 640 /etc/pki/tls/ldap/servercert.pem +Verify that the CA's public certificate file has been installed as +/etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem, and has the correct permissions: +$ sudo mkdir /etc/pki/tls/CA +$ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem +$ sudo chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem + +As a result of these steps, the LDAP server will have access to its own private +certificate and the key with which that certificate is encrypted, and to the +public certificate file belonging to the CA. Note that it would be possible for +the key to be protected further, so that processes running as ldap could not +read it. If this were done, the LDAP server process would need to be restarted +manually whenever the server rebooted. + + + + + Mail Server Software + Mail servers are used to send and receive email over the network. +Mail is a very common service, and Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) are obvious +targets of network attack. +Ensure that systems are not running MTAs unnecessarily, +and configure needed MTAs as defensively as possible. + +Very few systems at any site should be configured to directly receive email over the +network. Users should instead use mail client programs to retrieve email +from a central server that supports protocols such as IMAP or POP3. +However, it is normal for most systems to be independently capable of sending email, +for instance so that cron jobs can report output to an administrator. +Most MTAs, including Postfix, support a submission-only mode in which mail can be sent from +the local system to a central site MTA (or directly delivered to a local account), +but the system still cannot receive mail directly over a network. + +The alternatives program in Oracle Linux 9 permits selection of other mail server software +(such as Sendmail), but Postfix is the default and is preferred. +Postfix was coded with security in mind and can also be more effectively contained by +SELinux as its modular design has resulted in separate processes performing specific actions. +More information is available on its website, + http://www.postfix.org. + + + The Postfix package is installed + A mail server is required for sending emails. +The postfix package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install postfix + SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 + Emails can be used to notify designated personnel about important +system events such as failures or warnings. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "postfix" ; then + yum install -y "postfix" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure postfix is installed + package: + name: postfix + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_postfix_installed + + include install_postfix + +class install_postfix { + package { 'postfix': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=postfix + + +[[packages]] +name = "postfix" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall Sendmail Package + Sendmail is not the default mail transfer agent and is +not installed by default. +The sendmail package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase sendmail + BP28(R1) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000381 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + The sendmail software was not developed with security in mind and +its design prevents it from being effectively contained by SELinux. Postfix +should be used instead. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove sendmail +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on sendmail. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "sendmail" ; then + + yum remove -y "sendmail" + +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure sendmail is removed + package: + name: sendmail + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_sendmail_removed + + include remove_sendmail + +class remove_sendmail { + package { 'sendmail': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=sendmail + + + + + + + + + + Enable Postfix Service + The Postfix mail transfer agent is used for local mail delivery +within the system. The default configuration only listens for connections to +the default SMTP port (port 25) on the loopback interface (127.0.0.1). It is +recommended to leave this service enabled for local mail delivery. + +The postfix service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable postfix.service + Local mail delivery is essential to some system maintenance and +notification tasks. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'postfix.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'postfix.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'postfix.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service postfix + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service postfix + systemd: + name: postfix + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_postfix_enabled + - unknown_severity + + include enable_postfix + +class enable_postfix { + service {'postfix': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["postfix"] + + + + + + + + + + Configure SMTP For Mail Clients + This section discusses settings for Postfix in a submission-only +e-mail configuration. + + Postfix Network Interfaces + The setting for inet_interfaces in /etc/postfix/main.cf + loopback-only + loopback-only + localhost + + + Postfix relayhost + Specify the host all outbound email should be routed into. + smtp.$mydomain + + + Postfix Root Mail Alias + Specify an email address (string) for a root mail alias. + system.administrator@mail.mil + system.administrator@mail.mil + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail For The Root Account + Make sure that mails delivered to root user are forwarded to a monitored +email address. Make sure that the address + is a valid email address +reachable from the system in question. Use the following command to +configure the alias: +$ sudo echo "root: " >> /etc/aliases +$ sudo newaliases + BP28(R49) + CCI-000139 + CCI-000366 + CM-6(a) + SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 + A number of system services utilize email messages sent to the root user to +notify system administrators of active or impending issues. These messages must +be forwarded to at least one monitored email address. + + + + + + + + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account + Verify the administrators are notified in the event of an audit processing failure. +Check that the "/etc/aliases" file has a defined value for "root". +$ sudo grep "postmaster:\s*root$" /etc/aliases + +postmaster: root + CCI-000139 + AU-5(a) + AU-5.1(ii) + SRG-OS-000046-GPOS-00022 + It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to +process audit logs as required. Without this notification, the security personnel may be +unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability, and system operation may be adversely +affected. + +Audit processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing +mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if [ -e "/etc/aliases" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*postmaster\s*:\s*/Id" "/etc/aliases" +else + touch "/etc/aliases" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/aliases" + +cp "/etc/aliases" "/etc/aliases.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "postmaster: root" >> "/etc/aliases" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/aliases.bak" + +if [ -f /usr/bin/newaliases ]; then + newaliases +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/aliases + create: false + regexp: ^\s*postmaster\s*:\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/aliases + lineinfile: + path: /etc/aliases + create: false + regexp: ^\s*postmaster\s*:\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/aliases + lineinfile: + path: /etc/aliases + create: true + regexp: ^\s*postmaster\s*:\s* + line: 'postmaster: root' + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5.1(ii) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster + +- name: Check if newaliases command is available + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/newaliases + register: result_newaliases_present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5.1(ii) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster + +- name: Update postfix aliases + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: newaliases + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - result_newaliases_present.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-5(a) + - NIST-800-53-AU-5.1(ii) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster + + + + + + + + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail through a specific host + Set up a relay host that will act as a gateway for all outbound email. +Edit the file /etc/postfix/main.cf to ensure that only the following +relayhost line appears: +relayhost = + A central outbound email location ensures messages sent from any network host +can be audited for potential unexpected content. Tooling on the central server +may help prevent spam or viruses from being delivered. + + + + + + + Disable Postfix Network Listening + Edit the file /etc/postfix/main.cf to ensure that only the following +inet_interfaces line appears: +inet_interfaces = + BP28(R48) + 11 + 14 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000382 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + 2.2.4 + This ensures postfix accepts mail messages +(such as cron job reports) from the local system only, +and not from the network, which protects it from network attack. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q postfix; }; then + +var_postfix_inet_interfaces='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/postfix/main.cf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*inet_interfaces\s\+=\s\+/Id" "/etc/postfix/main.cf" +else + touch "/etc/postfix/main.cf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/postfix/main.cf" + +cp "/etc/postfix/main.cf" "/etc/postfix/main.cf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "inet_interfaces=$var_postfix_inet_interfaces" >> "/etc/postfix/main.cf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/postfix/main.cf.bak" + +systemctl restart postfix + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_postfix_inet_interfaces # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_postfix_inet_interfaces: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Gather list of packages + package_facts: + manager: auto + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - postfix_network_listening_disabled + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Make changes to Postfix configuration file + lineinfile: + path: /etc/postfix/main.cf + create: false + regexp: ^inet_interfaces\s*=\s.* + line: inet_interfaces = {{ var_postfix_inet_interfaces }} + state: present + insertafter: ^inet_interfaces\s*=\s.* + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' + - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - postfix_network_listening_disabled + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Operating System to Protect Mail Server + The guidance in this section is appropriate for any host which is +operating as a site MTA, whether the mail server runs using Sendmail, Postfix, +or some other software. + + + Configure SSL Certificates for Use with SMTP AUTH + If SMTP AUTH is to be used, the use of SSL to protect credentials in transit is strongly recommended. +There are also configurations for which it may be desirable to encrypt all mail in transit from one MTA to another, +though such configurations are beyond the scope of this guide. In either event, the steps for creating and installing +an SSL certificate are independent of the MTA in use, and are described here. + + Ensure Security of Postfix SSL Certificate + Create the PKI directory for mail certificates, if it does not already exist: +$ sudo mkdir /etc/pki/tls/mail +$ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail +$ sudo chmod 755 /etc/pki/tls/mail +Using removable media or some other secure transmission format, install the files generated in the previous +step onto the mail server: +/etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem: the private key mailserverkey.pem +/etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem: the certificate file mailservercert.pem +Verify the ownership and permissions of these files: +$ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem +$ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem +$ sudo chmod 600 /etc/pki/tls/mail/serverkey.pem +$ sudo chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/mail/servercert.pem +Verify that the CA's public certificate file has been installed as /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem, and has the +correct permissions: +$ sudo chown root:root /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem +$ sudo chmod 644 /etc/pki/tls/CA/cacert.pem + + + + Configure Postfix if Necessary + Postfix stores its configuration files in the directory +/etc/postfix by default. The primary configuration file is +/etc/postfix/main.cf. + + Configure Postfix Resource Usage to Limit Denial of Service Attacks + Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf. Edit the following lines to +configure the amount of system resources Postfix can consume: +default_process_limit = 100 +smtpd_client_connection_count_limit = 10 +smtpd_client_connection_rate_limit = 30 +queue_minfree = 20971520 +header_size_limit = 51200 +message_size_limit = 10485760 +smtpd_recipient_limit = 100 +The values here are examples. + Note: The values given here are examples, and may +need to be modified for any particular site. By default, the Postfix anvil +process gathers mail receipt statistics. To get information about about what +connection rates are typical at your site, look in /var/log/maillog +for lines with the daemon name postfix/anvil. + + + Control Mail Relaying + Postfix's mail relay controls are implemented with the help of the +smtpd recipient restrictions option, which controls the restrictions placed on +the SMTP dialogue once the sender and recipient envelope addresses are known. +The guidance in the following sections should be applied to all systems. If +there are systems which must be allowed to relay mail, but which cannot be +trusted to relay unconditionally, configure SMTP AUTH with SSL support. + + Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying + Modify the /etc/postfix/main.cf file to restrict client connections +to the local network with the following command: +$ sudo postconf -e 'smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject' + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If unrestricted mail relaying is permitted, unauthorized senders could use this +host as a mail relay for the purpose of sending spam or other unauthorized +activity. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && rpm --quiet -q postfix; then + +if ! grep -q ^smtpd_client_restrictions /etc/postfix/main.cf; then + echo "smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject" >> /etc/postfix/main.cf +else + sed -i "s/^smtpd_client_restrictions.*/smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject/g" /etc/postfix/main.cf +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - postfix_prevent_unrestricted_relay + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/postfix/main.cf + create: false + regexp: ^[ \t]*smtpd_client_restrictions\s*=\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/postfix/main.cf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/postfix/main.cf + create: false + regexp: ^[ \t]*smtpd_client_restrictions\s*=\s* + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/postfix/main.cf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/postfix/main.cf + create: true + regexp: ^[ \t]*smtpd_client_restrictions\s*=\s* + line: smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks,reject + state: present + when: + - '"postfix" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - postfix_prevent_unrestricted_relay + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Enact SMTP Recipient Restrictions + To configure Postfix to restrict addresses to which it +will send mail, see: + + http://www.postfix.org/SMTPD_ACCESS_README.html#danger + +The full contents of smtpd_recipient_restrictions will +vary by site, since this is a common place to put spam restrictions and other +site-specific options. The permit_mynetworks option allows all mail to +be relayed from the systems in mynetworks. Then, the +reject_unauth_destination option denies all mail whose destination +address is not local, preventing any other systems from relaying. These two +options should always appear in this order, and should usually follow one +another immediately unless SMTP AUTH is used. + + + Enact SMTP Relay Restrictions + To configure Postfix to restrict addresses to which it +will send mail, see: + + http://www.postfix.org/SMTPD_ACCESS_README.html#danger + +The full contents of smtpd_recipient_restrictions will +vary by site, since this is a common place to put spam restrictions and other +site-specific options. The permit_mynetworks option allows all mail to +be relayed from the systems in mynetworks. Then, the +reject_unauth_destination option denies all mail whose destination +address is not local, preventing any other systems from relaying. These two +options should always appear in this order, and should usually follow one +another immediately unless SMTP AUTH is used. + + + Use TLS for SMTP AUTH + Postfix provides options to use TLS for certificate-based +authentication and encrypted sessions. An encrypted session protects the +information that is transmitted with SMTP mail or with SASL authentication. +To configure Postfix to protect all SMTP AUTH transactions +using TLS, see + http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html. + + + Configure Trusted Networks and Hosts + Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf, and configure the contents of +the mynetworks variable in one of the following ways: +If any system in the subnet containing the MTA may be trusted to relay +messages, add or correct the following line: +mynetworks_style = subnet +This is also the default setting, and is in effect if all +my_networks_style directives are commented.If only the MTA host itself is trusted to relay messages, add or correct +the following line: +mynetworks_style = hostIf the set of systems which can relay is more complicated, manually +specify an entry for each netblock or IP address which is trusted to relay by +setting the mynetworks variable directly: +mynetworks = 10.0.0.0/16, 192.168.1.0/24, 127.0.0.1 + + + Require SMTP AUTH Before Relaying from Untrusted Clients + SMTP authentication allows remote clients to relay mail safely by +requiring them to authenticate before submitting mail. Postfix's SMTP AUTH uses +an authentication library called SASL, which is not part of Postfix itself. To +enable the use of SASL authentication, see + + http://www.postfix.org/SASL_README.html + + + + + + + NFS and RPC + The Network File System is a popular distributed filesystem for +the Unix environment, and is very widely deployed. This section discusses the +circumstances under which it is possible to disable NFS and its dependencies, +and then details steps which should be taken to secure +NFS's configuration. This section is relevant to systems operating as NFS +clients, as well as to those operating as NFS servers. + + Uninstall nfs-utils Package + The nfs-utils package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase nfs-utils + 2.2.4 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + nfs-utils provides a daemon for the kernel NFS server and related tools. This +package also contains the showmount program. showmount queries the mount +daemon on a remote host for information about the Network File System (NFS) server on the +remote host. For example, showmount can display the clients which are mounted on +that host. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove nfs-utils +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on nfs-utils. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "nfs-utils" ; then + + yum remove -y "nfs-utils" + +fi + + - name: Ensure nfs-utils is removed + package: + name: nfs-utils + state: absent + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_nfs-utils_removed + + include remove_nfs-utils + +class remove_nfs-utils { + package { 'nfs-utils': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=nfs-utils + + + + + + + + + + Disable All NFS Services if Possible + If there is not a reason for the system to operate as either an +NFS client or an NFS server, follow all instructions in this section to disable +subsystems required by NFS. + The steps in this section will prevent a system +from operating as either an NFS client or an NFS server. Only perform these +steps on systems which do not need NFS at all. + + + Disable netfs if Possible + To determine if any network filesystems handled by netfs are +currently mounted on the system execute the following command: +$ mount -t nfs,nfs4,smbfs,cifs,ncpfs +If the command did not return any output then disable netfs. + + Disable Network File Systems (netfs) + The netfs script manages the boot-time mounting of several types +of networked filesystems, of which NFS and Samba are the most common. If these +filesystem types are not in use, the script can be disabled, protecting the +system somewhat against accidental or malicious changes to /etc/fstab +and against flaws in the netfs script itself. + +The netfs service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now netfs.service + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'netfs.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'netfs.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'netfs.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files netfs.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'netfs.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'netfs.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'netfs.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service netfs + block: + + - name: Disable service netfs + block: + + - name: Disable service netfs + systemd: + name: netfs.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service netfs' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_netfs_disabled + - unknown_severity + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - netfs.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files netfs.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_netfs_disabled + - unknown_severity + +- name: Disable socket netfs + systemd: + name: netfs.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("netfs.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_netfs_disabled + - unknown_severity + + include disable_netfs + +class disable_netfs { + service {'netfs': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["netfs"] + + + + + + + + Disable Services Used Only by NFS + If NFS is not needed, disable the NFS client daemons nfslock, rpcgssd, and rpcidmapd. + +All of these daemons run with elevated privileges, and many listen for network +connections. If they are not needed, they should be disabled to improve system +security posture. + + + + + Configure All Systems which Use NFS + The steps in this section are appropriate for all systems which +run NFS, whether they operate as clients or as servers. + + Make Each System a Client or a Server, not Both + If NFS must be used, it should be deployed in the simplest +configuration possible to avoid maintainability problems which may lead to +unnecessary security exposure. Due to the reliability and security problems +caused by NFS (specially NFSv3 and NFSv2), it is not a good idea for systems +which act as NFS servers to also mount filesystems via NFS. At the least, +crossed mounts (the situation in which each of two servers mounts a filesystem +from the other) should never be used. + + + Configure NFS Services to Use Fixed Ports (NFSv3 and NFSv2) + Firewalling should be done at each host and at the border +firewalls to protect the NFS daemons from remote access, since NFS servers +should never be accessible from outside the organization. However, by default +for NFSv3 and NFSv2, the RPC Bind service assigns each NFS service to a port +dynamically at service startup time. Dynamic ports cannot be protected by port + +filtering firewalls such as iptables. + + +Therefore, restrict each service to always use a given port, so that +firewalling can be done effectively. Note that, because of the way RPC is +implemented, it is not possible to disable the RPC Bind service even if ports +are assigned statically to all RPC services. + +In NFSv4, the mounting and locking protocols have been incorporated into the +protocol, and the server listens on the the well-known TCP port 2049. As such, +NFSv4 does not need to interact with the rpcbind, lockd, and rpc.statd +daemons, which can and should be disabled in a pure NFSv4 environment. The +rpc.mountd daemon is still required on the NFS server to setup +exports, but is not involved in any over-the-wire operations. + + + + Configure NFS Clients + The steps in this section are appropriate for systems which operate as NFS clients. + + Disable NFS Server Daemons + There is no need to run the NFS server daemons nfs and +rpcsvcgssd except on a small number of properly secured systems +designated as NFS servers. Ensure that these daemons are turned off on +clients. + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with Restrictive Options + Edit the file /etc/fstab. For each filesystem whose type +(column 3) is nfs or nfs4, add the text +,nodev,nosuid to the list of mount options in column 4. If +appropriate, also add ,noexec. + +See the section titled "Restrict Partition Mount Options" for a description of +the effects of these options. In general, execution of files mounted via NFS +should be considered risky because of the possibility that an adversary could +intercept the request and substitute a malicious file. Allowing setuid files to +be executed from remote servers is particularly risky, both for this reason and +because it requires the clients to extend root-level trust to the NFS +server. + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with Kerberos Security + Add the sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +any NFS mounts. + 1 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + IA-2 + IA-2(8) + IA-2(9) + AC-17(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + When an NFS server is configured to use AUTH_SYS a selected userid and groupid are used to handle +requests from the remote user. The userid and groupid could mistakenly or maliciously be set +incorrectly. The AUTH_GSS method of authentication uses certificates on the server and client +systems to more securely authenticate the remote mount request. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +vfstype_points=() +readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') + +for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" +do + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="nfs4" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p|" /etc/fstab + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p + command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nosec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p -n -P + register: points_register + check_mode: false + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_krb_sec_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Add sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p to nfs and nfs4 mount points + mount: + path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + state: present + opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item + with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_krb_sec_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with nodev + Add the nodev option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +any NFS mounts. + 11 + 13 + 14 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.06 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.9 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.8.2.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.8.3.1 + A.8.3.3 + A.9.1.2 + CM-6(a) + MP-2 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-2 + PR.PT-3 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Legitimate device files should only exist in the /dev directory. NFS mounts +should not present device files to users. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +vfstype_points=() +readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') + +for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" +do + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nodev)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="nfs4" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nodev 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nodev"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nodev|" /etc/fstab + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have nodev + command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nonodev -n -P + register: points_register + check_mode: false + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MP-2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_nodev_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Add nodev to nfs and nfs4 mount points + mount: + path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + state: present + opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},nodev' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item + with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-MP-2 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_nodev_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with noexec + Add the noexec option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +any NFS mounts. + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-6 + AC-6(8) + AC-6(10) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The noexec mount option causes the system not to execute binary files. This option must be used +for mounting any file system not containing approved binary files as they may be incompatible. Executing +files from untrusted file systems increases the opportunity for unprivileged users to attain unauthorized +administrative access. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +vfstype_points=() +readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') + +for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" +do + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|noexec)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="nfs4" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}noexec 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "noexec"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,noexec|" /etc/fstab + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have noexec + command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nonoexec -n -P + register: points_register + check_mode: false + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(10) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(8) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_noexec_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Add noexec to nfs and nfs4 mount points + mount: + path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + state: present + opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},noexec' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item + with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(10) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(8) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_noexec_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with nosuid + Add the nosuid option to the fourth column of /etc/fstab for the line which controls mounting of +any NFS mounts. + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-6 + AC-6(1) + CM6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + NFS mounts should not present suid binaries to users. Only vendor-supplied suid executables +should be installed to their default location on the local filesystem. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +vfstype_points=() +readarray -t vfstype_points < <(grep -E "[[:space:]]nfs[4]?[[:space:]]" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $2}') + +for vfstype_point in "${vfstype_points[@]}" +do + mount_point_match_regexp="$(printf "[^#].*[[:space:]]%s[[:space:]]" ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\})" + + # If the mount point is not in /etc/fstab, get previous mount options from /etc/mtab + if ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab; then + # runtime opts without some automatic kernel/userspace-added defaults + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/mtab | head -1 | awk '{print $4}' \ + | sed -E "s/(rw|defaults|seclabel|nosuid)(,|$)//g;s/,$//") + [ "$previous_mount_opts" ] && previous_mount_opts+="," + # In iso9660 filesystems mtab could describe a "blocksize" value, this should be reflected in + # fstab as "block". The next variable is to satisfy shellcheck SC2050. + fs_type="nfs4" + if [ "$fs_type" == "iso9660" ] ; then + previous_mount_opts=$(sed 's/blocksize=/block=/' <<< "$previous_mount_opts") + fi + echo " ${vfstype_point//\\/\\\\} nfs4 defaults,${previous_mount_opts}nosuid 0 0" >> /etc/fstab + # If the mount_opt option is not already in the mount point's /etc/fstab entry, add it + elif ! grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | grep "nosuid"; then + previous_mount_opts=$(grep "$mount_point_match_regexp" /etc/fstab | awk '{print $4}') + sed -i "s|\(${mount_point_match_regexp}.*${previous_mount_opts}\)|\1,nosuid|" /etc/fstab + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Get nfs and nfs4 mount points, that don't have nosuid + command: findmnt --fstab --types nfs,nfs4 -O nonosuid -n -P + register: points_register + check_mode: false + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_nosuid_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Add nosuid to nfs and nfs4 mount points + mount: + path: '{{ item | regex_search(''TARGET="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + src: '{{ item | regex_search(''SOURCE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + fstype: '{{ item | regex_search(''FSTYPE="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }}' + state: present + opts: '{{ item | regex_search(''OPTIONS="([^"]+)"'',''\1'') | first }},nosuid' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - (points_register.stdout | length > 0) and '\\x09' not in item + with_items: '{{ points_register.stdout_lines }}' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM6(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - mount_option_nosuid_remote_filesystems + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure NFS Servers + The steps in this section are appropriate for systems which operate as NFS servers. + + Ensure All-Squashing Disabled On All Exports + The all_squash maps all uids and gids to an anonymous user. +This should be disabled by removing any instances of the +all_squash option from the file /etc/exports. + The all_squash option maps all client requests to a single anonymous +uid/gid on the NFS server, negating the ability to track file access +by user ID. + + + + + + Use Kerberos Security on All Exports + Using Kerberos on all exported mounts prevents a malicious client or user from +impersonating a system user. To cryptography authenticate users to the NFS server, +add sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p to each export in /etc/exports. + 1 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + IA-2 + IA-2(8) + IA-2(9) + AC-17(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + When an NFS server is configured to use AUTH_SYS a selected userid and groupid are used to handle +requests from the remote user. The userid and groupid could mistakenly or maliciously be set +incorrectly. The AUTH_GSS method of authentication uses certificates on the server and client +systems to more securely authenticate the remote mount request. + +nfs_exports=() +readarray -t nfs_exports < <(grep -E "^/.*[[:space:]]+ .*\(.*\)[[:space:]]*$" /etc/exports | awk '{print $2}') + +for nfs_export in "${nfs_exports[@]}" +do + correct_export="" + if [ "$(grep -c "sec=" <<<"$nfs_export")" -eq 0 ]; then + correct_export="$(echo $nfs_export|sed -e 's/).*$/,sec=krb5\:krb5i\:krb5p)/')" + else + correct_export="$(echo $nfs_export|sed -e 's/sec=[^\,\)]*/sec=krb5\:krb5i\:krb5p/')" + fi + sed -i "s|$nfs_export|$correct_export|g" /etc/exports +done + + - name: Drop any security clause for every export + replace: + path: /etc/exports + regexp: ^(/.*\w+.*\(.*),sec=[^,]*(.*\)\w*$) + replace: \1\2 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - use_kerberos_security_all_exports + +- name: Add kerberos security when no security is defined for an export + replace: + path: /etc/exports + regexp: ^(/.*\w+.*\(.*)(\)\w*$) + replace: \1,sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p\2 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(8) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(9) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - use_kerberos_security_all_exports + + + + + + + + + + Configure the Exports File Restrictively + Linux's NFS implementation uses the file /etc/exports to control what filesystems +and directories may be accessed via NFS. (See the exports(5) manpage for more information about the +format of this file.) + +The syntax of the exports file is not necessarily checked fully on reload, and syntax errors +can leave your NFS configuration more open than intended. Therefore, exercise caution when modifying +the file. + +The syntax of each line in /etc/exports is: +/DIR host1(opt1,opt2) host2(opt3) +where /DIR is a directory or filesystem to export, hostN is an IP address, netblock, +hostname, domain, or netgroup to which to export, and optN is an option. + + + Export Filesystems Read-Only if Possible + If a filesystem is being exported so that users can view the files in a convenient +fashion, but there is no need for users to edit those files, exporting the filesystem read-only +removes an attack vector against the server. The default filesystem export mode is ro, +so do not specify rw without a good reason. + + + Use Access Lists to Enforce Authorization Restrictions + When configuring NFS exports, ensure that each export line in /etc/exports contains +a list of hosts which are allowed to access that export. If no hosts are specified on an export line, +then that export is available to any remote host which requests it. All lines of the exports file should +specify the hosts (or subnets, if needed) which are allowed to access the exported directory, so that +unknown or remote hosts will be denied. + +Authorized hosts can be specified in several different formats: +Name or alias that is recognized by the resolverFully qualified domain nameIP addressIP subnets in the format address/netmask or address/CIDR + + + + + Network Time Protocol + The Network Time Protocol is used to manage the system +clock over a network. Computer clocks are not very accurate, so +time will drift unpredictably on unmanaged systems. Central time +protocols can be used both to ensure that time is consistent among +a network of systems, and that their time is consistent with the +outside world. + +If every system on a network reliably reports the same time, then it is much +easier to correlate log messages in case of an attack. In addition, a number of +cryptographic protocols (such as Kerberos) use timestamps to prevent certain +types of attacks. If your network does not have synchronized time, these +protocols may be unreliable or even unusable. + +Depending on the specifics of the network, global time accuracy may be just as +important as local synchronization, or not very important at all. If your +network is connected to the Internet, using a public timeserver (or one +provided by your enterprise) provides globally accurate timestamps which may be +essential in investigating or responding to an attack which originated outside +of your network. + +A typical network setup involves a small number of internal systems operating +as NTP servers, and the remainder obtaining time information from those +internal servers. + +There is a choice between the daemons ntpd and chronyd, which +are available from the repositories in the ntp and chrony +packages respectively. + +The default chronyd daemon can work well when external time references +are only intermittently accesible, can perform well even when the network is +congested for longer periods of time, can usually synchronize the clock faster +and with better time accuracy, and quickly adapts to sudden changes in the rate +of the clock, for example, due to changes in the temperature of the crystal +oscillator. Chronyd should be considered for all systems which are +frequently suspended or otherwise intermittently disconnected and reconnected +to a network. Mobile and virtual systems for example. + +The ntpd NTP daemon fully supports NTP protocol version 4 (RFC 5905), +including broadcast, multicast, manycast clients and servers, and the orphan +mode. It also supports extra authentication schemes based on public-key +cryptography (RFC 5906). The NTP daemon (ntpd) should be considered +for systems which are normally kept permanently on. Systems which are required +to use broadcast or multicast IP, or to perform authentication of packets with +the Autokey protocol, should consider using ntpd. + +Refer to + + + https://docs.oracle.com/en/operating-systems/oracle-linux/9/network/network-ConfiguringNetworkTime.html#ol-nettime + +for more detailed comparison of features of chronyd +and ntpd daemon features respectively, and for further guidance how to +choose between the two NTP daemons. + +The upstream manual pages at + https://chrony-project.org/documentation.html for +chronyd and + http://www.ntp.org for ntpd provide additional +information on the capabilities and configuration of each of the NTP daemons. + + + Vendor Approved Time pools + The list of vendor-approved pool servers + 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org + 0.fedora.pool.ntp.org,1.fedora.pool.ntp.org,2.fedora.pool.ntp.org,3.fedora.pool.ntp.org + 0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org + 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org + 0.suse.pool.ntp.org,1.suse.pool.ntp.org,2.suse.pool.ntp.org,3.suse.pool.ntp.org + 0.ntp.cloud.aliyuncs.com,1.ntp.aliyun.com,2.ntp1.aliyun.com,3.ntp1.cloud.aliyuncs.com + + + Vendor Approved Time Servers + The list of vendor-approved time servers + 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org + 0.fedora.pool.ntp.org,1.fedora.pool.ntp.org,2.fedora.pool.ntp.org,3.fedora.pool.ntp.org + 0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org + 0.pool.ntp.org,1.pool.ntp.org,2.pool.ntp.org,3.pool.ntp.org + 0.suse.pool.ntp.org,1.suse.pool.ntp.org,2.suse.pool.ntp.org,3.suse.pool.ntp.org + 0.ntp.cloud.aliyuncs.com,1.ntp.aliyun.com,2.ntp1.aliyun.com,3.ntp1.cloud.aliyuncs.com + + + Maximum NTP or Chrony Poll + The maximum NTP or Chrony poll interval number in seconds specified as a power of two. + 17 + 16 + 10 + 10 + + + The Chrony package is installed + System time should be synchronized between all systems in an environment. This is +typically done by establishing an authoritative time server or set of servers and having all +systems synchronize their clocks to them. +The chrony package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install chrony + BP28(R71) + 0988 + 1405 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + Req-10.4 + 10.6.1 + SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 + Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms like +Kerberos and also ensures log files have consistent time records across the enterprise, +which aids in forensic investigations. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "chrony" ; then + yum install -y "chrony" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure chrony is installed + package: + name: chrony + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_chrony_installed + + include install_chrony + +class install_chrony { + package { 'chrony': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=chrony + + +[[packages]] +name = "chrony" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install the ntp service + The ntpd service should be installed. + NT012(R03) + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000160 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.4 + Time synchronization (using NTP) is required by almost all network and administrative tasks (syslog, cryptographic based services (authentication, etc.), etc.). Ntpd is regulary maintained and updated, supporting security features such as RFC 5906. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "ntp" ; then + yum install -y "ntp" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure ntp is installed + package: + name: ntp + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 + - enable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_ntp_installed + + include install_ntp + +class install_ntp { + package { 'ntp': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=ntp + + +[[packages]] +name = "ntp" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + The Chronyd service is enabled + chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP) is designed to +synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source that is highly +accurate. More information on chrony can be found at + + http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/. +Chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server. +To enable Chronyd service, you can run: +# systemctl enable chronyd.service +This recommendation only applies if chrony is in use on the system. + 0988 + 1405 + SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 + If chrony is in use on the system proper configuration is vital to ensuring time +synchronization is working properly. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q chrony; }; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'chronyd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'chronyd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'chronyd.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_chronyd_enabled + +- name: Enable service chronyd + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service chronyd + systemd: + name: chronyd + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_chronyd_enabled + + include enable_chronyd + +class enable_chronyd { + service {'chronyd': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["chronyd"] + + + + + + + + + + Enable the NTP Daemon + +The ntp service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable ntp.service + NT012(R03) + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-000160 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + AU-8(1)(a) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.4 + 10.6.1 + Enabling the ntp service ensures that the ntp +service will be running and that the system will synchronize its time to +any servers specified. This is important whether the system is configured to be +a client (and synchronize only its own clock) or it is also acting as an NTP +server to other systems. Synchronizing time is essential for authentication +services such as Kerberos, but it is also important for maintaining accurate +logs and auditing possible security breaches. + +The NTP daemon offers all of the functionality of ntpdate, which is now +deprecated. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q ntp; }; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ntp.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ntp.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ntp.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 + - enable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ntp_enabled + +- name: Enable service ntp + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service ntp + systemd: + name: ntp + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 + - enable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ntp_enabled + + include enable_ntp + +class enable_ntp { + service {'ntp': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["ntp"] + + + + + + + + + + Enable the NTP Daemon + +The ntpd service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable ntpd.service + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + AU-8(1)(a) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.4 + 10.6.1 + Enabling the ntpd service ensures that the ntpd +service will be running and that the system will synchronize its time to +any servers specified. This is important whether the system is configured to be +a client (and synchronize only its own clock) or it is also acting as an NTP +server to other systems. Synchronizing time is essential for authentication +services such as Kerberos, but it is also important for maintaining accurate +logs and auditing possible security breaches. + +The NTP daemon offers all of the functionality of ntpdate, which is now +deprecated. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q ntp; }; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'ntpd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'ntpd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'ntpd.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ntpd_enabled + +- name: Enable service ntpd + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service ntpd + systemd: + name: ntpd + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"ntp" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_ntpd_enabled + + include enable_ntpd + +class enable_ntpd { + service {'ntpd': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["ntpd"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable chrony daemon from acting as server + The port option in /etc/chrony.conf can be set to +0 to make chrony daemon to never open any listening port +for server operation and to operate strictly in a client-only mode. + CCI-000381 + AU-8(1) + AU-12(1) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information systems. +Operating systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., VPN and IPS); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. +To support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the operating system must support the organizational requirements, providing only essential capabilities and limiting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to conduct official business or to address authorized quality of life issues. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^port") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^port\\>" "/etc/chrony.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^port\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/chrony.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/chrony.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/chrony.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/chrony.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/chrony.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Disable chrony daemon from acting as server + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*port\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/chrony.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*port\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/chrony.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + create: true + regexp: ^\s*port\s+ + line: port 0 + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1) + - chronyd_client_only + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Disable network management of chrony daemon + The cmdport option in /etc/chrony.conf can be set to +0 to stop chrony daemon from listening on the UDP port 323 +for management connections made by chronyc. + CCI-000381 + CM-7(1) + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + Minimizing the exposure of the server functionality of the chrony +daemon diminishes the attack surface. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^cmdport") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "0" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^cmdport\\>" "/etc/chrony.conf"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^cmdport\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/chrony.conf" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/chrony.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/chrony.conf" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/chrony.conf" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/chrony.conf" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Disable network management of chrony daemon + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*cmdport\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/chrony.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + create: false + regexp: ^\s*cmdport\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/chrony.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + create: true + regexp: ^\s*cmdport\s+ + line: cmdport 0 + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(1) + - chronyd_no_chronyc_network + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval + The maxpoll should be configured to + in /etc/ntp.conf or +/etc/chrony.conf to continuously poll time servers. To configure +maxpoll in /etc/ntp.conf or /etc/chrony.conf +add the following after each `server`, `pool` or `peer` entry: +maxpoll +to server directives. If using chrony any pool directives +should be configured too. +If no server or pool directives are configured, the rule evaluates +to pass. + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + CCI-001891 + CCI-002046 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + AU-8(1)(b) + AU-12(1) + PR.PT-1 + SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 + SRG-OS-000356-GPOS-00144 + SRG-OS-000359-GPOS-00146 + Inaccurate time stamps make it more difficult to correlate events and can lead to an inaccurate analysis. Determining the correct time a particular event occurred on a system is critical when conducting forensic analysis and investigating system events. Sources outside the configured acceptable allowance (drift) may be inaccurate. +Synchronizing internal information system clocks provides uniformity of time stamps for information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network. +Organizations should consider endpoints that may not have regular access to the authoritative time server (e.g., mobile, teleworking, and tactical endpoints). + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { ( rpm --quiet -q chrony || rpm --quiet -q ntp ); }; then + +var_time_service_set_maxpoll='' + + + + +pof="/usr/sbin/pidof" + + +CONFIG_FILES="/etc/ntp.conf" +$pof ntpd || { + CHRONY_NAME=/etc/chrony.conf + CHRONY_PATH=${CHRONY_NAME%%.*} + CONFIG_FILES=$(find ${CHRONY_PATH}.* -type f -name '*.conf') +} + +# get list of ntp files + +for config_file in $CONFIG_FILES; do + # Set maxpoll values to var_time_service_set_maxpoll + sed -i "s/^\(\(server\|pool\|peer\).*maxpoll\) [0-9][0-9]*\(.*\)$/\1 $var_time_service_set_maxpoll \3/" "$config_file" +done + + + + +for config_file in $CONFIG_FILES; do + # Add maxpoll to server, pool or peer entries without maxpoll + grep "^\(server\|pool\|peer\)" "$config_file" | grep -v maxpoll | while read -r line ; do + sed -i "s/$line/& maxpoll $var_time_service_set_maxpoll/" "$config_file" + done +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy +- name: XCCDF Value var_time_service_set_maxpoll # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_time_service_set_maxpoll: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Check that /etc/ntp.conf exist + stat: + path: /etc/ntp.conf + register: ntp_conf_exist_result + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update the maxpoll values in /etc/ntp.conf + replace: + path: /etc/ntp.conf + regexp: ^(server.*maxpoll)[ ]+[0-9]+(.*)$ + replace: \1 {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\2 + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) + - ntp_conf_exist_result.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set the maxpoll values in /etc/ntp.conf + replace: + path: /etc/ntp.conf + regexp: (^server\s+((?!maxpoll).)*)$ + replace: \1 maxpoll {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\n + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) + - ntp_conf_exist_result.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Check that /etc/chrony.conf exist + stat: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + register: chrony_conf_exist_result + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Get get conf files from /etc/chrony.conf + shell: | + set -o pipefail + CHRONY_NAME=/etc/chrony.conf + CHRONY_PATH=${CHRONY_NAME%%.*} + find ${CHRONY_PATH}.* -type f -name '*.conf' + register: update_chrony_files + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) + - chrony_conf_exist_result.stat.exists + changed_when: false + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Update the maxpoll values in /etc/chrony.conf + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^((?:server|pool|peer).*maxpoll)[ ]+[0-9]+(.*)$ + replace: \1 {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\2 + loop: '{{ update_chrony_files.stdout_lines|list|flatten|unique }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) + - chrony_conf_exist_result.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Set the maxpoll values in /etc/chrony.conf + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: (^(?:server|pool|peer)\s+((?!maxpoll).)*)$ + replace: \1 maxpoll {{ var_time_service_set_maxpoll }}\n + loop: '{{ update_chrony_files.stdout_lines|list|flatten|unique }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ( "chrony" in ansible_facts.packages or "ntp" in ansible_facts.packages ) + - chrony_conf_exist_result.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-12(1) + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Chrony is only configured with the server directive + Check that Chrony only has time sources configured with the server directive. + This rule doesn't come with a remediation, the time source needs to be added by the administrator. + CCI-001891 + SRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143 + SRG-OS-000356-GPOS-00144 + SRG-OS-000359-GPOS-00146 + Depending on the infrastructure being used the pool directive may not be supported. + + + + + + + + + + A remote time server for Chrony is configured + Chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP). It is designed to +synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source that is highly +accurate. More information on chrony can be found at + + http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/. +Chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server. +Add or edit server or pool lines to /etc/chrony.conf as appropriate: +server <remote-server> +Multiple servers may be configured. + BP28(R71) + CCI-000160 + CCI-001891 + 0988 + 1405 + CM-6(a) + AU-8(1)(a) + Req-10.4.3 + 10.6.2 + If chrony is in use on the system proper configuration is vital to ensuring time +synchronization is working properly. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && { rpm --quiet -q chrony; }; then + +var_multiple_time_servers='' + + +config_file="/etc/chrony.conf" + +if ! grep -q '^[[:space:]]*\(server\|pool\)[[:space:]]\+[[:graph:]]\+' "$config_file" ; then + if ! grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' "$config_file" ; then + for server in $(echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n') ; do + printf '\nserver %s' "$server" >> "$config_file" + done + else + sed -i 's/#[ \t]*server/server/g' "$config_file" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2 + - chronyd_specify_remote_server + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed +- name: XCCDF Value var_multiple_time_servers # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_multiple_time_servers: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Detect if chrony is already configured with pools or servers + find: + path: /etc + patterns: chrony.conf + contains: ^[\s]*(?:server|pool)[\s]+[\w]+ + register: chrony_servers + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2 + - chronyd_specify_remote_server + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Configure remote time servers + lineinfile: + path: /etc/chrony.conf + line: server {{ item }} + state: present + create: true + loop: '{{ var_multiple_time_servers.split(",") }}' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages' + - chrony_servers.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2 + - chronyd_specify_remote_server + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Specify Additional Remote NTP Servers + Additional NTP servers can be specified for time synchronization +in the file /etc/ntp.conf. To do so, add additional lines of the +following form, substituting the IP address or hostname of a remote NTP server for +ntpserver: +server ntpserver + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + AU-8(1)(a) + AU-8(2) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.4.3 + 10.6.2 + Specifying additional NTP servers increases the availability of +accurate time data, in the event that one of the specified servers becomes +unavailable. This is typical for a system acting as an NTP server for +other systems. + + + + + + Specify a Remote NTP Server + To specify a remote NTP server for time synchronization, edit +the file /etc/ntp.conf. Add or correct the following lines, +substituting the IP or hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver: +server ntpserver +This instructs the NTP software to contact that remote server to obtain time +data. + 1 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 6 + APO11.04 + BAI03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + MEA02.01 + 4.3.3.3.9 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.4.4.7 + 4.4.2.1 + 4.4.2.2 + 4.4.2.4 + SR 2.10 + SR 2.11 + SR 2.12 + SR 2.8 + SR 2.9 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.2 + A.12.4.3 + A.12.4.4 + A.12.7.1 + CM-6(a) + AU-8(1)(a) + PR.PT-1 + Req-10.4.1 + Req-10.4.3 + 10.6.1 + 10.6.2 + Synchronizing with an NTP server makes it possible +to collate system logs from multiple sources or correlate computer events with +real time events. + + + + + + + + + + + Obsolete Services + This section discusses a number of network-visible +services which have historically caused problems for system +security, and for which disabling or severely limiting the service +has been the best available guidance for some time. As a result of +this, many of these services are not installed as part of Oracle Linux 9 +by default. + +Organizations which are running these services should +switch to more secure equivalents as soon as possible. +If it remains absolutely necessary to run one of +these services for legacy reasons, care should be taken to restrict +the service as much as possible, for instance by configuring host + +firewall software such as iptables to restrict access to the + +vulnerable service to only those remote hosts which have a known +need to use it. + + Xinetd + The xinetd service acts as a dedicated listener for some +network services (mostly, obsolete ones) and can be used to provide access +controls and perform some logging. It has been largely obsoleted by other +features, and it is not installed by default. The older Inetd service +is not even available as part of Oracle Linux 9. + + + Uninstall xinetd Package + The xinetd package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase xinetd + BP28(R1) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000305 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + 2.2.4 + Removing the xinetd package decreases the risk of the +xinetd service's accidental (or intentional) activation. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove xinetd +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on xinetd. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "xinetd" ; then + + yum remove -y "xinetd" + +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure xinetd is removed + package: + name: xinetd + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_xinetd_removed + + include remove_xinetd + +class remove_xinetd { + package { 'xinetd': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=xinetd + + + + + + + + + + Disable xinetd Service + +The xinetd service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now xinetd.service + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + 3.4.7 + CCI-000305 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + The xinetd service provides a dedicated listener service for some programs, +which is no longer necessary for commonly-used network services. Disabling +it ensures that these uncommon services are not running, and also prevents +attacks against xinetd itself. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'xinetd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'xinetd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'xinetd.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files xinetd.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'xinetd.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'xinetd.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'xinetd.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service xinetd + block: + + - name: Disable service xinetd + block: + + - name: Disable service xinetd + systemd: + name: xinetd.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service xinetd' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_xinetd_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - xinetd.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files xinetd.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_xinetd_disabled + +- name: Disable socket xinetd + systemd: + name: xinetd.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("xinetd.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_xinetd_disabled + + include disable_xinetd + +class disable_xinetd { + service {'xinetd': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["xinetd"] + + + + + + + + + + + NIS + The Network Information Service (NIS), also known as 'Yellow +Pages' (YP), and its successor NIS+ have been made obsolete by +Kerberos, LDAP, and other modern centralized authentication +services. NIS should not be used because it suffers from security +problems inherent in its design, such as inadequate protection of +important authentication information. + + + Rlogin, Rsh, and Rexec + The Berkeley r-commands are legacy services which +allow cleartext remote access and have an insecure trust +model. + + Uninstall rsh-server Package + The rsh-server package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase rsh-server + BP28(R1) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000381 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(1)(c) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + The rsh-server service provides unencrypted remote access service which does not +provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session and has very weak +authentication. If a privileged user were to login using this service, the privileged user password +could be compromised. The rsh-server package provides several obsolete and insecure +network services. Removing it decreases the risk of those services' accidental (or intentional) +activation. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove rsh-server +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on rsh-server. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "rsh-server" ; then + + yum remove -y "rsh-server" + +fi + + - name: Ensure rsh-server is removed + package: + name: rsh-server + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_rsh-server_removed + + include remove_rsh-server + +class remove_rsh-server { + package { 'rsh-server': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=rsh-server + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall rsh Package + +The rsh package contains the client commands + +for the rsh services + BP28(R1) + 3.1.13 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + A.8.2.3 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + 2.2.4 + These legacy clients contain numerous security exposures and have +been replaced with the more secure SSH package. Even if the server is removed, +it is best to ensure the clients are also removed to prevent users from +inadvertently attempting to use these commands and therefore exposing + +their credentials. Note that removing the rsh package removes + +the clients for rsh,rcp, and rlogin. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove rsh +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on rsh. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "rsh" ; then + + yum remove -y "rsh" + +fi + + - name: Ensure rsh is removed + package: + name: rsh + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_rsh_removed + - unknown_severity + + include remove_rsh + +class remove_rsh { + package { 'rsh': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=rsh + + + + + + + + + + Disable rlogin Service + The rlogin service, which is available with +the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately +as a systemd socket, should be disabled. +If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin. + +The rlogin socket can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now rlogin.socket + 1 + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.13 + 3.4.7 + CCI-001436 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(1)(c) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + The rlogin service uses unencrypted network communications, which +means that data from the login session, including passwords and +all other information transmitted during the session, can be +stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rlogin.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'rlogin.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rlogin.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files rlogin.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'rlogin.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'rlogin.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'rlogin.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service rlogin + block: + + - name: Disable service rlogin + block: + + - name: Disable service rlogin + systemd: + name: rlogin.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service rlogin' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rlogin_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - rlogin.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files rlogin.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rlogin_disabled + +- name: Disable socket rlogin + systemd: + name: rlogin.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("rlogin.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rlogin_disabled + + include disable_rlogin + +class disable_rlogin { + service {'rlogin': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["rlogin"] + + + + + + + + + + Remove Host-Based Authentication Files + The shosts.equiv file lists remote hosts and users that are trusted by the local +system. To remove these files, run the following command to delete them from any location: +$ sudo rm /[path]/[to]/[file]/shosts.equiv + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The shosts.equiv files are used to configure host-based authentication for the system via SSH. +Host-based authentication is not sufficient for preventing unauthorized access to the system, +as it does not require interactive identification and authentication of a connection request, +or for the use of two-factor authentication. + +# Identify local mounts +MOUNT_LIST=$(df --local | awk '{ print $6 }') + +# Find file on each listed mount point +for cur_mount in ${MOUNT_LIST} +do + find ${cur_mount} -xdev -type f -name "shosts.equiv" -exec rm -f {} \; +done + + - name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Excluded (Non-Local) File + Systems and Paths + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + excluded_fstypes: + - afs + - ceph + - cifs + - smb3 + - smbfs + - sshfs + - ncpfs + - ncp + - nfs + - nfs4 + - gfs + - gfs2 + - glusterfs + - gpfs + - pvfs2 + - ocfs2 + - lustre + - davfs + - fuse.sshfs + excluded_paths: + - dev + - proc + - run + - sys + search_paths: [] + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Find Relevant Root Directories Ignoring + Pre-Defined Excluded Paths + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: / + file_type: directory + excludes: '{{ excluded_paths }}' + hidden: true + recurse: false + register: result_relevant_root_dirs + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Include Relevant Root Directories + in a List of Paths to be Searched + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.path]) }}' + loop: '{{ result_relevant_root_dirs.files }}' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List with + Local Partitions Mount Points + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.mount]) }}' + loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' + when: + - item.fstype not in excluded_fstypes + - item.mount != '/' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List with + Local NFS File System Targets + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.device.split('':'')[1]]) }}' + loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' + when: item.device is search("localhost:") + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Rule Specific Facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + shosts_equiv_files: + - /shosts.equiv + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Find All shosts.equiv Files in Local + File Systems + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -type f -name "shosts.equiv" + loop: '{{ search_paths }}' + changed_when: false + register: result_found_shosts_equiv_files + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Create List of shosts.equiv Files + Present in Local File Systems + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + shosts_equiv_files: '{{ shosts_equiv_files | union(item.stdout_lines) | list }}' + loop: '{{ result_found_shosts_equiv_files.results }}' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove Host-Based Authentication Files - Ensure No shosts.equiv Files Are + Present in the System + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + state: absent + loop: '{{ shosts_equiv_files }}' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_host_based_files + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Remove Rsh Trust Files + The files /etc/hosts.equiv and ~/.rhosts (in +each user's home directory) list remote hosts and users that are trusted by the +local system when using the rshd daemon. +To remove these files, run the following command to delete them from any +location: +$ sudo rm /etc/hosts.equiv +$ rm ~/.rhosts + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-001436 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + This action is only meaningful if .rhosts support is permitted +through PAM. Trust files are convenient, but when used in conjunction with +the R-services, they can allow unauthenticated access to a system. + +find /root -xdev -type f -name ".rhosts" -exec rm -f {} \; +find /home -maxdepth 2 -xdev -type f -name ".rhosts" -exec rm -f {} \; +rm -f /etc/hosts.equiv + + - name: Detect .rhosts files in users home directories + find: + paths: + - /root + - /home + recurse: true + patterns: .rhosts + hidden: true + file_type: file + check_mode: false + register: rhosts_locations + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_rsh_trust_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove .rhosts files + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + state: absent + with_items: '{{ rhosts_locations.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list }}' + when: rhosts_locations is success + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_rsh_trust_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove /etc/hosts.equiv file + file: + path: /etc/hosts.equiv + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_rsh_trust_files + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files + The ~/.shosts (in each user's home directory) files +list remote hosts and users that are trusted by the +local system. To remove these files, run the following command +to delete them from any location: +$ sudo find / -name '.shosts' -type f -delete + CCI-000366 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The .shosts files are used to configure host-based authentication for +individual users or the system via SSH. Host-based authentication is not +sufficient for preventing unauthorized access to the system, as it does not +require interactive identification and authentication of a connection request, +or for the use of two-factor authentication. + +# Identify local mounts +MOUNT_LIST=$(df --local | awk '{ print $6 }') + +# Find file on each listed mount point +for cur_mount in ${MOUNT_LIST} +do + find ${cur_mount} -xdev -type f -name ".shosts" -exec rm -f {} \; +done + + - name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Excluded (Non-Local) + File Systems and Paths + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + excluded_fstypes: + - afs + - ceph + - cifs + - smb3 + - smbfs + - sshfs + - ncpfs + - ncp + - nfs + - nfs4 + - gfs + - gfs2 + - glusterfs + - gpfs + - pvfs2 + - ocfs2 + - lustre + - davfs + - fuse.sshfs + excluded_paths: + - dev + - proc + - run + - sys + search_paths: [] + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Find Relevant Root Directories + Ignoring Pre-Defined Excluded Paths + ansible.builtin.find: + paths: / + file_type: directory + excludes: '{{ excluded_paths }}' + hidden: true + recurse: false + register: result_relevant_root_dirs + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Include Relevant Root Directories + in a List of Paths to be Searched + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.path]) }}' + loop: '{{ result_relevant_root_dirs.files }}' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List + with Local Partitions Mount Points + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.mount]) }}' + loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' + when: + - item.fstype not in excluded_fstypes + - item.mount != '/' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Increment Search Paths List + with Local NFS File System Targets + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + search_paths: '{{ search_paths | union([item.device.split('':'')[1]]) }}' + loop: '{{ ansible_mounts }}' + when: item.device is search("localhost:") + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Define Rule Specific Facts + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + user_shosts_files: + - /.shosts + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Find All .shosts Files in Local + File Systems + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: find {{ item }} -xdev -type f -name ".shosts" + loop: '{{ search_paths }}' + changed_when: false + register: result_found_shosts_files + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Create List of .shosts Files + Present in Local File Systems + ansible.builtin.set_fact: + user_shosts_files: '{{ user_shosts_files | union(item.stdout_lines) | list }}' + loop: '{{ result_found_shosts_files.results }}' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files - Ensure No .shosts Files Are + Present in the System + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + state: absent + loop: '{{ user_shosts_files }}' + tags: + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - no_user_host_based_files + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Chat/Messaging Services + The talk software makes it possible for users to send and receive messages +across systems through a terminal session. + + Uninstall talk-server Package + The talk-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase talk-server + BP28(R1) + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + The talk software presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols +for communications. Removing the talk-server package decreases the +risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of talk services. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove talk-server +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on talk-server. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "talk-server" ; then + + yum remove -y "talk-server" + +fi + + - name: Ensure talk-server is removed + package: + name: talk-server + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_talk-server_removed + + include remove_talk-server + +class remove_talk-server { + package { 'talk-server': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=talk-server + + + + + + + + + + Uninstall talk Package + The talk package contains the client program for the +Internet talk protocol, which allows the user to chat with other users on +different systems. Talk is a communication program which copies lines from one +terminal to the terminal of another user. +The talk package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase talk + BP28(R1) + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 2.2.4 + The talk software presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols +for communications. Removing the talk package decreases the +risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of talk client program. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove talk +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on talk. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "talk" ; then + + yum remove -y "talk" + +fi + + - name: Ensure talk is removed + package: + name: talk + state: absent + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_talk_removed + + include remove_talk + +class remove_talk { + package { 'talk': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=talk + + + + + + + + + + + Telnet + The telnet protocol does not provide confidentiality or integrity +for information transmitted on the network. This includes authentication +information such as passwords. Organizations which use telnet should be +actively working to migrate to a more secure protocol. + + Uninstall telnet-server Package + The telnet-server package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase telnet-server + BP28(R1) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000381 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + Req-2.2.2 + 2.2.4 + SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049 + It is detrimental for operating systems to provide, or install by default, +functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. These +unnecessary capabilities are often overlooked and therefore may remain +unsecure. They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional +attack vectors. + +The telnet service provides an unencrypted remote access service which does +not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the +remote session. If a privileged user were to login using this service, the +privileged user password could be compromised. + +Removing the telnet-server package decreases the risk of the +telnet service's accidental (or intentional) activation. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnet-server +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on telnet-server. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "telnet-server" ; then + + yum remove -y "telnet-server" + +fi + + - name: Ensure telnet-server is removed + package: + name: telnet-server + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.2 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_telnet-server_removed + + include remove_telnet-server + +class remove_telnet-server { + package { 'telnet-server': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=telnet-server + + + + + + + + + + Remove telnet Clients + The telnet client allows users to start connections to other systems via +the telnet protocol. + BP28(R1) + 3.1.13 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + A.8.2.3 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + 2.2.4 + The telnet protocol is insecure and unencrypted. The use +of an unencrypted transmission medium could allow an unauthorized user +to steal credentials. The ssh package provides an +encrypted session and stronger security and is included in Oracle Linux 9. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnet +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on telnet. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "telnet" ; then + + yum remove -y "telnet" + +fi + + - name: Ensure telnet is removed + package: + name: telnet + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_telnet_removed + + include remove_telnet + +class remove_telnet { + package { 'telnet': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=telnet + + + + + + + + + + Disable telnet Service + Make sure that the activation of the telnet service on system boot is disabled. + +The telnet socket can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now telnet.socket + If the system relies on xinetd to manage telnet sessions, ensure the telnet service +is disabled by the following line: disable = yes. Note that the xinetd file for +telnet is not created automatically, therefore it might have different names. + 1 + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 3 + 5 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.13 + 3.4.7 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + IA-5(1)(c) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + The telnet protocol uses unencrypted network communication, which means that data from the +login session, including passwords and all other information transmitted during the session, +can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. The telnet protocol is also subject to +man-in-the-middle attacks. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'telnet.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'telnet.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'telnet.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files telnet.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'telnet.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'telnet.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'telnet.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service telnet + block: + + - name: Disable service telnet + block: + + - name: Disable service telnet + systemd: + name: telnet.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service telnet' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_telnet_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - telnet.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files telnet.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_telnet_disabled + +- name: Disable socket telnet + systemd: + name: telnet.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("telnet.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.4.7 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_telnet_disabled + + include disable_telnet + +class disable_telnet { + service {'telnet': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["telnet"] + + + + + + + + + + + TFTP Server + TFTP is a lightweight version of the FTP protocol which has +traditionally been used to configure networking equipment. However, +TFTP provides little security, and modern versions of networking +operating systems frequently support configuration via SSH or other +more secure protocols. A TFTP server should be run only if no more +secure method of supporting existing equipment can be +found. + + TFTP server secure directory + Specify the directory which is used by TFTP server as a root directory when running in secure mode. + /var/lib/tftpboot + + + Uninstall tftp-server Package + The tftp-server package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase tftp-server + BP28(R1) + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 3 + 8 + 9 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.05 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000318 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000368 + CCI-001812 + CCI-001813 + CCI-001814 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.9.1.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Removing the tftp-server package decreases the risk of the accidental +(or intentional) activation of tftp services. + +If TFTP is required for operational support (such as transmission of router +configurations), its use must be documented with the Information Systems +Securty Manager (ISSM), restricted to only authorized personnel, and have +access control rules established. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove tftp-server +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on tftp-server. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "tftp-server" ; then + + yum remove -y "tftp-server" + +fi + + - name: Ensure tftp-server is removed + package: + name: tftp-server + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_tftp-server_removed + + include remove_tftp-server + +class remove_tftp-server { + package { 'tftp-server': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=tftp-server + + + + + + + + + + Remove tftp Daemon + Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is a simple file transfer protocol, +typically used to automatically transfer configuration or boot files between systems. +TFTP does not support authentication and can be easily hacked. The package +tftp is a client program that allows for connections to a tftp server. + BP28(R1) + It is recommended that TFTP be removed, unless there is a specific need +for TFTP (such as a boot server). In that case, use extreme caution when configuring +the services. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove tftp +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on tftp. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "tftp" ; then + + yum remove -y "tftp" + +fi + + - name: Ensure tftp is removed + package: + name: tftp + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_tftp_removed + + include remove_tftp + +class remove_tftp { + package { 'tftp': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=tftp + + + + + + + + + + Ensure tftp Daemon Uses Secure Mode + If running the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) service is necessary, +it should be configured to change its root directory at startup. To do so, +find the path for the tftp systemd service: +$ sudo systemctl show tftp | grep FragmentPath= +FragmentPath=/etc/systemd/system/tftp.service + +and ensure the ExecStart line on that file includes the -s option with a subdirectory: +ExecStart=/usr/sbin/in.tftpd -s + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 8 + 9 + APO01.06 + APO13.01 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.11.2.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(b) + AC-6 + CM-7(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Using the -s option causes the TFTP service to only serve files from the +given directory. Serving files from an intentionally-specified directory +reduces the risk of sharing files which should remain private. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q tftp-server; then + +var_tftpd_secure_directory='' + + +if grep -q 'server_args' /etc/xinetd.d/tftp; then + sed -i -E "s;^([[:blank:]]*server_args[[:blank:]]+=[[:blank:]]+.*?)(-s[[:blank:]]+[[:graph:]]+)*(.*)$;\1 -s $var_tftpd_secure_directory \3;" /etc/xinetd.d/tftp +else + echo "server_args = -s $var_tftpd_secure_directory" >> /etc/xinetd.d/tftp +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - tftpd_uses_secure_mode +- name: XCCDF Value var_tftpd_secure_directory # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_tftpd_secure_directory: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find out if the file exists and contains the line configuring server arguments + find: + path: /etc/xinetd.d + patterns: tftp + contains: ^[\s]+server_args.*$ + register: tftpd_secure_config_line + when: '"tftp-server" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - tftpd_uses_secure_mode + +- name: Ensure that TFTP server is configured to start with secure directory + lineinfile: + path: /etc/xinetd.d/tftp + regexp: ^[\s]*(server_args[\s]+=[\s]+.*?)(-s[\s]+[/\.\w]+)*(.*)$ + line: \1 -s {{ var_tftpd_secure_directory }} \3 + state: present + backrefs: true + when: + - '"tftp-server" in ansible_facts.packages' + - tftpd_secure_config_line is defined and tftpd_secure_config_line.matched > 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - tftpd_uses_secure_mode + +- name: Insert correct config line to start TFTP server with secure directory + lineinfile: + path: /etc/xinetd.d/tftp + line: server_args = -s {{ var_tftpd_secure_directory }} + state: present + create: true + when: + - '"tftp-server" in ansible_facts.packages' + - tftpd_secure_config_line is defined and tftpd_secure_config_line.matched == 0 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - tftpd_uses_secure_mode + + + + + + + + + + + + + Print Support + The Common Unix Printing System (CUPS) service provides both local +and network printing support. A system running the CUPS service can accept +print jobs from other systems, process them, and send them to the appropriate +printer. It also provides an interface for remote administration through a web +browser. The CUPS service is installed and activated by default. The project +homepage and more detailed documentation are available at + + http://www.cups.org. + + + Configure the CUPS Service if Necessary + CUPS provides the ability to easily share local printers with +other systems over the network. It does this by allowing systems to share +lists of available printers. Additionally, each system that runs the CUPS +service can potentially act as a print server. Whenever possible, the printer +sharing and print server capabilities of CUPS should be limited or disabled. +The following recommendations should demonstrate how to do just that. + + + + Proxy Server + A proxy server is a very desirable target for a +potential adversary because much (or all) sensitive data for a +given infrastructure may flow through it. Therefore, if one is +required, the system acting as a proxy server should be dedicated +to that purpose alone and be stored in a physically secure +location. The system's default proxy server software is Squid, and +provided in an RPM package of the same name. + + Disable Squid if Possible + If Squid was installed and activated, but the system +does not need to act as a proxy server, then it should be disabled +and removed. + + Uninstall squid Package + The squid package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase squid + If there is no need to make the proxy server software available, +removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove squid +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on squid. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "squid" ; then + + yum remove -y "squid" + +fi + + - name: Ensure squid is removed + package: + name: squid + state: absent + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - package_squid_removed + - unknown_severity + + include remove_squid + +class remove_squid { + package { 'squid': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=squid + + + + + + + + + + Disable Squid + +The squid service can be disabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl mask --now squid.service + Running proxy server software provides a network-based avenue +of attack, and should be removed if not needed. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'squid.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'squid.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'squid.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files squid.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'squid.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'squid.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'squid.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service squid + block: + + - name: Disable service squid + block: + + - name: Disable service squid + systemd: + name: squid.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service squid' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_squid_disabled + - unknown_severity + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - squid.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files squid.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_squid_disabled + - unknown_severity + +- name: Disable socket squid + systemd: + name: squid.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("squid.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_squid_disabled + - unknown_severity + + include disable_squid + +class disable_squid { + service {'squid': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["squid"] + + + + + + + + + + + + Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) + Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) is a networking +protocol, operating on port 1812 that provides centralized +Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA or Triple A) +management for users who connect and use a network service. + + + Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Daemon + The rngd feeds random data from hardware device to kernel random device. + + + Enable the Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Service + The Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer service should be enabled. + +The rngd service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable rngd.service + CCI-000366 + FCS_RBG_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + The rngd service +feeds random data from hardware device to kernel random device. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'rngd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'rngd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'rngd.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service rngd + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service rngd + systemd: + name: rngd + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"rng-tools" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_rngd_enabled + + include enable_rngd + +class enable_rngd { + service {'rngd': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["rngd"] + + + + + + + + + + + Network Routing + A router is a very desirable target for a +potential adversary because they fulfill a variety of +infrastructure networking roles such as access to network segments, +gateways to other networks, filtering, etc. Therefore, if one is +required, the system acting as a router should be dedicated +to that purpose alone and be stored in a physically secure +location. The system's default routing software is Quagga, and +provided in an RPM package of the same name. + + Disable Quagga if Possible + If Quagga was installed and activated, but the system +does not need to act as a router, then it should be disabled +and removed. + + Uninstall quagga Package + The quagga package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase quagga + 12 + 15 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS05.02 + CCI-000366 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Routing software is typically used on routers to exchange network topology information +with other routers. If routing software is used when not required, system network +information may be unnecessarily transmitted across the network. + +If there is no need to make the router software available, +removing it provides a safeguard against its activation. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove quagga +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on quagga. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "quagga" ; then + + yum remove -y "quagga" + +fi + + - name: Ensure quagga is removed + package: + name: quagga + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_quagga_removed + + include remove_quagga + +class remove_quagga { + package { 'quagga': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=quagga + + + + + + + + + + + + Samba(SMB) Microsoft Windows File Sharing Server + When properly configured, the Samba service allows +Linux systems to provide file and print sharing to Microsoft +Windows systems. There are two software packages that provide +Samba support. The first, samba-client, provides a series of +command line tools that enable a client system to access Samba +shares. The second, simply labeled samba, provides the Samba +service. It is this second package that allows a Linux system to +act as an Active Directory server, a domain controller, or as a +domain member. Only the samba-client package is installed by +default. + + Configure Samba if Necessary + All settings for the Samba daemon can be found in +/etc/samba/smb.conf. Settings are divided between a +[global] configuration section and a series of user +created share definition sections meant to describe file or print +shares on the system. By default, Samba will operate in user mode +and allow client systems to access local home directories and +printers. It is recommended that these settings be changed or that +additional limitations be set in place. + + Restrict Printer Sharing + By default, Samba utilizes the CUPS printing service to enable +printer sharing with Microsoft Windows workstations. If there are no printers +on the local system, or if printer sharing with Microsoft Windows is not +required, disable the printer sharing capability by commenting out the +following lines, found in /etc/samba/smb.conf: +[global] + load printers = yes + cups options = raw +[printers] + comment = All Printers + path = /usr/spool/samba + browseable = no + guest ok = no + writable = no + printable = yes +There may be other options present, but these are the only options enabled and +uncommented by default. Removing the [printers] share should be enough +for most users. If the Samba printer sharing capability is needed, consider +disabling the Samba network browsing capability or restricting access to a +particular set of users or network addresses. Set the valid users +parameter to a small subset of users or restrict it to a particular group of +users with the shorthand @. Separate each user or group of users with +a space. For example, under the [printers] share: +[printers] + valid users = user @printerusers + + + Restrict SMB File Sharing to Configured Networks + Only users with local user accounts will be able to log in to +Samba shares by default. Shares can be limited to particular users or network +addresses. Use the hosts allow and hosts deny directives +accordingly, and consider setting the valid users directive to a limited subset +of users or to a group of users. Separate each address, user, or user group +with a space as follows for a particular share or global: +[share] + hosts allow = 192.168.1. 127.0.0.1 + valid users = userone usertwo @usergroup +It is also possible to limit read and write access to particular users with the +read list and write list options, though the permissions set by the system +itself will override these settings. Set the read only attribute for each share +to ensure that global settings will not accidentally override the individual +share settings. Then, as with the valid users directive, separate each user or +group of users with a space: +[share] + read only = yes + write list = userone usertwo @usergroup + + + + Disable Samba if Possible + Even after the Samba server package has been installed, it +will remain disabled. Do not enable this service unless it is +absolutely necessary to provide Microsoft Windows file and print +sharing functionality. + + + + SNMP Server + The Simple Network Management Protocol allows +administrators to monitor the state of network devices, including +computers. Older versions of SNMP were well-known for weak +security, such as plaintext transmission of the community string +(used for authentication) and usage of easily-guessable +choices for the community string. + + Disable SNMP Server if Possible + The system includes an SNMP daemon that allows for its remote +monitoring, though it not installed by default. If it was installed and +activated but is not needed, the software should be disabled and removed. + + + Configure SNMP Server if Necessary + If it is necessary to run the snmpd agent on the system, some best +practices should be followed to minimize the security risk from the +installation. The multiple security models implemented by SNMP cannot be fully +covered here so only the following general configuration advice can be offered: +use only SNMP version 3 security models and enable the use of authentication and encryptionwrite access to the MIB (Management Information Base) should be allowed only if necessaryall access to the MIB should be restricted following a principle of least privilegenetwork access should be limited to the maximum extent possible including restricting to expected network +addresses both in the configuration files and in the system firewall rulesensure SNMP agents send traps only to, and accept SNMP queries only from, authorized management +stationsensure that permissions on the snmpd.conf configuration file (by default, in /etc/snmp) are 640 or more restrictiveensure that any MIB files' permissions are also 640 or more restrictive + + SNMP read-only community string + Specify the SNMP community string used for read-only access. + changemero + + + SNMP read-write community string + Specify the SNMP community string used for read-write access. + changemerw + + + + + SSH Server + The SSH protocol is recommended for remote login and +remote file transfer. SSH provides confidentiality and integrity +for data exchanged between two systems, as well as server +authentication, through the use of public key cryptography. The +implementation included with the system is called OpenSSH, and more +detailed documentation is available from its website, + + https://www.openssh.com. +Its server program is called sshd and provided by the RPM package +openssh-server. + + + SSH enabled firewalld zone + Specify firewalld zone to enable SSH service. This value is used only for remediation purposes. + block + public + dmz + drop + external + home + internal + public + trusted + work + + + SSH Approved ciphers by FIPS + Specify the FIPS approved ciphers that are used for data integrity protection by the SSH server. + aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr + aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,3des-cbc + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com + + + SSH Approved MACs by FIPS + Specify the FIPS approved MACs (message authentication code) algorithms + that are used for data integrity protection by the SSH server. + hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 + hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com + umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 + + + SSH session Idle time + Specify duration of allowed idle time. + 600 + 7200 + 840 + 900 + 1800 + 300 + 3600 + 300 + + + SSH Server Listening Port + Specify port the SSH server is listening. + 22 + + + SSH Max authentication attempts + Specify the maximum number of authentication attempts per connection. + 10 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 4 + + + SSH is required to be installed + Specify if the Policy requires SSH to be installed. Used by SSH Rules +to determine if SSH should be uninstalled or configured. +A value of 0 means that the policy doesn't care if OpenSSH server is installed or not. If it is installed, scanner will check for it's configuration, if it's not installed, the check will pass. +A value of 1 indicates that OpenSSH server package is not required by the policy; +A value of 2 indicates that OpenSSH server package is required by the policy. + 0 + 1 + 2 + + + SSH Strong KEX by FIPS + Specify the FIPS approved KEXs (Key Exchange Algorithms) algorithms + that are used for methods in cryptography by which cryptographic keys are exchanged between two parties + ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 + ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 + curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 + curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 + curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 + ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 + + + SSH Max Sessions Count + Specify the maximum number of open sessions permitted. + 10 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 + 0 + 10 + + + SSH Max Keep Alive Count + Specify the maximum number of idle message counts before session is terminated. + 10 + 3 + 5 + 0 + 1 + 0 + + + Install OpenSSH client software + The openssh-clients package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install openssh-clients + FIA_UAU.5 + FTP_ITC_EXT.1 + FCS_SSH_EXT.1 + FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + This package includes utilities to make encrypted connections and transfer +files securely to SSH servers. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "openssh-clients" ; then + yum install -y "openssh-clients" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure openssh-clients is installed + package: + name: openssh-clients + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_openssh-clients_installed + + include install_openssh-clients + +class install_openssh-clients { + package { 'openssh-clients': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=openssh-clients + + +[[packages]] +name = "openssh-clients" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Install the OpenSSH Server Package + The openssh-server package should be installed. +The openssh-server package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install openssh-server + 13 + 14 + APO01.06 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + CCI-002418 + CCI-002420 + CCI-002421 + CCI-002422 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.2 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + PR.DS-2 + PR.DS-5 + FIA_UAU.5 + FTP_ITC_EXT.1 + FCS_SSH_EXT.1 + FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 + SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 + SRG-OS-000425-GPOS-00189 + SRG-OS-000426-GPOS-00190 + Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality, and +integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be +intercepted and either read or altered. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "openssh-server" ; then + yum install -y "openssh-server" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure openssh-server is installed + package: + name: openssh-server + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_openssh-server_installed + + include install_openssh-server + +class install_openssh-server { + package { 'openssh-server': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=openssh-server + + +[[packages]] +name = "openssh-server" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Remove the OpenSSH Server Package + The openssh-server package should be removed. +The openssh-server package can be removed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum erase openssh-server + Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality, and +integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be +intercepted and either read or altered. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove openssh-server +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on openssh-server. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "openssh-server" ; then + + yum remove -y "openssh-server" + +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure openssh-server is removed + package: + name: openssh-server + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_openssh-server_removed + + include remove_openssh-server + +class remove_openssh-server { + package { 'openssh-server': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=openssh-server + + + + + + + + + + Enable the OpenSSH Service + The SSH server service, sshd, is commonly needed. + +The sshd service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable sshd.service + 13 + 14 + APO01.06 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.13 + 3.5.4 + 3.13.8 + CCI-002418 + CCI-002420 + CCI-002421 + CCI-002422 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.2 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CM-6(a) + SC-8 + SC-8(1) + SC-8(2) + SC-8(3) + SC-8(4) + PR.DS-2 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 + SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 + SRG-OS-000425-GPOS-00189 + SRG-OS-000426-GPOS-00190 + Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality, and +integrity may be compromised because unprotected communications can be +intercepted and either read or altered. + +This checklist item applies to both internal and external networks and all types +of information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, +mobile devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, etc). Communication paths +outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility +of interception and modification. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'sshd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'sshd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'sshd.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service sshd + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service sshd + systemd: + name: sshd + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"openssh-server" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.8 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.4 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-8 + - NIST-800-53-SC-8(1) + - NIST-800-53-SC-8(2) + - NIST-800-53-SC-8(3) + - NIST-800-53-SC-8(4) + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_sshd_enabled + + include enable_sshd + +class enable_sshd { + service {'sshd': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["sshd"] + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Server If Possible + +The SSH server service, sshd, is commonly needed. +However, if it can be disabled, do so. +This is unusual, as SSH is a common method for encrypted and authenticated +remote access. + CM-3(6) + IA-2(4) + SRG-APP-000185-CTR-000490 + SRG-APP-000141-CTR-000315 + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'sshd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'sshd.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'sshd.service' +# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it +if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files sshd.socket; then + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'sshd.socket' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'sshd.socket' +fi +# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed, +# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass. +# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though. +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'sshd.service' || true + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Block Disable service sshd + block: + + - name: Disable service sshd + block: + + - name: Disable service sshd + systemd: + name: sshd.service + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + rescue: + + - name: Intentionally ignored previous 'Disable service sshd' failure, service + was already disabled + meta: noop + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_sshd_disabled + +- name: Unit Socket Exists - sshd.socket + command: systemctl -q list-unit-files sshd.socket + register: socket_file_exists + changed_when: false + failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1] + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_sshd_disabled + +- name: Disable socket sshd + systemd: + name: sshd.socket + enabled: 'no' + state: stopped + masked: 'yes' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("sshd.socket",multiline=True) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-3(6) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(4) + - disable_strategy + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - service_sshd_disabled + + include disable_sshd + +class disable_sshd { + service {'sshd': + enable => false, + ensure => 'stopped', + } +} + + +[customizations.services] +disabled = ["sshd"] + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns SSH Server config file + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/ssh/sshd_config + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective +services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable +configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chgrp 0 /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/ssh/sshd_config + stat: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_sshd_config + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /etc/ssh/sshd_config + file: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + group: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_groupowner_sshd_config + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + SSH server private keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*_key glob, must be +group-owned by ssh_keys group. + If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be impersonated. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group ssh_keys -regex '^.*_key$' -exec chgrp ssh_keys {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ + command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group ssh_keys -regex "^.*_key$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: ssh_keys + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + SSH server public keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*.pub glob, must be +group-owned by root group. + If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service +may be compromised. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex '^.*\.pub$' -exec chgrp 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ + command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regex "^.*\.pub$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure group owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + group: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on SSH Server config file + +To properly set the owner of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/ssh/sshd_config + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective +services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable +configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chown 0 /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/ssh/sshd_config + stat: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_sshd_config + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner 0 on /etc/ssh/sshd_config + file: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + owner: '0' + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - configure_strategy + - file_owner_sshd_config + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + SSH server private keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*_key glob, must be owned +by root user. + If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be impersonated. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*_key$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ + command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*_key$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*_key$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + SSH server public keys, files that match the /etc/ssh/*.pub glob, must be owned +by root user. + If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service +may be compromised. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex '^.*\.pub$' -exec chown 0 {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ + command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regex "^.*\.pub$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_sshd_pub_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure owner on /etc/ssh/ file(s) matching ^.*\.pub$ + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + owner: '0' + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - file_ownership_sshd_pub_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server config file + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/ssh/sshd_config + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Service configuration files enable or disable features of their respective +services that if configured incorrectly can lead to insecure and vulnerable +configurations. Therefore, service configuration files should be owned by the +correct group to prevent unauthorized changes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Test for existence /etc/ssh/sshd_config + stat: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + register: file_exists + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_config + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /etc/ssh/sshd_config + file: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_config + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + SSH server private keys - files that match the /etc/ssh/*_key glob, have to have restricted permissions. +If those files are owned by the root user and the root group, they have to have the 0600 permission or stricter. +If they are owned by the root user, but by a dedicated group ssh_keys, they can have the 0640 permission or stricter. + BP28(R36) + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.13 + 3.13.10 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be +impersonated. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +for keyfile in /etc/ssh/*_key; do + test -f "$keyfile" || continue + if test root:root = "$(stat -c "%U:%G" "$keyfile")"; then + + chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt "$keyfile" + + elif test root:ssh_keys = "$(stat -c "%U:%G" "$keyfile")"; then + chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt "$keyfile" + else + echo "Key-like file '$keyfile' is owned by an unexpected user:group combination" + fi +done + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find root:root-owned keys + ansible.builtin.command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -user root -regex ".*_key$" + -type f -group root -perm /u+xs,g+xwrs,o+xwrt + register: root_owned_keys + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for root:root-owned keys + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ root_owned_keys.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Find root:ssh_keys-owned keys + ansible.builtin.command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -user root -regex ".*_key$" + -type f -group ssh_keys -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt + register: dedicated_group_owned_keys + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for root:ssh_keys-owned keys + ansible.builtin.file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ dedicated_group_owned_keys.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_private_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + include ssh_private_key_perms + +class ssh_private_key_perms { + exec { 'sshd_priv_key': + command => "chmod 0640 /etc/ssh/*_key", + path => '/bin:/usr/bin' + } +} + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + To properly set the permissions of /etc/ssh/*.pub, run the command: $ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/ssh/*.pub + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.13 + 3.13.10 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + AC-6(1) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service +may be compromised. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwt -type f -regex '^.*\.pub$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt {} \; + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find /etc/ssh/ file(s) + command: find -H /etc/ssh/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwt -type f -regex "^.*\.pub$" + register: files_found + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_pub_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Set permissions for /etc/ssh/ file(s) + file: + path: '{{ item }}' + mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwt + state: file + with_items: + - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.13.10 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - file_permissions_sshd_pub_key + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + include ssh_public_key_perms + +class ssh_public_key_perms { + exec { 'sshd_pub_key': + command => "chmod 0644 /etc/ssh/*.pub", + path => '/bin:/usr/bin' + } +} + + + + + + + + + + Remove SSH Server iptables Firewall exception (Unusual) + By default, inbound connections to SSH's port are allowed. If the SSH +server is not being used, this exception should be removed from the +firewall configuration. + +Edit the files /etc/sysconfig/iptables and +/etc/sysconfig/ip6tables (if IPv6 is in use). In each file, locate +and delete the line: +-A INPUT -m state --state NEW -m tcp -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT +This is unusual, as SSH is a common method for encrypted and authenticated +remote access. + If inbound SSH connections are not expected, disallowing access to the SSH +port will avoid possible exploitation of the port by an attacker. + + + Configure OpenSSH Client if Necessary + The following configuration changes apply to the SSH client. They can +improve security parameters relwevant to the client user, e.g. increasing +entropy while generating initialization vectors. Note that these changes +influence only the default SSH client configuration. Changes in this group +can be overridden by the client user by modifying files within the +~/.ssh directory or by supplying parameters on the command line. + + Configure session renegotiation for SSH client + The RekeyLimit parameter specifies how often +the session key is renegotiated, both in terms of +amount of data that may be transmitted and the time +elapsed. To decrease the default limits, put line +RekeyLimit to file /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf. +Make sure that there is no other RekeyLimit configuration preceding +the include directive in the main config file +/etc/ssh/ssh_config. Check also other files in +/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d directory. Files are processed according to +lexicographical order of file names. Make sure that there is no file +processed before 02-rekey-limit.conf containing definition of +RekeyLimit. + CCI-000068 + FCS_SSH_EXT.1.8 + SRG-OS-000423-GPOS-00187 + SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 + SRG-OS-000424-GPOS-00188 + By decreasing the limit based on the amount of data and enabling +time-based limit, effects of potential attacks against +encryption keys are limited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size='' +var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time='' + + +main_config="/etc/ssh/ssh_config" +include_directory="/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d" + +if grep -q '^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$' "$main_config"; then + sed -i '/^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*/d' "$main_config" +fi + +for file in "$include_directory"/*.conf; do + if grep -q '^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$' "$file"; then + sed -i '/^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*/d' "$file" + fi +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*RekeyLimit\s\+/d" "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" + +cp "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "RekeyLimit $var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size $var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time" >> "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size: !!str + tags: + - always +- name: XCCDF Value var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure RekeyLimit is not configured in /etc/ssh/ssh_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/ssh_config + create: false + regexp: ^\s*RekeyLimit.*$ + state: absent + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - ssh_client_rekey_limit + +- name: Collect all include config files for ssh client which configure RekeyLimit + find: + paths: /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ + contains: ^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$ + patterns: '*.config' + register: ssh_config_include_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - ssh_client_rekey_limit + +- name: Remove all occurences of RekeyLimit configuration from include config files + of ssh client + lineinfile: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^[\s]*RekeyLimit.*$ + state: absent + loop: '{{ ssh_config_include_files.files }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - ssh_client_rekey_limit + +- name: Ensure that rekey limit is set to {{ var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size }} {{ + var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time }} in /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf + create: true + regexp: ^\s*RekeyLimit.*$ + line: RekeyLimit {{ var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_size }} {{ var_ssh_client_rekey_limit_time + }} + state: present + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - ssh_client_rekey_limit + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify the SSH Private Key Files Have a Passcode + When creating SSH key pairs, always use a passcode. + +You can create such keys with the following command: +$ sudo ssh-keygen -n [passphrase] +Oracle Linux 9, for certificate-based authentication, must enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key. + SRG-OS-000067-GPOS-00035 + If an unauthorized user obtains access to a private key without a passcode, +that user would have unauthorized access to any system where the associated +public key has been installed. + + + + + + + Configure OpenSSH Server if Necessary + If the system needs to act as an SSH server, then +certain changes should be made to the OpenSSH daemon configuration +file /etc/ssh/sshd_config. The following recommendations can be +applied to this file. See the sshd_config(5) man page for more +detailed information. + + SSH RekeyLimit - size + Specify the size component of the rekey limit. + default + 512M + 512M + 1G + + + SSH RekeyLimit - size + Specify the size component of the rekey limit. + none + 1h + 1h + + + SSH Compression Setting + Specify the compression setting for SSH connections. + no + delayed + no + + + SSH Privilege Separation Setting + Specify whether and how sshd separates privileges when handling incoming network connections. + no + yes + sandbox + sandbox + + + SSH LoginGraceTime setting + Configure parameters for how long the servers stays connected before the user has successfully logged in + 60 + 60 + + + SSH MaxStartups setting + Configure parameters for maximum concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. + 10:30:100 + 10:30:60 + + + Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero + The SSH server sends at most ClientAliveCountMax messages +during a SSH session and waits for a response from the SSH client. +The option ClientAliveInterval configures timeout after +each ClientAliveCountMax message. If the SSH server does not +receive a response from the client, then the connection is considered unresponsive +and terminated. + +To ensure the SSH timeout occurs precisely when the +ClientAliveInterval is set, set the ClientAliveCountMax to +value of 0 in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 5.5.6 + APO13.01 + BAI03.01 + BAI03.02 + BAI03.03 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.11 + CCI-000879 + CCI-001133 + CCI-002361 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.14.1.1 + A.14.2.1 + A.14.2.5 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.1.5 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + AC-2(5) + AC-12 + AC-17(a) + SC-10 + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.IP-2 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000126-GPOS-00066 + SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 + SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109 + This ensures a user login will be terminated as soon as the ClientAliveInterval +is reached. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveCountMax 0" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveCountMax 0" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_keepalive_0 + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*ClientAliveCountMax.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_keepalive_0 + +- name: Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ + line: ClientAliveCountMax 0 + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_keepalive_0 + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Count Max + The SSH server sends at most ClientAliveCountMax messages +during a SSH session and waits for a response from the SSH client. +The option ClientAliveInterval configures timeout after +each ClientAliveCountMax message. If the SSH server does not +receive a response from the client, then the connection is considered unresponsive +and terminated. +For SSH earlier than v8.2, a ClientAliveCountMax value of 0 +causes a timeout precisely when the ClientAliveInterval is set. +Starting with v8.2, a value of 0 disables the timeout functionality +completely. If the option is set to a number greater than 0, then +the session will be disconnected after +ClientAliveInterval * ClientAliveCountMax seconds without receiving +a keep alive message. + BP28(R32) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 5.5.6 + APO13.01 + BAI03.01 + BAI03.02 + BAI03.03 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.11 + CCI-000879 + CCI-001133 + CCI-002361 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.14.1.1 + A.14.2.1 + A.14.2.5 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.1.5 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + AC-2(5) + AC-12 + AC-17(a) + SC-10 + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.IP-2 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 + SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109 + This ensures a user login will be terminated as soon as the ClientAliveInterval +is reached. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_sshd_set_keepalive='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveCountMax $var_sshd_set_keepalive" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveCountMax $var_sshd_set_keepalive" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_set_keepalive # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sshd_set_keepalive: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_keepalive + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*ClientAliveCountMax.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_keepalive + +- name: Set SSH Client Alive Count Max + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s+ + line: ClientAliveCountMax {{ var_sshd_set_keepalive }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_keepalive + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Interval + SSH allows administrators to set a network responsiveness timeout interval. +After this interval has passed, the unresponsive client will be automatically logged out. + +To set this timeout interval, edit the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config as +follows: +ClientAliveInterval + +The timeout interval is given in seconds. For example, have a timeout +of 10 minutes, set interval to 600. + +If a shorter timeout has already been set for the login shell, that value will +preempt any SSH setting made in /etc/ssh/sshd_config. Keep in mind that +some processes may stop SSH from correctly detecting that the user is idle. + SSH disconnecting unresponsive clients will not have desired effect without also +configuring ClientAliveCountMax in the SSH service configuration. + Following conditions may prevent the SSH session to time out: +Remote processes on the remote machine generates output. As the output has to be transferred over the network to the client, the timeout is reset every time such transfer happens.Any scp or sftp activity by the same user to the host resets the timeout. + BP28(R29) + 1 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 8 + 5.5.6 + APO13.01 + BAI03.01 + BAI03.02 + BAI03.03 + DSS01.03 + DSS03.05 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.11 + CCI-000879 + CCI-001133 + CCI-002361 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 6.2 + A.12.4.1 + A.12.4.3 + A.14.1.1 + A.14.2.1 + A.14.2.5 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.6.1.5 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + CM-6(a) + AC-17(a) + AC-2(5) + AC-12 + AC-17(a) + SC-10 + CM-6(a) + DE.CM-1 + DE.CM-3 + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.IP-2 + Req-8.1.8 + 8.2.8 + SRG-OS-000126-GPOS-00066 + SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072 + SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109 + SRG-OS-000395-GPOS-00175 + Terminating an idle ssh session within a short time period reduces the window of +opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session +enabled on the console or console port that has been let unattended. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +sshd_idle_timeout_value='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveInterval $sshd_idle_timeout_value" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveInterval $sshd_idle_timeout_value" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value sshd_idle_timeout_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sshd_idle_timeout_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_idle_timeout + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*ClientAliveInterval.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_idle_timeout + +- name: Set SSH Client Alive Interval + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s+ + line: ClientAliveInterval {{ sshd_idle_timeout_value }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.11 + - NIST-800-53-AC-12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-SC-10 + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_idle_timeout + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Host-Based Authentication + SSH's cryptographic host-based authentication is +more secure than .rhosts authentication. However, it is +not recommended that hosts unilaterally trust one another, even +within an organization. + +The default SSH configuration disables host-based authentication. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for HostbasedAuthentication. + +To explicitly disable host-based authentication, add or correct the +following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +HostbasedAuthentication no + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 9 + 5.5.6 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + AC-3 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + 8.3.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 + SSH trust relationships mean a compromise on one host +can allow an attacker to move trivially to other hosts. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*HostbasedAuthentication/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "HostbasedAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "HostbasedAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 + - disable_host_auth + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*HostbasedAuthentication.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 + - disable_host_auth + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + +- name: Disable Host-Based Authentication + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*HostbasedAuthentication\s+ + line: HostbasedAuthentication no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-3 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.1 + - disable_host_auth + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + + + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception + If the SSH server is in use, inbound connections to SSH's port should be allowed to permit +remote access through SSH. In more restrictive firewalld settings, the SSH port should be +added to the proper firewalld zone in order to allow SSH remote access. + + + + +To configure firewalld to allow ssh access, run the following command(s): +firewall-cmd --permanent --add-service=ssh + +Then run the following command to load the newly created rule(s): +firewall-cmd --reload + The remediation for this rule uses firewall-cmd and nmcli tools. +Therefore, it will only be executed if firewalld and NetworkManager +services are running. Otherwise, the remediation will be aborted and a informative message +will be shown in the remediation report. +These respective services will not be started in order to preserve any intentional change +in network components related to firewall and network interfaces. + This rule also checks if the SSH port was modified by the administrator in the firewalld +services definitions and is reflecting the expected port number. Although this is checked, +fixing the custom ssh.xml file placed by the administrator at /etc/firewalld/services it +is not in the scope of the remediation since there is no reliable way to manually change +the respective file. If the default SSH port is modified, it is on the administrator +responsibility to ensure the firewalld customizations in the service port level are +properly configured. + Oracle Linux 9 prefers and recommends to use NetworkManager keyfiles instead of the +ifcfg files stored in /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts. Therefore, if the +system was upgraded from a previous release, make sure the NIC configuration files are +properly migrated from ifcfg format to NetworkManager keyfiles. Otherwise, this +rule won't be able to check the configuration. The migration can be accomplished by +nmcli connection migrate command. + 3.1.12 + 1416 + AC-17(a) + CM-6(b) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + SRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050 + If inbound SSH connections are expected, adding the SSH port to the proper firewalld zone +will allow remote access through the SSH port. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "firewalld" ; then + yum install -y "firewalld" +fi +if ! rpm -q --quiet "NetworkManager" ; then + yum install -y "NetworkManager" +fi +firewalld_sshd_zone='' + + +if systemctl is-active NetworkManager && systemctl is-active firewalld; then + # First make sure the SSH service is enabled in run-time for the proper zone. + # This is to avoid connection issues when new interfaces are addeded to this zone. + firewall-cmd --zone="$firewalld_sshd_zone" --add-service=ssh + + # This will collect all NetworkManager connections names + readarray -t nm_connections < <(nmcli -f UUID,TYPE con | grep ethernet | awk '{ print $1 }') + # If the connection is not yet assigned to a firewalld zone, assign it to the proper zone. + # This will not change connections which are already assigned to any firewalld zone. + for connection in "${nm_connections[@]}"; do + current_zone=$(nmcli -f connection.zone connection show "$connection" | awk '{ print $2}') + if [ $current_zone = "--" ]; then + nmcli connection modify "$connection" connection.zone $firewalld_sshd_zone + fi + done + systemctl restart NetworkManager + + # Active zones are zones with at least one interface assigned to it. + # It is possible that traffic is comming by any active interface and consequently any + # active zone. So, this make sure all active zones are permanently allowing SSH service. + readarray -t firewalld_active_zones < <(firewall-cmd --get-active-zones | grep -v interfaces) + for zone in "${firewalld_active_zones[@]}"; do + firewall-cmd --permanent --zone="$zone" --add-service=ssh + done + firewall-cmd --reload +else + echo " + firewalld and NetworkManager services are not active. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld and NetworkManager services running. + The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection issues." + exit 1 +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value firewalld_sshd_zone # promote to variable + set_fact: + firewalld_sshd_zone: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure firewalld and NetworkManager + packages are installed + ansible.builtin.package: + name: '{{ item }}' + state: present + with_items: + - firewalld + - NetworkManager + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect facts about system + services + ansible.builtin.service_facts: null + register: result_services_states + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Remediation is applicable + if firewalld and NetworkManager services are running + block: + + - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect NetworkManager + connections names + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: nmcli -f UUID,TYPE con | grep ethernet | awk '{ print $1 }' + register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_names + changed_when: false + + - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect NetworkManager + connections zones + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: nmcli -f connection.zone connection show {{ item | trim }} | awk '{ print + $2}' + register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_zones + changed_when: false + with_items: + - '{{ result_nmcli_cmd_connections_names.stdout_lines }}' + + - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure NetworkManager connections + are assigned to a firewalld zone + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: nmcli connection modify {{ item.0 }} connection.zone {{ firewalld_sshd_zone + }} + register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment + with_together: + - '{{ result_nmcli_cmd_connections_names.stdout_lines }}' + - '{{ result_nmcli_cmd_connections_zones.results }}' + when: + - item.1.stdout == '--' + + - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure NetworkManager connections + changes are applied + ansible.builtin.service: + name: NetworkManager + state: restarted + when: + - result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment is changed + + - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Collect firewalld active + zones + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: firewall-cmd --get-active-zones | grep -v interfaces + register: result_firewall_cmd_zones_names + changed_when: false + + - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure firewalld zones + allow SSH + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: firewall-cmd --permanent --zone={{ item }} --add-service=ssh + register: result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment + changed_when: + - '''ALREADY_ENABLED'' not in result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment.stderr' + with_items: + - '{{ result_firewall_cmd_zones_names.stdout_lines }}' + + - name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Ensure firewalld changes + are applied + ansible.builtin.service: + name: firewalld + state: reloaded + when: + - result_nmcli_cmd_connections_assignment is changed + when: + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running' + - ansible_facts.services['NetworkManager.service'].state == 'running' + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + +- name: Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception - Informative message based + on services states + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running' + - ansible_facts.services['NetworkManager.service'].state == 'running' + fail_msg: + - firewalld and NetworkManager services are not active. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld and NetworkManager + services running. + - The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection + issues. + success_msg: + - Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception remediation successfully executed + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - configure_strategy + - firewalld_sshd_port_enabled + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + + + + + + + + + + + Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 + Only SSH protocol version 2 connections should be +permitted. The default setting in +/etc/ssh/sshd_config is correct, and can be +verified by ensuring that the following +line appears: +Protocol 2 + As of openssh-server version 7.4 and above, the only protocol +supported is version 2, and line Protocol 2 in +/etc/ssh/sshd_config is not necessary. + NT007(R1) + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + 8 + 5.5.6 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.13 + 3.5.4 + CCI-000197 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.6 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + 0487 + 1449 + 1506 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CIP-003-8 R4.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R7.1 + CM-6(a) + AC-17(a) + AC-17(2) + IA-5(1)(c) + SC-13 + MA-4(6) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-3 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000074-GPOS-00042 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SSH protocol version 1 is an insecure implementation of the SSH protocol and +has many well-known vulnerability exploits. Exploits of the SSH daemon could provide +immediate root access to the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^Protocol") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "2" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^Protocol\\>" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^Protocol\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.4 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_allow_only_protocol2 + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*Protocol.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.4 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_allow_only_protocol2 + +- name: Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Protocol\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Protocol\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*Protocol\s+ + line: Protocol 2 + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-171-3.5.4 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c) + - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6) + - NIST-800-53-SC-13 + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_allow_only_protocol2 + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed + Compression is useful for slow network connections over long +distances but can cause performance issues on local LANs. If use of compression +is required, it should be enabled only after a user has authenticated; otherwise, +it should be disabled. To disable compression or delay compression until after +a user has successfully authenticated, add or correct the following line in the +/etc/ssh/sshd_config file: +Compression + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If compression is allowed in an SSH connection prior to authentication, +vulnerabilities in the compression software could result in compromise of the +system from an unauthenticated connection, potentially with root privileges. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_sshd_disable_compression='' + + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^Compression") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_sshd_disable_compression" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^Compression\\>" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^Compression\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_disable_compression # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sshd_disable_compression: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_compression + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*Compression.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_compression + +- name: Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Compression\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Compression\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*Compression\s+ + line: Compression {{ var_sshd_disable_compression }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_compression + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords + Disallow SSH login with empty passwords. +The default SSH configuration disables logins with empty passwords. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for PermitEmptyPasswords. + +To explicitly disallow SSH login from accounts with empty passwords, +add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + + +PermitEmptyPasswords no +Any accounts with empty passwords should be disabled immediately, and PAM configuration +should prevent users from being able to assign themselves empty passwords. + NT007(R17) + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 9 + 5.5.6 + APO01.06 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.1 + 3.1.5 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000766 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 5.2 + SR 7.6 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.DS-5 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Configuring this setting for the SSH daemon provides additional assurance +that remote login via SSH will require a password, even in the event of +misconfiguration elsewhere. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "PermitEmptyPasswords no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "PermitEmptyPasswords no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_empty_passwords + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*PermitEmptyPasswords.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_empty_passwords + +- name: Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitEmptyPasswords\s+ + line: PermitEmptyPasswords no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_empty_passwords + + + + + + + + + + + Disable GSSAPI Authentication + Unless needed, SSH should not permit extraneous or unnecessary +authentication mechanisms like GSSAPI. + +The default SSH configuration disallows authentications based on GSSAPI. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for GSSAPIAuthentication. + +To explicitly disable GSSAPI authentication, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +GSSAPIAuthentication no + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000318 + CCI-000368 + CCI-001812 + CCI-001813 + CCI-001814 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + 0418 + 1055 + 1402 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + AC-17(a) + PR.IP-1 + FTP_ITC_EXT.1 + FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 + SRG-OS-000364-GPOS-00151 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + GSSAPI authentication is used to provide additional authentication mechanisms to +applications. Allowing GSSAPI authentication through SSH exposes the system's +GSSAPI to remote hosts, increasing the attack surface of the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "GSSAPIAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "GSSAPIAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_gssapi_auth + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*GSSAPIAuthentication.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_gssapi_auth + +- name: Disable GSSAPI Authentication + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ + line: GSSAPIAuthentication no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_gssapi_auth + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kerberos Authentication + Unless needed, SSH should not permit extraneous or unnecessary +authentication mechanisms like Kerberos. + +The default SSH configuration disallows authentication validation through Kerberos. +The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for KerberosAuthentication. + +To explicitly disable Kerberos authentication, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +KerberosAuthentication no + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000318 + CCI-000368 + CCI-001812 + CCI-001813 + CCI-001814 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + FTP_ITC_EXT.1 + FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 + SRG-OS-000364-GPOS-00151 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Kerberos authentication for SSH is often implemented using GSSAPI. If Kerberos +is enabled through SSH, the SSH daemon provides a means of access to the +system's Kerberos implementation. +Configuring these settings for the SSH daemon provides additional assurance that remote logon via SSH will not use unused methods of authentication, even in the event of misconfiguration elsewhere. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*KerberosAuthentication/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "KerberosAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "KerberosAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_kerb_auth + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*KerberosAuthentication.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_kerb_auth + +- name: Disable Kerberos Authentication + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*KerberosAuthentication\s+ + line: KerberosAuthentication no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_kerb_auth + + + + + + + + + + + Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication + Unless needed, SSH should not permit extraneous or unnecessary +authentication mechanisms. To disable PubkeyAuthentication authentication, add or +correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +PubkeyAuthentication no + PubkeyAuthentication authentication is used to provide additional authentication mechanisms to +applications. Allowing PubkeyAuthentication authentication through SSH allows users to +generate their own authentication tokens, increasing the attack surface of the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PubkeyAuthentication/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "PubkeyAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "PubkeyAuthentication no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_pubkey_auth + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*PubkeyAuthentication.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_pubkey_auth + +- name: Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ + line: PubkeyAuthentication no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_pubkey_auth + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files + SSH can emulate the behavior of the obsolete rsh +command in allowing users to enable insecure access to their +accounts via .rhosts files. + +The default SSH configuration disables support for .rhosts. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for IgnoreRhosts. + +To explicitly disable support for .rhosts files, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +IgnoreRhosts yes + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 9 + 5.5.6 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.IP-1 + PR.PT-3 + FIA_UAU.1 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SSH trust relationships mean a compromise on one host +can allow an attacker to move trivially to other hosts. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*IgnoreRhosts/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "IgnoreRhosts yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "IgnoreRhosts yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_rhosts + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*IgnoreRhosts.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_rhosts + +- name: Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreRhosts\s+ + line: IgnoreRhosts yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_rhosts + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication + SSH can allow authentication through the obsolete rsh +command through the use of the authenticating user's SSH keys. This should be disabled. + +To ensure this behavior is disabled, add or correct the +following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config: +RhostsRSAAuthentication no + As of openssh-server version 7.4 and above, +the RhostsRSAAuthentication option has been deprecated, and the line +RhostsRSAAuthentication no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config is not +necessary. + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Configuring this setting for the SSH daemon provides additional +assurance that remote login via SSH will require a password, even +in the event of misconfiguration elsewhere. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without +# adding any search characters to the config file. +stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^RhostsRSAAuthentication") + +# shellcheck disable=SC2059 +printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "no" + +# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file. +# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>), +# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match. +if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^RhostsRSAAuthentication\\>" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"; then + escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output") + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^RhostsRSAAuthentication\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + if [[ -s "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" || true)" ]]; then + LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + fi + printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_rhosts_rsa + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*RhostsRSAAuthentication.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_rhosts_rsa + +- name: Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*RhostsRSAAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*RhostsRSAAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*RhostsRSAAuthentication\s+ + line: RhostsRSAAuthentication no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_rhosts_rsa + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Root Login + The root user should never be allowed to login to a +system directly over a network. +To disable root login via SSH, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +PermitRootLogin no + BP28(R19) + NT007(R21) + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 5.5.6 + APO01.06 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.02 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.1 + 3.1.5 + CCI-000366 + CCI-000770 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.18.1.4 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + AC-6(2) + AC-17(a) + IA-2 + IA-2(5) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + PR.DS-5 + PR.PT-3 + FAU_GEN.1 + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000109-GPOS-00056 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-APP-000148-CTR-000335 + SRG-APP-000190-CTR-000500 + Even though the communications channel may be encrypted, an additional layer of +security is gained by extending the policy of not logging directly on as root. +In addition, logging in with a user-specific account provides individual +accountability of actions performed on the system and also helps to minimize +direct attack attempts on root's password. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitRootLogin/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitRootLogin\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "PermitRootLogin no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "PermitRootLogin no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(2) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(5) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_root_login + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*PermitRootLogin.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(2) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(5) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_root_login + +- name: Disable SSH Root Login + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ + line: PermitRootLogin no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.1 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.5 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6(2) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - NIST-800-53-IA-2 + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(5) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_root_login + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) + To disable password-based root logins over SSH, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +PermitRootLogin prohibit-password + While this disables password-based root logins, direct root logins +through other means such as through SSH keys or GSSAPI will still be +permitted. Permitting any sort of root login remotely opens up the +root account to attack. +To fully disable direct root logins over SSH (which is considered a +best practice) and prevent remote attacks against the root account, +see CCE-27100-7, CCE-27445-6, CCE-80901-2, and similar. + Even though the communications channel may be encrypted, an additional +layer of security is gained by preventing use of a password. +This also helps to minimize direct attack attempts on root's password. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitRootLogin/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitRootLogin\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_root_password_login + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*PermitRootLogin.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_root_password_login + +- name: Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitRootLogin\s+ + line: PermitRootLogin prohibit-password + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_root_password_login + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH TCP Forwarding + The AllowTcpForwarding parameter specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. +To disable TCP forwarding, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +AllowTcpForwarding no + 2.2.6 + Leaving port forwarding enabled can expose the organization to security risks and back-doors. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*AllowTcpForwarding/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "AllowTcpForwarding no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "AllowTcpForwarding no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_tcp_forwarding + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*AllowTcpForwarding.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_tcp_forwarding + +- name: Disable SSH TCP Forwarding + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*AllowTcpForwarding\s+ + line: AllowTcpForwarding no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_tcp_forwarding + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts + SSH can allow system users to connect to systems if a cache of the remote +systems public keys is available. This should be disabled. + +To ensure this behavior is disabled, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes + 11 + 3 + 9 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + FIA_UAU.1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Configuring this setting for the SSH daemon provides additional +assurance that remote login via SSH will require a password, even +in the event of misconfiguration elsewhere. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_user_known_hosts + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_user_known_hosts + +- name: Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*IgnoreUserKnownHosts\s+ + line: IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_user_known_hosts + + + + + + + + + + + Disable X11 Forwarding + The X11Forwarding parameter provides the ability to tunnel X11 traffic +through the connection to enable remote graphic connections. +SSH has the capability to encrypt remote X11 connections when SSH's +X11Forwarding option is enabled. + +The default SSH configuration disables X11Forwarding. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for X11Forwarding. + +To explicitly disable X11 Forwarding, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +X11Forwarding no + CCI-000366 + CM-6(b) + 2.2.4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Disable X11 forwarding unless there is an operational requirement to use X11 +applications directly. There is a small risk that the remote X11 servers of +users who are logged in via SSH with X11 forwarding could be compromised by +other users on the X11 server. Note that even if X11 forwarding is disabled, +users can always install their own forwarders. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11Forwarding/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11Forwarding\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "X11Forwarding no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "X11Forwarding no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_x11_forwarding + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*X11Forwarding.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_x11_forwarding + +- name: Disable X11 Forwarding + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ + line: X11Forwarding no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_disable_x11_forwarding + + + + + + + + + + + Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options + Ensure that users are not able to override environment variables of the SSH daemon. + +The default SSH configuration disables environment processing. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for PermitUserEnvironment. + +To explicitly disable Environment options, add or correct the following + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +PermitUserEnvironment no + 11 + 3 + 9 + 5.5.6 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + AC-17(a) + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.IP-1 + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00229 + SSH environment options potentially allow users to bypass +access restriction in some configurations. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitUserEnvironment/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "PermitUserEnvironment no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "PermitUserEnvironment no" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_do_not_permit_user_env + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*PermitUserEnvironment.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_do_not_permit_user_env + +- name: Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*PermitUserEnvironment\s+ + line: PermitUserEnvironment no + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_do_not_permit_user_env + + + + + + + + + + + Enable GSSAPI Authentication + Sites setup to use Kerberos or other GSSAPI Authenticaion require setting +sshd to accept this authentication. +To enable GSSAPI authentication, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +GSSAPIAuthentication yes + Kerberos authentication for SSH is often implemented using GSSAPI. If +Kerberos is enabled through SSH, the SSH daemon provides a means of access +to the system's Kerberos implementation. Vulnerabilities in the system's +Kerberos implementations may be subject to exploitation. + +For enterprises, Kerberos is often enabled and used with GSSAPI for +centralized user account management which may necessitate enabling of +GSSAPI functionality in SSH. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "GSSAPIAuthentication yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "GSSAPIAuthentication yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_gssapi_auth + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*GSSAPIAuthentication.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_gssapi_auth + +- name: Enable GSSAPI Authentication + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*GSSAPIAuthentication\s+ + line: GSSAPIAuthentication yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_gssapi_auth + + + + + + + + + + + Enable PAM + UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to “yes” this will +enable PAM authentication using ChallengeResponseAuthentication and +PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all +authentication types. + +To enable PAM authentication, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +UsePAM yes + CCI-000877 + 2.2.4 + SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065 + When UsePAM is set to yes, PAM runs through account and session types properly. This is +important if you want to restrict access to services based off of IP, time or other factors of +the account. Additionally, you can make sure users inherit certain environment variables +on login or disallow access to the server. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*UsePAM/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*UsePAM\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "UsePAM yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "UsePAM yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_pam + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*UsePAM.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_pam + +- name: Enable PAM + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePAM\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePAM\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePAM\s+ + line: UsePAM yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_pam + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Public Key Authentication + Enable SSH login with public keys. + +The default SSH configuration enables authentication based on public keys. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for PubkeyAuthentication. + +To explicitly enable Public Key Authentication, add or correct the following + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +PubkeyAuthentication yes + CCI-000765 + CCI-000766 + CCI-000767 + CCI-000768 + SRG-OS-000105-GPOS-00052 + SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 + SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 + Without the use of multifactor authentication, the ease of access to +privileged functions is greatly increased. Multifactor authentication +requires using two or more factors to achieve authentication. +A privileged account is defined as an information system account with +authorizations of a privileged user. +The DoD CAC with DoD-approved PKI is an example of multifactor +authentication. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PubkeyAuthentication/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "PubkeyAuthentication yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "PubkeyAuthentication yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_pubkey_auth + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*PubkeyAuthentication.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_pubkey_auth + +- name: Enable Public Key Authentication + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*PubkeyAuthentication\s+ + line: PubkeyAuthentication yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_pubkey_auth + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking + SSHs StrictModes option checks file and ownership permissions in +the user's home directory .ssh folder before accepting login. If world- +writable permissions are found, logon is rejected. + +The default SSH configuration has StrictModes enabled. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for StrictModes. + +To explicitly enable StrictModes in SSH, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +StrictModes yes + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + AC-6 + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + If other users have access to modify user-specific SSH configuration files, they +may be able to log into the system as another user. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*StrictModes/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*StrictModes\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "StrictModes yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "StrictModes yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_strictmodes + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*StrictModes.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_strictmodes + +- name: Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*StrictModes\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*StrictModes\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*StrictModes\s+ + line: StrictModes yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_strictmodes + + + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Warning Banner + To enable the warning banner and ensure it is consistent +across the system, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +Banner /etc/issue +Another section contains information on how to create an +appropriate system-wide warning banner. + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5.5.6 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.9 + CCI-000048 + CCI-000050 + CCI-001384 + CCI-001385 + CCI-001386 + CCI-001387 + CCI-001388 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-8(a) + AC-8(c) + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FTA_TAB.1 + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 + SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 + The warning message reinforces policy awareness during the logon process and +facilitates possible legal action against attackers. Alternatively, systems +whose ownership should not be obvious should ensure usage of a banner that does +not provide easy attribution. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "Banner /etc/issue" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "Banner /etc/issue" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_warning_banner + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*Banner.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_warning_banner + +- name: Enable SSH Warning Banner + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ + line: Banner /etc/issue + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_warning_banner + + + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Warning Banner + To enable the warning banner and ensure it is consistent +across the system, add or correct the following line in + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf: + +Banner /etc/issue.net +Another section contains information on how to create an +appropriate system-wide warning banner. + 5.5.6 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + 3.1.9 + CCI-000048 + CCI-000050 + CCI-001384 + CCI-001385 + CCI-001386 + CCI-001387 + CCI-001388 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-8(a) + AC-8(c) + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-7 + FTA_TAB.1 + SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006 + SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088 + The warning message reinforces policy awareness during the logon process and +facilitates possible legal action against attackers. Alternatively, systems +whose ownership should not be obvious should ensure usage of a banner that does +not provide easy attribution. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "Banner /etc/issue.net" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "Banner /etc/issue.net" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_warning_banner_net + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*Banner.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_warning_banner_net + +- name: Enable SSH Warning Banner + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*Banner\s+ + line: Banner /etc/issue.net + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - CJIS-5.5.6 + - NIST-800-171-3.1.9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_warning_banner_net + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding + By default, remote X11 connections are not encrypted when initiated +by users. SSH has the capability to encrypt remote X11 connections when SSH's +X11Forwarding option is enabled. + +To enable X11 Forwarding, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +X11Forwarding yes + 1 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 20 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 9 + BAI03.08 + BAI07.04 + BAI10.01 + BAI10.02 + BAI10.03 + BAI10.05 + DSS03.01 + 3.1.13 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.4.3.2 + 4.3.4.3.3 + 4.4.3.3 + SR 7.6 + A.12.1.1 + A.12.1.2 + A.12.1.4 + A.12.5.1 + A.12.6.2 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.2 + A.14.2.2 + A.14.2.3 + A.14.2.4 + CIP-007-3 R7.1 + CM-6(a) + AC-17(a) + AC-17(2) + DE.AE-1 + PR.DS-7 + PR.IP-1 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Non-encrypted X displays allow an attacker to capture keystrokes and to execute commands +remotely. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11Forwarding/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11Forwarding\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "X11Forwarding yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "X11Forwarding yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_x11_forwarding + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*X11Forwarding.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_x11_forwarding + +- name: Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11Forwarding\s+ + line: X11Forwarding yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.13 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - high_severity + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_enable_x11_forwarding + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Users' SSH Access + By default, the SSH configuration allows any user with an account +to access the system. There are several options available to limit +which users and group can access the system via SSH. It is +recommended that at least one of the following options be leveraged: +- AllowUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of + allowing specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of + space separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with + this variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user + access further by specifically allowing a user's access only from a + particular host, the entry can be specified in the form of user@host. +- AllowGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of + allowing specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list + consists of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not + recognized with this variable. +- DenyUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of + denying specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of + space separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with + this variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user + access further by specifically denying a user's access from a + particular host, the entry can be specified in the form of user@host. +- DenyGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of + denying specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list + consists of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not + recognized with this variable. + 11 + 12 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.06 + 3.1.12 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.5.3 + 4.3.3.5.4 + 4.3.3.5.5 + 4.3.3.5.6 + 4.3.3.5.7 + 4.3.3.5.8 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.1 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.3 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.11 + SR 1.12 + SR 1.13 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.6 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + SR 2.2 + SR 2.3 + SR 2.4 + SR 2.5 + SR 2.6 + SR 2.7 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.2.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.2 + CIP-007-3 R5.3.3 + AC-3 + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-4 + PR.AC-6 + PR.PT-3 + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + Specifying which accounts are allowed SSH access into the system reduces the +possibility of unauthorized access to the system. + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Print Last Log + Ensure that SSH will display the date and time of the last successful account logon. + +The default SSH configuration enables print of the date and time of the last login. +The appropriate configuration is used if no value is set for PrintLastLog. + +To explicitly enable LastLog in SSH, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +PrintLastLog yes + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.10 + CCI-000052 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + A.18.1.4 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + AC-9 + AC-9(1) + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Providing users feedback on when account accesses last occurred facilitates user +recognition and reporting of unauthorized account use. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PrintLastLog/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*PrintLastLog\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "PrintLastLog yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "PrintLastLog yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_print_last_log + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*PrintLastLog.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_print_last_log + +- name: Enable SSH Print Last Log + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PrintLastLog\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*PrintLastLog\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*PrintLastLog\s+ + line: PrintLastLog yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-9 + - NIST-800-53-AC-9(1) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_print_last_log + + + + + + + + + + + Force frequent session key renegotiation + The RekeyLimit parameter specifies how often +the session key of the is renegotiated, both in terms of +amount of data that may be transmitted and the time +elapsed. +To decrease the default limits, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +RekeyLimit + CCI-000068 + FCS_SSH_EXT.1.8 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014 + By decreasing the limit based on the amount of data and enabling +time-based limit, effects of potential attacks against +encryption keys are limited. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_rekey_limit_size='' +var_rekey_limit_time='' + + + + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*RekeyLimit/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*RekeyLimit\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "RekeyLimit $var_rekey_limit_size $var_rekey_limit_time" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "RekeyLimit $var_rekey_limit_size $var_rekey_limit_time" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_rekey_limit_size # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_rekey_limit_size: !!str + tags: + - always +- name: XCCDF Value var_rekey_limit_time # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_rekey_limit_time: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sshd_rekey_limit + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*RekeyLimit.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sshd_rekey_limit + +- name: Force frequent session key renegotiation + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*RekeyLimit\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*RekeyLimit\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*RekeyLimit\s+ + line: RekeyLimit {{ var_rekey_limit_size }} {{ var_rekey_limit_time }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sshd_rekey_limit + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured + The LoginGraceTime parameter to the SSH server specifies the time allowed for successful authentication to +the SSH server. The longer the Grace period is the more open unauthenticated connections +can exist. Like other session controls in this session the Grace Period should be limited to +appropriate limits to ensure the service is available for needed access. + Setting the LoginGraceTime parameter to a low number will minimize the risk of successful +brute force attacks to the SSH server. It will also limit the number of concurrent +unauthenticated connections. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_sshd_set_login_grace_time='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LoginGraceTime\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "LoginGraceTime $var_sshd_set_login_grace_time" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "LoginGraceTime $var_sshd_set_login_grace_time" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_set_login_grace_time # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sshd_set_login_grace_time: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_login_grace_time + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*LoginGraceTime.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_login_grace_time + +- name: Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*LoginGraceTime\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*LoginGraceTime\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*LoginGraceTime\s+ + line: LoginGraceTime {{ var_sshd_set_login_grace_time }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_login_grace_time + + + + + + + + + + + + Set LogLevel to INFO + The INFO parameter specifices that record login and logout activity will be logged. + +The default SSH configuration sets the log level to INFO. The appropriate +configuration is used if no value is set for LogLevel. + +To explicitly specify the log level in SSH, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +LogLevel INFO + AC-17(a) + CM-6(a) + SSH provides several logging levels with varying amounts of verbosity. DEBUG is specifically +not recommended other than strictly for debugging SSH communications since it provides +so much data that it is difficult to identify important security information. INFO level is the +basic level that only records login activity of SSH users. In many situations, such as Incident +Response, it is important to determine when a particular user was active on a system. The +logout record can eliminate those users who disconnected, which helps narrow the field. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LogLevel/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LogLevel\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "LogLevel INFO" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "LogLevel INFO" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_loglevel_info + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*LogLevel.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_loglevel_info + +- name: Set LogLevel to INFO + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ + line: LogLevel INFO + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - low_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_loglevel_info + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE + The VERBOSE parameter configures the SSH daemon to record login and logout activity. +To specify the log level in +SSH, add or correct the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +LogLevel VERBOSE + CCI-000067 + CIP-007-3 R7.1 + AC-17(a) + AC-17(1) + CM-6(a) + Req-2.2.4 + 2.2.6 + SRG-OS-000032-GPOS-00013 + SSH provides several logging levels with varying amounts of verbosity. DEBUG is specifically +not recommended other than strictly for debugging SSH communications since it provides +so much data that it is difficult to identify important security information. INFO or +VERBOSE level is the basic level that only records login activity of SSH users. In many +situations, such as Incident Response, it is important to determine when a particular user was active +on a system. The logout record can eliminate those users who disconnected, which helps narrow the +field. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LogLevel/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*LogLevel\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "LogLevel VERBOSE" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "LogLevel VERBOSE" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_loglevel_verbose + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*LogLevel.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_loglevel_verbose + +- name: Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*LogLevel\s+ + line: LogLevel VERBOSE + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(1) + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.4 + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_loglevel_verbose + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH authentication attempt limit + The MaxAuthTries parameter specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts +permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. +to set MaxAUthTries edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config as follows: +MaxAuthTries + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + 2.2.6 + Setting the MaxAuthTries parameter to a low number will minimize the risk of successful +brute force attacks to the SSH server. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +sshd_max_auth_tries_value='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*MaxAuthTries\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "MaxAuthTries $sshd_max_auth_tries_value" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "MaxAuthTries $sshd_max_auth_tries_value" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value sshd_max_auth_tries_value # promote to variable + set_fact: + sshd_max_auth_tries_value: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_max_auth_tries + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*MaxAuthTries.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_max_auth_tries + +- name: Set SSH authentication attempt limit + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxAuthTries\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxAuthTries\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxAuthTries\s+ + line: MaxAuthTries {{ sshd_max_auth_tries_value }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_max_auth_tries + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH MaxSessions limit + The MaxSessions parameter specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted +from a given connection. To set MaxSessions edit +/etc/ssh/sshd_config as follows: MaxSessions + 2.2.6 + To protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of concurrent +sessions, use the rate limiting function of MaxSessions to protect availability +of sshd logins and prevent overwhelming the daemon. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_sshd_max_sessions='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*MaxSessions\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "MaxSessions $var_sshd_max_sessions" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "MaxSessions $var_sshd_max_sessions" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_max_sessions # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sshd_max_sessions: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sshd_set_max_sessions + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*MaxSessions.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sshd_set_max_sessions + +- name: Set SSH MaxSessions limit + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxSessions\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxSessions\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxSessions\s+ + line: MaxSessions {{ var_sshd_max_sessions }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sshd_set_max_sessions + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured + The MaxStartups parameter specifies the maximum number of concurrent +unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be +dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime expires for a +connection. To confgure MaxStartups, you should add or correct the following +line in the +/etc/ssh/sshd_config file: +MaxStartups +CIS recommends a MaxStartups value of '10:30:60', or more restrictive where +dictated by site policy. + 2.2.6 + To protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of pending +authentication connection attempts, use the rate limiting function of MaxStartups +to protect availability of sshd logins and prevent overwhelming the daemon. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_sshd_set_maxstartups='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*MaxStartups\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "MaxStartups $var_sshd_set_maxstartups" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "MaxStartups $var_sshd_set_maxstartups" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_set_maxstartups # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sshd_set_maxstartups: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_maxstartups + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*MaxStartups.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_maxstartups + +- name: Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*MaxStartups\s+ + line: MaxStartups {{ var_sshd_set_maxstartups }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6 + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_set_maxstartups + + + + + + + + + + + Distribute the SSH Server configuration to multiple files in a config directory. + Make sure to have the Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf line in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file. +Ideally, don't have any active configuration directives in that file, and distribute the service configuration +to several files in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d directory. + This form of distributed configuration is considered as a good practice, and as other sshd rules assume that directives in files in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d config directory are effective, there has to be a rule that ensures this. +Aside from that, having multiple configuration files makes the SSH Server configuration changes easier to partition according to the reason that they were introduced, and therefore it should help to perform merges of hardening updates. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +if test -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/sshd_config_original.conf; then + printf '%s\n' "Remediation probably already happened, '/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/sshd_config_original.conf' already exists, not doing anything." >&2 +false 1 +elif grep -Eq '^\s*Include\s+/etc/ssh/sshd_config\.d/\*\.conf' /etc/ssh/sshd_config && ! grep -Eq '^\s*Match\s' /etc/ssh/sshd_config; then + printf '%s\n' "Remediation probably already happened, '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' already contains the include directive." >&2 +false 1 +else + mkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d + mv /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/sshd_config_original.conf +cat > /etc/ssh/sshd_config << EOF +# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a *.conf file under +# /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ which will be automatically included below + +Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf +EOF +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Use of Privilege Separation + When enabled, SSH will create an unprivileged child process that +has the privilege of the authenticated user. To enable privilege separation in +SSH, add or correct the following line in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: +UsePrivilegeSeparation + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15 + 16 + 18 + 3 + 5 + APO01.06 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.07 + DSS06.02 + 3.1.12 + CCI-000366 + 164.308(a)(4)(i) + 164.308(b)(1) + 164.308(b)(3) + 164.310(b) + 164.312(e)(1) + 164.312(e)(2)(ii) + 4.3.3.7.3 + SR 2.1 + SR 5.2 + A.10.1.1 + A.11.1.4 + A.11.1.5 + A.11.2.1 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.1.3 + A.13.2.1 + A.13.2.3 + A.13.2.4 + A.14.1.2 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.1.2 + A.7.1.1 + A.7.1.2 + A.7.3.1 + A.8.2.2 + A.8.2.3 + A.9.1.1 + A.9.1.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.4.1 + A.9.4.4 + A.9.4.5 + CIP-003-8 R5.1.1 + CIP-003-8 R5.3 + CIP-004-6 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R2.1 + CIP-007-3 R2.2 + CIP-007-3 R2.3 + CIP-007-3 R5.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.1 + CIP-007-3 R5.1.2 + CM-6(a) + AC-17(a) + AC-6 + PR.AC-4 + PR.DS-5 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + SSH daemon privilege separation causes the SSH process to drop root privileges +when not needed which would decrease the impact of software vulnerabilities in +the unprivileged section. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +var_sshd_priv_separation='' + + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "UsePrivilegeSeparation $var_sshd_priv_separation" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "UsePrivilegeSeparation $var_sshd_priv_separation" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_priv_separation # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sshd_priv_separation: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_use_priv_separation + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_use_priv_separation + +- name: Enable Use of Privilege Separation + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*UsePrivilegeSeparation\s+ + line: UsePrivilegeSeparation {{ var_sshd_priv_separation }} + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-171-3.1.12 + - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a) + - NIST-800-53-AC-6 + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_use_priv_separation + + + + + + + + + + + + Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display + The SSH daemon should prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy +display. + +The default SSH configuration for X11UseLocalhost is yes, +which prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. + +To explicitly prevent remote connections to the proxy display, add or correct +the following line in + + +/etc/ssh/sshd_config: + +X11UseLocalhost yes + CCI-000366 + CM-6(b) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the +server and client displays if the sshd proxy display is configured to listen +on the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the +loopback address and sets the hostname part of the DISPLAY +environment variable to localhost. This prevents remote hosts from +connecting to the proxy display. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +# Find the include keyword, extract from the line the glob expression representing included files. +# And if it is a relative path prepend '/etc/ssh/' +included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') +for included_file in ${included_files} ; do + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11UseLocalhost/Id" "$included_file" +done + +if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + +cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" +# Insert before the line matching the regex '^Match'. +line_number="$(LC_ALL=C grep -n "^Match" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/:.*//g')" +if [ -z "$line_number" ]; then + # There was no match of '^Match', insert at + # the end of the file. + printf '%s\n' "X11UseLocalhost yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +else + head -n "$(( line_number - 1 ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + printf '%s\n' "X11UseLocalhost yes" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" + tail -n "+$(( line_number ))" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" +fi +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Find sshd_config included files + shell: |- + included_files=$(grep -oP "^\s*(?i)include.*" /etc/ssh/sshd_config | sed -e 's/Include\s*//i' | sed -e 's|^[^/]|/etc/ssh/&|') + [[ -n $included_files ]] && ls $included_files || true + register: sshd_config_included_files + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_x11_use_localhost + +- name: Comment conf from included files + replace: + path: '{{ item }}' + regexp: ^(\s*X11UseLocalhost.*)$ + replace: '# \1' + loop: '{{ sshd_config_included_files.stdout_lines }}' + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_x11_use_localhost + +- name: Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display + block: + + - name: Check for duplicate values + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s+ + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: dupes + + - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: false + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s+ + state: absent + when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1 + + - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config + lineinfile: + path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config + create: true + regexp: (?i)^\s*X11UseLocalhost\s+ + line: X11UseLocalhost yes + state: present + insertbefore: ^[#\s]*Match + validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - restrict_strategy + - sshd_x11_use_localhost + + + + + + + + + + + Strengthen Firewall Configuration if Possible + If the SSH server is expected to only receive connections from +the local network, then strengthen the default firewall rule for the SSH service +to only accept connections from the appropriate network segment(s). + +Determine an appropriate network block, netwk, network mask, mask, and +network protocol, ip_protocol, representing the systems on your network which will +be allowed to access this SSH server. + +Run the following command: +firewall-cmd --permanent --add-rich-rule='rule family="ip_protocol" source address="netwk/mask" service name="ssh" accept' + + + + + System Security Services Daemon + The System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) is a system daemon that provides access +to different identity and authentication providers such as Red Hat's IdM, Microsoft's AD, +openLDAP, MIT Kerberos, etc. It uses a common framework that can provide caching and offline +support to systems utilizing SSSD. SSSD using caching to reduce load on authentication +servers permit offline authentication as well as store extended user data. + +For more information, see + https://docs.oracle.com/en/operating-systems/oracle-linux/9/userauth/userauth-UsingtheSystemSecurityServicesDaemon.html + + + SSSD certificate_verification option + Value of the certificate_verification option in +the SSSD config. + sha1 + sha256 + sha384 + sha512 + sha1 + + + SSSD memcache_timeout option + Value of the memcache_timeout option in the [nss] section +of SSSD config /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. + 180 + 300 + 600 + 900 + 1800 + 86400 + 300 + + + SSSD ssh_known_hosts_timeout option + Value of the ssh_known_hosts_timeout option in the [ssh] section +of SSSD configuration file /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. + 180 + 300 + 600 + 900 + 1800 + 86400 + 180 + + + Certificate status checking in SSSD + Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, +for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards. +Configuring certificate_verification to ocsp_dgst= ensures that certificates for +multifactor solutions are checked via Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). + CCI-001948 + CCI-001954 + IA-2(11) + SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 + SRG-OS-000377-GPOS-00162 + Ensuring that multifactor solutions certificates are checked via Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) +ensures the security of the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common; then + +var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function='' + + +# sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist +# otherwise the sssd module fails to start +OLD_UMASK=$(umask) +umask u=rw,go= + +MAIN_CONF="/etc/sssd/conf.d/certificate_verification.conf" + +found=false + +# set value in all files if they contain section or key +for f in $(echo -n "$MAIN_CONF /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf"); do + if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then + continue + fi + + # find key in section and change value + if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*certificate_verification" "$f"; then + sed -i "s/certificate_verification[^(\n)]*/certificate_verification = ocsp_dgst = $var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function/" "$f" + found=true + + # find section and add key = value to it + elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]" "$f"; then + sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[sssd\]/a certificate_verification = ocsp_dgst = $var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function" "$f" + found=true + fi +done + +# if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter +if ! $found ; then + file=$(echo "$MAIN_CONF /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" + echo -e "[sssd]\ncertificate_verification = ocsp_dgst = $var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function" >> "$file" +fi + +umask $OLD_UMASK + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_certificate_verification +- name: XCCDF Value var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function # promote to variable + set_fact: + var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function: !!str + tags: + - always + +- name: Ensure that "certificate_verification" is not set in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + ini_file: + path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + section: sssd + option: certificate_verification + state: absent + mode: 384 + when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_certificate_verification + +- name: Ensure that "certificate_verification" is not set in /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf + ini_file: + path: /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf + section: sssd + option: certificate_verification + state: absent + mode: 384 + when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_certificate_verification + +- name: Ensure that "certificate_verification" is set + ini_file: + path: /etc/sssd/conf.d/certificate_verification.conf + section: sssd + option: certificate_verification + value: ocsp_dgst = {{ var_sssd_certificate_verification_digest_function }} + state: present + mode: 384 + when: '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-IA-2(11) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_certificate_verification + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Certmap in SSSD + SSSD should be configured to verify the certificate of the user or group. To set this up + ensure that section like certmap/testing.test/rule_name is setup in +/etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example + +[certmap/testing.test/rule_name] +matchrule =<SAN>.*EDIPI@mil +maprule = (userCertificate;binary={cert!bin}) +domains = testing.test + + Automatic remediation of this control is not available, since all of the settings in +in the certmap need to be customized. + CCI-000187 + IA-5 (2) (c) + SRG-OS-000068-GPOS-00036 + Without mapping the certificate used to authenticate to the user account, the ability to +determine the identity of the individual user or group will not be available for forensic +analysis. + + + + + + + + + Enable Smartcards in SSSD + SSSD should be configured to authenticate access to the system using smart cards. +To enable smart cards in SSSD, set pam_cert_auth to True under the +[pam] section in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example: +[pam] +pam_cert_auth = True + + +Add or update "pam_sss.so" line in auth section of "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file to include +"try_cert_auth" or "require_cert_auth" option, like in the following example: + +/etc/pam.d/system-auth:auth [success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die] pam_sss.so try_cert_auth + +Also add or update "pam_sss.so" line in auth section of "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" file to +include the "allow_missing_name" option, like in the following example: +/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth:auth sufficient pam_sss.so allow_missing_name + CCI-001954 + CCI-000765 + CCI-000766 + CCI-000767 + CCI-000768 + 0421 + 0422 + 0431 + 0974 + 1173 + 1401 + 1504 + 1505 + 1546 + 1557 + 1558 + 1559 + 1560 + 1561 + Req-8.3 + 8.4 + SRG-OS-000375-GPOS-00160 + SRG-OS-000105-GPOS-00052 + SRG-OS-000106-GPOS-00053 + SRG-OS-000107-GPOS-00054 + SRG-OS-000108-GPOS-00055 + Using an authentication device, such as a CAC or token that is separate from +the information system, ensures that even if the information system is +compromised, that compromise will not affect credentials stored on the +authentication device. + +Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) solutions that require devices separate from +information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens +providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart cards such +as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD Common +Access Card. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist +# otherwise the sssd module fails to start +OLD_UMASK=$(umask) +umask u=rw,go= + +found=false + +# set value in all files if they contain section or key +for f in $(echo -n "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf"); do + if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then + continue + fi + + # find key in section and change value + if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*pam_cert_auth" "$f"; then + sed -i "s/pam_cert_auth[^(\n)]*/pam_cert_auth = True/" "$f" + found=true + + # find section and add key = value to it + elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]" "$f"; then + sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[pam\]/a pam_cert_auth = True" "$f" + found=true + fi +done + +# if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter +if ! $found ; then + file=$(echo "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" + echo -e "[pam]\npam_cert_auth = True" >> "$file" +fi + +umask $OLD_UMASK + + +if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then + if authselect check; then + if ! authselect check; then + echo " + authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact. + It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available. + In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended." + exit 1 + fi + authselect enable-feature with-smartcard + + authselect apply-changes -b + fi +else + if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*)/\1'"sufficient"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" + else + echo 'auth '"sufficient"' pam_sss.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\sallow_missing_name\b' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*auth\s+'"sufficient"'\s+pam_sss.so.*/ s/$/ allow_missing_name/' "/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth" + fi + if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then + # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module. + if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s*' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")" -eq 1 ]; then + # The control is updated only if one single line matches. + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks 's/^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*)/\1'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"' \2/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + else + echo 'auth '"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"' pam_sss.so' >> "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + fi + fi + # Check the option + if ! grep -qP '^\s*auth\s+'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"'\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\stry_cert_auth\b' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth"; then + sed -i -E --follow-symlinks '/\s*auth\s+'"\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]"'\s+pam_sss.so.*/ s/$/ try_cert_auth/' "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" + fi +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_enable_smartcards + +- name: Test for domain group + command: grep '^\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + register: test_grep_domain + ignore_errors: true + changed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_enable_smartcards + +- name: Add default domain group (if no domain there) + ini_file: + path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + section: '{{ item.section }}' + option: '{{ item.option }}' + value: '{{ item.value }}' + create: true + mode: 384 + with_items: + - section: sssd + option: domains + value: default + - section: domain/default + option: id_provider + value: files + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined + - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_enable_smartcards + +- name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD + ini_file: + dest: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + section: pam + option: pam_cert_auth + value: 'True' + create: true + mode: 384 + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_enable_smartcards + +- name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if system relies on authselect + ansible.builtin.stat: + path: /usr/bin/authselect + register: result_authselect_present + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_enable_smartcards + +- name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Remediate using authselect + block: + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check integrity of authselect current profile + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect check + register: result_authselect_check_cmd + changed_when: false + failed_when: false + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Informative message based on the authselect + integrity check result + ansible.builtin.assert: + that: + - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0 + fail_msg: + - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted! + - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not + selected or the selected profile is not intact. + - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool + is available. + - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, + a custom authselect profile is recommended. + success_msg: + - authselect integrity check passed + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Get authselect current features + ansible.builtin.shell: + cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }' + register: result_authselect_features + changed_when: false + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure "with-smartcard" feature is enabled using + authselect tool + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect enable-feature with-smartcard + register: result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd + when: + - result_authselect_check_cmd is success + - result_authselect_features.stdout is not search("with-smartcard") + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is not skipped + - result_authselect_enable_feature_cmd is success + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_enable_smartcards + +- name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Remediate by directly editing PAM files + block: + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if expected PAM module line is present + in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + regexp: ^\s*auth\s+sufficient\s+pam_sss.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Include or update the PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + block: + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if required PAM module line is present + in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + regexp: ^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the correct control for the required + PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*) + replace: \1sufficient \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the required PAM module line is included + in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + line: auth sufficient pam_sss.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if the required PAM module option is present + in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + regexp: ^\s*auth\s+sufficient\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\sallow_missing_name\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_allow_missing_name_option_present + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the "allow_missing_name" PAM option for + "pam_sss.so" is included in /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+sufficient\s+pam_sss.so.*) + line: \1 allow_missing_name + state: present + register: result_pam_allow_missing_name_add + when: + - result_pam_module_allow_missing_name_option_present.found == 0 + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if expected PAM module line is present + in /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: ^\s*auth\s+\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]\s+pam_sss.so\s*.* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_present + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Include or update the PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth + block: + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if required PAM module line is present + in /etc/pam.d/system-auth with different control + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: ^\s*auth\s+.*\s+pam_sss.so\s* + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_line_other_control_present + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the correct control for the required + PAM module line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ansible.builtin.replace: + dest: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+).*(\bpam_sss.so.*) + replace: \1\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\] + \2 + register: result_pam_module_edit + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1 + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the required PAM module line is included + in /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + dest: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + line: auth \[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\] pam_sss.so + register: result_pam_module_add + when: + - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found + > 1 + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure authselect changes are applied + ansible.builtin.command: + cmd: authselect apply-changes -b + when: + - result_authselect_present is defined + - result_authselect_present.stat.exists + - |- + (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed) + or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed) + when: + - result_pam_line_present.found is defined + - result_pam_line_present.found == 0 + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Check if the required PAM module option is present + in /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + regexp: ^\s*auth\s+\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]\s+pam_sss.so\s*.*\stry_cert_auth\b + state: absent + check_mode: true + changed_when: false + register: result_pam_module_try_cert_auth_option_present + + - name: Enable Smartcards in SSSD - Ensure the "try_cert_auth" PAM option for "pam_sss.so" + is included in /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ansible.builtin.lineinfile: + path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth + backrefs: true + regexp: ^(\s*auth\s+\[success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die\]\s+pam_sss.so.*) + line: \1 try_cert_auth + state: present + register: result_pam_try_cert_auth_add + when: + - result_pam_module_try_cert_auth_option_present.found == 0 + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - not result_authselect_present.stat.exists + tags: + - PCI-DSS-Req-8.3 + - PCI-DSSv4-8.4 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_enable_smartcards + + + + + + + + + + SSSD Has a Correct Trust Anchor + SSSD must have acceptable trust anchor present. + Automatic remediation of this control is not available. + CCI-000185 + IA-5 (2) (a) + SRG-OS-000066-GPOS-00034 + SRG-OS-000384-GPOS-00167 + Without path validation, an informed trust decision by the relying party cannot be made when +presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. + +A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It +is used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and DNSSEC. + +When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor; +it can be, for example, a Certification Authority (CA). A certification path starts with the +subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted +root certificate, typically issued by a trusted CA. + +This requirement verifies that a certification path to an accepted trust anchor is used for +certificate validation and that the path includes status information. Path validation is +necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any +certificate not already explicitly trusted. Status information for certification paths includes +certificate revocation lists or online certificate status protocol responses. +Validation of the certificate status information is out of scope for this requirement. + + + + + + Configure SSSD to Expire Offline Credentials + SSSD should be configured to expire offline credentials after 1 day. + +To configure SSSD to expire offline credentials, set +offline_credentials_expiration to 1 under the [pam] +section in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. For example: +[pam] +offline_credentials_expiration = 1 + + 1 + 12 + 15 + 16 + 5 + DSS05.04 + DSS05.05 + DSS05.07 + DSS05.10 + DSS06.03 + DSS06.10 + CCI-002007 + 4.3.3.2.2 + 4.3.3.5.1 + 4.3.3.5.2 + 4.3.3.6.1 + 4.3.3.6.2 + 4.3.3.6.3 + 4.3.3.6.4 + 4.3.3.6.5 + 4.3.3.6.6 + 4.3.3.6.7 + 4.3.3.6.8 + 4.3.3.6.9 + 4.3.3.7.2 + 4.3.3.7.4 + SR 1.1 + SR 1.10 + SR 1.2 + SR 1.3 + SR 1.4 + SR 1.5 + SR 1.7 + SR 1.8 + SR 1.9 + SR 2.1 + A.18.1.4 + A.7.1.1 + A.9.2.1 + A.9.2.2 + A.9.2.3 + A.9.2.4 + A.9.2.6 + A.9.3.1 + A.9.4.2 + A.9.4.3 + CM-6(a) + IA-5(13) + PR.AC-1 + PR.AC-6 + PR.AC-7 + SRG-OS-000383-GPOS-00166 + If cached authentication information is out-of-date, the validity of the +authentication information may be questionable. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if rpm --quiet -q sssd-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then + +# sssd configuration files must be created with 600 permissions if they don't exist +# otherwise the sssd module fails to start +OLD_UMASK=$(umask) +umask u=rw,go= + +found=false + +# set value in all files if they contain section or key +for f in $(echo -n "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf"); do + if [ ! -e "$f" ]; then + continue + fi + + # find key in section and change value + if grep -qzosP "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]([^\n\[]*\n+)+?[[:space:]]*offline_credentials_expiration" "$f"; then + sed -i "s/offline_credentials_expiration[^(\n)]*/offline_credentials_expiration = 1/" "$f" + found=true + + # find section and add key = value to it + elif grep -qs "[[:space:]]*\[pam\]" "$f"; then + sed -i "/[[:space:]]*\[pam\]/a offline_credentials_expiration = 1" "$f" + found=true + fi +done + +# if section not in any file, append section with key = value to FIRST file in files parameter +if ! $found ; then + file=$(echo "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf" | cut -f1 -d ' ') + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$file")" + echo -e "[pam]\noffline_credentials_expiration = 1" >> "$file" +fi + +umask $OLD_UMASK + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_offline_cred_expiration + +- name: Test for domain group + command: grep '\s*\[domain\/[^]]*]' /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + register: test_grep_domain + ignore_errors: true + changed_when: false + check_mode: false + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_offline_cred_expiration + +- name: Add default domain group (if no domain there) + ini_file: + path: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + section: '{{ item.section }}' + option: '{{ item.option }}' + value: '{{ item.value }}' + create: true + mode: 384 + with_items: + - section: sssd + option: domains + value: default + - section: domain/default + option: id_provider + value: files + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + - test_grep_domain.stdout is defined + - test_grep_domain.stdout | length < 1 + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_offline_cred_expiration + +- name: Configure SSD to Expire Offline Credentials + ini_file: + dest: /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + section: pam + option: offline_credentials_expiration + value: 1 + create: true + mode: 384 + when: + - '"sssd-common" in ansible_facts.packages' + - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-5(13) + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - medium_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - sssd_offline_cred_expiration + + + + + + + + + + System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) - LDAP + The System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) is a system daemon that provides access +to different identity and authentication providers such as Red Hat's IdM, Microsoft's AD, +openLDAP, MIT Kerberos, etc. It uses a common framework that can provide caching and offline +support to systems utilizing SSSD. SSSD using caching to reduce load on authentication +servers permit offline authentication as well as store extended user data. + +SSSD can support many backends including LDAP. The sssd-ldap backend +allows SSSD to fetch identity information from an LDAP server. + + + SSSD LDAP Backend Client CA Certificate Location + Path of a directory that contains Certificate Authority certificates. + /etc/openldap/cacerts + + + + + USBGuard daemon + The USBGuard daemon enforces the USB device authorization policy for all USB devices. + + + Install usbguard Package + +The usbguard package can be installed with the following command: + +$ sudo yum install usbguard + CCI-001958 + 1418 + CM-8(3) + IA-3 + SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 + usbguard is a software framework that helps to protect +against rogue USB devices by implementing basic whitelisting/blacklisting +capabilities based on USB device attributes. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then + +if ! rpm -q --quiet "usbguard" ; then + yum install -y "usbguard" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Ensure usbguard is installed + package: + name: usbguard + state: present + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3) + - NIST-800-53-IA-3 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_usbguard_installed + + include install_usbguard + +class install_usbguard { + package { 'usbguard': + ensure => 'installed', + } +} + + +package --add=usbguard + + --- +apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 +kind: MachineConfig +spec: + config: + ignition: + version: 3.1.0 + extensions: + - usbguard + + +[[packages]] +name = "usbguard" +version = "*" + + + + + + + + + + Enable the USBGuard Service + The USBGuard service should be enabled. + +The usbguard service can be enabled with the following command: +$ sudo systemctl enable usbguard.service + CCI-000416 + CCI-001958 + 1418 + CM-8(3)(a) + IA-3 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 + The usbguard service must be running in order to +enforce the USB device authorization policy for all USB devices. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then + +SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'usbguard.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'usbguard.service' +"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'usbguard.service' + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Enable service usbguard + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Enable service usbguard + systemd: + name: usbguard + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - '"usbguard" in ansible_facts.packages' + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-3 + - enable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - service_usbguard_enabled + + include enable_usbguard + +class enable_usbguard { + service {'usbguard': + enable => true, + ensure => 'running', + } +} + + --- +apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 +kind: MachineConfig +metadata: + annotations: + complianceascode.io/depends-on: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed +spec: + config: + ignition: + version: 3.1.0 + systemd: + units: + - name: usbguard.service + enabled: true + + +[customizations.services] +enabled = ["usbguard"] + + + + + + + + + + Log USBGuard daemon audit events using Linux Audit + To configure USBGuard daemon to log via Linux Audit +(as opposed directly to a file), +AuditBackend option in /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf +needs to be set to LinuxAudit. + CCI-000169 + CCI-000172 + AU-2 + CM-8(3) + IA-3 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031 + SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215 + SRG-APP-000141-CTR-000315 + Using the Linux Audit logging allows for centralized trace +of events. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ) && { rpm --quiet -q usbguard; }; then + +if [ -e "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" ] ; then + + LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*AuditBackend=/d" "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" +else + touch "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" +fi +# make sure file has newline at the end +sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" + +cp "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf.bak" +# Insert at the end of the file +printf '%s\n' "AuditBackend=LinuxAudit" >> "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf" +# Clean up after ourselves. +rm "/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf.bak" + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + --- +apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 +kind: MachineConfig +metadata: + annotations: + complianceascode.io/depends-on: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed + complianceascode.io/ocp-version: '>=4.7.0' +spec: + config: + ignition: + version: 3.1.0 + storage: + files: + - contents: + source: data:,{{ %0A%23%0A%23%20Rule%20set%20file%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20will%20use%20this%20file%20to%20load%20the%20policy%0A%23%20rule%20set%20from%20it%20and%20to%20write%20new%20rules%20received%20via%20the%0A%23%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20RuleFile%3D/path/to/rules.conf%0A%23%0ARuleFile%3D/etc/usbguard/rules.conf%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Rule%20set%20folder%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20will%20use%20this%20folder%20to%20load%20the%20policy%0A%23%20rule%20set%20from%20it%20and%20to%20write%20new%20rules%20received%20via%20the%0A%23%20IPC%20interface.%20Usually%2C%20we%20set%20the%20option%20to%0A%23%20/etc/usbguard/rules.d/.%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20is%20supposed%20to%0A%23%20behave%20like%20any%20other%20standard%20Linux%20daemon%20therefore%20it%0A%23%20loads%20rule%20files%20in%20alpha-numeric%20order.%20File%20names%20inside%0A%23%20RuleFolder%20directory%20should%20start%20with%20a%20two-digit%20number%0A%23%20prefix%20indicating%20the%20position%2C%20in%20which%20the%20rules%20are%0A%23%20scanned%20by%20the%20daemon.%0A%23%0A%23%20RuleFolder%3D/path/to/rulesfolder/%0A%23%0ARuleFolder%3D/etc/usbguard/rules.d/%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Implicit%20policy%20target.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20devices%20that%20don%27t%20match%20any%20rule%20in%20the%0A%23%20policy.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20-%20authorize%20the%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20-%20block%20the%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20-%20remove%20the%20device%0A%23%0AImplicitPolicyTarget%3Dblock%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Present%20device%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20devices%20that%20are%20already%20connected%20when%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20authorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20just%20sync%20the%20internal%20state%20and%20leave%20it%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0APresentDevicePolicy%3Dapply-policy%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Present%20controller%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20USB%20controllers%20that%20are%20already%20connected%0A%23%20when%20the%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20allow%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20authorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20just%20sync%20the%20internal%20state%20and%20leave%20it%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0APresentControllerPolicy%3Dkeep%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Inserted%20device%20policy.%0A%23%0A%23%20How%20to%20treat%20USB%20devices%20that%20are%20already%20connected%0A%23%20%2Aafter%2A%20the%20daemon%20starts.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20block%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20deauthorize%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20reject%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20remove%20every%20present%20device%0A%23%20%2A%20apply-policy%20-%20evaluate%20the%20ruleset%20for%20every%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20device%0A%23%0AInsertedDevicePolicy%3Dapply-policy%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Control%20which%20devices%20are%20authorized%20by%20default.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20modifies%20some%20the%20default%20authorization%20state%20attributes%0A%23%20of%20controller%20devices.%20This%20setting%2C%20enables%20you%20to%20define%20what%20value%20the%0A%23%20default%20authorization%20is%20set%20to.%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20keep%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20do%20not%20change%20the%20authorization%20state%0A%23%20%2A%20none%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20every%20new%20device%20starts%20out%20deauthorized%0A%23%20%2A%20all%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20-%20every%20new%20device%20starts%20out%20authorized%0A%23%20%2A%20internal%20%20%20%20%20-%20internal%20devices%20start%20out%20authorized%2C%20external%20devices%20start%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20out%20deauthorized%20%28this%20requires%20the%20ACPI%20tables%20to%20properly%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20label%20internal%20devices%2C%20and%20kernel%20support%29%0A%23%0A%23AuthorizedDefault%3Dnone%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Restore%20controller%20device%20state.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20USBGuard%20daemon%20modifies%20some%20attributes%20of%20controller%0A%23%20devices%20like%20the%20default%20authorization%20state%20of%20new%20child%20device%0A%23%20instances.%20Using%20this%20setting%2C%20you%20can%20control%20whether%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20will%20try%20to%20restore%20the%20attribute%20values%20to%20the%20state%0A%23%20before%20modification%20on%20shutdown.%0A%23%0A%23%20SECURITY%20CONSIDERATIONS%3A%20If%20set%20to%20true%2C%20the%20USB%20authorization%0A%23%20policy%20could%20be%20bypassed%20by%20performing%20some%20sort%20of%20attack%20on%20the%0A%23%20daemon%20%28via%20a%20local%20exploit%20or%20via%20a%20USB%20device%29%20to%20make%20it%20shutdown%0A%23%20and%20restore%20to%20the%20operating-system%20default%20state%20%28known%20to%20be%20permissive%29.%0A%23%0ARestoreControllerDeviceState%3Dfalse%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Device%20manager%20backend%0A%23%0A%23%20Which%20device%20manager%20backend%20implementation%20to%20use.%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20uevent%20%20%20-%20Netlink%20based%20implementation%20which%20uses%20sysfs%20to%20scan%20for%20present%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20devices%20and%20an%20uevent%20netlink%20socket%20for%20receiving%20USB%20device%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20related%20events.%0A%23%20%2A%20umockdev%20-%20umockdev%20based%20device%20manager%20capable%20of%20simulating%20devices%20based%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20on%20umockdev-record%20files.%20Useful%20for%20testing.%0A%23%0ADeviceManagerBackend%3Duevent%0A%0A%23%21%21%21%20WARNING%3A%20It%27s%20good%20practice%20to%20set%20at%20least%20one%20of%20the%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20two%20options%20bellow.%20If%20none%20of%20them%20are%20set%2C%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20the%20daemon%20will%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20anyone%2C%20thus%20allowing%20anyone%20to%20modify%20the%20%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%23%21%21%21%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20rule%20set%20and%20%28de%29authorize%20USB%20devices.%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%21%21%21%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Users%20allowed%20to%20use%20the%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20A%20space%20delimited%20list%20of%20usernames%20that%20the%20daemon%20will%0A%23%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from.%0A%23%0A%23%20IPCAllowedUsers%3Dusername1%20username2%20...%0A%23%0AIPCAllowedUsers%3Droot%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Groups%20allowed%20to%20use%20the%20IPC%20interface.%0A%23%0A%23%20A%20space%20delimited%20list%20of%20groupnames%20that%20the%20daemon%20will%0A%23%20accept%20IPC%20connections%20from.%0A%23%0A%23%20IPCAllowedGroups%3Dgroupname1%20groupname2%20...%0A%23%0AIPCAllowedGroups%3Dwheel%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20IPC%20access%20control%20definition%20files%20path.%0A%23%0A%23%20The%20files%20at%20this%20location%20will%20be%20interpreted%20by%20the%20daemon%0A%23%20as%20access%20control%20definition%20files.%20The%20%28base%29name%20of%20a%20file%0A%23%20should%20be%20in%20the%20form%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%20%20%5Buser%5D%5B%3A%3Cgroup%3E%5D%0A%23%0A%23%20and%20should%20contain%20lines%20in%20the%20form%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%20%20%3Csection%3E%3D%5Bprivilege%5D%20...%0A%23%0A%23%20This%20way%20each%20file%20defines%20who%20is%20able%20to%20connect%20to%20the%20IPC%0A%23%20bus%20and%20what%20privileges%20he%20has.%0A%23%0AIPCAccessControlFiles%3D/etc/usbguard/IPCAccessControl.d/%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Generate%20device%20specific%20rules%20including%20the%20%22via-port%22%0A%23%20attribute.%0A%23%0A%23%20This%20option%20modifies%20the%20behavior%20of%20the%20allowDevice%0A%23%20action.%20When%20instructed%20to%20generate%20a%20permanent%20rule%2C%0A%23%20the%20action%20can%20generate%20a%20port%20specific%20rule.%20Because%0A%23%20some%20systems%20have%20unstable%20port%20numbering%2C%20the%20generated%0A%23%20rule%20might%20not%20match%20the%20device%20after%20rebooting%20the%20system.%0A%23%0A%23%20If%20set%20to%20false%2C%20the%20generated%20rule%20will%20still%20contain%0A%23%20the%20%22parent-hash%22%20attribute%20which%20also%20defines%20an%20association%0A%23%20to%20the%20parent%20device.%20See%20usbguard-rules.conf%285%29%20for%20more%0A%23%20details.%0A%23%0ADeviceRulesWithPort%3Dfalse%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20USBGuard%20Audit%20events%20log%20backend%0A%23%0A%23%20One%20of%3A%0A%23%0A%23%20%2A%20FileAudit%20-%20Log%20audit%20events%20into%20a%20file%20specified%20by%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20AuditFilePath%20setting%20%28see%20below%29%0A%23%20%2A%20LinuxAudit%20-%20Log%20audit%20events%20using%20the%20Linux%20Audit%0A%23%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20subsystem%20%28using%20audit_log_user_message%29%0A%23%0AAuditBackend%3DLinuxAudit%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20USBGuard%20audit%20events%20log%20file%20path.%0A%23%0A%23AuditFilePath%3D/var/log/usbguard/usbguard-audit.log%0A%0A%23%0A%23%20Hides%20personally%20identifiable%20information%20such%20as%20device%20serial%20numbers%20and%0A%23%20hashes%20of%20descriptors%20%28which%20include%20the%20serial%20number%29%20from%20audit%20entries.%0A%23%0A%23HidePII%3Dfalse }} + mode: 0600 + path: /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf + overwrite: true + + + + + + + + + + Authorize Human Interface Devices and USB hubs in USBGuard daemon + To allow authorization of USB devices combining human interface device and hub capabilities +by USBGuard daemon, +add the line +allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* } +to /etc/usbguard/rules.conf. + This rule should be understood primarily as a convenience administration feature. This rule ensures that if the USBGuard default rules.conf file is present, it will alter it so that USB human interface devices and hubs are allowed. However, if the rules.conf file is altered by system administrator, the rule does not check if USB human interface devices and hubs are allowed. This assumes that an administrator modified the file with some purpose in mind. + CM-8(3) + IA-3 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059 + Without allowing Human Interface Devices, it might not be possible +to interact with the system. Without allowing hubs, it might not be possible to use any +USB devices on the system. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then + +echo "allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* }" >> /etc/usbguard/rules.conf + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Allow HID devices and hubs + lineinfile: + path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf + create: true + line: allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* } + state: present + when: ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", + "container"] and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3) + - NIST-800-53-IA-3 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - usbguard_allow_hid_and_hub + + --- +apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 +kind: MachineConfig +metadata: + annotations: + complianceascode.io/depends-on: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed +spec: + config: + ignition: + version: 3.1.0 + storage: + files: + - contents: + source: data:,{{ %0Aallow%20with-interface%20match-all%20%7B%2003%3A%2A%3A%2A%2009%3A00%3A%2A%20%7D }} + mode: 0600 + path: /etc/usbguard/rules.d/75-hid-and-hub.conf + overwrite: true + + + + + + + + + + Generate USBGuard Policy + By default USBGuard when enabled prevents access to all USB devices and this lead +to inaccessible system if they use USB mouse/keyboard. To prevent this scenario, +the initial policy configuration must be generated based on current connected USB +devices. + CCI-000416 + CCI-001958 + CM-8(3)(a) + IA-3 + FMT_SMF_EXT.1 + SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163 + The usbguard must be configured to allow connected USB devices to work +properly, avoiding the system to become inaccessible. + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if ( [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ] && ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); then + +if rpm --quiet -q usbguard +then + USBGUARD_CONF=/etc/usbguard/rules.conf + if [ ! -f "$USBGUARD_CONF" ] || [ ! -s "$USBGUARD_CONF" ]; then + usbguard generate-policy > $USBGUARD_CONF + if [ ! -s "$USBGUARD_CONF" ]; then + # make sure OVAL check doesn't fail on systems where + # generate-policy doesn't find any USB devices (for + # example a system might not have a USB bus) + echo "# No USB devices found" > $USBGUARD_CONF + fi + # make sure it has correct permissions + chmod 600 $USBGUARD_CONF + + SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'usbguard.service' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" restart 'usbguard.service' + "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'usbguard.service' + fi +else + echo "USBGuard is not installed. No remediation was applied!" +fi + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-3 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - usbguard_generate_policy + +- name: Generate USBGuard Policy + block: + + - name: Gather the package facts + package_facts: + manager: auto + + - name: Check that the /etc/usbguard/rules.conf exists + stat: + path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf + register: policy_file + + - name: Create USBGuard Policy configuration + command: usbguard generate-policy + register: policy + when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0 + + - name: Copy the Generated Policy configuration to a persistent file + copy: + content: '{{ policy.stdout }}' + dest: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf + mode: 384 + when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0 + + - name: Add comment into /etc/usbguard/rules.conf when system has no USB devices + lineinfile: + path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf + line: '# No USB devices found' + state: present + when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0 + + - name: Enable service usbguard + systemd: + name: usbguard + enabled: 'yes' + state: started + masked: 'no' + when: + - ( ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + and ansible_architecture != "s390x" ) + - '"usbguard" in ansible_facts.packages' + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a) + - NIST-800-53-IA-3 + - configure_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - usbguard_generate_policy + + + + + + + + + + + X Window System + The X Window System implementation included with the +system is called X.org. + + Disable X Windows + Unless there is a mission-critical reason for the +system to run a graphical user interface, ensure X is not set to start +automatically at boot and remove the X Windows software packages. +There is usually no reason to run X Windows +on a dedicated server system, as it increases the system's attack surface and consumes +system resources. Administrators of server systems should instead login via +SSH or on the text console. + + Remove the X Windows Package Group + By removing the xorg-x11-server-common package, the system no longer has X Windows +installed. If X Windows is not installed then the system cannot boot into graphical user mode. +This prevents the system from being accidentally or maliciously booted into a graphical.target +mode. To do so, run the following command:$ sudo yum groupremove base-x +$ sudo yum remove xorg-x11-server-common + The installation and use of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) increases your attack vector and decreases your +overall security posture. Removing the package xorg-x11-server-common package will remove the graphical target +which might bring your system to an inconsistent state requiring additional configuration to access the system +again. If a GUI is an operational requirement, a tailored profile that removes this rule should used before +continuing installation. + 12 + 15 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.6.6 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.6 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Unnecessary service packages must not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. X windows has a long history of security +vulnerabilities and should not be installed unless approved and documented. + +# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove xorg-x11-server-common +# from the system, and may remove any packages +# that depend on xorg-x11-server-common. Execute this +# remediation AFTER testing on a non-production +# system! + +if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-common" ; then + + yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-common" + +fi + + - name: Ensure xorg-x11-server-common is removed + package: + name: xorg-x11-server-common + state: absent + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - disable_strategy + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - no_reboot_needed + - package_xorg-x11-server-common_removed + + include remove_xorg-x11-server-common + +class remove_xorg-x11-server-common { + package { 'xorg-x11-server-common': + ensure => 'purged', + } +} + + +package --remove=xorg-x11-server-common + + + + + + + + + + Disable graphical user interface + By removing the following packages, the system no longer has X Windows installed. + +xorg-x11-server-Xorg xorg-x11-server-common xorg-x11-server-utils xorg-x11-server-Xwayland + +If X Windows is not installed then the system cannot boot into graphical user mode. +This prevents the system from being accidentally or maliciously booted into a graphical.target +mode. To do so, run the following command: + +sudo yum remove xorg-x11-server-Xorg xorg-x11-server-common xorg-x11-server-utils xorg-x11-server-Xwayland + The installation and use of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) increases your attack vector and decreases your +overall security posture. Removing the package xorg-x11-server-common package will remove the graphical target +which might bring your system to an inconsistent state requiring additional configuration to access the system +again. +The rule xwindows_runlevel_target can be used to configure the system to boot into the multi-user.target. +If a GUI is an operational requirement, a tailored profile that removes this rule should be used before +continuing installation. + CCI-000366 + CM-6(b) + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Unnecessary service packages must not be installed to decrease the attack surface of the system. X windows has a long history of security +vulnerabilities and should not be installed unless approved and documented. + + +# remove packages +if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-Xorg" ; then + + yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-Xorg" + +fi +if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-utils" ; then + + yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-utils" + +fi +if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-common" ; then + + yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-common" + +fi + +if rpm -q --quiet "xorg-x11-server-Xwayland" ; then + + yum remove -y "xorg-x11-server-Xwayland" + +fi + + +package --remove=xorg-x11-server-Xorg --remove=xorg-x11-server-common --remove=xorg-x11-server-utils --remove=xorg-x11-server-Xwayland + + + + + + + + + + Disable X Windows Startup By Setting Default Target + Systems that do not require a graphical user interface should only boot by +default into multi-user.target mode. This prevents accidental booting of the system +into a graphical.target mode. Setting the system's default target to +multi-user.target will prevent automatic startup of the X server. To do so, run: +$ systemctl set-default multi-user.target +You should see the following output: +Removed symlink /etc/systemd/system/default.target. +Created symlink from /etc/systemd/system/default.target to /usr/lib/systemd/system/multi-user.target. + 12 + 15 + 8 + APO13.01 + DSS01.04 + DSS05.02 + DSS05.03 + CCI-000366 + 4.3.3.6.6 + SR 1.13 + SR 2.6 + SR 3.1 + SR 3.5 + SR 3.8 + SR 4.1 + SR 4.3 + SR 5.1 + SR 5.2 + SR 5.3 + SR 7.1 + SR 7.6 + A.11.2.6 + A.13.1.1 + A.13.2.1 + A.14.1.3 + A.6.2.1 + A.6.2.2 + CM-7(a) + CM-7(b) + CM-6(a) + PR.AC-3 + PR.PT-4 + SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227 + Services that are not required for system and application processes +must not be active to decrease the attack surface of the system. X windows has a +long history of security vulnerabilities and should not be used unless approved +and documented. + + # Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms +if [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; then + +systemctl set-default multi-user.target + +else + >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done' +fi + + - name: Switch to multi-user runlevel + file: + src: /usr/lib/systemd/system/multi-user.target + dest: /etc/systemd/system/default.target + state: link + force: true + when: ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"] + tags: + - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a) + - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b) + - low_complexity + - low_disruption + - medium_severity + - reboot_required + - restrict_strategy + - xwindows_runlevel_target + + + + + + + + + + + + + Introduction + The purpose of this guidance is to provide security configuration +recommendations and baselines for the Oracle Linux 9 operating +system. Recommended settings for the basic operating system are provided, +as well as for many network services that the system can provide to other systems. +The guide is intended for system administrators. Readers are assumed to +possess basic system administration skills for Unix-like systems, as well +as some familiarity with the product's documentation and administration +conventions. Some instructions within this guide are complex. +All directions should be followed completely and with understanding of +their effects in order to avoid serious adverse effects on the system +and its security. + + General Principles + The following general principles motivate much of the advice in this +guide and should also influence any configuration decisions that are +not explicitly covered. + + Encrypt Transmitted Data Whenever Possible + Data transmitted over a network, whether wired or wireless, is susceptible +to passive monitoring. Whenever practical solutions for encrypting +such data exist, they should be applied. Even if data is expected to +be transmitted only over a local network, it should still be encrypted. +Encrypting authentication data, such as passwords, is particularly +important. Networks of Oracle Linux 9 machines can and should be configured +so that no unencrypted authentication data is ever transmitted between +machines. + + + Least Privilege + Grant the least privilege necessary for user accounts and software to perform tasks. +For example, sudo can be implemented to limit authorization to super user +accounts on the system only to designated personnel. Another example is to limit +logins on server systems to only those administrators who need to log into them in +order to perform administration tasks. Using SELinux also follows the principle of +least privilege: SELinux policy can confine software to perform only actions on the +system that are specifically allowed. This can be far more restrictive than the +actions permissible by the traditional Unix permissions model. + + + Minimize Software to Minimize Vulnerability + The simplest way to avoid vulnerabilities in software is to avoid +installing that software. On Oracle Linux 9,the RPM Package Manager (originally Red Hat Package Manager, abbreviated RPM) +allows for careful management of +the set of software packages installed on a system. Installed software +contributes to system vulnerability in several ways. Packages that +include setuid programs may provide local attackers a potential path to +privilege escalation. Packages that include network services may give +this opportunity to network-based attackers. Packages that include +programs which are predictably executed by local users (e.g. after +graphical login) may provide opportunities for trojan horses or other +attack code to be run undetected. The number of software packages +installed on a system can almost always be significantly pruned to include +only the software for which there is an environmental or operational need. + + + Run Different Network Services on Separate Systems + Whenever possible, a server should be dedicated to serving exactly one +network service. This limits the number of other services that can +be compromised in the event that an attacker is able to successfully +exploit a software flaw in one network service. + + + Configure Security Tools to Improve System Robustness + Several tools exist which can be effectively used to improve a system's +resistance to and detection of unknown attacks. These tools can improve +robustness against attack at the cost of relatively little configuration +effort. In particular, this guide recommends and discusses the use of +host-based firewalling, SELinux for protection against +vulnerable services, and a logging and auditing infrastructure for +detection of problems. + + + + How to Use This Guide + Readers should heed the following points when using the guide. + + Formatting Conventions + Commands intended for shell execution, as well as configuration file text, +are featured in a monospace font. Italics are used +to indicate instances where the system administrator must substitute +the appropriate information into a command or configuration file. + + + Read Sections Completely and in Order + Each section may build on information and recommendations discussed in +prior sections. Each section should be read and understood completely; +instructions should never be blindly applied. Relevant discussion may +occur after instructions for an action. + + + Reboot Required + A system reboot is implicitly required after some actions in order to +complete the reconfiguration of the system. In many cases, the changes +will not take effect until a reboot is performed. In order to ensure +that changes are applied properly and to test functionality, always +reboot the system after applying a set of recommendations from this guide. + + + Root Shell Environment Assumed + Most of the actions listed in this document are written with the +assumption that they will be executed by the root user running the +/bin/bash shell. Commands preceded with a hash mark (#) +assume that the administrator will execute the commands as root, i.e. +apply the command via sudo whenever possible, or use +su to gain root privileges if sudo cannot be +used. Commands which can be executed as a non-root user are are preceded +by a dollar sign ($) prompt. + + + Test in Non-Production Environment + This guidance should always be tested in a non-production environment +before deployment. This test environment should simulate the setup in +which the system will be deployed as closely as possible. + + + + + + + + + combine_ovals.py from SCAP Security Guide + ssg: [0, 1, 69], python: 3.9.16 + 5.11 + 2023-09-14T00:00:00 + + + + + Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail For The Root Account + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if root has the correct mail alias. + + + + + + + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if postmaster has the correct mail alias. + + + + + + + + + Disable Postfix Network Listening + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Postfix network listening should be disabled + + + + + + + + + + Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'smtpd_client_restrictions' is configured with value 'permit_mynetworks[ \t]*[, \t][ \t]*reject' in /etc/postfix/main.cf + + + + + + + + + + + + Use Kerberos Security on All Exports + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Using Kerberos Security allows to cryptography authenticate a + valid user to an NFS share. + + + + + + + + + + Disable chrony daemon from acting as server + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure the port setting in /etc/chrony.conf to disable + server operation. + + + + + + + + + + Disable network management of chrony daemon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure the cmdport setting in /etc/chrony.conf to disable + chronyc management connections over network. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure the maxpoll setting in /etc/ntp.conf or chrony.conf + to continuously poll the time source servers. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Chrony is only configured with the server directive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure Chrony has time sources configured with server directive + + + + + + + + + + A remote time server for Chrony is configured + + Oracle Linux 9 + + A remote NTP Server for time synchronization should be + specified (and dependencies are met) + + + + + + + + + Specify Additional Remote NTP Servers + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Multiple ntpd NTP Servers for time synchronization should be specified. + + + + + + + + + Specify a Remote NTP Server + + Oracle Linux 9 + + A remote ntpd NTP Server for time synchronization should be + specified (and dependencies are met) + + + + + + + + + Remove Host-Based Authentication Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + There should not be any shosts.equiv files on the system. + + + + + + + + + Remove Rsh Trust Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + There should not be any .rhosts or hosts.equiv files on the system. + + + + + + + + + + + Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + There should not be any .shosts files on the system. + + + + + + + + + Ensure tftp Daemon Uses Secure Mode + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The TFTP daemon should use secure mode. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The system sshd key is owned by root:root and has the 0600 permission, or by a root:ssh_keys with the 0640 permission + + + + + + + + + Configure session renegotiation for SSH client + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'RekeyLimit' is configured with the correct value in /etc/ssh/ssh_config and /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf + + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If inbound SSH access is needed, the firewall should allow access to + the SSH service. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The OpenSSH daemon should be running protocol 2. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + SSH should either have compression disabled or set to delayed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + SSH can allow authentication through the obsolete rsh command + through the use of the authenticating user's SSH keys. This should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Users' SSH Access + + Oracle Linux 9 + + One of the following parameters of the sshd configuration file is set: AllowUsers, DenyUsers, AllowGroups, DenyGroups. + + + + + + + + + + + + Force frequent session key renegotiation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure RekeyLimit is configured with the appropriate value in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Interval + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SSH idle timeout interval should be set to an + appropriate value. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Count Max + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SSH ClientAliveCountMax should be set to an appropriate value (and + dependencies are met) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SSH number seconds for login grace time should be set to an + appropriate value. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH authentication attempt limit + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SSH MaxAuthTries should be set to an + appropriate value. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH MaxSessions limit + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SSH number of max sessions should be set to an + appropriate value. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'MaxStartups' is configured in + '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Distribute the SSH Server configuration to multiple files in a config directory. + + Oracle Linux 9 + + foo + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Use of Privilege Separation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'UsePrivilegeSeparation' is configured with value 'sandbox' in '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' + + + + + + + + + + + + + Certificate status checking in SSSD + + Oracle Linux 9 + + SSSD should be configured with the correct ocsp_dgst + digest function + + + + + + + + + Enable Smartcards in SSSD + + Oracle Linux 9 + + SSSD should be configured to authenticate access to the system + using smart cards. + + + + + + + + + + + Configure SSSD to Expire Offline Credentials + + Oracle Linux 9 + + SSSD should be configured to expire offline credentials after 1 day. + + + + + + + + + Log USBGuard daemon audit events using Linux Audit + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'AuditBackend' is configured with value 'LinuxAudit' in /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf + + + + + + + + + + + + Authorize Human Interface Devices and USB hubs in USBGuard daemon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that /etc/usbguard/rules.conf contains at least one non whitespace character and exists. + + + + + + + + + Generate USBGuard Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that /etc/usbguard/rules.conf contains at least one non whitespace character and exists. + + + + + + + + + Disable graphical user interface + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that the default runlevel target is set to multi-user.target. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable X Windows Startup By Setting Default Target + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that the default runlevel target is set to multi-user.target. + + + + + + + + + Enable authselect + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that authselect is enabled + + + + + + + + + + + + + Modify the System Login Banner + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The system login banner text should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The system login banner text should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Enable the GNOME3 Login warning banner. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Enable the GUI warning banner. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation. + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure the system to notify users of last login/access using pam_lastlog. + + + + + + + + + + An SELinux Context must be configured for the pam_faillock.so records directory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + An SELinux Context must be configured for the Faillock directory. + + + + + + + + + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Password Reuse: password-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The passwords to remember should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Password Reuse: system-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The passwords to remember should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit Password Reuse + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The passwords to remember should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Lockout account after failed login attempts + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The root account should be configured to deny access after the number of + defined failed attempts has been reached. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Lock Accounts Must Persist + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Persist lockout account after reboot + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The number of allowed failed logins should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The unlock time after number of failed logins should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The PAM module pam_pwquality is used in password-auth + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The PAM module pam_pwquality is used in system-auth + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password retry should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/libuser.conf. + + + + + + + + + Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/login.defs. + + + + + + + + + Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/pam.d/password-auth. + + + + + + + + + Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password hashing algorithm should be set correctly in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. + + + + + + + + + Set Password Hashing Minimum Rounds in /etc/login.defs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password hashing minimum rounds should be set correctly in /etc/login.defs. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure the CtrlAltDelBurstAction setting in /etc/systemd/system.conf + or /etc/systemd/system.conf.d/* to none to prevent a reboot if Ctrl-Alt-Delete is + pressed more than 7 times in 2 seconds. + + + + + + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + By default, the system will reboot when the + Ctrl-Alt-Del key sequence is pressed. + + + + + + + + + Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The ability for users to perform interactive startups should + be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Require Authentication for Emergency Systemd Target + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The requirement for a password to boot into emergency mode + should be configured correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + Require Authentication for Single User Mode + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The requirement for a password to boot into single-user mode + should be configured correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + Support session locking with tmux + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if tmux is configured to exec at the end of bashrc. + + + + + + + + + Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if tmux is configured to lock sessions after period of inactivity. + + + + + + + + + + Configure the tmux Lock Command + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if the vlock command is configured to be used as a locking mechanism in tmux. + + + + + + + + + + Prevent user from disabling the screen lock + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that tmux is not listed in /etc/shells + + + + + + + + + Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure the organization's smart card driver so that only + the smart card in use by the organization will be recognized by the system. + + + + + + + + + Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Force opensc to use the organization's smart card driver so that only + the smart card in use by the organization will be recognized by the system. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique User IDs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All accounts on the system should have unique IDs for proper accountability. + + + + + + + + + Only Authorized Local User Accounts Exist on Operating System + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Besides the default operating system user, there should be no other users + except the users that are authorized to exist locally on the operating system. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group ID + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All groups on the system should have unique names for proper accountability. + + + + + + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity in password-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The accounts should be configured to expire automatically following password expiration. + + + + + + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity in system-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The accounts should be configured to expire automatically following password expiration. + + + + + + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The accounts should be configured to expire automatically following password expiration. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique Names + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All accounts on the system should have unique names for proper accountability. + + + + + + + + + Set Password Maximum Age + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The maximum password age policy should meet minimum requirements. + + + + + + + + + Set Password Minimum Age + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The minimum password age policy should be set appropriately. + + + + + + + + + Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password minimum length should be set appropriately. + + + + + + + + + Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age + + + + + + + + + + + Set Existing Passwords Minimum Age + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Warning Age + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password expiration warning age should be set appropriately. + + + + + + + + + Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All password hashes should be shadowed. + + + + + + + + + Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed with SHA512 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All password hashes should be shadowed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure all users last password change date is in the past + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All passwords last change date is in the past. + + + + + + + + + + Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The number of rounds for password hashing should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The number of rounds for password hashing should be set correctly. + + + + + + + + + + + + + All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group. + + + + + + + + + Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The file /etc/pam.d/system-auth should not contain the nullok option + + + + + + + + + Ensure There Are No Accounts With Blank or Null Passwords + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The file /etc/shadow shows that there aren't empty passwords + + + + + + + + + Verify No netrc Files Exist + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The .netrc files contain login information used to auto-login into FTP servers and reside in the user's home directory. Any .netrc files should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Verify Only Root Has UID 0 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Only the root account should be assigned a user id of 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Root Has A Primary GID 0 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The root account should have primary group of 0 + + + + + + + + + Direct root Logins Not Allowed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Preventing direct root logins help ensure accountability for actions + taken on the system using the root account. + + + + + + + + + + Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked + + + + + + + + + Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The root account is the only system account that should have + a login shell. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Serial Port Root Logins + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Preventing direct root login to serial port interfaces helps + ensure accountability for actions taken on the system using the root + account. + + + + + + + + + Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Preventing direct root login to virtual console devices + helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the system using the + root account. + + + + + + + + + Enforce usage of pam_wheel for su authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Only members of the wheel group should be able to authenticate through the su command. + + + + + + + + + Ensure Home Directories are Created for New Users + + Oracle Linux 9 + + CREATE_HOME should be enabled + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Logon Failure Delay is Set Correctly in login.defs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The delay between failed authentication attempts should be + set for all users specified in /etc/login.defs + + + + + + + + + Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The maximum number of concurrent login sessions per user should meet + minimum requirements. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Polyinstantiation of /tmp Directories + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Polyinstantiation of /var/tmp Directories + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Interactive Session Timeout + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks interactive shell timeout + + + + + + + + + + + User Initialization Files Must Not Run World-Writable Programs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + User Initialization Files Must Not Execute World-Writable Programs + + + + + + + + + All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined + + + + + + + + + All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist + + + + + + + + + + All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All interactive user's Home Directories must be group-owned by its user + + + + + + + + + Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + User initialization files have mode 0740 or less permissive + + + + + + + + + All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive + + + + + + + + + Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable + + + + + + + + + Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include World or Group-Writable Directories + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check each directory in root's path and make use it does + not grant write permission to group and other + + + + + + + + + Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include Relative Paths or Null Directories + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The environment variable PATH should be set correctly for + the root user. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default Bash Umask is Set Correctly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The default umask for users of the bash shell + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default C Shell Umask is Set Correctly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The default umask for users of the csh shell + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in login.defs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The default umask for all users specified in /etc/login.defs + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The default umask for all users should be set correctly + + + + + + + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users + + + + + + + + + Enable Syscall Auditing + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Syscall auditing should not be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Make the auditd Configuration Immutable + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Force a reboot to change audit rules is enabled + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules that detect changes to the system's mandatory access controls (SELinux) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls in usr/share + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules that detect changes to the system's + mandatory access controls (SELinux) in usr/share/selinux are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The network environment should not be modified by anything other than + administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules should capture information about session initiation. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit actions taken by system administrators on the system - /etc/sudoers. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers.d/ + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit actions taken by system administrators on the system - /etc/sudoers.d/. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events When Privileged Executables Are Run + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure audit rule for all uses of privileged functions is enabled + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit actions taken by system administrators on the system. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Shutdown System When Auditing Failures Occur + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The system will shutdown when auditing fails. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules should detect modification to system files that hold information about users and groups. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Access Events to Audit Log Directory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the read events to /var/log/audit + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks that all /var/log/audit directories are group owned by the root user. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks that all /var/log/audit directories are owned by the root user. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0750 or Less Permissive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks for correct permissions for audit logs. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Group Owned By Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks that all audit log files are group owned by the root user. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks that all /var/log/audit files and directories are owned by the root user and group. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks that all audit log files are owned by the root user. + + + + + + + + + + + + + System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks for correct permissions for all audit log files. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit files deletion events. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - delete_module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - finit_module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading - init_module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The audit rules should be configured to log information about kernel module loading and unloading. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of privileged commands are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settime + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Record attempts to alter time through clock_settime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stime + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Record attempts to alter time through stime. Note that on + 64-bit architectures the stime system call is not defined in the audit + system calls lookup table. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter the localtime File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Record attempts to alter time through /etc/localtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog plugin + + Oracle Linux 9 + + active setting in /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf is set to 'yes' + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + + Oracle Linux 9 + + disk_error_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + + Oracle Linux 9 + + disk_error_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to SYSLOG, SINGLE or HALT + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + + Oracle Linux 9 + + disk_full_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + + Oracle Linux 9 + + disk_full_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to SYSLOG, SINGLE or HALT + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + action_mail_acct setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain account + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + admin_space_left_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + admin_space_left setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd flush priority + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The setting for flush in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Max Log File Size + + Oracle Linux 9 + + max_log_file setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + + Oracle Linux 9 + + max_log_file_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + + Oracle Linux 9 + + max_log_file_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained + + Oracle Linux 9 + + num_logs setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + space_left_action setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a certain action + + + + + + + + + Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + space_left setting in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to at least a certain value + + + + + + + + + Set hostname as computer node name in audit logs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'name_format' is configured with value 'hostname' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + + + + + + + + Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'overflow_action' is configured with value '(syslog|single|halt)' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + + + + + + + + Disable Recovery Booting + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Recovery mode should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + Set the Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The grub2 boot loader superuser should have a username that is hard to guess. + + + + + + + + + Set Boot Loader Password in grub2 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The grub2 boot loader should have password protection enabled. + + + + + + + + + Set the UEFI Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The grub2 boot loader superuser should have a username that is hard to guess. + + + + + + + + + Set the UEFI Boot Loader Password + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The UEFI grub2 boot loader should have password protection enabled. + + + + + + + + + Ensure cron Is Logging To Rsyslog + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Rsyslog should be configured to capture cron messages. + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Rsyslogd must authenticate remote system its sending logs to. + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Rsyslogd must encrypt the off-loading of logs off of the system. + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Rsyslogd must encrypt the off-loading of logs off of the system. + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Rsyslog should be configured to monitor remote access methods. + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Logrotate Runs Periodically + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The frequency of automatic log files rotation performed by the logrotate utility should be configured to run daily + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + + Oracle Linux 9 + + rsyslogd should reject remote messages + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Host + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Syslog logs should be sent to a remote loghost + + + + + + + + + + Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that all needed TLS-related options are present + + + + + + + + + Configure CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that the CA certificate path is set + + + + + + + + + Configure Multiple DNS Servers in /etc/resolv.conf + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Multiple Domain Name System (DNS) Servers should be configured + in /etc/resolv.conf. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Disable the network sniffer + + + + + + + + + Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packets + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Change the default firewalld zone to drop. + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Networking Support Automatic Loading + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The disable option will allow the IPv6 module to be inserted, but prevent address assignment and activation of the network stack. + + + + + + + + + Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All wireless interfaces should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All world writable directories should be owned by root. + + + + + + + + + Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The sticky bit should be set for all world-writable directories. + + + + + + + + + Verify that local System.map file (if exists) is readable only by root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + Checks that /boot/System.map-* are only readable by root. + + + + + + + + + + Ensure All SGID Executables Are Authorized + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Evaluates to true if all files with SGID set are owned by RPM packages. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All SUID Executables Are Authorized + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Evaluates to true if all files with SUID set are owned by RPM packages. + + + + + + + + + Ensure No World-Writable Files Exist + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The world-write permission should be disabled for all files. + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Group + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All files should be owned by a group + + + + + + + + + Ensure All Files Are Owned by a User + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All files should be owned by a user + + + + + + + + + Verify that system commands files are group owned by root or a system account + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + Checks that system commands in /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin + are owned by root group or a system account. + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executables Have Root Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + Checks that /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /usr/local/bin, + /usr/local/sbin, /usr/libexec, and objects therein, are owned by root. + + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executables Have Restrictive Permissions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + Checks that binary files under /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, + /usr/local/bin, /usr/local/sbin, and /usr/libexec are not group-writable or world-writable. + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The nodev mount option prevents files from being interpreted + as character or block devices. Legitimate character and block devices + should exist in the /dev directory on the root partition or within chroot + jails built for system services. All other locations should not allow + character and block devices. + + + + + + + + + Disable core dump backtraces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'ProcessSizeMax' is configured with value '0 in section 'Coredump' in /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + + + + + + + + + + Disable storing core dump + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'Storage' is configured with value 'none in section 'Coredump' in /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + + + + + + + + + + Disable Core Dumps for All Users + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Core dumps for all users should be disabled + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOS + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The NX (no-execution) bit flag should be set on the system. + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + Check if selinux=0 OR enforcing=0 within the GRUB2 configuration files, fail if found. + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinux + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All pids in /proc should be assigned an SELinux security context other than 'unconfined_service_t'. + + + + + + + + + Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled + + Oracle Linux 9 + + SELinux is not Disabled. + + + + + + + + + Configure SELinux Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux policy should be set appropriately. + + + + + + + + + Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux state should be enforcing the local policy. + + + + + + + + + Prefer to use a 64-bit Operating System when supported + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if the system supports a 64-bit Operating System + + + + + + + + + + + + + Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure GNOME3 DConf User Profile + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The DConf User profile should have the local DB configured. + + + + + + + + + + Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Disable the GNOME3 Login GUI Restart and Shutdown buttons to all users on the login screen. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the GNOME3 Login User List + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Disable the GNOME3 GUI listing of all known users on the login screen. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable GDM Automatic Login + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Disable the GNOME Display Manager (GDM) ability to allow users to + automatically login. + + + + + + + + + + Disable XDMCP in GDM + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'Enable' is configured with value 'false in section 'xdmcp' in /etc/gdm/custom.conf + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable GNOME3 automount-open + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount + devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) + whenever they are inserted into the system. Disable automount-open within GNOME3. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable GNOME3 autorun + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount + devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) + whenever they are inserted into the system. Disable autorun within GNOME3. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure GNOME3 to require credential prompting for remote access. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure GNOME3 to require encryption for remote access connections. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Idle activation of the screen saver should be enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The allowed period of inactivity before the screensaver is activated. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Idle activation of the screen lock should be enabled immediately or + after a delay. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Idle activation of the screen lock should be enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Idle activation of the screen lock should not be changed by users. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Implement Blank Screensaver + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The GNOME3 screensaver should be blank. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Settings + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 screensaver idle and lock settings. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Session Idle Settings + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that users cannot change GNOME3 session idle settings. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Disable the GNOME3 ctrl-alt-del reboot key sequence in GNOME3. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + The Installed Operating System Is Vendor Supported + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is supported by a vendor that provides security patches. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure BIND to use System Crypto Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + BIND should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. + + + + + + + + + + Configure System Cryptography Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure crypto policy is correctly configured in /etc/crypto-policies/config, and the policy is current. + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Kerberos should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Libreswan should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. + + + + + + + + + + Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + OpenSSL should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. + + + + + + + + + Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + SSH should be configured to use the system-wide crypto policy setting. + + + + + + + + + Harden SSH client Crypto Policy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure the ssh client ciphers are configured correctly in /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: openssh.config + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Limit the Ciphers to those which are FIPS-approved. + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Limit the Ciphers to those which are FIPS-approved. + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: openssh.config + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Limit the Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to those which are FIPS-approved. + + + + + + + + + Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Limit the Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to those which are FIPS-approved. + + + + + + + + + Install Intrusion Detection Software + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Intrusion detection software or SELinux should be installed and enabled. + + + + + + + + + + Install McAfee Virus Scanning Software + + Oracle Linux 9 + + McAfee Antivirus software should be installed. + + + + + + + + + + Install the McAfee Runtime Libraries and Linux Agent + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Install the McAfee Runtime Libraries (MFErt) and Linux Agent (MFEcma). + + + + + + + + + + Ensure McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running. + + + + + + + + + Install the Asset Configuration Compliance Module (ACCM) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Install the Asset Configuration Compliance Module (ACCM). + + + + + + + + + Install the Policy Auditor (PA) Module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Install the Policy Auditor (PA) Module. + + + + + + + + + Enable Dracut FIPS Module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + fips module should be enabled in Dracut configuration + + + + + + + + + Enable FIPS Mode + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if FIPS mode is enabled on the system + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure '/etc/system-fips' exists + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check /etc/system-fips exists + + + + + + + + + Set kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' to 1 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'crypto.fips_enabled' parameter should be set to '1' in system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Build and Test AIDE Database + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The aide database must be initialized. + + + + + + + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify the Audit Tools + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The Oracle Linux 9 operating system file integrity tool must be configured to protect the integrity of the audit tools. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE + + Oracle Linux 9 + + By default, AIDE does not install itself for periodic + execution. Periodically running AIDE is necessary to reveal + unexpected changes in installed files. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details + + Oracle Linux 9 + + AIDE should notify appropriate personnel of the details + of a scan after the scan has been run. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify Access Control Lists (ACLs) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + AIDE should be configured to verify Access Control Lists (ACLs). + + + + + + + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify Extended Attributes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + AIDE should be configured to verify extended file attributes. + + + + + + + + + + Verify File Hashes with RPM + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Verify the RPM digests of system binaries using the RPM database. + + + + + + + + + Verify and Correct Ownership with RPM + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Verify ownership of installed packages + by comparing the installed files with information about the + files taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM + database. + + + + + + + + + + Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPM + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Verify the permissions of installed packages + by comparing the installed files with information about the + files taken from the package metadata stored in the RPM + database. + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo !authenticate + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudo usage without authentication + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo NOPASSWD + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudo usage without password + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudo usage without password + + + + + + + + + + Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command + + Oracle Linux 9 + + 'Ensure sudo timestamp_timeout is appropriate - sudo timestamp_timeout + + + + + + + + + + The operating system must restrict privilege elevation to authorized personnel + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that sudoers doesn't allow all users to run commands via sudo + + + + + + + + + + Only the VDSM User Can Use sudo NOPASSWD + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudo usage for the vdsm user without a password + + + + + + + + + + Explicit arguments in sudo specifications + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that sudoers doesn't contain commands without arguments specified + + + + + + + + + Don't define allowed commands in sudoers by means of exclusion + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that sudoers doesn't contain command negations + + + + + + + + + Don't target root user in the sudoers file + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that sudoers doesn't allow users to run commands as root + + + + + + + + + + Ensure invoking users password for privilege escalation when using sudo + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure invoking user's password for privilege escalation when using sudo + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure yum Removes Previous Package Versions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The clean_requirements_on_remove option should be used to ensure that old + versions of software components are removed after updating. + + + + + + + + + Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'apply_updates' is configured with value 'yes in section 'commands' in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'upgrade_type' is configured with value 'security in section 'commands' in /etc/dnf/automatic.conf + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main yum Configuration + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The gpgcheck option should be used to ensure that checking + of an RPM package's signature always occurs prior to its + installation. + + + + + + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Local Packages + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The localpkg_gpgcheck option should be used to ensure that checking + of an RPM package's signature always occurs prior to its + installation. + + + + + + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for All yum Package Repositories + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure all yum or dnf repositories utilize signature checking. + + + + + + + + + Ensure Oracle Linux GPG Key Installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The Oracle Linux key packages are required to be installed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password dcredit should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary Words + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password dictcheck should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password difok should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check presence of enforce_for_root in /etc/security/pwquality.conf + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password lcredit should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters from Same Character Class + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password maxclassrepeat should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password maxrepeat should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password minclass should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password minlen should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password ocredit should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The password ucredit should meet minimum requirements + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file accesses + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file accesses + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure basic parameters of Audit system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file creations + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file creations + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file deletions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file deletions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure immutable Audit login UIDs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file modifications + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful file modifications + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of loading and unloading of kernel modules + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules + + + + + + + + + Perform general configuration of Audit for OSPP + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful ownership changes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful ownership changes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful permission changes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules + + + + + + + + + Configure auditing of successful permission changes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Inspect the contents of /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - init + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of init is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - poweroff + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of poweroff is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - reboot + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of reboot is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - shutdown + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of shutdown is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattr + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattr + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchown + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattr + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattr + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattr + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattr + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount2 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run chacl + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of chacl is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run chcon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of chcon is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run restorecon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of restorecon is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run semanage + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of semanage is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setfacl + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of setfacl is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setfiles + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of setfiles is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setsebool + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of setsebool is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run seunshare + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of seunshare is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rename + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The deletion of files should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - renameat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The deletion of files should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rmdir + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The deletion of files should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlink + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The deletion of files should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlinkat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The deletion of files should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - faillock + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - lastlog + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - tallylog + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules should be configured to log successful and unsuccessful login and logout events. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The changing of file permissions and attributes should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - at + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of at is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chage + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of chage is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chsh + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of chsh is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - crontab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of crontab is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - gpasswd + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of gpasswd is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - kmod + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of kmod is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - mount + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of mount is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgrp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of newgrp is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pam_timestamp_check + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of pam_timestamp_check is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - passwd + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of passwd is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postdrop + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of postdrop is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postqueue + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of postqueue is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pt_chown + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of pt_chown is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run ssh-agent + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of ssh_agent is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - ssh-keysign + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of ssh_keysign is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - su + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of su is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudo + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of sudo is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudoedit + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of sudoedit is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - umount + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of umount is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_chkpwd + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of unix_chkpwd is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_update + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of unix_update is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - userhelper + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of userhelper is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usermod + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of usermod is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usernetctl + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the information on the use of usernetctl is enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - creat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - openat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - rename + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - truncate + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit rules about the unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful) are enabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/group + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit user/group modification. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/gshadow + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit user/group modification. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/security/opasswd + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit user/group modification. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/passwd + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit user/group modification. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/shadow + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Audit user/group modification. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'freq' is configured with value '50' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + + + + + + + + Include Local Events in Audit Logs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'local_events' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + + + + + + + + Resolve information before writing to audit logs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'log_format' is configured with value 'ENRICHED' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + + + + + + + + Write Audit Logs to the Disk + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'write_logs' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + + + + + + + + + Enable the GNOME3 Screen Locking On Smartcard Removal + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'removal-action' is configured with value ''lock-screen' in section 'org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard' in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Group Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executable Have Root Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /bin/, /sbin/, /usr/bin/, /usr/sbin/, /usr/local/bin/, /usr/local/sbin/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify that System Executable Directories Have Restrictive Permissions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /bin/, /sbin/, /usr/bin/, /usr/sbin/, /usr/local/bin/, /usr/local/sbin/ has mode 0755. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Restrictive Permissions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ has mode 7755. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Host-Based Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'HostbasedAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Audit Tools Must Be Group-owned by Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/augenrules is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Audit Tools Must Be Owned by Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/augenrules is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Audit Tools Must Have a Mode of 0755 or Less Permissive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /sbin/auditctl, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/autrace, /sbin/auditd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/augenrules has mode 0755. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup group File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/group- is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup gshadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow- is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup passwd File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/passwd- is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup shadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/shadow- is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.allow is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.d + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.d/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.daily + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.daily/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.hourly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.hourly/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.monthly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.monthly/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.weekly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.weekly/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Crontab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/crontab is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/user.cfg is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns group File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/group is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns gshadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns passwd File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/passwd is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns shadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/shadow is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Group Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns SSH Server config file + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/sshd_config is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/user.cfg is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log Directory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/messages File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/messages is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/syslog File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/syslog is group owned by 4. + + + + + + + + + Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Group root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/audit/, /etc/audit/rules.d/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is group owned by ssh_keys. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup group File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/group- is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup gshadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow- is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup passwd File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/passwd- is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup shadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/shadow- is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.allow is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.d + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.d/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.daily + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.daily/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.hourly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.hourly/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.monthly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.monthly/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on cron.weekly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.weekly/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on crontab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/crontab is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns group File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/group is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns gshadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns passwd File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/passwd is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns shadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/shadow is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg User Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Owner on SSH Server config file + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/sshd_config is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg User Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /boot/grub2/user.cfg is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log Directory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log/messages File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/messages is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log/syslog File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/syslog is owned by 104. + + + + + + + + + Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Root + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/audit/, /etc/audit/rules.d/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Files Have Root Ownership + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Verify Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ is owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + Audit Configuration Files Permissions are 640 or More Restrictive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/audit/, /etc/audit/rules.d/ has mode 0640. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup group File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/group- has mode 0644. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup gshadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow- has mode 0000. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup passwd File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/passwd- has mode 0644. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup shadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/shadow- has mode 0000. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/cron.allow file + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.allow has mode 0640. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.d + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.d/ has mode 0700. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.daily + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.daily/ has mode 0700. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.hourly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.hourly/ has mode 0700. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.monthly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.monthly/ has mode 0700. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.weekly + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/cron.weekly/ has mode 0700. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on crontab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/crontab has mode 0600. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/audit/auditd.conf has mode 0640. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/audit/rules.d/ has mode 0640. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on group File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/group has mode 0644. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on gshadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/gshadow has mode 0000. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on passwd File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/passwd has mode 0644. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on shadow File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/shadow has mode 0000. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify that Shared Library Files Have Restrictive Permissions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ has mode 7755. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server config file + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/sshd_config has mode 0600. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /etc/ssh/ has mode 0644. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log Directory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/ has mode 0755. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log/messages File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/messages has mode 0640. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log/syslog File + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /var/log/syslog has mode 0640. + If the target file or directory has an extended ACL, then it will fail the mode check. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Firewalld to Use the Nftables Backend + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'FirewallBackend' is configured with value 'nftables' in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + + + + + + + + + Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure audit=1 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure audit_backlog_limit=8192 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + IOMMU configuration directive + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure iommu=force is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure kernel to zero out memory before allocation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure init_on_alloc=1 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure L1 Terminal Fault mitigations + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure l1tf is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Force kernel panic on uncorrected MCEs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure mce=0 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SMAP is not disabled during boot + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure nosmap is not set in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure SMEP is not disabled during boot + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure nosmep is not set in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable randomization of the page allocator + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure page_alloc.shuffle=1 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable page allocator poisoning + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure page_poison=1 is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure pti=on is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure the confidence in TPM for entropy + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure rng_core.default_quality is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable merging of slabs with similar size + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure slab_nomerge=yes is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure slub_debug is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Speculative Store Bypass Mitigation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure spec_store_bypass_disable is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enforce Spectre v2 mitigation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure spectre_v2=on is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled during boot + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure systemd.debug-shell is not set in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable vsyscalls + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure vsyscall=none is configured in the kernel line in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Install Smart Card Packages For Multifactor Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package openssl-pkcs11 should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Do not allow ACPI methods to be inserted/replaced at run time + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable kernel support for MISC binaries + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable support for BUG() + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_BUG should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable compatibility with brk() + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the 32-bit vDSO + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on credential management + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable kernel debugfs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_FS should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on linked list manipulation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on notifier call chains + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable checks on scatter-gather (SG) table operations + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_SG should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure low address space to protect from user allocation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR should have value 65536 + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable /dev/kmem virtual device support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_DEVKMEM should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable hibernation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_HIBERNATION should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable IA32 emulation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the IPv6 protocol + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_IPV6 should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable kexec system call + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_KEXEC should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable legacy (BSD) PTY support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable module signature verification + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable automatic signing of all modules + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Require modules to be validly signed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Specify the hash to use when signing modules + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH should have value according to var_kernel_config_module_sig_hash + + + + + + + + + + + + Specify module signing key to use + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY should have value according to var_kernel_config_module_sig_key + + + + + + + + + + + + Sign kernel modules with SHA-512 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable poison without sanity check + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Use zero for poisoning instead of debugging value + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Remove the kernel mapping in user mode + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic oops + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic timeout + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT should have value according to var_kernel_config_panic_timeout + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable support for /proc/kkcore + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_PROC_KCORE should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Randomize the kernel memory sections + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_RETPOLINE should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SECCOMP should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable use of Berkeley Packet Filter with seccomp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable different security models + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable mutable hooks + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Yama support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable SLUB debugging support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable TCP/IP syncookie support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka KAISER) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 should have value y + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable x86 vsyscall emulation + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION should have value n + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable ATM Support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module atm should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Bluetooth Kernel Module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module bluetooth should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable CAN Support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module can should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Mounting of cramfs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module cramfs should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable IEEE 1394 (FireWire) Support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module firewire-core should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable RDS Support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module rds should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SCTP Support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module sctp should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable TIPC Support + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module tipc should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module usb-storage should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the uvcvideo module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel module uvcvideo should be disabled. + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /boot + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /boot should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /boot + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /boot should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /boot + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /boot should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /dev/shm + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /dev/shm should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /dev/shm + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /dev/shm should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /dev/shm should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add grpquota Option to /home + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Home mount points should be mounted with mount option grpquota. + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /home + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /home should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /home + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Home mount points should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /home + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Home mount points should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + Add usrquota Option to /home + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Home mount points should be mounted with mount option usrquota. + + + + + + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with Kerberos Security + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The sec_krb5_krb5i_krb5p option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. + + + + + + + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with nodev + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The nodev option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to Removable Media Partitions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The nodev option should be enabled for all removable devices mounts in /etc/fstab. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with noexec + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The noexec option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to Removable Media Partitions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The noexec option should be enabled for all removable devices mounts in /etc/fstab. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with nosuid + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The nosuid option should be enabled for all NFS mounts in /etc/fstab. + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to Removable Media Partitions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The nosuid option should be enabled for all removable devices mounts in /etc/fstab. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /opt + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /opt should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /srv + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /srv should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /tmp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /tmp should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /tmp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /tmp should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /tmp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /tmp should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/log/audit should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/log/audit should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/log/audit should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/log + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/log should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/log + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/log should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/log + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/log should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/tmp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/tmp should be mounted with mount option nodev. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/tmp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/tmp should be mounted with mount option noexec. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp + + Oracle Linux 9 + + /var/tmp should be mounted with mount option nosuid. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + package_GConf2_installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package GConf2 should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package MFEhiplsm should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install AIDE + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package aide should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install audispd-plugins Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package audispd-plugins should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure the default plugins for the audit dispatcher are Installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package audit-audispd-plugins should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure the audit Subsystem is Installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package audit should be installed. + + + + + + + + + package_avahi_installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package avahi should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall bind Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package bind should be removed. + + + + + + + + + The Chrony package is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package chrony should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install the cron service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package cron should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install crypto-policies package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package crypto-policies should be installed. + + + + + + + + + package_dconf_installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package dconf should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall DHCP Server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package dhcp should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install dnf-automatic Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package dnf-automatic should be installed. + + + + + + + + + package_esc_installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package esc should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install fapolicyd Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package fapolicyd should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install firewalld Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package firewalld should be installed. + + + + + + + + + package_gdm_installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package gdm should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure gnutls-utils is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package gnutls-utils should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall gssproxy Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package gssproxy should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall the inet-based telnet server + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package inetutils-telnetd should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall iprutils Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package iprutils should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall krb5-workstation Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package krb5-workstation should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install libreswan Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package libreswan should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure logrotate is Installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package logrotate should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package McAfeeTP should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall nfs-utils Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package nfs-utils should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall the nis package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package nis should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure nss-tools is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package nss-tools should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install the ntp service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package ntp should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall the ntpdate package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package ntpdate should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install the opensc Package For Multifactor Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package opensc should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install openscap-scanner Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package openscap-scanner should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install OpenSSH client software + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package openssh-clients should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install the OpenSSH Server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package openssh-server should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Remove the OpenSSH Server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package openssh-server should be removed. + + + + + + + + + package_pam_ldap_removed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package pam_ldap should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install the pcsc-lite package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package pcsc-lite should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install policycoreutils-python-utils package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package policycoreutils-python-utils should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install policycoreutils Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package policycoreutils should be installed. + + + + + + + + + The Postfix package is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package postfix should be installed. + + + + + + + + + package_prelink_removed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package prelink should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall quagga Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package quagga should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install rear Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package rear should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Install rng-tools Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package rng-tools should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall rsh-server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package rsh-server should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall rsh Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package rsh should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package rsyslog-gnutls should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure rsyslog is Installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package rsyslog should be installed. + + + + + + + + + package_samba-common_removed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package samba-common should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install scap-security-guide Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package scap-security-guide should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall Sendmail Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package sendmail should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot-plugins Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package setroubleshoot-plugins should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot-server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package setroubleshoot-server should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package setroubleshoot should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall squid Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package squid should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install sudo Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package sudo should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure syslog-ng is Installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package syslog-ng should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall talk-server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package talk-server should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall talk Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package talk should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall telnet-server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package telnet-server should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Remove telnet Clients + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package telnet should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall the ssl compliant telnet server + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package telnetd-ssl should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall the telnet server + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package telnetd should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall tftp-server Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package tftp-server should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Remove tftp Daemon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package tftp should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install the tmux Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package tmux should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall tuned Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package tuned should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Install usbguard Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package usbguard should be installed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall vsftpd Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package vsftpd should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Uninstall xinetd Package + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package xinetd should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Remove the X Windows Package Group + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package xorg-x11-server-common should be removed. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /dev/shm is configured + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /dev/shm. If /dev/shm will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /home Located On Separate Partition + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /home. If /home will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /srv Located On Separate Partition + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /srv. If /srv will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /tmp Located On Separate Partition + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /tmp. If /tmp will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var Located On Separate Partition + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /var. If /var will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var/log Located On Separate Partition + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /var/log. If /var/log will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var/log/audit Located On Separate Partition + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /var/log/audit. If /var/log/audit will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Ensure /var/tmp Located On Separate Partition + + Oracle Linux 9 + + If stored locally, create a separate partition for + /var/tmp. If /var/tmp will be mounted from another + system such as an NFS server, then creating a separate partition is not + necessary at this time, and the mountpoint can instead be configured + later. + + + + + + + + + Verify the system-wide library files in directories +"/lib", "/lib64", "/usr/lib/" and "/usr/lib64" are group-owned by root. + + Oracle Linux 9 + + This test makes sure that /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/lib/, /usr/lib64/ is group owned by 0. + + + + + + + + + + + + Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All syslog log files should have appropriate ownership. + + + + + + + + + Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All syslog log files should have appropriate ownership. + + + + + + + + + Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions + + Oracle Linux 9 + + All syslog log files should have appropriate ownership. + + + + + + + + + Configure the deny_execmem SELinux Boolean + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux 'deny_execmem' boolean should be set in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux 'polyinstantiation_enabled' boolean should be set in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux 'secure_mode_insmod' boolean should be set in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux 'selinuxuser_execheap' boolean should be set in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux 'selinuxuser_execmod' boolean should be set in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux 'selinuxuser_execstack' boolean should be set in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The SELinux 'ssh_sysadm_login' boolean should be set in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + Disable Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The abrtd service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable At Service (atd) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The atd service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable auditd Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The auditd service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the Automounter + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The autofs service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Avahi Server Software + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The avahi-daemon service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + The Chronyd service is enabled + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The chronyd service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable cron Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The cron service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable cron Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The crond service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable debug-shell SystemD Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The debug-shell service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the File Access Policy Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The fapolicyd service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify firewalld Enabled + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The firewalld service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify ip6tables Enabled if Using IPv6 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The ip6tables service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify iptables Enabled + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The iptables service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable KDump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kdump service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Network File Systems (netfs) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The netfs service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the NTP Daemon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The ntp service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the NTP Daemon + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The ntpd service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable ntpdate Service (ntpdate) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The ntpdate service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Odd Job Daemon (oddjobd) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The oddjobd service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the pcscd Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The pcscd service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Postfix Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The postfix service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Apache Qpid (qpidd) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The qpidd service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Network Router Discovery Daemon (rdisc) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The rdisc service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable rlogin Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The rlogin service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The rngd service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable rsyslog Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The rsyslog service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Squid + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The squid service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Server If Possible + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The sshd service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the OpenSSH Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The sshd service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + service_syslog_disabled + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The syslog service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable syslog-ng Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The syslog-ng service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Disable {{{ SOCKETNAME }}}.socket + + + + + + + + + Enable systemd-journald Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The systemd-journald service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable telnet Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The telnet service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Verify ufw Enabled + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The ufw service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable the USBGuard Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The usbguard service should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable xinetd Service + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The xinetd service should be disabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'PermitEmptyPasswords' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable GSSAPI Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'GSSAPIAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kerberos Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'KerberosAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'PubkeyAuthentication' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'IgnoreRhosts' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Root Login + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'PermitRootLogin' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'PermitRootLogin' is configured with value 'prohibit-password' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH TCP Forwarding + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'AllowTcpForwarding' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'IgnoreUserKnownHosts' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable X11 Forwarding + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'X11Forwarding' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'PermitUserEnvironment' is configured with value 'no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable GSSAPI Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'GSSAPIAuthentication' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable PAM + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'UsePAM' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Public Key Authentication + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'PubkeyAuthentication' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'StrictModes' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Warning Banner + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'Banner' is configured with value '/etc/issue' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Warning Banner + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'Banner' is configured with value '/etc/issue.net' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'X11Forwarding' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + sshd_includes_config_files + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check presence of Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + Enable SSH Print Last Log + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'PrintLastLog' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'ClientAliveCountMax' is configured with value '0' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set LogLevel to INFO + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'LogLevel' is configured with value 'INFO' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'LogLevel' is configured with value 'VERBOSE' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure 'X11UseLocalhost' is configured with value 'yes' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Certmap in SSSD + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check presence of \[certmap\/.+\/.+\] in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + + + + + + + + + Ensure Privileged Escalated Commands Cannot Execute Other Commands - sudo NOEXEC + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration + + + + + + + + + Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo requiretty + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration + + + + + + + + + Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo use_pty + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration + + + + + + + + + Ensure Sudo Logfile Exists - sudo logfile + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks sudoers Defaults {{ OPTION }} configuration + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'fs.protected_hardlinks' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'fs.protected_hardlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'fs.protected_hardlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'fs.protected_symlinks' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'fs.protected_symlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'fs.protected_symlinks' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'fs.suid_dumpable' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'fs.suid_dumpable' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'fs.suid_dumpable' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable storing core dumps + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.core_pattern' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable storing core dumps + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.core_pattern' parameter should be set to |/bin/false in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable storing core dumps + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.core_pattern' parameter should be set to |/bin/false in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure file name of core dumps + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.core_uses_pid' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure file name of core dumps + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.core_uses_pid' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure file name of core dumps + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.core_uses_pid' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.dmesg_restrict' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.dmesg_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.dmesg_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Image Loading + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Image Loading + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Image Loading + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.kptr_restrict' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.kptr_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.kptr_restrict' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.modules_disabled' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.modules_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.modules_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic on oops + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.panic_on_oops' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic on oops + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.panic_on_oops' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Kernel panic on oops + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.panic_on_oops' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid' parameter should be set to 2 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.perf_event_paranoid' parameter should be set to 2 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure maximum number of process identifiers + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.pid_max' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure maximum number of process identifiers + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.pid_max' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure maximum number of process identifiers + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.pid_max' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.randomize_va_space' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.randomize_va_space' parameter should be set to 2 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.randomize_va_space' parameter should be set to 2 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disallow magic SysRq key + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.sysrq' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disallow magic SysRq key + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.sysrq' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disallow magic SysRq key + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.sysrq' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'kernel.yama.ptrace_scope' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden' parameter should be set to 2 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.core.bpf_jit_harden' parameter should be set to 2 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter' parameter should be set to 1 or 2 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.ip_forward' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_forward' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_forward' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' parameter should be set to 32768 65535 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range' parameter should be set to 32768 65535 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6' parameter should be set to 1 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations' parameter should be set to the appropriate value in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Disable the use of user namespaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'user.max_user_namespaces' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Disable the use of user namespaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'user.max_user_namespaces' parameter should be set to 0 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Disable the use of user namespaces + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'user.max_user_namespaces' parameter should be set to 0 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The 'vm.mmap_min_addr' kernel parameter should be set to the appropriate value in both system configuration and system runtime. + + + + + + + + + + Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'vm.mmap_min_addr' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system runtime. + + + + + + + + + Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The kernel 'vm.mmap_min_addr' parameter should be set to 65536 in the system configuration. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable dnf-automatic Timer + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The dnf-automatic timer should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Enable logrotate Timer + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The logrotate timer should be enabled if possible. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Check pam_faillock Existence in system-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that pam_faillock.so exists in system-auth + + + + + + + + + Check pam_pwquality Existence in system-auth + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that pam_pwquality.so exists in system-auth + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run semanage + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Test if auditctl is in use for audit rules. + + + + + + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run semanage + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Test if augenrules is enabled for audit rules. + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The network environment should not be modified by anything other than + administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The network environment should not be modified by anything other than + administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be audited. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 'log_file' Not Set In /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Verify 'log_file' is not set in /etc/audit/auditd.conf. + + + + + + + + + 'log_group' Not Set To 'root' In /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Verify 'log_group' is not set to 'root' in + /etc/audit/auditd.conf. + + + + + + + + + + Verify GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY Set to true + + Oracle Linux 9 + + GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY set to 'true' in + /etc/default/grub + + + + + + + + + Specify Multiple Remote chronyd NTP Servers for Time Data + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Multiple chronyd NTP Servers for time synchronization should be specified. + + + + + + + + + GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT existance check + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT exists in /etc/default/grub. + + + + + + + + + Use $kernelopts in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Ensure that grubenv-defined kernel options are referenced in individual boot loader entries + + + + + + + + + Install McAfee Host-Based Intrusion Detection Software (HBSS) + + Oracle Linux 9 + + McAfee Host-Based Intrusion Detection Software (HBSS) software + should be installed. + + + + + + + + + + + + Anolis OS 23 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Anolis OS 23 + + + + + + + + + + CentOS 7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + CentOS 7 + + + + + + + + + + CentOS 8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + CentOS 8 + + + + + + + + + + + CentOS Stream 9 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + CentOS Stream 9 + + + + + + + + + + + Debian + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The operating system installed is a Debian System + + + + + + + + + + Installed operating system is Fedora + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + The operating system installed on the system is Fedora + + + + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Installed OS is OL + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Oracle Linux 7 + + + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Oracle Linux 8 + + + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + openSUSE + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE. + + + + + + + + + + Installed operating system is part of the Unix family + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The operating system installed on the system is part of the Unix OS family + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS release 4 + + + + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS RHEL9 Based + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + 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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The 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^[\s]*\[pam](?:[^\n\[]*\n+)+?[\s]*pam_cert_auth[\s]*=[\s]*(?i)true\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + ^\s*auth.*?pam_sss\.so(.*) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*auth.*?pam_sss\.so(.*) + 1 + + + /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + ^[\s]*\[pam](?:[^\n\[]*\n+)+?[\s]*offline_credentials_expiration[\s]*=[\s]*1\s*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf + ^[ \t]*AuditBackend=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + ^/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf + + + xorg-x11-server-Xorg + + + xorg-x11-server-utils + + + xorg-x11-server-Xwayland + + + /etc/systemd/system/default.target + + + /etc/pam.d/fingerprint-auth + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + + /etc/pam.d/postlogin + + + /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + + + ^/etc/issue(\.d/.*)?$ + ^(.*)$ + 1 + + + + ^/etc/issue\.net$ + ^(.*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?banner-message-enable=true$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ + ^.*$ + ^banner-message-text=[\s]*'*(.*?)'$ + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/sudo + ^.*pam_succeed_if.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/postlogin + ^\s*session\s+required\s+pam_lastlog\.so(?:\s+[\w=]+)*\s+showfailed(\s|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/postlogin + ^\s*session\s+.*\s+pam_lastlog\.so(?:\s+[\w=]+)*\s+silent(\s|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth|/etc/pam.d/system-auth|/etc/security/faillock.conf + ^\s*(?:auth.*pam_faillock\.so.*)?dir\s*=\s*(\S+) + 1 + + + + + + + oval:ssg-var_account_password_selinux_faillock_dir_collector:var:1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + 1 + + + /etc/security/faillock.conf + ^\s*audit + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwhistory.conf$ + + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + 1 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^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ + + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + 1 + oval:ssg-state_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_not_default_value:ste:1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + + 1 + oval:ssg-state_pam_faillock_dir_parameter_not_default_value:ste:1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_faillock_dir_set_both_preauth_authfail_system_auth:var:1 + + + oval:ssg-var_faillock_dir_set_both_preauth_authfail_password_auth:var:1 + + + /etc/security/faillock.conf + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/faillock.conf$ + + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + ^password[\s]*requisite[\s]*pam_pwquality\.so + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^password[\s]*requisite[\s]*pam_pwquality\.so + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_pwquality\.so.*retry=([0-9]*).*$ + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_pwquality\.so.*retry=([0-9]*).*$ + 1 + + + /etc/security/pwquality.conf + ^[\s]*retry[\s]*=[\s]*(\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/libuser.conf + ^[\s]*crypt_style[\s]+=[\s]+(?i)sha512[\s]*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/login.defs + .*\n[^#]*(ENCRYPT_METHOD\s+\w+)\s*\n + 1 + + + oval:ssg-variable_last_encrypt_method_instance_value:var:1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + ^[\s]*password[\s]+(?:(?:required)|(?:sufficient))[\s]+pam_unix\.so[\s]+.*sha512.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^[\s]*password[\s]+(?:(?:required)|(?:sufficient))[\s]+pam_unix\.so[\s]+.*sha512.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s* + 1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS\s+(\d+)\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS\s* + 1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^\s*SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS\s+(\d+)\s*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/systemd/system.conf(\.d/.*\.conf)?$ + ^[\s]*CtrlAltDelBurstAction[\s]*=[\s]*none$ + 1 + + + /etc/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.target + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(?:.*\s)?systemd\.confirm_spawn(?:=(?:1|yes|true|on))?(?:\s.*)?"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=".*systemd\.confirm_spawn=(?:1|yes|true|on).*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service + ^ExecStart=\-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell[\s]+emergency + 1 + + + /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.target + ^Requires=.*emergency\.service + 1 + + + + /etc/systemd/system + ^emergency.service$ + + + + /etc/systemd/system + ^emergency.target$ + + + /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service + ^ExecStart=\-.*/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell[ ]+rescue + 1 + + + /usr/lib/systemd/system/runlevel1.target + ^Requires=.*rescue\.service + 1 + + + + /etc/systemd/system + ^rescue.service$ + + + + /etc/systemd/system + ^runlevel1.target$ + + + + ^/etc/bashrc$|^/etc/profile\.d/.*$ + if \[ "\$PS1" \]; then\n\s+parent=\$\(ps -o ppid= -p \$\$\)\n\s+name=\$\(ps -o comm= -p \$parent\)\n\s+case "\$name" in sshd\|login\) exec tmux ;; esac\nfi + 1 + + + /etc/tmux.conf + ^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-after-time\s+(\d+)\s*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + /etc/tmux.conf + ^\s*set\s+-g\s+lock-command\s+vlock\s*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + /etc/shells + tmux\s*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/opensc.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]+card_drivers[\s]+=[\s]+(\S+);$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/opensc.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]+force_card_driver[\s]+=[\s]+(\S+);$ + 1 + + + .* + + + oval:ssg-variable_count_of_all_uids:var:1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^([a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+?): + 1 + oval:ssg-state_default_os_user:ste:1 + + + /etc/group + ^.+:.+:(\d+):.*$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-variable_count_of_all_group_ids:var:1 + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + ^auth\s*(?:required|requisite)\s*pam_lastlog\.so[^#]*inactive=(\d+)[\s\S]*^\s*auth\s*sufficient\s*pam_unix\.so + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^auth\s*(?:required|requisite)\s*pam_lastlog\.so[^#]*inactive=(\d+)[\s\S]*^\s*auth\s*sufficient\s*pam_unix\.so + 1 + + + /etc/default/useradd + ^\s*INACTIVE\s*=\s*(\d+)\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^([^:]+):.*$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-variable_count_of_all_usernames_from_etc_passwd:var:1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^(?:.*\n)*\s*[^#]*(PASS_MAX_DAYS\s+\d+)\s*\n + 1 + + + oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_max_days_instance_value:var:1 + + + + /etc/login.defs + .*\n[^#]*(PASS_MIN_DAYS\s+\d+)\s*\n + 1 + + + oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_min_days_instance_value:var:1 + + + + /etc/login.defs + .*\n[^#]*(PASS_MIN_LEN\s+\d+)\s*\n + 1 + + + oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_min_len_instance_value:var:1 + + + /etc/shadow + ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){2}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){3}(?:[^:]*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/shadow + ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:){2}(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){3}(?:[^:]*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/shadow + ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]+:)(?:[^:]*:){2}():(?:[^:]*:){3}(?:[^:]*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/shadow + ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:)(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){4}(?:[^:]*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/shadow + ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]*:)(?:[^:]*:)(\d+):(?:[^:]*:){4}(?:[^:]*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/shadow + ^(?:[^:]*:)(?:[^\!\*:]+:)(?:[^:]*:)():(?:[^:]*:){4}(?:[^:]*)$ + 1 + + + + /etc/login.defs + .*\n[^#]*(PASS_WARN_AGE\s+\d+)\s*\n + 1 + + + oval:ssg-variable_last_pass_warn_age_instance_value:var:1 + + + .* + + + .* + oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_shadowed_has_no_password:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_shadowed_has_locked_password:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_shadowed_sha512:ste:1 + + + .* + oval:ssg-state_accounts_password_all_chage_past_has_no_password:ste:1 + + + oval:ssg-var_accounts_password_last_change_time_diff:var:1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/password-auth$ + ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:sufficient)|(?:required))\s+pam_unix\.so.*rounds=([0-9]*).*$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_password_pam_unix_rounds:var:1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/system-auth$ + ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:sufficient)|(?:required))\s+pam_unix\.so.*rounds=([0-9]*).*$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_password_pam_unix_rounds:var:1 + + + /etc/group + ^[^:]+:[^:]+:([0-9]+): + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^[^:]+:[^:]+:[0-9]+:([0-9]+): + 1 + + + ^/etc/pam.d/(system|password)-auth$ + ^[^#]*\bnullok\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/shadow + ^[^:]+::.*$ + 1 + + + + /home + ^\.netrc$ + + + /etc/passwd + ^(?!root:)[^:]*:[^:]*:0 + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^root:.+:\d+:(\d+).+ + 1 + + + /etc/securetty + ^.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/securetty + ^$ + 1 + + + .* + oval:ssg-state_no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_users_uids:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_users_ignored:ste:1 + + + + oval:ssg-filter_no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_no_passwords_or_locked_accounts:ste:1 + + + + /etc/login.defs + .*(?:^|\n)\s*(UID_MIN[\s]+[\d]+)\s*(?:$|\n) + 1 + + + + /etc/login.defs + .*(?:^|\n)\s*(SYS_UID_MIN[\s]+[\d]+)\s*(?:$|\n) + 1 + + + + /etc/login.defs + .*(?:^|\n)\s*(SYS_UID_MAX[\s]+[\d]+)\s*(?:$|\n) + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^(?!root).*:x:([\d]+):[\d]+:[^:]*:[^:]*:(?!\/usr\/sbin\/nologin|\/sbin\/nologin|\/bin\/sync|\/sbin\/shutdown|\/sbin\/halt|\/bin\/false|\/usr\/bin\/false).*$ + 1 + + + /etc/securetty + ^ttyS[0-9]+$ + 1 + + + /etc/securetty + ^vc/[0-9]+$ + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/su + ^[\s]*auth[\s]+required[\s]+pam_wheel\.so[\s]+use_uid$ + 1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^[\s]*(?i)CREATE_HOME(?-i)[\s]+yes[\s]*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^[\s]*(?i)FAIL_DELAY(?-i)[\s]+([^#\s]*) + 1 + + + /etc/security/limits.conf + ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins[\s]+(\d+)\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/security/limits.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins[\s]+(\d+)\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/security/limits.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:(?:hard)|(?:-))[\s]+maxlogins + 1 + + + /tmp/tmp-inst + + + + /etc/security/namespace.conf + ^\s*/tmp\s+/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$ + 1 + + + /var/tmp/tmp-inst + + + + /etc/security/namespace.conf + ^\s*/var/tmp\s+/var/tmp/tmp-inst/\s+level\s+root,adm$ + 1 + + + /etc/profile + ^[\s]*declare[\s]+-xr[\s]+TMOUT=([\w$]+).*$ + 1 + + + /etc/profile.d + ^.*\.sh$ + ^[\s]*declare[\s]+-xr[\s]+TMOUT=([\w$]+).*$ + 1 + + + + oval:ssg-object_etc_profile_tmout:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_etc_profiled_tmout:obj:1 + + + + oval:ssg-variable_count_of_tmout_instances:var:1 + + + .* + oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_users_uids:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_users_ignored:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 + + + + / + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_world_writable_programs:ste:1 + + + + + + 1 + + + .* + oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_users_uids:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_users_ignored:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd + + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_objects_users_ignored:ste:1 + + + + + + + oval:ssg-var_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_dirs_count_fs:var:1 + + + oval:ssg-var_accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_dirs_count:var:1 + + + /etc/passwd + + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_object_file_groupownership_home_directories_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd + + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_object_file_groupownership_home_directories_gids_users_ignored:ste:1 + + + + + + + + + + + .* + oval:ssg-state_file_permission_user_init_files_users_uids:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permission_user_init_files_users_ignored:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permission_user_init_files_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd + + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_object_file_permissions_home_directories_objects_users_ignored:ste:1 + + + + + + + .* + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_home_dirs_users_uids:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_home_dirs_users_ignored:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_home_dirs_users_nologin_shell:ste:1 + + + + + + + + PATH + + + + + oval:ssg-state_accounts_root_path_dirs_wrong_perms:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_root_path_dirs_symlink:ste:1 + + + + PATH + + + /etc/bashrc + ^[\s]*umask[\s]+([^#\s]*) + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_etc_bashrc_umask_as_number:var:1 + + + /etc/csh.cshrc + ^[\s]*(?i)UMASK(?-i)[\s]+([^#\s]*) + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_etc_csh_cshrc_umask_as_number:var:1 + + + /etc/login.defs + ^[\s]*UMASK[\s]+([^#\s]*) + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_etc_login_defs_umask_as_number:var:1 + + + ^\/etc\/profile(?:\.d\/.*\.sh|\.d\/sh\.local)?$ + ^[\s]*umask[\s]+([^#\s]*) + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_etc_profile_umask_as_number:var:1 + + + /etc/passwd + + 1 + + + /etc/passwd + ^([^:]*):[^:]*:\d{4,}:(?:[^:]*:){3}(?!\/sbin\/nologin)[^:]*$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_object_accounts_umask_interactive_users_objects_users_ignored:ste:1 + + + + ^\..* + ^[\s]*umask\s* + 1 + oval:ssg-state_accounts_umask_interactive_users_bash_history:ste:1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+task,never[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+task,never[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-e\s+2\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-e\s+2\s*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/usr/share/selinux/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue\.net[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/hosts[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/issue\.net[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/hosts[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sysconfig/network[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+\-p\s+wa\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+uid!=euid[\s]+-F[\s]+euid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+-S[\s]+execve[\s]+-C[\s]+gid!=egid[\s]+-F[\s]+egid=0[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers\.d/[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-f\s+(\d)\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-f\s+(\d)\s*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/group[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/passwd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/shadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/group[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/passwd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/shadow[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + + 1 + + + + /var/log/audit + + oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + + oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories-non_root:ste:1 + + + + + + oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 + + + + + + + + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 + + + /var/log/audit + + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit_directories:ste:1 + + + + + + oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0700:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + + oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0700:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + + oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0750:ste:1 + + + + + + oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0750:ste:1 + + + + oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 + + + /var/log/audit/audit.log + oval:ssg-state_group_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit-non_root:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit-non_root:ste:1 + + + + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 + + + + /var/log/audit + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_owner_not_root_var_log_audit:ste:1 + + + + oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0600:ste:1 + + + /var/log/audit/audit.log + oval:ssg-state_not_mode_0600:ste:1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+delete_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])delete_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+finit_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])finit_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+init_module[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])init_module([\s]+|[,]))).*(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295))\s+(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^(?!/proc(/.*|$)).*$ + oval:ssg-state_audit_rules_privileged_commands_dev_partitons:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_audit_rules_privileged_commands_nosuid_partitons:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_audit_rules_privileged_commands_noexec_partitons:ste:1 + + + + + ^\w+ + oval:ssg-state_setuid_or_setgid_set:ste:1 + + + oval:ssg-var_audit_rules_privileged_commands_priv_cmds_count:var:1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + + 1 + oval:ssg-state_unprivileged_commands:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + + 1 + oval:ssg-state_unprivileged_commands:ste:1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+adjtimex[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])adjtimex([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+(-S[\s]+clock_settime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])clock_settime([\s]+|[,]))-F[\s]+a0=(?:0x)?0[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+key=|-k[\s]+)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b64.*(-S[\s]+settimeofday[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])settimeofday([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+stime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])stime([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+arch=b32.*(-S[\s]+stime[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])stime([\s]+|[,])).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-w[\s]+\/etc\/localtime[\s]+-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-w[\s]+\/etc\/localtime[\s]+-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf + ^[ ]*active[ ]+=[ ]+yes[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*disk_error_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*disk_error_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*disk_full_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*disk_full_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*action_mail_acct[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*admin_space_left_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[\s]*admin_space_left[\s]+=[\s]+(\d+)%[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*flush[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*max_log_file[ ]+=[ ]+(\d+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*max_log_file_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*max_log_file_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*num_logs[ ]+=[ ]+(\d+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*space_left_action[ ]+=[ ]+(\S+)[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[\s]*space_left[\s]+=[\s]+(\d+)%[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ \t]*(?i)name_format(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ \t]*(?i)overflow_action(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + .* + + + /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + ^[\s]*set[\s]+superusers="(?i)\b(?!(?:root|admin|administrator)\b)(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/grub2/user.cfg + ^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$ + 1 + + + .* + + + /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + ^[\s]*set[\s]+superusers="(?i)\b(?!(?:root|admin|administrator)\b)(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/grub2/user.cfg + ^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.conf + ^[\s]*cron\.\*[\s]+/var/log/cron\s*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.d + ^.*$ + ^[\s]*cron\.\*[\s]+/var/log/cron\s*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.conf + ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.d + ^.*conf$ + ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.conf + ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.d + ^.*conf$ + ^\$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.conf + ^\$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.d + ^.*conf$ + ^\$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ + ^[^#]*auth\.\*.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ + ^[^#]*authpriv\.\*.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ + ^[^#]*daemon\.\*.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/logrotate.conf + ^\s*daily[\s#]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/logrotate.conf + ^\s*(weekly|monthly|yearly)[\s#]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/cron.daily/logrotate + ^[\s]*/usr/sbin/logrotate[\s\S]*/etc/logrotate.conf$ + 1 + + + ^\/etc\/rsyslog(\.conf|\.d\/.*\.conf)$ + ^[\s]*\$((?:Input(?:TCP|RELP)|UDP)ServerRun|ModLoad[\s]+(imtcp|imudp|imrelp)) + 1 + + + ^\/etc\/rsyslog(\.conf|\.d\/.*\.conf)$ + ^\s*(?:module|input)\((?:load|type)="(imtcp|imudp)".*$ + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.conf + ^\*\.\*[\s]+(?:@|\:omrelp\:) + 1 + + + /etc/rsyslog.d + ^.+\.conf$ + ^\*\.\*[\s]+(?:@|\:omrelp\:) + 1 + + + + ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ + ^\s*action\((?i)type(?-i)="omfwd"(.+?)\) + 0 + + + ^/etc/rsyslog\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ + ^\s*global\(DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile="(.+?)"\)\s*\n + 0 + + + /etc/resolv.conf + ^[\s]*nameserver[\s]+([0-9\.]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/nsswitch.conf + ^\s*hosts\s*:\s*.*dns.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/resolv.conf + + + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_promisc:ste:1 + + + /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + ^DefaultZone=drop$ + 1 + + + /etc/modprobe.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^\s*options\s+ipv6\s+.*disable=1.*$ + 1 + + + ^wl.*$ + + + + / + + oval:ssg-state_uid_is_not_root_and_world_writable:ste:1 + + + + / + + oval:ssg-state_world_writable_and_not_sticky:ste:1 + + + /boot + ^System\.map.*$ + + + + / + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_sgid_set:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_filepaths:ste:1 + + + + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + + + + + / + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_sgid_set:ste:1 + + + + / + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_suid_set:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_filepaths:ste:1 + + + + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + + + + + / + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_suid_set:ste:1 + + + + / + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_world_write:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_world_write_exclude_special_selinux_files:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_world_write_exclude_proc:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_unauthorized_world_write_exclude_sys:ste:1 + + + + / + .* + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_ungroupowned:ste:1 + + + /etc/group + ^[^:]+:[^:]*:([\d]+):[^:]*$ + 1 + + + .* + + + + / + .* + oval:ssg-file_permissions_unowned_userid_list_match:ste:1 + + + ^\/s?bin|^\/usr\/s?bin|^\/usr\/local\/s?bin + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_groupowner_system_commands_dirs_not_root_or_system_account:ste:1 + + + ^\/(|s)bin|^\/usr\/(|local\/)(|s)bin|^\/usr\/libexec + + oval:ssg-state_owner_binaries_not_root:ste:1 + + + ^\/(|s)bin|^\/usr\/(|local\/)(|s)bin|^\/usr\/libexec + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_owner_binaries_not_root:ste:1 + + + ^\/(|s)bin|^\/usr\/(|local\/)(|s)bin|^\/usr\/libexec + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_perms_binary_files_nogroupwrite_noworldwrite:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_perms_binary_files_symlink:ste:1 + + + ^/\w.*$ + oval:ssg-state_local_nodev:ste:1 + + + /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)ProcessSizeMax(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d + .*\.conf$ + ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)ProcessSizeMax(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)Storage(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/systemd/coredump.conf.d + .*\.conf$ + ^\s*\[Coredump\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^[ \t]*(?i)Storage(?-i)[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/security/limits.conf + ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:hard|-)[\s]+core[\s]+([\d]+) + 1 + + + /etc/security/limits.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:hard|-)[\s]+core[\s]+([\d]+) + 1 + + + /etc/security/limits.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*\*[\s]+(?:hard|-)[\s]+core + 1 + + + /proc/cpuinfo + ^flags[\s]+:.*[\s]+nx[\s]+.*$ + 1 + + + /proc/cmdline + .+noexec[0-9]*=off.+ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^[\s]*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*(selinux|enforcing)=0.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/grub2.cfg + ^.*(selinux|enforcing)=0.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/grub.d + ^.*$ + ^.*(selinux|enforcing)=0.*$ + 1 + + + + /proc + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-state_selinux_confinement_of_daemons:ste:1 + + + /etc/selinux/config + ^SELINUX=(.*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/selinux/config + ^SELINUXTYPE=([\w]*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/selinux/config + ^SELINUX=(.*)$ + 1 + + + kernel + + + /proc/cpuinfo + ^flags\s+:\s+(.*)$ + 1 + + + /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease + ^.*\.(.*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm + + + ^/etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/.* + + + oval:ssg-var_dconf_gdm_db_modified_time:var:1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local + + + ^/etc/dconf/db/local.d/.* + + + oval:ssg-var_dconf_local_db_modified_time:var:1 + + + /etc/dconf/profile/user + ^user-db:user\nsystem-db:local$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?disable-restart-buttons=true$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/login-screen\]([^\n]*\n+)+?disable-user-list=true$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$ + 1 + + + /etc/gdm/custom.conf + ^\[daemon]([^\n]*\n+)+?AutomaticLoginEnable=[Ff]alse$ + 1 + + + /etc/gdm/custom.conf + ^\s*\[xdmcp\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^\s*Enable[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + ^/etc/gdm/custom.conf + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\]([^\n]*\n+)+?automount-open=false$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\]([^\n]*\n+)+?autorun-never=true$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/Vino\]([^\n]*\n+)+?authentication-methods=\['vnc'\]$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/Vino\]([^\n]*\n+)+?require-encryption=true$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?idle-activation-enabled=true$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/desktop/session\]([^\n]*\n+)+?idle-delay=uint32[\s][0-9]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^idle-delay[\s=]*uint32[\s]([^=\s]*) + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?lock-delay=uint32[\s][0-9]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^lock-delay[\s=]*uint32[\s]([^=\s]*) + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?lock-enabled=true$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\]([^\n]*\n+)+?picture-uri=string \'\'$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/ + ^.*$ + ^\[org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys\]([^\n]*\n+)+?logout[\s]*=[\s]*''$ + 1 + + + /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/ + ^.*$ + ^/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout$ + 1 + + + /etc/named.conf + ^\s*include\s+"/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config"\s*;\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/state/current + + + /etc/crypto-policies/config + + + oval:ssg-variable_crypto_policies_config_file_timestamp:var:1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/config + ^(?!#)(\S+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/state/current + ^(?!#)(\S+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/nss.config + + + oval:ssg-var_symlink_kerberos_crypto_policy_configuration:var:1 + + + /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config + + + /etc/ipsec.conf + ^\s*include\s+/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config\s*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf + ^\s*\[\s*crypto_policy\s*\]\s*\n*\s*\.include\s*(?:=\s*)?/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config + ^\s*(?:TLS\.)?(?i)MinProtocol\s*=\s*TLSv(\S*) + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config + ^\s*(?:DTLS\.)?(?i)MinProtocol\s*=\s*DTLSv(\S*) + 1 + + + crypto-policies + + + /etc/sysconfig/sshd + ^\s*(?i)CRYPTO_POLICY\s*=.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + ^[ \t]*Match[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + ^Match final all(?:.* +)*?\s*RekeyLimit[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + ^Match final all(?:.* +)*?\s*GSSAPIAuthentication[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + ^Match final all(?:.* +)*?\s*Ciphers[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + ^Match final all(?:.* +)*?\s*PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + ^Match final all(?:.* +)*?\s*MACs[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf + ^Match final all(?:.* +)*?\s*KexAlgorithms[\s]+(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config + ^Ciphers.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config + ^(?!#).*(-oCiphers=[^\s']+).*$ + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config + ^MACs.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config + ^(?!#).*(-oMACs=\S+).+$ + 1 + + + /etc/selinux/config + ^[\s]*SELINUX[\s]*=[\s]*enforcing[\s]*$ + 1 + + + McAfeeVSEForLinux + + + MFErt + + + MFEcma + + + ^mfetpd.*$ + 0 + + + /opt/McAfee/accm/bin + accm + + + /opt/McAfee/auditengine/bin + auditmanager + + + /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf + ^\s*add_dracutmodules\+="\s*(\w*)\s*"\s*(?:#.*)?$ + 1 + + + ^/boot/loader/entries/.*.conf + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_system_crypto_policy:var:1 + + + /etc/system-fips + + + crypto.fips_enabled + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^database=file:@@{DBDIR}/([a-z.]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^@@define[\s]DBDIR[\s]+(/.*)$ + 1 + + + + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^\/usr\/sbin\/auditctl\s+([^\n]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^/usr/sbin/auditd\s+([^\n]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^/usr/sbin/ausearch\s+([^\n]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^/usr/sbin/aureport\s+([^\n]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^/usr/sbin/autrace\s+([^\n]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^/usr/sbin/rsyslogd\s+([^\n]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^/usr/sbin/augenrules\s+([^\n]+)$ + 1 + + + /etc/crontab + ^(([0-9]*[\s]*[0-9]*[\s]*\*[\s]*\*[\s]*(\*|([0-7]|mon|tue|wed|thu|fri|sat|sun)|[0-7]-[0-7]))|@(hourly|daily|weekly))[\s]*root[\s]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/cron.d + ^.*$ + ^(([0-9]*[\s]*[0-9]*[\s]*\*[\s]*\*[\s]*(\*|([0-7]|mon|tue|wed|thu|fri|sat|sun)|[0-7]-[0-7]))|@(hourly|daily|weekly))[\s]*root[\s]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*$ + 1 + + + /var/spool/cron/root + ^(([0-9]*[\s]*[0-9]*[\s]*\*[\s]*\*[\s]*(\*|([0-7]|mon|tue|wed|thu|fri|sat|sun)|[0-7]-[0-7]))|@(hourly|daily|weekly))[\s]*(root)?[\s]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/cron.(daily|weekly)$ + ^.*$ + ^[^#]*\/usr\/sbin\/aide\s+\-\-check\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/crontab + ^.*/usr/sbin/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*\|.*/bin/mail[\s]*-s[\s]*".*"[\s]*.+@.+$ + 1 + + + /var/spool/cron/root + ^.*/usr/sbin/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*\|.*/bin/mail[\s]*-s[\s]*".*"[\s]*.+@.+$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/cron.(d|daily|weekly|monthly)$ + ^.*$ + ^.*/usr/sbin/aide[\s]*\-\-check.*\|.*/bin/mail[\s]*-s[\s]*".*"[\s]*.+@.+$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^(?!ALLXTRAHASHES)[A-Z][a-zA-Z_]*[\s]*=[\s]*([a-zA-Z0-9\+]*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/aide.conf + ^(?!ALLXTRAHASHES)[A-Z][a-zA-Z_]*[\s]*=[\s]*([a-zA-Z0-9\+]*)$ + 1 + + + + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + ^/(bin|sbin|lib|lib64|usr)/.+$ + oval:ssg-state_files_fail_md5_hash:ste:1 + + + + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + oval:ssg-state_files_fail_user_ownership:ste:1 + + + + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + oval:ssg-state_files_fail_group_ownership:ste:1 + + + + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + .* + oval:ssg-state_files_fail_mode:ste:1 + + + /etc/sudoers + ^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sudoers.d + ^.*$ + ^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sudoers + ^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sudoers.d + ^.*$ + ^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ + 1 + + + ^\/etc\/(sudoers|sudoers\.d\/.*)$ + ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]+timestamp_timeout[\s]*=\s*[+]?(\d*\.\d+|\d+\.\d*|\d+)$ + 1 + + + ^\/etc\/(sudoers|sudoers\.d\/.*)$ + ^[\s]*Defaults[\s]+timestamp_timeout[\s]*=\s*[\-](\d*\.\d+|\d+\.\d*|\d+)$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\)\s+ALL\s*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\:ALL\)\s+ALL\s* + 1 + + + /etc/sudoers + ^(?!(#|vdsm.*)).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sudoers.d + ^.*$ + ^(?!(#|vdsm.*)).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+(?:[ \t]+[^,\s]+)+[ \t]*,)*(\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+[ \t]*(?:,|$)) + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,!\n][^,\n]+,)*\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()(!\S+).* + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*\([\w\s]*\b(root|ALL)\b[\w\s]*\) + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*[^\(\s] + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^Defaults !targetpw$\r?\n + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^Defaults !rootpw$\r?\n + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^Defaults !runaspw$\r?\n + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^Defaults targetpw$\r?\n + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^Defaults rootpw$\r?\n + 1 + + + ^/etc/sudoers(\.d/.*)?$ + ^Defaults runaspw$\r?\n + 1 + + + /etc/yum.conf + ^\s*clean_requirements_on_remove\s*=\s*(1|True|yes)\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/dnf/automatic.conf + ^\s*\[commands\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^\s*apply_updates[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + ^/etc/dnf/automatic.conf + + + /etc/dnf/automatic.conf + ^\s*\[commands\].*(?:\n\s*[^[\s].*)*\n^\s*upgrade_type[ \t]*=[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + ^/etc/dnf/automatic.conf + + + /etc/yum.conf + ^\s*gpgcheck\s*=\s*1\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/yum.conf + ^\s*localpkg_gpgcheck\s*=\s*(1|True|yes)\s*$ + 1 + + + /etc/yum.repos.d + .* + ^\s*gpgcheck\s*=\s*0\s*$ + 1 + + + gpg-pubkey + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bdcredit\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*dcredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bdictcheck\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*dictcheck[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bdifok\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*difok[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/security/pwquality.conf + ^[\s]*enforce_for_root[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\blcredit\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*lcredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bmaxclassrepeat\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*maxclassrepeat[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bmaxrepeat\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*maxrepeat[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bminclass\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*minclass[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bminlen\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*minlen[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bocredit\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*ocredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password.*pam_pwquality\.so.*\bucredit\b + 1 + + + ^/etc/security/pwquality\.conf$ + ^\s*ucredit[\s]*=[\s]*(-?\d+)(?:[\s]|$) + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + + /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules + ^.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + 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^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/reboot(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/reboot(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/shutdown(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/shutdown(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + 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^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+umount2[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])umount2([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chacl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chacl(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chcon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chcon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/restorecon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/restorecon(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/semanage(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/semanage(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + 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^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/setsebool(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/setsebool(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/seunshare(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/sbin\/seunshare(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rmdir[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rmdir([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+\/var\/log\/faillock[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+\/var\/log\/faillock[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+\/var\/log\/lastlog[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+\/var\/log\/lastlog[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^\-w[\s]+\/var\/log\/tallylog[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^\-w[\s]+\/var\/log\/tallylog[\s]+\-p[\s]+\b([rx]*w[rx]*a[rx]*|[rx]*a[rx]*w[rx]*)\b.*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+mount[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])mount([\s]+|[,])))(?:.*-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:.*-F\s+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset)[\s]+).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/at(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/at(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+-F[\s]+path=\/usr\/bin\/chage(?:[\s]+-F[\s]+perm=x)[\s]+-F[\s]+auid>=1000[\s]+-F[\s]+auid!=(?:4294967295|unset|-1)[\s]+(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + 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oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.allow + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_cron_allow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_cron_allow_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.d + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_cron_d_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_cron_d_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.daily + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_cron_daily_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_cron_daily_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.hourly + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_cron_hourly_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_cron_hourly_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.monthly + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_cron_monthly_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_cron_monthly_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.weekly + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_cron_weekly_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_cron_weekly_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/crontab + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_crontab_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_crontab_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /boot/grub2/user.cfg + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/group + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_etc_group_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_etc_group_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/gshadow + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_etc_gshadow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_etc_gshadow_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_etc_passwd_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_etc_passwd_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/shadow + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_etc_shadow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_etc_shadow_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_grub2_cfg_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_grub2_cfg_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/ssh/sshd_config + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_sshd_config_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_sshd_config_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /boot/grub2/user.cfg + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_user_cfg_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_user_cfg_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /var/log + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_var_log_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_var_log_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /var/log/messages + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_var_log_messages_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_var_log_messages_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /var/log/syslog + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupowner_var_log_syslog_uid_4:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupowner_var_log_syslog_gid_4_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit + ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownership_audit_configuration_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupownership_audit_configuration_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit/rules.d + ^.*\.rules$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownership_audit_configuration_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupownership_audit_configuration_gid_0_1:ste:1 + + + /etc/ssh + ^.*_key$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownership_sshd_private_key_uid_ssh_keys:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupownership_sshd_private_key_gid_ssh_keys_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/group + ^ssh_keys:\w+:(\w+):.* + 1 + + + /etc/ssh + ^.*\.pub$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key_gid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/group- + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_backup_etc_group_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_backup_etc_group_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/gshadow- + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd- + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_backup_etc_passwd_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_backup_etc_passwd_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/shadow- + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_backup_etc_shadow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_backup_etc_shadow_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.allow + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_cron_allow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_cron_allow_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.d + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_cron_d_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_cron_d_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.daily + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_cron_daily_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_cron_daily_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.hourly + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_cron_hourly_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_cron_hourly_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.monthly + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_cron_monthly_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_cron_monthly_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.weekly + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_cron_weekly_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_cron_weekly_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/crontab + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_crontab_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_crontab_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/group + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_etc_group_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_etc_group_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/gshadow + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_etc_gshadow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_etc_gshadow_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_etc_passwd_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_etc_passwd_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/shadow + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_etc_shadow_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_etc_shadow_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_grub2_cfg_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_grub2_cfg_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/ssh/sshd_config + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_sshd_config_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_sshd_config_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /boot/grub2/user.cfg + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_user_cfg_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_user_cfg_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /var/log + + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_var_log_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_var_log_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /var/log/messages + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_var_log_messages_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_var_log_messages_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /var/log/syslog + oval:ssg-symlink_file_owner_var_log_syslog_uid_104:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_owner_var_log_syslog_uid_104_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit + ^audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_audit_configuration_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_audit_configuration_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit/rules.d + ^.*\.rules$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_audit_configuration_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_audit_configuration_uid_0_1:ste:1 + + + + /lib + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + + /lib64 + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0_1:ste:1 + + + + /usr/lib + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0_2:ste:1 + + + + /usr/lib64 + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_library_dirs_uid_0_3:ste:1 + + + /etc/ssh + ^.*_key$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_sshd_private_key_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_sshd_private_key_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/ssh + ^.*\.pub$ + oval:ssg-symlink_file_ownership_sshd_pub_key_uid_0:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_ownership_sshd_pub_key_uid_0_0:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit + .*audit\(\.rules\|d\.conf\)$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__audit_configuration:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_audit_configuration_0_mode_0640or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit/rules.d + .*\.rules$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__audit_configuration:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_audit_configuration_1_mode_0640or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/group- + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__backup_etc_group:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_backup_etc_group_0_mode_0644or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/gshadow- + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__backup_etc_gshadow:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_backup_etc_gshadow_0_mode_0000or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd- + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__backup_etc_passwd:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_backup_etc_passwd_0_mode_0644or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/shadow- + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__backup_etc_shadow:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_backup_etc_shadow_0_mode_0000or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.allow + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__cron_allow:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_cron_allow_0_mode_0640or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.d + + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__cron_d:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_cron_d_0_mode_0700or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.daily + + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__cron_daily:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_cron_daily_0_mode_0700or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.hourly + + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__cron_hourly:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_cron_hourly_0_mode_0700or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.monthly + + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__cron_monthly:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_cron_monthly_0_mode_0700or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/cron.weekly + + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__cron_weekly:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_cron_weekly_0_mode_0700or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/crontab + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__crontab:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_crontab_0_mode_0600or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__etc_audit_auditd:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_etc_audit_auditd_0_mode_0640or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/audit/rules.d + ^.*rules$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__etc_audit_rulesd:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_etc_audit_rulesd_0_mode_0640or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/group + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__etc_group:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_etc_group_0_mode_0644or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/gshadow + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__etc_gshadow:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_etc_gshadow_0_mode_0000or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/passwd + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__etc_passwd:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_etc_passwd_0_mode_0644or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/shadow + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__etc_shadow:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_etc_shadow_0_mode_0000or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + + /lib + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__library_dirs:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_library_dirs_0_mode_7755or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + + /lib64 + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__library_dirs:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_library_dirs_1_mode_7755or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + + /usr/lib + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__library_dirs:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_library_dirs_2_mode_7755or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + + /usr/lib64 + ^.*$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__library_dirs:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_library_dirs_3_mode_7755or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/ssh/sshd_config + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__sshd_config:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_sshd_config_0_mode_0600or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/ssh + ^.*\.pub$ + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__sshd_pub_key:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_sshd_pub_key_0_mode_0644or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /var/log + + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__var_log:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_var_log_0_mode_0755or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /var/log/messages + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__var_log_messages:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_var_log_messages_0_mode_0640or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /var/log/syslog + oval:ssg-exclude_symlinks__var_log_syslog:ste:1 + oval:ssg-state_file_permissions_var_log_syslog_0_mode_0640or_stricter_:ste:1 + + + /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + ^[ \t]*FirewallBackend=(.+?)[ \t]*(?:$|#) + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_audit_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_audit_backlog_limit_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_enable_iommu_force:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_init_on_alloc_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_l1tf_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_mce_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(?!.*\bnosmap\b.*).*"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(?!.*\bnosmap\b).*"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_nosmap_argument_absent:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(?!.*\bnosmep\b.*).*"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(?!.*\bnosmep\b).*"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_nosmep_argument_absent:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_page_alloc_shuffle_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_page_poison_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_pti_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_rng_core_default_quality_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_slab_nomerge_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_slub_debug_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_spec_store_bypass_disable_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_spectre_v2_argument:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(?!.*\bsystemd.debug-shell\b.*).*"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(?!.*\bsystemd.debug-shell\b).*"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent:ste:1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="(.*)"$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options (.*)$ + 1 + oval:ssg-state_grub2_rescue_entry_for_grub2_vsyscall_argument:ste:1 + + + openssl-pkcs11 + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_acpi_custom_method_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_binfmt_misc_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_BUG="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_bug_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_compat_brk_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_compat_vdso_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_credentials_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_DEBUG_FS="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_fs_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_list_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_notifiers_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_DEBUG_SG="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_debug_sg_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_default_mmap_min_addr_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + ^CONFIG_DEVKMEM="?(.*?)"?$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-local_var_config_devkmem_count_kernels_installed:var:1 + + + /boot + ^config-.*$ + + + ^/boot/config-.*$ + 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oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.dmesg_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.kexec_load_disabled + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kexec_load_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.kptr_restrict + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.kptr_restrict[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.modules_disabled + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.modules_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.panic_on_oops + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.panic_on_oops[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.perf_event_paranoid + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.perf_event_paranoid[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.pid_max + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_pid_max:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.pid_max[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.randomize_va_space + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.randomize_va_space[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.sysrq + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_sysrq:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.sysrq[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + kernel.yama.ptrace_scope + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*kernel.yama.ptrace_scope[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.core.bpf_jit_harden + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.core.bpf_jit_harden[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.ip_forward + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + user.max_user_namespaces + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*user.max_user_namespaces[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + vm.mmap_min_addr + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctls_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_usr_local_sysctls_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_sysctl_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_etc_sysctld_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 + + + + + oval:ssg-object_static_usr_local_lib_sysctld_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 + oval:ssg-object_static_run_sysctld_sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr:obj:1 + + + + /etc/sysctl.conf + ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /run/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/sysctl.d + ^.*\.conf$ + ^[\s]*vm.mmap_min_addr[\s]*=[\s]*(.*)[\s]*$ + 1 + + + multi-user.target + + + dnf-automatic\.timer + ActiveState + + + multi-user.target + + + logrotate\.timer + ActiveState + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_faillock\.so.*$ + 1 + + + + ^\s*password\s+(?:(?:required)|(?:requisite))\s+pam_pwquality\.so.*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service + ^ExecStartPost=\-\/sbin\/auditctl.*$ + 1 + + + /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service + ^(ExecStartPost=\-\/sbin\/augenrules.*$|Requires=augenrules.service) + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+setdomainname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])setdomainname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/audit/rules\.d/.*\.rules$ + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/audit.rules + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:.*-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+sethostname[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])sethostname([\s]+|[,]))).*(-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^(log_file\s*=\s*.*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=[ ]+root[ ]*$ + 1 + + + /etc/audit/auditd.conf + ^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=.*$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=(.*)$ + 1 + + + ^/etc/chrony\.(conf|d/.+\.conf)$ + ^([\s]*server[\s]+.+$){2,}$ + 1 + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=.*$ + 1 + + + /boot/loader/entries/ + ^.*\.conf$ + ^options(?:\s+.*)?\s+\$kernelopts\b.*$ + 1 + + + anolis-release + + + centos-release + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID="(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID="(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/debian_version + + + fedora-release.* + + + /etc/system-release-cpe + ^cpe:\/o:fedoraproject:fedora:[\d]+$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ + 1 + + + oraclelinux-release + + + oraclelinux-release + + + oraclelinux-release + + + openSUSE-release + + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID="(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID="(\d)\.\d+"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^RHEL_VERSION="(\d).*"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ + 1 + + + + redhat-release-client + + + redhat-release-workstation + + + redhat-release-server + + + redhat-release-computenode + + + /etc/redhat-release + ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ + 1 + + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + /etc/redhat-release + ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ + 1 + + + + redhat-release + + + /etc/redhat-release + ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ + 1 + + + redhat-release-virtualization-host + + + sl-release + + + + sled-release + + + sles-release + + + SLES_SAP-release + + + + sled-release + + + sles-release + + + SLES_SAP-release + + + SUSE-Manager-Server-release + + + SLE_HPC-release + + + /etc/lsb-release + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu$ + 1 + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=xenial$ + 1 + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=bionic$ + 1 + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal$ + 1 + + + s390utils-base + + + + container + + + /etc/fstab + + 1 + + + + + + oval:ssg-sshd_required:var:1 + + + oval:ssg-sshd_required:var:1 + + + oval:ssg-sshd_required:var:1 + + + openssh-server + + + + + + + + + /etc/tmux.conf + + + ^/etc/usbguard/(rules|rules\.d/.*)\.conf$ + ^.*\S+.*$ + 1 + + + oval:ssg-var_accounts_user_umask_umask_as_number:var:1 + + + oval:ssg-var_removable_partition:var:1 + + + oval:ssg-var_umask_for_daemons_umask_as_number:var:1 + + + + + 0 + + + + + + (?i)root + + + + + + ^permit_mynetworks[ \t]*[, \t][ \t]*reject$ + + + ^.*,sec=krb5\:krb5i\:krb5p.*$ + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + + + + maxpoll \d+ + + + + + + symbolic link + + + /etc/ssh + .*_key$ + 0 + 0 + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + /etc/ssh + .*_key$ + + 0 + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + + + + 0 + + + + + + 0 + + + 10 + + + 30 + + + 100 + + + + + + + + + ^.*(try_cert_auth|require_cert_auth).*$ + + + ^.*allow_missing_name.*$ + + + ^LinuxAudit$ + + + /etc/systemd/system/default.target + ^(/usr)?/lib/systemd/system/multi-user.target$ + + + /etc/pam.d/fingerprint-auth + /etc/authselect/fingerprint-auth + + + /etc/pam.d/password-auth + /etc/authselect/password-auth + + + /etc/pam.d/postlogin + /etc/authselect/postlogin + + + /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth + /etc/authselect/smartcard-auth + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + /etc/authselect/system-auth + + + + + + + + + + + + faillog_t + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + /var/run/faillock + + + 2 + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + + + + 5000 + + + /etc/systemd/system/ctrl-alt-del.target + /dev/null + + + 0 + + + 900 + + + + + + + + + + + + ^root$ + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + + + + 0 + + + + + + -1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ^[x*]$ + + + ^(!|!!|!\*|\*|!locked)$ + + + ^(!\$6\$|!!\$6\$).*$ + + + SHA-512 + + + .* + + + ^(!|!!|!\*|\*|!locked)$ + + + 86400000 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + 1000 + + + ^(root|halt|sync|shutdown|nfsnobody)$ + + + ^(!|!!|!\*|\*|!locked).*$ + + + 0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + directory + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + directory + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + 1 + + + + + + 1000 + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + ^/sbin/nologin$ + + + regular + true + + + 1000 + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + ^/sbin/nologin$ + + + ^\/[^\/\n]*\/[^\/\n]{1,}.*$ + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + + + + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + 1000 + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + ^/sbin/nologin$ + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + directory + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + 1000 + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + ^/sbin/nologin$ + + + directory + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + true + true + + + symbolic link + + + ^[:\.] + + + :: + + + \.\. + + + [:\.]$ + + + ^[^/] + + + [^\\]:[^/] + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(nobody|nfsnobody)$ + + + ^\.bash_history + + + + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + + + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + + + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + + + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + true + + + ^/dev/.*$ + + + nosuid + + + noexec + + + true + true + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + SYSLOG + + + SINGLE + + + HALT + + + + + + SYSLOG + + + SINGLE + + + HALT + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + rotate + + + single + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(?i)hostname(?-i)$ + + + ^(?i)(syslog|single|halt)(?-i)$ + + + + + + + + + (?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)protocol(?-i)="tcp")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)Target(?-i)="[^"]+?")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)port(?-i)="6514")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriver(?-i)="gtls")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriverMode(?-i)="1")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriverAuthMode(?-i)="x509/name")(?=[\S\s]*\s(?i)StreamDriver\.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose(?-i)="on") + + + 0 + + + PROMISC + + + UP + + + 0 + true + + + false + true + + + 0 + + + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + true + + + + + + true + + + + + + regular + true + + + ^/selinux/(?:(?:member)|(?:user)|(?:relabel)|(?:create)|(?:access)|(?:context))$ + + + ^/proc/.*$ + + + ^/sys/.*$ + + + + + + + + + 1000 + + + 0 + + + true + true + + + symbolic link + + + ^/dev/.*$ + nodev + + + ^(?i)0(?-i)$ + + + ^(?i)0(?-i)$ + + + ^(?i)none(?-i)$ + + + ^(?i)none(?-i)$ + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + unconfined_service_t + + + ^(enforcing|permissive)$ + + + + + + + + + x86_64 + + + \blm\b + + + ^(x86_64|aarch64|ppc64le|s390x)$ + + + + + + + + + ^false$ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config + + + 1.2 + + + + + + + + + 0:20210617-1 + + + ^final all$ + + + ^512M 1h$ + + + ^no$ + + + ^aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes128-cbc$ + + + ^ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256$ + + + ^hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256$ + + + ^ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1$ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + fips + + + ^(?:.*\s)?fips=1(?:\s.*)?$ + + + ^FIPS(:OSPP)?$ + + + 1 + + + ^p\+i\+n\+u\+g\+s\+b\+acl(|\+selinux)\+xattrs\+sha512$ + + + ^.*acl.*$ + + + ^.*xattrs.*$ + + + fail + false + false + + + fail + + + fail + + + fail + + + ^yes$ + + + ^security$ + + + 629e59ec + 8d8b756f + + + 629ec292 + 8b4efbe6 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access + + + + ## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access + + + + ## First rule - delete all +-D + +## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. +## Make this bigger for busy systems +-b 8192 + +## This determine how long to wait in burst of events +--backlog_wait_time 60000 + +## Set failure mode to syslog +-f 1 + + + + + ## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + + + + ## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + + + + ## Unsuccessful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + + + + ## Successful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete + + + + ## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. +--loginuid-immutable + + + + + ## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + + + + ## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + + + + ## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring +## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload + + + + ## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating +## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having +## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: +## +## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules +## +## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ + + +## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and +## shadow for writes +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + +## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and +## gshadow for writes +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify + + +## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid +## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because +## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + +## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes + +## Audit log access +-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail +## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information +-a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session + +## Attempts to modify MAC controls +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy + +## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. + +## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd + +## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules + +## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement +## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to +## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by +## that daemon. + + + + + ## Unsuccessful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change + + + + ## Successful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change + + + + ## Unsuccessful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change + + + + ## Successful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change + + + + ^(?i)50(?-i)$ + + + ^(?i)yes(?-i)$ + + + ^(?i)ENRICHED(?-i)$ + + + ^(?i)yes(?-i)$ + + + ^'lock-screen'$ + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + symbolic link + + + false + false + + + false + false + + + false + false + + + false + false + + + symbolic link + + + ^no$ + + + ^no$ + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 4 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 104 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + 0 + + + symbolic link + + + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + false + + + symbolic link 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+ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+open_by_handle_at[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])open_by_handle_at([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+open_by_handle_at[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])open_by_handle_at([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+openat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])openat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+openat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])openat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+rename[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])rename([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+renameat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])renameat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+truncate[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])truncate([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+truncate[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])truncate([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlink[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlink([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b32[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + ^[\s]*-a[\s]+always,exit[\s]+(?:-F[\s]+arch=b64[\s]+)(?:.*(-S[\s]+unlinkat[\s]+|([\s]+|[,])unlinkat([\s]+|[,])))(?:(?!-F[\s]+a\d&).)* + + + [\s]+(?:-F\s+auid>=1000[\s]+)(?:-F\s+auid!=(unset|4294967295)[\s]+)(?:-k[\s]+|-F[\s]+key=)[\S]+[\s]*$ + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EACCES) + + + + + + + (?:-F\s+exit=-EPERM) + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(?:.*\s)?l1tf= + + (?:\s.*)?$ + + + + + + ^(?:.*\s)?rng_core.default_quality= + + (?:\s.*)?$ + + + + + + ^(?:.*\s)?slub_debug= + + (?:\s.*)?$ + + + + + + ^(?:.*\s)?spec_store_bypass_disable= + + (?:\s.*)?$ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + /etc/modprobe.d + /etc/modules-load.d + /run/modprobe.d + /run/modules-load.d + /usr/lib/modprobe.d + /usr/lib/modules-load.d + + + + ^(?:(?!nobody).*)?:.*?:[1-9]\d{3,}:.*?:.*?:( + + ).*?:.* + + + + + + + + ^(?:(?!nobody).*)?:.*?:[1-9]\d{3,}:.*?:.*?:( + + ).*?:.* + + + + + + + + ^(?:(?!nobody).*)?:.*?:[1-9]\d{3,}:.*?:.*?:( + + ).*?:.* + + + + + + + + ^(?:(?!nobody).*)?:.*?:[1-9]\d{3,}:.*?:.*?:( + + ).*?:.* + + + + + + + /dev/cdrom + /dev/dvd + /dev/scd0 + /dev/sr0 + + + + ^[\s]* + + [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ + + + + + ^[\s]* + + [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ + + + + + /dev/cdrom + /dev/dvd + /dev/scd0 + /dev/sr0 + + + + ^[\s]* + + [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ + + + + + ^[\s]* + + [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ + + + + /dev/cdrom + /dev/dvd + /dev/scd0 + /dev/sr0 + + + + ^[\s]* + + [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ + + + + + ^[\s]* + + [\s]+[/\w]+[\s]+[\w]+[\s]+([^\s]+)(?:[\s]+[\d]+){2}$ + + + + + + + + + + + ^/etc/rsyslog.conf$ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ^/etc/rsyslog.conf$ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ^/etc/rsyslog.conf$ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + ^(/etc/ssh/(?!/))? + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + + + + + + + /dev/cdrom + /dev/dvd + /dev/scd0 + /dev/sr0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 64 + + + + 8 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 64 + + + + 8 + + + + + + + + + + + + build_shorthand.py from SCAP Security Guide + ssg: 0.1.69 + 2.0 + 2023-09-14T00:00:00 + + + + Disable Avahi Server Software + + ocil:ssg-service_avahi-daemon_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (abrtd) + + ocil:ssg-service_abrtd_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable KDump Kernel Crash Analyzer (kdump) + + ocil:ssg-service_kdump_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable ntpdate Service (ntpdate) + + ocil:ssg-service_ntpdate_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Odd Job Daemon (oddjobd) + + ocil:ssg-service_oddjobd_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Apache Qpid (qpidd) + + ocil:ssg-service_qpidd_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Network Router Discovery Daemon (rdisc) + + ocil:ssg-service_rdisc_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_allow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns /etc/cron.allow file + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_allow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/cron.allow file + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_allow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.d + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_d_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.daily + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_daily_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.hourly + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_hourly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.monthly + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_monthly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns cron.weekly + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_cron_weekly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Crontab + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_crontab_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Owner on cron.d + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_d_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Owner on cron.daily + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_daily_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Owner on cron.hourly + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_hourly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Owner on cron.monthly + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_monthly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Owner on cron.weekly + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_cron_weekly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Owner on crontab + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_crontab_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.d + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_d_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.daily + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_daily_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.hourly + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_hourly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.monthly + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_monthly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on cron.weekly + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_cron_weekly_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on crontab + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_crontab_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install the cron service + + ocil:ssg-package_cron_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable At Service (atd) + + ocil:ssg-service_atd_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable cron Service + + ocil:ssg-service_cron_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable cron Service + + ocil:ssg-service_crond_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall DHCP Server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_dhcp_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall bind Package + + ocil:ssg-package_bind_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Fapolicy Module to Employ a Deny-all, Permit-by-exception Policy to Allow the Execution of Authorized Software Programs. + + ocil:ssg-fapolicy_default_deny_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install fapolicyd Package + + ocil:ssg-package_fapolicyd_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the File Access Policy Service + + ocil:ssg-service_fapolicyd_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall vsftpd Package + + ocil:ssg-package_vsftpd_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail For The Root Account + + ocil:ssg-postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail From Postmaster to The Root Account + + ocil:ssg-postfix_client_configure_mail_alias_postmaster_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure System to Forward All Mail through a specific host + + ocil:ssg-postfix_client_configure_relayhost_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Postfix Network Listening + + ocil:ssg-postfix_network_listening_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Prevent Unrestricted Mail Relaying + + ocil:ssg-postfix_prevent_unrestricted_relay_action:testaction:1 + + + + The Postfix package is installed + + ocil:ssg-package_postfix_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall Sendmail Package + + ocil:ssg-package_sendmail_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Postfix Service + + ocil:ssg-service_postfix_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with Kerberos Security + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_krb_sec_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with nodev + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_nodev_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with noexec + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_noexec_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 + + + + Mount Remote Filesystems with nosuid + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_nosuid_remote_filesystems_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All-Squashing Disabled On All Exports + + ocil:ssg-no_all_squash_exports_action:testaction:1 + + + + Use Kerberos Security on All Exports + + ocil:ssg-use_kerberos_security_all_exports_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall nfs-utils Package + + ocil:ssg-package_nfs-utils_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable chrony daemon from acting as server + + ocil:ssg-chronyd_client_only_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable network management of chrony daemon + + ocil:ssg-chronyd_no_chronyc_network_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Time Service Maxpoll Interval + + ocil:ssg-chronyd_or_ntpd_set_maxpoll_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Chrony is only configured with the server directive + + ocil:ssg-chronyd_server_directive_action:testaction:1 + + + + A remote time server for Chrony is configured + + ocil:ssg-chronyd_specify_remote_server_action:testaction:1 + + + + Specify a Remote NTP Server + + ocil:ssg-ntpd_specify_remote_server_action:testaction:1 + + + + The Chrony package is installed + + ocil:ssg-package_chrony_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install the ntp service + + ocil:ssg-package_ntp_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + The Chronyd service is enabled + + ocil:ssg-service_chronyd_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the NTP Daemon + + ocil:ssg-service_ntp_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the NTP Daemon + + ocil:ssg-service_ntpd_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall xinetd Package + + ocil:ssg-package_xinetd_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable xinetd Service + + ocil:ssg-service_xinetd_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove Host-Based Authentication Files + + ocil:ssg-no_host_based_files_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove Rsh Trust Files + + ocil:ssg-no_rsh_trust_files_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove User Host-Based Authentication Files + + ocil:ssg-no_user_host_based_files_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall rsh-server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_rsh-server_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall rsh Package + + ocil:ssg-package_rsh_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable rlogin Service + + ocil:ssg-service_rlogin_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall talk-server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_talk-server_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall talk Package + + ocil:ssg-package_talk_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall telnet-server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_telnet-server_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove telnet Clients + + ocil:ssg-package_telnet_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable telnet Service + + ocil:ssg-service_telnet_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall tftp-server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_tftp-server_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove tftp Daemon + + ocil:ssg-package_tftp_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure tftp Daemon Uses Secure Mode + + ocil:ssg-tftpd_uses_secure_mode_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall squid Package + + ocil:ssg-package_squid_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Squid + + ocil:ssg-service_squid_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the Hardware RNG Entropy Gatherer Service + + ocil:ssg-service_rngd_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall quagga Package + + ocil:ssg-package_quagga_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure session renegotiation for SSH client + + ocil:ssg-ssh_client_rekey_limit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify the SSH Private Key Files Have a Passcode + + ocil:ssg-ssh_keys_passphrase_protected_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Host-Based Authentication + + ocil:ssg-disable_host_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable SSH Server firewalld Firewall Exception + + ocil:ssg-firewalld_sshd_port_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Allow Only SSH Protocol 2 + + ocil:ssg-sshd_allow_only_protocol2_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Compression Or Set Compression to delayed + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_compression_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH Access via Empty Passwords + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_empty_passwords_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable GSSAPI Authentication + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_gssapi_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kerberos Authentication + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_kerb_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable PubkeyAuthentication Authentication + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_pubkey_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH Support for .rhosts Files + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_rhosts_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH Support for Rhosts RSA Authentication + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_rhosts_rsa_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH Root Login + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_root_login_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH root Login with a Password (Insecure) + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_root_password_login_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH TCP Forwarding + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_tcp_forwarding_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH Support for User Known Hosts + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_user_known_hosts_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable X11 Forwarding + + ocil:ssg-sshd_disable_x11_forwarding_action:testaction:1 + + + + Do Not Allow SSH Environment Options + + ocil:ssg-sshd_do_not_permit_user_env_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable GSSAPI Authentication + + ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_gssapi_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable PAM + + ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_pam_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Public Key Authentication + + ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_pubkey_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Use of Strict Mode Checking + + ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_strictmodes_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable SSH Warning Banner + + ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_warning_banner_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable SSH Warning Banner + + ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_warning_banner_net_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Encrypted X11 Forwarding + + ocil:ssg-sshd_enable_x11_forwarding_action:testaction:1 + + + + Limit Users' SSH Access + + ocil:ssg-sshd_limit_user_access_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable SSH Print Last Log + + ocil:ssg-sshd_print_last_log_action:testaction:1 + + + + Force frequent session key renegotiation + + ocil:ssg-sshd_rekey_limit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Interval + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_idle_timeout_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Count Max + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_keepalive_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set SSH Client Alive Count Max to zero + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_keepalive_0_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure SSH LoginGraceTime is configured + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_login_grace_time_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set LogLevel to INFO + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_loglevel_info_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set SSH Daemon LogLevel to VERBOSE + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_loglevel_verbose_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set SSH authentication attempt limit + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_max_auth_tries_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set SSH MaxSessions limit + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_max_sessions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure SSH MaxStartups is configured + + ocil:ssg-sshd_set_maxstartups_action:testaction:1 + + + + Distribute the SSH Server configuration to multiple files in a config directory. + + ocil:ssg-sshd_use_directory_configuration_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Use of Privilege Separation + + ocil:ssg-sshd_use_priv_separation_action:testaction:1 + + + + Prevent remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display + + ocil:ssg-sshd_x11_use_localhost_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns SSH Server config file + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_sshd_config_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + + ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_sshd_private_key_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + + ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_sshd_pub_key_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Owner on SSH Server config file + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_sshd_config_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Ownership on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + + ocil:ssg-file_ownership_sshd_private_key_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Ownership on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + + ocil:ssg-file_ownership_sshd_pub_key_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server config file + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_sshd_config_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server Private *_key Key Files + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_sshd_private_key_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Files + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_sshd_pub_key_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install OpenSSH client software + + ocil:ssg-package_openssh-clients_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install the OpenSSH Server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_openssh-server_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove the OpenSSH Server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_openssh-server_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SSH Server If Possible + + ocil:ssg-service_sshd_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the OpenSSH Service + + ocil:ssg-service_sshd_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Certificate status checking in SSSD + + ocil:ssg-sssd_certificate_verification_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Certmap in SSSD + + ocil:ssg-sssd_enable_certmap_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Smartcards in SSSD + + ocil:ssg-sssd_enable_smartcards_action:testaction:1 + + + + SSSD Has a Correct Trust Anchor + + ocil:ssg-sssd_has_trust_anchor_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure SSSD to Expire Offline Credentials + + ocil:ssg-sssd_offline_cred_expiration_action:testaction:1 + + + + Log USBGuard daemon audit events using Linux Audit + + ocil:ssg-configure_usbguard_auditbackend_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install usbguard Package + + ocil:ssg-package_usbguard_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the USBGuard Service + + ocil:ssg-service_usbguard_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Authorize Human Interface Devices and USB hubs in USBGuard daemon + + ocil:ssg-usbguard_allow_hid_and_hub_action:testaction:1 + + + + Generate USBGuard Policy + + ocil:ssg-usbguard_generate_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove the X Windows Package Group + + ocil:ssg-package_xorg-x11-server-common_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable graphical user interface + + ocil:ssg-xwindows_remove_packages_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable X Windows Startup By Setting Default Target + + ocil:ssg-xwindows_runlevel_target_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_banner_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set the GNOME3 Login Warning Banner Text + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_login_banner_text_action:testaction:1 + + + + Modify the System Login Banner + + ocil:ssg-banner_etc_issue_action:testaction:1 + + + + Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections + + ocil:ssg-banner_etc_issue_net_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/password-auth File. + + ocil:ssg-account_password_pam_faillock_password_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the Use of the pam_faillock.so Module in the /etc/pam.d/system-auth File. + + ocil:ssg-account_password_pam_faillock_system_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + An SELinux Context must be configured for the pam_faillock.so records directory + + ocil:ssg-account_password_selinux_faillock_dir_action:testaction:1 + + + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + + ocil:ssg-account_passwords_pam_faillock_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Account Lockouts Must Persist + + ocil:ssg-account_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_action:testaction:1 + + + + Limit Password Reuse: password-auth + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_password_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Limit Password Reuse: system-auth + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwhistory_remember_system_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Limit Password Reuse + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_unix_remember_action:testaction:1 + + + + Account Lockouts Must Be Logged + + ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify No netrc Files Exist + + ocil:ssg-no_netrc_files_action:testaction:1 + + + + Lock Accounts After Failed Password Attempts + + ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the root Account for Failed Password Attempts + + ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny_root_action:testaction:1 + + + + Lock Accounts Must Persist + + ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_dir_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts + + ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_interval_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Lockout Time for Failed Password Attempts + + ocil:ssg-accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Digit Characters + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_dcredit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Prevent the Use of Dictionary Words + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_dictcheck_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Characters + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_difok_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Enforce for root User + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_enforce_root_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Lowercase Characters + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_lcredit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters from Same Character Class + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_maxclassrepeat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Maximum Consecutive Repeating Characters + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_maxrepeat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_minclass_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_minlen_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Special Characters + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_ocredit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in password-auth + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwquality_password_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM password complexity module is enabled in system-auth + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_pwquality_system_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_retry_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Uppercase Characters + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_ucredit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.conf + + ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_libuserconf_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs + + ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth + + ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm + + ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Hashing Rounds in /etc/login.defs + + ocil:ssg-set_password_hashing_min_rounds_logindefs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disallow Configuration to Bypass Password Requirements for Privilege Escalation + + ocil:ssg-disallow_bypass_password_sudo_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure PAM Displays Last Logon/Access Notification + + ocil:ssg-display_login_attempts_action:testaction:1 + + + + Support session locking with tmux + + ocil:ssg-configure_bashrc_exec_tmux_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure tmux to lock session after inactivity + + ocil:ssg-configure_tmux_lock_after_time_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the tmux Lock Command + + ocil:ssg-configure_tmux_lock_command_action:testaction:1 + + + + Prevent user from disabling the screen lock + + ocil:ssg-no_tmux_in_shells_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install the tmux Package + + ocil:ssg-package_tmux_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure opensc Smart Card Drivers + + ocil:ssg-configure_opensc_card_drivers_action:testaction:1 + + + + Force opensc To Use Defined Smart Card Driver + + ocil:ssg-force_opensc_card_drivers_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install Smart Card Packages For Multifactor Authentication + + ocil:ssg-install_smartcard_packages_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install the opensc Package For Multifactor Authentication + + ocil:ssg-package_opensc_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install the pcsc-lite package + + ocil:ssg-package_pcsc-lite_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the pcscd Service + + ocil:ssg-service_pcscd_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Burst Action + + ocil:ssg-disable_ctrlaltdel_burstaction_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Activation + + ocil:ssg-disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabled + + ocil:ssg-grub2_disable_interactive_boot_action:testaction:1 + + + + Require Authentication for Emergency Systemd Target + + ocil:ssg-require_emergency_target_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Require Authentication for Single User Mode + + ocil:ssg-require_singleuser_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable debug-shell SystemD Service + + ocil:ssg-service_debug-shell_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity in password-auth + + ocil:ssg-account_disable_inactivity_password_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity in system-auth + + ocil:ssg-account_disable_inactivity_system_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Account Expiration Following Inactivity + + ocil:ssg-account_disable_post_pw_expiration_action:testaction:1 + + + + Assign Expiration Date to Emergency Accounts + + ocil:ssg-account_emergency_expire_date_action:testaction:1 + + + + Assign Expiration Date to Temporary Accounts + + ocil:ssg-account_temp_expire_date_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique Names + + ocil:ssg-account_unique_name_action:testaction:1 + + + + Use Centralized and Automated Authentication + + ocil:ssg-account_use_centralized_automated_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Maximum Age + + ocil:ssg-accounts_maximum_age_login_defs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Minimum Age + + ocil:ssg-accounts_minimum_age_login_defs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_minlen_login_defs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_set_max_life_existing_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Existing Passwords Minimum Age + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_set_min_life_existing_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Password Warning Age + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_all_shadowed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed with SHA512 + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_all_shadowed_sha512_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure all users last password change date is in the past + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_last_change_is_in_past_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - password-auth + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_password_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set number of Password Hashing Rounds - system-auth + + ocil:ssg-accounts_password_pam_unix_rounds_system_auth_action:testaction:1 + + + + All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group + + ocil:ssg-gid_passwd_group_same_action:testaction:1 + + + + Prevent Login to Accounts With Empty Password + + ocil:ssg-no_empty_passwords_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure There Are No Accounts With Blank or Null Passwords + + ocil:ssg-no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Only Root Has UID 0 + + ocil:ssg-accounts_no_uid_except_zero_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Root Has A Primary GID 0 + + ocil:ssg-accounts_root_gid_zero_action:testaction:1 + + + + Direct root Logins Not Allowed + + ocil:ssg-no_direct_root_logins_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked + + ocil:ssg-no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login + + ocil:ssg-no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts_action:testaction:1 + + + + Restrict Serial Port Root Logins + + ocil:ssg-restrict_serial_port_logins_action:testaction:1 + + + + Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins + + ocil:ssg-securetty_root_login_console_only_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enforce usage of pam_wheel for su authentication + + ocil:ssg-use_pam_wheel_for_su_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All Accounts on the System Have Unique User IDs + + ocil:ssg-account_unique_id_action:testaction:1 + + + + Only Authorized Local User Accounts Exist on Operating System + + ocil:ssg-accounts_authorized_local_users_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All Groups on the System Have Unique Group ID + + ocil:ssg-group_unique_id_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure that Root's Path Does Not Include World or Group-Writable Directories + + ocil:ssg-accounts_root_path_dirs_no_write_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the Default Bash Umask is Set Correctly + + ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_bashrc_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the Default C Shell Umask is Set Correctly + + ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_csh_cshrc_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in login.defs + + ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_login_defs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Interactive Session Timeout + + ocil:ssg-accounts_tmout_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly in /etc/profile + + ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_etc_profile_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the Default Umask is Set Correctly For Interactive Users + + ocil:ssg-accounts_umask_interactive_users_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Home Directories are Created for New Users + + ocil:ssg-accounts_have_homedir_login_defs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the Logon Failure Delay is Set Correctly in login.defs + + ocil:ssg-accounts_logon_fail_delay_action:testaction:1 + + + + Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per User + + ocil:ssg-accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Polyinstantiation of /tmp Directories + + ocil:ssg-accounts_polyinstantiated_tmp_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Polyinstantiation of /var/tmp Directories + + ocil:ssg-accounts_polyinstantiated_var_tmp_action:testaction:1 + + + + User Initialization Files Must Not Run World-Writable Programs + + ocil:ssg-accounts_user_dot_no_world_writable_programs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure that Users Path Contains Only Local Directories + + ocil:ssg-accounts_user_home_paths_only_action:testaction:1 + + + + All Interactive Users Must Have A Home Directory Defined + + ocil:ssg-accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_defined_action:testaction:1 + + + + All Interactive Users Home Directories Must Exist + + ocil:ssg-accounts_user_interactive_home_directory_exists_action:testaction:1 + + + + All Interactive User Home Directories Must Be Group-Owned By The Primary Group + + ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_home_directories_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All User Initialization Files Have Mode 0740 Or Less Permissive + + ocil:ssg-file_permission_user_init_files_action:testaction:1 + + + + All Interactive User Home Directories Must Have mode 0750 Or Less Permissive + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_home_directories_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure that User Home Directories are not Group-Writable or World-Readable + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_home_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable authselect + + ocil:ssg-enable_authselect_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_chown_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattr + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattr + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchown + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattr + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattr + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattr + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattr + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_umount_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - umount2 + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_dac_modification_umount2_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run chacl + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_chacl_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setfacl + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_setfacl_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run chcon + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_chcon_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run restorecon + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_restorecon_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run semanage + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_semanage_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setfiles + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_setfiles_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run setsebool + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_setsebool_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run seunshare + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_execution_seunshare_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rename + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rename_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - renameat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_renameat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - rmdir + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_rmdir_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlink + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlink_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by User - unlinkat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_file_deletion_events_unlinkat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful) + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - creat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_creat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - ftruncate + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_ftruncate_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - open_by_handle_at + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_open_by_handle_at_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - openat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_openat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - rename + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_rename_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - renameat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_renameat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Access Attempts to Files - truncate + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_truncate_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlink + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlink_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Unsuccessful Delete Attempts to Files - unlinkat + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_unsuccessful_file_modification_unlinkat_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Unloading - delete_module + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_delete_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and Unloading - finit_module + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_finit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading - init_module + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_kernel_module_loading_init_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - faillock + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_login_events_faillock_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - lastlog + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_login_events_lastlog_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events - tallylog + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_login_events_tallylog_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - init + + ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_init_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - poweroff + + ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_poweroff_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - reboot + + ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_reboot_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - shutdown + + ocil:ssg-audit_privileged_commands_shutdown_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - at + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_at_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chage + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_chage_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stime + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_stime_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - chsh + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_chsh_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - crontab + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_crontab_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - gpasswd + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_gpasswd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - kmod + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_kmod_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - mount + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_mount_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - newgrp + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_newgrp_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pam_timestamp_check + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_pam_timestamp_check_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - passwd + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postdrop + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_postdrop_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - postqueue + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_postqueue_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - pt_chown + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_pt_chown_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Any Attempts to Run ssh-agent + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_agent_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - ssh-keysign + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_ssh_keysign_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - su + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_su_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudo + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudo_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - sudoedit + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_sudoedit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - umount + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_umount_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_chkpwd + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_chkpwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - unix_update + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_unix_update_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - userhelper + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_userhelper_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usermod + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_usermod_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged Commands - usernetctl + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_privileged_commands_usernetctl_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record attempts to alter time through adjtimex + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_adjtimex_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settime + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_clock_settime_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record attempts to alter time through settimeofday + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_settimeofday_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Attempts to Alter the localtime File + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_time_watch_localtime_action:testaction:1 + + + + Make the auditd Configuration Immutable + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_immutable_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_mac_modification_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access Controls in usr/share + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_mac_modification_usr_share_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful) + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_media_export_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify the System's Network Environment + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_networkconfig_modification_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_sudoers_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions - /etc/sudoers.d/ + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_sudoers_d_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events When Privileged Executables Are Run + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_suid_privilege_function_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_sysadmin_actions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Shutdown System When Auditing Failures Occur + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_system_shutdown_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/group + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/gshadow + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/security/opasswd + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/passwd + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/shadow + + ocil:ssg-audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Record Access Events to Audit Log Directory + + ocil:ssg-directory_access_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + System Audit Directories Must Be Group Owned By Root + + ocil:ssg-directory_group_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + System Audit Directories Must Be Owned By Root + + ocil:ssg-directory_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0750 or Less Permissive + + ocil:ssg-directory_permissions_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Group Owned By Root + + ocil:ssg-file_group_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Group root + + ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_audit_configuration_action:testaction:1 + + + + Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Root + + ocil:ssg-file_ownership_audit_configuration_action:testaction:1 + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root + + ocil:ssg-file_ownership_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root + + ocil:ssg-file_ownership_var_log_audit_stig_action:testaction:1 + + + + Audit Configuration Files Permissions are 640 or More Restrictive + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_audit_configuration_action:testaction:1 + + + + System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissive + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure a Sufficiently Large Partition for Audit Logs + + ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_configure_sufficiently_large_partition_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog plugin + + ocil:ssg-auditd_audispd_syslog_plugin_activated_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_error_action_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd Disk Error Action on Disk Error + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_error_action_stig_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_full_action_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd Disk Full Action when Disk Space Is Full + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_disk_full_action_stig_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk Space + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_action_mail_acct_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk Space + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_action_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd admin_space_left on Low Disk Space + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_admin_space_left_percentage_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd flush priority + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_flush_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd Max Log File Size + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action_stig_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd Number of Logs Retained + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_num_logs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk Space + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_space_left_action_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditd space_left on Low Disk Space + + ocil:ssg-auditd_data_retention_space_left_percentage_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set number of records to cause an explicit flush to audit logs + + ocil:ssg-auditd_freq_action:testaction:1 + + + + Include Local Events in Audit Logs + + ocil:ssg-auditd_local_events_action:testaction:1 + + + + Resolve information before writing to audit logs + + ocil:ssg-auditd_log_format_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set hostname as computer node name in audit logs + + ocil:ssg-auditd_name_format_action:testaction:1 + + + + Appropriate Action Must be Setup When the Internal Audit Event Queue is Full + + ocil:ssg-auditd_overflow_action_action:testaction:1 + + + + Write Audit Logs to the Disk + + ocil:ssg-auditd_write_logs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file accesses + + ocil:ssg-audit_access_failed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of successful file accesses + + ocil:ssg-audit_access_success_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure basic parameters of Audit system + + ocil:ssg-audit_basic_configuration_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file creations + + ocil:ssg-audit_create_failed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of successful file creations + + ocil:ssg-audit_create_success_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file deletions + + ocil:ssg-audit_delete_failed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of successful file deletions + + ocil:ssg-audit_delete_success_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure immutable Audit login UIDs + + ocil:ssg-audit_immutable_login_uids_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful file modifications + + ocil:ssg-audit_modify_failed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of successful file modifications + + ocil:ssg-audit_modify_success_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of loading and unloading of kernel modules + + ocil:ssg-audit_module_load_action:testaction:1 + + + + Perform general configuration of Audit for OSPP + + ocil:ssg-audit_ospp_general_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful ownership changes + + ocil:ssg-audit_owner_change_failed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of successful ownership changes + + ocil:ssg-audit_owner_change_success_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of unsuccessful permission changes + + ocil:ssg-audit_perm_change_failed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure auditing of successful permission changes + + ocil:ssg-audit_perm_change_success_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit Daemon + + ocil:ssg-grub2_audit_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Extend Audit Backlog Limit for the Audit Daemon + + ocil:ssg-grub2_audit_backlog_limit_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install audispd-plugins Package + + ocil:ssg-package_audispd-plugins_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the default plugins for the audit dispatcher are Installed + + ocil:ssg-package_audit-audispd-plugins_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure the audit Subsystem is Installed + + ocil:ssg-package_audit_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable auditd Service + + ocil:ssg-service_auditd_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Group Ownership + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg User Ownership + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_grub2_cfg_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg User Ownership + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set the Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value + + ocil:ssg-grub2_admin_username_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Boot Loader Password in grub2 + + ocil:ssg-grub2_password_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_efi_user_cfg_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set the UEFI Boot Loader Admin Username to a Non-Default Value + + ocil:ssg-grub2_uefi_admin_username_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set the UEFI Boot Loader Password + + ocil:ssg-grub2_uefi_password_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Recovery Booting + + ocil:ssg-grub2_disable_recovery_action:testaction:1 + + + + IOMMU configuration directive + + ocil:ssg-grub2_enable_iommu_force_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure kernel to zero out memory before allocation + + ocil:ssg-grub2_init_on_alloc_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure L1 Terminal Fault mitigations + + ocil:ssg-grub2_l1tf_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Force kernel panic on uncorrected MCEs + + ocil:ssg-grub2_mce_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure SMAP is not disabled during boot + + ocil:ssg-grub2_nosmap_argument_absent_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure SMEP is not disabled during boot + + ocil:ssg-grub2_nosmep_argument_absent_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable randomization of the page allocator + + ocil:ssg-grub2_page_alloc_shuffle_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI) + + ocil:ssg-grub2_pti_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the confidence in TPM for entropy + + ocil:ssg-grub2_rng_core_default_quality_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable merging of slabs with similar size + + ocil:ssg-grub2_slab_nomerge_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Speculative Store Bypass Mitigation + + ocil:ssg-grub2_spec_store_bypass_disable_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enforce Spectre v2 mitigation + + ocil:ssg-grub2_spectre_v2_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure debug-shell service is not enabled during boot + + ocil:ssg-grub2_systemd_debug-shell_argument_absent_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable vsyscalls + + ocil:ssg-grub2_vsyscall_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Do not allow ACPI methods to be inserted/replaced at run time + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_acpi_custom_method_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable kernel support for MISC binaries + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_binfmt_misc_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable support for BUG() + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_bug_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable compatibility with brk() + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_compat_brk_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the 32-bit vDSO + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_compat_vdso_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable checks on credential management + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_credentials_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable kernel debugfs + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_fs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable checks on linked list manipulation + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_list_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable checks on notifier call chains + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_notifiers_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable checks on scatter-gather (SG) table operations + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_debug_sg_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure low address space to protect from user allocation + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_default_mmap_min_addr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable /dev/kmem virtual device support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_devkmem_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable hibernation + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_hibernation_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable IA32 emulation + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_ia32_emulation_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the IPv6 protocol + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_ipv6_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable kexec system call + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_kexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable legacy (BSD) PTY support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_legacy_ptys_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable module signature verification + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable automatic signing of all modules + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_all_action:testaction:1 + + + + Require modules to be validly signed + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_force_action:testaction:1 + + + + Specify the hash to use when signing modules + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_hash_action:testaction:1 + + + + Specify module signing key to use + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_key_action:testaction:1 + + + + Sign kernel modules with SHA-512 + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_module_sig_sha512_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable poison without sanity check + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_page_poisoning_no_sanity_action:testaction:1 + + + + Use zero for poisoning instead of debugging value + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_page_poisoning_zero_action:testaction:1 + + + + Remove the kernel mapping in user mode + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_page_table_isolation_action:testaction:1 + + + + Kernel panic oops + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_panic_on_oops_action:testaction:1 + + + + Kernel panic timeout + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_panic_timeout_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable support for /proc/kkcore + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_proc_kcore_action:testaction:1 + + + + Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR) + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_randomize_base_action:testaction:1 + + + + Randomize the kernel memory sections + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_randomize_memory_action:testaction:1 + + + + Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_retpoline_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_seccomp_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable use of Berkeley Packet Filter with seccomp + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_seccomp_filter_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable different security models + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_action:testaction:1 + + + + Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_dmesg_restrict_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable mutable hooks + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_writable_hooks_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Yama support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_security_yama_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable SLUB debugging support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_slub_debug_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable TCP/IP syncookie support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_syn_cookies_action:testaction:1 + + + + Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka KAISER) + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_unmap_kernel_at_el0_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable x86 vsyscall emulation + + ocil:ssg-kernel_config_x86_vsyscall_emulation_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure cron Is Logging To Rsyslog + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_cron_logging_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Authenticates Off-Loaded Audit Records + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdriverauthmode_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_encrypt_offload_actionsendstreamdrivermode_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Rsyslog Encrypts Off-Loaded Audit Records + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_encrypt_offload_defaultnetstreamdriver_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate Group + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_files_groupownership_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Log Files Are Owned By Appropriate User + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_files_ownership_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure System Log Files Have Correct Permissions + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_files_permissions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure remote access methods are monitored in Rsyslog + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_access_monitoring_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable systemd-journald Service + + ocil:ssg-service_systemd-journald_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Logrotate Runs Periodically + + ocil:ssg-ensure_logrotate_activated_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure logrotate is Installed + + ocil:ssg-package_logrotate_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable logrotate Timer + + ocil:ssg-timer_logrotate_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure syslog-ng is Installed + + ocil:ssg-package_syslogng_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure rsyslog Does Not Accept Remote Messages Unless Acting As Log Server + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_nolisten_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable syslog-ng Service + + ocil:ssg-service_syslogng_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Host + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_loghost_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure TLS for rsyslog remote logging + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_tls_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging + + ocil:ssg-rsyslog_remote_tls_cacert_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure rsyslog-gnutls is installed + + ocil:ssg-package_rsyslog-gnutls_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure rsyslog is Installed + + ocil:ssg-package_rsyslog_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable rsyslog Service + + ocil:ssg-service_rsyslog_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install firewalld Package + + ocil:ssg-package_firewalld_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify firewalld Enabled + + ocil:ssg-service_firewalld_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the Firewalld Ports + + ocil:ssg-configure_firewalld_ports_action:testaction:1 + + + + Firewalld Must Employ a Deny-all, Allow-by-exception Policy for Allowing Connections to Other Systems + + ocil:ssg-configured_firewalld_default_deny_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packets + + ocil:ssg-set_firewalld_default_zone_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Firewalld to Use the Nftables Backend + + ocil:ssg-firewalld-backend_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Any Configured IPSec Tunnel Connections + + ocil:ssg-libreswan_approved_tunnels_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install libreswan Package + + ocil:ssg-package_libreswan_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify ip6tables Enabled if Using IPv6 + + ocil:ssg-service_ip6tables_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify iptables Enabled + + ocil:ssg-service_iptables_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Default ip6tables Policy for Incoming Packets + + ocil:ssg-set_ip6tables_default_rule_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set configuration for IPv6 loopback traffic + + ocil:ssg-set_ipv6_loopback_traffic_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set configuration for loopback traffic + + ocil:ssg-set_loopback_traffic_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Default iptables Policy for Incoming Packets + + ocil:ssg-set_iptables_default_rule_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Default iptables Policy for Forwarded Packets + + ocil:ssg-set_iptables_default_rule_forward_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_defrtr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_pinfo_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_rtr_pref_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_autoconf_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IPv6 Forwarding + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_forwarding_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_max_addresses_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_router_solicitations_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Accepting Default Router in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_defrtr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Accepting Prefix Information in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_pinfo_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Accepting Router Preference in Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_rtr_pref_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Auto Configuration on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_autoconf_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Maximum Number of Autoconfigured Addresses on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_max_addresses_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Denying Router Solicitations on All IPv6 Interfaces By Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_router_solicitations_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable IPv6 Networking Support Automatic Loading + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_ipv6_option_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on All IPv6 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_disable_ipv6_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable IPv6 Addressing on IPv6 Interfaces by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_disable_ipv6_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Accepting Packets Routed Between Local Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_local_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure ARP filtering for All IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_filter_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Response Mode of ARP Requests for All IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_arp_ignore_action:testaction:1 + + + + Drop Gratuitious ARP frames on All IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_drop_gratuitous_arp_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_action:testaction:1 + + + + Prevent Routing External Traffic to Local Loopback on All IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_route_localnet_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_shared_media_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Sending and Accepting Shared Media Redirects by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_shared_media_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set Kernel Parameter to Increase Local Port Range + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_local_port_range_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Kernel to Rate Limit Sending of Duplicate TCP Acknowledgments + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_invalid_ratelimit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP RFC 1337 on IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_rfc1337_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify ufw Enabled + + ocil:ssg-service_ufw_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable ATM Support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_atm_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable CAN Support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_can_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable IEEE 1394 (FireWire) Support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_firewire-core_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable RDS Support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_rds_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable SCTP Support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_sctp_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable TIPC Support + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_tipc_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Bluetooth Kernel Module + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_bluetooth_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Deactivate Wireless Network Interfaces + + ocil:ssg-wireless_disable_interfaces_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Multiple DNS Servers in /etc/resolv.conf + + ocil:ssg-network_configure_name_resolution_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure System is Not Acting as a Network Sniffer + + ocil:ssg-network_sniffer_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup group File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_group_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup gshadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup passwd File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup shadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_backup_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns group File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_group_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns gshadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns passwd File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns shadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup group File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_group_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup gshadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns Backup passwd File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns Backup shadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_backup_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns group File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_group_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns gshadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns passwd File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns shadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup group File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_group_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup gshadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup passwd File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on Backup shadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_backup_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on group File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_group_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on gshadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_gshadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on passwd File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on shadow File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_shadow_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log Directory + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_var_log_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/messages File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_var_log_messages_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Group Who Owns /var/log/syslog File + + ocil:ssg-file_groupowner_var_log_syslog_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log Directory + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_var_log_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log/messages File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_var_log_messages_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify User Who Owns /var/log/syslog File + + ocil:ssg-file_owner_var_log_syslog_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log Directory + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log/messages File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_messages_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on /var/log/syslog File + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_var_log_syslog_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Group Ownership + + ocil:ssg-dir_group_ownership_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that System Executable Have Root Ownership + + ocil:ssg-dir_ownership_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Root Ownership + + ocil:ssg-dir_ownership_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that System Executable Directories Have Restrictive Permissions + + ocil:ssg-dir_permissions_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that Shared Library Directories Have Restrictive Permissions + + ocil:ssg-dir_permissions_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that system commands files are group owned by root or a system account + + ocil:ssg-file_groupownership_system_commands_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that System Executables Have Root Ownership + + ocil:ssg-file_ownership_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that Shared Library Files Have Root Ownership + + ocil:ssg-file_ownership_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that System Executables Have Restrictive Permissions + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_binary_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that Shared Library Files Have Restrictive Permissions + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_library_dirs_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify the system-wide library files in directories +"/lib", "/lib64", "/usr/lib/" and "/usr/lib64" are group-owned by root. + + ocil:ssg-root_permissions_syslibrary_files_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All World-Writable Directories Are Owned by root User + + ocil:ssg-dir_perms_world_writable_root_owned_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that All World-Writable Directories Have Sticky Bits Set + + ocil:ssg-dir_perms_world_writable_sticky_bits_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_audit_auditd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify Permissions on /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_etc_audit_rulesd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify that local System.map file (if exists) is readable only by root + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_systemmap_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All SGID Executables Are Authorized + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_unauthorized_sgid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All SUID Executables Are Authorized + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_unauthorized_suid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure No World-Writable Files Exist + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_unauthorized_world_writable_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All Files Are Owned by a Group + + ocil:ssg-file_permissions_ungroupowned_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure All Files Are Owned by a User + + ocil:ssg-no_files_unowned_by_user_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Hardlinks + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_fs_protected_hardlinks_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Kernel Parameter to Enforce DAC on Symlinks + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_fs_protected_symlinks_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Mounting of cramfs + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_cramfs_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the Automounter + + ocil:ssg-service_autofs_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /boot + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /boot + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /boot + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_boot_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /dev/shm + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_dev_shm_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /dev/shm + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_dev_shm_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /dev/shm + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_dev_shm_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add grpquota Option to /home + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_grpquota_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /home + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /home + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /home + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add usrquota Option to /home + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_home_usrquota_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to Non-Root Local Partitions + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_nodev_nonroot_local_partitions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to Removable Media Partitions + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_nodev_removable_partitions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to Removable Media Partitions + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_noexec_removable_partitions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to Removable Media Partitions + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_nosuid_removable_partitions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /opt + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_opt_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /srv + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_srv_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /tmp + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_tmp_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /tmp + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_tmp_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /tmp + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_tmp_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/log/audit + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_audit_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/log/audit + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_audit_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/log/audit + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_audit_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/log + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/log + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/log + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_log_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /var + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /var + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nodev Option to /var/tmp + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_tmp_nodev_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add noexec Option to /var/tmp + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_tmp_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Add nosuid Option to /var/tmp + + ocil:ssg-mount_option_var_tmp_nosuid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable core dump backtraces + + ocil:ssg-coredump_disable_backtraces_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable storing core dump + + ocil:ssg-coredump_disable_storage_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Core Dumps for All Users + + ocil:ssg-disable_users_coredumps_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps + + ocil:ssg-service_systemd-coredump_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable_action:testaction:1 + + + + Restrict Exposed Kernel Pointer Addresses Access + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_kptr_restrict_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Space + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOS + + ocil:ssg-bios_enable_execution_restrictions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable page allocator poisoning + + ocil:ssg-grub2_page_poison_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable SLUB/SLAB allocator poisoning + + ocil:ssg-grub2_slub_debug_argument_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the uvcvideo module + + ocil:ssg-kernel_module_uvcvideo_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable storing core dumps + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_core_pattern_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure file name of core dumps + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_core_uses_pid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Restrict Access to Kernel Message Buffer + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_dmesg_restrict_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Kernel Image Loading + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_kexec_load_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable loading and unloading of kernel modules + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_modules_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Kernel panic on oops + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_panic_on_oops_action:testaction:1 + + + + Limit CPU consumption of the Perf system + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_perf_cpu_time_max_percent_action:testaction:1 + + + + Limit sampling frequency of the Perf system + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_perf_event_max_sample_rate_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disallow kernel profiling by unprivileged users + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_perf_event_paranoid_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure maximum number of process identifiers + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_pid_max_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disallow magic SysRq key + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_sysrq_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Access to Network bpf() Syscall From Unprivileged Processes + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_unprivileged_bpf_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Restrict usage of ptrace to descendant processes + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_kernel_yama_ptrace_scope_action:testaction:1 + + + + Harden the operation of the BPF just-in-time compiler + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_net_core_bpf_jit_harden_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the use of user namespaces + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_user_max_user_namespaces_action:testaction:1 + + + + Prevent applications from mapping low portion of virtual memory + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_vm_mmap_min_addr_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the deny_execmem SELinux Boolean + + ocil:ssg-sebool_deny_execmem_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the polyinstantiation_enabled SELinux Boolean + + ocil:ssg-sebool_polyinstantiation_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure the secure_mode_insmod SELinux Boolean + + ocil:ssg-sebool_secure_mode_insmod_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux Boolean + + ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_execheap_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux Boolean + + ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_execmod_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux Boolean + + ocil:ssg-sebool_selinuxuser_execstack_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux Boolean + + ocil:ssg-sebool_ssh_sysadm_login_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub + + ocil:ssg-grub2_enable_selinux_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install policycoreutils-python-utils package + + ocil:ssg-package_policycoreutils-python-utils_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install policycoreutils Package + + ocil:ssg-package_policycoreutils_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot-plugins Package + + ocil:ssg-package_setroubleshoot-plugins_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall setroubleshoot-server Package + + ocil:ssg-package_setroubleshoot-server_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinux + + ocil:ssg-selinux_confinement_of_daemons_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure SELinux is Not Disabled + + ocil:ssg-selinux_not_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure SELinux Policy + + ocil:ssg-selinux_policytype_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing + + ocil:ssg-selinux_state_action:testaction:1 + + + + Encrypt Partitions + + ocil:ssg-encrypt_partitions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /dev/shm is configured + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_dev_shm_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /home Located On Separate Partition + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_home_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /srv Located On Separate Partition + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_srv_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /tmp Located On Separate Partition + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_tmp_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /var Located On Separate Partition + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /var/log Located On Separate Partition + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_log_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /var/log/audit Located On Separate Partition + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_log_audit_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure /var/tmp Located On Separate Partition + + ocil:ssg-partition_for_var_tmp_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the GNOME3 Login Restart and Shutdown Buttons + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_restart_shutdown_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable the GNOME3 Login User List + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_user_list_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable the GNOME3 Screen Locking On Smartcard Removal + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_lock_screen_on_smartcard_removal_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable GDM Automatic Login + + ocil:ssg-gnome_gdm_disable_automatic_login_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable XDMCP in GDM + + ocil:ssg-gnome_gdm_disable_xdmcp_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable GNOME3 Automount Opening + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable GNOME3 Automount running + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_autorun_action:testaction:1 + + + + Require Credential Prompting for Remote Access in GNOME3 + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_remote_access_credential_prompt_action:testaction:1 + + + + Require Encryption for Remote Access in GNOME3 + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_remote_access_encryption_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Idle Activation + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_activation_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Lock After Idle Period + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_locked_action:testaction:1 + + + + Implement Blank Screensaver + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_mode_blank_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Screensaver Settings + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_screensaver_user_locks_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Users Cannot Change GNOME3 Session Idle Settings + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_session_idle_user_locks_action:testaction:1 + + + + Disable Ctrl-Alt-Del Reboot Key Sequence in GNOME3 + + ocil:ssg-dconf_gnome_disable_ctrlaltdel_reboot_action:testaction:1 + + + + Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles + + ocil:ssg-dconf_db_up_to_date_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure GNOME3 DConf User Profile + + ocil:ssg-enable_dconf_user_profile_action:testaction:1 + + + + The Installed Operating System Is Vendor Supported + + ocil:ssg-installed_OS_is_vendor_supported_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure BIND to use System Crypto Policy + + ocil:ssg-configure_bind_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure System Cryptography Policy + + ocil:ssg-configure_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Kerberos to use System Crypto Policy + + ocil:ssg-configure_kerberos_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Libreswan to use System Crypto Policy + + ocil:ssg-configure_libreswan_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure OpenSSL library to use System Crypto Policy + + ocil:ssg-configure_openssl_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure OpenSSL library to use TLS Encryption + + ocil:ssg-configure_openssl_tls_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy + + ocil:ssg-configure_ssh_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Harden SSH client Crypto Policy + + ocil:ssg-harden_ssh_client_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: openssh.config + + ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_ciphers_openssh_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated Ciphers: opensshserver.config + + ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_ciphers_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure SSH Client to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: openssh.config + + ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_macs_openssh_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure SSH Server to Use FIPS 140-2 Validated MACs: opensshserver.config + + ocil:ssg-harden_sshd_macs_opensshserver_conf_crypto_policy_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install crypto-policies package + + ocil:ssg-package_crypto-policies_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) is running + + ocil:ssg-agent_mfetpd_running_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux (ENSL) + + ocil:ssg-package_mcafeetp_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) Module + + ocil:ssg-package_MFEhiplsm_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Backups of User Data + + ocil:ssg-configure_user_data_backups_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install Intrusion Detection Software + + ocil:ssg-install_hids_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable Dracut FIPS Module + + ocil:ssg-enable_dracut_fips_module_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable FIPS Mode + + ocil:ssg-enable_fips_mode_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure '/etc/system-fips' exists + + ocil:ssg-etc_system_fips_exists_action:testaction:1 + + + + Set kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' to 1 + + ocil:ssg-sysctl_crypto_fips_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Build and Test AIDE Database + + ocil:ssg-aide_build_database_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify the Audit Tools + + ocil:ssg-aide_check_audit_tools_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE + + ocil:ssg-aide_periodic_cron_checking_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure Notification of Post-AIDE Scan Details + + ocil:ssg-aide_scan_notification_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify Access Control Lists (ACLs) + + ocil:ssg-aide_verify_acls_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure AIDE to Verify Extended Attributes + + ocil:ssg-aide_verify_ext_attributes_action:testaction:1 + + + + Audit Tools Must Be Group-owned by Root + + ocil:ssg-file_audit_tools_group_ownership_action:testaction:1 + + + + Audit Tools Must Be Owned by Root + + ocil:ssg-file_audit_tools_ownership_action:testaction:1 + + + + Audit Tools Must Have a Mode of 0755 or Less Permissive + + ocil:ssg-file_audit_tools_permissions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install AIDE + + ocil:ssg-package_aide_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify File Hashes with RPM + + ocil:ssg-rpm_verify_hashes_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify and Correct Ownership with RPM + + ocil:ssg-rpm_verify_ownership_action:testaction:1 + + + + Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPM + + ocil:ssg-rpm_verify_permissions_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install sudo Package + + ocil:ssg-package_sudo_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Privileged Escalated Commands Cannot Execute Other Commands - sudo NOEXEC + + ocil:ssg-sudo_add_noexec_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo requiretty + + ocil:ssg-sudo_add_requiretty_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo use_pty + + ocil:ssg-sudo_add_use_pty_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Sudo Logfile Exists - sudo logfile + + ocil:ssg-sudo_custom_logfile_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo !authenticate + + ocil:ssg-sudo_remove_no_authenticate_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo NOPASSWD + + ocil:ssg-sudo_remove_nopasswd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo + + ocil:ssg-sudo_require_authentication_action:testaction:1 + + + + Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command + + ocil:ssg-sudo_require_reauthentication_action:testaction:1 + + + + The operating system must restrict privilege elevation to authorized personnel + + ocil:ssg-sudo_restrict_privilege_elevation_to_authorized_action:testaction:1 + + + + Only the VDSM User Can Use sudo NOPASSWD + + ocil:ssg-sudo_vdsm_nopasswd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Explicit arguments in sudo specifications + + ocil:ssg-sudoers_explicit_command_args_action:testaction:1 + + + + Don't define allowed commands in sudoers by means of exclusion + + ocil:ssg-sudoers_no_command_negation_action:testaction:1 + + + + Don't target root user in the sudoers file + + ocil:ssg-sudoers_no_root_target_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure invoking users password for privilege escalation when using sudo + + ocil:ssg-sudoers_validate_passwd_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure gnutls-utils is installed + + ocil:ssg-package_gnutls-utils_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall gssproxy Package + + ocil:ssg-package_gssproxy_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall iprutils Package + + ocil:ssg-package_iprutils_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall krb5-workstation Package + + ocil:ssg-package_krb5-workstation_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure nss-tools is installed + + ocil:ssg-package_nss-tools_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install openscap-scanner Package + + ocil:ssg-package_openscap-scanner_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install rear Package + + ocil:ssg-package_rear_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install rng-tools Package + + ocil:ssg-package_rng-tools_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install scap-security-guide Package + + ocil:ssg-package_scap-security-guide_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Uninstall tuned Package + + ocil:ssg-package_tuned_removed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure yum Removes Previous Package Versions + + ocil:ssg-clean_components_post_updating_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure dnf-automatic to Install Available Updates Automatically + + ocil:ssg-dnf-automatic_apply_updates_action:testaction:1 + + + + Configure dnf-automatic to Install Only Security Updates + + ocil:ssg-dnf-automatic_security_updates_only_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main yum Configuration + + ocil:ssg-ensure_gpgcheck_globally_activated_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for Local Packages + + ocil:ssg-ensure_gpgcheck_local_packages_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure gpgcheck Enabled for All yum Package Repositories + + ocil:ssg-ensure_gpgcheck_never_disabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Oracle Linux GPG Key Installed + + ocil:ssg-ensure_oracle_gpgkey_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Install dnf-automatic Package + + ocil:ssg-package_dnf-automatic_installed_action:testaction:1 + + + + Ensure Software Patches Installed + + ocil:ssg-security_patches_up_to_date_action:testaction:1 + + + + Enable dnf-automatic Timer + + ocil:ssg-timer_dnf-automatic_enabled_action:testaction:1 + + + + Prefer to use a 64-bit Operating System when supported + + ocil:ssg-prefer_64bit_os_action:testaction:1 + + + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + 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+ + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + PASS + + + FAIL + + + + + + To check that the avahi-daemon service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled avahi-daemon +Output should indicate the avahi-daemon service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled avahi-daemon disabled + +Run the following command to verify avahi-daemon is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active avahi-daemon + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the avahi-daemon is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show avahi-daemon | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "avahi-daemon" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To check that the abrtd service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled abrtd +Output should indicate the abrtd service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled abrtd disabled + +Run the following command to verify abrtd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active abrtd + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the abrtd is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show abrtd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "abrtd" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To check that the kdump service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled kdump +Output should indicate the kdump service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled kdump disabled + +Run the following command to verify kdump is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active kdump + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the kdump is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show kdump | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "kdump" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To check that the ntpdate service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled ntpdate +Output should indicate the ntpdate service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled ntpdate disabled + +Run the following command to verify ntpdate is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active ntpdate + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the ntpdate is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show ntpdate | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "ntpdate" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To check that the oddjobd service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled oddjobd +Output should indicate the oddjobd service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled oddjobd disabled + +Run the following command to verify oddjobd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active oddjobd + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the oddjobd is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show oddjobd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "oddjobd" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To check that the qpidd service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled qpidd +Output should indicate the qpidd service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled qpidd disabled + +Run the following command to verify qpidd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active qpidd + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the qpidd is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show qpidd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "qpidd" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To check that the rdisc service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled rdisc +Output should indicate the rdisc service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled rdisc disabled + +Run the following command to verify rdisc is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active rdisc + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the rdisc is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show rdisc | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "rdisc" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.allow, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.allow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.allow does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/cron.allow, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.allow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.allow does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/cron.allow, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/cron.allow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r----- + Is it the case that /etc/cron.allow does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.d, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.d +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.d does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.daily, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.daily +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.daily does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.hourly, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.hourly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.hourly does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.monthly, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.monthly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.monthly does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/cron.weekly, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.weekly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.weekly does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/crontab, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/crontab +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/crontab does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/cron.d, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.d +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.d does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/cron.daily, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.daily +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.daily does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/cron.hourly, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.hourly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.hourly does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/cron.monthly, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.monthly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.monthly does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/cron.weekly, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/cron.weekly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/cron.weekly does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/crontab, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/crontab +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/crontab does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/cron.d, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/cron.d +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rwx------ + Is it the case that /etc/cron.d does not have unix mode -rwx------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/cron.daily, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/cron.daily +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rwx------ + Is it the case that /etc/cron.daily does not have unix mode -rwx------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/cron.hourly, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/cron.hourly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rwx------ + Is it the case that /etc/cron.hourly does not have unix mode -rwx------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/cron.monthly, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/cron.monthly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rwx------ + Is it the case that /etc/cron.monthly does not have unix mode -rwx------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/cron.weekly, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/cron.weekly +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rwx------ + Is it the case that /etc/cron.weekly does not have unix mode -rwx------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/crontab, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/crontab +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw------- + Is it the case that /etc/crontab does not have unix mode -rw-------? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the cron package is installed: +$ rpm -q cron + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + To check that the atd service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled atd +Output should indicate the atd service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled atd disabled + +Run the following command to verify atd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active atd + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the atd is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show atd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "atd" is loaded and not masked? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +cron service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active cron +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that ? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +crond service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active crond +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that ? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the dhcp-server package is installed: +$ rpm -q dhcp-server + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the bind package is installed: +$ rpm -q bind + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Verify the Oracle Linux 9 "fapolicyd" employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy. + +Check that "fapolicyd" is in enforcement mode with the following command: + +$ sudo grep permissive /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf + +permissive = 0 + +Check that fapolicyd employs a deny-all policy on system mounts with the following commands: +$ sudo tail /etc/fapolicyd/compiled.rules + +allow exe=/usr/bin/python3.7 : ftype=text/x-python +deny_audit perm=any pattern=ld_so : all +deny perm=any all : all + Is it the case that fapolicyd is not running in enforcement mode with a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the fapolicyd package is installed: $ rpm -q fapolicyd + Is it the case that the fapolicyd package is not installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +fapolicyd service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active fapolicyd +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the service is not enabled? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the vsftpd package is installed: +$ rpm -q vsftpd + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Find the list of alias maps used by the Postfix mail server: +$ sudo postconf alias_maps +Query the Postfix alias maps for an alias for the root user: +$ sudo postmap -q root hash:/etc/aliases +The output should return an alias. + Is it the case that the alias is not set? + + + + Find the list of alias maps used by the Postfix mail server: +$ sudo postconf alias_maps +Query the Postfix alias maps for an alias for the postmaster user: +$ sudo postmap -q postmaster hash:/etc/aliases +The output should return root. + Is it the case that the alias is not set or is not root? + + + + Run the following command to ensure postfix routes mail to this system: +$ grep relayhost /etc/postfix/main.cf +If properly configured, the output should show only . + Is it the case that it is not? + + + + Run the following command to ensure postfix accepts mail messages from only the local system: +$ grep inet_interfaces /etc/postfix/main.cf +If properly configured, the output should show only . + Is it the case that it does not? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to prevent unrestricted mail relaying, +run the following command: +$ sudo postconf -n smtpd_client_restrictions + Is it the case that the "smtpd_client_restrictions" parameter contains any entries other than "permit_mynetworks" and "reject"? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the postfix package is installed: $ rpm -q postfix + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the sendmail package is installed: +$ rpm -q sendmail + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +postfix service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active postfix +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the system is not a cross domain solution and the service is not enabled? + + + + To verify the sec option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: +$ mount | grep "sec=" +All NFS mounts should show the sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p setting in parentheses. +This is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. + Is it the case that the setting is not configured, has the 'sys' option added, or does not have all Kerberos options added? + + + + To verify the nodev option is configured for all NFS mounts, run +the following command: +$ mount | grep nfs +All NFS mounts should show the nodev setting in parentheses. This +is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. + Is it the case that the setting does not show? + + + + To verify the noexec option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: +$ mount | grep nfs +All NFS mounts should show the noexec setting in parentheses. This is not applicable if NFS is +not implemented. + Is it the case that the setting does not show? + + + + To verify the nosuid option is configured for all NFS mounts, run +the following command: +$ mount | grep nfs +All NFS mounts should show the nosuid setting in parentheses. This +is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. + Is it the case that the setting does not show? + + + + To verify all squashing has been disabled, run the following command: +$ grep all_squash /etc/exports + Is it the case that there is output? + + + + To verify the sec option is configured for all NFS mounts, run the following command: +$ grep "sec=" /etc/exports +All configured NFS exports should show the sec=krb5:krb5i:krb5p setting in parentheses. +This is not applicable if NFS is not implemented. + Is it the case that the setting is not configured, has the 'sys' option added, or does not have all Kerberos options added? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the nfs-utils package is installed: +$ rpm -q nfs-utils + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 disables the chrony daemon from acting as a server with the following command: +$ grep -w port /etc/chrony.conf +port 0 + Is it the case that the "port" option is not set to "0", is commented out, or is missing? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 disables network management of the chrony daemon with the following command: +$ grep -w cmdport /etc/chrony.conf +cmdport 0 + Is it the case that the "cmdport" option is not set to "0", is commented out, or is missing? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 is securely comparing internal information system clocks at a regular interval with an NTP server with the following command: +$ sudo grep maxpoll /etc/ntp.conf /etc/chrony.conf +server [ntp.server.name] iburst maxpoll . + Is it the case that "maxpoll" has not been set to the value of "<sub idref="var_time_service_set_maxpoll" />", is commented out, or is missing? + + + + Run the following command and verify that time sources are only configured with server directive: +# grep -E "^(server|pool)" /etc/chrony.conf +A line with the appropriate server should be returned, any line returned starting with pool is a finding. + Is it the case that an authoritative remote time server is not configured or configured with pool directive? + + + + Run the following command and verify remote server is configured properly: +# grep -E "^(server|pool)" /etc/chrony.conf + Is it the case that a remote time server is not configured? + + + + To verify that a remote NTP service is configured for time synchronization, +open the following file: +/etc/ntp.conf +In the file, there should be a section similar to the following: +server ntpserver + Is it the case that this is not the case? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the chrony package is installed: $ rpm -q chrony + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the ntp package is installed: $ rpm -q ntp + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +chronyd service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active chronyd +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the chronyd process is not running? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +ntp service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active ntp +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that ? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +ntpd service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active ntpd +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that ? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the xinetd package is installed: +$ rpm -q xinetd + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + If network services are using the xinetd service, this is not applicable. + +To check that the xinetd service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled xinetd +Output should indicate the xinetd service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled xinetd disabled + +Run the following command to verify xinetd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active xinetd + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the xinetd is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show xinetd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "xinetd" is loaded and not masked? + + + + Verify that there are no shosts.equiv files on the system, run the following command: +$ find / -name shosts.equiv + Is it the case that shosts.equiv files exist? + + + + The existence of the file /etc/hosts.equiv or a file named +.rhosts inside a user home directory indicates the presence +of an Rsh trust relationship. + Is it the case that these files exist? + + + + To verify that there are no .shosts files +on the system, run the following command: +$ sudo find / -name '.shosts' + Is it the case that .shosts files exist? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the rsh-server package is installed: +$ rpm -q rsh-server + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + The rsh package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase rsh + Is it the case that ? + + + + +To check that the rlogin service is disabled in system boot configuration with xinetd, run the following command: +$ chkconfig rlogin --list +Output should indicate the rlogin service has either not been installed, or has been disabled, as shown in the example below: +$ chkconfig rlogin --list + +Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native +systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native +systemd configuration. + +If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'. +To see services enabled on particular target use +'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'. + +rlogin off + +To check that the rlogin socket is disabled in system boot configuration with systemd, run the following command: +$ systemctl is-enabled rlogin +Output should indicate the rlogin socket has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled rlogindisabled + +Run the following command to verify rlogin is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active rlogin + +If the socket is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The socket will also be masked, to check that the rlogin is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show rlogin | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the socket is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that service and/or socket are running? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the talk-server package is installed: +$ rpm -q talk-server + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the talk package is installed: +$ rpm -q talk + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the telnet-server package is installed: +$ rpm -q telnet-server + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + The telnet package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase telnet + Is it the case that ? + + + + +To check that the telnet service is disabled in system boot configuration with xinetd, run the following command: +$ chkconfig telnet --list +Output should indicate the telnet service has either not been installed, or has been disabled, as shown in the example below: +$ chkconfig telnet --list + +Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native +systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native +systemd configuration. + +If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'. +To see services enabled on particular target use +'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'. + +telnet off + +To check that the telnet socket is disabled in system boot configuration with systemd, run the following command: +$ systemctl is-enabled telnet +Output should indicate the telnet socket has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled telnetdisabled + +Run the following command to verify telnet is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active telnet + +If the socket is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The socket will also be masked, to check that the telnet is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show telnet | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the socket is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that service and/or socket are running? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the tftp-server package is installed: +$ rpm -q tftp-server + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + The tftp package can be removed with the following command: $ sudo yum erase tftp + Is it the case that ? + + + + Verify the TFTP daemon is configured to operate in secure mode. + +Check if a TFTP server is installed with the following command: + +$ sudo dnf list --installed tftp-server + +tftp-server.x86_64 5.2-35.el9.x86_64 + + +If a TFTP server is not installed, this is Not Applicable. + + +If a TFTP server is installed, check for the server arguments with the following command: + +$ systemctl cat tftp | grep ExecStart= +ExecStart=/usr/sbin/in.tftpd -s + Is it the case that 'the "ExecStart" line does not have a "-s" option, and a subdirectory is not assigned'? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the squid package is installed: +$ rpm -q squid + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + To check that the squid service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled squid +Output should indicate the squid service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled squid disabled + +Run the following command to verify squid is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active squid + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the squid is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show squid | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "squid" is loaded and not masked? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +rngd service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active rngd +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the "rngd" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the quagga package is installed: +$ rpm -q quagga + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + To check if RekeyLimit is set correctly, run the following command: +$ sudo grep RekeyLimit /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf +If configured properly, output should be +/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-rekey-limit.conf: +RekeyLimit +Check also the main configuration file with the following command: +$ sudo grep RekeyLimit /etc/ssh/ssh_config +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that it is commented out or is not set? + + + + For each private key stored on the system, use the following command: +$ sudo ssh-keygen -y -f /path/to/file +If the contents of the key are displayed, this is a finding. + Is it the case that no ssh private key is accessible without a passcode? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's HostbasedAuthentication option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i HostbasedAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + + +To determine if firewalld is configured to allow access to ssh +on port 22/tcp, run the following command(s): + + firewall-cmd --list-ports + + + firewall-cmd --list-services + +If firewalld is configured to allow access through the firewall, something similar to the following will be output: + +If it is a service: +ssh + + +If it is a port: +22/tcp + + Is it the case that sshd service is not enabled in the proper firewalld zone? + + + + To check which SSH protocol version is allowed, check version of openssh-server with following command: + +$ rpm -qi openssh-server | grep Version + +Versions equal to or higher than 7.4 only allow Protocol 2. +If version is lower than 7.4, run the following command to check configuration: +$ sudo grep Protocol /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If configured properly, output should be Protocol 2 + Is it the case that it is commented out or is not set correctly to Protocol 2? + + + + To check if compression is enabled or set correctly, run the +following command: +$ sudo grep Compression /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If configured properly, output should be no or delayed. + Is it the case that it is commented out, or is not set to no or delayed? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitEmptyPasswords option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i PermitEmptyPasswords /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's GSSAPIAuthentication option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i GSSAPIAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's KerberosAuthentication option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i KerberosAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's PubkeyAuthentication option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i PubkeyAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's IgnoreRhosts option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i IgnoreRhosts /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To check which SSH protocol version is allowed, check version of +openssh-server with following command: +$ rpm -qi openssh-server | grep Version +Versions equal to or higher than 7.4 have deprecated the RhostsRSAAuthentication option. +If version is lower than 7.4, run the following command to check configuration: +To determine how the SSH daemon's RhostsRSAAuthentication option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i RhostsRSAAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitRootLogin option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i PermitRootLogin /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitRootLogin option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i PermitRootLogin /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating prohibit-password is returned, then the required value is set. + Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's AllowTcpForwarding option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i AllowTcpForwarding /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + Is it the case that The AllowTcpForwarding option exists and is disabled? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's IgnoreUserKnownHosts option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i IgnoreUserKnownHosts /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's X11Forwarding option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i X11Forwarding /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's PermitUserEnvironment option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i PermitUserEnvironment /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating no is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's GSSAPIAuthentication option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i GSSAPIAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's UsePAM option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i UsePAM /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's PubkeyAuthentication option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i PubkeyAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's StrictModes option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i StrictModes /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's Banner option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i Banner /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating /etc/issue is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's Banner option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i Banner /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating /etc/issue.net is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's X11Forwarding option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i X11Forwarding /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To ensure sshd limits the users who can log in, run the following: +pre>$ sudo grep -rPi '^\h*(allow|deny)(users|groups)\h+\H+(\h+.*)?$' /etc/ssh/sshd_config* +If properly configured, the output should be a list of usernames and/or +groups allowed to log in to this system. + Is it the case that sshd does not limit the users who can log in? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's PrintLastLog option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i PrintLastLog /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To check if RekeyLimit is set correctly, run the +following command: + +$ sudo grep RekeyLimit /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If configured properly, output should be +RekeyLimit + Is it the case that it is commented out or is not set? + + + + Run the following command to see what the timeout interval is: +$ sudo grep ClientAliveInterval /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, the output should be: +ClientAliveInterval + Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? + + + + To ensure ClientAliveInterval is set correctly, run the following command: +$ sudo grep ClientAliveCountMax /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, the output should be: +ClientAliveCountMax +For SSH earlier than v8.2, a ClientAliveCountMax value of 0 causes a timeout precisely when +the ClientAliveInterval is set. Starting with v8.2, a value of 0 disables the timeout +functionality completely. +If the option is set to a number greater than 0, then the session will be disconnected after +ClientAliveInterval * ClientAliveCountMax seconds without receiving a keep alive message. + Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? + + + + To ensure ClientAliveInterval is set correctly, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep ClientAliveCountMax /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If properly configured, the output should be: +ClientAliveCountMax 0 + +In this case, the SSH timeout occurs precisely when +the ClientAliveInterval is set. + Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? + + + + To ensure LoginGraceTime is set correctly, run the following command: +$ sudo grep LoginGraceTime /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, the output should be: +LoginGraceTime +If the option is set to a number greater than 0, then the unauthenticated session will be disconnected +after the configured number seconds. + Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's LogLevel option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i LogLevel /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating INFO is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's LogLevel option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i LogLevel /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating VERBOSE is returned, then the required value is set. + + Is it the case that the required value is not set? + + + + To ensure the MaxAuthTries parameter is set, run the following command: +$ sudo grep MaxAuthTries /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, output should be: +MaxAuthTries + Is it the case that it is commented out or not configured properly? + + + + Run the following command to see what the max sessions number is: +$ sudo grep MaxSessions /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, the output should be: +MaxSessions + Is it the case that MaxSessions is not configured or not configured correctly? + + + + To check if MaxStartups is configured, run the following command: +$ sudo grep MaxStartups /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If configured, this command should output the configuration. + Is it the case that maxstartups is not configured? + + + + To determine whether the SSH server includes configuration files from the right directory, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -i '^Include' /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If a line Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf is returned, then the configuration file inclusion is set correctly. + Is it the case that you don't include other configuration files from the main configuration file? + + + + To check if UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled or set correctly, run the +following command: +$ sudo grep UsePrivilegeSeparation /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If configured properly, output should be . + Is it the case that it is commented out or is not enabled? + + + + To determine how the SSH daemon's X11UseLocalhost option is set, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i X11UseLocalhost /etc/ssh/sshd_config + +If a line indicating yes is returned, then the required value is set. + Is it the case that the display proxy is listening on wildcard address? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/sshd_config does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/ssh/*_key, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*_key +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*_key does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/ssh/*.pub, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*.pub +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*.pub does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/sshd_config does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/ssh/*_key, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*_key +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*_key does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/ssh/*.pub, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/ssh/*.pub +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*.pub does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/ssh/sshd_config, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/ssh/sshd_config +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw------- + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/sshd_config does not have unix mode -rw-------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/ssh/*_key, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/ssh/*_key +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw------- + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*_key does not have unix mode -rw-------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/ssh/*.pub, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/ssh/*.pub +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r--r-- + Is it the case that /etc/ssh/*.pub does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the openssh-clients package is installed: $ rpm -q openssh-clients + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the openssh-server package is installed: $ rpm -q openssh-server + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the openssh-server package is installed: $ rpm -q openssh-server + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + To check that the sshd service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled sshd +Output should indicate the sshd service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled sshd disabled + +Run the following command to verify sshd is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active sshd + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the sshd is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show sshd | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "sshd" is loaded and not masked? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +sshd service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active sshd +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that sshd service is disabled? + + + + Check to see if Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) +is enabled and using the proper digest value on the system with the following command: +$ sudo grep certificate_verification /etc/sssd/sssd.conf /etc/sssd/conf.d/*.conf | grep -v "^#" +If configured properly, output should look like + + certificate_verification = ocsp_dgst= + + Is it the case that certificate_verification in sssd is not configured? + + + + To verify Certmap is enabled in SSSD, run the following command: +$ sudo cat /etc/sssd/sssd.conf +If configured properly, output should contain section like the following + +[certmap/testing.test/rule_name] +matchrule =<SAN>.*EDIPI@mil +maprule = (userCertificate;binary={cert!bin}) +domains = testing.test + + Is it the case that Certmap is not configured in SSSD? + + + + To verify that smart cards are enabled in SSSD, run the following command: +$ sudo grep pam_cert_auth /etc/sssd/sssd.conf +If configured properly, output should be +pam_cert_auth = True + + +To verify that smart cards are enabled in PAM files, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -e "auth.*pam_sss\.so.*\(allow_missing_name\|try_cert_auth\)" /etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth +If configured properly, output should be + +/etc/pam.d/smartcard-auth:auth sufficient pam_sss.so allow_missing_name +/etc/pam.d/system-auth:auth [success=done authinfo_unavail=ignore ignore=ignore default=die] pam_sss.so try_cert_auth + + Is it the case that smart cards are not enabled in SSSD? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 for PKI-based authentication has valid certificates by constructing a +certification path (which includes status information) to an accepted trust anchor. + +Check that the system has a valid DoD root CA installed with the following command: + +$ sudo openssl x509 -text -in /etc/sssd/pki/sssd_auth_ca_db.pem + +Certificate: +Data: +Version: 3 (0x2) +Serial Number: 1 (0x1) +Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption +Issuer: C = US, O = U.S. Government, OU = DoD, OU = PKI, CN = DoD Root CA 3 +Validity +Not Before: Mar 20 18:46:41 2012 GMT +Not After : Dec 30 18:46:41 2029 GMT +Subject: C = US, O = U.S. Government, OU = DoD, OU = PKI, CN = DoD Root CA 3 +Subject Public Key Info: +Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Is it the case that root CA file is not a DoD-issued certificate with a valid date and installed in the /etc/sssd/pki/sssd_auth_ca_db.pem location? + + + + +To verify that SSSD expires offline credentials, run the following command: +$ sudo grep offline_credentials_expiration /etc/sssd/sssd.conf +If configured properly, output should be +offline_credentials_expiration = 1 + Is it the case that it does not exist or is not configured properly? + + + + To verify that Linux Audit logging is enabled for the USBGuard daemon, +run the following command: +$ sudo grep AuditBackend /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf +The output should be +AuditBackend=LinuxAudit + Is it the case that AuditBackend is not set to LinuxAudit? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the usbguard package is installed: $ rpm -q usbguard + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +usbguard service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active usbguard +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the service is not enabled? + + + + To verify that USB Human Interface Devices and hubs will be authorized by the USBGuard daemon, +run the following command: +$ sudo grep allow /etc/usbguard/rules.conf +The output lines should include +allow with-interface match-all { 03:*:* 09:00:* } + Is it the case that USB devices of class 3 and 9:00 are not authorized? + + + + Verify the USBGuard has a policy configured with the following command: + +$ usbguard list-rules + +allow id 1d6b:0001 serial + +If the command does not return results or an error is returned, ask the SA to indicate how unauthorized peripherals are being blocked. + Is it the case that there is no evidence that unauthorized peripherals are being blocked before establishing a connection? + + + + To ensure the X Windows package group is removed, run the following command: +$ rpm -qi xorg-x11-server-common +The output should be: +package xorg-x11-server-common is not installed + Is it the case that the X Windows package group or xorg-x11-server-common has not be removed? + + + + To ensure the X Windows package group is removed, run the following command: + +$ rpm -qi xorg-x11-server-Xorg xorg-x11-server-common xorg-x11-server-utils xorg-x11-server-Xwayland + +For each package mentioned above you should receive following line: +package <package> is not installed + Is it the case that xorg related packages are not removed and run level is not correctly configured? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to boot to the command line: +$ systemctl get-default +multi-user.target + Is it the case that the system default target is not set to "multi-user.target" and the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) lacks a documented requirement for a graphical user interface? + + + + To ensure a login warning banner is enabled, run the following: +$ grep banner-message-enable /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* +If properly configured, the output should be true. +To ensure a login warning banner is locked and cannot be changed by a user, run the following: +$ grep banner-message-enable /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable. + Is it the case that it is not? + + + + +To ensure the login warning banner text is properly set, run the following: +$ grep banner-message-text /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* +If properly configured, the proper banner text will appear. +To ensure the login warning banner text is locked and cannot be changed by a user, run the following: +$ grep banner-message-text /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-text. + Is it the case that it does not? + + + + To check if the system login banner is compliant, +run the following command: +$ cat /etc/issue + Is it the case that it does not display the required banner? + + + + To check if the system login banner is compliant, run the following command: +$ cat /etc/issue.net + Is it the case that it does not display the required banner? + + + + Verify the pam_faillock.so module is present in the "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" file: + +$ sudo grep pam_faillock.so /etc/pam.d/password-auth + +auth required pam_faillock.so preauth +auth required pam_faillock.so authfail +account required pam_faillock.so + Is it the case that the pam_faillock.so module is not present in the "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" file with the "preauth" line listed before pam_unix.so? + + + + Verify the pam_faillock.so module is present in the "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file: + +$ sudo grep pam_faillock.so /etc/pam.d/system-auth + +auth required pam_faillock.so preauth +auth required pam_faillock.so authfail +account required pam_faillock.so + Is it the case that the pam_faillock.so module is not present in the "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file with the "preauth" line listed before pam_unix.so? + + + + If the system does not have SELinux enabled and enforcing a targeted policy, or if the +pam_faillock.so module is not configured for use, this requirement is not applicable. + +Verify the location of the non-default tally directory for the pam_faillock.so module with +the following command: + +$ sudo grep -w dir /etc/security/faillock.conf + +dir = /var/log/faillock + +Check the security context type of the non-default tally directory with the following command: + +$ sudo ls -Zd /var/log/faillock + +unconfined_u:object_r:faillog_t:s0 /var/log/faillock + Is it the case that the security context type of the non-default tally directory is not "faillog_t"? + + + + Verify the "/etc/security/faillock.conf" file is configured to log user name information when unsuccessful logon attempts occur: + +$ sudo grep audit /etc/security/faillock.conf + +audit + Is it the case that the "audit" option is not set, is missing or commented out? + + + + Verify the "/etc/security/faillock.conf" file is configured use a non-default faillock directory to ensure contents persist after reboot: + +$ sudo grep 'dir =' /etc/security/faillock.conf + +dir = /var/log/faillock + Is it the case that the "dir" option is not set to a non-default documented tally log directory, is missing or commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 use the "pam_pwhistory.so" module in the /etc/pam.d/password-auth file +and is configured to prohibit password reuse for a minimum of +generations. + +Verify the "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" file with the following command: + +$ grep pam_pwhistory.so /etc/pam.d/password-auth +password pam_pwhistory.so use_authtok remember= + + +Verify the "/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" file using the following command: + +$ grep remember /etc/security/pwhistory.conf +remember = + +The pam_pwhistory.so "remember" option must be configured only in one file. + Is it the case that the pam_pwhistory.so module is not used, the "remember" module option is not set in +/etc/pam.d/password-auth or in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf, or is set in both files, or is set +with a value less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_remember" />"? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 use the "pam_pwhistory.so" module in the /etc/pam.d/system-auth file +and is configured to prohibit password reuse for a minimum of +generations. + +Verify the "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" file with the following command: + +$ grep pam_pwhistory.so /etc/pam.d/system-auth +password pam_pwhistory.so use_authtok remember= + + +Verify the "/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" file using the following command: + +$ grep remember /etc/security/pwhistory.conf +remember = + +The pam_pwhistory.so "remember" option must be configured only in one file. + Is it the case that the pam_pwhistory.so module is not used, the "remember" module option is not set in +/etc/pam.d/system-auth or in /etc/security/pwhistory.conf, or is set in both files, or is set +with a value less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_remember" />"? + + + + To verify the password reuse setting is compliant, run the following command: +$ grep remember /etc/pam.d/system-auth +The output should show the following at the end of the line: +remember= + + +In newer systems, the pam_pwhistory PAM module options can also be set in +"/etc/security/pwhistory.conf" file. Use the following command to verify: +$ grep remember /etc/security/pwhistory.conf +remember = + +The pam_pwhistory remember option must be configured only in one file. + Is it the case that the value of remember is not equal to or greater than the expected value? + + + + Verify the "/etc/security/faillock.conf" file is configured to log user name information when unsuccessful logon attempts occur: + +$ sudo grep audit /etc/security/faillock.conf + +audit + Is it the case that the "audit" option is not set, is missing or commented out? + + + + To check the system for the existence of any .netrc files, +run the following command: +$ sudo find /home -xdev -name .netrc + Is it the case that any .netrc files exist? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 is configured to lock an account after +unsuccessful logon attempts with the command: + + +$ grep 'deny =' /etc/security/faillock.conf +deny = . + Is it the case that the "deny" option is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" />" +or less (but not "0"), is missing or commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 is configured to lock the root account after +unsuccessful logon attempts with the command: + + +$ grep even_deny_root /etc/security/faillock.conf +even_deny_root + Is it the case that the "even_deny_root" option is not set, is missing or commented out? + + + + To ensure the tally directory is configured correctly, run the following command: +$ sudo grep 'dir =' /etc/security/faillock.conf +The output should show that dir is set to something other than "/var/run/faillock" + Is it the case that the "dir" option is not set to a non-default documented tally log directory, is missing or commented out? + + + + To ensure the failed password attempt policy is configured correctly, run the following command: + +$ grep fail_interval /etc/security/faillock.conf +The output should show fail_interval = <interval-in-seconds> where interval-in-seconds is or greater. + Is it the case that the "fail_interval" option is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" />" +or less (but not "0"), the line is commented out, or the line is missing? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 is configured to lock an account until released by an administrator +after unsuccessful logon +attempts with the command: + + +$ grep 'unlock_time =' /etc/security/faillock.conf +unlock_time = + Is it the case that the "unlock_time" option is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" />", +the line is missing, or commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one numeric character be used. + +Check the value for "dcredit" with the following command: + +$ sudo grep dcredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf + +/etc/security/pwquality.conf:dcredit = + Is it the case that the value of "dcredit" is a positive number or is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 prevents the use of dictionary words for passwords with the following command: + +$ sudo grep dictcheck /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf + +/etc/security/pwquality.conf:dictcheck=1 + Is it the case that "dictcheck" does not have a value other than "0", or is commented out? + + + + Verify the value of the "difok" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: + +$ sudo grep difok /etc/security/pwquality.conf + +difok = + Is it the case that the value of "difok" is set to less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_difok" />", or is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 enforces password complexity rules for the root account. + +Check if root user is required to use complex passwords with the following command: + +$ grep enforce_for_root /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf + +/etc/security/pwquality.conf:enforce_for_root + Is it the case that "enforce_for_root" is commented or missing? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one lower-case character. + +Check the value for "lcredit" with the following command: + +$ sudo grep lcredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf + +/etc/security/pwquality.conf:lcredit = -1 + Is it the case that the value of "lcredit" is a positive number or is commented out? + + + + Verify the value of the "maxclassrepeat" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: + +$ grep maxclassrepeat /etc/security/pwquality.conf + +maxclassrepeat = + Is it the case that the value of "maxclassrepeat" is set to "0", more than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_maxclassrepeat" />" or is commented out? + + + + Verify the value of the "maxrepeat" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: + +$ grep maxrepeat /etc/security/pwquality.conf + +maxrepeat = + Is it the case that the value of "maxrepeat" is set to more than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_maxrepeat" />" or is commented out? + + + + Verify the value of the "minclass" option in "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" with the following command: + +$ grep minclass /etc/security/pwquality.conf + +minclass = + Is it the case that the value of "minclass" is set to less than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_minclass" />" or is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 enforces a minimum -character password length with the following command: + +$ grep minlen /etc/security/pwquality.conf + +minlen = + Is it the case that the command does not return a "minlen" value of "<sub idref="var_password_pam_minlen" />" or greater, does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one special character with the following command: + +$ sudo grep ocredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf + +ocredit = + Is it the case that value of "ocredit" is a positive number or is commented out? + + + + To check if pam_pwquality.so is enabled in password-auth, run the following command: +$ grep pam_pwquality /etc/pam.d/password-auth +The output should be similar to the following: +password requisite pam_pwquality.so + Is it the case that pam_pwquality.so is not enabled in password-auth? + + + + To check if pam_pwquality.so is enabled in system-auth, run the following command: +$ grep pam_pwquality /etc/pam.d/system-auth +The output should be similar to the following: +password requisite pam_pwquality.so + Is it the case that pam_pwquality.so is not enabled in system-auth? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 is configured to limit the "pwquality" retry option to . + + +Check for the use of the "pwquality" retry option in the pwquality.conf file with the following command: +$ grep retry /etc/security/pwquality.conf + Is it the case that the value of "retry" is set to "0" or greater than "<sub idref="var_password_pam_retry" />", or is missing? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 enforces password complexity by requiring that at least one upper-case character. + +Check the value for "ucredit" with the following command: + +$ sudo grep ucredit /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf + +ucredit = -1 + Is it the case that the value of "ucredit" is a positive number or is commented out? + + + + Verify that the libuser is set to encrypt password with a FIPS 140-3 approved cryptographic hashing algorithm. + + +Check the hashing algorithm that is being used to hash passwords with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i crypt_style /etc/libuser.conf + +crypt_style = sha512 + Is it the case that crypt_style is not set to sha512? + + + + Verify that the shadow password suite configuration is set to encrypt password with a FIPS 140-3 approved cryptographic hashing algorithm. + + +Check the hashing algorithm that is being used to hash passwords with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i ENCRYPT_METHOD /etc/login.defs + +ENCRYPT_METHOD + Is it the case that ENCRYPT_METHOD is not set to <sub idref="var_password_hashing_algorithm" />? + + + + Inspect the password section of /etc/pam.d/password-auth +and ensure that the pam_unix.so module includes the argument +sha512: +$ grep sha512 /etc/pam.d/password-auth + Is it the case that it does not? + + + + Inspect the password section of /etc/pam.d/system-auth +and ensure that the pam_unix.so module is configured to use the argument +sha512: + +$ sudo grep "^password.*pam_unix\.so.*sha512" /etc/pam.d/system-auth + +password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 + Is it the case that "sha512" is missing, or is commented out? + + + + Inspect /etc/login.defs and ensure that if eihter +SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS or SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS +are set, they must have the minimum value of 5000. + Is it the case that it does not? + + + + Verify the operating system is not configured to bypass password requirements for privilege +escalation. Check the configuration of the "/etc/pam.d/sudo" file with the following command: +$ sudo grep pam_succeed_if /etc/pam.d/sudo + Is it the case that system is configured to bypass password requirements for privilege escalation? + + + + Verify users are provided with feedback on when account accesses last occurred with the following command: + +$ sudo grep pam_lastlog /etc/pam.d/postlogin + +session required pam_lastlog.so showfailed + Is it the case that "pam_lastlog" is missing from "/etc/pam.d/postlogin" file, or the silent option is present? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 shell initialization file is configured to start each shell with the tmux terminal multiplexer. + +Determine the location of the tmux script with the following command: + +$ sudo grep tmux /etc/bashrc /etc/profile.d/* + +/etc/profile.d/tmux.sh: case "$name" in (sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac + +Review the tmux script by using the following example: + +$ cat /etc/profile.d/tmux.sh + +if [ "$PS1" ]; then +parent=$(ps -o ppid= -p $$) +name=$(ps -o comm= -p $parent) +case "$name" in (sshd|login) exec tmux ;; esac +fi + +If the shell file is not configured as the example above, is commented out, or is missing, this is a finding. + +Determine if tmux is currently running with the following command: + +$ sudo ps all | grep tmux | grep -v grep + Is it the case that the command does not produce output? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 initiates a session lock after 15 minutes of inactivity. + +Check the value of the system inactivity timeout with the following command: + +$ grep -i lock-after-time /etc/tmux.conf + +set -g lock-after-time 900 + +Then, verify that the /etc/tmux.conf file can be read by other users than root: + +$ sudo ls -al /etc/tmux.conf + Is it the case that "lock-after-time" is not set to "900" or less in the global tmux configuration file to enforce session lock after inactivity? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 enables the user to initiate a session lock with the following command: + +$ grep lock-command /etc/tmux.conf + +set -g lock-command vlock + +Then, verify that the /etc/tmux.conf file can be read by other users than root: + +$ sudo ls -al /etc/tmux.conf + Is it the case that the "lock-command" is not set in the global settings to call "vlock"? + + + + To verify that tmux is not listed as allowed shell on the system +run the following command: +$ grep 'tmux$' /etc/shells +The output should be empty. + Is it the case that tmux is listed in /etc/shells? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the tmux package is installed: $ rpm -q tmux + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 loads the driver with the following command: + +$ grep card_drivers /etc/opensc.conf + +card_drivers = ; + Is it the case that "<sub idref="var_smartcard_drivers" />" is not listed as a card driver, or there is no line returned for "card_drivers"? + + + + To verify that is configured +as the smart card driver, run the following command: +$ grep force_card_driver /etc/opensc.conf +The output should return something similar to: +force_card_driver = ; + Is it the case that the smart card driver is not configured correctly? + + + + Check that Oracle Linux 9 has the packages for smart card support installed. + +Run the following command to determine if the openssl-pkcs11 package is installed: +$ rpm -q openssl-pkcs11 + Is it the case that smartcard software is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the opensc package is installed: $ rpm -q opensc + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the pcsc-lite package is installed: $ rpm -q pcsc-lite + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +pcscd service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active pcscd +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the pcscd service is not enabled? + + + + To ensure the system is configured to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del setting, +enter the following command: +$ sudo grep -i ctrlaltdelburstaction /etc/systemd/system.conf +The output should return: +CtrlAltDelBurstAction=none + Is it the case that the system is configured to reboot when Ctrl-Alt-Del is pressed more than 7 times in 2 seconds.? + + + + To ensure the system is configured to mask the Ctrl-Alt-Del sequence, Check +that the ctrl-alt-del.target is masked and not active with the following +command: +sudo systemctl status ctrl-alt-del.target +The output should indicate that the target is masked and not active. It +might resemble following output: +ctrl-alt-del.target +Loaded: masked (/dev/null; bad) +Active: inactive (dead) + Is it the case that the system is configured to reboot when Ctrl-Alt-Del is pressed? + + + + Inspect /etc/default/grub for any instances of +systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on) in the kernel boot arguments. +Presence of a systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on) indicates +that interactive boot is enabled at boot time and verify that +GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY=true to disable recovery boot. + Is it the case that Interactive boot is enabled at boot time? + + + + To check if authentication is required for emergency mode, run the following command: +$ grep sulogin /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.service +The output should be similar to the following, and the line must begin with +ExecStart and /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell. + ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell emergency + +Then, check if the emergency target requires the emergency service: +Run the following command: +$ sudo grep Requires /usr/lib/systemd/system/emergency.target +The output should be the following: +Requires=emergency.service + +Then, check if there is no custom emergency target configured in systemd configuration. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grep -r emergency.target /etc/systemd/system/ +The output should be empty. + +Then, check if there is no custom emergency service configured in systemd configuration. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grep -r emergency.service /etc/systemd/system/ +The output should be empty. + Is it the case that the output is different? + + + + To check if authentication is required for single-user mode, run the following command: +$ grep sulogin /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service +The output should be similar to the following, and the line must begin with +ExecStart and /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell. + ExecStart=-/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sulogin-shell rescue + + +Then, verify that the rescue service is in the runlevel1.target. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grep "^Requires=.*rescue\.service" /usr/lib/systemd/system/runlevel1.target +The output should be the following: +Requires=sysinit.target rescue.service + +Then, check if there is no custom runlevel1 target configured in systemd configuration. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grep -r "^runlevel1.target$" /etc/systemd/system +There should be no output. + +Then, check if there is no custom rescue service configured in systemd configuration. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grep -r "^rescue.service$" /etc/systemd/system +There should be no output. + Is it the case that the output is different? + + + + To check that the debug-shell service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled debug-shell +Output should indicate the debug-shell service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled debug-shell disabled + +Run the following command to verify debug-shell is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active debug-shell + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the debug-shell is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show debug-shell | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "debug-shell" is loaded and not masked? + + + + To verify the inactive setting, run the following command: +$ grep 'inactive\|pam_unix' /etc/pam.d/password-auth | grep -w auth +The output should indicate the inactive configuration option is set +to an appropriate integer between 1 and +; and should appear +before the pam_unix.so module as shown in the example below: +$ grep 'inactive\|pam_unix' /etc/pam.d/password-auth | grep -w auth +auth required pam_lastlog.so inactive= +auth sufficient pam_unix.so + Is it the case that the value of inactive is incorrect or is not set before pam_unix.so? + + + + To verify the inactive setting, run the following command: +$ grep 'inactive\|pam_unix' /etc/pam.d/system-auth | grep -w auth +The output should indicate the inactive configuration option is set +to an appropriate integer between 1 and +; and should appear +before the pam_unix.so module as shown in the example below: +$ grep 'inactive\|pam_unix' /etc/pam.d/system-auth | grep -w auth +auth required pam_lastlog.so inactive= +auth sufficient pam_unix.so + Is it the case that the value of inactive is incorrect or is not set before pam_unix.so? + + + + To verify the INACTIVE setting, run the following command: +$ grep "INACTIVE" /etc/default/useradd +The output should indicate the INACTIVE configuration option is set +to an appropriate integer as shown in the example below: +$ grep "INACTIVE" /etc/default/useradd +INACTIVE= + Is it the case that the value of INACTIVE is greater than the expected value or is -1? + + + + Verify emergency accounts have been provisioned with an expiration date of 72 hours. + +For every emergency account, run the following command to obtain its account aging and expiration information: + +$ sudo chage -l emergency_account_name + +Verify each of these accounts has an expiration date set within 72 hours or as documented. + Is it the case that any emergency accounts have no expiration date set or do not expire within 72 hours? + + + + Verify that temporary accounts have been provisioned with an expiration date +of 72 hours. For every temporary account, run the following command to +obtain its account aging and expiration information: +$ sudo chage -l temporary_account_name +Verify each of these accounts has an expiration date set within 72 hours or +as documented. + Is it the case that any temporary accounts have no expiration date set or do not expire within 72 hours? + + + + To verify all accounts have unique names, run the following command: +$ sudo getent passwd | awk -F: '{ print $1}' | uniq -d +No output should be returned. + Is it the case that a line is returned? + + + + Verify that the system is integrated with a centralized authentication mechanism +such as as Active Directory, Kerberos, Directory Server, etc. that has +automated account mechanisms in place. + Is it the case that the system is not using a centralized authentication mechanism, or it is not automated? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 enforces a -day maximum password lifetime for new user accounts by running the following command: + +$ grep -i pass_max_days /etc/login.defs + +PASS_MAX_DAYS + Is it the case that the "PASS_MAX_DAYS" parameter value is greater than "<sub idref="var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" />", or commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 enforces 24 hours/1 day as the minimum password lifetime for new user accounts. + +Check for the value of "PASS_MIN_DAYS" in "/etc/login.defs" with the following command: + +$ grep -i pass_min_days /etc/login.defs + +PASS_MIN_DAYS + Is it the case that the "PASS_MIN_DAYS" parameter value is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" />" or greater, or is commented out? + + + + To check the minimum password length, run the command: +$ grep PASS_MIN_LEN /etc/login.defs +The DoD requirement is 15. + Is it the case that it is not set to the required value? + + + + Check whether the maximum time period for existing passwords is restricted to days with the following commands: + +$ sudo awk -F: '$5 > 60 {print $1 " " $5}' /etc/shadow + +$ sudo awk -F: '$5 <= 0 {print $1 " " $5}' /etc/shadow + Is it the case that any results are returned that are not associated with a system account? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 has configured the minimum time period between password changes for each user account is one day or greater with the following command: + +$ sudo awk -F: '$4 < 1 {print $1 " " $4}' /etc/shadow + Is it the case that any results are returned that are not associated with a system account? + + + + To check the password warning age, run the command: +$ grep PASS_WARN_AGE /etc/login.defs +The DoD requirement is 7. + Is it the case that it is not set to the required value? + + + + To check that no password hashes are stored in +/etc/passwd, run the following command: +awk '!/\S:x|\*/ {print}' /etc/passwd +If it produces any output, then a password hash is +stored in /etc/passwd. + Is it the case that any stored hashes are found in /etc/passwd? + + + + Verify that the interactive user account passwords are using a strong +password hash with the following command: + +$ sudo cut -d: -f2 /etc/shadow + +$6$kcOnRq/5$NUEYPuyL.wghQwWssXRcLRFiiru7f5JPV6GaJhNC2aK5F3PZpE/BCCtwrxRc/AInKMNX3CdMw11m9STiql12f/ + +Password hashes ! or * indicate inactive accounts not +available for logon and are not evaluated. + Is it the case that any interactive user password hash does not begin with "$6"? + + + + Verify that the interactive user account passwords last change time is not in the future +The following command should return no output +$ sudo expiration=$(cat /etc/shadow|awk -F ':' '{print $3}'); +for edate in ${expiration[@]}; do if [[ $edate > $(( $(date +%s)/86400 )) ]]; +then echo "Expiry date in future"; +fi; done + Is it the case that any interactive user password that has last change time in the future? + + + + To verify the number of rounds for the password hashing algorithm is configured, run the following command: +$ sudo grep rounds /etc/pam.d/password-auth +The output should show the following match: +password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 rounds= + Is it the case that rounds is not set to <sub idref="var_password_pam_unix_rounds" /> or is commented out? + + + + To verify the number of rounds for the password hashing algorithm is configured, run the following command: +$ sudo grep rounds /etc/pam.d/system-auth +The output should show the following match: +password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 rounds= + Is it the case that rounds is not set to <sub idref="var_password_pam_unix_rounds" /> or is commented out? + + + + To ensure all GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd are defined in /etc/group, +run the following command: +$ sudo pwck -qr +There should be no output. + Is it the case that GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd are returned as not defined in /etc/group? + + + + To verify that null passwords cannot be used, run the following command: + +$ grep nullok /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/pam.d/password-auth + +If this produces any output, it may be possible to log into accounts +with empty passwords. Remove any instances of the nullok option to +prevent logins with empty passwords. + Is it the case that NULL passwords can be used? + + + + To verify that null passwords cannot be used, run the following command: +$ sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow +If this produces any output, it may be possible to log into accounts +with empty passwords. + Is it the case that Blank or NULL passwords can be used? + + + + Verify that only the "root" account has a UID "0" assignment with the +following command: +$ awk -F: '$3 == 0 {print $1}' /etc/passwd +root + Is it the case that any accounts other than "root" have a UID of "0"? + + + + To verify that root's primary group is zero run the following command: + + grep '^root:' /etc/passwd | cut -d : -f 4 + +The command should return: + +0 + + Is it the case that root has a primary gid not equal to zero? + + + + To ensure root may not directly login to the system over physical consoles, +run the following command: +cat /etc/securetty +If any output is returned, this is a finding. + Is it the case that the /etc/securetty file is not empty? + + + + To obtain a list of all users and the content of their shadow password field, run the command: +$ sudo readarray -t systemaccounts +Verify if all accounts are locked. + Is it the case that system accounts are not locked? + + + + To obtain a listing of all users, their UIDs, and their shells, run the command: +$ awk -F: '{print $1 ":" $3 ":" $7}' /etc/passwd +Identify the system accounts from this listing. These will primarily be the accounts with UID +numbers less than 1000, other than root. + Is it the case that any system account other than root has a login shell? + + + + To check for serial port entries which permit root login, +run the following command: +$ sudo grep ^ttyS/[0-9] /etc/securetty +If any output is returned, then root login over serial ports is permitted. + Is it the case that root login over serial ports is permitted? + + + + To check for virtual console entries which permit root login, run the +following command: +$ sudo grep ^vc/[0-9] /etc/securetty +If any output is returned, then root logins over virtual console devices is permitted. + Is it the case that root login over virtual console devices is permitted? + + + + Run the following command to check if the line is present: +grep pam_wheel /etc/pam.d/su +The output should contain the following line: +auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid + Is it the case that the line is not in the file or it is commented? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 contains no duplicate User IDs (UIDs) for interactive users. + +Check that the operating system contains no duplicate UIDs for interactive users with the following command: + +$ sudo awk -F ":" 'list[$3]++{print $1, $3}' /etc/passwd + Is it the case that output is produced and the accounts listed are interactive user accounts? + + + + To verify that there are no unauthorized local user accounts, run the following command: +$ less /etc/passwd +Inspect the results, and if unauthorized local user accounts exist, remove them by running +the following command: +$ sudo userdel unauthorized_user + Is it the case that there are unauthorized local user accounts on the system? + + + + Run the following command to check for duplicate group names: +Check that the operating system contains no duplicate group names for interactive users by running the following command: + + cut -d : -f 3 /etc/group | uniq -d + +If output is produced, this is a finding. +Configure the operating system to contain no duplicate names for groups. +Edit the file "/etc/group" and provide each group that has a duplicate group id with a unique group id. + Is it the case that the system has duplicate group ids? + + + + To ensure write permissions are disabled for group and other + for each element in root's path, run the following command: +# ls -ld DIR + Is it the case that group or other write permissions exist? + + + + Verify the umask setting is configured correctly in the /etc/bashrc file with the following command: + +$ sudo grep "umask" /etc/bashrc + +umask + Is it the case that the value for the "umask" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", or the "umask" parameter is missing or is commented out? + + + + Verify the "umask" setting is configured correctly in the "/etc/csh.cshrc" file with the following command: + +$ grep umask /etc/csh.cshrc + +umask 077 +umask 077 + Is it the case that the value for the "umask" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", or the "umask" parameter is missing or is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 defines default permissions for all authenticated users in such a way that the user can only read and modify their own files with the following command: + +# grep -i umask /etc/login.defs + +UMASK + Is it the case that the value for the "UMASK" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", or the "UMASK" parameter is missing or is commented out? + + + + Run the following command to ensure the TMOUT value is configured for all users +on the system: + +$ sudo grep TMOUT /etc/profile /etc/profile.d/*.sh + +The output should return the following: +TMOUT= + Is it the case that value of TMOUT is not less than or equal to expected setting? + + + + Verify the umask setting is configured correctly in the /etc/profile file +or scripts within /etc/profile.d directory with the following command: +$ grep "umask" /etc/profile* +umask + Is it the case that the value for the "umask" parameter is not "<sub idref="var_accounts_user_umask" />", +or the "umask" parameter is missing or is commented out? + + + + Verify that the default umask for all local interactive users is "077". + +Identify the locations of all local interactive user home directories by looking at the "/etc/passwd" file. + +Check all local interactive user initialization files for interactive users with the following command: + +Note: The example is for a system that is configured to create users home directories in the "/home" directory. + +# grep -ri umask /home/ + +/home/smithj/.bash_history:grep -i umask /etc/bashrc /etc/csh.cshrc /etc/profile +/home/smithj/.bash_history:grep -i umask /etc/login.defs + Is it the case that any local interactive user initialization files are found to have a umask statement that sets a value less restrictive than "077"? + + + + Verify all local interactive users on Oracle Linux 9 are assigned a home +directory upon creation with the following command: +$ grep -i create_home /etc/login.defs +CREATE_HOME yes + Is it the case that the value for "CREATE_HOME" parameter is not set to "yes", the line is missing, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 enforces a delay of at least seconds between console logon prompts following a failed logon attempt with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i "FAIL_DELAY" /etc/login.defs +FAIL_DELAY + Is it the case that the value of "FAIL_DELAY" is not set to "<sub idref="var_accounts_fail_delay" />" or greater, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 limits the number of concurrent sessions to +"" for all +accounts and/or account types with the following command: +$ grep -r -s maxlogins /etc/security/limits.conf /etc/security/limits.d/*.conf +/etc/security/limits.conf:* hard maxlogins 10 +This can be set as a global domain (with the * wildcard) but may be set differently for multiple domains. + Is it the case that the "maxlogins" item is missing, commented out, or the value is set greater +than "<sub idref="var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions" />" and +is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an +operational requirement for all domains that have the "maxlogins" item +assigned'? + + + + Run the following command to ensure that /tmp is configured as a +polyinstantiated directory: +$ sudo grep /tmp /etc/security/namespace.conf +The output should return the following: +/tmp /tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm + Is it the case that is not configured? + + + + Run the following command to ensure that /var/tmp is configured as a +polyinstantiated directory: +$ sudo grep /var/tmp /etc/security/namespace.conf +The output should return the following: +/var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm + Is it the case that is not configured? + + + + Verify that local initialization files do not execute world-writable programs with the following command: + +Note: The example will be for a system that is configured to create user home directories in the "/home" directory. + +$ sudo find /home -perm -002 -type f -name ".[^.]*" -exec ls -ld {} \; + Is it the case that any local initialization files are found to reference world-writable files? + + + + Verify that all local interactive user initialization file executable search path statements do not contain statements that will reference a working directory other than user home directories with the following commands: + +$ sudo grep -i path= /home/*/.* + +/home/[localinteractiveuser]/.bash_profile:PATH=$PATH:$HOME/.local/bin:$HOME/bin + Is it the case that any local interactive user initialization files have executable search path statements that include directories outside of their home directory and is not documented with the ISSO as an operational requirement? + + + + Verify that interactive users on the system have a home directory assigned with the following command: + +$ sudo awk -F: '($3>=1000)&&($7 !~ /nologin/){print $1, $3, $6}' /etc/passwd + +Inspect the output and verify that all interactive users (normally users with a UID greater than 1000) have a home directory defined. + Is it the case that users home directory is not defined? + + + + Verify the assigned home directories of all interactive users on the system exist with the following command: + +$ sudo pwck -r + +user 'mailnull': directory 'var/spool/mqueue' does not exist + +The output should not return any interactive users. + Is it the case that users home directory does not exist? + + + + To verify the assigned home directory of all interactive users is group- +owned by that users primary GID, run the following command: +# ls -ld $(awk -F: '($3>=1000)&&($7 !~ /nologin/){print $6}' /etc/passwd) + Is it the case that the group ownership is incorrect? + + + + To verify that all user initialization files have a mode of 0740 or +less permissive, run the following command: +$ sudo find /home -type f -name '\.*' \( -perm -0002 -o -perm -0020 \) +There should be no output. + Is it the case that they are not 0740 or more permissive? + + + + To verify the assigned home directory of all interactive user home directories +have a mode of 0750 or less permissive, run the following command: +$ sudo ls -l /home +Inspect the output for any directories with incorrect permissions. + Is it the case that they are more permissive? + + + + To ensure the user home directory is not group-writable or world-readable, run the following: +# ls -ld /home/USER + Is it the case that the user home directory is group-writable or world-readable? + + + + Verify that authselect is enabled by running +authselect current +If authselect is enabled on the system, the output should show the ID of the profile which is currently in use. + Is it the case that authselect is not used to manage user authentication setup on the system? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +chmod system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "chmod" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +chown system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "chown" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +fchmod system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "fchmod" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +fchmodat system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "fchmodat" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +fchown system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "fchown" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +fchownat system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "fchownat" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +fremovexattr system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "fremovexattr" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +fsetxattr system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "fsetxattr" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +lchown system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "lchown" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +lremovexattr system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "lremovexattr" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +lsetxattr system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "lsetxattr" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +removexattr system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "removexattr" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +setxattr system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "setxattr" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for all uses of the "umount" and system call. +To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +"umount" system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "umount" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line like the following. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S umount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-umount + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +umount2 system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "umount2" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "chacl" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep chacl + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k perm_mod + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "setfacl" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep setfacl + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k perm_mod + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "chcon" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep chcon + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k perm_mod + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "restorecon" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep restorecon + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/restorecon -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-restorecon + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "semanage" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep semanage + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/semanage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix-update + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "setfiles" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep setfiles + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setfiles -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix-update + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "setsebool" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep setsebool + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/setsebool -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + To verify that execution of the command is being audited, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "path=/usr/sbin/seunshare" /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* +The output should return something similar to: +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=privileged + Is it the case that ? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +rmdir system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "rmdir" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. +To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +unlink system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "unlink" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. +To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +unlinkat system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "unlinkat" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. +To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +rename system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "rename" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. +To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +renameat system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "renameat" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +rename system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "rename" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +renameat system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "renameat" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +rmdir system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "rmdir" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +unlink system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "unlink" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +unlinkat system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "unlinkat" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To verify that the audit system collects unauthorized file accesses, run the following commands: +$ sudo grep EACCES /etc/audit/audit.rules +$ sudo grep EPERM /etc/audit/audit.rules + Is it the case that 32-bit and 64-bit system calls to creat, open, openat, open_by_handle_at, truncate, and ftruncate are not audited during EACCES and EPERM? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the creat system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r creat /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep creat /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the ftruncate system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r ftruncate /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep ftruncate /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the open system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r open /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep open /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the open_by_handle_at system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep open_by_handle_at /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the openat system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r openat /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep openat /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the rename system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r rename /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep rename /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the renameat system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r renameat /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep renameat /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the truncate system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r truncate /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep truncate /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k access + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the unlink system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r unlink /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep unlink /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates an audit record for unsuccessful attempts to use the unlinkat system call. + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "augenrules" program to to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -r unlinkat /etc/audit/rules.d + +If the auditd daemon is configured to use the "auditctl" utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep unlinkat /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlinkat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k unsuccessful-delete + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +init_module system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "init_module" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. +To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +delete_module system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "delete_module" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +delete_module system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "delete_module" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +finit_module system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "finit_module" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +init_module system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "init_module" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/security/opasswd" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep /var/log/faillock + +-w /var/log/faillock -p wa -k logins + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/var/log/lastlog" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep /var/log/lastlog + +-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/var/log/tallylog" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep /var/log/tallylog + +-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "init" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep init + +-a always,exit -F path=/init -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-init + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "poweroff" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep poweroff + +-a always,exit -F path=/poweroff -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-poweroff + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "reboot" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep reboot + +-a always,exit -F path=/reboot -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-reboot + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "shutdown" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep shutdown + +-a always,exit -F path=/shutdown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-shutdown + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the following command +to search privileged commands in relevant partitions and check if they are covered by auditd +rules: + +FILTER_NODEV=$(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) +PARTITIONS=$(findmnt -n -l -k -it $FILTER_NODEV | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid" | awk '{ print $1 }') +for PARTITION in $PARTITIONS; do + for PRIV_CMD in $(find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null); do + grep -qr "${PRIV_CMD}" /etc/audit/rules.d /etc/audit/audit.rules && + printf "OK: ${PRIV_CMD}\n" || printf "WARNING - rule not found for: ${PRIV_CMD}\n" + done +done + +The output should not contain any WARNING. + Is it the case that any setuid or setgid programs doesn't have a line in the audit rules? + + + + To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the +following command: +$ sudo grep '\bat\b' /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* +It should return a relevant line in the audit rules. + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "chage" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep chage + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + If the system is not configured to audit time changes, this is a finding. +If the system is 64-bit only, this is not applicable +ocil: | +To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +stime system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "stime" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "chsh" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep chsh + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chsh -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chsh + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "crontab" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep crontab + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-crontab + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "gpasswd" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep gpasswd + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-gpasswd + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "kmod" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep kmod + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-kmod + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "mount" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep mount + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-mount + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "newgrp" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep newgrp + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-newgrp + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "pam_timestamp_check" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep pam_timestamp_check + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-pam_timestamp_check + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "passwd" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep passwd + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-passwd + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "postdrop" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep postdrop + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/postdrop -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-postdrop + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "postqueue" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep postqueue + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/postqueue -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-postqueue + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "pt_chown" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep pt_chown + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/pt_chown -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-pt_chown + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "ssh-agent" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep ssh-agent + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-agent + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "ssh-keysign" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep ssh-keysign + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-ssh-keysign + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "su" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep su + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/su -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-su + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "sudo" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep sudo + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-sudo + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "sudoedit" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep sudoedit + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudoedit -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-sudoedit + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "umount" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep umount + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-umount + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "unix_chkpwd" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep unix_chkpwd + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix_chkpwd + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "unix_update" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep unix_update + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/unix_update -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-unix_update + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "userhelper" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep userhelper + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-userhelper + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "usermod" command with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep usermod + +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-usermod + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + To verify that auditing of privileged command use is configured, run the +following command: +$ sudo grep usernetctl /etc/audit/audit.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/* +It should return a relevant line in the audit rules. + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +adjtimex system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "adjtimex" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +clock_settime system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "clock_settime" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +settimeofday system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "settimeofday" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit attempts to +alter time via the /etc/localtime file, run the following +command: +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep "watch=/etc/localtime" +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit time changes? + + + + Verify the audit system prevents unauthorized changes with the following command: + +$ sudo grep "^\s*[^#]" /etc/audit/audit.rules | tail -1 +-e 2 + + Is it the case that the audit system is not set to be immutable by adding the "-e 2" option to the end of "/etc/audit/audit.rules"? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit changes to its SELinux +configuration files, run the following command: +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep "dir=/etc/selinux" +If the system is configured to watch for changes to its SELinux +configuration, a line should be returned (including +perm=wa indicating permissions that are watched). + Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit attempts to change the MAC policy? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit changes to its SELinux +configuration files, run the following command: +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep "dir=/usr/share/selinux" +If the system is configured to watch for changes to its SELinux +configuration, a line should be returned (including +perm=wa indicating permissions that are watched). + Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit attempts to change the MAC policy? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit calls to the +mount system call, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "mount" /etc/audit/audit.* +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit changes to its network configuration, +run the following command: +auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/issue|/etc/issue.net|/etc/hosts|/etc/sysconfig/network)' +If the system is configured to watch for network configuration changes, a line should be returned for +each file specified (and perm=wa should be indicated for each). + Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit changes of the network configuration? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/sudoers" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep /etc/sudoers + +-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k identity + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/sudoers.d/" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep/etc/sudoers.d + +-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k identity + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 audits the execution of privileged functions. + +Check if Oracle Linux 9 is configured to audit the execution of the "execve" system call using the following command: + +$ sudo grep execve /etc/audit/audit.rules + +The output should be the following: + + +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k setuid +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C gid!=egid -F egid=0 -k setgid + Is it the case that the command does not return all lines, or the lines are commented out? + + + + To verify that auditing is configured for system administrator actions, run the following command: +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep "watch=/etc/sudoers\|watch=/etc/sudoers.d\|-w /etc/sudoers\|-w /etc/sudoers.d" + Is it the case that there is not output? + + + + To verify that the system will shutdown when auditd fails, +run the following command: +$ sudo grep "\-f " /etc/audit/audit.rules +The output should contain: +-f + Is it the case that the system is not configured to shutdown on auditd failures? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit account changes, +run the following command: +auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|/etc/group|/etc/gshadow|/etc/security/opasswd)' +If the system is configured to watch for account changes, lines should be returned for +each file specified (and with perm=wa for each). + Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit account changes? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/group" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/group)' + +-w /etc/group -p wa -k identity + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/gshadow" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/gshadow)' + +-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k identity + +If the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out, this is a finding. + Is it the case that the system is not configured to audit account changes? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/security/opasswd" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/security/opasswd)' + +-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k identity + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/passwd" with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/passwd)' + +-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity + Is it the case that the command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 generates audit records for all account creations, modifications, disabling, and termination events that affect "/etc/passwd with the following command: + +$ sudo auditctl -l | grep -E '(/etc/shadow)' + +-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity + Is it the case that command does not return a line, or the line is commented out? + + + + To determine if the system is configured to audit accesses to +/var/log/audit directory, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "dir=/var/log/audit" /etc/audit/audit.rules +If the system is configured to audit this activity, it will return a line. + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +Determine the audit log group by running the following command: + +$ sudo grep -P '^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=.*$' /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +Then, check that all directories within the /var/log/audit directory are owned by the group specified as log_group or by root if the log_group is not specified. +Run the following command: + +$ sudo find /var/log/audit -type d -printf "%p %g\n" + +All listed directories must be owned by the log_group or by root if the log_group is not specified. + Is it the case that there is a directory owned by different group? + + + + Determine where the audit logs are stored with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log + +Determine the owner of the audit log directory by using the output of the above command +(default: "/var/log/audit/"). Run the following command with the correct audit log directory +path: + +$ sudo ls -ld /var/log/audit + +drwx------ 2 root root 23 Jun 11 11:56 /var/log/audit + +The audit log directory must be owned by "root" + Is it the case that the directory is not owned by root? + + + + Verify the audit log directories have a correct mode or less permissive mode. + +Find the location of the audit logs: + +$ sudo grep "^log_file" /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + +Find the group that owns audit logs: + +$ sudo grep "^log_group" /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + +Run the following command to check the mode of the system audit logs: + +$ sudo stat -c "%a %n" [audit_log_directory] + +Replace "[audit_log_directory]" to the correct audit log directory path, by default this location is "/var/log/audit". + + +If the log_group is "root" or is not set, the correct permissions are 0700, otherwise they are 0750. + Is it the case that audit logs have a more permissive mode? + + + + Check group owners of the system audit logs. + +First, determine where the audit log file is located. + +$ sudo grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf +log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log + +The log_file option specifies the audit log file path. +If the log_file option isn't defined, check all files within /var/log/audit directory. + + +Then, determine the audit log group by running the following command: +$ sudo grep -P '^[ ]*log_group[ ]+=.*$' /etc/audit/auditd.conf + + +Then, check that the audit log file is owned by the correct group. +Run the following command to display the owner of the audit log file: + +$ sudo stat -c "%n %G" log_file + + +The audit log file must be owned by the log_group or by root if the log_group is not specified. + Is it the case that audit log files are owned by incorrect group? + + + + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/audit/, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/audit/ + +To properly set the group owner of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: +$ sudo chgrp root /etc/audit/rules.d/ + Is it the case that ? + + + + +To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/audit/ + +To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /etc/audit/rules.d/ + Is it the case that ? + + + + +To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit + +To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: +$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit/* + Is it the case that ? + + + + Verify the audit logs are owned by "root". First, determine where the audit logs are stored with the following command: +$ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf +log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log +Using the location of the audit log file, determine if the audit log is owned by "root" using the following command: +$ sudo stat -c "%n %U" /var/log/audit/audit.log +Audit logs must be owned by user root. +If the log_file isn't defined in /etc/audit/auditd.conf, check all files in /var/log/audit/ directory instead. + Is it the case that the audit log is not owned by root? + + + + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/ + +To properly set the permissions of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: +$ sudo chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/ + Is it the case that ? + + + + Run the following command to check the mode of the system audit logs: +$ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf +log_file=/var/log/audit/audit.log +$ sudo stat -c "%n %a" /var/log/audit/* +$ sudo ls -l /var/log/audit +Audit logs must be mode 0640 or less permissive. + Is it the case that any permissions are more permissive? + + + + To verify whether audispd plugin off-loads audit records onto a different +system or media from the system being audited, run the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i remote_server /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf + +The output should return something similar to where REMOTE_SYSTEM +is an IP address or hostname: +remote_server = REMOTE_SYSTEM + +Determine which partition the audit records are being written to with the +following command: + +$ sudo grep log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf +log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log + +Check the size of the partition that audit records are written to with the +following command and verify whether it is sufficiently large: + +$ sudo df -h /var/log/audit/ +/dev/sda2 24G 10.4G 13.6G 43% /var/log/audit + Is it the case that audispd is not sending logs to a remote system and the local partition has inadequate space? + + + + To verify the audispd's syslog plugin is active, run the following command: +$ sudo grep active /etc/audit/plugins.d/syslog.conf +If the plugin is active, the output will show yes. + Is it the case that it is not activated? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs. + +Check that Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs with the following command: + +$ sudo grep disk_error_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +disk_error_action = + +If the value of the "disk_error_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit process failure occurs. + Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs. + +Check that Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when an audit processing failure occurs with the following command: + +$ sudo grep disk_error_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +disk_error_action = HALT + +If the value of the "disk_error_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit process failure occurs. + Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full. + +Check that Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full with the following command: + +$ sudo grep disk_full_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +disk_full_action = + +If the value of the "disk_full_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit storage volume is full. + Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full. + +Check that Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when the audit storage volume is full with the following command: + +$ sudo grep disk_full_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +disk_full_action = + +If the value of the "disk_full_action" option is not "SYSLOG", "SINGLE", or "HALT", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit storage volume is full. + Is it the case that there is no evidence of appropriate action? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to notify the SA and/or ISSO (at a minimum) in the event of an audit processing failure with the following command: + +$ sudo grep action_mail_acct /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +action_mail_acct = + Is it the case that the value of the "action_mail_acct" keyword is not set to "<sub idref="var_auditd_action_mail_acct" />" and/or other accounts for security personnel, the "action_mail_acct" keyword is missing, or the retuned line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how they and the ISSO are notified of an audit process failure. If there is no evidence of the proper personnel being notified of an audit processing failure? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 is configured to take action in the event of allocated audit record storage volume reaches 95 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: + +$ sudo grep admin_space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +admin_space_left_action = single + +If the value of the "admin_space_left_action" is not set to "single", or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is providing real-time alerts to the SA and ISSO. + Is it the case that there is no evidence that real-time alerts are configured on the system? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 takes action when allocated audit record storage volume reaches 95 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -w admin_space_left /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +admin_space_left = % + +If the value of the "admin_space_left" keyword is not set to % of the storage volume allocated to audit logs, or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is taking action if the allocated storage is about to reach capacity. + Is it the case that the "admin_space_left" value is not configured to the correct value? + + + + Inspect /etc/audit/auditd.conf and locate the following line to +determine if the system is configured to synchronize audit event data +with the log files on the disk: +$ sudo grep flush /etc/audit/auditd.conf +flush = DATA +Acceptable values are DATA, and SYNC. The setting is +case-insensitive. + Is it the case that auditd is not configured to synchronously write audit event data to disk? + + + + Inspect /etc/audit/auditd.conf and locate the following line to +determine how much data the system will retain in each audit log file: +$ sudo grep max_log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf +max_log_file = 6 + Is it the case that the system audit data threshold has not been properly configured? + + + + Verify that the SA and ISSO (at a minimum) are notified when the audit storage volume is full. + +Check which action Oracle Linux 9 takes when the audit storage volume is full with the following command: + +$ sudo grep max_log_file_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf +max_log_file_action = + Is it the case that the value of the "max_log_file_action" option is set to "ignore", "rotate", or "suspend", or the line is commented out? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when the audit files have reached maximum size. + +Check that Oracle Linux 9 takes the appropriate action when the audit files have reached maximum size with the following command: + +$ sudo grep max_log_file_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +max_log_file_action = + Is it the case that the value of the "max_log_file_action" option is not "ROTATE", "SINGLE", or the line is commented out, ask the system administrator to indicate how the system takes appropriate action when an audit storage volume is full. If there is no evidence of appropriate action? + + + + Inspect /etc/audit/auditd.conf and locate the following line to +determine how many logs the system is configured to retain after rotation: +$ sudo grep num_logs /etc/audit/auditd.conf +num_logs = 5 + Is it the case that the system log file retention has not been properly configured? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 notifies the SA and ISSO (at a minimum) when allocated audit record storage volume reaches 75 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -w space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +space_left_action = + +If the value of the "space_left_action" is not set to "", or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is providing real-time alerts to the SA and ISSO. + Is it the case that there is no evidence that real-time alerts are configured on the system? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 takes action when allocated audit record storage volume reaches 75 percent of the repository maximum audit record storage capacity with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -w space_left /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +space_left = % + Is it the case that the value of the "space_left" keyword is not set to <sub idref="var_auditd_space_left_percentage" />% of the storage volume allocated to audit logs, or if the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator to indicate how the system is providing real-time alerts to the SA and ISSO. If the "space_left" value is not configured to the correct value? + + + + To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to flush to disk after +every records, run the following command: +$ sudo grep freq /etc/audit/auditd.conf +The output should return the following: +freq = + Is it the case that freq isn't set to <sub idref="var_auditd_freq" />? + + + + To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to include local events, run the +following command: +$ sudo grep local_events /etc/audit/auditd.conf +The output should return the following: +local_events = yes + Is it the case that local_events isn't set to yes? + + + + To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to resolve all uid, gid, syscall, +architecture, and socket address information before writing the event to disk, +run the following command: +$ sudo grep log_format /etc/audit/auditd.conf +The output should return the following: +log_format = ENRICHED + Is it the case that log_format isn't set to ENRICHED? + + + + To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to record the hostname +in audit events, run the following command: +$ sudo grep name_format /etc/audit/auditd.conf +The output should return the following: +name_format = hostname + Is it the case that name_format isn't set to hostname? + + + + Verify the audit system is configured to take an appropriate action when the internal event queue is full: +$ sudo grep -i overflow_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf + +The output should contain overflow_action = syslog + +If the value of the "overflow_action" option is not set to syslog, +single, halt or the line is commented out, ask the System Administrator +to indicate how the audit logs are off-loaded to a different system or media. + Is it the case that auditd overflow action is not set correctly? + + + + To verify that Audit Daemon is configured to write logs to the disk, run the +following command: +$ sudo grep write_logs /etc/audit/auditd.conf +The output should return the following: +write_logs = yes + Is it the case that write_logs isn't set to yes? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Successful file access (any other opens) This has to go last. +## These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,openat2,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/10-base-config.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## First rule - delete all +-D + +## Increase the buffers to survive stress events. +## Make this bigger for busy systems +-b 8192 + +## This determine how long to wait in burst of events +--backlog_wait_time 60000 + +## Set failure mode to syslog +-f 1 + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Successful file creation (open with O_CREAT) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Unsuccessful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Successful file delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +$ sudo cat /etc/audit/rules.d/11-loginuid.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Make the loginuid immutable. This prevents tampering with the auid. +--loginuid-immutable + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Successful file modifications (open for write or truncate) +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/43-module-load.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## These rules watch for kernel module insertion. By monitoring +## the syscall, we do not need any watches on programs. +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module -F key=module-load +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -F key=module-unload + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating +## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having +## the following rule files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d: +## +## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-1-create-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-1-create-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-2-modify-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-3-access-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-3-access-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-failed.rules, 30-ospp-v42-4-delete-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules, +## 30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules +## +## original copies may be found in /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ + + +## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and +## shadow for writes +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify + +## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could +## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and +## gshadow for writes +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify + + +## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid +## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because +## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration. +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes + +## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam. + +## Watch for configuration changes to privilege escalation. +-a always,exit -F path=/etc/sudoers -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/sudoers.d/ -F perm=wa -F key=special-config-changes + +## Audit log access +-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail +## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information +-a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session +-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session + +## Attempts to modify MAC controls +-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy + +## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm. + +## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd + +## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules + +## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement +## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to +## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by +## that daemon. + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-failed.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Unsuccessful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-owner-change + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-6-owner-change-success.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Successful ownership change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-owner-change + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-failed.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Unsuccessful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + To verify that the Audit is correctly configured according to recommended rules, check the content of the file with the following command: +cat /etc/audit/rules.d/30-ospp-v42-5-perm-change-success.rules +The output has to be exactly as follows: +## Successful permission change +-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change +-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change + Is it the case that the file does not exist or the content differs? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes audit=1, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*audit=1.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*audit=1.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'audit=1' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that auditing is not enabled at boot time? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes audit_backlog_limit=8192, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*audit_backlog_limit=8192.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*audit_backlog_limit=8192.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'audit_backlog_limit=8192' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that audit backlog limit is not configured? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the audispd-plugins package is installed: $ rpm -q audispd-plugins + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the audit package is installed: $ rpm -q audit + Is it the case that the audit package is not installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +auditd service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active auditd +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the auditd service is not running? + + + + To check the group ownership of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /boot/grub2/grub.cfg +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /boot/grub2/user.cfg +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /boot/grub2/user.cfg does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /boot/grub2/grub.cfg +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /boot/grub2/grub.cfg does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /boot/grub2/user.cfg +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /boot/grub2/user.cfg does not have an owner of root? + + + + To verify the boot loader superuser account has been set, run the following +command: +sudo grep -A1 "superusers" /boot/grub2/grub.cfg +The output should show the following: +set superusers="superusers-account" +export superusers +where superusers-account is the actual account name different from common names like root, +admin, or administrator and different from any other existing user name. + Is it the case that superuser account is not set or is set to root, admin, administrator or any other existing user name? + + + + First, check whether the password is defined in either /boot/grub2/user.cfg or +/boot/grub2/grub.cfg. +Run the following commands: +$ sudo grep '^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$' /boot/grub2/user.cfg +$ sudo grep '^[\s]*password_pbkdf2[\s]+.*[\s]+grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$' /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + + +Second, check that a superuser is defined in /boot/grub2/grub.cfg. +$ sudo grep '^[\s]*set[\s]+superusers=("?)[a-zA-Z_]+\1$' /boot/grub2/grub.cfg + Is it the case that it does not produce any output? + + + + To check the group ownership of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /boot/grub2/user.cfg +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /boot/grub2/user.cfg does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To verify the boot loader superuser account has been set, run the following +command: +sudo grep -A1 "superusers" /boot/grub2/grub.cfg +The output should show the following: +set superusers="superusers-account" +export superusers +where superusers-account is the actual account name different from common names like root, +admin, or administrator and different from any other existing user name. + Is it the case that superuser account is not set or is set to an existing name or to a common name? + + + + To verify the boot loader superuser password has been set, run the following command: +$ sudo grep "^[\s]*GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub\.pbkdf2\.sha512.*$" /boot/grub2/user.cfg +The output should be similar to: +GRUB2_PASSWORD=grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.C4E08AC72FBFF7E837FD267BFAD7AEB3D42DDC +2C99F2A94DD5E2E75C2DC331B719FE55D9411745F82D1B6CFD9E927D61925F9BBDD1CFAA0080E0 +916F7AB46E0D.1302284FCCC52CD73BA3671C6C12C26FF50BA873293B24EE2A96EE3B57963E6D7 +0C83964B473EC8F93B07FE749AA6710269E904A9B08A6BBACB00A2D242AD828 + Is it the case that no password is set? + + + + Verify that GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY is set to true in /etc/default/grub to disable recovery boot. +Run the following command: + +$ sudo grep GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY /etc/default/grub + Is it the case that GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY is not set to true or is missing? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes iommu=force, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*iommu=force.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*iommu=force.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'iommu=force' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that I/OMMU is not activated? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes init_on_alloc=1, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*init_on_alloc=1.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*init_on_alloc=1.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'init_on_alloc=1' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that the kernel is not configured to zero out memory before allocation? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes l1tf=, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*l1tf=.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*l1tf=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'l1tf=' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that l1tf mitigations are not configured appropriately? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes mce=0, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*mce=0.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*mce=0.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'mce=0' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that MCE tolerance is not set to zero? + + + + Make sure that the kernel is not disabling SMAP with the following +commands. +grep -q nosmap /boot/config-`uname -r` +If the command returns a line, it means that SMAP is being disabled. + Is it the case that the kernel is configured to disable SMAP? + + + + Make sure that the kernel is not disabling SMEP with the following +commands. +grep -q nosmep /boot/config-`uname -r` +If the command returns a line, it means that SMEP is being disabled. + Is it the case that the kernel is configured to disable SMEP? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes page_alloc.shuffle=1, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*page_alloc.shuffle=1.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*page_alloc.shuffle=1.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'page_alloc.shuffle=1' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that randomization of the page allocator is not enabled in the kernel? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes pti=on, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*pti=on.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*pti=on.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'pti=on' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that Kernel page-table isolation is not enabled? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes rng_core.default_quality=, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*rng_core.default_quality=.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*rng_core.default_quality=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'rng_core.default_quality=' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that trust on hardware random number generator is not configured appropriately? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes slab_nomerge=yes, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*slab_nomerge=yes.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*slab_nomerge=yes.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'slab_nomerge=yes' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that merging of slabs with similar size is enabled? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes spec_store_bypass_disable=, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*spec_store_bypass_disable=.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*spec_store_bypass_disable=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'spec_store_bypass_disable=' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that SSB is not configured appropriately? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes spectre_v2=on, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*spectre_v2=on.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*spectre_v2=on.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'spectre_v2=on' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that spectre_v2 mitigation is not enforced? + + + + Ensure that debug-shell service is not enabled with the following command: +grep systemd\.debug-shell=1 /boot/grub2/grubenv /etc/default/grub +If the command returns a line, it means that debug-shell service is being enabled. + Is it the case that the comand returns a line? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes vsyscall=none, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*vsyscall=none.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*vsyscall=none.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'vsyscall=none' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that vsyscalls are enabled? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_BUG /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_FS /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_DEBUG_SG /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "65536" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_DEVKMEM /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_HIBERNATION /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_IPV6 /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_KEXEC /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_PROC_KCORE /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_RETPOLINE /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SECCOMP /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 /boot/config.* + + For each kernel installed, a line with value "y" should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + To determine the config value the kernel was built with, run the following command: + $ grep CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION /boot/config.* + + Configs with value 'n' are not explicitly set in the file, so either commented lines or no + lines should be returned. + + Is it the case that the kernel was not built with the required value? + + + + Verify that cron is logging to rsyslog, +run the following command: +grep -rni "cron\.\*" /etc/rsyslog.* +cron.* /var/log/cron + Is it the case that cron is not logging to rsyslog? + + + + Verify the operating system authenticates the remote logging server for off-loading audit logs with the following command: + +$ sudo grep -i '$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf +The output should be +$/etc/rsyslog.conf:$ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name + Is it the case that $ActionSendStreamDriverAuthMode in /etc/rsyslog.conf is not set to x509/name? + + + + Verify the operating system encrypts audit records off-loaded onto a different system +or media from the system being audited with the following commands: + +$ sudo grep -i '$ActionSendStreamDriverMode' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf + +The output should be: + +/etc/rsyslog.conf:$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1 + Is it the case that rsyslogd ActionSendStreamDriverMode is not set to 1? + + + + Verify the operating system encrypts audit records off-loaded onto a different system +or media from the system being audited with the following commands: + +$ sudo grep -i '$DefaultNetstreamDriver' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf + +The output should be: + +/etc/rsyslog.conf:$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls + Is it the case that rsyslogd DefaultNetstreamDriver not set to gtls? + + + + The group-owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be + +root. + +These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in +/etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. +To see the group-owner of a given log file, run the following command: +$ ls -l LOGFILE + Is it the case that the group-owner is not correct? + + + + The owner of all log files written by rsyslog should be + +root. + +These log files are determined by the second part of each Rule line in +/etc/rsyslog.conf and typically all appear in /var/log. +To see the owner of a given log file, run the following command: +$ ls -l LOGFILE + Is it the case that the owner is not correct? + + + + The file permissions for all log files written by rsyslog should +be set to 640, or more restrictive. These log files are determined by the +second part of each Rule line in /etc/rsyslog.conf and typically +all appear in /var/log. To see the permissions of a given log +file, run the following command: +$ ls -l LOGFILE +The permissions should be 640, or more restrictive. + Is it the case that the permissions are not correct? + + + + To verify that remote access methods are logging to rsyslog, +run the following command: +grep -rE '(auth.\*|authpriv.\*|daemon.\*)' /etc/rsyslog.* +The output should contain auth.*, authpriv.*, and daemon.* +pointing to a log file. + Is it the case that remote access methods are not logging to rsyslog? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +systemd-journald service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active systemd-journald +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the systemd-journald service is not running? + + + + To determine the status and frequency of logrotate, run the following command: +$ sudo grep logrotate /var/log/cron* +If logrotate is configured properly, output should include references to +/etc/cron.daily. + Is it the case that logrotate is not configured to run daily? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the logrotate package is installed: $ rpm -q logrotate + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine the current status of the logrotate timer: $ sudo systemctl is-active logrotate.timer If the timer is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that logrotate timer is not enabled? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the syslog-ng-core package is installed: $ rpm -q syslog-ng-core + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Verify that the system is not accepting "rsyslog" messages from other systems unless it is +documented as a log aggregation server. +Display the contents of the rsyslog configuration files: +find /etc -maxdepth 2 -regex '/etc/rsyslog\(\.conf\|\.d\/.*\.conf\)' -exec cat '{}' \; + +If any of the below lines are found, ask to see the documentation for the system being used +for log aggregation: + +If using legacy syntax: +$ModLoad imtcp +$InputTCPServerRun port +$ModLoad imudp +$UDPServerRun port +$ModLoad imrelp +$InputRELPServerRun port + +If using RainerScript syntax: +module(load="imtcp") +module(load="imudp") +input(type="imtcp" port="514") +input(type="imudp" port="514") + + Is it the case that rsyslog accepts remote messages and is not documented as a log aggregation system? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +syslog-ng service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active syslog-ng +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the "syslog-ng" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? + + + + To ensure logs are sent to a remote host, examine the file +/etc/rsyslog.conf. +If using UDP, a line similar to the following should be present: + *.* @ +If using TCP, a line similar to the following should be present: + *.* @@ +If using RELP, a line similar to the following should be present: + *.* :omrelp: + Is it the case that no evidence that the audit logs are being off-loaded to another system or media? + + + + To verify that rsyslog's Forwarding Output Module is configured +to use TLS for logging to remote server, run the following command: +$ grep omfwd /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf +The output should include record similar to +action(type="omfwd" protocol="tcp" Target="<remote system>" port="6514" + StreamDriver="gtls" StreamDriverMode="1" StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name" streamdriver.CheckExtendedKeyPurpose="on") + +where the <remote system> present in the configuration line above must be a valid IP address or a host name of the remote logging server. + Is it the case that omfwd is not configured with gtls and AuthMode? + + + + To verify that rsyslog's Forwarding Output Module has CA certificate +configured for its TLS connections to remote server, run the following command: +$ grep DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf +The output should include record similar to +global(DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile="/etc/pki/tls/cert.pem") +where the path to the CA file (/etc/pki/tls/cert.pem in case above) must point to the correct CA certificate. + Is it the case that CA certificate for rsyslog remote logging via TLS is not set? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the rsyslog-gnutls package is installed: +$ rpm -q rsyslog-gnutls + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the rsyslog package is installed: $ rpm -q rsyslog + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +rsyslog service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active rsyslog +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the "rsyslog" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the firewalld package is installed: $ rpm -q firewalld + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +firewalld service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active firewalld +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the "firewalld" service is disabled, masked, or not started.? + + + + Inspect the list of enabled firewall ports and verify they are configured correctly by running +the following command: + +$ sudo firewall-cmd --list-all + +Ask the System Administrator for the site or program Ports, Protocols, and Services Management Component Local Service Assessment (PPSM CLSA). Verify the services allowed by the firewall match the PPSM CLSA. + Is it the case that there are additional ports, protocols, or services that are not in the PPSM CLSA, or there are ports, protocols, or services that are prohibited by the PPSM Category Assurance List (CAL), or there are no firewall rules configured? + + + + Verify "firewalld" is configured to employ a deny-all, allow-by-exception policy for allowing connections to other systems with the following commands: + +$ sudo firewall-cmd --state + +running + +$ sudo firewall-cmd --get-active-zones + +[custom] +interfaces: ens33 + +$ sudo firewall-cmd --info-zone=[custom] | grep target + +target: DROP + Is it the case that no zones are active on the interfaces or if the target is set to a different option other than "DROP"? + + + + Inspect the file /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf to determine +the default zone for the firewalld. It should be set to DefaultZone=drop: +$ sudo grep DefaultZone /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + Is it the case that the default zone is not set to DROP? + + + + Verify "nftables" is configured to allow rate limits on any connection to the system with the following command: + +Verify "firewalld" has "nftables" set as the default backend: + +$ sudo grep -i firewallbackend /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf + +# FirewallBackend +FirewallBackend=nftables + Is it the case that the "nftables" is not set as the "firewallbackend"? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 does not have unauthorized IP tunnels configured. + + +# yum list installed libreswan +libreswan.x86-64 3.20-5.el7_4 + + +If "libreswan" is installed, check to see if the "IPsec" service is active with the following command: + +# systemctl status ipsec +ipsec.service - Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol Daemon for IPsec +Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/ipsec.service; disabled) +Active: inactive (dead) + + +If the "IPsec" service is active, check for configured IPsec connections (conn), perform the following: +grep -rni conn /etc/ipsec.conf /etc/ipsec.d/ +Verify any returned results for organizational approval. + Is it the case that the IPSec tunnels are not approved? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the libreswan package is installed: $ rpm -q libreswan + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + If IPv6 is disabled, this is not applicable. + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +ip6tables service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active ip6tables +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that ? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +iptables service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active iptables +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that ? + + + + If IPv6 is disabled, this is not applicable. + +Inspect the file /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables to determine +the default policy for the INPUT chain. It should be set to DROP: +$ sudo grep ":INPUT" /etc/sysconfig/ip6tables + Is it the case that the default policy for the INPUT chain is not set to DROP? + + + + Verify that the ipv6 loopback interface has required rules in order: +$ iptables -L INPUT -v -n + Is it the case that ipv6 loopback traffic is not configured? + + + + Run the following commands and verify output: + +# iptables -L INPUT -v -n | grep lo | grep ACCEPT + + +# iptables -L INPUT -v -n | grep 127.0.0.0\/8 | grep DROP + + +# iptables -L OUTPUT -v -n | grep lo | grep ACCEPT + + Is it the case that loopback traffic is not configured? + + + + Inspect the file /etc/sysconfig/iptables to determine +the default policy for the INPUT chain. It should be set to DROP: +$ sudo grep ":INPUT" /etc/sysconfig/iptables + Is it the case that the default policy for the INPUT chain is not set to DROP? + + + + Run the following command to ensure the default FORWARD policy is DROP: +grep ":FORWARD" /etc/sysconfig/iptables +The output should be similar to the following: +$ sudo grep ":FORWARD" /etc/sysconfig/iptables +:FORWARD DROP [0:0 + Is it the case that the default policy for the FORWARD chain is not set to DROP? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_defrtr +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_pinfo +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra_rtr_pref +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.autoconf +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding +0. +The ability to forward packets is only appropriate for routers. + Is it the case that IP forwarding value is "1" and the system is not router? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.max_addresses +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.router_solicitations +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + If the system uses IPv6, this is not applicable. + +If the system is configured to disable the +ipv6 kernel module, it will contain a line +of the form: +options ipv6 disable=1 +Such lines may be inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the +deprecated/etc/modprobe.conf. This permits insertion of the IPv6 +kernel module (which other parts of the system expect to be present), but +otherwise keeps it inactive. Run the following command to search for such +lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated +/etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r ipv6 /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that the ipv6 kernel module is not disabled? + + + + If the system uses IPv6, this is not applicable. + +If the system is configured to prevent the usage of the ipv6 on +network interfaces, it will contain a line of the form: +net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1 +Such lines may be inside any file in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. +This permits insertion of the IPv6 kernel module (which other parts of the +system expect to be present), but otherwise keeps all network interfaces +from using IPv6. Run the following command to search for such lines in all +files in /etc/sysctl.d: +$ grep -r ipv6 /etc/sysctl.d + Is it the case that the ipv6 support is disabled on all network interfaces? + + + + If the system uses IPv6, this is not applicable. + +If the system is configured to prevent the usage of the ipv6 on +network interfaces, it will contain a line of the form: +net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1 +Such lines may be inside any file in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. +This permits insertion of the IPv6 kernel module (which other parts of the +system expect to be present), but otherwise keeps network interfaces +from using IPv6. Run the following command to search for such lines in all +files in /etc/sysctl.d: +$ grep -r ipv6 /etc/sysctl.d + Is it the case that the ipv6 support is disabled by default on network interfaces? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_local +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter +. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore +. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.drop_gratuitous_arp +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter +The output of the command should indicate either: +net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 +or: +net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 2 +The output of the command should not indicate: +net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 0 + +The preferable way how to assure the runtime compliance is to have +correct persistent configuration, and rebooting the system. + +The persistent sysctl parameter configuration is performed by specifying the appropriate +assignment in any file located in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. +Verify that there is not any existing incorrect configuration by executing the following command: +$ grep -r '^\s*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\s*=' /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/sysctl.d +The command should not find any assignments other than: +net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 +or: +net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 2 + +Conflicting assignments are not allowed. + Is it the case that the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter is not set to 1 or 2 or is configured to be 0? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range +32768 65535. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + To verify that the operating system protects against or limits the effects of DoS +attacks by ensuring implementation of rate-limiting measures +on impacted network interfaces, run the following command: +# grep 'net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit' /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/sysctl.d/* +The command should output the following line: +/etc/sysctl.conf:net.ipv4.tcp_invalid_ratelimit = +The file where the line has been found can differ, but it must be either /etc/sysctl.conf +or a file located under the /etc/sysctl.d/ directory. + Is it the case that rate limiting of duplicate TCP acknowledgments is not configured? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_forward kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward +0. +The ability to forward packets is only appropriate for routers. + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + + +Run the following command to determine the current status of the +ufw service: +$ sudo systemctl is-active ufw +If the service is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the service is not enabled? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the atm kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the atm kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r atm /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the can kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the can kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r can /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the firewire-core kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the firewire-core kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r firewire-core /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the rds kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the rds kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r rds /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the sctp kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the sctp kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r sctp /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the tipc kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the tipc kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r tipc /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the bluetooth kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the bluetooth kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r bluetooth /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + Verify that there are no wireless interfaces configured on the system +with the following command: + +Note: This requirement is Not Applicable for systems that do not have physical wireless network radios. + +$ nmcli device status +DEVICE TYPE STATE CONNECTION +virbr0 bridge connected virbr0 +wlp7s0 wifi connected wifiSSID +enp6s0 ethernet disconnected -- +p2p-dev-wlp7s0 wifi-p2p disconnected -- +lo loopback unmanaged -- +virbr0-nic tun unmanaged -- + Is it the case that a wireless interface is configured and has not been documented and approved by the Information System Security Officer (ISSO)? + + + + Verify that DNS servers have been configured properly, perform the following: +$ sudo grep nameserver /etc/resolv.conf + Is it the case that less than two lines are returned that are not commented out? + + + + Verify that Promiscuous mode of an interface is disabled, run the following command: +$ ip link | grep PROMISC + Is it the case that any network device is in promiscuous mode? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/group-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/group- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/group- does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/gshadow-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/gshadow- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/gshadow- does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/passwd-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/passwd- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/passwd- does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/shadow-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/shadow- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/shadow- does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/group, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/group +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/group does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/gshadow, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/gshadow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/gshadow does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/passwd, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/passwd +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/passwd does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /etc/shadow, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/shadow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/shadow does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/group-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/group- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/group- does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/gshadow-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/gshadow- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/gshadow- does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/passwd-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/passwd- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/passwd- does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/shadow-, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/shadow- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/shadow- does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/group, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/group +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/group does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/gshadow, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/gshadow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/gshadow does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/passwd, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/passwd +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/passwd does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /etc/shadow, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /etc/shadow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /etc/shadow does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/group-, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/group- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r--r-- + Is it the case that /etc/group- does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/gshadow-, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/gshadow- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +---------- + Is it the case that /etc/gshadow- does not have unix mode ----------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/passwd-, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/passwd- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r--r-- + Is it the case that /etc/passwd- does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/shadow-, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/shadow- +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +---------- + Is it the case that /etc/shadow- does not have unix mode ----------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/group, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/group +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r--r-- + Is it the case that /etc/group does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/gshadow, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/gshadow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +---------- + Is it the case that /etc/gshadow does not have unix mode ----------? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/passwd, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/passwd +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r--r-- + Is it the case that /etc/passwd does not have unix mode -rw-r--r--? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/shadow, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/shadow +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +---------- + Is it the case that /etc/shadow does not have unix mode ----------? + + + + To check the group ownership of /var/log, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /var/log +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /var/log does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /var/log/messages, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /var/log/messages +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +root + Is it the case that /var/log/messages does not have a group owner of root? + + + + To check the group ownership of /var/log/syslog, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /var/log/syslog +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following group-owner: +adm + Is it the case that /var/log/syslog does not have a group owner of adm? + + + + To check the ownership of /var/log, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /var/log +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /var/log does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /var/log/messages, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /var/log/messages +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +root + Is it the case that /var/log/messages does not have an owner of root? + + + + To check the ownership of /var/log/syslog, +run the command: +$ ls -lL /var/log/syslog +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following owner: +syslog + Is it the case that /var/log/syslog does not have an owner of syslog? + + + + To check the permissions of /var/log, +run the command: +$ ls -l /var/log +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +drwxr-xr-x + Is it the case that /var/log does not have unix mode drwxr-xr-x? + + + + To check the permissions of /var/log/messages, +run the command: +$ ls -l /var/log/messages +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r----- + Is it the case that /var/log/messages does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? + + + + To check the permissions of /var/log/syslog, +run the command: +$ ls -l /var/log/syslog +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r----- + Is it the case that /var/log/syslog does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? + + + + Verify the system-wide shared library directories are group-owned by "root" with the following command: + +$ sudo find /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -group root -type d -exec stat -c "%n %G" '{}' \; + +If any system-wide shared library directory is returned and is not group-owned by a required system account, this is a finding. + Is it the case that any system-wide shared library directory is returned and is not group-owned by a required system account? + + + + System executables are stored in the following directories by default: +/bin +/sbin +/usr/bin +/usr/local/bin +/usr/local/sbin +/usr/sbin +For each of these directories, run the following command to find files +not owned by root: +$ sudo find -L DIR/ ! -user root -type d -exec chown root {} \; + Is it the case that any system executables directories are found to not be owned by root? + + + + Verify the system-wide shared library directories are owned by "root" with the following command: + +$ sudo find /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -user root -type d -exec stat -c "%n %U" '{}' \; + Is it the case that any system-wide shared library directory is not owned by root? + + + + System executables are stored in the following directories by default: +/bin +/sbin +/usr/bin +/usr/sbin +/usr/local/bin +/usr/local/sbin +To find system executables directories that are group-writable or +world-writable, run the following command for each directory DIR +which contains system executables: +$ sudo find -L DIR -perm /022 -type d + Is it the case that any of these files are group-writable or world-writable? + + + + Shared libraries are stored in the following directories: +/lib +/lib64 +/usr/lib +/usr/lib64 + +To find shared libraries that are group-writable or world-writable, +run the following command for each directory DIR which contains shared libraries: +$ sudo find -L DIR -perm /022 -type d + Is it the case that any of these files are group-writable or world-writable? + + + + Verify the system commands contained in the following directories are group-owned by "root", or a required system account, with the following command: + +$ sudo find -L /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin ! -group root -exec ls -l {} \; + Is it the case that any system commands are returned and is not group-owned by a required system account? + + + + Verify the system commands contained in the following directories are owned by "root" with the following command: + +$ sudo find -L /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/libexec /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin ! -user root -exec ls -l {} \; + Is it the case that any system commands are found to not be owned by root? + + + + Verify the system-wide shared library files are owned by "root" with the following command: + +$ sudo find -L /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -user root -exec ls -l {} \; + Is it the case that any system wide shared library file is not owned by root? + + + + Verify the system commands contained in the following directories have mode "755" or less permissive with the following command: + +$ sudo find -L /bin /sbin /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/libexec /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin -perm /022 -exec ls -l {} \; + Is it the case that any system commands are found to be group-writable or world-writable? + + + + Verify the system-wide shared library files contained in the following directories have mode "755" or less permissive with the following command: + +$ sudo find -L /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 -perm /022 -type f -exec ls -l {} \; + Is it the case that any system-wide shared library file is found to be group-writable or world-writable? + + + + Verify the system-wide shared library files are group-owned by "root" with the following command: + +$ sudo find -L /lib /lib64 /usr/lib /usr/lib64 ! -group root -exec ls -l {} \; + Is it the case that any system wide shared library file is returned and is not group-owned by a required system account? + + + + The following command will discover and print world-writable directories that +are not owned by root. Run it once for each local partition PART: +$ sudo find PART -xdev -type d -perm -0002 -uid +0 -print + Is it the case that there are world-writable directories not owned by root? + + + + To find world-writable directories that lack the sticky bit, run the following command: +$ sudo find / -type d \( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) -print 2>/dev/null +fixtext: |- +Configure all world-writable directories to have the sticky bit set to prevent unauthorized and unintended information transferred via shared system resources. + +Set the sticky bit on all world-writable directories using the command, replace "[World-Writable Directory]" with any directory path missing the sticky bit: + +$ chmod a+t [World-Writable Directory] +srg_requirement: +A sticky bit must be set on all Oracle Linux 9 public directories to prevent unauthorized and unintended information transferred via shared system resources. + Is it the case that any world-writable directories are missing the sticky bit? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/audit/auditd.conf, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/audit/auditd.conf +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r----- + Is it the case that /etc/audit/auditd.conf does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? + + + + To check the permissions of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, +run the command: +$ ls -l /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw-r----- + Is it the case that /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules does not have unix mode -rw-r-----? + + + + To check the permissions of /boot/Sysem.map-*, +run the command: +$ ls -l /boot/Sysem.map-* +If properly configured, the output should indicate the following permissions: +-rw------- + Is it the case that ? + + + + To find SGID files, run the following command: +$ sudo find / -xdev -type f -perm -2000 + Is it the case that there is output? + + + + To find SUID files, run the following command: +$ sudo find / -xdev -type f -perm -4000 + Is it the case that only authorized files appear in the output of the find command? + + + + To find world-writable files, run the following command: +$ sudo find / -xdev -type f -perm -002 + Is it the case that there is output? + + + + The following command will discover and print any +files on local partitions which do not belong to a valid group. +$ df --local -P | awk '{if (NR!=1) print $6}' | sudo xargs -I '{}' find '{}' -xdev -nogroup + +Either remove all files and directories from the system that do not have a valid group, +or assign a valid group with the chgrp command: +$ sudo chgrp group file + Is it the case that there is output? + + + + The following command will discover and print any +files on local partitions which do not belong to a valid user. +$ df --local -P | awk {'if (NR!=1) print $6'} | sudo xargs -I '{}' find '{}' -xdev -nouser + +Either remove all files and directories from the system that do not have a +valid user, or assign a valid user to all unowned files and directories on +the system with the chown command: +$ sudo chown user file + Is it the case that files exist that are not owned by a valid user? + + + + The runtime status of the fs.protected_hardlinks kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl fs.protected_hardlinks +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the fs.protected_symlinks kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl fs.protected_symlinks +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the cramfs kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the cramfs kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r cramfs /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + +If the system is configured to prevent the loading of the usb-storage kernel module, +it will contain lines inside any file in /etc/modprobe.d or the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf. +These lines instruct the module loading system to run another program (such as /bin/true) upon a module install event. + +These lines can also instruct the module loading system to ignore the usb-storage kernel module via blacklist keyword. + +Run the following command to search for such lines in all files in /etc/modprobe.d and the deprecated /etc/modprobe.conf: +$ grep -r usb-storage /etc/modprobe.conf /etc/modprobe.d + Is it the case that no line is returned? + + + + To check that the autofs service is disabled in system boot configuration, +run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled autofs +Output should indicate the autofs service has either not been installed, +or has been disabled at all runlevels, as shown in the example below: +$ sudo systemctl is-enabled autofs disabled + +Run the following command to verify autofs is not active (i.e. not running) through current runtime configuration: +$ sudo systemctl is-active autofs + +If the service is not running the command will return the following output: +inactive + +The service will also be masked, to check that the autofs is masked, run the following command: +$ sudo systemctl show autofs | grep "LoadState\|UnitFileState" + +If the service is masked the command will return the following outputs: + +LoadState=masked + +UnitFileState=masked + Is it the case that the "autofs" is loaded and not masked? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /boot mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot\s' + . . . /boot . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/boot" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /boot mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot\s' + . . . /boot . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/boot" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /boot mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/boot\s' + . . . /boot . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/boot" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /dev/shm mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/dev/shm\s' + . . . /dev/shm . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/dev/shm" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /dev/shm mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/dev/shm\s' + . . . /dev/shm . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/dev/shm" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /dev/shm mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/dev/shm\s' + . . . /dev/shm . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/dev/shm" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the grpquota option is configured for the /home mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' + . . . /home . . . grpquota . . . + + Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "grpquota" option set? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /home mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' + . . . /home . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /home mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' + . . . /home . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /home mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' + . . . /home . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the usrquota option is configured for the /home mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/home\s' + . . . /home . . . usrquota . . . + + Is it the case that the "/home" file system does not have the "usrquota" option set? + + + + To verify the nodev option is configured for non-root local partitions, run the following command: +$ sudo mount | grep '^/dev\S* on /\S' | grep --invert-match 'nodev' +The output shows local non-root partitions mounted without the nodev option, and there should be no output at all. + + Is it the case that some mounts appear among output lines? + + + + Verify file systems that are used for removable media are mounted with the "nodev" option with the following command: + +$ sudo more /etc/fstab + +UUID=2bc871e4-e2a3-4f29-9ece-3be60c835222 /mnt/usbflash vfat noauto,owner,ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec 0 0 + Is it the case that a file system found in "/etc/fstab" refers to removable media and it does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + To verify that binaries cannot be directly executed from removable media, run the following command: +$ grep -v noexec /etc/fstab +The resulting output will show partitions which do not have the noexec flag. Verify all partitions +in the output are not removable media. + Is it the case that removable media partitions are present? + + + + Verify file systems that are used for removable media are mounted with the "nosuid" option with the following command: + +$ sudo more /etc/fstab + +UUID=2bc871e4-e2a3-4f29-9ece-3be60c835222 /mnt/usbflash vfat noauto,owner,ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec 0 0 + Is it the case that file system found in "/etc/fstab" refers to removable media and it does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /opt mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/opt\s' + . . . /opt . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/opt" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /srv mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/srv\s' + . . . /srv . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/srv" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /tmp mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/tmp\s' + . . . /tmp . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/tmp" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /tmp mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/tmp\s' + . . . /tmp . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/tmp" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /tmp mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/tmp\s' + . . . /tmp . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/tmp" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var/log/audit mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log/audit\s' + . . . /var/log/audit . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/log/audit" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var/log/audit mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log/audit\s' + . . . /var/log/audit . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/log/audit" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var/log/audit mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log/audit\s' + . . . /var/log/audit . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/log/audit" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var/log mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log\s' + . . . /var/log . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/log" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var/log mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log\s' + . . . /var/log . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/log" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var/log mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/log\s' + . . . /var/log . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/log" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var\s' + . . . /var . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var\s' + . . . /var . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var\s' + . . . /var . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify the nodev option is configured for the /var/tmp mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/tmp\s' + . . . /var/tmp . . . nodev . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/tmp" file system does not have the "nodev" option set? + + + + Verify the noexec option is configured for the /var/tmp mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/tmp\s' + . . . /var/tmp . . . noexec . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/tmp" file system does not have the "noexec" option set? + + + + Verify the nosuid option is configured for the /var/tmp mount point, + run the following command: + $ sudo mount | grep '\s/var/tmp\s' + . . . /var/tmp . . . nosuid . . . + + Is it the case that the "/var/tmp" file system does not have the "nosuid" option set? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 disables core dump backtraces by issuing the following command: + +$ grep -i process /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + +ProcessSizeMax=0 + Is it the case that the "ProcessSizeMax" item is missing, commented out, or the value is anything other than "0" and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement for all domains that have the "core" item assigned? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 disables storing core dumps for all users by issuing the following command: + +$ grep -i storage /etc/systemd/coredump.conf + +Storage=none + Is it the case that Storage is not set to none or is commented out and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement for all domains that have the "core" item assigned? + + + + Verify that core dumps are disabled for all users, run the following command: +$ grep core /etc/security/limits.conf +* hard core 0 + Is it the case that the "core" item is missing, commented out, or the value is anything other than "0" and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement for all domains that have the "core"? + + + + To verify that acquiring, saving, and processing core dumps is disabled, run the +following command: +$ systemctl status systemd-coredump.socket +The output should be similar to: +● systemd-coredump.socket + Loaded: masked (Reason: Unit systemd-coredump.socket is masked.) + Active: inactive (dead) ... + + Is it the case that unit systemd-coredump.socket is not masked or running? + + + + The runtime status of the fs.suid_dumpable kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl fs.suid_dumpable +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.kptr_restrict kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict +The output of the command should indicate either: +kernel.kptr_restrict = 1 +or: +kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 +The output of the command should not indicate: +kernel.kptr_restrict = 0 + +The preferable way how to assure the runtime compliance is to have +correct persistent configuration, and rebooting the system. + +The persistent kernel parameter configuration is performed by specifying the appropriate +assignment in any file located in the /etc/sysctl.d directory. +Verify that there is not any existing incorrect configuration by executing the following command: +$ grep -r '^\s*kernel.kptr_restrict\s*=' /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/sysctl.d +The command should not find any assignments other than: +kernel.kptr_restrict = 1 +or: +kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 + +Conflicting assignments are not allowed. + Is it the case that the kernel.kptr_restrict is not set to 1 or 2 or is configured to be 0? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.randomize_va_space kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space +2. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + Verify the NX (no-execution) bit flag is set on the system. + +Check that the no-execution bit flag is set with the following commands: + +$ sudo dmesg | grep NX + +[ 0.000000] NX (Execute Disable) protection: active + +If "dmesg" does not show "NX (Execute Disable) protection" active, check the cpuinfo settings with the following command: + +$ sudo grep flags /proc/cpuinfo +flags : fpu vme de pse tsc ms nx rdtscp lm constant_ts + +The output should contain the "nx" flag. + Is it the case that NX is disabled? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes page_poison=1, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*page_poison=1.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*page_poison=1.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'page_poison=1' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that page allocator poisoning is not enabled? + + + + Inspect the form of default GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system +in /etc/default/grub. If it includes slub_debug=, +then the parameter will be configured for newly installed kernels. +First check if the GRUB recovery is enabled: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_DISABLE_RECOVERY' /etc/default/grub +If this option is set to true, then check that a line is output by the following command: +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT.*slub_debug=.*' /etc/default/grub +If the recovery is disabled, check the line with +$ sudo grep 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX.*slub_debug=.*' /etc/default/grub.Moreover, command line parameters for currently installed kernels should be checked as well. +Run the following command: +$ sudo grubby --info=ALL | grep args | grep -v 'slub_debug=' +The command should not return any output. + Is it the case that SLUB/SLAB poisoning is not enabled? + + + + If the device or Oracle Linux 9 does not have a camera installed, this requirement is not applicable. + +This requirement is not applicable to mobile devices (smartphones and tablets), where the use of the camera is a local AO decision. + +This requirement is not applicable to dedicated VTC suites located in approved VTC locations that are centrally managed. + +For an external camera, if there is not a method for the operator to manually disconnect the camera at the end of collaborative computing sessions, this is a finding. + +For a built-in camera, the camera must be protected by a camera cover (e.g., laptop camera cover slide) when not in use. If the built-in camera is not protected with a camera cover, or is not physically disabled, this is a finding. + +If the camera is not disconnected, covered, or physically disabled, determine if it is being disabled via software with the following commands: + +Verify the operating system disables the ability to load the uvcvideo kernel module. + +$ sudo grep -r uvcvideo /etc/modprobe.d/* | grep "/bin/true" + +install uvcvideo /bin/true + Is it the case that the command does not return any output, or the line is commented out, and the collaborative computing device has not been authorized for use? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.core_pattern kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.core_pattern +|/bin/false. + + Is it the case that the returned line does not have a value of "|/bin/false", or a line is not +returned and the need for core dumps is not documented with the Information +System Security Officer (ISSO) as an operational requirement? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.core_uses_pid kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.core_uses_pid +0. + Is it the case that the returned line does not have a value of 0? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.dmesg_restrict kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.dmesg_restrict +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.kexec_load_disabled kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.kexec_load_disabled +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.modules_disabled kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.modules_disabled +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.panic_on_oops kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.panic_on_oops +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.perf_cpu_time_max_percent +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.perf_event_paranoid kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.perf_event_paranoid +2. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.pid_max kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.pid_max +65536. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.sysrq kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.sysrq +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the kernel.yama.ptrace_scope kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl kernel.yama.ptrace_scope +1. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the net.core.bpf_jit_harden kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_harden +2. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + Verify that Oracle Linux 9 disables the use of user namespaces with the following commands: + +Note: User namespaces are used primarily for Linux containers. If containers are in use, this requirement is not applicable. + +The runtime status of the user.max_user_namespaces kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl user.max_user_namespaces +0. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + The runtime status of the vm.mmap_min_addr kernel parameter can be queried +by running the following command: +$ sysctl vm.mmap_min_addr +65536. + + Is it the case that the correct value is not returned? + + + + +Run the following command to get the current configured value for deny_execmem +SELinux boolean: +$ getsebool deny_execmem +The expected cofiguration is . +"on" means true, and "off" means false + Is it the case that deny_execmem is not set as expected? + + + + +Run the following command to get the current configured value for polyinstantiation_enabled +SELinux boolean: +$ getsebool polyinstantiation_enabled +The expected cofiguration is . +"on" means true, and "off" means false + Is it the case that polyinstantiation_enabled is not set as expected? + + + + +Run the following command to get the current configured value for secure_mode_insmod +SELinux boolean: +$ getsebool secure_mode_insmod +The expected cofiguration is . +"on" means true, and "off" means false + Is it the case that secure_mode_insmod is not set as expected? + + + + +Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_execheap SELinux boolean is disabled: +$ getsebool selinuxuser_execheap +If properly configured, the output should show the following: +selinuxuser_execheap --> off + Is it the case that selinuxuser_execheap is not disabled? + + + + +Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_execmod SELinux boolean is enabled: +$ getsebool selinuxuser_execmod +If properly configured, the output should show the following: +selinuxuser_execmod --> on + Is it the case that selinuxuser_execmod is not enabled? + + + + +Run the following command to determine if the selinuxuser_execstack SELinux boolean is disabled: +$ getsebool selinuxuser_execstack +If properly configured, the output should show the following: +selinuxuser_execstack --> off + Is it the case that selinuxuser_execstack is not disabled? + + + + +Run the following command to determine if the ssh_sysadm_login SELinux boolean is disabled: +$ getsebool ssh_sysadm_login +If properly configured, the output should show the following: +ssh_sysadm_login --> off + Is it the case that ssh_sysadm_login is not disabled? + + + + Inspect /etc/default/grub for any instances of selinux=0 +in the kernel boot arguments. Presence of selinux=0 indicates +that SELinux is disabled at boot time. + Is it the case that SELinux is disabled at boot time? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the policycoreutils-python-utils package is installed: $ rpm -q policycoreutils-python-utils + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the policycoreutils package is installed: $ rpm -q policycoreutils + Is it the case that the policycoreutils package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the setroubleshoot-plugins package is installed: +$ rpm -q setroubleshoot-plugins + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the setroubleshoot-server package is installed: +$ rpm -q setroubleshoot-server + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Ensure there are no unconfined daemons running on the system, +the following command should produce no output: +$ sudo ps -eZ | grep "unconfined_service_t" + Is it the case that There are unconfined daemons running on the system? + + + + Ensure that Oracle Linux 9 does not disable SELinux. + +Check if "SELinux" is active and in "enforcing" or "permissive" mode with the following command: + +$ sudo getenforce +Enforcing +-OR- +Permissive + Is it the case that SELinux is disabled? + + + + Verify the SELINUX on Oracle Linux 9 is using the policy with the following command: + +$ sestatus | grep policy + +Loaded policy name: + Is it the case that the loaded policy name is not "<sub idref="var_selinux_policy_name" />"? + + + + Ensure that Oracle Linux 9 verifies correct operation of security functions. + +Check if "SELinux" is active and in "" mode with the following command: + +$ sudo getenforce + + Is it the case that SELINUX is not set to enforcing? + + + + Check the system partitions to determine if they are encrypted with the following command: +blkid + +Output will be similar to: +/dev/sda1: UUID=" ab12c3de-4f56-789a-8f33-3850cc8ce3a2 +" TYPE="crypto_LUKS" +/dev/sda2: UUID=" bc98d7ef-6g54-321h-1d24-9870de2ge1a2 +" TYPE="crypto_LUKS" + +The boot partition and pseudo-file systems, such as /proc, /sys, and tmpfs, +are not required to use disk encryption and are not a finding. + Is it the case that partitions do not have a type of crypto_LUKS? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /dev/shm with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /dev/shm + + Is it the case that "/dev/shm is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /home with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /home + + Is it the case that "/home is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /srv with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /srv + + Is it the case that "/srv is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /tmp with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /tmp + + Is it the case that "/tmp is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /var + + Is it the case that "/var is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var/log with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /var/log + + Is it the case that "/var/log is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var/log/audit with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /var/log/audit + + Is it the case that "/var/log/audit is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + Verify that a separate file system/partition has been created for /var/tmp with the following command: + +$ mountpoint /var/tmp + + Is it the case that "/var/tmp is not a mountpoint" is returned? + + + + To ensure disable and restart on the login screen are disabled, run the following command: +$ grep disable-restart-buttons /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* +The output should be true. +To ensure that users cannot enable disable and restart on the login screen, run the following: +$ grep disable-restart-buttons /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-restart-buttons + Is it the case that disable-restart-buttons has not been configured or is not disabled? + + + + To ensure the user list is disabled, run the following command: +$ grep disable-user-list /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/* +The output should be true. +To ensure that users cannot enable displaying the user list, run the following: +$ grep disable-user-list /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list + Is it the case that disable-user-list has not been configured or is not disabled? + + + + To ensure screen locking on smartcard removal is enabled, run the following command: +$ grep removal-action /etc/dconf/db/local.d/* +The output should be 'lock-screen'. +To ensure that users cannot disable screen locking on smartcard removal, run the following: +$ grep removal-action /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/settings-daemon/peripherals/smartcard/removal-action + Is it the case that removal-action has not been configured? + + + + To verify that automatic logins are disabled, run the following command: +$ grep -Pzoi "^\[daemon]\\nautomaticlogin.*" /etc/gdm/custom.conf +The output should show the following: +[daemon] +AutomaticLoginEnable=false + Is it the case that GDM allows users to automatically login? + + + + To ensure that XDMCP is disabled in /etc/gdm/custom.conf, run the following command: +grep -Pzo "\[xdmcp\]\nEnable=false" /etc/gdm/custom.conf +The output should return the following: + +[xdmcp] +Enable=false + + Is it the case that the Enable is not set to false or is missing in the xdmcp section of the /etc/gdm/custom.conf gdm configuration file? + + + + These settings can be verified by running the following: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.media-handling automount-open +If properly configured, the output for automount-openshould be false. +To ensure that users cannot enable automount opening in GNOME3, run the following: +$ grep 'automount-open' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output for automount-open should be /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open + Is it the case that GNOME automounting is not disabled? + + + + These settings can be verified by running the following: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.media-handling autorun-never +If properly configured, the output for autorun-nevershould be true. +To ensure that users cannot enable autorun in GNOME3, run the following: +$ grep 'autorun-never' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output for autorun-never should be /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never + Is it the case that GNOME autorun is not disabled? + + + + To ensure that remote access requires credentials, run the following command: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.Vino authentication-methods +If properly configured, the output should be false. +To ensure that users cannot disable credentials for remote access, run the following: +$ grep authentication-methods /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be +/org/gnome/Vino/authentication-methods + Is it the case that wireless network notification is enabled and not disabled? + + + + To ensure that remote access connections are encrypted, run the following command: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.Vino require-encrpytion +If properly configured, the output should be true. +To ensure that users cannot disable encrypted remote connections, run the following: +$ grep require-encryption /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be +/org/gnome/Vino/require-encryption + Is it the case that remote access connections are not encrypted? + + + + To check the screensaver mandatory use status, run the following command: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver idle-activation-enabled +If properly configured, the output should be true. +To ensure that users cannot disable the screensaver idle inactivity setting, run the following: +$ grep idle-activation-enabled /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/idle-activation-enabled + Is it the case that idle-activation-enabled is not enabled or configured? + + + + To check the current idle time-out value, run the following command: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.session idle-delay +If properly configured, the output should be 'uint32 '. +To ensure that users cannot change the screensaver inactivity timeout setting, run the following: +$ grep idle-delay /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay + Is it the case that idle-delay is set to 0 or a value greater than <sub idref="inactivity_timeout_value" />? + + + + To check that the screen locks immediately when activated, run the following command: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver lock-delay +If properly configured, the output should be 'uint32 '. + Is it the case that the screensaver lock delay is missing, or is set to a value greater than <sub idref="var_screensaver_lock_delay" />? + + + + To check the status of the idle screen lock activation, run the following command: + +$ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver lock-enabled +If properly configured, the output should be true. +To ensure that users cannot change how long until the screensaver locks, run the following: +$ grep lock-enabled /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output for lock-enabled should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled + Is it the case that screensaver locking is not enabled and/or has not been set or configured correctly? + + + + To ensure that users cannot change how long until the screensaver locks, run the following: +$ grep lock-enabled /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output for lock-enabled should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled + Is it the case that screensaver locking is not locked? + + + + To ensure the screensaver is configured to be blank, run the following command: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver picture-uri +If properly configured, the output should be ''. + +To ensure that users cannot set the screensaver background, run the following: +$ grep picture-uri /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be /org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/picture-uri + Is it the case that it is not set or configured properly? + + + + To ensure that users cannot change session idle and lock settings, run the following: +$ grep 'lock-delay' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should return: +/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay + Is it the case that GNOME3 session settings are not locked or configured properly? + + + + To ensure that users cannot change session idle and lock settings, run the following: +$ grep 'idle-delay' /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should return: +/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay + Is it the case that idle-delay is not locked? + + + + To ensure the system is configured to ignore the Ctrl-Alt-Del sequence, +run the following command: +$ gsettings get org.gnome.settings-daemon.plugins.media-keys logout +$ grep logout /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/* +If properly configured, the output should be +/org/gnome/settings-daemon/plugins/media-keys/logout + Is it the case that GNOME3 is configured to reboot when Ctrl-Alt-Del is pressed? + + + + In order to be sure that the databases are up-to-date, run the +dconf update +command as the administrator. + Is it the case that The system-wide dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles? + + + + To verify that the DConf User profile is configured correctly, run the following +command: + +$ cat /etc/dconf/profile/user +The output should show the following: +user-db:user +system-db:local +system-db:site +system-db:distro + Is it the case that DConf User profile does not exist or is not configured correctly? + + + + To verify that the installed operating system is supported, run +the following command: + +$ grep -i "oracle" /etc/oracle-release + +Oracle Linux 9 + Is it the case that the installed operating system is not supported? + + + + To verify that BIND uses the system crypto policy, check out that the BIND config file +/etc/named.conf contains the include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config"; +directive: +$ sudo grep 'include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";' /etc/named.conf +Verify that the directive is at the bottom of the options section of the config file. + Is it the case that BIND is installed and the BIND config file doesn't contain the +<pre>include "/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/bind.config";</pre> directive? + + + + To verify that cryptography policy has been configured correctly, run the +following command: +$ update-crypto-policies --show +The output should return . +Run the command to check if the policy is correctly applied: +$ update-crypto-policies --is-applied +The output should be The configured policy is applied. +Moreover, check if settings for selected crypto policy are as expected. +List all libraries for which it holds that their crypto policies do not have symbolic link in /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends. +$ ls -l /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/ | grep '^[^l]' | tail -n +2 | awk -F' ' '{print $NF}' | awk -F'.' '{print $1}' | sort +Subsequently, check if matching libraries have drop in files in the /etc/crypto-policies/local.d directory. +$ ls /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/ | awk -F'-' '{print $1}' | uniq | sort +Outputs of two previous commands should match. + Is it the case that cryptographic policy is not configured or is configured incorrectly? + + + + Check that the symlink exists and target the correct Kerberos crypto policy, with the following command: +file /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies +If command ouput shows the following line, Kerberos is configured to use the system-wide crypto policy. +/etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies: symbolic link to /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/krb5.config + Is it the case that the symlink does not exist or points to a different target? + + + + Verify that the IPSec service uses the system crypto policy. + +If the ipsec service is not installed is not applicable. + +Check to see if the "IPsec" service is active with the following command: + +$ systemctl status ipsec + +ipsec.service - Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol Daemon for IPsec +Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/ipsec.service; disabled) +Active: inactive (dead) + +If the "IPsec" service is active, check to see if it is using the system crypto policy with the following command: + +$ sudo grep include /etc/ipsec.conf /etc/ipsec.d/*.conf + +/etc/ipsec.conf:include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config + Is it the case that the "IPsec" service is active and the ipsec configuration file does not contain does not contain <tt>include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/libreswan.config</tt>? + + + + To verify that OpenSSL uses the system crypto policy, check out that the OpenSSL config file +/etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf contains the [ crypto_policy ] section with the +.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config directive: + +$ sudo grep '\.include\s* /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config$' /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf. + Is it the case that the OpenSSL config file doesn't contain the whole section, +or the section doesn't contain the <pre>.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config</pre> directive? + + + + To verify if the OpenSSL uses defined TLS Crypto Policy, run: +$ grep -P '^(TLS\.)?MinProtocol' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config +and verify that the value is +TLSv1.2 + Is it the case that cryptographic policy for openssl is not configured or is configured incorrectly? + + + + Verify that sshd isn't configured to ignore the system wide cryptographic policy. + +Check that the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is not set or is commented out in the +/etc/sysconfig/sshd. + +Run the following command: + +$ sudo grep CRYPTO_POLICY /etc/sysconfig/sshd + Is it the case that the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is set or is not commented out in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd? + + + + To verify if the OpenSSH Client uses defined Crypto Policy, run: +$ cat /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/02-ospp.conf +and verify that the line matches +Match final all +RekeyLimit 512M 1h +GSSAPIAuthentication no +Ciphers aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes128-cbc +PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 +MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 +KexAlgorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 + Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH Client is not configured according to CC requirements? + + + + To verify if the OpenSSH client uses defined Cipher suite in the Crypto Policy, run: +$ grep -i ciphers /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config +and verify that the line matches: +Ciphers + Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH client is not configured correctly? + + + + To verify if the OpenSSH server uses defined ciphers in the Crypto Policy, run: +$ grep -Po '(-oCiphers=\S+)' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config +and verify that the line matches: +-oCiphers= + Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH Server is not configured correctly? + + + + To verify if the OpenSSH client uses defined MACs in the Crypto Policy, run: +$ grep -i macs /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config +and verify that the line matches: +MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256 + Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH client is not configured correctly? + + + + To verify if the OpenSSH server uses defined MACs in the Crypto Policy, run: +$ grep -Po '(-oMACs=\S+)' /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config +and verify that the line matches: +-oMACS=hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com + Is it the case that Crypto Policy for OpenSSH Server is not configured correctly? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the crypto-policies package is installed: $ rpm -q crypto-policies + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + To verify that McAfee Endpoint Security for Linux is +running, run the following command: +$ sudo ps -ef | grep -i mfetpd + Is it the case that virus scanning software is not running? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the McAfeeTP package is installed: $ rpm -q McAfeeTP + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + To verify that McAfee HIPS is installed, run the following command(s): +$ rpm -q MFEhiplsm + Is it the case that the HBSS HIPS module is not installed? + + + + Verify that the system backups user data. + Is it the case that it is not? + + + + Inspect the system to determine if intrusion detection software has been installed. +Verify this intrusion detection software is active. + Is it the case that no host-based intrusion detection tools are installed? + + + + To verify that the Dracut FIPS module is enabled, run the following command: +grep "add_dracutmodules" /etc/dracut.conf.d/40-fips.conf +The output should look like this: +add_dracutmodules+=" fips " + Is it the case that the Dracut FIPS module is not enabled? + + + + To verify that FIPS mode is enabled properly, run the following command: +fips-mode-setup --check +The output should contain the following: +FIPS mode is enabled. +To verify that the cryptographic policy has been configured correctly, run the +following command: +$ update-crypto-policies --show +The output should return . + Is it the case that FIPS mode is not enabled? + + + + To verify /etc/system-fips exists, run the following command: +ls -l /etc/system-fips +The output should be similar to the following: +-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 36 Nov 26 11:31 /etc/system-fips + Is it the case that /etc/system-fips does not exist? + + + + To verify that kernel parameter 'crypto.fips_enabled' is set properly, run the following command: +sysctl crypto.fips_enabled +The output should contain the following: +crypto.fips_enabled = 1 + Is it the case that crypto.fips_enabled is not 1? + + + + To find the location of the AIDE database file, run the following command: +$ sudo ls -l DBDIR/database_file_name + Is it the case that there is no database file? + + + + Check that AIDE is properly configured to protect the integrity of the +audit tools by running the following command: + +# sudo cat /etc/aide.conf | grep /usr/sbin/au + +/usr/sbin/auditctl p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 +/usr/sbin/auditd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 +/usr/sbin/ausearch p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 +/usr/sbin/aureport p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 +/usr/sbin/autrace p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 + +/usr/sbin/rsyslogd p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 + +/usr/sbin/augenrules p+i+n+u+g+s+b+acl+xattrs+sha512 + + +If AIDE is configured properly to protect the integrity of the audit tools, +all lines listed above will be returned from the command. + +If one or more lines are missing, this is a finding. + Is it the case that integrity checks of the audit tools are missing or incomplete? + + + + Verify the operating system routinely checks the baseline configuration for unauthorized changes. + +To determine that periodic AIDE execution has been scheduled, run the following command: +$ grep aide /etc/crontab +The output should return something similar to the following: +05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check + +NOTE: The usage of special cron times, such as @daily or @weekly, is acceptable. + Is it the case that AIDE is not configured to scan periodically? + + + + To determine that periodic AIDE execution has been scheduled, run the following command: +$ grep aide /etc/crontab +The output should return something similar to the following: +05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check | /bin/mail -s "$(hostname) - AIDE Integrity Check" root@localhost +The email address that the notifications are sent to can be changed by overriding +. + Is it the case that AIDE has not been configured or has not been configured to notify personnel of scan details? + + + + To determine that AIDE is verifying ACLs, run the following command: +$ grep acl /etc/aide.conf +Verify that the acl option is added to the correct ruleset. + Is it the case that the acl option is missing or not added to the correct ruleset? + + + + To determine that AIDE is verifying extended file attributes, run the following command: +$ grep xattrs /etc/aide.conf +Verify that the xattrs option is added to the correct ruleset. + Is it the case that the xattrs option is missing or not added to the correct ruleset? + + + + Verify the audit tools are group-owned by "root" to prevent any unauthorized access, deletion, or modification. + +Check the group-owner of each audit tool by running the following command: + +$ sudo stat -c "%G %n" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/rsyslogd /sbin/augenrules + +root /sbin/auditctl +root /sbin/aureport +root /sbin/ausearch +root /sbin/autrace +root /sbin/auditd +root /sbin/rsyslogd +root /sbin/augenrules + Is it the case that any audit tools are not group-owned by root? + + + + Verify the audit tools are owned by "root" to prevent any unauthorized access, deletion, or modification. + +Check the owner of each audit tool by running the following command: + +$ sudo stat -c "%U %n" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/rsyslogd /sbin/augenrules + +root /sbin/auditctl +root /sbin/aureport +root /sbin/ausearch +root /sbin/autrace +root /sbin/auditd +root /sbin/rsyslogd +root /sbin/augenrules + Is it the case that any audit tools are not owned by root? + + + + Verify the audit tools are protected from unauthorized access, deletion, or modification by checking the permissive mode. + +Check the octal permission of each audit tool by running the following command: + +$ sudo stat -c "%U %n" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/rsyslogd /sbin/augenrules + Is it the case that any of these files have more permissive permissions than 0755? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the aide package is installed: $ rpm -q aide + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + The following command will list which files on the system +have file hashes different from what is expected by the RPM database. +$ rpm -Va --noconfig | awk '$1 ~ /..5/ && $2 != "c"' + Is it the case that there is output? + + + + The following command will list which files on the system have ownership different from what +is expected by the RPM database: +$ rpm -Va | rpm -Va --nofiledigest | awk '{ if (substr($0,6,1)=="U" || substr($0,7,1)=="G") print $NF }' + Is it the case that there is output? + + + + The following command will list which files on the system have permissions different from what +is expected by the RPM database: +$ rpm -Va | awk '{ if (substr($0,2,1)=="M") print $NF }' + Is it the case that there is output? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the sudo package is installed: $ rpm -q sudo + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + To determine if NOEXEC has been configured for sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\bnoexec\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return a matching output. + Is it the case that noexec is not enabled in sudo? + + + + To determine if requiretty has been configured for sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\brequiretty\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return a matching output. + Is it the case that requiretty is not enabled in sudo? + + + + To determine if use_pty has been configured for sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults.*\buse_pty\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return a matching output. + Is it the case that use_pty is not enabled in sudo? + + + + To determine if logfile has been configured for sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -ri "^[\s]*Defaults\s*\blogfile\b.*" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return a matching output. + Is it the case that logfile is not enabled in sudo? + + + + To determine if !authenticate has not been configured for sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -r \!authenticate /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return no output. + Is it the case that !authenticate is specified in the sudo config files? + + + + To determine if NOPASSWD has been configured for sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -ri nopasswd /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return no output. + Is it the case that nopasswd is specified in the sudo config files? + + + + To determine if NOPASSWD or !authenticate have been configured for +sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -ri "nopasswd\|\!authenticate" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return no output. + Is it the case that nopasswd and/or !authenticate is enabled in sudo? + + + + Verify the operating system requires re-authentication +when using the "sudo" command to elevate privileges, run the following command: +sudo grep -ri '^Defaults.*timestamp_timeout' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d +The output should be: +/etc/sudoers:Defaults timestamp_timeout=0 or "timestamp_timeout" is set to a positive number. +If conflicting results are returned, this is a finding. + Is it the case that timestamp_timeout is not set with the appropriate value for sudo? + + + + Determine if "sudoers" file restricts sudo access run the following commands: +$ sudo grep -PR '^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\)\s+ALL\s*$' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* +$ sudo grep -PR '^\s*ALL\s+ALL\=\(ALL\:ALL\)\s+ALL\s*$' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* + Is it the case that either of the commands returned a line? + + + + To determine if NOPASSWD has been configured for the vdsm user for sudo, +run the following command: +$ sudo grep -ri nopasswd /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return output only for the vdsm user. + Is it the case that nopasswd is set for any users beyond vdsm? + + + + To determine if arguments that commands can be executed with are restricted, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -PR '^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+(?:[ \t]+[^,\s]+)+[ \t]*,)*(\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,\s]+[ \t]*(?:,|$))' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return no output. + Is it the case that /etc/sudoers file contains user specifications that allow execution of commands with any arguments? + + + + To determine if negation is used to define commands users are allowed to execute using sudo, run the following command: +$ sudo grep -PR '^(?:\s*[^#=]+)=(?:\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()[^,!\n][^,\n]+,)*\s*(?:\([^\)]+\))?\s*(?!\s*\()(!\S+).*' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +The command should return no output. + Is it the case that /etc/sudoers file contains rules that define the set of allowed commands using negation? + + + + To determine if the users are allowed to run commands as root, run the following commands: +$ sudo grep -PR '^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*[^\(\s]' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +and +$ sudo grep -PR '^\s*((?!root\b)[\w]+)\s*(\w+)\s*=\s*(.*,)?\s*\([\w\s]*\b(root|ALL)\b[\w\s]*\)' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ +Both commands should return no output. + Is it the case that /etc/sudoers file contains rules that allow non-root users to run commands as root? + + + + Run the following command to Verify that the sudoers security policy is configured to use the invoking user's password for privilege escalation: + sudo cvtsudoers -f sudoers /etc/sudoers | grep -E '^Defaults !?(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)' +or if cvtsudoers not supported: + sudo find /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d \( \! -name '*~' -a \! -name '*.*' \) -exec grep -E --with-filename '^[[:blank:]]*Defaults[[:blank:]](.*[[:blank:]])?!?\b(rootpw|targetpw|runaspw)' -- {} \; +If no results are returned, this is a finding. +If conflicting results are returned, this is a finding. +If "Defaults !targetpw" is not defined, this is a finding. +If "Defaults !rootpw" is not defined, this is a finding. +If "Defaults !runaspw" is not defined, this is a finding. + Is it the case that invoke user passwd when using sudo? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the gnutls-utils package is installed: $ rpm -q gnutls-utils + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the gssproxy package is installed: +$ rpm -q gssproxy + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the iprutils package is installed: +$ rpm -q iprutils + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the krb5-workstation package is installed: +$ rpm -q krb5-workstation + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the nss-tools package is installed: $ rpm -q nss-tools + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the openscap-scanner package is installed: $ rpm -q openscap-scanner + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the rear package is installed: $ rpm -q rear + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the rng-tools package is installed: $ rpm -q rng-tools + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the scap-security-guide package is installed: $ rpm -q scap-security-guide + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the tuned package is installed: +$ rpm -q tuned + Is it the case that the package is installed? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 removes all software components after updated versions have been installed. + + +$ grep clean_requirements_on_remove /etc/yum.conf +clean_requirements_on_remove=1 + Is it the case that '"clean_requirements_on_remove" is not set to "1"'? + + + + To verify that packages comprising the available updates will be automatically installed by dnf-automatic, run the following command: +$ sudo grep apply_updates /etc/dnf/automatic.conf +The output should return the following: +apply_updates = yes + Is it the case that apply_updates is not set to yes? + + + + To verify that only security updates will be automatically installed by dnf-automatic, run the following command: +$ sudo grep upgrade_type /etc/dnf/automatic.conf +The output should return the following: +upgrade_type = security + Is it the case that the upgrade_type is not set to security? + + + + Verify that yum verifies the signature of packages from a repository prior to install with the following command: + +$ grep gpgcheck /etc/yum.conf + +gpgcheck=1 + +If "gpgcheck" is not set to "1", or if the option is missing or commented out, ask the System Administrator how the certificates for patches and other operating system components are verified. + Is it the case that there is no process to validate certificates that is approved by the organization? + + + + Verify that yum verifies the signature of local packages prior to install with the following command: + +$ grep localpkg_gpgcheck /etc/yum.conf + +localpkg_gpgcheck=1 + +If "localpkg_gpgcheck" is not set to "1", or if the option is missing or commented out, ask the System Administrator how the certificates for patches and other operating system components are verified. + Is it the case that there is no process to validate certificates for local packages that is approved by the organization? + + + + To determine whether yum has been configured to disable +gpgcheck for any repos, inspect all files in +/etc/yum.repos.d and ensure the following does not appear in any +sections: +gpgcheck=0 +A value of 0 indicates that gpgcheck has been disabled for that repo. + Is it the case that GPG checking is disabled? + + + + To ensure that the GPG key is installed, run: +$ rpm -q --queryformat "%{SUMMARY}\n" gpg-pubkey +The command should return the string below: +gpg(Oracle OSS group (Open Source Software group) <build@oss.oracle.com> + Is it the case that the Oracle GPG Key is not installed? + + + + Run the following command to determine if the dnf-automatic package is installed: $ rpm -q dnf-automatic + Is it the case that the package is not installed? + + + + Verify Oracle Linux 9 security patches and updates are installed and up to date. +Updates are required to be applied with a frequency determined by organizational policy. + + + +Typical update frequency may be overridden by Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) notifications from CYBERCOM. + Is it the case that Oracle Linux 9 is in non-compliance with the organizational patching policy? + + + + Run the following command to determine the current status of the dnf-automatic timer: $ sudo systemctl is-active dnf-automatic.timer If the timer is running, it should return the following: active + Is it the case that the dnf-automatic.timer is not enabled? + + + + To check if the installed Operating System is 64-bit, run the following command: +$ uname -m +The output should be one of the following: x86_64, aarch64, ppc64le or s390x. +If the output is i686 or i386 the operating system is 32-bit. +Check if the installed CPU supports 64-bit operating systems by running the following command: +$ lscpu | grep "CPU op-mode" +If the output contains 64bit, the CPU supports 64-bit operating systems. + Is it the case that the installed operating sytem is 32-bit but the CPU supports operation in 64-bit? + + + + + + + + + combine_ovals.py from SCAP Security Guide + ssg: [0, 1, 69], python: 3.9.16 + 5.11 + 2023-09-14T00:00:00 + + + + + Alibaba Cloud Linux 2 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Alibaba Cloud Linux 2 + + + + + + + + + Alibaba Cloud Linux 3 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Alibaba Cloud Linux 3 + + + + + + + + + Anolis OS 8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Anolis OS 8 + + + + + + + + + Debian Linux 10 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Debian 10 + + + + + + + + + Debian Linux 11 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Debian 11 + + + + + + + + + openSUSE Leap 15 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE Leap 15. + + + + + + + + + openSUSE Leap 42 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE Leap 42. + + + + + + + + + Ubuntu 22.04 LTS + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 22.04 LTS + + + + + + + + + UnionTech OS Server 20 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is UnionTech OS Server 20 + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Virtualization 4 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The application installed installed on the system is + Red Hat Virtualization 4. + + + + + + + + + Package grub2 is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks if package grub2-common is installed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Package providing /etc/login.defs is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks if package providing /etc/login.defs and is installed. + + + + + + + + + Check if the system doesn't act as an oVirt host or manager + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if the system has neither ovirt-host nor ovirt-engine installed. + + + + + + + + Check if the system acts as an oVirt host or manager + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if the system has ovirt-host or ovirt-engine installed + + + + + + + + + + WiFi interface is present + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks if any wifi interface is present. + + + + + + + + + Check if the scan target is a container + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check for presence of files characterizing container filesystems. + + + + + + + + + + Check if the scan target is a machine + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check for absence of files characterizing container filesystems. + + + + + + + + + Kerberos server is older than 1.17-18 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + Check if version of Kerberos server is lesser than 1.17-18 + + + + + + + + + Kerberos workstation is older than 1.17-18 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + Check if version of Kerberos workstation is lesser than 1.17-18 + + + + + + + + + Test that the architecture is aarch64 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is aarch64 + + + + + + + + Test for different architecture than aarch64 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is not aarch64 + + + + + + + + Test for different architecture than s390x + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is not s390x + + + + + + + + Test that the architecture is ppc64le + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is ppc64le + + + + + + + + Test that the architecture is s390x + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check that architecture of kernel in /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease is s390x + + + + + + + + SSSD is configured to use LDAP + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Identification provider is not set to ad within /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + + + + + + + + + Non-UEFI system boot mode check + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if System boot mode is non-UEFI. + + + + + + + + + UEFI system boot mode check + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check if system boot mode is UEFI. + + + + + + + + + Anolis OS 23 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Anolis OS 23 + + + + + + + + + CentOS 7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + CentOS 7 + + + + + + + + + CentOS 8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + CentOS 8 + + + + + + + + + + CentOS Stream 9 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + CentOS Stream 9 + + + + + + + + + + Debian + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The operating system installed is a Debian System + + + + + + + + + Installed operating system is Fedora + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + The operating system installed on the system is Fedora + + + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Installed OS is OL + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Oracle Linux 7 + + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Oracle Linux 8 + + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + openSUSE + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The operating system installed on the system is openSUSE. + + + + + + + + + Installed operating system is part of the Unix family + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The operating system installed on the system is part of the Unix OS family + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS release 4 + + + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS RHEL9 Based + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS RHEL9 Based + + + + + + + + + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Installed OS is RHEL + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.0 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.0 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.5 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.7 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.9 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10 + + + + + + + + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Red Hat Virtualization 4 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Red Hat Virtualization Host 4.4+ or Red Hat Enterprise Host. + + + + + + + + + Scientific Linux 7 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is + Scientific Linux 7 + + + + + + + + + SUSE Linux Enterprise 12 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + The operating system installed on the system is + SUSE Linux Enterprise 12. + + + + + + + + + + + + + SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + The operating system installed on the system is + SUSE Linux Enterprise 15. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Ubuntu + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The operating system installed is an Ubuntu System + + + + + + + + + + Ubuntu 16.04 LTS + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS + + + + + + + + + Ubuntu 18.04 LTS + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 18.04 LTS + + + + + + + + + Ubuntu 20.04 LTS + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + The operating system installed on the system is Ubuntu 20.04 LTS + + + + + + + + + System uses zIPL + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Checks if system uses zIPL bootloader. + + + + + + + + + Check if the environment is a OSBuild pipeline + + Oracle Linux 9 + + Check the value of environment variable container. + + + + + + + + + IPv6 is enabled on system + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /home is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /opt is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /srv is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /tmp is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /var/log/audit is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /var/log is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /var/tmp is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mountpoint /var is active (mounted) or configured in /etc/fstab + + Oracle Linux 9 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Operating System is ol + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The installed operating system is Oracle Linux + + + + + + + + + Operating System is rhel + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux + + + + + + + + + Operating System is rhel + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The installed operating system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux + + + + + + + + + Package audit is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package audit should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package chrony is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package chrony should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package firewalld is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package firewalld should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package gdm is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package gdm should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package iptables is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package iptables should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package libuser is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package libuser should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package nftables is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package nftables should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package ntp is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package ntp should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package pam is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package pam should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package postfix is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package postfix should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package shadow-utils is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package shadow-utils should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package sssd-common is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package sssd-common should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package sudo is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package sudo should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package systemd is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package systemd should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package tftp-server is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package tftp-server should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package tmux is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package tmux should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package ufw is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package ufw should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package usbguard is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package usbguard should be installed. + + + + + + + + Package yum is installed + + Oracle Linux 9 + + The RPM package yum should be installed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + alinux-release + + + alinux-release + + + anolis-release + + + /etc/debian_version + ^10.[0-9]+$ + 1 + + + /etc/debian_version + ^11.[0-9]+$ + 1 + + + openSUSE-release + + + openSUSE-release + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=jammy$ + 1 + + + uos-release + + + rhvm-appliance + + + grub2-common + + + /sys/firmware/opal + + + shadow-utils + + + ovirt-host + + + ovirt-engine + + + /proc/net/wireless + + + /.dockerenv + + + /run/.containerenv + + + krb5-server + + + krb5-workstation + + + /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease + ^.*\.(.*)$ + 1 + + + /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease + ^.*\.(.*)$ + 1 + + + /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease + ^.*\.(.*)$ + 1 + + + /etc/sssd/sssd.conf + ^[\s]*\[domain\/[^]]*]([^\n\[\]]*\n+)+?[\s]*id_provider[ \t]*=[ \t]*((?i)ad)[ \t]*$ + 1 + + + /sys/firmware/efi + + + + anolis-release + + + centos-release + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID="(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID="(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID="(\d)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/debian_version + + + fedora-release.* + + + /etc/system-release-cpe + ^cpe:\/o:fedoraproject:fedora:[\d]+$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ + 1 + + + oraclelinux-release + + + oraclelinux-release + + + oraclelinux-release + + + openSUSE-release + + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID="(\w+)"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID="(\d)\.\d+"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^RHEL_VERSION="(\d).*"$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ + 1 + + + + redhat-release-client + + + redhat-release-workstation + + + redhat-release-server + + + redhat-release-computenode + + + /etc/redhat-release + ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ + 1 + + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + redhat-release + + + /etc/redhat-release + ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ + 1 + + + + redhat-release + + + /etc/redhat-release + ^Red Hat Enterprise Linux release (\d)\.\d+$ + 1 + + + redhat-release-virtualization-host + + + sl-release + + + + sled-release + + + sles-release + + + SLES_SAP-release + + + + sled-release + + + sles-release + + + SLES_SAP-release + + + SUSE-Manager-Server-release + + + SLE_HPC-release + + + /etc/lsb-release + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu$ + 1 + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=xenial$ + 1 + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=bionic$ + 1 + + + /etc/lsb-release + ^DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal$ + 1 + + + s390utils-base + + + + container + + + + /etc/default/grub + ^\s*GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=".*ipv6\.disable=(\d).*$ + 1 + + + /home + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/home[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /opt + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/opt[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /srv + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/srv[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /tmp + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/tmp[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /var/log/audit + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var/log/audit[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /var/log + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var/log[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /var/tmp + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var/tmp[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /var + + + /etc/fstab + ^[\s]*[\S]+[\s]+/var[\s]+[\S]+[\s]+([\S]+) + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^ID=["']?(\w+)["']?$ + 1 + + + /etc/os-release + ^VERSION_ID=["']?([\w.]+)["']?$ + 1 + + + audit + + + chrony + + + firewalld + + + gdm + + + iptables + + + libuser + + + nftables + + + ntp + + + pam + + + postfix + + + shadow-utils + + + sssd-common + + + sudo + + + systemd + + + tftp-server + + + tmux + + + ufw + + + usbguard + + + yum + + + + + ^2.*$ + + + ^3.*$ + + + ^8.*$ + + + ^15.*$ + + + ^42.*$ + + + ^20.*$ + + + ^4.*$ + + + 0:1.17-18 + + + 0:1.17-18 + + + ^aarch64$ + + + ^ppc64le$ + + + ^s390x$ + + + ^23.*$ + + + ^7.*$ + + + centos + + + 8 + + + centos + + + 9 + + + ol + + + ^7.*$ + + + ^8.*$ + + + ^9.*$ + + + openSUSE-release + + + unix + + + rhcos + + + 4 + + + 9 + + + rhel + + + unix + + + ^7.*$ + + + ^7.*$ + + + ^7.*$ + + + ^7.*$ + + + 7 + + + unix + + + ^8.*$ + + + ^8.0*$ + + + ^8.1*$ + + + ^8.2*$ + + + ^8.3*$ + + + ^8.4*$ + + + ^8.5*$ + + + ^8.6*$ + + + ^8.7*$ + + + ^8.8*$ + + + ^8.9*$ + + + ^8.10*$ + + + 8 + + + unix + + + ^9.*$ + + + 9 + + + 0:4.4 + + + ^7.*$ + + + unix + + + ^12.*$ + + + ^12.*$ + + + ^12.*$ + + + unix + + + ^15.*$ + + + ^15.*$ + + + ^15.*$ + + + ^4.*$ + + + ^15.*$ + + + bwrap-osbuild + + + ppc64le + + + 0 + + + ol + + + 9.0 + + + rhel + + + 9.0 + + + rhel + + + 8.4 + + + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/salt/stig/init.sls b/salt/stig/init.sls new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f6035d6d1a --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/init.sls @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one +# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at +# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the +# Elastic License 2.0. + +{% from 'stig/map.jinja' import STIGMERGED %} + +include: +{% if STIGMERGED.enabled %} + - stig.schedule +{% if not salt['schedule.is_enabled'](name="stig_remediate_schedule") %} + - stig.enabled +{% endif %} +{% else %} + - stig.disabled +{% endif %} diff --git a/salt/stig/map.jinja b/salt/stig/map.jinja new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1016e3d97c --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/map.jinja @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +{# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one + or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at + https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the + Elastic License 2.0. #} + +{% import_yaml 'stig/defaults.yaml' as STIGDEFAULTS with context %} +{% set STIGMERGED = salt['pillar.get']('stig', STIGDEFAULTS.stig, merge=True) %} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/salt/stig/schedule.sls b/salt/stig/schedule.sls new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94aaf4e2d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/schedule.sls @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one +# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at +# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the +# Elastic License 2.0. + +{% from 'stig/map.jinja' import STIGMERGED %} +{% if 'stg' in salt['pillar.get']('features', []) %} +stig_remediate_schedule: + schedule.present: + - function: state.apply + - job_args: + - stig.enabled + - hours: {{ STIGMERGED.run_interval }} + - maxrunning: 1 + - enabled: true +{% else %} +{{sls}}_no_license_detected: + test.fail_without_changes: + - name: {{sls}}_no_license_detected + - comment: + - "The application of STIGs is a feature supported only for customers with a valid license. + Contact Security Onion Solutions, LLC via our website at https://securityonionsolutions.com + for more information about purchasing a license to enable this feature." +{% endif %} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/salt/stig/soc_stig.yaml b/salt/stig/soc_stig.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1fb030c316 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/stig/soc_stig.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +stig: + enabled: + description: You can enable or disable the application of STIGS using oscap. Note that the actions performed by OSCAP are not automatically reversible. + forcedType: bool + advanced: True + run_interval: + description: The interval in hours between OSCAP remediate executions. + forcedType: int + regex: ^([1-9][0-9]{0,2})$ + regexFailureMessage: The value must be an integer between 1 and 999. + advanced: True \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/salt/strelka/defaults.yaml b/salt/strelka/defaults.yaml index 76110aafef..da259fa142 100644 --- a/salt/strelka/defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/strelka/defaults.yaml @@ -17,9 +17,10 @@ strelka: mime_db: '/usr/lib/file/magic.mgc' yara_rules: '/etc/strelka/taste/' scanners: - 'ScanBase64': + 'ScanBase64PE': - positive: - filename: '^base64_' + flavors: + - 'base64_pe' priority: 5 'ScanBatch': - positive: @@ -27,12 +28,27 @@ strelka: - 'text/x-msdos-batch' - 'batch_file' priority: 5 + 'ScanBmpEof': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'image/x-ms-bmp' + - 'bmp_file' + negative: + source: + - 'ScanTranscode' + priority: 5 'ScanBzip2': - positive: flavors: - 'application/x-bzip2' - 'bzip2_file' priority: 5 + 'ScanDmg': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'dmg_disk_image' + - 'hfsplus_disk_image' + priority: 5 'ScanDocx': - positive: flavors: @@ -40,6 +56,11 @@ strelka: priority: 5 options: extract_text: False + 'ScanDonut': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'hacktool_win_shellcode_donut' + priority: 5 'ScanElf': - positive: flavors: @@ -56,6 +77,26 @@ strelka: - 'message/rfc822' - 'email_file' priority: 5 + 'ScanEncryptedDoc': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'encrypted_word_document' + priority: 5 + options: + max_length: 5 + scanner_timeout: 150 + log_pws: True + password_file: "/etc/strelka/passwords.dat" + 'ScanEncryptedZip': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'encrypted_zip' + priority: 5 + options: + max_length: 5 + scanner_timeout: 150 + log_pws: True + password_file: '/etc/strelka/passwords.dat' 'ScanEntropy': - positive: flavors: @@ -111,6 +152,16 @@ strelka: priority: 5 options: tmp_directory: '/dev/shm/' + 'ScanFooter': + - positive: + flavors: + - '*' + priority: 5 + options: + length: 50 + encodings: + - classic + - backslash 'ScanGif': - positive: flavors: @@ -144,13 +195,25 @@ strelka: - 'html_file' priority: 5 options: - parser: "html5lib" + max_hyperlinks: 50 + 'ScanIqy': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'iqy_file' + priority: 5 'ScanIni': - positive: filename: '(\.([Cc][Ff][Gg]|[Ii][Nn][Ii])|PROJECT)$' flavors: - 'ini_file' priority: 5 + 'ScanIso': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'application/x-iso9660-image' + priority: 5 + options: + limit: 50 'ScanJarManifest': - positive: flavors: @@ -198,6 +261,25 @@ strelka: priority: 5 options: limit: 1000 + 'ScanLNK': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'lnk_file' + priority: 5 + 'ScanLsb': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'image/png' + - 'png_file' + - 'image/jpeg' + - 'jpeg_file' + - 'image/x-ms-bmp' + - 'bmp_file' + - 'image/webp' + negative: + source: + - 'ScanTranscode' + priority: 5 'ScanLzma': - positive: flavors: @@ -214,6 +296,36 @@ strelka: priority: 5 options: tmp_directory: '/dev/shm/' + 'ScanManifest': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'browser_manifest' + priority: 5 + 'ScanMsi': + - positive: + flavors: + - "image/vnd.fpx" + - "application/vnd.ms-msi" + - "application/x-msi" + priority: 5 + options: + tmp_directory: '/dev/shm/' + keys: + - 'Author' + - 'Characters' + - 'Company' + - 'CreateDate' + - 'LastModifiedBy' + - 'Lines' + - 'ModifyDate' + - 'Pages' + - 'Paragraphs' + - 'RevisionNumber' + - 'Software' + - 'Template' + - 'Title' + - 'TotalEditTime' + - 'Words' 'ScanOcr': - positive: flavors: @@ -236,6 +348,13 @@ strelka: - 'application/msword' - 'olecf_file' priority: 5 + 'ScanOnenote': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'application/onenote' + - 'application/msonenote' + - 'onenote_file' + priority: 5 'ScanPdf': - positive: flavors: @@ -285,6 +404,30 @@ strelka: - 'ProgramArguments' - 'RunAtLoad' - 'StartInterval' + 'ScanPngEof': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'image/png' + - 'png_file' + negative: + source: + - 'ScanTranscode' + priority: 5 + 'ScanQr': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'image/jpeg' + - 'jpeg_file' + - 'image/png' + - 'png_file' + - 'image/tiff' + - 'type_is_tiff' + - 'image/x-ms-bmp' + - 'bmp_file' + - 'image/webp' + priority: 5 + options: + support_inverted: True 'ScanRar': - positive: flavors: @@ -309,6 +452,19 @@ strelka: priority: 5 options: limit: 1000 + 'ScanSevenZip': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'application/x-7z-compressed' + - '_7zip_file' + - "image/vnd.fpx" + - "application/vnd.ms-msi" + - "application/x-msi" + priority: 5 + options: + scanner_timeout: 150 + crack_pws: True + log_pws: True 'ScanSwf': - positive: flavors: @@ -351,6 +507,7 @@ strelka: flavors: - 'vb_file' - 'vbscript' + - 'hta_file' priority: 5 'ScanVba': - positive: @@ -362,6 +519,20 @@ strelka: priority: 5 options: analyze_macros: True + 'ScanVhd': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'application/x-vhd' + - 'vhd_file' + - 'vhdx_file' + priority: 5 + options: + limit: 100 + 'ScanVsto': + - positive: + flavors: + - 'vsto_file' + priority: 5 'ScanX509': - positive: flavors: @@ -391,6 +562,12 @@ strelka: priority: 5 options: location: '/etc/yara/' + compiled: + enabled: False + filename: "rules.compiled" + store_offset: True + offset_meta_key: "StrelkaHexDump" + offset_padding: 32 'ScanZip': - positive: flavors: @@ -530,6 +707,20 @@ strelka: ttl: 1h response: log: "/var/log/strelka/strelka.log" + broker: + bootstrap: "PLACEHOLDER" + protocol: "PLACEHOLDER" + certlocation: "PLACEHOLDER" + keylocation: "PLACEHOLDER" + calocation: "PLACEHOLDER" + topic: "PLACEHOLDER" + s3redundancy: "PLACEHOLDER - This should be a boolean value" + s3: + accesskey: "PLACEHOLDER" + secretkey: "PLACEHOLDER" + bucketName: "PLACEHOLDER" + region: "PLACEHOLDER" + endpoint: "PLACEHOLDER" manager: enabled: False config: diff --git a/salt/suricata/config.sls b/salt/suricata/config.sls index 8d5279349a..3ec1324bf0 100644 --- a/salt/suricata/config.sls +++ b/salt/suricata/config.sls @@ -84,10 +84,12 @@ suridatadir: - mode: 770 - makedirs: True +# salt:// would resolve to /opt/so/rules/nids because of the defined file_roots and +# not existing under /opt/so/saltstack/local/salt or /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt surirulesync: file.recurse: - name: /opt/so/conf/suricata/rules/ - - source: salt://suricata/rules/ + - source: salt://suri/ - user: 940 - group: 940 - show_changes: False diff --git a/salt/suricata/manager.sls b/salt/suricata/manager.sls index c196c5cae8..3d51835568 100644 --- a/salt/suricata/manager.sls +++ b/salt/suricata/manager.sls @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ruleslink: - name: /opt/so/saltstack/local/salt/suricata/rules - user: socore - group: socore - - target: /opt/so/rules/nids + - target: /opt/so/rules/nids/suri refresh_salt_master_fileserver_suricata_ruleslink: salt.runner: @@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ refresh_salt_master_fileserver_suricata_ruleslink: test.fail_without_changes: - name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed -{% endif %} \ No newline at end of file +{% endif %} diff --git a/salt/telegraf/defaults.yaml b/salt/telegraf/defaults.yaml index ab4b73183a..d3718f0b52 100644 --- a/salt/telegraf/defaults.yaml +++ b/salt/telegraf/defaults.yaml @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ telegraf: - suriloss.sh - zeekcaptureloss.sh - zeekloss.sh + - features.sh manager: - influxdbsize.sh - lasthighstate.sh @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ telegraf: - raid.sh - redis.sh - sostatus.sh + - features.sh managersearch: - eps.sh - influxdbsize.sh @@ -51,6 +53,7 @@ telegraf: - raid.sh - redis.sh - sostatus.sh + - features.sh import: - influxdbsize.sh - lasthighstate.sh @@ -67,6 +70,7 @@ telegraf: - suriloss.sh - zeekcaptureloss.sh - zeekloss.sh + - features.sh heavynode: - checkfiles.sh - eps.sh @@ -90,6 +94,7 @@ telegraf: - os.sh - raid.sh - sostatus.sh + - features.sh receiver: - eps.sh - lasthighstate.sh diff --git a/salt/telegraf/scripts/features.sh b/salt/telegraf/scripts/features.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c4fe6f524 --- /dev/null +++ b/salt/telegraf/scripts/features.sh @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one +# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at +# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the +# Elastic License 2.0. + +if [[ ! "`pidof -x $(basename $0) -o %PPID`" ]]; then + + FPS_ENABLED=$(cat /var/log/sostatus/fps_enabled) + LKS_ENABLED=$(cat /var/log/sostatus/lks_enabled) + + echo "features fps=$FPS_ENABLED" + echo "features lks=$LKS_ENABLED" +fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/salt/top.sls b/salt/top.sls index a07f2d9e17..16b355476b 100644 --- a/salt/top.sls +++ b/salt/top.sls @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one -# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at +# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at # https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the # Elastic License 2.0. @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ base: - zeek - strelka - elasticfleet.install_agent_grid + - stig '*_eval and G@saltversion:{{saltversion}}': - match: compound @@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ base: - soctopus - playbook - elasticfleet + - stig '*_standalone and G@saltversion:{{saltversion}}': - match: compound @@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ base: - sensoroni - telegraf - idstools - - suricata.manager + - suricata.manager - healthcheck - mysql - elasticsearch @@ -146,6 +148,7 @@ base: - soctopus - playbook - elasticfleet + - stig '*_searchnode and G@saltversion:{{saltversion}}': - match: compound @@ -157,6 +160,7 @@ base: - elasticsearch - logstash - elasticfleet.install_agent_grid + - stig '*_managersearch and G@saltversion:{{saltversion}}': - match: compound @@ -187,6 +191,7 @@ base: - soctopus - playbook - elasticfleet + - stig '*_heavynode and G@saltversion:{{saltversion}}': - match: compound @@ -206,7 +211,7 @@ base: - zeek - elasticfleet.install_agent_grid - elasticagent - + '*_import and G@saltversion:{{saltversion}}': - match: compound - salt.master @@ -259,6 +264,7 @@ base: - telegraf - firewall - logstash + - nginx - elasticfleet - elasticfleet.install_agent_grid - schedule diff --git a/setup/so-functions b/setup/so-functions index 178ea35694..f0462e4d64 100755 --- a/setup/so-functions +++ b/setup/so-functions @@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ make_some_dirs() { mkdir -p $local_salt_dir/salt/firewall/portgroups mkdir -p $local_salt_dir/salt/firewall/ports - for THEDIR in bpf pcap elasticsearch ntp firewall redis backup influxdb strelka sensoroni soc soctopus docker zeek suricata nginx telegraf logstash soc manager kratos idstools idh elastalert global;do + for THEDIR in bpf pcap elasticsearch ntp firewall redis backup influxdb strelka sensoroni soc soctopus docker zeek suricata nginx telegraf logstash soc manager kratos idstools idh elastalert stig global;do mkdir -p $local_salt_dir/pillar/$THEDIR touch $local_salt_dir/pillar/$THEDIR/adv_$THEDIR.sls touch $local_salt_dir/pillar/$THEDIR/soc_$THEDIR.sls @@ -1600,6 +1600,9 @@ reinstall_init() { salt-call -l info saltutil.kill_all_jobs --local fi + logCmd "salt-call state.apply ca.remove -linfo --local --file-root=../salt" + logCmd "salt-call state.apply ssl.remove -linfo --local --file-root=../salt" + # Kill any salt processes (safely) for service in "${salt_services[@]}"; do # Stop the service in the background so we can exit after a certain amount of time @@ -1621,9 +1624,6 @@ reinstall_init() { done done - logCmd "salt-call state.apply ca.remove -linfo --local --file-root=../salt" - logCmd "salt-call state.apply ssl.remove -linfo --local --file-root=../salt" - # Remove all salt configs rm -rf /etc/salt/engines/* /etc/salt/grains /etc/salt/master /etc/salt/master.d/* /etc/salt/minion /etc/salt/minion.d/* /etc/salt/pki/* /etc/salt/proxy /etc/salt/proxy.d/* /var/cache/salt/ @@ -1933,7 +1933,11 @@ saltify() { logCmd "dnf -y install salt-$SALTVERSION salt-master-$SALTVERSION salt-minion-$SALTVERSION" else # We just need the minion - logCmd "dnf -y install salt-$SALTVERSION salt-minion-$SALTVERSION" + if [[ $is_airgap ]]; then + logCmd "dnf -y install salt salt-minion" + else + logCmd "dnf -y install salt-$SALTVERSION salt-minion-$SALTVERSION" + fi fi fi @@ -2148,11 +2152,12 @@ set_default_log_size() { esac local disk_dir="/" - if [ -d /nsm ]; then + if mountpoint -q /nsm; then disk_dir="/nsm" fi - if [ -d /nsm/elasticsearch ]; then + if mountpoint -q /nsm/elasticsearch; then disk_dir="/nsm/elasticsearch" + percentage=80 fi local disk_size_1k diff --git a/sigs/securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso.sig b/sigs/securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso.sig new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb9eac3235 Binary files /dev/null and b/sigs/securityonion-2.4.50-20240220.iso.sig differ