Build failed #1

ghost · 2017-05-21T02:46:51Z

Got this error on the linaro 4.9 aarch64 toolchain.

In file included from arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.c:15:0:
include/linux/cpufeature.h:47:33: warning: ‘cpu_feature_match_SHA1’ defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
error, forbidden warning: cpufeature.h:47
scripts/Makefile.build:257: recipe for target 'arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.o' failed
make[1]: *** [arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.o] Error 1
Makefile:946: recipe for target 'arch/arm64/crypto' failed
make: *** [arch/arm64/crypto] Error 2
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

This fixes CVE-2016-7042. Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Change-Id: I23554b54eb9b82f44554a3ef620200de9f6ea55a Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Git-repo: http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git Git-commit: 03dab86 Signed-off-by: Dennis Cagle <[email protected]>

Kernel panic when type "cat /sys/kernel/debug/shrinker" Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0af37d40 pgd = d4dec000 [0af37d40] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [<c0bb8f24>] (_raw_spin_lock) from [<c020aa08>] (list_lru_count_one+0x14/0x28) [<c020aa08>] (list_lru_count_one) from [<c02309a8>] (super_cache_count+0x40/0xa0) [<c02309a8>] (super_cache_count) from [<c01f6ab0>] (debug_shrinker_show+0x50/0x90) [<c01f6ab0>] (debug_shrinker_show) from [<c024fa5c>] (seq_read+0x1ec/0x48c) [<c024fa5c>] (seq_read) from [<c022e8f8>] (__vfs_read+0x20/0xd0) [<c022e8f8>] (__vfs_read) from [<c022f0d0>] (vfs_read+0x7c/0x104) [<c022f0d0>] (vfs_read) from [<c022f974>] (SyS_read+0x44/0x9c) [<c022f974>] (SyS_read) from [<c0107580>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c) Code: e1a04000 e3a00001 ebd66b39 f594f000 (e1943f9f) ---[ end trace 60c74014a63a9688 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception shrink_control.nid is used but not initialzed, same for shrink_control.memcg. This reverts commit b0e7a582b2264cdf75874dcd8df915b6b4427755. Change-Id: I108de88fa4baaef99a53c4e4c6a1d8c4b4804157 Reported-by: Xiaowen Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <[email protected]> Git-commit: ad95c12f66df9efae04b15d5c4d0d0ba56ab2620 Git-repo: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4.git Signed-off-by: Vinayak Menon <[email protected]>

This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Fixes: cdec9cb ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Change-Id: I6923933270a657da75ae06acddc71d4b278164df Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Git-commit: f5527ff Signed-off-by: Dennis Cagle <[email protected]>

Kernel panic when type "cat /sys/kernel/debug/shrinker" Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0af37d40 pgd = d4dec000 [0af37d40] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [<c0bb8f24>] (_raw_spin_lock) from [<c020aa08>] (list_lru_count_one+0x14/0x28) [<c020aa08>] (list_lru_count_one) from [<c02309a8>] (super_cache_count+0x40/0xa0) [<c02309a8>] (super_cache_count) from [<c01f6ab0>] (debug_shrinker_show+0x50/0x90) [<c01f6ab0>] (debug_shrinker_show) from [<c024fa5c>] (seq_read+0x1ec/0x48c) [<c024fa5c>] (seq_read) from [<c022e8f8>] (__vfs_read+0x20/0xd0) [<c022e8f8>] (__vfs_read) from [<c022f0d0>] (vfs_read+0x7c/0x104) [<c022f0d0>] (vfs_read) from [<c022f974>] (SyS_read+0x44/0x9c) [<c022f974>] (SyS_read) from [<c0107580>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c) Code: e1a04000 e3a00001 ebd66b39 f594f000 (e1943f9f) ---[ end trace 60c74014a63a9688 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception shrink_control.nid is used but not initialzed, same for shrink_control.memcg. This reverts commit b0e7a582b2264cdf75874dcd8df915b6b4427755. Change-Id: I108de88fa4baaef99a53c4e4c6a1d8c4b4804157 Reported-by: Xiaowen Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <[email protected]> Git-commit: ad95c12f66df9efae04b15d5c4d0d0ba56ab2620 Git-repo: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4.git Signed-off-by: Vinayak Menon <[email protected]>

Once we failed to merge inline data into inode page during flushing inline inode, we will skip invoking inode_dec_dirty_pages, which makes dirty page count incorrect, result in panic in ->evict_inode, Fix it. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/inode.c:336! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 3 PID: 10004 Comm: umount Tainted: G O 4.6.0-rc5+ #17 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 task: f0c33000 ti: c5212000 task.ti: c5212000 EIP: 0060:[<f89aacb5>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 3 EIP is at f2fs_evict_inode+0x85/0x490 [f2fs] EAX: 00000001 EBX: c4529ea0 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000 ESI: c0131000 EDI: f89dd0a0 EBP: c5213e9c ESP: c5213e78 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: b75878c0 CR3: 1a36a700 CR4: 000406f0 Stack: c4529ea0 c4529ef4 c5213e8c c176d45c c4529ef4 00000000 c4529ea0 c4529fac f89dd0a0 c5213eb0 c1204a68 c5213ed8 c452a2b4 c6680930 c5213ec0 c1204b64 c6680d44 c6680620 c5213eec c120588d ee84b000 ee84b5c0 c5214000 ee84b5e0 Call Trace: [<c176d45c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2c/0x50 [<c1204a68>] evict+0xa8/0x170 [<c1204b64>] dispose_list+0x34/0x50 [<c120588d>] evict_inodes+0x10d/0x130 [<c11ea941>] generic_shutdown_super+0x41/0xe0 [<c1185190>] ? unregister_shrinker+0x40/0x50 [<c1185190>] ? unregister_shrinker+0x40/0x50 [<c11eac52>] kill_block_super+0x22/0x70 [<f89af23e>] kill_f2fs_super+0x1e/0x20 [f2fs] [<c11eae1d>] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 [<c11eb383>] deactivate_super+0x43/0x60 [<c1208ec9>] cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x80 [<c1208f50>] __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 [<c107d091>] task_work_run+0x71/0x90 [<c105725a>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x72/0x9e [<c1001c7c>] do_fast_syscall_32+0x19c/0x1c0 [<c176dd48>] sysenter_past_esp+0x45/0x74 EIP: [<f89aacb5>] f2fs_evict_inode+0x85/0x490 [f2fs] SS:ESP 0068:c5213e78 ---[ end trace d30536330b7fdc58 ]--- Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

FI_DIRTY_INODE flag is not covered by inode page lock, so it can be unset at any time like below. Thread #1 Thread #2 - lock_page(ipage) - update i_fields - update i_size/i_blocks/and so on - set FI_DIRTY_INODE - reset FI_DIRTY_INODE - set_page_dirty(ipage) In this case, we can lose the latest i_field information. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

This patch enhances the xattr consistency of dirs from suddern power-cuts. Possible scenario would be: 1. dir->setxattr used by per-file encryption 2. file->setxattr goes into inline_xattr 3. file->fsync In that case, we should do checkpoint for #1. Otherwise we'd lose dir's key information for the file given #2. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

tests/generic/251 of fstest suit complains us with below message: ------------[ cut here ]------------ invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 2 PID: 7698 Comm: fstrim Tainted: G O 4.7.0+ #21 task: e9f4e000 task.stack: e7262000 EIP: 0060:[<f89fcefe>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 2 EIP is at write_checkpoint+0xfde/0x1020 [f2fs] EAX: f33eb300 EBX: eecac310 ECX: 00000001 EDX: ffff0001 ESI: eecac000 EDI: eecac5f0 EBP: e7263dec ESP: e7263d18 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: b76ab01c CR3: 2eb89de0 CR4: 000406f0 Stack: 00000001 a220fb7b e9f4e000 00000002 419ff2d3 b3a05151 00000002 e9f4e5d8 e9f4e000 419ff2d3 b3a05151 eecac310 c10b8154 b3a05151 419ff2d3 c10b78bd e9f4e000 e9f4e000 e9f4e5d8 00000001 e9f4e000 ec409000 eecac2cc eecac288 Call Trace: [<c10b8154>] ? __lock_acquire+0x3c4/0x760 [<c10b78bd>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x80 [<f8a10632>] f2fs_trim_fs+0x1c2/0x2e0 [f2fs] [<f89e9f56>] f2fs_ioctl+0x6b6/0x10b0 [f2fs] [<c13d51df>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20 [<c10b4281>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x91/0x120 [<f89e98a0>] ? __exchange_data_block+0xd30/0xd30 [f2fs] [<c120b2e1>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x81/0x7f0 [<c11d57c5>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x245/0x2e0 [<c1217840>] ? get_unused_fd_flags+0x40/0x40 [<c1206eec>] ? putname+0x4c/0x50 [<c11f631e>] ? do_sys_open+0x16e/0x1d0 [<c1001990>] ? do_fast_syscall_32+0x30/0x1c0 [<c13d51df>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20 [<c120baa8>] SyS_ioctl+0x58/0x80 [<c1001a01>] do_fast_syscall_32+0xa1/0x1c0 [<c178cc54>] sysenter_past_esp+0x45/0x74 EIP: [<f89fcefe>] write_checkpoint+0xfde/0x1020 [f2fs] SS:ESP 0068:e7263d18 ---[ end trace 4de95d7e6b3aa7c6 ]--- The reason is: with below call stack, we will encounter BUG_ON during doing fstrim. Thread A Thread B - write_checkpoint - do_checkpoint - f2fs_write_inode - update_inode_page - update_inode - set_page_dirty - f2fs_set_node_page_dirty - inc_page_count - percpu_counter_inc - set_sbi_flag(SBI_IS_DIRTY) - clear_sbi_flag(SBI_IS_DIRTY) Thread C Thread D - f2fs_write_node_page - set_node_addr - __set_nat_cache_dirty - nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt++ - do_vfs_ioctl - f2fs_ioctl - f2fs_trim_fs - write_checkpoint - f2fs_bug_on(nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt) Fix it by setting superblock dirty correctly in do_checkpoint and f2fs_write_node_page. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

Previously, f2fs_write_begin sets PageUptodate all the time. But, when user tries to update the entire page (i.e., len == PAGE_SIZE), we need to consider that the page is able to be copied partially afterwards. In such the case, we will lose the remaing region in the page. This patch fixes this by setting PageUptodate in f2fs_write_end as given copied result. In the short copy case, it returns zero to let generic_perform_write retry copying user data again. As a result, f2fs_write_end() works: PageUptodate len copied return retry 1. no 4096 4096 4096 false -> return 4096 2. no 4096 1024 0 true -> goto #1 case 3. yes 2048 2048 2048 false -> return 2048 4. yes 2048 1024 1024 false -> return 1024 Suggested-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6071bd1 ] This was recently reported to me, and reproduced on the latest net kernel, when attempting to run netperf from a host that had a netem qdisc attached to the egress interface: [ 788.073771] ---------------------[ cut here ]--------------------------- [ 788.096716] WARNING: at net/core/dev.c:2253 skb_warn_bad_offload+0xcd/0xda() [ 788.129521] bnx2: caps=(0x00000001801949b3, 0x0000000000000000) len=2962 data_len=0 gso_size=1448 gso_type=1 ip_summed=3 [ 788.182150] Modules linked in: sch_netem kvm_amd kvm crc32_pclmul ipmi_ssif ghash_clmulni_intel sp5100_tco amd64_edac_mod aesni_intel lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper edac_mce_amd cryptd pcspkr sg edac_core hpilo ipmi_si i2c_piix4 k10temp fam15h_power hpwdt ipmi_msghandler shpchp acpi_power_meter pcc_cpufreq nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic mgag200 syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ahci ata_generic pata_acpi ttm libahci crct10dif_pclmul pata_atiixp tg3 libata crct10dif_common drm crc32c_intel ptp serio_raw bnx2 r8169 hpsa pps_core i2c_core mii dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 788.465294] CPU: 16 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/16 Tainted: G W ------------ 3.10.0-327.el7.x86_64 TheScarastic#1 [ 788.511521] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL385p Gen8, BIOS A28 12/17/2012 [ 788.542260] ffff880437c036b8 f7afc56532a53db9 ffff880437c03670 ffffffff816351f1 [ 788.576332] ffff880437c036a8 ffffffff8107b200 ffff880633e74200 ffff880231674000 [ 788.611943] 0000000000000001 0000000000000003 0000000000000000 ffff880437c03710 [ 788.647241] Call Trace: [ 788.658817] <IRQ> [<ffffffff816351f1>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 788.686193] [<ffffffff8107b200>] warn_slowpath_common+0x70/0xb0 [ 788.713803] [<ffffffff8107b29c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 [ 788.741314] [<ffffffff812f92f3>] ? ___ratelimit+0x93/0x100 [ 788.767018] [<ffffffff81637f49>] skb_warn_bad_offload+0xcd/0xda [ 788.796117] [<ffffffff8152950c>] skb_checksum_help+0x17c/0x190 [ 788.823392] [<ffffffffa01463a1>] netem_enqueue+0x741/0x7c0 [sch_netem] [ 788.854487] [<ffffffff8152cb58>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2a8/0x570 [ 788.880870] [<ffffffff8156ae1d>] ip_finish_output+0x53d/0x7d0 ... The problem occurs because netem is not prepared to handle GSO packets (as it uses skb_checksum_help in its enqueue path, which cannot manipulate these frames). The solution I think is to simply segment the skb in a simmilar fashion to the way we do in __dev_queue_xmit (via validate_xmit_skb), with some minor changes. When we decide to corrupt an skb, if the frame is GSO, we segment it, corrupt the first segment, and enqueue the remaining ones. tested successfully by myself on the latest net kernel, to which this applies Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> CC: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d0c31e0 ] We noticed this panic while enabling SR-IOV in sparc. mlx4_core: Mellanox ConnectX core driver v2.2-1 (Jan 1 2015) mlx4_core: Initializing 0007:01:00.0 mlx4_core 0007:01:00.0: Enabling SR-IOV with 5 VFs mlx4_core: Initializing 0007:01:00.1 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference insmod(10010): Oops [TheScarastic#1] CPU: 391 PID: 10010 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.1.12-32.el6uek.kdump2.sparc64 TheScarastic#1 TPC: <dma_supported+0x20/0x80> I7: <__mlx4_init_one+0x324/0x500 [mlx4_core]> Call Trace: [00000000104c5ea4] __mlx4_init_one+0x324/0x500 [mlx4_core] [00000000104c613c] mlx4_init_one+0xbc/0x120 [mlx4_core] [0000000000725f14] local_pci_probe+0x34/0xa0 [0000000000726028] pci_call_probe+0xa8/0xe0 [0000000000726310] pci_device_probe+0x50/0x80 [000000000079f700] really_probe+0x140/0x420 [000000000079fa24] driver_probe_device+0x44/0xa0 [000000000079fb5c] __device_attach+0x3c/0x60 [000000000079d85c] bus_for_each_drv+0x5c/0xa0 [000000000079f588] device_attach+0x88/0xc0 [000000000071acd0] pci_bus_add_device+0x30/0x80 [0000000000736090] virtfn_add.clone.1+0x210/0x360 [00000000007364a4] sriov_enable+0x2c4/0x520 [000000000073672c] pci_enable_sriov+0x2c/0x40 [00000000104c2d58] mlx4_enable_sriov+0xf8/0x180 [mlx4_core] [00000000104c49ac] mlx4_load_one+0x42c/0xd40 [mlx4_core] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Caller[00000000104c5ea4]: __mlx4_init_one+0x324/0x500 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c613c]: mlx4_init_one+0xbc/0x120 [mlx4_core] Caller[0000000000725f14]: local_pci_probe+0x34/0xa0 Caller[0000000000726028]: pci_call_probe+0xa8/0xe0 Caller[0000000000726310]: pci_device_probe+0x50/0x80 Caller[000000000079f700]: really_probe+0x140/0x420 Caller[000000000079fa24]: driver_probe_device+0x44/0xa0 Caller[000000000079fb5c]: __device_attach+0x3c/0x60 Caller[000000000079d85c]: bus_for_each_drv+0x5c/0xa0 Caller[000000000079f588]: device_attach+0x88/0xc0 Caller[000000000071acd0]: pci_bus_add_device+0x30/0x80 Caller[0000000000736090]: virtfn_add.clone.1+0x210/0x360 Caller[00000000007364a4]: sriov_enable+0x2c4/0x520 Caller[000000000073672c]: pci_enable_sriov+0x2c/0x40 Caller[00000000104c2d58]: mlx4_enable_sriov+0xf8/0x180 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c49ac]: mlx4_load_one+0x42c/0xd40 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c5f90]: __mlx4_init_one+0x410/0x500 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c613c]: mlx4_init_one+0xbc/0x120 [mlx4_core] Caller[0000000000725f14]: local_pci_probe+0x34/0xa0 Caller[0000000000726028]: pci_call_probe+0xa8/0xe0 Caller[0000000000726310]: pci_device_probe+0x50/0x80 Caller[000000000079f700]: really_probe+0x140/0x420 Caller[000000000079fa24]: driver_probe_device+0x44/0xa0 Caller[000000000079fb08]: __driver_attach+0x88/0xa0 Caller[000000000079d90c]: bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xa0 Caller[000000000079f29c]: driver_attach+0x1c/0x40 Caller[000000000079e35c]: bus_add_driver+0x17c/0x220 Caller[00000000007a02d4]: driver_register+0x74/0x120 Caller[00000000007263fc]: __pci_register_driver+0x3c/0x60 Caller[00000000104f62bc]: mlx4_init+0x60/0xcc [mlx4_core] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Details: Here is the call sequence virtfn_add->__mlx4_init_one->dma_set_mask->dma_supported The panic happened at line 760(file arch/sparc/kernel/iommu.c) 758 int dma_supported(struct device *dev, u64 device_mask) 759 { 760 struct iommu *iommu = dev->archdata.iommu; 761 u64 dma_addr_mask = iommu->dma_addr_mask; 762 763 if (device_mask >= (1UL << 32UL)) 764 return 0; 765 766 if ((device_mask & dma_addr_mask) == dma_addr_mask) 767 return 1; 768 769 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI 770 if (dev_is_pci(dev)) 771 return pci64_dma_supported(to_pci_dev(dev), device_mask); 772 #endif 773 774 return 0; 775 } 776 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_supported); Same panic happened with Intel ixgbe driver also. SR-IOV code looks for arch specific data while enabling VFs. When VF device is added, driver probe function makes set of calls to initialize the pci device. Because the VF device is added different way than the normal PF device(which happens via of_create_pci_dev for sparc), some of the arch specific initialization does not happen for VF device. That causes panic when archdata is accessed. To fix this, I have used already defined weak function pcibios_setup_device to copy archdata from PF to VF. Also verified the fix. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ethan Zhao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7cafc0b ] We must handle data access exception as well as memory address unaligned exceptions from return from trap window fill faults, not just normal TLB misses. Otherwise we can get an OOPS that looks like this: ld-linux.so.2(36808): Kernel bad sw trap 5 [TheScarastic#1] CPU: 1 PID: 36808 Comm: ld-linux.so.2 Not tainted 4.6.0 #34 task: fff8000303be5c60 ti: fff8000301344000 task.ti: fff8000301344000 TSTATE: 0000004410001601 TPC: 0000000000a1a784 TNPC: 0000000000a1a788 Y: 00000002 Not tainted TPC: <do_sparc64_fault+0x5c4/0x700> g0: fff8000024fc8248 g1: 0000000000db04dc g2: 0000000000000000 g3: 0000000000000001 g4: fff8000303be5c60 g5: fff800030e672000 g6: fff8000301344000 g7: 0000000000000001 o0: 0000000000b95ee8 o1: 000000000000012b o2: 0000000000000000 o3: 0000000200b9b358 o4: 0000000000000000 o5: fff8000301344040 sp: fff80003013475c1 ret_pc: 0000000000a1a77c RPC: <do_sparc64_fault+0x5bc/0x700> l0: 00000000000007ff l1: 0000000000000000 l2: 000000000000005f l3: 0000000000000000 l4: fff8000301347e98 l5: fff8000024ff3060 l6: 0000000000000000 l7: 0000000000000000 i0: fff8000301347f60 i1: 0000000000102400 i2: 0000000000000000 i3: 0000000000000000 i4: 0000000000000000 i5: 0000000000000000 i6: fff80003013476a1 i7: 0000000000404d4c I7: <user_rtt_fill_fixup+0x6c/0x7c> Call Trace: [0000000000404d4c] user_rtt_fill_fixup+0x6c/0x7c The window trap handlers are slightly clever, the trap table entries for them are composed of two pieces of code. First comes the code that actually performs the window fill or spill trap handling, and then there are three instructions at the end which are for exception processing. The userland register window fill handler is: add %sp, STACK_BIAS + 0x00, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %l0; \ mov 0x08, %g2; \ mov 0x10, %g3; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %l1; \ mov 0x18, %g5; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %l2; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %l3; \ add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %l4; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %l5; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %l6; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %l7; \ add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %i0; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %i1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %i2; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %i3; \ add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %i4; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %i5; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %i6; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %i7; \ restored; \ retry; nop; nop; nop; nop; \ b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup_dax; \ b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup_mna; \ b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup; And the way this works is that if any of those memory accesses generate an exception, the exception handler can revector to one of those final three branch instructions depending upon which kind of exception the memory access took. In this way, the fault handler doesn't have to know if it was a spill or a fill that it's handling the fault for. It just always branches to the last instruction in the parent trap's handler. For example, for a regular fault, the code goes: winfix_trampoline: rdpr %tpc, %g3 or %g3, 0x7c, %g3 wrpr %g3, %tnpc done All window trap handlers are 0x80 aligned, so if we "or" 0x7c into the trap time program counter, we'll get that final instruction in the trap handler. On return from trap, we have to pull the register window in but we do this by hand instead of just executing a "restore" instruction for several reasons. The largest being that from Niagara and onward we simply don't have enough levels in the trap stack to fully resolve all possible exception cases of a window fault when we are already at trap level 1 (which we enter to get ready to return from the original trap). This is executed inline via the FILL_*_RTRAP handlers. rtrap_64.S's code branches directly to these to do the window fill by hand if necessary. Now if you look at them, we'll see at the end: ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup; ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup; ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup; And oops, all three cases are handled like a fault. This doesn't work because each of these trap types (data access exception, memory address unaligned, and faults) store their auxiliary info in different registers to pass on to the C handler which does the real work. So in the case where the stack was unaligned, the unaligned trap handler sets up the arg registers one way, and then we branched to the fault handler which expects them setup another way. So the FAULT_TYPE_* value ends up basically being garbage, and randomly would generate the backtrace seen above. Reported-by: Nick Alcock <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 368301f ] With this command sequence: modprobe plip modprobe pps_parport rmmod pps_parport the partport_pps modules causes this crash: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: parport_detach+0x1d/0x60 [pps_parport] Oops: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] SMP ... Call Trace: parport_unregister_driver+0x65/0xc0 [parport] SyS_delete_module+0x187/0x210 The sequence that builds up to this is: 1) plip is loaded and takes the parport device for exclusive use: plip0: Parallel port at 0x378, using IRQ 7. 2) pps_parport then fails to grab the device: pps_parport: parallel port PPS client parport0: cannot grant exclusive access for device pps_parport pps_parport: couldn't register with parport0 3) rmmod of pps_parport is then killed because it tries to access pardev->name, but pardev (taken from port->cad) is NULL. So add a check for NULL in the test there too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> Acked-by: Rodolfo Giometti <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 190ce86 ] Currently we have 2 segments that are bolted for the kernel linear mapping (ie 0xc000... addresses). This is 0 to 1TB and also the kernel stacks. Anything accessed outside of these regions may need to be faulted in. (In practice machines with TM always have 1T segments) If a machine has < 2TB of memory we never fault on the kernel linear mapping as these two segments cover all physical memory. If a machine has > 2TB of memory, there may be structures outside of these two segments that need to be faulted in. This faulting can occur when running as a guest as the hypervisor may remove any SLB that's not bolted. When we treclaim and trecheckpoint we have a window where we need to run with the userspace GPRs. This means that we no longer have a valid stack pointer in r1. For this window we therefore clear MSR RI to indicate that any exceptions taken at this point won't be able to be handled. This means that we can't take segment misses in this RI=0 window. In this RI=0 region, we currently access the thread_struct for the process being context switched to or from. This thread_struct access may cause a segment fault since it's not guaranteed to be covered by the two bolted segment entries described above. We've seen this with a crash when running as a guest with > 2TB of memory on PowerVM: Unrecoverable exception 4100 at c00000000004f138 Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [TheScarastic#1] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 1280 PID: 7755 Comm: kworker/1280:1 Tainted: G X 4.4.13-46-default TheScarastic#1 task: c000189001df4210 ti: c000189001d5c000 task.ti: c000189001d5c000 NIP: c00000000004f138 LR: 0000000010003a24 CTR: 0000000010001b20 REGS: c000189001d5f730 TRAP: 4100 Tainted: G X (4.4.13-46-default) MSR: 8000000100001031 <SF,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR: 24000048 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000004ed18 SOFTE: 0 GPR00: ffffffffc58d7b60 c000189001d5f9b0 00000000100d7d00 000000003a738288 GPR04: 0000000000002781 0000000000000006 0000000000000000 c0000d1f4d889620 GPR08: 000000000000c350 00000000000008ab 00000000000008ab 00000000100d7af0 GPR12: 00000000100d7ae8 00003ffe787e67a0 0000000000000000 0000000000000211 GPR16: 0000000010001b20 0000000000000000 0000000000800000 00003ffe787df110 GPR20: 0000000000000001 00000000100d1e10 0000000000000000 00003ffe787df050 GPR24: 0000000000000003 0000000000010000 0000000000000000 00003fffe79e2e30 GPR28: 00003fffe79e2e68 00000000003d0f00 00003ffe787e67a0 00003ffe787de680 NIP [c00000000004f138] restore_gprs+0xd0/0x16c LR [0000000010003a24] 0x10003a24 Call Trace: [c000189001d5f9b0] [c000189001d5f9f0] 0xc000189001d5f9f0 (unreliable) [c000189001d5fb90] [c00000000001583c] tm_recheckpoint+0x6c/0xa0 [c000189001d5fbd0] [c000000000015c40] __switch_to+0x2c0/0x350 [c000189001d5fc30] [c0000000007e647c] __schedule+0x32c/0x9c0 [c000189001d5fcb0] [c0000000007e6b58] schedule+0x48/0xc0 [c000189001d5fce0] [c0000000000deabc] worker_thread+0x22c/0x5b0 [c000189001d5fd80] [c0000000000e7000] kthread+0x110/0x130 [c000189001d5fe30] [c000000000009538] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0xa4 Instruction dump: 7cb103a6 7cc0e3a6 7ca222a6 78a58402 38c00800 7cc62838 08860000 7cc000a6 38a00006 78c60022 7cc62838 0b060000 <e8c701a0> 7ccff120 e8270078 e8a70098 ---[ end trace 602126d0a1dedd54 ]--- This fixes this by copying the required data from the thread_struct to the stack before we clear MSR RI. Then once we clear RI, we only access the stack, guaranteeing there's no segment miss. We also tighten the region over which we set RI=0 on the treclaim() path. This may have a slight performance impact since we're adding an mtmsr instruction. Fixes: 090b928 ("powerpc/tm: Clear MSR RI in non-recoverable TM code") Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6bcb801 ] At the start of __tm_recheckpoint() we save the kernel stack pointer (r1) in SPRG SCRATCH0 (SPRG2) so that we can restore it after the trecheckpoint. Unfortunately, the same SPRG is used in the SLB miss handler. If an SLB miss is taken between the save and restore of r1 to the SPRG, the SPRG is changed and hence r1 is also corrupted. We can end up with the following crash when we start using r1 again after the restore from the SPRG: Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [TheScarastic#1] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 658 PID: 143777 Comm: htm_demo Tainted: G EL X 4.4.13-0-default TheScarastic#1 task: c0000b56993a7810 ti: c00000000cfec000 task.ti: c0000b56993bc000 NIP: c00000000004f188 LR: 00000000100040b8 CTR: 0000000010002570 REGS: c00000000cfefd40 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G EL X (4.4.13-0-default) MSR: 8000000300001033 <SF,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 02000424 XER: 20000000 CFAR: c000000000008468 DAR: 00003ffd84e66880 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 0 PACATMSCRATCH: 00003ffbc865e680 GPR00: fffffffcfabc4268 00003ffd84e667a0 00000000100d8c38 000000030544bb80 GPR04: 0000000000000002 00000000100cf200 0000000000000449 00000000100cf100 GPR08: 000000000000c350 0000000000002569 0000000000002569 00000000100d6c30 GPR12: 00000000100d6c28 c00000000e6a6b00 00003ffd84660000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000003 0000000000000449 0000000010002570 0000010009684f20 GPR20: 0000000000800000 00003ffd84e5f110 00003ffd84e5f7a0 00000000100d0f40 GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003ffff0673f50 GPR28: 00003ffd84e5e960 00000000003d0f00 00003ffd84e667a0 00003ffd84e5e680 NIP [c00000000004f188] restore_gprs+0x110/0x17c LR [00000000100040b8] 0x100040b8 Call Trace: Instruction dump: f8a1fff0 e8e700a8 38a00000 7ca10164 e8a1fff8 e821fff0 7c0007dd 7c421378 7db142a6 7c3242a6 38800002 7c810164 <e9c100e0> e9e100e8 ea0100f0 ea2100f8 We hit this on large memory machines (> 2TB) but it can also be hit on smaller machines when 1TB segments are disabled. To hit this, you also need to be virtualised to ensure SLBs are periodically removed by the hypervisor. This patches moves the saving of r1 to the SPRG to the region where we are guaranteed not to take any further SLB misses. Fixes: 98ae22e ("powerpc: Add helper functions for transactional memory context switching") Cc: [email protected] # v3.9+ Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]> Acked-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bd975d1 ] The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below: mount.cifs(8) TheScarastic#1 mount.cifs(8) TheScarastic#2 Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated? // false secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash.. secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc.. sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd; secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc // sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm // not yet assigned crypto_shash_update() deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030 epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 Call Trace: crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84 build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248 CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178 cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314 cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440 mount_fs+0x20/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138 do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4 syscall_common+0x30/0x54 Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar locking. Fixes: 95dc8dd ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires") Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]> CC: Stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d3e6952 ] I ran into this: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ TheScarastic#19 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>] [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710 RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048 RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: 0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220 ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232 ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190 [<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0 [<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410 [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74 RIP [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710 RSP <ffff880111747bb8> ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]--- The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL, and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88716a9 ] After a device is disconnected, xhci_stop_device() will be invoked in xhci_bus_suspend(). Also the "disconnect" IRQ will have ISR to invoke xhci_free_virt_device() in this sequence. xhci_irq -> xhci_handle_event -> handle_cmd_completion -> xhci_handle_cmd_disable_slot -> xhci_free_virt_device If xhci->devs[slot_id] has been assigned to NULL in xhci_free_virt_device(), then virt_dev->eps[i].ring in xhci_stop_device() may point to an invlid address to cause kernel panic. virt_dev = xhci->devs[slot_id]; : if (virt_dev->eps[i].ring && virt_dev->eps[i].ring->dequeue) [] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00001a68 [] pgd=ffffffc001430000 [] [00001a68] *pgd=000000013c807003, *pud=000000013c807003, *pmd=000000013c808003, *pte=0000000000000000 [] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [TheScarastic#1] PREEMPT SMP [] CPU: 0 PID: 39 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G U [] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [] task: ffffffc0bc0e0bc0 ti: ffffffc0bc0ec000 task.ti: ffffffc0bc0ec000 [] PC is at xhci_stop_device.constprop.11+0xb4/0x1a4 This issue is found when running with realtek ethernet device (0bda:8153). Signed-off-by: Jim Lin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6b760bb ] I got this: divide error: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #189 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 task: ffff8801120a9580 task.stack: ffff8801120b0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0 RSP: 0018:ffff88011aa87da8 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000004f76 RBX: ffff880112655e88 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880112655ea0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff88011aa87e00 R08: ffff88013fff905c R09: ffff88013fff9048 R10: ffff88013fff9050 R11: 00000001050a7b8c R12: ffff880114778a00 R13: ffff880114778ab4 R14: ffff880114778b30 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f071647c700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 0000000112021000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffff880114778ab8 ffff880112655ea0 0000000000004f76 ffff880112655ec8 ffff880112655e80 ffff880112655e88 ffff88011aa98fc0 00000000b97ccf2b dffffc0000000000 ffff88011aa98fc0 ffff88011aa87ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff813abce7>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x347/0xa00 [<ffffffff82c8bbc0>] ? snd_hrtimer_close+0x130/0x130 [<ffffffff813ab9a0>] ? retrigger_next_event+0x1b0/0x1b0 [<ffffffff813ae1a6>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x136/0x4b0 [<ffffffff813ae220>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x1b0/0x4b0 [<ffffffff8120f91e>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0xf0 [<ffffffff81227ad3>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x13/0xc0 [<ffffffff83c35086>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 [<ffffffff83c3416c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 <EOI> [<ffffffff83c3239c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x60 [<ffffffff82c8185d>] snd_timer_start1+0xdd/0x670 [<ffffffff82c87015>] snd_timer_continue+0x45/0x80 [<ffffffff82c88100>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x1030/0x2830 [<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90 [<ffffffff815aa4f8>] ? handle_mm_fault+0xbc8/0x27f0 [<ffffffff815a9930>] ? __pmd_alloc+0x370/0x370 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050 [<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200 [<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0 [<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190 [<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0 [<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 [<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050 [<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0 [<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: e8 fc 42 7b fe 8b 0d 06 8a 50 03 49 0f af cf 48 85 c9 0f 88 7c 01 00 00 48 89 4d a8 e8 e0 42 7b fe 48 8b 45 c0 48 8b 4d a8 48 99 <48> f7 f9 49 01 c7 e8 cb 42 7b fe 48 8b 55 d0 48 b8 00 00 00 00 RIP [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0 RSP <ffff88011aa87da8> ---[ end trace 6aa380f756a21074 ]--- The problem happens when you call ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE) on a completely new/unused timer -- it will have ->sticks == 0, which causes a divide by 0 in snd_hrtimer_callback(). Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ddc056 ] I hit this with syzkaller: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #190 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 task: ffff88011278d600 task.stack: ffff8801120c0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8ba07>] [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100 RSP: 0018:ffff8801120c7a60 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 1ffff10023483091 RDI: 0000000000000048 RBP: ffff8801120c7a78 R08: ffff88011a5cf768 R09: ffff88011a5ba790 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffed00234b9ef1 R12: ffff880114843980 R13: ffffffff84213c00 R14: ffff880114843ab0 R15: 0000000000000286 FS: 00007f72958f3700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 00000001126ab000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff880114843980 ffff880111eb2dc0 ffff880114843a34 ffff8801120c7ad0 ffffffff82c81ab1 0000000000000000 ffffffff842138e0 0000000100000000 ffff880111eb2dd0 ffff880111eb2dc0 0000000000000001 ffff880111eb2dc0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82c81ab1>] snd_timer_start1+0x331/0x670 [<ffffffff82c85bfd>] snd_timer_start+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff82c8795e>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x88e/0x2830 [<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90 [<ffffffff8132762f>] ? put_prev_entity+0x108f/0x21a0 [<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050 [<ffffffff813510af>] ? cpuacct_account_field+0x12f/0x1a0 [<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200 [<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0 [<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190 [<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0 [<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0 [<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 [<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050 [<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0 [<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: c7 c7 c4 b9 c8 82 48 89 d9 4c 89 ee e8 63 88 7f fe e8 7e 46 7b fe 48 8d 7b 48 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 04 84 c0 7e 65 80 7b 48 00 74 0e e8 52 46 RIP [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100 RSP <ffff8801120c7a60> ---[ end trace 5955b08db7f2b029 ]--- This can happen if snd_hrtimer_open() fails to allocate memory and returns an error, which is currently not checked by snd_timer_open(): ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT) - snd_timer_user_tselect() - snd_timer_close() - snd_hrtimer_close() - (struct snd_timer *) t->private_data = NULL - snd_timer_open() - snd_hrtimer_open() - kzalloc() fails; t->private_data is still NULL ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START) - snd_timer_user_start() - snd_timer_start() - snd_timer_start1() - snd_hrtimer_start() - t->private_data == NULL // boom Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f8a765 ] When a user timer instance is continued without the explicit start beforehand, the system gets eventually zero-division error like: divide error: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 27320 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3-next-20160825+ #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88003c9b2280 task.stack: ffff880027280000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [< inline >] ktime_divns include/linux/ktime.h:195 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [<ffffffff858e1a6c>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1bc/0x3c0 sound/core/hrtimer.c:62 Call Trace: <IRQ> [< inline >] __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1238 [<ffffffff81504335>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x325/0xe70 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1302 [<ffffffff81506ceb>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x18b/0x420 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1336 [<ffffffff8126d8df>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:933 [<ffffffff86e13056>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:957 [<ffffffff86e1210c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:487 <EOI> ..... Although a similar issue was spotted and a fix patch was merged in commit [6b760bb: ALSA: timer: fix division by zero after SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE], it seems covering only a part of iceberg. In this patch, we fix the issue a bit more drastically. Basically the continue of an uninitialized timer is supposed to be a fresh start, so we do it for user timers. For the direct snd_timer_continue() call, there is no way to pass the initial tick value, so we kick out for the uninitialized case. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03dab86 ] This fixes CVE-2016-7042. Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 TheScarastic#1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 28b89b9 ] A discrepancy between cpu_online_mask and cpuset's effective_cpus mask is inevitable during hotplug since cpuset defers updating of effective_cpus mask using a workqueue, during which time nothing prevents the system from more hotplug operations. For that reason guarantee_online_cpus() walks up the cpuset hierarchy until it finds an intersection under the assumption that top cpuset's effective_cpus mask intersects with cpu_online_mask even with such a race occurring. However a sequence of CPU hotplugs can open a time window, during which none of the effective CPUs in the top cpuset intersect with cpu_online_mask. For example when there are 4 possible CPUs 0-3 and only CPU0 is online: ======================== =========================== cpu_online_mask top_cpuset.effective_cpus ======================== =========================== echo 1 > cpu2/online. CPU hotplug notifier woke up hotplug work but not yet scheduled. [0,2] [0] echo 0 > cpu0/online. The workqueue is still runnable. [2] [0] ======================== =========================== Now there is no intersection between cpu_online_mask and top_cpuset.effective_cpus. Thus invoking sys_sched_setaffinity() at this moment can cause following: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000d0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ Kernel BUG at ffffffc0001389b0 [verbose debug info unavailable] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 96000005 [TheScarastic#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 1420 Comm: taskset Tainted: G W 4.4.8+ #98 task: ffffffc06a5c4880 ti: ffffffc06e124000 task.ti: ffffffc06e124000 PC is at guarantee_online_cpus+0x2c/0x58 LR is at cpuset_cpus_allowed+0x4c/0x6c <snip> Process taskset (pid: 1420, stack limit = 0xffffffc06e124020) Call trace: [<ffffffc0001389b0>] guarantee_online_cpus+0x2c/0x58 [<ffffffc00013b208>] cpuset_cpus_allowed+0x4c/0x6c [<ffffffc0000d61f0>] sched_setaffinity+0xc0/0x1ac [<ffffffc0000d6374>] SyS_sched_setaffinity+0x98/0xac [<ffffffc000085cb0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 The top cpuset's effective_cpus are guaranteed to be identical to cpu_online_mask eventually. Hence fall back to cpu_online_mask when there is no intersection between top cpuset's effective_cpus and cpu_online_mask. Signed-off-by: Joonwoo Park <[email protected]> Acked-by: Li Zefan <[email protected]> Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.17+ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af30922 ] If a block device is closed while iterate_bdevs() is handling it, the following NULL pointer dereference occurs because bdev->b_disk is NULL in bdev_get_queue(), which is called from blk_get_backing_dev_info() (in turn called by the mapping_cap_writeback_dirty() call in __filemap_fdatawrite_range()): BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000508 IP: [<ffffffff81314790>] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20 PGD 9e62067 PUD 9ee8067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 2422 Comm: sync Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7+ #400 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) task: ffff880009f4d700 ti: ffff880009f5c000 task.ti: ffff880009f5c000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81314790>] [<ffffffff81314790>] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20 RSP: 0018:ffff880009f5fe68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000ec17a38 RCX: ffffffff81a4e940 RDX: 7fffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000ec176c0 RBP: ffff880009f5fe68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88000ec17860 R13: ffffffff811b25c0 R14: ffff88000ec178e0 R15: ffff88000ec17a38 FS: 00007faee505d700(0000) GS:ffff88000fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000508 CR3: 0000000009e8a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880009f5feb8 ffffffff8112e7f5 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 ffff88000ec178e0 ffff88000ec17860 ffff880009f5fec8 ffffffff8112e81f Call Trace: [<ffffffff8112e7f5>] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x85/0x90 [<ffffffff8112e81f>] filemap_fdatawrite+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff811b25d6>] fdatawrite_one_bdev+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff811bc402>] iterate_bdevs+0xf2/0x130 [<ffffffff811b2763>] sys_sync+0x63/0x90 [<ffffffff815d4272>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 f0 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 <48> 8b 80 08 05 00 00 5d RIP [<ffffffff81314790>] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20 RSP <ffff880009f5fe68> CR2: 0000000000000508 ---[ end trace 2487336ceb3de62d ]--- The crash is easily reproducible by running the following command, if an msleep(100) is inserted before the call to func() in iterate_devs(): while :; do head -c1 /dev/nullb0; done > /dev/null & while :; do sync; done Fix it by holding the bd_mutex across the func() call and only calling func() if the bdev is opened. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 5c0d6b6 ("vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices") Reported-and-tested-by: Wei Fang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1620094 ] We've got a kernel crash report showing like: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000008 pgd = a1d7c000 [00000008] *pgd=31c93831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 17 [TheScarastic#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM CPU: 0 PID: 250 Comm: dbus-daemon Not tainted 3.14.51-03479-gf50bdf4 TheScarastic#1 task: a3ae61c0 ti: a08c8000 task.ti: a08c8000 PC is at retire_capture_urb+0x10/0x1f4 [snd_usb_audio] LR is at snd_complete_urb+0x140/0x1f0 [snd_usb_audio] pc : [<7f0eb22c>] lr : [<7f0e57fc>] psr: 200e0193 sp : a08c9c98 ip : a08c9ce8 fp : a08c9ce4 r10: 0000000a r9 : 00000102 r8 : 94cb3000 r7 : 94cb3000 r6 : 94d0f000 r5 : 94d0e8e8 r4 : 94d0e000 r3 : 7f0eb21c r2 : 00000000 r1 : 94cb3000 r0 : 00000000 Flags: nzCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c5387d Table: 31d7c04a DAC: 00000015 Process dbus-daemon (pid: 250, stack limit = 0xa08c8238) Stack: (0xa08c9c98 to 0xa08ca000) ... Backtrace: [<7f0eb21c>] (retire_capture_urb [snd_usb_audio]) from [<7f0e57fc>] (snd_complete_urb+0x140/0x1f0 [snd_usb_audio]) [<7f0e56bc>] (snd_complete_urb [snd_usb_audio]) from [<80371118>] (__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x78/0xf4) [<803710a0>] (__usb_hcd_giveback_urb) from [<80371514>] (usb_giveback_urb_bh+0x8c/0xc0) [<80371488>] (usb_giveback_urb_bh) from [<80028e3c>] (tasklet_hi_action+0xc4/0x148) [<80028d78>] (tasklet_hi_action) from [<80028358>] (__do_softirq+0x190/0x380) [<800281c8>] (__do_softirq) from [<80028858>] (irq_exit+0x8c/0xfc) [<800287cc>] (irq_exit) from [<8000ea88>] (handle_IRQ+0x8c/0xc8) [<8000e9fc>] (handle_IRQ) from [<800085e8>] (gic_handle_irq+0xbc/0xf8) [<8000852c>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80509044>] (__irq_svc+0x44/0x78) [<80508820>] (_raw_spin_unlock_irq) from [<8004b880>] (finish_task_switch+0x5c/0x100) [<8004b824>] (finish_task_switch) from [<805052f0>] (__schedule+0x48c/0x6d8) [<80504e64>] (__schedule) from [<805055d4>] (schedule+0x98/0x9c) [<8050553c>] (schedule) from [<800116c8>] (do_work_pending+0x30/0xd0) [<80011698>] (do_work_pending) from [<8000e160>] (work_pending+0xc/0x20) Code: e1a0c00d e92ddff0 e24cb004 e24dd024 (e5902008) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt There is a race between retire_capture_urb() and stop_endpoints(). The latter is called at stopping the stream and it sets some endpoint fields to NULL. But its call is asynchronous, thus the pending complete callback might get called after these NULL clears, and it leads the NULL dereference like the above. The fix is to move the NULL clearance after the synchronization, i.e. wait_clear_urbs(). This is called at prepare and hw_free callbacks, so it's assured to be called before the restart of the stream or the release of the stream. Also, while we're at it, put the EP_FLAG_RUNNING flag check at the beginning of snd_complete_urb() to skip the pending complete after the stream is stopped. Fixes: b2eb950 ("ALSA: usb-audio: stop both data and sync...") Reported-by: Jiada Wang <[email protected]> Reported-by: Mark Craske <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5fa8bbd ] Dmitry reported a warning [1] showing that we were calling net_disable_timestamp() -> static_key_slow_dec() from a non process context. Grabbing a mutex while holding a spinlock or rcu_read_lock() is not allowed. As Cong suggested, we now use a work queue. It is possible netstamp_clear() exits while netstamp_needed_deferred is not zero, but it is probably not worth trying to do better than that. netstamp_needed_deferred atomic tracks the exact number of deferred decrements. [1] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0-rc5+ #192 Not tainted ------------------------------- ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:561 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by syz-executor14/23111: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83a35c35>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1454 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83a35c35>] rawv6_sendmsg+0x1e65/0x3ec0 net/ipv6/raw.c:919 TheScarastic#1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83ae2678>] nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:201 [inline] TheScarastic#1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83ae2678>] __ip6_local_out+0x258/0x840 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 23111 Comm: syz-executor14 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc5+ #192 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x139/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4452 rcu_preempt_sleep_check include/linux/rcupdate.h:560 [inline] ___might_sleep+0x560/0x650 kernel/sched/core.c:7748 __might_sleep+0x95/0x1a0 kernel/sched/core.c:7739 mutex_lock_nested+0x24f/0x1730 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x119/0x160 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1060 __static_key_slow_dec+0x7a/0x1e0 kernel/jump_label.c:149 static_key_slow_dec+0x51/0x90 kernel/jump_label.c:174 net_disable_timestamp+0x3b/0x50 net/core/dev.c:1728 sock_disable_timestamp+0x98/0xc0 net/core/sock.c:403 __sk_destruct+0x27d/0x6b0 net/core/sock.c:1441 sk_destruct+0x47/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1460 __sk_free+0x57/0x230 net/core/sock.c:1468 sock_wfree+0xae/0x120 net/core/sock.c:1645 skb_release_head_state+0xfc/0x200 net/core/skbuff.c:655 skb_release_all+0x15/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668 __kfree_skb+0x15/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:684 kfree_skb+0x16e/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:705 inet_frag_destroy+0x121/0x290 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:304 inet_frag_put include/net/inet_frag.h:133 [inline] nf_ct_frag6_gather+0x1106/0x3840 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:617 ipv6_defrag+0x1be/0x2b0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:102 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x290 net/netfilter/core.c:310 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:212 [inline] __ip6_local_out+0x489/0x840 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160 ip6_local_out+0x2d/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:170 ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1722 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1742 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:613 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2d1a/0x3ec0 net/ipv6/raw.c:927 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 sock_write_iter+0x326/0x600 net/socket.c:848 do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e3/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:695 do_readv_writev+0x42c/0x9b0 fs/read_write.c:872 vfs_writev+0x87/0xc0 fs/read_write.c:911 do_writev+0x110/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:944 SYSC_writev fs/read_write.c:1017 [inline] SyS_writev+0x27/0x30 fs/read_write.c:1014 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x445559 RSP: 002b:00007f6f46fceb58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000445559 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020f1eff0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000006e19c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000700000 R13: 0000000020f59000 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000020400 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 23111, name: syz-executor14 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 2 PID: 23111 Comm: syz-executor14 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc5+ #192 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 ___might_sleep+0x47e/0x650 kernel/sched/core.c:7780 __might_sleep+0x95/0x1a0 kernel/sched/core.c:7739 mutex_lock_nested+0x24f/0x1730 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x119/0x160 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1060 __static_key_slow_dec+0x7a/0x1e0 kernel/jump_label.c:149 static_key_slow_dec+0x51/0x90 kernel/jump_label.c:174 net_disable_timestamp+0x3b/0x50 net/core/dev.c:1728 sock_disable_timestamp+0x98/0xc0 net/core/sock.c:403 __sk_destruct+0x27d/0x6b0 net/core/sock.c:1441 sk_destruct+0x47/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1460 __sk_free+0x57/0x230 net/core/sock.c:1468 sock_wfree+0xae/0x120 net/core/sock.c:1645 skb_release_head_state+0xfc/0x200 net/core/skbuff.c:655 skb_release_all+0x15/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668 __kfree_skb+0x15/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:684 kfree_skb+0x16e/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:705 inet_frag_destroy+0x121/0x290 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:304 inet_frag_put include/net/inet_frag.h:133 [inline] nf_ct_frag6_gather+0x1106/0x3840 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:617 ipv6_defrag+0x1be/0x2b0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:102 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x290 net/netfilter/core.c:310 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:212 [inline] __ip6_local_out+0x489/0x840 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160 ip6_local_out+0x2d/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:170 ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1722 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1742 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:613 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2d1a/0x3ec0 net/ipv6/raw.c:927 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 sock_write_iter+0x326/0x600 net/socket.c:848 do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e3/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:695 do_readv_writev+0x42c/0x9b0 fs/read_write.c:872 vfs_writev+0x87/0xc0 fs/read_write.c:911 do_writev+0x110/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:944 SYSC_writev fs/read_write.c:1017 [inline] SyS_writev+0x27/0x30 fs/read_write.c:1014 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x445559 Fixes: b90e579 ("net: dont call jump_label_dec from irq context") Suggested-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d7426c6 ] Dmitry reported a double free in sit_init_net(): kernel BUG at mm/percpu.c:689! invalid opcode: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 15692 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6-next-20170206 TheScarastic#1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801c9cc27c0 task.stack: ffff88017d1d8000 RIP: 0010:pcpu_free_area+0x68b/0x810 mm/percpu.c:689 RSP: 0018:ffff88017d1df488 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 00000000000007c0 RCX: ffffc90002829000 RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffffffff81940efb RDI: ffff8801db841d94 RBP: ffff88017d1df590 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 1ffffffff0bb3bdd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 00000000000135dd R12: ffff8801db841d80 R13: 0000000000038e40 R14: 00000000000007c0 R15: 00000000000007c0 FS: 00007f6ea608f700(0000) GS:ffff8801dbe00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002000aff8 CR3: 00000001c8d44000 CR4: 00000000001426f0 DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: free_percpu+0x212/0x520 mm/percpu.c:1264 ipip6_dev_free+0x43/0x60 net/ipv6/sit.c:1335 sit_init_net+0x3cb/0xa10 net/ipv6/sit.c:1831 ops_init+0x10a/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:115 setup_net+0x2ed/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:291 copy_net_ns+0x26c/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:396 create_new_namespaces+0x409/0x860 kernel/nsproxy.c:106 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205 SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline] SyS_unshare+0x64e/0xfc0 kernel/fork.c:2231 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 This is because when tunnel->dst_cache init fails, we free dev->tstats once in ipip6_tunnel_init() and twice in sit_init_net(). This looks redundant but its ndo_uinit() does not seem enough to clean up everything here. So avoid this by setting dev->tstats to NULL after the first free, at least for -net. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 73d2c66 ] Andrey reported a kernel crash: general protection fault: 0000 [TheScarastic#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ #124 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000 RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline] RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837 RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2 RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0 R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check. Fixes: c319b4d ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…_route [ Upstream commit 2cf7507 ] Since the commit below the ipmr/ip6mr rtnl_unicast() code uses the portid instead of the previous dst_pid which was copied from in_skb's portid. Since the skb is new the portid is 0 at that point so the packets are sent to the kernel and we get scheduling while atomic or a deadlock (depending on where it happens) by trying to acquire rtnl two times. Also since this is RTM_GETROUTE, it can be triggered by a normal user. Here's the sleeping while atomic trace: [ 7858.212557] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620 [ 7858.212748] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0 [ 7858.212881] 2 locks held by swapper/0/0: [ 7858.213013] #0: (((&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350 [ 7858.213422] TheScarastic#1: (mfc_unres_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff8161e005>] ipmr_expire_process+0x25/0x130 [ 7858.213807] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc7+ #179 [ 7858.213934] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014 [ 7858.214108] 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403c50 ffffffff813a7804 0000000000000000 [ 7858.214412] ffffffff81a1338e ffff88005b403c78 ffffffff810a4a72 ffffffff81a1338e [ 7858.214716] 000000000000026c 0000000000000000 ffff88005b403ca8 ffffffff810a4b9f [ 7858.215251] Call Trace: [ 7858.215412] <IRQ> [<ffffffff813a7804>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc1 [ 7858.215662] [<ffffffff810a4a72>] ___might_sleep+0x192/0x250 [ 7858.215868] [<ffffffff810a4b9f>] __might_sleep+0x6f/0x100 [ 7858.216072] [<ffffffff8165bea3>] mutex_lock_nested+0x33/0x4d0 [ 7858.216279] [<ffffffff815a7a5f>] ? netlink_lookup+0x25f/0x460 [ 7858.216487] [<ffffffff8157474b>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1b/0x40 [ 7858.216687] [<ffffffff815a9a0c>] netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x260 [ 7858.216900] [<ffffffff81573c70>] rtnl_unicast+0x20/0x30 [ 7858.217128] [<ffffffff8161cd39>] ipmr_destroy_unres+0xa9/0xf0 [ 7858.217351] [<ffffffff8161e06f>] ipmr_expire_process+0x8f/0x130 [ 7858.217581] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180 [ 7858.217785] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180 [ 7858.217990] [<ffffffff810fbc95>] call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x350 [ 7858.218192] [<ffffffff810fbbf5>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x350 [ 7858.218415] [<ffffffff8161dfe0>] ? ipmr_net_init+0x180/0x180 [ 7858.218656] [<ffffffff810fde10>] run_timer_softirq+0x260/0x640 [ 7858.218865] [<ffffffff8166379b>] ? __do_softirq+0xbb/0x54f [ 7858.219068] [<ffffffff816637c8>] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x54f [ 7858.219269] [<ffffffff8107a948>] irq_exit+0xb8/0xc0 [ 7858.219463] [<ffffffff81663452>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x50 [ 7858.219678] [<ffffffff816625bc>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 [ 7858.219897] <EOI> [<ffffffff81055f16>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 [ 7858.220165] [<ffffffff810d64dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 7858.220373] [<ffffffff810298e3>] default_idle+0x23/0x190 [ 7858.220574] [<ffffffff8102a20f>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20 [ 7858.220790] [<ffffffff810c9f8c>] default_idle_call+0x4c/0x60 [ 7858.221016] [<ffffffff810ca33b>] cpu_startup_entry+0x39b/0x4d0 [ 7858.221257] [<ffffffff8164f995>] rest_init+0x135/0x140 [ 7858.221469] [<ffffffff81f83014>] start_kernel+0x50e/0x51b [ 7858.221670] [<ffffffff81f82120>] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120 [ 7858.221894] [<ffffffff81f8243f>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [ 7858.222113] [<ffffffff81f8257c>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x13b/0x14a Fixes: 2942e90 ("[RTNETLINK]: Use rtnl_unicast() for rtnetlink unicasts") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a4b8e71 ] Most of getsockopt handlers in net/sctp/socket.c check len against sizeof some structure like: if (len < sizeof(int)) return -EINVAL; On the first look, the check seems to be correct. But since len is int and sizeof returns size_t, int gets promoted to unsigned size_t too. So the test returns false for negative lengths. Yes, (-1 < sizeof(long)) is false. Fix this in sctp by explicitly checking len < 0 before any getsockopt handler is called. Note that sctp_getsockopt_events already handled the negative case. Since we added the < 0 check elsewhere, this one can be removed. If not checked, this is the result: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ../mm/page_alloc.c:2722:19 shift exponent 52 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' CPU: 1 PID: 24535 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.1-0-syzkaller TheScarastic#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.1-0-gb3ef39f-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 0000000000000000 ffff88006d99f2a8 ffffffffb2f7bdea 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffffb4363c14 ffffffffb2f7bcde ffff88006d99f2d0 ffff88006d99f270 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000034 ffffffffb5096422 Call Trace: [<ffffffffb3051498>] ? __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x29c/0x300 ... [<ffffffffb273f0e4>] ? kmalloc_order+0x24/0x90 [<ffffffffb27416a4>] ? kmalloc_order_trace+0x24/0x220 [<ffffffffb2819a30>] ? __kmalloc+0x330/0x540 [<ffffffffc18c25f4>] ? sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs+0x174/0xca0 [sctp] [<ffffffffc18d2bcd>] ? sctp_getsockopt+0x10d/0x1b0 [sctp] [<ffffffffb37c1219>] ? sock_common_getsockopt+0xb9/0x150 [<ffffffffb37be2f5>] ? SyS_getsockopt+0x1a5/0x270 Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]> Cc: Neil Horman <[email protected]> Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit b44c018 upstream. KoWei reported crash during raid5 reshape: [ 1032.252932] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [...] [ 1032.252943] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [...] [ 1032.252947] RSP: 0018:ffffba1ac0c03b78 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 1032.252949] RAX: 0000784ac0000000 RBX: ffff91bec3d09740 RCX: 0000000000001000 [ 1032.252951] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffff91be6781c000 RDI: 0000784ac0000000 [ 1032.252953] RBP: ffffba1ac0c03bd8 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffba1ac0c03bf8 [ 1032.252954] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffba1ac0c03bf8 [ 1032.252955] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 1032.252958] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91becf500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1032.252959] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1032.252961] CR2: 0000784ac0000000 CR3: 000000031780a002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 1032.252962] Call Trace: [ 1032.252969] ? async_memcpy+0x179/0x1000 [async_memcpy] [ 1032.252977] ? raid5_release_stripe+0x8e/0x110 [raid456] [ 1032.252982] handle_stripe_expansion+0x15a/0x1f0 [raid456] [ 1032.252988] handle_stripe+0x592/0x1270 [raid456] [ 1032.252993] handle_active_stripes.isra.0+0x3cb/0x5a0 [raid456] [ 1032.252999] raid5d+0x35c/0x550 [raid456] [ 1032.253002] ? schedule+0x42/0xb0 [ 1032.253006] ? schedule_timeout+0x10e/0x160 [ 1032.253011] md_thread+0x97/0x160 [ 1032.253015] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 1032.253019] kthread+0x104/0x140 [ 1032.253022] ? md_start_sync+0x60/0x60 [ 1032.253024] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 1032.253027] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 This is because cache_size_mutex was unlocked too early in resize_stripes, which races with grow_one_stripe() that grow_one_stripe() allocates a stripe with wrong pool_size. Fix this issue by unlocking cache_size_mutex after updating pool_size. Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.4+ Reported-by: KoWei Sung <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 6dbf7bb upstream. If block_write_full_page() is called for a page that is beyond current inode size, it will truncate page buffers for the page and return 0. This logic has been added in 2.5.62 in commit 81eb69062588 ("fix ext3 BUG due to race with truncate") in history.git tree to fix a problem with ext3 in data=ordered mode. This particular problem doesn't exist anymore because ext3 is long gone and ext4 handles ordered data differently. Also normally buffers are invalidated by truncate code and there's no need to specially handle this in ->writepage() code. This invalidation of page buffers in block_write_full_page() is causing issues to filesystems (e.g. ext4 or ocfs2) when block device is shrunk under filesystem's hands and metadata buffers get discarded while being tracked by the journalling layer. Although it is obviously "not supported" it can cause kernel crashes like: [ 7986.689400] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at +0000000000000008 [ 7986.697197] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 7986.699724] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [ 7986.703200] CPU: 4 PID: 203778 Comm: jbd2/dm-3-8 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G +O --------- - - 4.18.0-147.5.0.5.h126.eulerosv2r9.x86_64 #1 [ 7986.716438] Hardware name: Huawei RH2288H V3/BC11HGSA0, BIOS 1.57 08/11/2015 [ 7986.723462] RIP: 0010:jbd2_journal_grab_journal_head+0x1b/0x40 [jbd2] ... [ 7986.810150] Call Trace: [ 7986.812595] __jbd2_journal_insert_checkpoint+0x23/0x70 [jbd2] [ 7986.818408] jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x155f/0x1b60 [jbd2] [ 7986.836467] kjournald2+0xbd/0x270 [jbd2] which is not great. The crash happens because bh->b_private is suddently NULL although BH_JBD flag is still set (this is because block_invalidatepage() cleared BH_Mapped flag and subsequent bh lookup found buffer without BH_Mapped set, called init_page_buffers() which has rewritten bh->b_private). So just remove the invalidation in block_write_full_page(). Note that the buffer cache invalidation when block device changes size is already careful to avoid similar problems by using invalidate_mapping_pages() which skips busy buffers so it was only this odd block_write_full_page() behavior that could tear down bdev buffers under filesystem's hands. Reported-by: Ye Bin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 83bc156 upstream. If we fail to find suitable zones for a new readahead extent, we end up leaving a stale pointer in the global readahead extents radix tree (fs_info->reada_tree), which can trigger the following trace later on: [13367.696354] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b0 [13367.696802] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [13367.697249] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [13367.697721] PGD 0 P4D 0 [13367.698171] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [13367.698632] CPU: 6 PID: 851214 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [13367.699100] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [13367.700069] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x20a/0x3970 [13367.700562] Code: ff 1f 0f b7 c0 48 0f (...) [13367.701609] RSP: 0018:ffffb14448f57790 EFLAGS: 00010046 [13367.702140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 29b935140c15e8cf RCX: 0000000000000000 [13367.702698] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffffb3d66bd0 RDI: 0000000000000046 [13367.703240] RBP: ffff8a52ba8ac040 R08: 00000c2866ad9288 R09: 0000000000000001 [13367.703783] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000b66d9b53 R12: ffff8a52ba8ac9b0 [13367.704330] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a532b6333e8 R15: 0000000000000000 [13367.704880] FS: 00007fe1df6b5700(0000) GS:ffff8a5376600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [13367.705438] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [13367.705995] CR2: 00000000000000b0 CR3: 000000022cca8004 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [13367.706565] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [13367.707127] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [13367.707686] Call Trace: [13367.708246] ? ___slab_alloc+0x395/0x740 [13367.708820] ? reada_add_block+0xae/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.709383] lock_acquire+0xb1/0x480 [13367.709955] ? reada_add_block+0xe0/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.710537] ? reada_add_block+0xae/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.711097] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [13367.711659] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x8d2/0x990 [13367.712221] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [13367.712784] _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x80 [13367.713356] ? reada_add_block+0xe0/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.713966] reada_add_block+0xe0/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.714529] ? btrfs_root_node+0x15/0x1f0 [btrfs] [13367.715077] btrfs_reada_add+0x117/0x170 [btrfs] [13367.715620] scrub_stripe+0x21e/0x10d0 [btrfs] [13367.716141] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10 [13367.716657] ? __lock_acquire+0x41e/0x3970 [13367.717184] ? scrub_chunk+0x60/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.717697] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [13367.718254] ? scrub_chunk+0x60/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.718773] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [13367.719278] ? scrub_chunk+0xcd/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.719786] scrub_chunk+0xcd/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.720291] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x270/0x5c0 [btrfs] [13367.720787] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [13367.721281] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1ee/0x620 [btrfs] [13367.721762] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x8e/0xb0 [13367.722235] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [13367.722710] ? __sb_start_write+0x19b/0x290 [13367.723192] btrfs_ioctl+0x7f5/0x36f0 [btrfs] [13367.723660] ? __fget_files+0x101/0x1d0 [13367.724118] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [13367.724559] ? __fget_files+0x101/0x1d0 [13367.724982] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [13367.725399] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [13367.725802] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [13367.726188] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [13367.726574] RIP: 0033:0x7fe1df7add87 [13367.726948] Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 09 91 (...) [13367.727763] RSP: 002b:00007fe1df6b4d48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [13367.728179] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055ce1fb596a0 RCX: 00007fe1df7add87 [13367.728604] RDX: 000055ce1fb596a0 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003 [13367.729021] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fe1df6b5700 R09: 0000000000000000 [13367.729431] R10: 00007fe1df6b5700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd922b07de [13367.729842] R13: 00007ffd922b07df R14: 00007fe1df6b4e40 R15: 0000000000802000 [13367.730275] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor (...) [13367.732638] CR2: 00000000000000b0 [13367.733166] ---[ end trace d298b6805556acd9 ]--- What happens is the following: 1) At reada_find_extent() we don't find any existing readahead extent for the metadata extent starting at logical address X; 2) So we proceed to create a new one. We then call btrfs_map_block() to get information about which stripes contain extent X; 3) After that we iterate over the stripes and create only one zone for the readahead extent - only one because reada_find_zone() returned NULL for all iterations except for one, either because a memory allocation failed or it couldn't find the block group of the extent (it may have just been deleted); 4) We then add the new readahead extent to the readahead extents radix tree at fs_info->reada_tree; 5) Then we iterate over each zone of the new readahead extent, and find that the device used for that zone no longer exists, because it was removed or it was the source device of a device replace operation. Since this left 'have_zone' set to 0, after finishing the loop we jump to the 'error' label, call kfree() on the new readahead extent and return without removing it from the radix tree at fs_info->reada_tree; 6) Any future call to reada_find_extent() for the logical address X will find the stale pointer in the readahead extents radix tree, increment its reference counter, which can trigger the use-after-free right away or return it to the caller reada_add_block() that results in the use-after-free of the example trace above. So fix this by making sure we delete the readahead extent from the radix tree if we fail to setup zones for it (when 'have_zone = 0'). Fixes: 3194502 ("btrfs: reada: bypass adding extent when all zone failed") CC: [email protected] # 4.9+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit aea948b upstream. Every error log reported by OPAL is exported to userspace through a sysfs interface and notified using kobject_uevent(). The userspace daemon (opal_errd) then reads the error log and acknowledges the error log is saved safely to disk. Once acknowledged the kernel removes the respective sysfs file entry causing respective resources to be released including kobject. However it's possible the userspace daemon may already be scanning elog entries when a new sysfs elog entry is created by the kernel. User daemon may read this new entry and ack it even before kernel can notify userspace about it through kobject_uevent() call. If that happens then we have a potential race between elog_ack_store->kobject_put() and kobject_uevent which can lead to use-after-free of a kernfs object resulting in a kernel crash. eg: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bfb Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000008ff2a0 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV CPU: 27 PID: 805 Comm: irq/29-opal-elo Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00214-g6f56a67bcbb5-dirty #363 ... NIP kobject_uevent_env+0xa0/0x910 LR elog_event+0x1f4/0x2d0 Call Trace: 0x5deadbeef0000122 (unreliable) elog_event+0x1f4/0x2d0 irq_thread_fn+0x4c/0xc0 irq_thread+0x1c0/0x2b0 kthread+0x1c4/0x1d0 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c This patch fixes this race by protecting the sysfs file creation/notification by holding a reference count on kobject until we safely send kobject_uevent(). The function create_elog_obj() returns the elog object which if used by caller function will end up in use-after-free problem again. However, the return value of create_elog_obj() function isn't being used today and there is no need as well. Hence change it to return void to make this fix complete. Fixes: 774fea1 ("powerpc/powernv: Read OPAL error log and export it through sysfs") Cc: [email protected] # v3.15+ Reported-by: Oliver O'Halloran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oliver O'Halloran <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <[email protected]> [mpe: Rework the logic to use a single return, reword comments, add oops] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…lone() [ Upstream commit 286228d ] All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned up. This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler, can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered. To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB. The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which detects the already 0 refcount. We can easily reproduce this with following example: testj1939 -B -r can0: & cansend can0 1823ff40#0123 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) Backtrace: [<c010f570>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c010f90c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c010f8ec>] (show_stack) from [<c0c3e1a4>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0) [<c0c3e118>] (dump_stack) from [<c0127fec>] (__warn+0xe0/0x108) [<c0127f0c>] (__warn) from [<c01283c8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc) [<c0128324>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0539c0c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174) [<c0539b04>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0ad2cac>] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210) [<c0ad2aa0>] (j1939_can_recv) from [<c0ac9dc8>] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268) [<c0ac9d14>] (can_rcv_filter) from [<c0aca2cc>] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4) [<c0aca21c>] (can_receive) from [<c0aca348>] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98) [<c0aca300>] (can_rcv) from [<c09b1fdc>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88) [<c09b1f78>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [<c09b2070>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94) [<c09b2038>] (__netif_receive_skb) from [<c09b2130>] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8) [<c09b20cc>] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [<c09b21f8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c) [<c09b21c4>] (netif_receive_skb) from [<c0791278>] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4) Fixes: 0ae89be ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit df5b0ab upstream. Limit the CPU number to num_possible_cpus(), because setting it to a value lower than INT_MAX but higher than NR_CPUS produces the following error on reboot and shutdown: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff90ab1bb0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1c09067 P4D 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-kvm #110 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:migrate_to_reboot_cpu+0xe/0x60 Code: ea ea 00 48 89 fa 48 c7 c7 30 57 f1 81 e9 fa ef ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 8b 1d d5 ea ea 00 e8 14 33 fe ff 89 da <48> 0f a3 15 ea fc bd 00 48 89 d0 73 29 89 c2 c1 e8 06 65 48 8b 3c RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88801f0a0000 RBX: 0000000077359400 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000077359400 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffffffff81c199e0 RBP: ffffffff81c1e3c0 R08: ffff88801f41f000 R09: ffffffff81c1e348 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f32bedf8830 R14: 00000000fee1dead R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f32bedf8980(0000) GS:ffff88801f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff90ab1bb0 CR3: 000000001d057000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __do_sys_reboot.cold+0x34/0x5b do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 Fixes: 1b3a5d0 ("reboot: move arch/x86 reboot= handling to generic kernel") Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Fabian Frederick <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]> Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]> Cc: Robin Holt <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> [sudip: use reboot_mode instead of mode] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit e50e4f0 upstream If interrupt comes late, during probe error path or device remove (could be triggered with CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ), the interrupt handler i2c_imx_isr() will access registers with the clock being disabled. This leads to external abort on non-linefetch on Toradex Colibri VF50 module (with Vybrid VF5xx): Unhandled fault: external abort on non-linefetch (0x1008) at 0x8882d003 Internal error: : 1008 [#1] ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.7.0 #607 Hardware name: Freescale Vybrid VF5xx/VF6xx (Device Tree) (i2c_imx_isr) from [<8017009c>] (free_irq+0x25c/0x3b0) (free_irq) from [<805844ec>] (release_nodes+0x178/0x284) (release_nodes) from [<80580030>] (really_probe+0x10c/0x348) (really_probe) from [<80580380>] (driver_probe_device+0x60/0x170) (driver_probe_device) from [<80580630>] (device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60) (device_driver_attach) from [<805806bc>] (__driver_attach+0x84/0xc0) (__driver_attach) from [<8057e228>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb4) (bus_for_each_dev) from [<8057f3ec>] (bus_add_driver+0x144/0x1ec) (bus_add_driver) from [<80581320>] (driver_register+0x78/0x110) (driver_register) from [<8010213c>] (do_one_initcall+0xa8/0x2f4) (do_one_initcall) from [<80c0100c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x178/0x1dc) (kernel_init_freeable) from [<80807048>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x110) (kernel_init) from [<80100114>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) Additionally, the i2c_imx_isr() could wake up the wait queue (imx_i2c_struct->queue) before its initialization happens. The resource-managed framework should not be used for interrupt handling, because the resource will be released too late - after disabling clocks. The interrupt handler is not prepared for such case. Fixes: 1c4b6c3 ("i2c: imx: implement bus recovery") Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]> [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d51794 ] When removing the driver we would hit BUG_ON(!list_empty(&dev->ptype_specific)) in net/core/dev.c due to still having the NC-SI packet handler registered. # echo 1e660000.ethernet > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/ftgmac100/unbind ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:10254! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM CPU: 0 PID: 115 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3-next-20201111-00007-g02e0365710c4 #46 Hardware name: Generic DT based system PC is at netdev_run_todo+0x314/0x394 LR is at cpumask_next+0x20/0x24 pc : [<806f5830>] lr : [<80863cb0>] psr: 80000153 sp : 855bbd58 ip : 00000001 fp : 855bbdac r10: 80c03d00 r9 : 80c06228 r8 : 81158c54 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 80c05dec r5 : 80c05d18 r4 : 813b9280 r3 : 813b9054 r2 : 8122c470 r1 : 00000002 r0 : 00000002 Flags: Nzcv IRQs on FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 00c5387d Table: 85514008 DAC: 00000051 Process sh (pid: 115, stack limit = 0x7cb5703d) ... Backtrace: [<806f551c>] (netdev_run_todo) from [<80707eec>] (rtnl_unlock+0x18/0x1c) r10:00000051 r9:854ed710 r8:81158c54 r7:80c76bb0 r6:81158c10 r5:8115b410 r4:813b9000 [<80707ed4>] (rtnl_unlock) from [<806f5db8>] (unregister_netdev+0x2c/0x30) [<806f5d8c>] (unregister_netdev) from [<805a8180>] (ftgmac100_remove+0x20/0xa8) r5:8115b410 r4:813b9000 [<805a8160>] (ftgmac100_remove) from [<805355e4>] (platform_drv_remove+0x34/0x4c) Fixes: bd466c3 ("net/faraday: Support NCSI mode") Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 3d05cad upstream. Lockdep reported the following splat when running test btrfs/190 from fstests: [ 9482.126098] ====================================================== [ 9482.126184] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 9482.126281] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted [ 9482.126365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 9482.126456] mount/24187 is trying to acquire lock: [ 9482.126534] ffffa0c869a7dac0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.126647] but task is already holding lock: [ 9482.126777] ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.126886] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 9482.127078] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 9482.127213] -> #1 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}: [ 9482.127366] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.127436] down_read_nested+0x45/0x220 [ 9482.127528] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.127613] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x41/0x130 [btrfs] [ 9482.127702] btrfs_search_slot+0x514/0xc30 [btrfs] [ 9482.127788] update_qgroup_status_item+0x72/0x140 [btrfs] [ 9482.127877] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xde/0x680 [btrfs] [ 9482.127964] btrfs_work_helper+0xf1/0x600 [btrfs] [ 9482.128039] process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0 [ 9482.128110] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 [ 9482.128181] kthread+0x153/0x170 [ 9482.128256] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 9482.128327] -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 9482.128464] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 9482.128551] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 9482.128623] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.130029] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30 [ 9482.130590] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.131577] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs] [ 9482.132175] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs] [ 9482.132756] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] [ 9482.133325] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.133866] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.134392] fc_mount+0xe/0x40 [ 9482.134908] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 [ 9482.135428] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] [ 9482.135942] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.136444] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.136949] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70 [ 9482.137438] do_mount+0x75/0x90 [ 9482.137923] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 [ 9482.138400] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 9482.138873] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 9482.139346] other info that might help us debug this: [ 9482.140735] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 9482.141594] CPU0 CPU1 [ 9482.142011] ---- ---- [ 9482.142411] lock(btrfs-quota-00); [ 9482.142806] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock); [ 9482.143216] lock(btrfs-quota-00); [ 9482.143629] lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock); [ 9482.144056] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 9482.145242] 2 locks held by mount/24187: [ 9482.145637] #0: ffffa0c8411c40e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb9/0x400 [ 9482.146061] #1: ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.146509] stack backtrace: [ 9482.147350] CPU: 1 PID: 24187 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 [ 9482.147788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 9482.148709] Call Trace: [ 9482.149169] dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5 [ 9482.149628] check_noncircular+0xff/0x110 [ 9482.150090] check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 [ 9482.150561] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 9482.151017] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10 [ 9482.151470] __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110 [ 9482.151941] ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs] [ 9482.152402] lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490 [ 9482.152887] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.153354] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30 [ 9482.153826] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.154301] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.154768] ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.155226] qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs] [ 9482.155690] btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs] [ 9482.156160] open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs] [ 9482.156643] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs] [ 9482.157108] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [ 9482.157567] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0 [ 9482.158030] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.158489] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.158947] fc_mount+0xe/0x40 [ 9482.159403] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 [ 9482.159875] btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] [ 9482.160335] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [ 9482.160805] ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0 [ 9482.161260] ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.161714] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60 [ 9482.162166] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0 [ 9482.162616] path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70 [ 9482.163070] do_mount+0x75/0x90 [ 9482.163525] __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 [ 9482.163986] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [ 9482.164437] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 9482.164902] RIP: 0033:0x7f51e907caaa This happens because at btrfs_read_qgroup_config() we can call qgroup_rescan_init() while holding a read lock on a quota btree leaf, acquired by the previous call to btrfs_search_slot_for_read(), and qgroup_rescan_init() acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock. A qgroup rescan worker does the opposite: it acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock, at btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(), and then tries to update the qgroup status item in the quota btree through the call to update_qgroup_status_item(). This inversion of locking order between the qgroup_rescan_lock mutex and quota btree locks causes the splat. Fix this simply by releasing and freeing the path before calling qgroup_rescan_init() at btrfs_read_qgroup_config(). CC: [email protected] # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e773ca7 ] Actually, burst size is equal to '1 << desc->rqcfg.brst_size'. we should use burst size, not desc->rqcfg.brst_size. dma memcpy performance on Rockchip RV1126 @ 1512MHz A7, 1056MHz LPDDR3, 200MHz DMA: dmatest: /# echo dma0chan0 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/channel /# echo 4194304 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/test_buf_size /# echo 8 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/iterations /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/norandom /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/verbose /# echo 1 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/run dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #1: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #2: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result TheScarastic#3: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result TheScarastic#4: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result TheScarastic#5: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result TheScarastic#6: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result TheScarastic#7: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #8: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 Before: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 48 iops 200338 KB/s (0) After this patch: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 179 iops 734873 KB/s (0) After this patch and increase dma clk to 400MHz: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 259 iops 1062929 KB/s (0) Signed-off-by: Sugar Zhang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eb9c4dd ] If, for some reason, the xusb PHY fails to probe, it leaves a dangling pointer attached to the platform device structure. This would normally be harmless, but the Tegra XHCI driver then goes and extract that pointer from the PHY device. Things go downhill from there: 8.752082] [004d554e5145533c] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 8.752085] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 8.752088] Modules linked in: max77620_regulator(E+) xhci_tegra(E+) sdhci_tegra(E+) xhci_hcd(E) sdhci_pltfm(E) cqhci(E) fixed(E) usbcore(E) scsi_mod(E) sdhci(E) host1x(E+) [ 8.752103] CPU: 4 PID: 158 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G S W E 5.9.0-rc7-00298-gf6337624c4fe #1980 [ 8.752105] Hardware name: NVIDIA Jetson TX2 Developer Kit (DT) [ 8.752108] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 8.752115] pc : kobject_put+0x1c/0x21c [ 8.752120] lr : put_device+0x20/0x30 [ 8.752121] sp : ffffffc012eb3840 [ 8.752122] x29: ffffffc012eb3840 x28: ffffffc010e82638 [ 8.752125] x27: ffffffc008d56440 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 8.752128] x25: ffffff81eb508200 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 8.752130] x23: ffffff81eb538800 x22: 0000000000000000 [ 8.752132] x21: 00000000fffffdfb x20: ffffff81eb538810 [ 8.752134] x19: 3d4d554e51455300 x18: 0000000000000020 [ 8.752136] x17: ffffffc008d00270 x16: ffffffc008d00c94 [ 8.752138] x15: 0000000000000004 x14: ffffff81ebd4ae90 [ 8.752140] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffff81eb86a4e8 [ 8.752142] x11: ffffff81eb86a480 x10: ffffff81eb862fea [ 8.752144] x9 : ffffffc01055fb28 x8 : ffffff81eb86a4a8 [ 8.752146] x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 8.752148] x5 : ffffff81dff8bc38 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 8.752150] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000001 [ 8.752152] x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : 3d4d554e51455300 [ 8.752155] Call trace: [ 8.752157] kobject_put+0x1c/0x21c [ 8.752160] put_device+0x20/0x30 [ 8.752164] tegra_xusb_padctl_put+0x24/0x3c [ 8.752170] tegra_xusb_probe+0x8b0/0xd10 [xhci_tegra] [ 8.752174] platform_drv_probe+0x60/0xb4 [ 8.752176] really_probe+0xf0/0x504 [ 8.752179] driver_probe_device+0x100/0x170 [ 8.752181] device_driver_attach+0xcc/0xd4 [ 8.752183] __driver_attach+0xb0/0x17c [ 8.752185] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xd4 [ 8.752187] driver_attach+0x30/0x3c [ 8.752189] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x250 [ 8.752191] driver_register+0x84/0x140 [ 8.752193] __platform_driver_register+0x54/0x60 [ 8.752197] tegra_xusb_init+0x40/0x1000 [xhci_tegra] [ 8.752201] do_one_initcall+0x54/0x2d0 [ 8.752205] do_init_module+0x68/0x29c [ 8.752207] load_module+0x2178/0x26c0 [ 8.752209] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb0/0x120 [ 8.752211] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x40 [ 8.752215] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x80/0x240 [ 8.752218] do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa0 [ 8.752220] el0_svc+0x18/0x50 [ 8.752223] el0_sync_handler+0x90/0x318 [ 8.752225] el0_sync+0x158/0x180 [ 8.752230] Code: a9bd7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 aa0003f3 (3940f000) [ 8.752232] ---[ end trace 90f6c89d62d85ff5 ]--- Reset the pointer on probe failure fixes the issue. Fixes: 53d2a71 ("phy: Add Tegra XUSB pad controller support") Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0e435be ] crq->msgs could be NULL if the previous reset did not complete after freeing crq->msgs. Check for NULL before dereferencing them. Snippet of call trace: ... ibmvnic 30000003 env3 (unregistering): Releasing sub-CRQ ibmvnic 30000003 env3 (unregistering): Releasing CRQ BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000c1a30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: ibmvnic(E-) rpadlpar_io rpaphp xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables xsk_diag tcp_diag udp_diag tun raw_diag inet_diag unix_diag bridge af_packet_diag netlink_diag stp llc rfkill sunrpc pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio binfmt_misc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: ibmvnic] CPU: 20 PID: 8426 Comm: kworker/20:0 Tainted: G E 5.10.0-rc1+ TheScarastic#12 Workqueue: events __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic] NIP: c0000000000c1a30 LR: c008000001b00c18 CTR: 0000000000000400 REGS: c00000000d05b7a0 TRAP: 0380 Tainted: G E (5.10.0-rc1+) MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002480 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000000c19ec IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000400 c00000000d05ba30 c008000001b17c00 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000000001e2 GPR08: 000000000001f400 ffffffffffffd950 0000000000000000 c008000001b0b280 GPR12: c0000000000c19c8 c00000001ec72e00 c00000000019a778 c00000002647b440 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000006 0000000000000001 0000000000000003 0000000000000002 GPR24: 0000000000001000 c008000001b0d570 0000000000000005 c00000007ab5d550 GPR28: c00000007ab5c000 c000000032fcf848 c00000007ab5cc00 c000000032fcf800 NIP [c0000000000c1a30] memset+0x68/0x104 LR [c008000001b00c18] ibmvnic_reset_crq+0x70/0x110 [ibmvnic] Call Trace: [c00000000d05ba30] [0000000000000800] 0x800 (unreliable) [c00000000d05bab0] [c008000001b0a930] do_reset.isra.40+0x224/0x634 [ibmvnic] [c00000000d05bb80] [c008000001b08574] __ibmvnic_reset+0x17c/0x3c0 [ibmvnic] [c00000000d05bc50] [c00000000018d9ac] process_one_work+0x2cc/0x800 [c00000000d05bd20] [c00000000018df58] worker_thread+0x78/0x520 [c00000000d05bdb0] [c00000000019a934] kthread+0x1c4/0x1d0 [c00000000d05be20] [c00000000000d5d0] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c Fixes: 032c5e8 ("Driver for IBM System i/p VNIC protocol") Signed-off-by: Lijun Pan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200951 These is a NULL pointer dereference issue reported in bugzilla: Hi, in the setup there is a SATA SSD connected to a SATA-to-USB bridge. The disc is "Samsung SSD 850 PRO 256G" which supports TRIM. There are four partitions: sda1: FAT /boot sda2: F2FS / sda3: F2FS /home sda4: F2FS The bridge is ASMT1153e which uses the "uas" driver. There is no TRIM pass-through, so, when mounting it reports: mounting with "discard" option, but the device does not support discard The USB host is USB3.0 and UASP capable. It is the one on RK3399. Given this everything works fine, except there is no TRIM support. In order to enable TRIM a new UDEV rule is added [1]: /etc/udev/rules.d/10-sata-bridge-trim.rules: ACTION=="add|change", ATTRS{idVendor}=="174c", ATTRS{idProduct}=="55aa", SUBSYSTEM=="scsi_disk", ATTR{provisioning_mode}="unmap" After reboot any F2FS write hangs forever and dmesg reports: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference Also tested on a x86_64 system: works fine even with TRIM enabled. same disc same bridge different usb host controller different cpu architecture not root filesystem Regards, Vicenç. [1] Post TheScarastic#5 in https://bbs.archlinux.org/viewtopic.php?id=236280 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000003e Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000626e3122 [000000000000003e] pgd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: overlay snd_soc_hdmi_codec rc_cec dw_hdmi_i2s_audio dw_hdmi_cec snd_soc_simple_card snd_soc_simple_card_utils snd_soc_rockchip_i2s rockchip_rga snd_soc_rockchip_pcm rockchipdrm videobuf2_dma_sg v4l2_mem2mem rtc_rk808 videobuf2_memops analogix_dp videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common dw_hdmi dw_wdt cec rc_core videodev drm_kms_helper media drm rockchip_thermal rockchip_saradc realtek drm_panel_orientation_quirks syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops dwmac_rk stmmac_platform stmmac pwm_bl squashfs loop crypto_user gpio_keys hid_kensington CPU: 5 PID: 957 Comm: nvim Not tainted 4.19.0-rc1-1-ARCH #1 Hardware name: Sapphire-RK3399 Board (DT) pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : update_sit_entry+0x304/0x4b0 lr : update_sit_entry+0x108/0x4b0 sp : ffff00000ca13bd0 x29: ffff00000ca13bd0 x28: 000000000000003e x27: 0000000000000020 x26: 0000000000080000 x25: 0000000000000048 x24: ffff8000ebb85cf8 x23: 0000000000000253 x22: 00000000ffffffff x21: 00000000000535f2 x20: 00000000ffffffdf x19: ffff8000eb9e6800 x18: ffff8000eb9e6be8 x17: 0000000007ce6926 x16: 000000001c83ffa8 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffff8000f602df90 x13: 0000000000000006 x12: 0000000000000040 x11: 0000000000000228 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 00000000000535f2 x6 : ffff8000ebff3440 x5 : ffff8000ebff3440 x4 : ffff8000ebe3a6c8 x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : 0000000000000020 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8000eb9e5800 Process nvim (pid: 957, stack limit = 0x0000000063a78320) Call trace: update_sit_entry+0x304/0x4b0 f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x98/0x140 truncate_node+0x90/0x400 f2fs_remove_inode_page+0xe8/0x340 f2fs_evict_inode+0x2b0/0x408 evict+0xe0/0x1e0 iput+0x160/0x260 do_unlinkat+0x214/0x298 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x68 el0_svc_handler+0x94/0x118 el0_svc+0x8/0xc Code: f9400800 b9488400 36080140 f9400f01 (387c4820) ---[ end trace a0f21a307118c477 ]--- The reason is it is possible to enable discard flag on block queue via UDEV, but during mount, f2fs will initialize se->discard_map only if this flag is set, once the flag is set after mount, f2fs may dereference NULL pointer on se->discard_map. So this patch does below changes to fix this issue: - initialize and update se->discard_map all the time. - don't clear DISCARD option if device has no QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD flag during mount. - don't issue small discard on zoned block device. - introduce some functions to enhance the readability. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Vicente Bergas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

generic/417 reported as blow: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/inode.c:695! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 21697 Comm: umount Tainted: G W O 4.18.0-rc2+ #39 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 EIP: f2fs_evict_inode+0x556/0x580 [f2fs] Call Trace: ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2c/0x50 evict+0xa8/0x170 dispose_list+0x34/0x40 evict_inodes+0x118/0x120 generic_shutdown_super+0x41/0x100 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x97/0xa0 kill_block_super+0x22/0x50 kill_f2fs_super+0x6f/0x80 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 task_work_run+0x81/0xa0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x59/0xa7 do_fast_syscall_32+0x1f5/0x22c entry_SYSENTER_32+0x53/0x86 EIP: f2fs_evict_inode+0x556/0x580 [f2fs] It can simply reproduced with scripts: Enable quota feature during mkfs. Testcase1: 1. mkfs.f2fs /dev/zram0 2. mount -t f2fs /dev/zram0 /mnt/f2fs 3. xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/file -c "pwrite 0 4k" -c "fsync" 4. godown /mnt/f2fs 5. umount /mnt/f2fs 6. mount -t f2fs -o ro /dev/zram0 /mnt/f2fs 7. umount /mnt/f2fs Testcase2: 1. mkfs.f2fs /dev/zram0 2. mount -t f2fs /dev/zram0 /mnt/f2fs 3. touch /mnt/f2fs/file 4. create process[pid = x] do: a) open /mnt/f2fs/file; b) unlink /mnt/f2fs/file 5. godown -f /mnt/f2fs 6. kill process[pid = x] 7. umount /mnt/f2fs 8. mount -t f2fs -o ro /dev/zram0 /mnt/f2fs 9. umount /mnt/f2fs The reason is: during recovery, i_{c,m}time of inode will be updated, then the inode can be set dirty w/o being tracked in sbi->inode_list[DIRTY_META] global list, so later write_checkpoint will not flush such dirty inode into node page. Once umount is called, sync_filesystem() in generic_shutdown_super() will skip syncng dirty inodes due to sb_rdonly check, leaving dirty inodes there. To solve this issue, during umount, add remove SB_RDONLY flag in sb->s_flags, to make sure sync_filesystem() will not be skipped. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200219 Reproduction way: - mount image - run poc code - umount image F2FS-fs (loop1): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:15364 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /home/yuchao/git/devf2fs/segment.c:2061! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 2 PID: 17686 Comm: umount Tainted: G W O 4.18.0-rc2+ #39 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 EIP: update_sit_entry+0x459/0x4e0 [f2fs] Code: e8 1c b5 fd ff 0f 0b 0f 0b 8b 45 e4 c7 44 24 08 9c 7a 6c f8 c7 44 24 04 bc 4a 6c f8 89 44 24 0c 8b 06 89 04 24 e8 f7 b4 fd ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 0f b6 d2 89 54 24 10 c7 44 24 08 60 7a 6c f8 c7 44 EAX: 00000032 EBX: 000000f8 ECX: 00000002 EDX: 00000001 ESI: d7177000 EDI: f520fe68 EBP: d6477c6c ESP: d6477c34 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010282 CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7fbe000 CR3: 2a99b3c0 CR4: 000406f0 Call Trace: f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x124/0x580 [f2fs] do_write_page+0x78/0x150 [f2fs] f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x25/0xa0 [f2fs] __write_node_page+0x2bf/0x550 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x60e/0x6d0 [f2fs] ? sync_inode_metadata+0x2f/0x40 ? f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x28f/0x7d0 [f2fs] ? up_write+0x1e/0x80 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x2a9/0x7d0 [f2fs] ? mark_held_locks+0x5d/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50 kill_f2fs_super+0x68/0x90 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 task_work_run+0x81/0xa0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x59/0xa7 do_fast_syscall_32+0x1f5/0x22c entry_SYSENTER_32+0x53/0x86 EIP: 0xb7f95c51 Code: c1 1e f7 ff ff 89 e5 8b 55 08 85 d2 8b 81 64 cd ff ff 74 02 89 02 5d c3 8b 0c 24 c3 8b 1c 24 c3 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d 76 00 58 b8 77 00 00 00 cd 80 90 8d 76 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 0871ab90 ECX: bfb2cd00 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 0871ab90 EBP: 0871ab90 ESP: bfb2cd7c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000246 Modules linked in: f2fs(O) crc32_generic bnep rfcomm bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq pcbc joydev aesni_intel snd_seq_device aes_i586 snd_timer crypto_simd snd cryptd soundcore mac_hid serio_raw video i2c_piix4 parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic psmouse usbhid hid e1000 [last unloaded: f2fs] ---[ end trace d423f83982cfcdc5 ]--- The reason is, different log headers using the same segment, once one log's next block address is used by another log, it will cause panic as above. Main area: 24 segs, 24 secs 24 zones - COLD data: 0, 0, 0 - WARM data: 1, 1, 1 - HOT data: 20, 20, 20 - Dir dnode: 22, 22, 22 - File dnode: 22, 22, 22 - Indir nodes: 21, 21, 21 So this patch adds sanity check to detect such condition to avoid this issue. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

There is one case that we can leave bio in f2fs, result in hanging page writeback waiter. Thread A Thread B - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_submit_page_write page #0 cached in bio #0 of cold log - f2fs_submit_page_write page #1 cached in bio #1 of warm log - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_submit_page_write bio is full, submit bio #1 contain page #1 - f2fs_submit_merged_write_cond(, page #1) fail to submit bio #0 due to page #1 is not in any cached bios. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

During recover, we will try to create new dentries for inodes with dentry_mark. But if the parent is missing (e.g. killed by fsck), recover will break. But those recovered dirty pages are not cleanup. This will hit f2fs_bug_on: [ 53.519566] F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint [ 53.539354] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_inode: ino = 5, name = file, inline = 3 [ 53.539402] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_dentry: ino = 5, name = file, dir = 0, err = -2 [ 53.545760] F2FS-fs (loop0): Cannot recover all fsync data errno=-2 [ 53.546105] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:4294967295 [ 53.546171] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1798 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:163 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320 [ 53.546174] Modules linked in: [ 53.546183] CPU: 1 PID: 1798 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #1 [ 53.546186] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 53.546191] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x26c/0x320 [ 53.546195] Code: 85 bb 00 00 00 48 89 df 88 44 24 07 e8 ad a8 db ff 48 8b 3b 44 89 e1 48 c7 c2 40 03 72 a9 48 c7 c6 e0 01 72 a9 e8 84 3c ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 e9 8a 00 00 00 48 8d bf 38 01 00 00 e8 7c a8 [ 53.546201] RSP: 0018:ffff88006c067768 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 53.546208] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880068844200 RCX: ffffffffa83e1a33 [ 53.546211] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88006d51e590 [ 53.546215] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: ffffed000daa3cb3 R09: ffffed000daa3cb3 [ 53.546218] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed000daa3cb2 R12: 00000000ffffffff [ 53.546221] R13: ffff88006a1f8000 R14: 0000000000000200 R15: 0000000000000009 [ 53.546226] FS: 00007fb2f3646840(0000) GS:ffff88006d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 53.546229] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 53.546234] CR2: 00007f0fd77f0008 CR3: 00000000687e6002 CR4: 00000000000206e0 [ 53.546237] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 53.546240] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 53.546242] Call Trace: [ 53.546248] f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x95/0x740 [ 53.546253] read_node_page+0x161/0x1e0 [ 53.546271] ? truncate_node+0x650/0x650 [ 53.546283] ? add_to_page_cache_lru+0x12c/0x170 [ 53.546288] ? pagecache_get_page+0x262/0x2d0 [ 53.546292] __get_node_page+0x200/0x660 [ 53.546302] f2fs_update_inode_page+0x4a/0x160 [ 53.546306] f2fs_write_inode+0x86/0xb0 [ 53.546317] __writeback_single_inode+0x49c/0x620 [ 53.546322] writeback_single_inode+0xe4/0x1e0 [ 53.546326] sync_inode_metadata+0x93/0xd0 [ 53.546330] ? sync_inode+0x10/0x10 [ 53.546342] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xed/0x100 [ 53.546347] f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0xe0/0x130 [ 53.546351] f2fs_fill_super+0x287d/0x2d10 [ 53.546367] ? vsnprintf+0x742/0x7a0 [ 53.546372] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180 [ 53.546379] ? up_write+0x20/0x40 [ 53.546385] ? set_blocksize+0x5f/0x140 [ 53.546391] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x180/0x180 [ 53.546402] mount_bdev+0x181/0x200 [ 53.546406] mount_fs+0x94/0x180 [ 53.546411] vfs_kern_mount+0x6c/0x1e0 [ 53.546415] do_mount+0xe5e/0x1510 [ 53.546420] ? fs_reclaim_release+0x9/0x30 [ 53.546424] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20 [ 53.546428] ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd/0x30 [ 53.546435] ? __might_sleep+0x2c/0xc0 [ 53.546440] ? ___might_sleep+0x53/0x170 [ 53.546453] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0x60 [ 53.546468] ? _copy_from_user+0x95/0xa0 [ 53.546474] ? memdup_user+0x39/0x60 [ 53.546478] ksys_mount+0x88/0xb0 [ 53.546482] __x64_sys_mount+0x5d/0x70 [ 53.546495] do_syscall_64+0x65/0x130 [ 53.546503] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 53.547639] ---[ end trace b804d1ea2fec893e ]--- So if recover fails, we need to drop all recovered data. Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

@blkno

[ Upstream commit 6a25747 ] As syzbot reported: kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:657! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 16220 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0xa51/0xdc0 fs/f2fs/segment.h:657 Call Trace: build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:4195 [inline] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x4b8a/0xa3c0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:4779 f2fs_fill_super+0x377d/0x6b80 fs/f2fs/super.c:3633 mount_bdev+0x32e/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1417 legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline] path_mount+0x1387/0x2070 fs/namespace.c:3192 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3390 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 @blkno in f2fs_ra_meta_pages could exceed max segment count, causing panic in following sanity check in current_sit_addr(), add check condition to avoid this issue. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: Ia36bce95fc247fb668d704c9ff8ca958f1d925cc

If we're queuing REQ_PRIO IO and the task is running at an idle IO class, then temporarily boost the priority. This prevents livelocks due to priority inversion, when a low priority task is holding file system resources while attempting to do IO. An example of that is shown below. An ioniced idle task is holding the directory mutex, while a normal priority task is trying to do a directory lookup. [478381.198925] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [478381.200315] INFO: task ionice:1168369 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [478381.201324] Not tainted 4.0.9-38_fbk5_hotfix1_2936_g85409c6 #1 [478381.202278] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [478381.203462] ionice D ffff8803692736a8 0 1168369 1 0x00000080 [478381.203466] ffff8803692736a8 ffff880399c21300 ffff880276adcc00 ffff880369273698 [478381.204589] ffff880369273fd8 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000002 [478381.205752] ffffffff8177d5e0 ffff8803692736c8 ffffffff8177cea7 0000000000000000 [478381.206874] Call Trace: [478381.207253] [<ffffffff8177d5e0>] ? bit_wait_io_timeout+0x80/0x80 [478381.208175] [<ffffffff8177cea7>] schedule+0x37/0x90 [478381.208932] [<ffffffff8177f5fc>] schedule_timeout+0x1dc/0x250 [478381.209805] [<ffffffff81421c17>] ? __blk_run_queue+0x37/0x50 [478381.210706] [<ffffffff810ca1c5>] ? ktime_get+0x45/0xb0 [478381.211489] [<ffffffff8177c407>] io_schedule_timeout+0xa7/0x110 [478381.212402] [<ffffffff810a8c2b>] ? prepare_to_wait+0x5b/0x90 [478381.213280] [<ffffffff8177d616>] bit_wait_io+0x36/0x50 [478381.214063] [<ffffffff8177d325>] __wait_on_bit+0x65/0x90 [478381.214961] [<ffffffff8177d5e0>] ? bit_wait_io_timeout+0x80/0x80 [478381.215872] [<ffffffff8177d47c>] out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x7c/0x90 [478381.216806] [<ffffffff810a89f0>] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x40/0x40 [478381.217773] [<ffffffff811f03aa>] __wait_on_buffer+0x2a/0x30 [478381.218641] [<ffffffff8123c557>] ext4_bread+0x57/0x70 [478381.219425] [<ffffffff8124498c>] __ext4_read_dirblock+0x3c/0x380 [478381.220467] [<ffffffff8124665d>] ext4_dx_find_entry+0x7d/0x170 [478381.221357] [<ffffffff8114c49e>] ? find_get_entry+0x1e/0xa0 [478381.222208] [<ffffffff81246bd4>] ext4_find_entry+0x484/0x510 [478381.223090] [<ffffffff812471a2>] ext4_lookup+0x52/0x160 [478381.223882] [<ffffffff811c401d>] lookup_real+0x1d/0x60 [478381.224675] [<ffffffff811c4698>] __lookup_hash+0x38/0x50 [478381.225697] [<ffffffff817745bd>] lookup_slow+0x45/0xab [478381.226941] [<ffffffff811c690e>] link_path_walk+0x7ae/0x820 [478381.227880] [<ffffffff811c6a42>] path_init+0xc2/0x430 [478381.228677] [<ffffffff813e6e26>] ? security_file_alloc+0x16/0x20 [478381.229776] [<ffffffff811c8c57>] path_openat+0x77/0x620 [478381.230767] [<ffffffff81185c6e>] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x2e/0x70 [478381.232019] [<ffffffff811cb253>] do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 [478381.233016] [<ffffffff8108c4a9>] ? creds_are_invalid+0x29/0x70 [478381.234072] [<ffffffff811c0cb0>] do_open_execat+0x70/0x170 [478381.235039] [<ffffffff811c1bf8>] do_execveat_common.isra.36+0x1b8/0x6e0 [478381.236051] [<ffffffff811c214c>] do_execve+0x2c/0x30 [478381.236809] [<ffffffff811ca392>] ? getname+0x12/0x20 [478381.237564] [<ffffffff811c23be>] SyS_execve+0x2e/0x40 [478381.238338] [<ffffffff81780a1d>] stub_execve+0x6d/0xa0 [478381.239126] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [478381.239915] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [478381.240606] INFO: task python2.7:1168375 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [478381.242673] Not tainted 4.0.9-38_fbk5_hotfix1_2936_g85409c6 #1 [478381.243653] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [478381.244902] python2.7 D ffff88005cf8fb98 0 1168375 1168248 0x00000080 [478381.244904] ffff88005cf8fb98 ffff88016c1f0980 ffffffff81c134c0 ffff88016c1f11a0 [478381.246023] ffff88005cf8ffd8 ffff880466cd0cbc ffff88016c1f0980 00000000ffffffff [478381.247138] ffff880466cd0cc0 ffff88005cf8fbb8 ffffffff8177cea7 ffff88005cf8fcc8 [478381.248252] Call Trace: [478381.248630] [<ffffffff8177cea7>] schedule+0x37/0x90 [478381.249382] [<ffffffff8177d08e>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xe/0x10 [478381.250465] [<ffffffff8177e892>] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x92/0x100 [478381.251409] [<ffffffff8177e91b>] mutex_lock+0x1b/0x2f [478381.252199] [<ffffffff817745ae>] lookup_slow+0x36/0xab [478381.253023] [<ffffffff811c690e>] link_path_walk+0x7ae/0x820 [478381.253877] [<ffffffff811aeb41>] ? try_charge+0xc1/0x700 [478381.254690] [<ffffffff811c6a42>] path_init+0xc2/0x430 [478381.255525] [<ffffffff813e6e26>] ? security_file_alloc+0x16/0x20 [478381.256450] [<ffffffff811c8c57>] path_openat+0x77/0x620 [478381.257256] [<ffffffff8115b2fb>] ? lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable+0x2b/0xa0 [478381.258390] [<ffffffff8117b623>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x13f3/0x1720 [478381.259309] [<ffffffff811cb253>] do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 [478381.260139] [<ffffffff811d7ae2>] ? __alloc_fd+0x42/0x120 [478381.260962] [<ffffffff811b95ac>] do_sys_open+0x13c/0x230 [478381.261779] [<ffffffff81011393>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x113/0x170 [478381.262851] [<ffffffff811b96c2>] SyS_open+0x22/0x30 [478381.263598] [<ffffffff81780532>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 [478381.264551] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [478381.265377] ------------[ cut here ]------------ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Park Ju Hyung <[email protected]>

Taking socket spinlock in tcp_get_info() can deadlock, as inet_diag_dump_icsk() holds the &hashinfo->ehash_locks[i], while packet processing can use the reverse locking order. We could avoid this locking for TCP_LISTEN states, but lockdep would certainly get confused as all TCP sockets share same lockdep classes. [ 523.722504] ====================================================== [ 523.728706] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 523.734990] 4.1.0-dbg-DEV #1676 Not tainted [ 523.739202] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 523.745474] ss/18032 is trying to acquire lock: [ 523.750002] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81669d44>] tcp_get_info+0x2c4/0x360 [ 523.758129] [ 523.758129] but task is already holding lock: [ 523.763968] (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff816bcb75>] inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x1d5/0x6c0 [ 523.774661] [ 523.774661] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 523.774661] [ 523.782850] [ 523.782850] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 523.790326] -> #1 (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.-...}: [ 523.796599] [<ffffffff811126bb>] lock_acquire+0xbb/0x270 [ 523.802565] [<ffffffff816f5868>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50 [ 523.808628] [<ffffffff81665af8>] __inet_hash_nolisten+0x78/0x110 [ 523.815273] [<ffffffff816819db>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x24b/0x350 [ 523.822067] [<ffffffff81684d41>] tcp_check_req+0x3c1/0x500 [ 523.828199] [<ffffffff81682d09>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x239/0x3d0 [ 523.834331] [<ffffffff816842fe>] tcp_v4_rcv+0xa8e/0xc10 [ 523.840202] [<ffffffff81658fa3>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x133/0x3e0 [ 523.847214] [<ffffffff81659a9a>] ip_local_deliver+0xaa/0xc0 [ 523.853440] [<ffffffff816593b8>] ip_rcv_finish+0x168/0x5c0 [ 523.859624] [<ffffffff81659db7>] ip_rcv+0x307/0x420 Lets use u64_sync infrastructure instead. As a bonus, 64bit arches get optimized, as these are nop for them. Fixes: 0df48c2 ("tcp: add tcpi_bytes_acked to tcp_info") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Commit ( perf: arm64: implement CPU_PM notifier) added code in the arm perf infrastructure that allows the kernel to save/restore perf counters whenever the CPU enters a low-power state. The kernel saves/restores the counters for each active event through the armpmu_{stop/start} ARM pmu API, so that the low-power state enter/exit cycle is emulated through pmu start/stop operations for each event in use. However, calling armpmu_start() for each active event on power up executes code that requires RCU locking (perf_event_update_userpage()) to be functional, so, given that the core may call the CPU_PM notifiers while running the idle thread in an quiescent RCU state this is not allowed as detected through the following splat when kernel is run with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING enabled: [ 49.293286] [ 49.294761] =============================== [ 49.298895] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 49.303031] 4.6.0-rc3+ #421 Not tainted [ 49.306821] ------------------------------- [ 49.310956] include/linux/rcupdate.h:872 rcu_read_lock() used illegally while idle! [ 49.318530] [ 49.318530] other info that might help us debug this: [ 49.318530] [ 49.326451] [ 49.326451] RCU used illegally from idle CPU! [ 49.326451] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ 49.337209] RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! [ 49.342892] 2 locks held by swapper/2/0: [ 49.346768] #0: (cpu_pm_notifier_lock){......}, at: [<ffffff8008163c28>] cpu_pm_exit+0x18/0x80 [ 49.355492] #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffff800816dc38>] perf_event_update_userpage+0x0/0x260 This patch wraps the armpmu_start() call (that indirectly calls perf_event_update_userpage()) on CPU_PM notifier power state exit (or failed entry) within the RCU_NONIDLE() macro so that the RCU subsystem is made aware the calling cpu is not idle from an RCU perspective for the armpmu_start() call duration, therefore fixing the issue. (cherry-picked from angler kernel) Bug: 30839193 Change-Id: I931833bc800d072eea17cf0ac5cd39a33af719c3 Signed-off-by: Francisco Franco <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 91df99a ] While doing error injection testing I got the following panic kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:1862! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 7836 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1+ #305 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:link_to_fixup_dir+0xd5/0xe0 RSP: 0018:ffffb5800180fa30 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: fffffffffffffffb RBX: 00000000fffffffb RCX: ffff8f595287faf0 RDX: ffffb5800180fa37 RSI: ffff8f5954978800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8f5953af9450 R08: 0000000000000019 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 000151f408682970 R11: 0000000120021001 R12: ffff8f5954978800 R13: ffff8f595287faf0 R14: ffff8f5953c77dd0 R15: 0000000000000065 FS: 00007fc5284c8c40(0000) GS:ffff8f59bbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc5287f47c0 CR3: 000000011275e002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 Call Trace: replay_one_buffer+0x409/0x470 ? btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0xd0/0x110 walk_up_log_tree+0x157/0x1e0 walk_log_tree+0xa6/0x1d0 btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x1da/0x360 ? replay_one_extent+0x7b0/0x7b0 open_ctree+0x1486/0x1720 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x12f/0x240 legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0x4d/0x90 legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0 path_mount+0x433/0xa10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae We can get -EIO or any number of legitimate errors from btrfs_search_slot(), panicing here is not the appropriate response. The error path for this code handles errors properly, simply return the error. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: Iacf738176f5ebb6790c09ede90ff9ed77541698e

[ Upstream commit 020ef93 ] mld_newpack() doesn't allow to allocate high order page, only order-0 allocation is allowed. If headroom size is too large, a kernel panic could occur in skb_put(). Test commands: ip netns del A ip netns del B ip netns add A ip netns add B ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1 ip link set veth0 netns A ip link set veth1 netns B ip netns exec A ip link set lo up ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::1/64 dev veth0 ip netns exec B ip link set lo up ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::2/64 dev veth1 for i in {1..99} do let A=$i-1 ip netns exec A ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \ local 2001:db8:$A::1 remote 2001:db8:$A::2 encaplimit 100 ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::1/64 dev ip6gre$i ip netns exec A ip link set ip6gre$i up ip netns exec B ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \ local 2001:db8:$A::2 remote 2001:db8:$A::1 encaplimit 100 ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::2/64 dev ip6gre$i ip netns exec B ip link set ip6gre$i up done Splat looks like: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.12.0+ #891 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15d/0x15f Code: 92 fe 4c 8b 4c 24 10 53 8b 4d 70 45 89 e0 48 c7 c7 00 ae 79 83 41 57 41 56 41 55 48 8b 54 24 a6 26 f9 ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 6c 24 20 89 34 24 e8 4a 4e 92 fe 8b 34 24 48 c7 c1 20 RSP: 0018:ffff88810091f820 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8881086e9000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1020123efb RBP: ffff888005f6eac0 R08: ffffed1022fc0031 R09: ffffed1022fc0031 R10: ffff888117e00187 R11: ffffed1022fc0030 R12: 0000000000000028 R13: ffff888008284eb0 R14: 0000000000000ed8 R15: 0000000000000ec0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888117c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8b801c5640 CR3: 0000000033c2c006 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600 ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600 skb_put.cold.104+0x22/0x22 ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0 mld_newpack+0x398/0x8f0 ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x600/0x600 ? lock_contended+0xc40/0xc40 add_grhead.isra.33+0x280/0x380 add_grec+0x5ca/0xff0 ? mld_sendpack+0xf40/0xf40 ? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690 mld_send_initial_cr.part.34+0xb9/0x180 ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x15d/0x1b0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x8d2/0xbb0 ? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690 ? addrconf_rs_timer+0x660/0x660 ? addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0 addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0 Allowing high order page allocation could fix this problem. Fixes: 72e09ad ("ipv6: avoid high order allocations") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: I7ca0d22a829743fc0aac7be1d5d61068f5a8c1c3

commit 082cd4e upstream. We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault: [130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762! [130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ...... [130747.334329] Call trace: [130747.334553] ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4] [130747.334975] ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4] [130747.335368] ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4] [130747.335759] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4] [130747.336179] ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4] [130747.336567] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4] [130747.336995] ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4] [130747.337359] generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8 [130747.337767] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190 [130747.338152] ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4] [130747.338556] __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188 [130747.338851] vfs_read+0x94/0x150 [130747.339110] ksys_read+0x74/0xf0 This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/[email protected]/ "I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable). Anything else indicates a HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping extents)." Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: I64ea28d437180a5997b9b10a24729142f0a8bde9

commit 0711f0d upstream. During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init task's struct pid. Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid via put_pid(). As we never called get_pid() when we initialized `cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore free the init task's struct pid early. As there can be dangling references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free (e.g. when delivering signals). This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in commit 9ec5209 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19. Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we assign it to `cad_pid`. Full KASAN splat below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509 Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273 CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline] task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509 do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950 exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline] do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845 do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922 get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781 do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline] do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936 work_pending+0xc/0x2dc Allocated by task 0: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920 alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180 copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129 kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500 kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552 rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687 arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28 start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064 0x0 Freed by task 270: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600 slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177 put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114 put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109 proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401 proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591 proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline] new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline] vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585 ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129 do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168 el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416 el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432 el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000 which belongs to the cache pid of size 224 The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of 224-byte region [ffff23794dda0000, ffff23794dda00e0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4dda0 head:(____ptrval____) order:1 compound_mapcount:0 flags: 0x3fffc0000010200(slab|head) raw: 03fffc0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff23794d40d080 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff23794dd9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff23794dd9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff23794dda0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff23794dda0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff23794dda0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 9ec5209 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Cc: Cedric Le Goater <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected] Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: I43c796353db78135bc12198c1fff155bc3c177c8

[ Upstream commit 13a6f31 ] When calling the 'ql_sem_spinlock', the driver has already acquired the spin lock, so the driver should not call 'ssleep' in atomic context. This bug can be fixed by using 'mdelay' instead of 'ssleep'. The KASAN's log reveals it: [ 3.238124 ] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/0/1/0x00000002 [ 3.238748 ] 2 locks held by swapper/0/1: [ 3.239151 ] #0: ffff88810177b240 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_driver_lock+0x41/0x60 [ 3.240026 ] #1: ffff888107c60e28 (&qdev->hw_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: ql3xxx_probe+0x2aa/0xea0 [ 3.240873 ] Modules linked in: [ 3.241187 ] irq event stamp: 460854 [ 3.241541 ] hardirqs last enabled at (460853): [<ffffffff843051bf>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4f/0x70 [ 3.242245 ] hardirqs last disabled at (460854): [<ffffffff843058ca>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0x70 [ 3.242245 ] softirqs last enabled at (446076): [<ffffffff846002e4>] __do_softirq+0x2e4/0x4b1 [ 3.242245 ] softirqs last disabled at (446069): [<ffffffff811ba5e0>] irq_exit_rcu+0x100/0x110 [ 3.242245 ] Preemption disabled at: [ 3.242245 ] [<ffffffff828ca5ba>] ql3xxx_probe+0x2aa/0xea0 [ 3.242245 ] Kernel panic - not syncing: scheduling while atomic [ 3.242245 ] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-00145 -gee7dc339169-dirty TheScarastic#16 [ 3.242245 ] Call Trace: [ 3.242245 ] dump_stack+0xba/0xf5 [ 3.242245 ] ? ql3xxx_probe+0x1f0/0xea0 [ 3.242245 ] panic+0x15a/0x3f2 [ 3.242245 ] ? vprintk+0x76/0x150 [ 3.242245 ] ? ql3xxx_probe+0x2aa/0xea0 [ 3.242245 ] __schedule_bug+0xae/0xe0 [ 3.242245 ] __schedule+0x72e/0xa00 [ 3.242245 ] schedule+0x43/0xf0 [ 3.242245 ] schedule_timeout+0x28b/0x500 [ 3.242245 ] ? del_timer_sync+0xf0/0xf0 [ 3.242245 ] ? msleep+0x2f/0x70 [ 3.242245 ] msleep+0x59/0x70 [ 3.242245 ] ql3xxx_probe+0x307/0xea0 [ 3.242245 ] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3a/0x70 [ 3.242245 ] ? pci_device_remove+0x110/0x110 [ 3.242245 ] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0 [ 3.242245 ] pci_device_probe+0x12b/0x1d0 [ 3.242245 ] really_probe+0x2a9/0x610 [ 3.242245 ] driver_probe_device+0x90/0x1d0 [ 3.242245 ] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 3.242245 ] device_driver_attach+0x68/0x70 [ 3.242245 ] __driver_attach+0x124/0x1b0 [ 3.242245 ] ? device_driver_attach+0x70/0x70 [ 3.242245 ] bus_for_each_dev+0xbb/0x110 [ 3.242245 ] ? rdinit_setup+0x45/0x45 [ 3.242245 ] driver_attach+0x27/0x30 [ 3.242245 ] bus_add_driver+0x1eb/0x2a0 [ 3.242245 ] driver_register+0xa9/0x180 [ 3.242245 ] __pci_register_driver+0x82/0x90 [ 3.242245 ] ? yellowfin_init+0x25/0x25 [ 3.242245 ] ql3xxx_driver_init+0x23/0x25 [ 3.242245 ] do_one_initcall+0x7f/0x3d0 [ 3.242245 ] ? rdinit_setup+0x45/0x45 [ 3.242245 ] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x4f/0x80 [ 3.242245 ] kernel_init_freeable+0x2aa/0x301 [ 3.242245 ] ? rest_init+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 3.242245 ] kernel_init+0x18/0x190 [ 3.242245 ] ? rest_init+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 3.242245 ] ? rest_init+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 3.242245 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 3.242245 ] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 3.242245 ] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 3.242245 ] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 3.242245 ] Rebooting in 1 seconds. Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: I2b1eed21af36ff92ae7d89947c35dd0a6b7596ae

commit d008890 upstream. There is no validation of the index from dwc3_wIndex_to_dep() and we might be referring a non-existing ep and trigger a NULL pointer exception. In certain configurations we might use fewer eps and the index might wrongly indicate a larger ep index than existing. By adding this validation from the patch we can actually report a wrong index back to the caller. In our usecase we are using a composite device on an older kernel, but upstream might use this fix also. Unfortunately, I cannot describe the hardware for others to reproduce the issue as it is a proprietary implementation. [ 82.958261] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a4 [ 82.966891] Mem abort info: [ 82.969663] ESR = 0x96000006 [ 82.972703] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 82.978603] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 82.981642] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 82.984765] Data abort info: [ 82.987631] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 [ 82.991449] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 82.994409] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000c6210ccc [ 83.000999] [00000000000000a4] pgd=0000000053aa5003, pud=0000000053aa5003, pmd=0000000000000000 [ 83.009685] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 83.026433] Process irq/62-dwc3 (pid: 303, stack limit = 0x000000003985154c) [ 83.033470] CPU: 0 PID: 303 Comm: irq/62-dwc3 Not tainted 4.19.124 #1 [ 83.044836] pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO) [ 83.049628] pc : dwc3_ep0_handle_feature+0x414/0x43c [ 83.054558] lr : dwc3_ep0_interrupt+0x3b4/0xc94 ... [ 83.141788] Call trace: [ 83.144227] dwc3_ep0_handle_feature+0x414/0x43c [ 83.148823] dwc3_ep0_interrupt+0x3b4/0xc94 [ 83.181546] ---[ end trace aac6b5267d84c32f ]--- Signed-off-by: Marian-Cristian Rotariu <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: I511a8a04c1bf6fe354eaf01d6c5edafc8f55c04e

We use IPI instead of NMI in ARM64 to get backtrace of all CPUs. However, smp_processor_id expects preempt disabled, and this leads to a kernel BUG seen as below: c3 19299 SysRq : Show backtrace of all active CPUs c3 19299 BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: sh/19299 c3 19299 caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x1c/0x24 c3 19299 CPU: 3 PID: 19299 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.18.31-gb1be511 #1 c3 19299 Hardware name: HTC Corporation. MSM8996pro + PMI8996 Sailfish XB (DT) c3 19299 Call trace: c3 19299 [<ffffffc00008aab4>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x23c c3 19299 [<ffffffc00008ad04>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c c3 19299 [<ffffffc000e29f38>] dump_stack+0x80/0xa4 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0003147a4>] check_preemption_disabled+0xe0/0x104 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0003147e4>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x1c/0x24 c3 19299 [<ffffffc000092b24>] arch_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace+0x18/0xdc c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048dd64>] sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0xc/0x14 c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048e33c>] __handle_sysrq+0x9c/0x154 c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048e724>] write_sysrq_trigger+0x54/0x68 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001f9c54>] proc_reg_write+0x68/0x84 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001a6e0c>] vfs_write+0xbc/0x18c c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001a6fd4>] SyS_write+0x54/0xa4 c3 19299 Backtrace for cpu 3 (current): c3 19299 CPU: 3 PID: 19299 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.18.31-gb1be511 #1 c3 19299 Hardware name: HTC Corporation. MSM8996pro + PMI8996 Sailfish XB (DT) c3 19299 Call trace: c3 19299 [<ffffffc00008aab4>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x23c c3 19299 [<ffffffc00008ad04>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c c3 19299 [<ffffffc000e29f38>] dump_stack+0x80/0xa4 c3 19299 [<ffffffc000092b70>] arch_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace+0x64/0xdc c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048dd64>] sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0xc/0x14 c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048e33c>] __handle_sysrq+0x9c/0x154 c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048e724>] write_sysrq_trigger+0x54/0x68 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001f9c54>] proc_reg_write+0x68/0x84 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001a6e0c>] vfs_write+0xbc/0x18c c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001a6fd4>] SyS_write+0x54/0xa4 c3 19299 c3 19299 sending IPI to all other CPUs: c3 19299 BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: sh/19299 c3 19299 caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x1c/0x24 c3 19299 CPU: 3 PID: 19299 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 3.18.31-gb1be511 #1 c3 19299 Hardware name: HTC Corporation. MSM8996pro + PMI8996 Sailfish XB (DT) c3 19299 Call trace: c3 19299 [<ffffffc00008aab4>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x23c c3 19299 [<ffffffc00008ad04>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c c3 19299 [<ffffffc000e29f38>] dump_stack+0x80/0xa4 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0003147a4>] check_preemption_disabled+0xe0/0x104 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0003147e4>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x1c/0x24 c3 19299 [<ffffffc000327d24>] gic_raise_softirq+0x128/0x158 c3 19299 [<ffffffc000092828>] smp_cross_call_common+0x80/0x94 c3 19299 [<ffffffc000092b94>] arch_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace+0x88/0xdc c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048dd64>] sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0xc/0x14 c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048e33c>] __handle_sysrq+0x9c/0x154 c3 19299 [<ffffffc00048e724>] write_sysrq_trigger+0x54/0x68 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001f9c54>] proc_reg_write+0x68/0x84 c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001a6e0c>] vfs_write+0xbc/0x18c c3 19299 [<ffffffc0001a6fd4>] SyS_write+0x54/0xa4 Bug: 35409577 Bug: 34193533 Test: on marlin, trigger sysrq Change-Id: I0239f388c8ec63f10fc73a32bf8a7deddc408104 Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Francisco Franco <[email protected]>

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ghost commented May 21, 2017