diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f4b87ee..8d9fe5a 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -185,11 +185,11 @@ Investor groups differ in their agility and capacity to influence consensus chan Self custodying proprietary owners of bitcoin can respond the fastest in consensus changes because they control the private keys to bitcoin and do not have to seek approval from anyone. They have the ability to immediately respond to contentious consensus changes by selling hard forks of bitcoin for example. -Institutional Investors often use qualified custodians (who are also often Economic Nodes) to custody bitcoin and are somewhat at the mercy of the Economic Nodes in forks. For instance, Coinbase’s User Agreement says that “Coinbase has no responsibility to support new Digital Asset forks” and “Coinbase has no liability for any losses related to supplemental protocols” including forked protocols.[^4] They are also subject to investor agreement terms which in cases may limit their ability to buy or sell hard forks of bitcoin. +Institutional Investors often use qualified custodians (who are also often Economic Nodes) to custody bitcoin and are somewhat at the mercy of the Economic Nodes in forks. For instance, Coinbase’s User Agreement says that “Coinbase has no responsibility to support new Digital Asset forks” and “Coinbase has no liability for any losses related to supplemental protocols” including forked protocols.[^6] They are also subject to investor agreement terms which in cases may limit their ability to buy or sell hard forks of bitcoin. Corporations with bitcoin on their balance sheet also tend to use qualified custodians and if publicly traded are held to high regulatory scrutiny for treasury assets. Publicly traded corporations, especially those listed on major stock exchanges, are subject to stringent regulatory scrutiny regarding how they manage their treasury assets, including bitcoin. They also have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their shareholders. Decisions made in a contentious consensus change likely requires board of director approval. -Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are operated by a sponsor (a financial institution or company responsible for creating, managing, and overseeing the ETF) and hold bitcoin in qualified custodians on behalf of their shareholders. With respect to consensus changes, the prospectus of BlackRock’s Bitcoin ETF (the largest ETF at the time of writing) says it will “use its sole discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Bitcoin network.” Furthermore, “the Sponsor may also disagree with Shareholders, the Bitcoin Custodian, other service providers, the Index Administrator, cryptocurrency platforms, or other market participants on what is generally accepted as bitcoin and should therefore be considered “bitcoin” for the Trust’s purposes.” “With respect to a fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event.”[^5] This suggests that in the case of a contentious consensus change, ETF sponsors have the ability to choose the fork they think is bitcoin and will abandon the incidental rights or coins that might arise from hard forks, but how this actually plays out in practice is unknown territory. +Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are operated by a sponsor (a financial institution or company responsible for creating, managing, and overseeing the ETF) and hold bitcoin in qualified custodians on behalf of their shareholders. With respect to consensus changes, the prospectus of BlackRock’s Bitcoin ETF (the largest ETF at the time of writing) says it will “use its sole discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Bitcoin network.” Furthermore, “the Sponsor may also disagree with Shareholders, the Bitcoin Custodian, other service providers, the Index Administrator, cryptocurrency platforms, or other market participants on what is generally accepted as bitcoin and should therefore be considered “bitcoin” for the Trust’s purposes.” “With respect to a fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event.”[^7] This suggests that in the case of a contentious consensus change, ETF sponsors have the ability to choose the fork they think is bitcoin and will abandon the incidental rights or coins that might arise from hard forks, but how this actually plays out in practice is unknown territory. ### Media Influencers @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ Powers: Incentives: - Generate engagement and grow their audience. -- Maintain credibility within the bitcoin community.[^6] +- Maintain credibility within the bitcoin community.[^8] - Act in their sponsors best interest. - Often have their own ideological or economic stakes in bitcoin's direction; may fall into one of the other Stakeholder categories. @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ Powers: - Create new blocks, determining which transactions are included. - Signal readiness for protocol changes through version bits. - Potentially censor transactions by not including them in blocks. -- Direct hash power to compete for chains in the event of a fork. Each ASIC mining chip can only mine for one side of a fork.[^7] +- Direct hash power to compete for chains in the event of a fork. Each ASIC mining chip can only mine for one side of a fork.[^9] In the current environment, Miners rarely run bitcoin software to construct block templates and thus do not directly control which consensus rules to follow, only a handful of pools do. However, the switching costs are low for a miner to switch to another pool. So if a pool acts against the interests of a miner, they will lose customers. The Miner’s state of mind (SOM) matters, if the miner is unaware or apathetic (SOM3, SOM4) then they might not even be aware it is in their interest to switch pools. @@ -247,17 +247,17 @@ The current segmentation of Miners power is detailed below | Mining Pools | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | | Chip manufacturers | No | No | No | No | -In the future, we may see a shift toward Miners running bitcoin software and directly controlling transaction selection and choosing consensus rules with protocols such as Stratum v2 and Braidpool.[^8] [^9] +In the future, we may see a shift toward Miners running bitcoin software and directly controlling transaction selection and choosing consensus rules with protocols such as Stratum v2 and Braidpool.[^10] [^11] Incentives: -- Maximize their revenue from block rewards and transaction fees.[^10] +- Maximize their revenue from block rewards and transaction fees.[^12] - Maintain the value of their specialized hardware investments. - Avoid network instability that could threaten the value of bitcoin. ### Protocol Developers -Protocol Developers (including the group often referred to as Core Developers) refers to the developers proposing and implementing consensus changes in addition to maintaining the bitcoin protocol and client(s). Protocol Developers do not have unilateral power over bitcoin because the clients that the economically meaningful stakeholders choose to run is what defines the rules of the network.[^11] [^12] If the Protocol Developers were to make a change to Bitcoin Core that the other stakeholders do not agree with, they would simply not run that version of the software. However, maintaining the reference client is quite powerful because it provides the Protocol Developers with veto-like power because of the difficulties of growing the adoption of an alternative client which we discuss in further detail later in this paper.[^13] +Protocol Developers (including the group often referred to as Core Developers) refers to the developers proposing and implementing consensus changes in addition to maintaining the bitcoin protocol and client(s). Protocol Developers do not have unilateral power over bitcoin because the clients that the economically meaningful stakeholders choose to run is what defines the rules of the network.[^13] [^14] If the Protocol Developers were to make a change to Bitcoin Core that the other stakeholders do not agree with, they would simply not run that version of the software. However, maintaining the reference client is quite powerful because it provides the Protocol Developers with veto-like power because of the difficulties of growing the adoption of an alternative client which we discuss in further detail later in this paper.[^15] Powers: @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ They include: - Developers creating smart contract-like functionality on Bitcoin - Teams working on sidechains or Layer 2 solutions for advanced functionality - On chain wallet providers -- Equity investors in bitcoin businesses[^14] +- Equity investors in bitcoin businesses[^16] Powers: @@ -330,19 +330,19 @@ Bitcoin consensus change is not achieved through formal governance but through a The consensus around the segwit upgrade was achieved through an extended, iterative process involving multiple stakeholder groups: -**Protocol Developers**: Developers implemented the segwit code, merging it into Bitcoin Core and advocating for its benefits. Developers also wrote about the risk of ASICBOOST (a method to increase the efficiency and profitability of mining that would be incompatible with segwit) and disclosed bugs and errors in alternative clients such as Bitcoin Unlimited.[^15] [^16] They played a crucial role in the technical discussions and public communications that shaped the broader community’s understanding of the upgrade. +**Protocol Developers**: Developers implemented the segwit code, merging it into Bitcoin Core and advocating for its benefits. Developers also wrote about the risk of ASICBOOST (a method to increase the efficiency and profitability of mining that would be incompatible with segwit) and disclosed bugs and errors in alternative clients such as Bitcoin Unlimited.[^17] [^18] They played a crucial role in the technical discussions and public communications that shaped the broader community’s understanding of the upgrade. -**Miners**: Initially, Miners showed low support for segwit activation. However, as the market demonstrated weak demand for competing proposals like Bitcoin Unlimited and SegWit2x, Miners faced increasing pressure to signal readiness for segwit. 84% of hashpower in 2017 also supported the New York Agreement which ultimately did not gain enough traction to reach consensus.[^17] +**Miners**: Initially, Miners showed low support for segwit activation. However, as the market demonstrated weak demand for competing proposals like Bitcoin Unlimited and SegWit2x, Miners faced increasing pressure to signal readiness for segwit. 84% of hashpower in 2017 also supported the New York Agreement which ultimately did not gain enough traction to reach consensus.[^19] -**Economic Nodes**: Exchanges like Bitfinex listed futures markets for Bitcoin Unlimited and SegWit2x, allowing price discovery that highlighted the economic viability (or lack thereof) of these forks. As the viability of these forks faded, Economic Nodes upgraded to support segwit, further solidifying its position as the preferred upgrade path. Economic Nodes also decided how to list these forks, overwhelmingly opting to list them under separate symbols. Major Economic Nodes also supported the New York Agreement but when faced with grassroots backlash, the proposal was wound down.[^18] +**Economic Nodes**: Exchanges like Bitfinex listed futures markets for Bitcoin Unlimited and SegWit2x, allowing price discovery that highlighted the economic viability (or lack thereof) of these forks. As the viability of these forks faded, Economic Nodes upgraded to support segwit, further solidifying its position as the preferred upgrade path. Economic Nodes also decided how to list these forks, overwhelmingly opting to list them under separate symbols. Major Economic Nodes also supported the New York Agreement but when faced with grassroots backlash, the proposal was wound down.[^20] -**Investors**: Investors expressed their preferences by trading futures contracts for the different forks. The strong sell-off in futures for SegWit2x and Bitcoin Unlimited indicated a clear market preference for not changing bitcoin consensus rules, pressuring other stakeholders to align with this preference. Some large holders of bitcoin at the time support the New York Agreement but given the lack of consensus, the proposal was wound down.[^19] +**Investors**: Investors expressed their preferences by trading futures contracts for the different forks. The strong sell-off in futures for SegWit2x and Bitcoin Unlimited indicated a clear market preference for not changing bitcoin consensus rules, pressuring other stakeholders to align with this preference. Some large holders of bitcoin at the time support the New York Agreement but given the lack of consensus, the proposal was wound down.[^21] ![chain_split_tokens](img/chain_split_tokens.png) -**Users and Developers**: Users and developers advocated for segwit on social media, forums, and other venues. Users also supported a User Activated Soft Fork (nodes would reject blocks that did not signal segwit) but the impact of the UASF client was minimal as “there were major exchanges and other businesses that were neutral or even spoke against the initiative, citing divergences in opinions and concerns of a potential split in the network.”[^20] Users and developers played a role in rejecting the New York Agreement.[^21] +**Users and Developers**: Users and developers advocated for segwit on social media, forums, and other venues. Users also supported a User Activated Soft Fork (nodes would reject blocks that did not signal segwit) but the impact of the UASF client was minimal as “there were major exchanges and other businesses that were neutral or even spoke against the initiative, citing divergences in opinions and concerns of a potential split in the network.”[^22] Users and developers played a role in rejecting the New York Agreement.[^23] -**Influencers**: Prominent voices in the community played a crucial role in advocating for and against segwit, shaping the broader debate and influencing the decisions of other stakeholders. Influencers and media outlets also played a role in helping reject the New York Agreement.[^22] +**Influencers**: Prominent voices in the community played a crucial role in advocating for and against segwit, shaping the broader debate and influencing the decisions of other stakeholders. Influencers and media outlets also played a role in helping reject the New York Agreement.[^24] The segwit activation demonstrates how bitcoin consensus is achieved not through hierarchical governance, but through a complex interplay of actions and reactions among stakeholders, each adjusting their strategies based on others' moves in a repeated game theory dynamic. @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ Measuring consensus in bitcoin is a complex task due to the decentralized nature | Media Influencers | Engagement and views | Most widely used social media platforms today have prohibitive costs to crawl engagements at scale
Different platforms are used in different regions of the world | | Miners | Miner signaling
Press statements and social media announcements | Forms of version bit signaling can be done without the client actually being upgraded | | Protocol Developers | Writing, implementing, and advocating for technical proposals
Press statements and social media announcements
Code and tests written
Bitcoin inquisition merge and usage
Comprehensive risk analysis
Sufficient calendar time for the ecosystem to review and provide feedback
Activation method proposed, debate, and decided | Developers' influence is often indirect, through their proposals being accepted or rejected. Their work is also subject to interpretation and debate within the community | -| Users and Application Developers | Press statements and social media announcements
Product developments and announcements | Difficult to track the actual impact of their activities due to the nascent and fragmented nature of these applications[^23]
Usage may be heavily influenced by external factors such as regulatory changes | +| Users and Application Developers | Press statements and social media announcements
Product developments and announcements | Difficult to track the actual impact of their activities due to the nascent and fragmented nature of these applications[^25]
Usage may be heavily influenced by external factors such as regulatory changes | Another way of measuring consensus is looking for the absence of press statements, social media announcements, or discourse from stakeholders. If certain stakeholder groups are not participating in public discourse, that suggests they are apathetic or unaware (SOM3, SOM4). It is also possible in rare cases that the stakeholder is not participating in an attempt to preserve trade secrets. Explaining how a consensus change could affect them might reveal the trade secret. To allow for consensus to occur, it would be beneficial for stakeholders who are advocating for the consensus change (SOM1, SOM2) or opposing the consensus change (SOM5, SOM6) to reach out to silent stakeholders to gauge their state of mind and try to engage them in the consensus change discourse. @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ Future improvements in measurement might include: - Transparency from Economic Nodes on their client versions: This could involve voluntary reporting mechanisms or public statements from the Economic Nodes - Development of prediction markets for bitcoin protocol changes: These markets could provide financial incentives for accurate forecasting of consensus outcomes, potentially offering valuable signals about stakeholder sentiment. - Implementation of anonymous cryptographic attestation mechanisms: This could allow stakeholders to prove their status (e.g., as a large holder or a frequent transactor) without revealing their identity, enabling more representative polling of different user groups. -- Aggregation websites that summarize support or lack of support: Sourcing stakeholder stances from the ecosystem on aggregation websites and sharing these websites with all stakeholders. For example during the segwit upgrade, websites like bitcoin.it wiki tracked the stance of different stakeholders.[^24] +- Aggregation websites that summarize support or lack of support: Sourcing stakeholder stances from the ecosystem on aggregation websites and sharing these websites with all stakeholders. For example during the segwit upgrade, websites like bitcoin.it wiki tracked the stance of different stakeholders.[^26] ## Future Scenarios and Considerations @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ Bitcoin’s consensus changes have historically progressed smoothly and without ### Consensus changes with alternative clients -Historically, all upgrades to bitcoin consensus have been merged into Bitcoin Core (which is by far the dominant client implementation of bitcoin with 98% of nodes), however that does not mean that upgrades to bitcoin consensus necessarily have to be merged to Bitcoin Core.[^25] [^26] We could see in the future upgrades that might be merged into an alternative client, either a fork of Bitcoin Core or written in a new language that implements the bitcoin protocol. We will refer to alternative clients with consensus changes as Alternative Consensus Clients. Many Alternative Consensus Clients have been created in the past (Bitcoin XT, Bitcoin Classic, Bitcoin Unlimited, etc.) but all have failed to get adoption.[^27] +Historically, all upgrades to bitcoin consensus have been merged into Bitcoin Core (which is by far the dominant client implementation of bitcoin with 98% of nodes), however that does not mean that upgrades to bitcoin consensus necessarily have to be merged to Bitcoin Core.[^27] [^28] We could see in the future upgrades that might be merged into an alternative client, either a fork of Bitcoin Core or written in a new language that implements the bitcoin protocol. We will refer to alternative clients with consensus changes as Alternative Consensus Clients. Many Alternative Consensus Clients have been created in the past (Bitcoin XT, Bitcoin Classic, Bitcoin Unlimited, etc.) but all have failed to get adoption.[^29] Changes to consensus were predominantly proposed by Protocol Developers who also maintained Bitcoin Core. Increasingly in recent years, developers from outside of the Bitcoin Core project are proposing and developing consensus changes. This increases the likelihood that a consensus change would come through an Alternative Consensus Client if the Protocol Developers do not merge the change into Bitcoin Core. If the developers proposing consensus changes are also building a product that is dependent on the consensus change, a reluctance from the maintainers of Bitcoin Core to merge the change could further motivate creating an alternative client. In other scenarios, it is also possible for the interests of the stakeholders of the network to diverge from the Protocol Developers, which might also warrant an alternative client for the protocol to continue to evolve. @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ Stakeholders have different motivations and concerns when deciding whether to ad | Stakeholder | Motivation to adopt Alternative Consensus Client | Motivation against adopting Alternative Consensus Client | | -------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| Economic Nodes | To support new features or upgrades that may increase revenue through higher user activity or they might have the perception that users want the new upgrades [^28]
Adopt alternative client in the hopes of a contentious hard fork and chain split that will generate trading fees | Risk of soft fork disruptions if not all Economic Nodes upgrade could cause double spend and loss of user funds
Uncertainty over stability, maintenance, and security of the alternative client
Costs and risks associated with upgrading systems and infrastructure | +| Economic Nodes | To support new features or upgrades that may increase revenue through higher user activity or they might have the perception that users want the new upgrades [^30]
Adopt alternative client in the hopes of a contentious hard fork and chain split that will generate trading fees | Risk of soft fork disruptions if not all Economic Nodes upgrade could cause double spend and loss of user funds
Uncertainty over stability, maintenance, and security of the alternative client
Costs and risks associated with upgrading systems and infrastructure | | Investors | N/A | Security - malicious alternative clients have previously been used to steal funds from investors collecting forkcoins | | Media Influencers | Opportunity to promote innovation and be seen as supporting advancements in the bitcoin ecosystem
Potential to gain attention and credibility by being at the forefront of a significant change
Sensationalism tends to be high engagement content which benefits distribution | Risk of losing credibility if the promoted alternative client fails or causes disruptions
Possibility of backlash from the community if perceived as pushing for changes that could harm bitcoin's stability and value | | Miners | Support for upgrades that might increase transaction fees
If the majority of Miners adopt the alternative client, it might become more profitable and reduce the risk of orphaned blocks | Uncertainty over stability, maintenance, and security of the alternative client
Performance issues related to unforeseen latency in the back end which could lead to longer template/job creation and peering risk resulting in suboptimal tx selection in blocks | @@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ For users, a chain split means having to decide which version of bitcoin they pr #### How might this occur with a soft fork -While a hard fork by definition results in a chain split, a soft fork does not always result in a chain split but that does not mean it is not possible. Chain split risk is elevated when the chain of upgraded blocks from a soft fork is disrupted by a sequence of high fee transactions that adds one or more not upgraded blocks subsequently. Transactions that violate the new rules that have high transaction fees could cause Miners to switch from the Alternative Consensus Client back to the unupgraded client or Miners on unupgraded clients to mine them. The sender of these soft fork undermining transactions does not need to be of any particular significance because there is little cost or downside to doing so for the sender. If Miners mine the transaction and see subsequent high transaction fee unupgraded transactions, they could build upon the unupgraded blocks which would disrupt the soft fork.[^29] Miners can in theory also build on unupgraded blocks with the upgraded soft fork blocks. +While a hard fork by definition results in a chain split, a soft fork does not always result in a chain split but that does not mean it is not possible. Chain split risk is elevated when the chain of upgraded blocks from a soft fork is disrupted by a sequence of high fee transactions that adds one or more not upgraded blocks subsequently. Transactions that violate the new rules that have high transaction fees could cause Miners to switch from the Alternative Consensus Client back to the unupgraded client or Miners on unupgraded clients to mine them. The sender of these soft fork undermining transactions does not need to be of any particular significance because there is little cost or downside to doing so for the sender. If Miners mine the transaction and see subsequent high transaction fee unupgraded transactions, they could build upon the unupgraded blocks which would disrupt the soft fork.[^31] Miners can in theory also build on unupgraded blocks with the upgraded soft fork blocks. It is important for there to be very clear consensus by bitcoin stakeholders including Economic Nodes before miners signal readiness, upgrade and begin producing blocks. Economic Nodes validate and propagate transactions across the network. The default behavior of Economic Nodes is not to reject new rules from a soft fork (by definition). However, for a consensus change to be successful and avoid risks such as bounty claims (described below) and chain splits, an overwhelming majority of Economic Nodes must upgrade and enforce the change. @@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ graph TD style J fill:#FFB482,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px ``` -[^30] +[^32] The risk of a chain split is amplified when a consensus change is rolled out with an Alternative Consensus Client with an activation mechanism because of greater uncertainty that the Alternative Consensus Client has consensus and is able to achieve full Economic Node adoption. Economic Nodes need strong economic justification to switch from Bitcoin Core. @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ Institutional Investors often hold bitcoin in addition to other cryptocurrencies Corporations holding bitcoin on their balance sheets either view it as a treasury asset and do not spend a lot of time following developments on bitcoin, or spend a lot of time studying developments on bitcoin. They will likely be slow to act if at all, and in aggregate (with the exception of a few firms) hold very little bitcoin; so, their price impact if an action is taken will be low. -Exchange traded funds are vehicles meant for passive Investors of various asset classes. These shareholders also likely do not spend time tracking developments on bitcoin and are apathetic or unaware. The decision may also not be up to the shareholders of the ETF to make. As of the writing of the paper, the prospectus of BlackRock’s Bitcoin ETF (the largest ETF at the time of writing) currently says BlackRock will “use its sole discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Bitcoin network.” Furthermore, “the Sponsor may also disagree with Shareholders, the Bitcoin Custodian, other service providers, the Index Administrator, cryptocurrency platforms, or other market participants on what is generally accepted as bitcoin and should therefore be considered “bitcoin” for the Trust’s purposes.” “With respect to a fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event.”[^31] This suggests that the ETF Sponsor would neither be able to buy nor sell the second coin, simply choosing one coin for the ETF to hold and consider bitcoin. If the ETF Sponsor is allowed to act, their market impact would be massive. +Exchange traded funds are vehicles meant for passive Investors of various asset classes. These shareholders also likely do not spend time tracking developments on bitcoin and are apathetic or unaware. The decision may also not be up to the shareholders of the ETF to make. As of the writing of the paper, the prospectus of BlackRock’s Bitcoin ETF (the largest ETF at the time of writing) currently says BlackRock will “use its sole discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Bitcoin network.” Furthermore, “the Sponsor may also disagree with Shareholders, the Bitcoin Custodian, other service providers, the Index Administrator, cryptocurrency platforms, or other market participants on what is generally accepted as bitcoin and should therefore be considered “bitcoin” for the Trust’s purposes.” “With respect to a fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event.”[^33] This suggests that the ETF Sponsor would neither be able to buy nor sell the second coin, simply choosing one coin for the ETF to hold and consider bitcoin. If the ETF Sponsor is allowed to act, their market impact would be massive. During a chain split, speed is important in addition to magnitude because the faster an investor acts, the faster Miners might allocate hashpower to one chain or another. If the fastest investor group acts within minutes and one coin trades disproportionately higher than the other, and if enough time passes before the next investor group can act the hashrate could have swung materially in favor of one coin instead of another. Even if the slower investor group supports the other coin, they might have to disproportionately show their preference to the market to catch up to the longest chain by hashrate. @@ -844,9 +844,6 @@ Stakeholders should remain engaged, stay informed about ongoing discussions, and To a long, healthy, prosperous bitcoin! -[^1]: https://blog.lopp.net/when-do-bitcoin-node-operators-upgrade/ -[^2]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/v0.6.0/src/main.cpp#L1281-L1283 -[^3]: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=63165.60 [^1]: https://blog.lopp.net/when-do-bitcoin-node-operators-upgrade/ [^2]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/v0.6.0/src/main.cpp#L1281-L1283 [^3]: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=63165.60