10_0_October_1925



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United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings
October, 1925
Edited by H. A. Baldridge
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U. S. Naval Institute
Publication Office: Menasha, Wisconsin
Editorial and Business Office: Annapolis, Maryland


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Any valve or fitting
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UNITED STATES
NAVAL INSTITUTE
PRO CE E DINGS
Vol. No. 51, No. 10
OCTOBER, 1925
WHOLE No. 272
Contents
GENTLEMEN, The Navy. By T. DOUGLAS ROBINSON, Assistant SEC-
RETARY OF THE NAVY....
1817
NAVY DAY. BY WALTER BRUCE Howe, NATIONAL (HAIRMAN, Navy
D AY, 1925 .................................................
1825
THE ELEMENTS OF SEA Power AND THE FUTURE OF THE NAVY. BY
ADMIRAL E. W. EBERLE, L'. S. Navy........
1832
PETROLEUM AND NATIONAL DEFENSE. BY REAR ADMIRAL H. P.
JONES, U. S. Navy........
1838
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS NECESSARY TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES. BY REAR ADMIRAL W. L.
RODGERS, U. S. Navy, RET........
1845
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS. BY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN A.
LEJEUNE, U. S. M. C., MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT, U. S.
M. C. ...
1858
SOME AVIATION FUNDAMENTALS. By REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM A.
MOFFETT, U, S. Navy....
1871
The Wise Man KNOWS His TOOLS. BY REAR ADMIRAL J. K. Rob-
ISON, U. S. NAVY, ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY............ 1882
THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN NAVY. BY CAP-
TAIN WALDO EVANS, U. S. Navy.....
1897
The ARRAY AGAINST SOVEREIGNTY. BY CAPTAIN WAT T. CLUVERIUS,
U. S. N AVY................................................. 1910
THE NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY. BY CAPTAIN PAUL FOLEY,
U . S. N A V Y .............................. ...................
1925
I'NIFIED PROCUREMENT OF GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT. By COMMANDER
E. E. WILSON, U. S. Navy....
1933
NEW LEASE OF LIFE FOR OLD IRONSIDES. BY HERMAN F. KRAFFT.... 1938
THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED MERCHANT MARINE. By LEIGH C. PALMER 1944
COMPARATIVE NAVAL DATA FOR THE TREATY NAVIES...
1954
DISCUSSION .......................................
1961
PROFESSIONAL NOTES ....
1967
NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS...
2036
BOOK REVIEWS .....
2045
SECRETARY'S NOTES ....
2047
The writers only are responsible for the contents of their respective articles.
Editor, Captain H. A. Baldridge; Assistant Editor, Lieutenant Com-
mander R. S. Field
Published monthly at 450 Ahnaip St., Menasha, Wis.
Executive, Editorial, and Business Offices, U. S. Naval Institute,
Annapolis, Md.
Entered as second-class matter at the post-office at Menasha, Wis.,
April 4, 1922, and at the post-office at Annapolis, Md., under Act of Aug. 24,
1912. Acceptance for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for
in section 1103, Act of Oct. 3, 1919, authorized Mar. 13, 1922.
Membership dues (including Proceedings). $3.00 a year.
Subscription Rates, $5.00 a year. (Foreign postage extra.) Single
copies, 50c.
Copyright, 1925, by U. S. Naval Institute


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OFFICERS OF THE INSTITUTE
President
REAR ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON, U. S. NAVY
Vice-President
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD H. JACKSON, U. S. Navy
Secretary-Treasurer
Cap Ain H. A. BALDRIDGE, U. S. Navy
Board of Control
REAR ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON, U. S. Navy (ex officio)
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD H. JACKSON, U. S. Navy (ex officio)
BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE RICHARDS, U, S. MARINE CORPS
CAPTAIN W. T. CLUVERIUS, U. S. Navy
CAPTAIN W. G. DUBOSE, (CC), U. S. Navy
Captain P. B. DUNGAN, U. S. Navy
COMMANDER BYRON MCCANDLESS, U. S. Navy
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER W. G. GREENMAN, U. S. Navy
CAPTAIN H. A. BALDRIDGE, U. S. Navy (ex officio)
PAST PRESIDENTS
ADMIRAL DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. Navy, 1873
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN L. WORDEN, U. S. Navy, 1874
REAR ADMIRAL C. R. P. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, 1875-78
COMMODORE FOXHALL A. PARKER, U. S. Navy, 1878-79
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS. U. S. Navy, 1870-82
REAR ADMIRAL C. R. P. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, 1882-83
REAR ADMIRAL THORNTON A. JENKINS, U. S. Navy, 1883-85
REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD SIMPSON, U. S. Navy, 1885-87
REAR ADMIRAL STEPHEN B. LUCE, U. S. Navy, 1887-98
REAR ADMIRAL WM. T. SAMPSON, U. S. Navy, 1898-1902
REAR ADMIRAL H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. NAVY, 1902-04
REAR ADMIRAL C. F. GOODRICH, U. S. Nayy, 1904-09
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. Navy, 1909-11
REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. Navy, 1911-23
Rear ADMIRAL WILLIAM L. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, 1923-24


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Foreword
The significance and purpose of Navy Day
have now become so well known to all officers
of the Navy and Marine Corps that no com-
ment is necessary other than to invite atten-
tion to the following pages, which have been
contributed by the respective authors. The
“Comparative Data for Treaty Navies”
will be found on page 1954.
The Board of Control has authorized this
Special Information Number in the hope
that it will assist in making our fellow citi-
zens better acquainted with their Navy.


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THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE “CONSTITUTION" AND "GUERRIERE"


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UNITED STATES
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P R O CE E D I N GS
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OCTOBER, 1925
WHOLE No. 272
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GENTLEMEN, THE NAVY!
By T. Douglas ROBINSON, Assistant SECRETARY Of the Navy
DRESIDENT COOLIDGE once said: “Great light is always
P shed on the question of what ought to be done by finding
out what has been done.”.
The Navy League of the United States is fostering again the ob-
servance of Navy Day on October 27. The date of October 27
was chosen because it is the anniversary of the birth of the late
President Roosevelt, so much of whose life was devoted to es-
tablishing a sound naval policy for this country. It was also on
October 27, 1775, that a special committee presented to the Con-
tinental Congress a bill providing for the construction of the first
ships of the Navy. The purposes of Navy Day are to explain
the past and present services of the Navy to the nation, and to
point out the important part that the Navy holds in our plan of
national life. It should be made clear that the Navy is our first
line of defense; that it is a protection to our rapidly increasing
commerce and our merchant ships, and is a form of national in-
surance that supports our foreign policies and operates to prevent
the causes that in the past have led to wars. The President, having
signified his approval, the Navy has promised to cooperate with
the Navy League, and will be “at home” on that day to our
people throughout the land.
No better opportunity is afforded the citizens of this great
Republic to "find out” the facts concerning the Navy, reviewing
what it has done, and seeing what it is doing.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Only through common understanding, trust, and confidence on
the part of the people can the Navy hope to accomplish success-
fully its many and important tasks. Far more dangerous than are
the projectiles from an enemy fleet are the false ideas concerning
the Navy's mission and its work, engendered in the minds of our
people through ignorant and misleading propaganda. The Navy
having made friends, seldom loses the friendships acquired.
To understand readily the raison d'être of our Navy, we must
necessarily review in our mind's eye the history of this Republic
from the beginning, the position that it holds in the world, the
part that our Navy played in attaining to this position, and the
part it now takes day by day in helping to maintain that position.
We are a "world power" with interests and obligations through-
out the seven seas. Through the medium of the Navy the life,
property, and the legitimate interests of you or me are afforded
a practical and effective insurance policy and protection whereso-
ever we choose to venture.
Supporting and fostering scientific endeavors in numerous fields,
the protector and friend of our merchant marine, carrying on im-
portant diplomatic missions, proceeding on errands of mercy to
earthquake stricken regions, a constant protector to our nationals
in distant lands—these and many other duties constitute the pay-
ing peace-time dividends from our National Life Insurance Policy,
the Navy.
President Coolidge, in an address to the graduating class of the
Naval Academy, recently stated: “If we are to heed the ad-
monition to put first things first, a very little deliberation would
reveal to us that one of the main essentials which lies at the very
beginning of civilization is that of security. It is only when people
can feel that their lives and the property which their industry has
produced today will continue to be safe on the morrow, that there
can be the stability of value and that economic progress on which
human development has always rested.”
Not only does the Navy afford the necessary protection to our
homes, cities, and towns from possible aggression, but it affords
the necessary protection to the products of our fields and industries
to their ultimate destination in foreign markets. Through the
Navy as agent, the federal government underwrites the American
farmer and manufacturer for the safe delivery of his products


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1819
Gentlemen, The Navy!
abroad. It is to be remembered that the Navy successfully under-
wrote the safe transportation of the American Army in the World
War, and landed that Army in France through submarine in-
fested waters without loss of life.
On reflecting upon the national naval policy of this country we
find, regardless of the fact that the personage in charge of the
executive branch of the government is changed every four or eight
years and represents first one political party and then another, that
there is a marked similarity of utterances from the lips of these
men, our presidents, concerning the importance of the American
Navy as a national agency and governmental department. In
considering the words of these great men we must bear in mind
certain things. First, that on taking office they execute a most
solemn oath: viz.,
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office
of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the constitution of the United States."
Further, they are elected to that high office by virtue largely of
previously announced policies or platforms, and that, ipso facto,
their election to office is indicative of the support of those policies
by the majority of the people. It therefore follows that the state-
ments of our presidents concerning the Navy are not alone the
personal views of the First Citizen, but virtually constitute the
reflected will and the voice of the people. As regards the per-
manency of national naval policy, we have but to compare the
words of our first president, in 1790, with those of the thirtieth
president, in 1925:
GEORGE WASHINGTON
January 8, 1790
To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving
peace.
December 7, 1796
To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and
ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the
necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent powers from com-
mitting such violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last,
leave no other option.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Calvin COOLIDGE
March 4, 1925
Our country represents nothing but peaceful intentions, but it ought not
to fail to maintain such a military force as comports with the dignity and
security of a great people. It should be conducted that all the world may
see in it but an instrument of security and peace.
Let us briefly sketch a review of our presidential announcements
on this matter :
GEORGE WASHINGTON
December 7, 1796
The art of war is at once comprehensive and complicated. It demands
much previous study, and the possession of it in its most improved and
perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation.
JOHN ADAMS
May 16, 1797
Naval power is the natural defense of the United States.
December 8, 1798
In demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war for the necessary
protection of our rights and honor we shall give no room to infer that
We abandon the desire of peace. Efficient preparation for war can alone in-
sure peace.
The beneficial effects of the small naval armament provided under the
acts of the last session are known and acknowledged. Perhaps no country
every experienced more sudden and remarkable advantages from any measure
of policy than we have derived from the arming of our maritime protec-
tion and defense. We ought without loss of time to lay the foundation
for an increase of our Navy to a sise sufficient to guard our coast and pro-
tect our trade. Such a naval force would afford the best means of general
defense.
December 3, 1799
A steady perseverance in a system of national defense commensurate
with our resources and the situation of our country is an obvious dictate of
wisdom, for nothing short of the power of repelling aggression will secure to
our country a rational prospect of escaping the calamities of war or national
degradation.
November 27, 1800
A navy, well organized, must constitute the natural and efficient defense of
this country against all foreign hostility.


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1925)
1821
Gentlemen, The Navy!
James Madison
May 25, 1813
The brilliant achievements of our infant Navy claim the highest praise
and the full recompense provided by Congress.
JAMES MONROE
January 30, 1824
Two great objects are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an
adequate naval force: The first, to prevent war so far as it may be practic-
able; the second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. No
government will be disposed to violate our rights if it knows we have the
means and are prepared and resolved to defend them.
John QUINCY ADAMS
December 6, 1825
A military marine is the only arm by which our power can be estimated
or felt by foreign nations, and the only standing military force which can
never be dangerous to our own liberty.
ANDREW JACKSON
March 4, 1829
The increase of our Navy, whose flag has displayed in distant climes our
skill in navigation and our fame in arms; the preservation of our forts,
arsenals, and dockyards, and the introduction of progressive improvements
in the discipline and science of both branches of our military service are so
plainly prescribed by prudence that I should be excused for omitting their
mention sooner than for enlarging on their importance.
December 8, 1829
Constituting, as the Navy does, the best standing security of this country
against foreign aggression, it claims the special attention of government,
and should continue to be cherished as the offspring of our national ex-
perience.
JOHN TYLER
December 7, 1841
Every effort will be made to add to the efficiency of the Navy, and I
cannot too strongly urge upon you liberal appropriations to that branch of
the public service.
James K. POLK
December 2, 1845
Our reliance for protection and defense on the land must be mainly on our
citisen soldiers, who will be ever ready, as they ever have been ready in


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(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
times past, to rush with alacrity at the call of their country to her defense.
This description of force, however, cannot defend our coast, harbors, and
inland seas, nor protect our commerce on the ocean or the lakes. These
must be protected by our Navy.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
December 8, 1863
The duties devolving on the naval branch of the service during the year,
and throughout the whole of this unhappy contest, have been discharged
with fidelity and eminent success.
The events of the war give an increased interest and importance to the
Navy, which will probably extend beyond the war itself.
U. S. GRANT
December 5, 1870
Separated by the ocean from the nations of the eastern continent, our
Navy is our only means of direct protection to our citizens abroad, or for
the enforcement of any foreign policy.
CHESTER A. ARTHUR
December 6, 1881
I cannot too strongly urge upon you my conviction that every consideration
of national safety, economy, and honor imperatively demands a thorough re-
habilitation of our Navy.
GROVER CLEVELAND
December 8, 1885
All must admit the importance of an effective Navy to a nation like ours.
BENJAMIN HARRISON
December 9, 1891
It is essential to the dignity of this nation and to that peaceful influence
which it should exercise on this hemisphere that its Navy should be ade-
quate, both upon the shores of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.
Grover CLEVELAND
December 3, 1894
During the past fiscal year there has been an unusual and pressing de-
mand in many quarters of the world for the presence of vessels to guard
American interests.


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1925]
1823
Gentlemen, The Navy!
William McKINLEY
December 5, 1899
The Navy has maintained the spirit and high efficiency which have al-
ways characterized that service, and has lost none of the gallantry in heroic
action which has signalized its brilliant and glorious past. The nation
has equal pride in its early and later achievements. Its habitual readiness
for every emergency has won the confidence and admiration of the coun-
try. The people are interested in the continued preparation and prestige
of the Navy and will justify liberal appropriations for its maintenance and
improvement. The officers have shown peculiar adaptation for the per-
formance of new and delicate duties which our recent war has imposed.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
December 3, 1901
The work of upbuilding the Navy must be steadily continued. No one
point of our policy, foreign or domestic, is more important than this to
the honor and material welfare, and, above all, to the peace of our nation
in the future. Whether we desire it or not, we must henceforth recognize
that we have international duties no less than international rights. Even if
our flag were hauled down in the Philippines and Porto Rico, even if we
decided not to build the Isthmian Canal, we should need a thoroughly
trained Navy of adequate size, or else be prepared definitely and for all time
to abandon the idea that our nation is among those whose sons go down to
the sea in ships. Unless our commerce is always to be carried in foreign
bottoms, we must have war craft to protect it.
Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine and to insist upon it
as the one sure means of securing the peace of the Western Hemisphere.
The Navy offers us the only means of making our insistence upon the
Monroe Doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation
chooses to disregard it. We desire the peace which comes as of right to
the just man armed, not the peace granted on terms of ignominity to the
craven and the weakling.
December 3, 1906
The United States Navy is the surest guarantor of peace which this
country possesses.
WILLIAM HOWARD Taft
December 6, 1912
The world's history has shown the importance of sea power both for
adequate defense and for the support of important and definite policies.


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1824
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
WOODROW WILSON
December 8, 1914
A powerful navy we have always regarded as our proper and natural
means of defense, and it has always been of defense that we have thought,
never of aggression or of conquest. But who shall tell us now what sort of
a Navy to build? We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas, in the
future as in the past; and there will be no thought of offense or of pro-
vocation in that. Our ships are our natural bulwarks.
WARREN GAMALIEL HARDING
July 27, 1923
We owe it to ourselves to understand that the Navy is rather more than
a mere instrumentality of warfare. It is the right arm of the Department
of State, seeing to the enforcement of its righteous pronouncements. It
guards the security of American citizens wherever they are, the world over.
One could not fully reverence his flag if he did not feel that its unfolding
meant security for Americans wherever they seek its proper protection.
It has our colors afloat today almost everywhere on the seven seas-at
Smyrna to offer proper restraint and relief; in Chinese waters to make for
security; in all waters to urge tranquility and maintain righteousness;
and with it all to emphasize our confidence in ourselves and our sense of
obligation at home.
Calvin CoolidGE
December 6, 1923
A people who neglect their national defense are putting in jeopardy their
national honor.
It is fitting that we should on Navy Day reflect upon the per-
manency of our national naval policy and that not only the Navy
but the people should pause to consider "what ought to be done by
finding out what has been done."


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NAVY DAY
By Walter Bruce Howe, NationAL CHAIRMAN, Navy Day,
1925
TAVY DAY was first sponsored by the Navy League of the
I United States, a volunteer association of individuals, who
seek to place information concerning the Navy before
the public, and since that time the official approval and cooperation
of practically all patriotic and veterans' organizations have been
offered in support of the observance of the day.
The sponsors of Navy Day have sought to establish at least one
day in the year when the people will turn their thoughts in a
special way to what their Navy means to them, when special ar-
ticles will be timely in the press, and when tribute can be paid to
the past and present services of the Navy to the nation.
October 27 has been celebrated as Navy Day because it is the
anniversary of the birth of President Theodore Roosevelt, so
much of whose life was devoted to establishing a sound naval
policy for the United States of America. It will be remembered
that President Roosevelt first achieved a national reputation by
writing a naval history of the war of 1812, a work of such merit
that it was incorporated into Clowe's Royal Navy, a monumental
history of the British sea service. Later, as Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, and finally, as president, Roosevelt bent his tre-
mendous energies to impress upon the American people the neces-
sity for an adequate navy, and through his leadership to realize
this ideal.
October 27 is also the birthday of the American Navy because on
that day in 1775, the first resolution to authorize American war-
ships was introduced into the Continental Congress, which measure
was passed three days later.
Navy Day was first celebrated in 1922, at which time President
Harding, in endorsing the observance, wrote:
From our earliest national beginnings the Navy has always been, and
deserved to be, an object of special pride to the American people. Its


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From a photograph copyrighted by H. Havelock Pierce
THEODORE ROOSEVELT


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1925]
1827
Navy Day
record is indeed one to inspire such sentiments and I am very sure that
such a commemoration as is planned will be a timely reminder.
It is well for us to have in mind that under a program of lessening navy
armaments there is a greater reason for maintaining the highest efficiency,
fitness, and morale in this branch of the national defensive service.
In connection with the first observance, Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes wrote:
The celebration of Navy Day has my hearty approval. This government
has taken the lead in securing the reduction of naval armament, but the
navy that we retain under the agreement should be maintained with efficient
personnel and pride in the service. It is essential that we should maintain
the relative naval strength of the United States. That, in my judgment, is
the way to peace and security. It will be upon that basis that we would
enter any future conference or make agreements for limitation, and it would
be folly to undermine our position.
President Coolidge said in connection with Navy Day in 1923:
Our country has undertaken, as its proper contribution to ameliorating
the burdens of armament in the world, to place certain strict limits on our
naval establishment. In view of these, which it need not be said will
always be strictly observed, it becomes desirable that the highest efficiency,
in men and material, be maintained.
The Navy is the first line of defense. Our national situation makes it
peculiarly important to us, for we have never been committed to the policy
of a large army, relying, to a greater extent than less-favored countries
might, on the advantage of our location and our confidence in an adequate
navy.
This traditional devotion of the Navy to the highest usefulness and effi-
ciency makes it especially fitting that Navy Day be so observed as to show
the country's appreciation of this splendid service.
It is interesting to know that the first observance of the day re-
ceived the endorsements of Senator Lodge, who served along with
Secretary Hughes as a delegate to the Washington Conference
for the Limitation of Armaments, of the governors of thirty-four
states, and literally hundreds of senators, representatives, and
other prominent men and women throughout the country. Since
then the day has met with very general approval as an appropriate
occasion to pay a deserved tribute to the naval service.
The Navy is brought to the attention of the people many times
throughout the year in various ways, especially in press dispatches,
but these usually deal with only one or another of the phases of
the work the Navy is doing. Apart from Navy Day, there is


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
little opportunity to place before the public some thought of the
fundamental reasons why we maintain a navy.
The Navy has always entered wholeheartedly into the ob-
servance of the day. Naval vessels visit cities along the coasts and
up navigable rivers, wherever these visits do not interfere ma-
terially with the training and employment of the fleet. Visitors are
received on ships and at shore stations, and every opportunity is
given the people to view their Navy at first hand. The oppor-
tunity to visit ships of the Navy is highly prized. Over 350,000
visitors were received on board the vessels which visited Atlantic
ports on Navy Day, 1924.
The press has been almost unanimous in encouraging a better
understanding of the Navy. Editorials were received in connec-
tion with Navy Day, 1922, from newspapers with an aggregate
circulation of over 12,000,000. Over 95 per cent approved the
celebration. This splendid praise of the naval service has mounted
annually until the circulation heard from in 1924 exceeded
18,000,000 copies.
Navy Day, 1922, following as it did the notable accomplishment
of the Washington Conference, was made an occasion to emphasize
the importance of the conference to the country and at the same
time to point out to the American people that there is a negative
as well as a positive implication of the treaties which grew out of
the conference.
So many people hold the erroneous idea that the Navy is only
the instrument of war, that attention was concentrated the next
two years on explaining the great peace-time value of the Navy;
how naval contracts with their exacting specifications have been
largely responsible for the development of the manufacture of
steel in this country, which has enormously benefited people in all
walks of life; how the Navy charts the seas and helps to keep
the ocean lanes free from derelicts, icebergs, and other menaces to
navigation; how the clocks of the nation are set from the Naval
Observatory. The great service the Navy has rendered to hu-
manity in disasters, such as those in Smyrna and Japan, was
pointed out.
Among the points which the sponsors hope to indicate this year
is the fact that for the great protection and service which the
Navy renders, it does not cost an excessive amount in taxation.


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Navy Day
The appropriation for the maintenance of the Navy for the year
1925-26 was $289,000,000. The appropriation for the year
1914-15 was over $140,000,000. At first glance this doubling
of the cost of the Navy is startling. The two years offer a fair
basis of comparison because the 1914 appropriations were made
before there was any indication of the World War, and this
year's appropriations were made on the assumption that this coun-
try at least has returned to a peace basis. Why, then, should our
naval costs have doubled in eleven years ?
The difference in the purchasing power of the dollar counts
for practically all of the increase. Figures compiled by the De-
partment of Labor and released on July 25, 1925, show that the
cost of living has increased 73.5 per cent in the last eleven years.
This figure is arrived at by averaging the cost of a long list of the
necessities of life.
The largest single item in the naval appropriation is the pay and
upkeep of personnel. Naval pay has been increased, which in-
crease, however, has not kept pace with the increased pay in
civilian industries. The cost of food stuffs, clothing, and housing
facilities furnished naval personnel, the cost of labor in navy
yards, and construction costs on naval vessels have all increased
because these products are bought in competitive markets.
If we take the index figure furnished by the Labor Department,
we find that $289,000,000 in 1925 has approximately the same pur-
chasing power as $165,000,000 in 1914. There has, therefore, been
an actual increase in the naval appropriations, based on purchas-
ing power, of about 17 per cent.
Considering that the United States maintained the Navy in 1914
far inferior to her standing in world affairs, it would seem that
this increase is very modest indeed. In 1912, the national wealth
was estimated at $186,000,000,000, making us the wealthiest
country in the world. Our foreign trade amounted to little less
than $4,000,000,000 annually. Of this less than 10 per cent was
carried in American bottoms. Our coast line, then as now, was
one of the most extensive in the world not to mention the defense
problems presented by the Panama Canal which is an essential ele-
ment in the defense plans of this country. There were, then as
now, the Philippine Islands lying 7,000 miles from our shore, to


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which we have accorded the protection of the American flag. With
this situation in world affairs, however, the United States Navy
was a bad third, with Great Britain first, and Germany second.
The population of continental United States was then 98,000,000.
Our population today is 115,000,000, an increase of 17 per cent.
Our national wealth is estimated at $350,000,000,000. Keeping
in mind the reduced purchasing power of the dollar, the national
wealth has kept pace with the growth of population. Our foreign
trade is now well over $8,000,000,000 annually. On the basis of
the adjusted dollar, as well as on the basis of tonnage, this is an
increase of over 25 per cent. What is most important, nearly 40
per cent of this foreign trade is carried in ships of American
registry.
One of the most important and least realized functions of the
Navy is to protect our commerce in peace and in war. It is a
function that is lost sight of by those who advocate purely a coast-
defense policy for this country.
A few air enthusiasts who have declared that surface warships
are obsolete lose sight of the impracticability of the prohibitive
cost of stationing airplanes all over the world to protect our
merchant marine.
In 1914 there were about $2,500,000,000 of American capital
invested in foreign countries, practically all of which was repre-
sented by investments in Canada and Latin America. Today
American capital in excess of $25,000,000,000 is invested abroad,
of which amount $12,000,000,000 were loaned by the United
States Treasury to foreign governments.
Still keeping in mind that it takes $1.73 now to buy as much
as a dollar would buy in 1913, we have the following figures :
our population has increased 17 per cent; our national wealth,
over 17 per cent; our foreign trade, 25 per cent; the amount of
American trade carried in American ships, 400 per cent; the
amount of American capital invested abroad, 1,000 per cent. In
the meantime, the cost of the Navy has increased 17 per cent.


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“GUARDING THE GIANT" FROM A PAINTING BY BURNELL POOLE
U.S.S. McCall depicted escorting the transport Olympic with the U.S.S. Stockton out ahead of the Olympic.


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THE ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER AND THE
FUTURE OF THE NAVY
BY ADMIRAL E. W. EBERLE, U. S. Navy, Chief of NAVAL
OPERATIONS
CINCE the day the ship made possible the transportation of
merchandise by sea the great nations of the world have been
found among those having extensive coast lines. History
proves that world power is measured by sea power and that na-
tional prosperity can continue only so long as a nation is willing
to maintain its sea power commensurate with its prosperity.
What are the fundamental factors of sea power?
They are:
1. Naval strength sufficient to insure free movement of na-
tional sea-borne trade.
2. A merchant marine of sufficient size and suitable charac-
teristics to carry the nation's products to the markets of
the world, to bring from such markets the products re-
quired for national prosperity, and, in time of war, to
carry on essential war time trade and to furnish auxil-
iaries and transportation for naval and army forces.
3. A sufficient number of well located and suitably equipped
and defended bases throughout the world, to afford sup-
port and protection to commerce, and operating bases for
the fleet.
In recent years the people of the United States have come to
realize the necessity for an American merchant marine, and the
government, by its support of the Shipping Board and Emergency
Fleet Corporation, has shown its appreciation of the value of the
merchant marine as a fundamental factor of sea power.
The value of a merchant marine increases with each restriction
in naval armaments. If war ships were abolished, the merchant
marines of the nations would have the potential power of navies.
It is, therefore, essential that the people of this nation realize that


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Elements of Sea Power
restriction in naval armament imposes the necessity for a stronger
merchant marine.
In respect to well located and suitably equipped and defended
bases, the United States is badly handicapped by the fact that most
of the best bases of the world were in the hands of comparatively
strong nations when the United States was founded. For many
years our traditional policy of isolation prevented attempts to
obtain suitable bases.
As a result of the war with Spain, the United States came into
possession of the Philippines and Porto Rico and, through the
aroused nationalism resulting from that war, entered into an era
of industrial and commercial activity which placed it in the fore-
front of world powers.
Thirty years ago we had no possessions outside of the conti-
nental United States except Alaska. Since that time we have ac-
quired the Philippines, Samoa, Guam, Hawaiian Islands, Porto
Rico, Panama Canal Zone, Guantanamo, and the Virgin Islands.
While it cannot be said that many of these were obtained with a
view to their use as bases, the change in policy which permitted
their acquisition was the result of a tardy recognition of the value
of bases as a factor of sea power.
The third fundamental factor of sea power is naval strength.
What is naval strength ?
In the days when the word "navy” became of general use,
weapons and ships were primitive. Control of sea communications
could be exercised only by the surface ships. As a result of this
condition the word navy was applied to forces composed of ships
alone, and even in the present day, has, to most people, this re-
stricted meaning. As a result of this restricted interpretation, the
reason for a navy has, to some extent, been lost sight of, and we
now find a tendency, as indicated by the air service advocates,
to confine the equipment of the Navy to ships and that which can
be operated from ships.
Efficiency in these modern days is measured by two factors:
first, tools or equipment suitable to the performance of the task;
second, skill in use of such tools or equipment. But, before tools
can be selected or skill acquired there must be a definite assignment
of a task. The task assigned to the Navy in war is the control of
vital lines of sea communication. The tools required are surface


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ships, submarines, and aircraft. The necessary skill can be ac-
quired only by using these tools in cooperation.
If the Navy is to perform its task effectively there must be an
acceptance of a broad definition of the word navy. The people
and the government must recognize that the Navy is that branch
of the national defense which is charged with the control of vital
lines of sea communications. This is a distinct branch of na-
tional defense and, whereas, in the past surface ships have been
the chief tools, it should be recognized that with changes in the
methods of conducting war the tools may change. The Navy
must comprise such types of vessels and equipment as are best
fitted to accomplish its task. Any weapons or equipment, or any
types of forces which can be used effectively in the accomplish-
ment of its task, legitimately belong to the Navy.
This principle has been recognized in the past by the organiza-
tion of the Marine Corps to assist the Navy in defending or
seizing temporary bases for fleet operations and in the provision
of shore establishments for the construction of ships, guns, tor-
pedoes, and so forth; the manufacture of experimental aircraft,
the preparation of charts and books (such as the Nautical Al-
manac) used in navigation of ships and by aircraft engaged in
oversea flights.
It is equally applicable to the use by the Navy of aircraft based
on shore. Whether or not such aircraft should be operated by
the Navy depends entirely on the function they are to perform.
Aircraft operating with a view to the control of sea communica-
tions must be coordinated in their operations with vessels engaged
in similar duties, and with the control and routing of shipping
which is a naval function.
The NAVAL FORCES
The naval forces of the nation are divided into three major
subdivisions, the fleet, the naval transportation service, and local
defense forces.
The Fleet.–Capital ship strength is limited by treaty and no
further capital ship construction can be undertaken before 1931.
The tonnage of aircraft carriers of more than 10,000 tons dis-
placement is also limited, but the United States, even when the
Saratoga and Lexington are completed, will not be up to allowed


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Elements of Sea Power
strength. The construction of additional aircraft carrier tonnage
must be undertaken if the Navy is to maintain the proper air
strength of the fleet.
In modern cruisers the United States Navy is far below its
proper strength. This type is limited in size and armament by
the treaty, but there is no restriction as to numbers. To attain
a cruiser ratio with Great Britain and Japan, the same as that
accepted for capital ships, we need twenty additional cruisers of
10,000 tons displacement.
In submarines the United States is superior in vessels of the
coastal type, but is much inferior in vessels capable of operating
with the fleet. The need for large submarines is urgent.
The operation of destroyers simulating war conditions con-
tinues to emphasize the need for destroyer leaders. Although
we possess a superiority in destroyers, many of these vessels are
old and none has been authorized since 1917. Japan is building
destroyers superior to our destroyers in size, speed, and arma-
ment. Newspaper reports indicate that Great Britain will adopt
a plan for constructing nine destroyers yearly. The superiority
we now possess will rapidly diminish with time, and with the
new construction of destroyers by Great Britain and Japan.
In naval aviation the developments during the past year have
been greater than ever before. The increase in the number of
planes capable of operations with the fleet has permitted the fur-
ther development of standard practice instructions for aircraft
operations, and tactical exercises have furnished opportunities
for the operation of aircraft in the simulation of war.
Preparations are being made to place the Lexington and Sara-
toga in commission with full aviation completements during 1926.
Three navy planes are preparing for a flight from the west
coast to Hawaii. This is the longest non-stop flight ever attempted
over the sea. The planes to be employed are of two designs de-
veloped by the Navy for scouting purposes.
The Secretary of the Navy has directed that a course in aviation
shall constitute part of the Naval Academy curriculum. In the
case of the class of 1926 a portion of this class will take the
course after graduation but before assignment to duty, while one
third of the class has completed the ground school course this
summer. This course should provide officers with a knowledge of


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
aviation and it is hoped that it will increase interest and requests
for further training in aviation.
During the past year the high standard of efficiency in gunnery
and engineering performances has been maintained. Tactical,
strategical, and joint army and navy exercises have been conducted.
The joint army and navy exercises conducted in the Hawaiian
Islands during April, 1925, was the most extensive exercise of
this nature ever conducted by United States forces and afforded
excellent training for large units of the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps.
The Naval Transportation Service.—It is impracticable to main-
tain in the Navy in time of peace the great number of auxiliaries,
storeships, tankers, colliers, and so forth required during war for
the supply and transportation of army and navy forces. The
merchant marine constitutes the source from which the govern-
ment may obtain such vessels. The vessels so obtained during
war are assigned to the fleet or to the naval transportation service.
Because of the menace of the submarine during the World War,
the Navy took over and manned the greater portion of all United
States vessels engaged in transportation of troops and stores for
our forces abroad. At one period during the World War the
number of ships operated by the naval transportation service
reached the enormous total of 558.
It will be seen from the above that the merchant marine is a
most important factor in sea power. Without adequate supply
our fleet is limited to its radius of action from some well stocked
naval base. With an adequate supply of fuel, food, and other
necessities the fleet can operate anywhere in the world, so long as
the lines of communication can be controlled.
The Local Defense Forces comprise the vessels and aircraft
operating under the commandants of naval districts for the pro-
tection of coastal sea areas. This includes a service of information
to determine the presence of enemy forces, and combat forces to
destroy any enemy forces located.
The local defense forces are concerned only with the defense
against secondary operation. Against primary or major opera-
tions the fleet would be used.
There has been an attempt to remove from naval jurisdiction
all aircraft based on shore. Such policy is based upon a consid-


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Elements of Sea Power
eration of the type of weapons to be employed and not on the
result to be accomplished, and is unsound.
The Navy requires aircraft for use from shore bases as a part
of the naval local defense forces and may further require them in
support of the fleet against a superior fleet. Such air forces are
a legitimate part of the naval force and the Navy would be reduced
in efficiency for the performance of its task if these were removed
from navy jurisdiction.
Unity of command over all forces employed in a given operation
or for the accomplishment of a definite task was one of the great
lessons of the World War which should not be forgotten.
The Future of the United States Navy.—If the people of the
United States forget the value of sea power as they did after the
Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Civil War, the future of
the Navy is not bright; but if the value of sea power is recognized
as it was after the war with Spain, and the nation enters into a
period of prosperity such as followed that war, the Navy should
have a brilliant future. Then the Navy will be recognized as a
branch of the government charged with a particular task.
The future of the Navy may be said to rest upon the indoctrina-
tion of the people of the nation with three fundamental truths :
First: National strength and prosperity depend upon the main-
tenance of adequate sea power.
Second: Sea power comprises the Navy, the merchant marine,
and suitable bases.
Third: The Navy is that branch of the national defense charged
with the control of communications by sea irrespective of whether
such control is exercised by surface ships, submarines, or aircraft.


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PETROLEUM AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
By Rear ADMIRAL H. P. JONES, U. S. Navy, CHAIRMAN
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, GENERAL BOARD
IN APPROACHING the subject of national defense from any
| angle, it is necessary to keep clearly in mind the real meaning
of the term. Unfortunately, it is the general tendency of the
man in the street to think of national defense in terms of coast
and territorial defense only, whereas, for us at least, this, in reality,
is a comparatively small and the most easily cared for part of our
national defense. Due to our geographical location, any possible
enemies, if such there may be, in order to attack our homeland,
must cross wide expanses of ocean, entailing operations organized
on an enormous scale and carried out in face of practically over-
whelming odds.
National defense in its real sense means defense of our lines
of communication across the seas, our commerical interests, our
rights as a neutral sanctioned by international law in wars not our
own, the lives and property of our nationals wherever they may be,
and our outlying possessions as well as the defense of our coast
and continental territory. The disruption of our commerical in-
tercourse with the rest of the world by cutting our lines of com-
munication across the seas would bring incalculable harm to our
social and economic life. Therefore, it may be truly and fairly
said that national defense means defense of the whole of our
structure of life, both political and economic. It should be remem-
bered that the World War was not won by defeating the German
armed forces, but by the breaking down of the national morale
due to economic conditions back of the Hindenburg line. This
was brought about very largely by the blockade that disrupted
Germany's lines of communication overseas. Since the Napoleonic
Wars, warfare has become more and more a national movement,
until now it calls for the mobilization of practically whole na-
tions—industrial as well as man power—for its prosecution. Its
effects are felt in the remotest hamlet of the country, even though


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Petroleum and National Defense
not a single one of its men may be actually enrolled in the fighting
forces.
It is often affirmed that the United States is self-supporting to
the extent that we can live entirely upon the products of the coun-
try and are not dependent on foreign commodities except for non-
necessities. This is an erroneous and a dangerous doctrine, for,
while it may be true that a part of the population in the country
can survive on what is raised on the farms for a season and even,
in the last analysis, on roots and herbs, our enormous urban and
industrial population would soon be brought to the verge of starva-
tion if deprived of the many necessities that come from outside.
Unquestionably, lack of many key commodities such as, for in-
stance, rubber, manganese ore, tin, and so forth, not produced
within our borders but which must be brought from overseas,
would so disrupt the economic and industrial life of the nation
that incalculable misery would result, even to the point of national
defeat, although our actual armed forces may still be unconquered
and our shores untouched by the foot of a foe. When we envisage
this true meaning of national defense, we must realize the absolute
necessity of preserving our communications with the rest of the
world at all times and in all circumstances.
It is a fundamental truth that the power to keep open the lines
along which its commerce is carried is necessary to the commercial
life and prosperity of a nation that is engaged in trade outside of
its own borders. At the present time and as far into the future as
human vision can reach such lines of communication are, and will
continue to be, on the surface of the sea. Therefore, sea power
will be necessary to keep such lines of communication open. The
two most important elements of sea power are: (a) a powerful
and efficient navy; (b) a merchant marine adequate to the task of
carrying on the nation's trade and of supplying its fleet in time
of war.
An absolutely inescapable requisite to the fulfilment of the mis-
sions of the fleet and the merchant marine is that the ships shall
be able to move upon the sea.
It is needless to trace the development of the motive power of
ships from the oars of the Phænician galleys to the steam turbine
and Diesel engine of today—from human brawn and muscle to


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1840
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
hydrocarbon fuel, whether raw coal or petroleum products, as the
source of power. Suffice it to say that the galley has wholly dis-
appeared and the sailing ship is almost gone from the sea. Possibly
we are even now passing from the age of steam to the age of the
internal combustion engine, and it may be that the giant turbines
of the Leviathan will be an anachronism on the sea in a few years.
The transition from coal to oil as fuel has been demanded by
commercial carriers due to the greater radius of action, economy
of labor, more rapid turn-around on voyages, and other causes
made possible by use of oil. In the case of naval vessels the rea-
sons for the transition are even more compelling. Therefore, coal
as a fuel for sea-borne traffic of all kinds is being rapidly super-
seded by oil, even for steam-driven plants. The further transition
from steam to the internal combustion engine drive is the demand
made by commerce today for the same reasons as given above for
the transition from coal to oil. This rapid conversion of commer-
cial carriers to the internal combustion engine drive intimately
concerns the Navy in that it vitally affects the operating problems
of the fleet, rendering liquid fuel more and more a necessity in
time of war. In the case of steam-driven machinery the conver-
sion from coal to oil as fuel or vice versa is a comparatively simple
process, involving only changes in boilers, furnaces, auxiliaries,
and bunker spaces, the machinery plant as a whole remaining prac-
tically the same; whereas the change from liquid to solid fuel, in
the case of internal combustion engine drive, would necessitate an
entire change in the whole machinery plant, involving an almost
complete interior reconstruction of the ship. In view of the fact
that the supply requirements of the Navy in an oversea campaign
in war will include fully 65 per cent of the whole deep water ton-
nage under the American flag (includes 80 per cent of all tanker
tonnage) the problem of supply would be prohibitively complicated
if the transportation of two kinds of fuel were involved. There-
fore, although many of the vessels of the fleet itself are steam
driven, the fuel should be liquid and raw coal should not be con-
sidered. In addition to navy requirements it must be remembered
that the whole army service of supply, involving movements of
troops, artillery, ammunition, provisions, and so forth, is practi-
cally, and all aerial operations of both services are absolutely,
dependent upon petroleum products for fuel, lubrication, and so


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Petroleum and National Defense
forth. From whatever angle the situation may be viewed, petro-
leum and petroleum products are becoming more and more basic-
ally essential to the life of the nation.
There is nothing in sight or even on the distant horizon that
will either take the place of petroleum or materially reduce the
amount we need. The prophecy so often heard that something
will be found to take its place when our supply is exhausted is a
mere draft upon imagination and a fatuous willingness to leave
our future economic independence in time of peace, or possibly
our very political existence in time of war, to the hazards of
chance.
There are many who lull themselves with the belief that foreign
sources will be at our command at all times and that we shall have
the price to pay. This argues a child-like faith in the commercial
altruism of our trade competitors in time of peace and ignores
such details as the hazards of the sea, hostile operations, questions
of the neutrality of the sources of supply, and so forth, in time of
war. That an ample supply should be available within our own
continental borders in time of war needs no argument. The com-
modily so absolutely vital to the very existence of the nation must
not be dependent upon foreign supply and overseas transportation,
else disaster and defeat will be inevitable, for even if there were
overseas sources upon which we could draw freely without inter-
national complications as to violations of neutrality, and so forth,
it would be necessary to call so heavily on the fleet for protection
of the lines of communication that the armed forces in the actual
combatant area must needs be seriously depleted.
What we need and should have are huge ground reserves of oil
capable of being drawn upon without delay to supply the petroleum
products needed by the armed forces and industries in the event
of war, and a sufficient amount of overground storage to take care
of our week to week needs. It is yet possible for the United States
to have this vast reserve of petroleum stored in its natural reser-
voirs, thereby insuring safety and low cost, and capable of quick
delivery to our seaports and industrial centers without the risk of
ocean transportation. But, we must remember that petroleum,
like other mineral raw materials, is a wasting asset. No other
mineral among those essential to the well-being of the country
has shown so rapid an increase in production and also in rate of


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1842
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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
depletion. The question is, how long can we keep up the pace we
are going and still have any reserve stored in the natural reser-
voirs ?
There are too many who comfort themselves with the thought
that there is an adequate ground reserve of petroleum in the United
States to take care of our needs as far into the future as we need
look, but this has no evidence of being based on anything more
than a mere guess, and that guess is contrary to all scientific in-
vestigation. The authoritative estimates by geologists that the
original supply of petroleum in the United States is more than
forty per cent gone should give us pause in the wild scramble for
oil that is going on at present.
In spite of the persistent warnings and earnest pleadings of
geologists and others whose prision reaches beyond the immediate
present, we have been, and still continue to be, criminally wasteful
of this most vital asset that, once gone, can never be built up again.
From 1906 to 1923 the production of crude oil increased by leaps
and bounds, but by the end of the latter year it began to decline
and in 1924 showed a decrease of 2 per cent from that of 1923.
Consumption has increased somewhat faster than production and
continues to increase in ever greater ratio. The following figures
will tell somewhat of the amazing story of oil. The years 1920,
1923, and 1924 are chosen as generally typical of production and
consumption of petroleum in barrels of forty-two gallons.
1920 1923 1924
Production of crude petroleum ........442,929,000 732,407,000 714,000,000
Imports from Mexico' .... ......... 106,163,000 79,354,000 73,981,000
Imports from all other sources ........ 12,000 2,661,000 3,796,000
Domestic consumption ................530,532,000 714,316,000 748,082,000
Pipe line and tank farm stocks (com-
mercial storage) as of December 31 ..
334,774,000 352,896,000
Average recovery of gasoline ........ 26 per cent
33 per cent
It was estimated that the recoverable crude oil remaining in the
ground within the continental limits of the United States in 1922
was 9,150,000,000 barrels. Of course, this estimate may be con-
sidered a guess, but it is a scientific guess based on studies of
geological formations with relation to their petroleum possibilities.
When it is realized that only 25 per cent of the oil in the sands is
recovered, some idea may be formed of our present wasteful


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Petroleum and National Defense
methods of production. It is, indeed, a sad commentary on our
methods of production that such is the case. New fields may be
found and sinking of wells deeper to reach lower strata of oil-
bearing sands naturally will prolong somewhat the life of our oil
supply, but, even if we should double the amount as estimated in
1922, which is a liberal hope to say the least, the end of our oil
supply is not far off. The statement of an English speaker not
long since, that in a few years we should be driven to British
sources for our oil supply, and that when that time comes the
United States will pay back to Great Britain far more than Great
Britain owes the United States, will not be far from the truth if
we continue wastefully to use up our petroleum reserves as we
are doing at the present time.
In the last resort the optimist points to our shale beds as justifi-
cation for the reckless dissipation of our ground reserves. In
reality this cannot be reconciled with commonplace wisdom any
more than to say that we would be justified in wastefully using the
anthracite coal beds of Pennsylvania because there are large de-
posits of bituminous coal in Colorado and Alaska. However, this
does not mean that serious attention should not be given to the
production of oil from other sources than from wells, such as the
shales, distillates of coal, and so forth. But, production from these
sources or on anything like a quantity basis is yet in the experi-
mental stage and it is exceedingly dangerous to trust our national
security to a hope that, like the pot of gold at the base of the rain-
bow, may never materialize or, at best, may not have been devel-
oped when the unforeseen hour of need strikes.
Surely "adequate supply and reasonable conservation” are not
antagonistic terms and the writer believes that when the great oil
producers of the country meet the President's Oil Conservation
Commission in a truly patriotic spirit, means will be found to meet
current demands and at the same time secure ground reserves of
oil for the nation's needs that will be an insurance against war and
a fair assurance of victory if, unhappily, war should be forced
upon us.


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Photograph by Burnell Poole
U.S.S. "NEVADA" AND DOWNTOWN MANHATTAN


  p. 1845 (#789)                      #

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS NECESSARY TO
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE
OF THE UNITED STATES:
By REAR ADMIRAL W. L. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, Ret.
IN A MESSAGE to Congress, George Washington, President
I of the United States, said:
To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserv-
ing peace.
There is a rank due the United States among nations which will be
withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire
to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace,
one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be
known that we are at all times ready for war.
The changing conditions of social life have not changed for us
the essential truth of that great man's message to his fellow
countrymen, for new conditions have not altered the nature of
man. The litany of the church prays, “From the violence of our
enemies, Good Lord, deliver us.” But, God helps those who help
themselves, and we must use our own strength and our own efforts
as well as rely upon the Lord. It is vain to hope that others will
exert themselves in our behalf if we ourselves remain passive. If
some strong nation seeks advantage over us by war, new inter-
national law for peace will not aid much, for among those who
should enforce the law will be the very ones who hope to gain by
assailing us.
It is contended that the armed forces of the United States are
necessary to its industrial security. It is proposed, therefore, to
indicate, first, what our industrial position is with regard to the
rest of the world, and how others look at it and at ourselves; and
secondly, how we may preserve in safety our present favorable
economic situation. We all want peace with security and the
enjoyment of the fruits of our labor: as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence puts it, we are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
* Debate in New York, March 15, 1925.


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happiness. As individuals, we expect that for ourselves, and as
a nation, we must not be seduced into accepting less for the coun-
try. We do not know what fortune our pursuit of happiness will
bring to each one of us, but assuredly, we need liberty for that
pursuit. As individuals, we now have liberty under protection of
the law, which itself is backed by the police, by the courts, and
by the jails, and, as a nation, we shall have liberty-economic
liberty—only under the protection of our own strength. Liberty
and security are not always compatible with peace. For this great
nation of ours, its security requires armies and navies to protect
its coasts from bombardment and our soil from invasion; and,
moreover, we must preserve ability to protect our national eco-
nomic policies from annulment and our standards of living from
interference by envious nations. The essential object of this
discussion is that we must maintain armed force in order to retain
freedom in our business relations with the rest of the world without
dictation from nations wielding greater force, perhaps without
even-handed justice.
As for our position in the international world, our first fore-
fathers came here three centuries ago, and after a few years of
hardship while establishing their footing, they and their descend-
ants to this day have lived in ease which other countries do not
enjoy. As we all know, all men are supported either directly or
indirectly from the products of the soil. Here, abundance of land
has made life less toilsome than for most communities. All of the
people of Europe have sent forth their emigrants, drawn here by
our prosperity consequent upon unoccupied land.
Now, the western frontier of two generations ago no longer
exists and new land is less readily secured. Instinctively, we feel
that all of the land now occupied will be needed by ourselves for
our children; and for long, the immigration laws have been in-
creasing in stringency in deference to this instinctive impulse.
Recently our thought has passed from instinct to reason, and we
are resolved to hold this land of ours for ourselves; or at least,
if admitting others, only to do so upon our own restrictive terms.
But, this decision puts us in conflict with the wishes and policies
of other nations, who, urged by poverty and by pressure of popu-
lation, wish to send their sons to share our prosperity, even
against our will. If we yield to those whose policy is to maintain


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an unrestricted birth rate and export their surplus population,
then will the newcomers improve their opportunities at the expense
of those now here. We see all employers individually wishing to
secure cheap labor. Every housewife wishes her work shared and
reduced by low-priced help. For three centuries, while land was
still plentiful, each influx of newcomers increased the welfare of
those already here. That day has passed, and now the newcomers
benefit themselves, but not the general public. Although all em-
ployers, from the great corporation to the mistress of the house-
hold, individually still seek the lowest priced help, collectively, the
people of the country have decided that it is better for the nation
to preserve its present high wages and machine industries, even
in household work, rather than lower our national standards of
living by admitting freely all would-be immigrants. Hencefor-
ward, this final decision as to our economic policy must be main-
tained against the efforts of others, jealous of our prosperity, and
anxious to share it, even to our detriment.
For this reason, as it seems to me, we need protection against
the violence of others; and the richer we are, the more we need to
take measures of security. There are many well-meaning people
among us, probably more in this country than elsewhere, who be-
lieve that safety may be reached through non-resistance and that
war (that is, the application of organized force by one state
against another) can be done away with by some form of agree-
ment. It is the view which ignores history, and every true Ameri-
can should review the steps by which the national temperament of
our people has developed along lines which deceive us in our in-
ternational outlook, and perhaps may involve us in loss, even if
not in injury. It is our international weakness that tempera-
mentally as a people, we do not realize that other nations lack our
complacent, benevolent altruism, and are ready to impose upon us
rather than to reciprocate our cooperative spirit. Their behavior
toward us is correct only when it must be so.
To understand our temperamental misconception of foreign
feeling toward us, we must recollect that the original settlers,
coming here to an unoccupied country, were, in large measure, cut
off from the traditions and social outlook of crowded Europe,
with its jealousies of neighbors and of racial and competing eco-
nomic groups. Owing to our abundance of land, the life struggle


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here has been to subdue more unoccupied land; whereas, in Europe,
where land is scarcer, men could obtain that ease and comfort
which goes with land, chiefly by dispossessing some present owner.
Europeans fought their neighbors; we fought the wilderness in
alliance with our neighbors, and so developed a rule and an ex-
pectation of mutual helpfulness. Today, this country has been
brought into economic neighborhood with the rest of the world,
without our realizing that what we call a neighborly spirit (i.e., a
willingness to cooperate without reward) does not exist in inter-
national affairs. That exemption from bitter economic struggle
with our fellow citizens, which has made us the richest nation, has
also made us credulous and unduly trustful of the professed good
will of other peoples who do not reciprocate our friendly dispo-
sition.
Generosity and altruism have become with us a national trait,
but we are wrong to look for it in other nations. Existence for
them has been too strenuous for its development. Our recent
great development of manufacturing power has thrown us into the
midst of the world struggle of economic rivalry, where we ask
little but the right to trade freely and prosper by the exchange
of our industrial products. But, owing to our previous isolation
in world policies, we are without an inherited national foreign
policy for our guidance, such as other nations have. We seem
about to pay a high price for instructive experience. Every man
in this democracy of ours ought to be acquainted with the gen-
eral foreign policy which his government is putting forward; but,
unfortunately for that, most people are absorbed in the manage-
ment of their personal affairs. Nevertheless, they will not trust
foreign matters to the members of the government whose duty it
is to represent the people in external relations. The government
should not yield as readily as it sometimes does to the uninformed
clamor of noisy minorities who feel no responsibility for the views
they urge, and will go unblamed if their counsel, being followed,
brings disaster.
Let us take a moment to consider on what our high prosperity
must rest in the future. We have a continent with highly varied
products of the soil and of the mine, so that we need little from
abroad. Our ancestors were almost entirely self-sustaining, but
we are less so. We have developed machine industries to a high


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degree and consume about 90 per cent of our products among
ourselves and export the rest in exchange for foreign goods. A
considerable part of these exports bring us in return things which
are essential to our industrial life, but which are not found within
our territory. For example, two of these substances are manganese
for the steel works and nitrates for the miners and for the chemi-
cal industries which are the foundation of so many others. The
whole organization of our national business life and the conse-
quent prosperity of every class of our population rests upon free
traffic across the seas in peace and in war, whether we are neutral
or whether we are belligerent. With the most complex system of
trade and exchange, growing more complex every decade, this
country is perilously situated if it is unable fully to protect and
control the freedom of traffic on which its prosperity rests. It is
not enough to ward our shores from invasion nor for our Navy
to grant physical protection to our trade and commerce. Beyond
that, we must retain economic freedom to buy and sell as we
please. At the present time, cheap transportation brings all the
corners of the globe together and local industries depend on sup-
plies from half around the world. The master of transportation
controls the business of all his customers. We see that readily
enough in our personal affairs. ' Think what a tie-up in the New
York subway means to passengers. It may be the loss of half a
day. It is just so in international business. Hostile foreign eco-
nomic pressure on American commerce through shipping can
deeply injure our fragile, complicated system of industrial and
social life. At present, this country lacks proper control of her
foreign communications. England owns half the shipping of the
world, and by that ownership and her system of finance, she in-
fluences the industries of all countries. England is our good
friend and long may she remain so; but her interests are not
identical with ours and her government very properly works for
English interests and is not misled by any glittering ideas of inter-
national brotherhood. We find brotherhood in the joint pursuit
of gain, but it is often forgotten in the subsequent division of
profits. Europe, just now, is thinking much of sharing our profits,
and when, at last, we realize that, we shall not feel so brotherly.
England controls the commerce of the world, but is, above all, a
European power. Our interests in Europe are less than England's


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and our economic necessities in the way of raw materials lie to the
south and west of us. To keep an unshakeable hold on our traffic
in those directions, independent of rival great manufacturing na-
tions, we need a great merchant fleet, owned and managed in this
country, so that, as a whole, our own people may control our in-
ternal and external transportation for the national benefit without
danger of interference from the opposing interests of foreign
powers. The men of the western part of our country do not yet
understand that their own livelihood and local industries are closely
connected with foreign trade, and, unfortunately, they regard
shipping as something to be left for rich corporations to play with.
It is a short-sighted view. A system of shipping under the national
flag is as much a public utility as a railway or a highway. An
American merchant fleet is necessary in time of peace to enhance
our economic prosperity and to preserve the high standards of
living of the great body of our people. Should war break out,
we being neutral, we should still need such a fleet, for belligerents
will pay high rates for war service and so draw off the world's
supply of ships leaving for the maintenance of the business of
this country only so many as we have provided for ourselves in
time of peace.
So far the effort has been to show that our national prosperity
is based on a growing measure of foreign trade whose control it is
essential for us to maintain. Now let us consider how best we may
make that control secure. It will not be done by trusting rivals
nor international groups. In times past, the great industrial and
transporting nations needed navies to confer security upon their
ocean transportation, and armies to secure and even to extend
their territorial peace.
Organized force has always been the instrument of order and
civilization. We must not let the frequent cases of violence and
of the abuse of force blind us to this great truth. We must re-
member that it is our army which has made and preserved us
a nation.
But we are more particularly occupied with the sea army, as
the French call the navy, rather than with the land army. In
general, their purposes are similar; that is, to provide a shield
behind which the life of the nation may be carried on, unmolested
by rival powers.


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In all times, navies have been maintained by strong governments
primarily to secure the unhindered movements of trade. Of course,
the corollary of this proposition is that in war a navy also strives
to break up the commercial and military traffic of its enemy, as
that is one way of rendering him incapable of continuing the war ;
for the movement of men and goods forms the basis of war, just
as it forms the basis of peaceful productive industry and pros-
perity.
In the present stage of international relations, we cannot trust
ourselves unarmed against the competition of our commercial
rivals. Open hostilities are not always necessary to gain economic
advantage over this country. There is much business in inter-
national affairs. Our riches and our most complex industrial or-
ganization put us in economic danger from other nations, and we
should be prepared for war which is most likely to come to us in
resisting what we regard as an attempt to take unfair economic
advantage of this rich people. If we are evidently well prepared
for war, our rivals will be less likely to encroach upon our eco-
nomic freedom.
Last fall at Geneva it was sought to define aggressive war,
hoping thereby to forbid all war, but no satisfactory agreement
could be reached upon a formula. But, against this country, an
aggressive attack is most likely to take an economic form. All
the world is now crying out to us, “Give: Relinquish debts: Per-
mit immigration.” Our war, if it comes, will probably be our
defense against some such economic attack, to meet which the
whole industry of the people needs armed protection just as much
as a warehouse needs an armed watchman.
There are many among us who try to persuade their fellow
countrymen that it is best to secure ourselves against attack by
other means than armed force; but, unfortunately, it is not possi-
ble. Let us see what such persons offer us as a substitute for the
armed forces which now guard our economic welfare.
At the Women's Conference last January in Washington, it was
urged that love should be relied upon; that children should be
trained to non-resistance, and that such a national attitude on our
part would engender a forbearing generosity in our opponent. It
is a dangerous experiment. We do not see such a spirit prevailing
among individuals. How can we expect to find it among the


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groups of men who make up states and act collectively for the
national benefit? Those are wrong who assert that men or nations
fight for sport, as they play ball. They fight for gain, or in de-
fense of interests, and to stop war we must deprive men of the
desire to gain either wealth or power.
Again, there are believers in internationalism, in a socialism of
nations. This creed has not justified itself as a means of main-
taining a high standard of living among individuals. A man
labors best when he works for himself, and so does a nation.
There is a very vocal class of people who assert that both peace
and security can be reached through treaties and agreements,
through a League of Nations and through a League Court. In
short, they think that international law can replace war, just as
municipal law is said to have done away with private violence;
but it is the policeman who has put an end to private violence—the
law always forbade it.
It is even affirmed that international law, unsupported by force
may act as a super-government, and that the unified public opinion
of all peoples may become the ultimate authority of the world.
It would be a dull and entirely unprogressive world if no one
were permitted to differ with his neighbor. What would our
pacifists have to fight? As there are now different public opinions
in different regions within this country, how can we attain world-
wide unity of thought? The church tried that with the Inquisition
and attained only a permanent schism. As for the binding force
of treaties, agreements which are fitting at one time are unsuited
to the next generation. We wear out treaties just as we wear out
clothes. No nation feeling strong enough to break it has ever
submitted to the terms of a treaty after its conditions have become
onerous.
In this country there is an unwarranted confidence in the bare
written word of the law. Men quite forget that law is no more
than a guide for the application of force. Unless force is at
hand, there is no governance. When our ancestors gave up the
personal exercise of force in support of their rights, they did not
renounce the use of force; they merely transferred its exercise
from their own hands to those of the state. Public opinion alone
can never become the ultimate authority to either private or inter-
national relations, for it is effective only when it is apparent that


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the public is ready to support it by force. Pascal said that the
majority rules because it has more reason, but he was in error;
the majority rules because it has more force.
It is alleged that the constructive energies of society may be
expected to prevent future wars; that the intelligence of the mass
of individuals and the moral sense of the community may main-
tain peace. We shall readily admit that a community in which
all hold the same views cannot fall into a state of war, for no one
thinks war desirable in itself. War is only the expression of
irreconcilable divergence of opinion as to the international dis-
tribution of the good things of the world, and is an effort to
amend them. The present methods of settling international dis-
sensions by diplomacy and war cannot be replaced by a league of
nations and its permanent court, handing out decisions. If we
follow such a dream we shall fall. International law is not law
at all, although most lawyers talk as if it were. Law is a rule of
conduct enforced by a power so great that resistance is futile.
If favorable public opinion is lacking, the executive neglects to
enforce the law and individuals break it at pleasure.
As an operative basis for the so-called international law of war,
the belligerents take the practice of the last war, and noting changes
in economic and political conditions, they introduce such modifi-
cations of the previous custom as will put the enemy at the
greatest disadvantage without annoying important neutrals so
much as to drive them into war. When conducting a war, if a
government does not fear the power of neutrals, it could not yield
so far to idealism as to risk losing the war by adherence to a rule
that the neutral government neglects to make respected. Other
nations are more given to trespass than we realize. If such go to
war between themselves it will be nothing else than our own fight-
ing strength and readiness for war which will confer on our gov-
ernment the ability to remain neutral without serious loss to our
business prosperity. There is no greater menace to the peace of
the world than for this richest country to be unarmed and so
tempt the cupidity of the world.
As a distinguished historian says in substance, some of the
greatest victories of a navy are the battles it has never fought,
meaning that its evident strength has forbidden the opponent to
contemplate war. But, continuing as to the efficacy of the league,


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it lacks the power of the purse to employ force to execute its
mandates; it is therefore no more than a convenient debating so-
ciety. The league promotes cooperation in small matters, but
without money to pay for an army of its own it cannot crush an
incipient conflict between great powers. Although the league began
as a political instrument, it now appears that it has an economic
aspect also, which enables its great manufacturing members to
profit from it. The products of the various nations differ very
much; none are wholly self-supporting and self-sustaining. All
need the manufactures of a few great powers whose machine in-
dustries and systems of transportation form the economic club
which drives the smaller nations into the league, and the average
voter is glad to have his country enter on account of the deceitful
bait of political equality within the league. One of the most im-
portant economic features of the league is its control of muni-
tions. Only a few manufacturing nations make the arms and sup-
plies necessary to wage successful war. Every small nation must
become an economic client of one of the manufacturing states in
order to be able to guard its political sovereignty in disputes with
neighbors. At present, the great manufacturing nations of the
league do not have full control of the smaller ones, because the
United States is outside the league and can deliver munitions
without reference to the league.
If our representatives go to Geneva and agree with the other
principal states as to the terms on which arms may be furnished
to the non-manufacturing nations, it will establish three or four
countries in a position to dominate the rest of the world. It might
thus happen that the United States might be driven to choose
between acquiescence in the policies of Europe toward non-Europe,
and a war to release some weak country from the enthrallment
of a munitions agreement. Any munitions treaty would go far to
convert the League of Nations into a league of manufacturing
nations, who, among themselves, would not necessarily be har-
monized in their interests, so that really important economic dif-
ferences would be solved as hitherto, either by submission of the
weaker power or by war. The League of Nations is not working
as its founders hoped, for it cannot secure uniformity of interest
and of purpose among sovereign states. Even the smallest of the
units of the league are important enough to have friends among


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the greater powers and these latter the league cannot coerce. Un-
less there is unanimity among the great powers, the league cannot
constrain a recalcitrant member. Such unanimity has not yet been
forthcoming, except that toward us there is a certain unanimity
in feeling as a debtor usually does toward the holder of his over-
due mortgage. In the present state of the world there is too much
difference in industry and civilization between nation and nation
to permit the attainment of harmony by coercion jointly exercised
by the great powers.
It has been suggested that through the league arrangements
might be made for equality of trade opportunities, for tariff ac-
commodations, and for a general balance or handicapping of the
natural economic advantage of one nation over another.
But, this requires that some nations should yield their inherent
favorable position for the sake of helping others. Unhappily,
however, nations are not yet altruistic, but are wholly selfish, even
more so than persons. It is this great difference in the economic
situation between states which prevents the public opinion of the
world from being harmonized and standardized. Thus, the agree-
ments apparently reached by the league will frequently be no more
than plays to the gallery, because the responsible national govern-
ments will refuse to limit their freedom to promote the welfare
of their own peoples as seems best.
As for the last substitute for armed force, the Permanent Court
of Justice of the League, that also may prove a snare to us. The
legal methods of courts are founded on the assumption that law
is a rule of reason and on that assumption courts seek the truth
by impartial investigation and by logical methods and then an-
nounce the proper rule to apply. But, if the litigants and the
court permit emotions to appear, the legal methods of courts are
unsuitable and cannot give satisfactory solutions to matters in
dispute. Such situations arise when the interests of large bodies
of people are involved, for then their emotions are invariably
aroused, and legal methods should be abandoned for diplomacy.
Diplomacy is the long developed way of dealing with subjects that
excite national emotions. Legislatures and executives are the
political departments of governments fitted to deal with emotion-
stirring affairs, for of such is politics made up. Moreover, the
League Court has no established and recognized system of law to


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apply. There is now a proposition to draft such a code, but it is
difficult to be as successful as with a code of municipal law. Na-
tional laws are rules made to apply to conditions which experience
has demonstrated as existing and as needing regulation. But, in
international relations we do not foresee the future and cannot
prepare today a code suitable for unforeseen conditions. Law and
court decisions are largely matters of precedent where vested in-
terests of all sorts enjoy preferential status. By its nature, a
court cannot be progressive—it must be conservative. Legisla-
tures, on the contrary, are the progressive element in government.
Thus, a court dealing with world affairs by strictly legal methods
will lack flexibility to meet new conditions as they arise, and so
an international court cannot be greatly serviceable unless it has
also the powers of a world legislature. Such authority no one is
proposing to entrust to any judiciary body. No doubt, the League
Court offers a satisfactory way of dealing with minor international
disputes, but it is in great measure superfluous, for already there
is the Hague Arbitral Court. Besides the intrinsic objection to
authorizing a court to deal by legal methods with political and
emotional subjects, there is another. We cannot foresee the line
of development of a court composed of men of many nationalities,
trained in different systems of law and influenced by all manner
of sub-conscious national and racial prejudices. As for this coun-
try's joining the League Court, I say again, the world is jealous
of our riches; we cannot afford to agree in advance to submit, we
know not what questions, either to the league or to the court. We
cannot trust the impartiality of either.
So we come back to the readiness of the Army and Navy to
guard the national prosperity and welfare as an indispensable
basis for their endurance. This is not a militaristic view, for
militarism arises from a discontented and envious national spirit.
Such a spirit our people do not have. We arm only for industrial
and territorial security, not for aggression.
It has been shown, it is hoped, that it is necessary for our people
to decide on a military policy for the national defense, not only in
war, but also that our national industrial life may be secured from
the threat of economic hostilities. It is repeated, our riches un-
defended challenge the cupidity of the world.
As for the Army, it will suffice to say that as an insurance
against war, it should be large enough to be a sufficient nucleus


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for quickly developing the military strength of the nation should
it unfortunately become involved in war. The General Staff esti-
mates that at present the Regular Army is about half as big as it
should be to achieve this end.
As for the Navy, it is our first line of defense to give security
to the external policies of the United States in regard to commerce
and free intercourse with the rest of the world. At the close of
the late war the government appreciated this, and started a large
ship-building program, but we have since agreed by treaty to limit
its size and effectiveness. It is not generally understood how much
we yielded in that treaty to other less wealthy powers who wished
to reduce our strength that theirs might become relatively greater.
As it was the United States which called the conference, in
order to obtain an ostensible success, the United States had to
accept terms suggested by the other powers whose financial situa-
tion was more onerous than ours.
Certain great powers are now basing their future position in
the world on maritime strength, including therein both naval and
commercial feets. These countries are jealous of the growing
international and economic strength of the United States. There
is no way for this country to continue in industrial security ex-
cept to maintain all components of our Navy at the treaty ratio
already established for battleships. Further agreements will prob-
ably serve to ensnare us. We are new and not clever at inter-
national diplomacy.
Our prosperity rests on free world communications in peace
and war. We should not further limit our ability to protect those
communications and lines of ocean traffic. As the poet says: "To
be weak is miserable," and the world is more likely to be miserable
if this country chooses to be weak. As long as our present na-
tional spirit lasts, our strength will not be used to the hurt of other
· nations which do not attack us.


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THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN A. LEJEUNE, U. S. M. C., MAJOR
GENERAL COMMANDANT, U. S. M. C.
THE TENTH day of November of this year will mark the
one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the birth of the United
States Marine Corps, since on November 10, 1775, the Con-
tinental Congress authorized the raising of two battalions of
marines for the defense of the colonies which were then preparing
to protect their rights, as they saw them, against the aggressions
of the mother country.
The men recruited for this force were to be familiar with the
life of the sea, but were to be trained as a military force, and it
was the intention to have them serve aboard the ships to be pro-
vided for the defense of the colonies. It is evident that the
founders of the Marine Corps had in mind the fine services pre-
viously rendered by the British marines, both afloat and ashore,
and that it was the intention to use the marines aboard the ships
in naval battles when on the high seas and as landing forces when
occasion might offer.
From that distant date down to the present day the United States
Marines have continued to serve as an integral part of the United
States Navy and in peace and war have proved their worth as the
military army of the Navy. In all of the wars in which the
United States have engaged the marines have played their part ac-
cording to their abilities and the occasions offered, and how well
this part has been played is amply testified to in the many reports
of the admirals who have commanded our squadrons and fleets
on the seven seas throughout the 150 years that have looked
down upon the organization and growth of our nation.
There is neither space nor inclination to give here even passing
note of the incidents that have contributed to the pages of history
due to the acts of the Marine Corps; but it appears to be proper
to state here the present-day mission of the corps which has been
derived from the experiences of a century and a half of service


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A Machine Gun CREW IN ACTION
Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, Fall Exercises, 1924


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in the Navy and to call attention to what has been done in recent
times to fit the corps to meet in a creditable and efficient manner
the requirements of the mission assigned to it by the highest
authority in control of the military and naval destinies of the
nation.
The mission of the Marine Corps, briefly stated, is:
“To support the fleet, or any part thereof, in the accomplish-
ment of its mission.”
The principal mission of the Navy as a whole may be briefly
stated, in the language of the great Mahan:
"To gain command of the sea and hold it."
Having these two basic statements in view, it will be seen that the
support considered is of a nature such that it can best be accom-
plished by a compact military force of all arms, thoroughly trained
to carry out the specific military tasks involved in the duties which
may properly be assigned to the Marine Corps as an important part
of the Navy.
The duties referred to are enumerated in the U. S. Navy
Regulations as follows: (Article 552 (7).)
7. The following duties may be performed by the Marine Corps, when
so directed by the Secretary of the Navy:
a) To furnish organizations for duty afloat on board armed transports
for service either with fleets, squadrons, or divisions, or on detached service.
b) To garrison the different navy yards and naval stations, both within
and beyond the continental limits of the United States.
c) To furnish the first line of the mobile defenses of naval bases and
naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.
d) To man such naval defenses and aid in manning, if necessary, such
other defenses as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval
stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.
e) To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond
seas as may be necessary in time of peace.
In addition to the above specific duties, which may be classified
as expeditionary service, the Revised Statutes (Section 1616)
prescribe that:
Marines may be detached for service on board the armed vessels of the
United States, and the President may detach and appoint for service on
said vessels such of the officers of said corps as he may deem necessary.
In order that the military services of the Marine Corps may be
employed to the utmost, when occasion requires, the Revised


  p. 1861 (#805)                      #

1925]
1861
The U. S. Marine Corps
Statutes also provide that any portion of the corps may be de-
tached for service with the United States Army, by order of the
President, and the occasions have been frequent when this has been
done and the services of the marines could be temporarily spared
by the Navy.
Unless the forces of the Marine Corps are so organized and so
trained as to be able and competent to carry out the tasks which
may be assigned to it in furtherance of its mission, as above
enumerated, the fleet may be seriously handicapped in its opera-
tions or even prevented from accomplishing its mission in peace
and war.
The military tasks which may be assigned to the Marine Corps,
if they are to be executed so as to obtain the best and quickest
results, require:
a) Unity of Command.—By law naval officers cannot command
army forces or vice versa, but this restriction does not apply to
the Marine Corps, since the latter is an integral part of the naval
establishment.
b) Flexibility of Organization.—The Marine Corps has been
constantly practiced on the organization and training of the dif-
ferent type-task units required for the varying service demanded
by its mission, and to meet these requirements it is purposely not
organized into the rigid units necessarily employed by the army
forces.
c) Mobility by Sea.—Throughout its history the Marine Corps
has been constantly indoctrinated with the sea idea through service
of certain of its units on the active ships of the fleet, and through
expeditionary service at sea and overseas in naval transports, as
well as by keeping alive a traditional interest in all naval affairs
and by recruiting its commissioned personnel in part from grad-
uates of the Naval Academy.
d) Training in the Specific Duties Required.—The training of
the Marine Corps personnel to accomplish the various duties which
may be assigned to it has been accomplished in the past by assign-
ing a part of the officers and enlisted men to regular sea service in
the active ships of the fleet, by frequent expeditions overseas,
both in peace and war, for the settlement of questions arising from
an application of the Monroe Doctrine, for the establishment of
law and order in certain unstable countries requiring the protection


  p. 1862 (#806)                      #

1862
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of the United States to insure their independence and prosperity
as nations, and for the training of the forces in such overseas
operations with the fleet as may be required in time of war.
The natural model for the organization of a strictly military
force would appear to be the United States Army, since all of its
duties are of a strictly military nature, and it is the service which
conducts land warfare on a large scale according to the require-
ments of the country's defense. However, the mission of the
Marine Corps requires of it a specific support of the seagoing
fleet in naval warfare, and the land operations of the corps in con-
nection with the operations of the feet are always incidental to
the sea operations of the fleet in its efforts to gain command of the
sea and hold it so that the Army may move in force across a
protected water route to attack an overseas land force of the
enemy and thus end a war with an overseas power.
For these reasons the Marine Corps must ever be closely asso-
ciated with the Navy, understanding the life at sea, the require-
ments and methods of naval warfare, and being imbued with the
esprit of the naval service; and it must be organized and trained to
meet the peculiar requirements of naval expeditionary duties with
the fleet.
The experience gained by the Navy during the Spanish-Ameri-
can War and a study of former wars caused the leaders of ad-
vanced thought on preparedness in the Navy to advocate the
organization and training of a force of marines as a naval advanced
base force, to be held in readiness for service as a part of the
fleet when it should be deemed advisable for the fleet to seize an
overseas base for distant operations. The duties for this force
would require a possible seizure of a suitable site for a naval
advanced base by landing operations against its enemy defenders,
and the subsequent erection of such temporary fortifications and
armament as would be required to make it a protected anchorage
for such ships of the fleet as might require re-fuelling, re-victual-
ling, or repairs, as well as for the numerous unarmed vessels of the
fleet train.
From 1902 to the present time numerous exercises have been
held at selected overseas locations to train the marines in the
execution of the details of the defense of such naval bases over-
seas, and from the experience gained, as well as from a study of


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1925]
1863
The U. S. Marine Corps
certain operations during the World War, the present marine corps
expeditionary forces have been evolved. As a result, there are at
present two organized marine corps expeditionary forces, the
larger one being based at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia,
and the second, or smaller one, being based at the Marine Corps
Base, San Diego, California,
These marine corps expeditionary forces, while primarily in-
tended to be organized and trained for service with the fleet in
war, are available for any military duty that may be required of
the Marine Corps at home or abroad. Expeditionary forces for
the peace-time requirements arising at home or abroad may vary
in size from a single company to the whole available strength of
the marine corps expeditionary force, and the training of the force
must be such as to best fit the whole or any part of it to meet such
requirements.
The peace-time expeditions usually partake of the nature of com-
bined operations afloat and ashore, the naval ships furnishing the
floating force and the marines furnishing the landing force, and
from their very nature they require the unity of command, flex-
ibility of organization, and mobility by sea which must be in-
herent in the Marine Corps as a part of the Navy if the corps is
fully to accomplish its assigned mission.
When the whole marine corps expeditionary force is operating
with the assembled fleet the duties required will be in the nature
of war-time operations in the face of the enemy; but when con-
ducting minor operations in which a portion of the marine corps
expeditionary force operates in conjunction with a detachment of
the fleet the operations will partake more of the nature of peace-
time operations. Such peace-time operations may prove to be the
preparatory stages of war on a large scale, or if they are success-
fully carried out they may serve to prevent such a war.
Considering only the requirements of the Marine Corps to
furnish such expeditions as may be required during peace and to
furnish the larger force necessary to seize and defend a naval ad-
vanced base in time of war, the training of the marine corps ex-
peditionary force might be carried on without reference to the
rest of the Marine Corps; but the other duties assigned to the
corps must be provided for and at the same time the personnel
assigned to these other duties must be so trained that it will


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1864
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
always be prepared for amalgamation with the expeditionary
forces when the imminence of war indicates the necessity for
operations on a major scale of effort.
Hence, by frequent interchange of the personnel of the corps
between the various classes of duty both ashore and afloat the
whole personnel is trained for the major effort and inculcated
with that indoctrination which is a prerequisite to the successful
fulfilment of the war-time mission of the corps.
The peace-time strength of the Marine Corps, like that of other
branches of the naval establishment, is not sufficient to meet the
requirements of war, and this fact necessitates the training of the
available force with a view to its rapid expansion to a much
greater strength when war looms upon the horizon; for the Navy
in all of its elements should be ready to take the sea in force on
the day ordered by the President and every day's delay after that
date gives the enemy more time for preparation to meet the at-
tack, diminishes the chances of the important element of surprise,
and prolongs the period and expense of the war. The training and
organization of the marine corps expeditionary forces is conducted
with a view of having all of the available force trained so that
the addition of reserves, volunteers, and newly enlisted men may be
added to the force with the least chance of confusion and the
best amalgamation of the entire body into a compact force in the
shortest possible time.
The training required to fit the marine corps expeditionary
forces in all arms and branches for the field service that may be
required of it in peace and war embraces every step from the
simple school of the soldier to actual maneuvers in unknown ter-
ritory overseas in company with the fleet under simulated war
conditions. This training may be divided into four phases: viz.,
a) Barracks Training, embracing all indoor and parade ground
drills and exercises and the necessary schools of instruction for
officers and enlisted men. For infantry this includes the theory
of musketry and the technique of primary and auxiliary weapons.
For artillery it includes the theory of fire and the technique of
all types of guns employed by the force. For the special troops,
signal troops, engineers and pioneers, and supply units, it includes
the technique of all mechanical material manned by such troops
and thorough preliminary practice in the use of such equipment.


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1925]
1865
The U. S. Marine Corps
witzers.
b) Target Range Training, embracing the prescribed courses in
target firing to qualify all individuals as good target shots with
the rifle; the training of automatic riflemen in direct fire at known
distances; the training of all infantrymen in musketry problems;
the training of machine gunners in direct and indirect fire on the
1,000-inch range and at longer ranges; the training of light
(Stokes) mortar gunners at indirect fire at known ranges; the
training of light howitzer gunners at direct and indirect range
firing; the training of grenadiers at firing rifle and hand grenades;
the training of squads, platoons, and companies in firing in normal
attack advances under stipulated conditions as to simulated ter-
rain; and combined attack exercises over the range employing
the infantry companies of a battalion supported by all auxiliary
weapons, automatic rifles, grenades, light mortars, machine guns,
and light howitzers.
For artillery troops this phase includes training in the service
of the guns, laying the guns, determination of ranges by all adopted
range-finding methods, and firing over known ranges under sim-
ulated terrain conditions from direct and indirect fire.
c) Barracks Field Training, embracing exercises over diversi-
fied terrain in situations requiring tactical decisions; marching over
roads adjacent to the barracks and through the surrounding coun-
try; advance and rear guard instruction and practice; exercises
and problems in security on the march and at halts; pitching and
striking camps, with attendant instruction in field cooking and
sanitation; combat exercises and problems, offensive and defensive,
with firing of all arms, infantry, and artillery; exercises in scout-
ing, patrolling, and military sketch mapping.
d) Maneuvers and Exercises, embracing the training of all arms
and branches in marching over unknown terrain under service con-
ditions; advance and rear guard and camp security problems;
scouting and patrolling, employing both land and air forces;
combat problems employing all arms of force under simulated
battle conditions, including the firing of the weapons of all arms;
advancing through and occupying cities and towns; problems in
occupying and holding and supplying isolated positions; night
maneuvering of all arms under varying conditions of terrain and
weather; embarking and disembarking the personnel and material
for overseas service, with proper loading and storing of equipment


  p. 1866 (#810)                      #

1866
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
and supplies with a view to its order of disembarkation under
simulated war conditions, the disembarkation being effected with
ships, boats and barges that can be transported on the transports
and freighters; landing operations on a coast assumed to be oc-
cupied and defended by an enemy; defense of an island position or
section of the coast against a hostile landing force supported by
such vessels of the feet as would normally be assigned to such
duty with an advanced base force; laying out and constructing
semi-permanent and temporary entrenchments and defenses such
as would be utilized in the defense of a naval advanced base; camp
sanitation and personal sanitation and hygiene on the march, on
board transports at sea, and in camp; first aid treatment in the
field under battle conditions; establishment and conduct of field
hospitals and dressing stations; care and preparation of rations
and food on the march and in camp; problems of supply on the
march and in camp, including the supply of overseas forces away
from established bases; the problem of the supply of widely scat-
tered detachments, employing all classes of available transporta-
tion, steamer, railroad, motor transport, pack animals, carriers,
boats, and aircraft; problems of communication by radio, field
telegraph and telephone, visual day and night signals, and runners;
aircraft scouting and patrolling and observation; anti-aircraft
detection and defense; target practice under simulated war con-
ditions with all classes and types of guns assigned to the artillery
units of an advanced base defense against targets simulating
those that would be presented in actual warfare of the nature
contemplated; use of gas in attack and defense, and protection
against gas attack by an enemy; planting and operating mine
fields at harbor entrances and in narrow and restricted waterways;
construction and protection of obstructions and barriers at beaches
and probable enemy landing points; operation of range finding
devices and communication systems for the artillery and other de-
fenses of a base or position seized and held on an enemy coast;
and combined problems in defense and attack coordinating all of
arms and branches of the force.
The above outline shows the wide variety of drills and exercises
demanded by the nature of the duties assigned to the Marine
Corps as the distinctly military supporting and landing force of
the Navy, and is given here in detail to demonstrate the necessity


  p. 1867 (#811)                      #

1925]
1867
The U. S. Marine Corps
for a more complete and thorough coordination and cooperation
between the fleet and the marine corps expeditionary forces, a
coordination that can only be effected, if we are to secure the
desired results, by frequent exercises of these forces on overseas
maneuvers with the fleet. In order that such cooperation in plans
and training and actual operations may secure the desired results it
is necessary that every marine from the general to the private
must feel that he is of the Navy and in the Navy, and likewise
that everyone in the Navy from the four star admiral to the man
before the mast must feel that the marine is a part of the person-
nel of the fleet with a definite and clear-cut line of duties to per-
form in the general scheme of naval operations in peace and war.
Properly to train and indoctrinate the marines for the expedi-
tionary duties required of them under their mission a plan of ex-
ercises has been developed which contemplates two maneuvers or
exercises of the marine corps expeditionary force away from its
permanent base in home territory during each year. One of these
exercises, designated to train the force in land operations, con-
sists in field exercises over suitable territory within marching
distance of the base; and the other annual exercise consists in
embarking the force in transports and taking it with the seagoing
fleet for the annual grand maneuvers of the fleet overseas. The
first of these exercises, as enumerated, is for the purpose of
familiarizing the personnel of the force with the conditions and
demands of land service in preparation for the landing operations
that will form a part of the actual war-time duties of the force in
support of an overseas naval expedition. The second exercise, and
the most important one, is for the purpose of preparing the force
to join the fleet when required and perform its part in the general
plan of an overseas. naval campaign on the scale that would be
required in major naval operations.
Previous to the World War the naval advanced base force, con-
sisting of marine infantry, artillery, and special units, was fre-
quently exercised with the fleet in maneuvers and exercises in West
Indian waters and in the Philippines, but for the three years fol-
lowing the close of that war it was not practicable to have such
overseas exercises of the marines with the fleet. However, the
strictly land exercises were carried out by the force to keep it
trained in readiness for any service that it might be called upon
to perform.


  p. 1868 (#812)                      #

1868
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
In the fall of 1921, the marine corps expeditionary force, based
at Quantico, Virginia, marched from its base to the Wilderness
territory, west of Fredricksburg and south of the Rapidan River,
and there conducted military exercises on the famous battle fields
of the Civil War, including a reproduction of certain phases of the
Battle of the Wilderness.
In June, 1922, the force marched from Quantico to Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania, conducting field training along the route and on that
famous battle field, including the reproduction of Pickett's charge,
the most noted incident of that decisive conflict of the Civil War,
demonstrating the manner in which the charge was carried out in
the original battle, followed by a demonstration of the manner in
which such an attack would be conducted under modern war-time
conditions.
In the fall of 1923, the force marched from Quantico across
Virginia to the upper Shenandoah Valley and encamped for two
weeks at Fort Defiance, where field exercises were carried out to
demonstrate the manner of occupying and holding a section of
foreign territory for the protection of the inhabitants thereof in
case of loyal revolution and disorder. The exercises concluded
with a reproduction of the Battle of Newmarket, in which pageant
the cadets of the Virginia Military Institute enacted the rôle of
their predecessors in the original battle.
In these reproductions of former battles an opportunity was
presented for the personnel of the force to witness a graphic ex-
emplification of the war-time methods of the past and thus gain
valuable historical military lessons.
In the winter of 1923-24, the force joined the United States
Fleet and participated in the winter maneuvers of the fleet in West
Indian waters. For these exercises the available marine personnel
was divided into two forces, one charged with the seizure and de-
fense of the Island of Culebra as a naval advanced base, and the
other accompanying the fleet for duty as a landing force against
the army defenses of the Panama Canal Zone and later as a
landing force for the assault of the defenses at Culebra.
In the fall of 1924, the force marched from its base at Quantico
through Washington, D. C., and Frederick, Maryland, to the bat-
tle field of Antietam, where it encamped for two weeks and con-
ducted field training over the surrounding country in a series of


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1925]
1869
The U. S. Marine Corps
problems demonstrating problems of attack and defense under
modern war conditions. These exercises terminated in a demon-
stration of a modern battle advance and attack employing all arms
of the force, infantry, artillery, signal troops, engineers and
pioneers, supply troops, tanks, motor transport, and squadrons
of airplanes.
In the spring of 1925, marines from the expeditionary forces
stationed at Quantico and San Diego were organized into a force
representing a war-time organization of two divisions of all arms,
aggregating 42,000 in strength, which joined the United States
Fleet at San Francisco for participation in the grand army and
navy joint exercises in Hawaiian waters. This force was dis-
tributed among sixteen ships of the fleet train representing trans-
ports and proceeded with the fleet across the Pacific to Hawaiian
waters, where it was employed in making a landing attack for the
capture of the army defenses of the Island of Oahu and the naval
base at Pearl Harbor, supported by the entire fleet.
The general staff work in preparation for these exercises was
carried out insofar as possible exactly as would be the case in a
war of major effort and the experience gained will prove of great
value in future plans and training of the force.
The landing operations were carried out in exact accordance
with the predetermined plans and the results fully demonstrated
the value of the previous drills and training of the force as well
as the necessity for more complete training in the future. The
lessons learned will be of great value to the Marine Corps and
the Navy, in general staff work, in organization and training of
the force for its major mission, and in cooperation with the other
important elements of the United States Fleet. It is hoped that
all plans for future naval exercises and maneuvers will include
the participation of a marine expeditionary force, for in no other
way can this force be prepared for the final test of naval warfare
of major magnitude.
While the marine corps expeditionary forces were being trained
and exercised to fit them for the execution of their major mission
the other duties of the Marine Corps were being carried cut at
the various naval stations and scenes of naval activity throughout
the world. In the fleet the marine detachments have served as a
part of the ships' crews, thus enabling a portion of the corps to


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1870
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
gain an intimate acquaintance with the Navy and its personnel and
to become thoroughly imbued with the life and language and cus-
toms of the sea. These officers and men so trained in the fleet
will, in turn, be replaced by others and in this way the whole corps
will gain in naval experience and come to the realization that
the marine in blue or khaki is in every way a brother in arms of the
sailor in blue and white.
At every navy yard and station of the country marines have
served to guard naval property and do their part in the general
work of preparing the Navy for active service at sea, and here
again an intimate cooperation with the naval officer and the
sailor helps to indoctrinate the marine in naval ideas and customs.
The unsettled conditions in China during the past year have
required the despatch of reenforcements to the marines serving
on the Asiatic Station, and these forces have been used when and
where required by the commander-in-chief of the naval forces on
that station for the protection of American citizens and interests
on the China coast and to help the Chinese authorities in the sup-
pression of riotous attacks upon foreigners and their property.
In Haiti, where we have treaty obligations to assist the local gov-
ernment in the reestablishment of a government that can peacefully
and capably conduct the affairs of that country, a brigade of marines
has been held in readiness for such duty as may be required of it,
and the authorities who have visited Haiti report that the condi-
tions of peace and order there promise much for the future of the
country and demonstrate the patience and efficiency with which the
marines stationed there have carried out their duties.
The marines stand ready today to carry out their mission as an
important part of the Navy and will continue to do all in their
power to "support the fleet, or any part thereof, in the accomplish-
ment of its mission.".


  p. 1871 (#815)                      #

SOME AVIATION FUNDAMENTALS
By REAR ADMIRAL William A. MOFFETT, U. S. Navy, CHIEF OF
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS
INCE the organization of the Bureau of Aeronautics, the
> Navy has bent every effort to get naval aviation in readiness
to go to sea with the fleet. It will be remembered that at
the close of the World War the activities of naval aviation were
confined primarily to coastal patrol. The task of developing air-
craft, training pilots, and of making aviation a useful component
of the fleet has been a difficult one. The exercises in the Pacific
this year constitute our first modicum of success in this endeavor.
During the joint maneuvers, twenty-six seaplanes from the air-
craft squadron's scouting fleet were operated as a part of the
defense forces. Battle fleet airplanes to the number of eighty-four
were operated from ships of the attacking forces. Of these sixty
were flown from battleships and light cruisers while twenty-four
were flown from the Langley. A total of 110 aircraft from the
United States fleet were thus engaged in the exercises and ac-
quited themselves well. In addition to these fleet units, fourteen
seaplanes from the Naval Air Station at Honolulu assisted in
the defense making a total of 124 naval aircraft engaged in the
exercises. Naval aviation is truly an integral part of the fleet.
The problems of naval aviation are not ordinarily appreciated.
From an engineering viewpoint the mechanical problems of air-
craft development are the most complex encountered in any engi-
neering line. Considerations of weight are the fundamental
difficulties. These are inherent in all aircraft construction but are
particularly so in the development of naval aircraft. Every man-
of-war is a compromise in which the utmost in armament, pro-
tection, and motive power have been concentrated into a small
space. When we attempt to add aircraft to the complexities of
ship board installation we find the restrictions of weight and
space, which are already great, multiplied many fold. This is one
of the problems on which we have concentrated and in which we are
obtaining a measure of success.


  p. 1872 (#816)                      #


U.S.NAVY-2
Bureau Aeronautics Photo
Navy Boeing PATROL SEAPLANE, PB-I, ONE OF THE THREE NAVY PLANES PREPARED FOR THE
SAN FRANCISCO-HONOLULU FLIGHT


  p. 1873 (#817)                      #

1925)
1873
Some Aviation Fundamentals
The difficulties which aviation personnel encounter are also
great. The crew of an aircraft is extremely small considering the
number of things that have to be done. Consider for a moment
the task of the crew of a two-seater observation plane on a spotting
mission. It requires skill and a high degree of training simply
to fly the aircraft. The observer must be maintained in a favorable
spotting position. . The spotter must observe accurately, make
his decisions instantly, and transmit his information back to his
ship immediately. He must do this while in a cramped position
at high altitude. This problem, difficult enough in peace time is
enhanced in war time by the fact that the spotting airplane will
probably be subject to attack from enemy aircraft. Flying air-
craft is difficult enough, carrying out the mission is a problem which
calls for an increased measure of skill, judgment and endurance.
The Navy's problem with regard to aviation has been made
more difficult by the controversy which has arisen as to its place
in national defense. The Bureau of Aeronautics has had to exert
much of its energies in controverting fallacious arguments which
I believe unsound when viewed from the broad angle of national
defense.
Two important factors have, to my mind, been misconstrued in
their application to the problem. The round-the-world flight, for
instance, has been pointed out as a conclusive demonstration that
we can place our major dependence upon aircraft. The bombing
experiments on vessels off the Virginia Capes have been construed
as marking the passing of surface craft. When viewed properly
these two events really demonstrate conclusively the utter and
absolute interdependence of aircraft and surface craft. As stated
by the President, naval requirements are for a balanced fleet on the
surface, under the surface and in the air. The important thing
to remember is that the surface is a reference plane to which all
activities must return and that anything which tends to separate
these activities is destructive of the result desired. In other
words, the solution lies not in separation of these activities with
a view to advancing development of one or the other, but in their
more complete unification.
Some aviation enthusiasts are intolerant of what they consider
to be delays in the development of aircraft and ascribe these
delays to the system of organization. These delays are properly


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1874
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
due to the difficulties encountered. In considering any problem
of this kind it must be remembered that it is administration and
not organization that tells. Organization is merely a plan of ad-
ministration. Any reasonable plan properly executed will suc-
ceed. The best plan improperly administered will fail. By simply
changing the organization we get nowhere. In the last analysis the
same people will have to do the work. No change in organization
is likely to improve their ability. They have every opportunity
to achieve the necessary development under the present system.
In viewing the importance of aviation it is necessary to look
at it from the broad general angle of national defense. There are
three major aspects, the strategical, the tactical, and the economic.
We have at present two major arms, the Army and the Navy.
Their activities are distinct and separate and there is no overlap-
ping except at the coast line. It is argued that the air introduces
another medium but it must be remembered that the ultimate ob-
jective is to occupy territory. It is the mission of the Army to
occupy land. To this end the Navy is an auxiliary to the Army
and aviation is an auxiliary to both. Any consideration of the
future of aviation must take this into consideration.
The essential requirement for success is unity of effort. Unity
in a single organization is comparatively simple. The unification
of two separate organizations is not just twice as hard as unifica-
tion of one; it is at least four times as hard. Unification and co-
ordination of three organizations is more nearly nine times as hard
as the unification of one organization. The establishment of a
separate air force on a parity with the Army and Navy would
bring upon the coordinating agency an almost superhuman task.
Even when the aircraft have developed sufficient offensive power
to overshadow all other arms, they will be most effective in co-
operation with other arms, and not by independent action.
It is fundamental that in any task the commander must have
authority commensurate with his responsibility. The commander-
in-chief of the fleet at sea carrying out the Navy's mission must
have complete authority over all the forces engaged in that mis-
sion. The military commander-in-chief, ashore, on the same task
must have the same authority. Insofar as aviation is concerned
and insofar as other arms are concerned this can best be accom-
plished by giving the department concerned authority over person-
nel, material, and operations.


  p. 1875 (#819)                      #


Bureau Aeronautics Photo
FORMATION OF NAVY FIGHTING PLANES, TYPE TS-1, IN Flight NEAR SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA


  p. 1876 (#820)                      #

1876
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The only useful employment of a separate air force would be in
repelling a sudden air attack before the military and naval forces
can be brought into action. This is a real danger where the
enemy air force is within reasonable flying distance of one's own
boundaries. Our isolation protects us from such possibilities and
will protect us for a long time to come. It is, therefore, unsound
to contemplate the establishment of a separate air force which will
only complicate the whole national defense system and will do
nothing which cannot be done by army and navy units.
Proponents of the separate air force urge that aviation will
never be properly developed until it has a separate organization
and is unhampered by other organizations. Aviation is an im-
portant branch of national defense and in their minds on a parity
with the military and naval establishments. The logical conclusion
to their minds is that a separate air force should be immediately
established. This is purely an aviation viewpoint and not a na-
tional defense viewpoint. The danger is that in endeavoring to de-
velop aviation more rapidly these enthusiasts may so complicate the
whole problem of national'detense as to jeopardize national safety.
I do not concede for a moment that the establishment of a sep-
arate air force would bring about more rapid development of
aviation. In any project of this kind development up to a certain
point is rapid. Improvement beyond that point is necessarily slow.
The problems of aeronautical engineering are so complex that
progress seems unduly slow. We are criticized for not having
large numbers of improved aircraft in service. It must be remem-
bered that aviation is in a development stage. It takes time,
approximately three years, to develop a new type of airplane to
the point where it is more satisfactory for service operating con-
ditions than is the previous type. Had we purchased large quan-
tities of airplanes we should have been attacked by the same
critics for having produced a large number of aircraft which would
have been obsolescent before their completion. In peace time it
is our task to carry on development as rapidly as possible, main-
taining on hand enough serviceable aircraft to meet peace-time
requirements and at the same time to have our designs, plans,
specifications, and industrial organization so arranged that large
quantities of aircraft can be produced in an emergency.


  p. 1877 (#821)                      #

1925]
1877
Some Aviation Fundamentals
It is important here to appreciate the policy of this country
insofar as national defense is concerned. The Navy must at all
times be retained at a high percentage of its war strength in readi-
ness for immediate action. The Army is maintained at a very low
percentage of its war-time strength and ready to a lesser degree.
It is contemplated, then, that behind the strong arm of the fleet we
can mobilize our reserves in time to prevent seizure of our ter-
ritory. This policy makes the task of naval aviation more difficult
than that of military aviation because naval aviation must be in
the same state of readiness as is the fleet.
It is the Navy's mission to protect our coasts, our sea-borne
commerce, and far-flung possessions. Once war is forced upon us
we must take the offensive to win it. The Navy is the first line
of offense and naval aviation as an advance guard of this first
line must deliver the brunt of attack. Naval aviation cannot take
the offensive from shore; it must go to sea on the back of the
fleet. I do not believe aircraft on shore can ward off a bombing
attack launched, perhaps, from carriers by night from an unknown
point for an unknown objective. On the other uand, a fleet with
adequate aviation of its own can drive the carriers back out of
effective range. Both for offense and defense the fleet and naval
aviation are one and inseparable.
The very isolation that gives us defensive strength gives us of-
fensive weakness and complicates the Navy problems. No one
appreciates this fact like those who fly over the sea. There could
be no finer illustration of the difficulties of naval aviation than
the round-the-world cruise. The outstanding feature of this
flight was the triumph of individual courage and far-sighted prep-
aration over the inherent limitations of aircraft as vehicles over the
sea. The unmistakable lesson of this flight is the utter and ab-
solute dependence of aircraft over the sea upon surface craft.
These are some of the strategic aspects of the problem. The
consideration of the economic aspects brings about the same con-
clusion. It has been argued that aviation is a cheap means of de-
fense. In support of the argument we have heard the costs of
individual aircraft contrasted with the cost of surface craft. Such
arguments fail to take into consideration the fact that the ex-
pensive part of aviation is the ground organization. A good
example is the cost of the carriers necessary to take aviation to


  p. 1878 (#822)                      #

1878
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
sea with the fleet. Those of us who have had to engage in the
development of aviation have been impressed with its costliness.
Proponents of the unified air force point to the expenditures that
have been made for aviation and use them as an argument for an
independent air force. These expenditures have been made with the
greatest care and I do not believe for a moment that they could have
been decreased by any other organization. On the contrary, they
would most certainly have been increased by a separate air force.
Our requests for appropriations must first be scrutinized by the
budget officer of the Navy Department and must stand on their
merits. They must then survive the scrutiny of the Director of the
Budget who will most certainly detect any extravagance. Follow-
ing this, they must survive the thorough investigation by the ap-
propriation committees of the House and Senate and of debate
on the floors of Congress. In substantiating our requests for these
appropriations we must account for the expenditures of the pre-
vious year. It is obvious that waste and extravagance cannot
exist under the circumstances. The funds expended in aircraft
development are, then, not an indication of incompetence, but a
real measure of the cost of aviation.
In bringing about aviation development we have had at our com-
mand the assistance of other branches of the Navy Department.
If now we establish a separate department on a parity with the
Army and Navy we shall have to duplicate many of these branches
of both the Army and the Navy which have contributed to aviation
development. A separate air department will have to have its
own service of supply, its own medical department, its own train-
ing centers, its own vast establishments. The cost of maintaining
such an establishment would force the present expenditures into
insignificance. Not only would the organization of a separate air
force fail to reduce the costs of aviation but it would increase
these costs enormously.
The Army and Navy have been accused of unnecessary duplica-
tion in aviation activities. This accusation is unfounded. A
certain amount of duplication is necessary in order that the factor
of competition may advance the development of the art. This
small duplication we have encouraged but any unnecessary dupli-
cation has been definitely eliminated through cooperation of the
Army Air Service and the Bureau of Aeronautics, as brought about


  p. 1879 (#823)                      #


IF 6
.
IFS
Bureau Aeronautics Photo
FORMATION OF Navy Fighting Planes, TYPE TS-1, OF THE AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS OF THE BATTLE FLEET,
OVER THE West Coast, NEAR SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA


  p. 1880 (#824)                      #

1880
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
by the joint aeronautical board and the "Joint Board.” Those
who accuse us of duplication at the present time in matters aero-
nautic are advocating the worst kind of duplication in the matter
of national defense. The establishment of the organizations of the
Army and the Navy and the air force on an equality would really
be triplication. From an economic viewpoint the establishment of
a separate air force is absolutely unsound.
Turning now to the tactical considerations we must always re-
member that success is had only through absolute. unity. This
unity cannot be produced by issuing orders. It must come about
as a result of continued association, cooperation and indoctrina-
tion. It is not necessary to enlarge upon this subject at this time; it
is so axiomatic that no discussion is required. I need only point out
some of the aspects of the fleet engagement to emphasize the point.
In any fleet action it will be the endeavor of the commander-in-
chief to bring all of his forces to bear simultaneously at the right
time and in the right place. It is simple enough to order such a
concentration but it is a different matter to bring it about with
units scattered over the surface of the sea out of range of effective
communication or when effective communication is impossible
because of the action. It is perfectly obvious, however, that the
commander-in-chief who can at the proper moment launch an at-
tack with torpedoes from submarines and destroyers, shells from
guns of his capital ships, and torpedoes and bombs from his air-
craft will have brought about that concentration which is essential
to success. For this purpose he will need in the air naval officers
who have spent their lives in the Navy, grown up with it, trained
with it and are prepared to exercise the initiative which can only be
had from complete knowledge of the purpose of the commander-in-
chief and thorough indoctrination with his methods of procedure.
In the employment of naval aviation with the fleet there are
numerous problems yet to be solved. The same thing is true of
the employment of other arms but these are older and the prob-
lems are nearer solution. In working out our problems we must
realize that they can be solved only by hard work and that a
change of method does not bring the solution. These problems
call for sympathetic understanding on the part of all concerned.
There will be minor difficulties here and there but if we adhere
to our purpose and drive along, success is assured. These diffi-


  p. 1881 (#825)                      #

1925]
1881
Some Aviation Fundamentals
culties are being worked out. To people in the field they may seem
slow of solution but this is true because from the broader view-
point of national defense they are more complex than from the
narrow viewpoint of local application. Success will come more
quickly if we forget the minor worries and concentrate upon the
problems at hand with a loyal devotion to fundamental principles.
To summarize, I consider the whole idea of a separate air force
to be unsound, strategically, tactically, and economically. I be-
lieve that, far from being behind in the development of aviation,
the Navy is well in front. Far from feeling that we have failed
we should be cheered in the knowledge that naval aviation is now
going to sea with the fleet; that it has become an essential part
of the fleet and that in spite of the handicaps under which it has
had to develop it has gone ahead by leaps and bounds and has de-
veloped far more rapidly than other arms which ante-date it in
point of time.
In addition to giving the impression that we are behind in avia-
tion development certain ardent proponents of the separate air
force have given the impression that we have met with opposition
within the Navy itself. This is far from being correct. If there
has been any handicap whatever in our work it has been due to
over-enthusiastic and absurd claims on the part of certain indi-
viduals outside the Navy. Far from helping in the big problem
these claims have only hindered. Without the cordial support
and cooperation of the Navy Department, the commander-in-chief
and the commanders of the squadrons and units afloat, naval avia-
tion could never have arrived where it is today.
Unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of command have
advanced naval aviation to a point where a separate air force
could never have put it. I believe some foreign powers have made
a mistake in adopting the separate air force; step by step one of
the leading naval powers is walking back to our system. These
mistakes have placed us in advance in the art. A vital mistake
in organization at this time would so complicate the administration
as to place us back where other leading naval powers were at the
close of the World War. Our real task now is to forget about
organization and concentrate on administration with a view to re-
fining and developing until we have a truly balanced fleet, on the
sea, under the sea, and over the sea.


  p. 1882 (#826)                      #

THE WISE MAN KNOWS HIS TOOLS
By REAR ADMIRAL J. K. ROBISON, U. S. Navy
ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY
W I TH all due regard to the present possible misinterpreta-
tion of the word, the Navy is a product of evolution. The
whys and wherefores of the necessity for navies need not
be examined. It is sufficient that at the present, all nations find
them necessary, hence their existence. They form the external
police force of the country. Ready at all times to safeguard life
and property, they are also ready in time of conflict, whether it
be internal or external. Perhaps the day will come when there
will be no need of traffic officers, patrolmen, state militia, or
constabulary, nor, conceivably, of customs officials. When civiliza-
tion has advanced to the stage that no one has any malice, envy,
or hatred for another, then perhaps, navies and armies can be dis-
pensed with. But, until that time shall arise, and it is no less
desired by those in military or naval service than others, the
reliance placed upon the Navy as the outpost of the nation's de-
fense must be made secure.
Primarily, a conflict between peoples and nations is a conflict
of wits. The wise man knows his tools. He knows best his
capabilities and physical limitations, and can only estimate those of
his opponent. The results of any encounter depend upon the
correctness of the estimates he forms of both his own and his op-
ponent's power. For him to neglect a searching analysis of his
abilities and resources is fatal. To only a certain degree is op-
timism permissible. Past performances and present conditions
contribute the largest factor to any such analysis. Optimism is
based upon the fortunes of the future, which no one can foresee
correctly. While coming events cannot be foretold, yet each
individual has within him the chance so to prepare himself that
adverse conditions will effect him less disastrously than if he were
unprepared.


  p. 1883 (#827)                      #

1925]
1883
The Wise Man Knows His Tools
All peoples are not gifted with the same talents and character-
istics, nor do all nations find themselves possessed of the same
natural resources. Shortcomings in those respects are natural,
but if these deficiencies are appreciated, much can be done to nar-
row the limits within which chance has control. In the same way,
an overplentiful supply of certain substances should not lead to
their easy waste. We are in the midst of a mechanical and ma-
terial era. Man has multiplied his own power many times. Un-
aided, a man may produce about 0.1 horsepower. In 1919, for
each producing man, there was available about 3.25 horsepower.
That is to say, mechanical devices today permit one man's ac-
complishing over thirty times the work which he could do by
himself. A conflict of wits resolves itself into the most efficient
utilization of both the man power and the material power of the
nation.
As a preparation for the accomplishment of the Navy's mission,
a study of strategy is deemed essential. As students we have
had held before us the examples of naval and military strategists,
master minds, comprehensive and flexible, ready to grasp every
opportunity, either of personnel or material. We have been in-
doctrinated with the various phases of strategy, tactics, and log-
istics and we fight our miniature engagements on the game boards
to examine the soundness of the theories we evolve. Finally,
we adjourn to the real game board, the open ocean, and under as
realistic conditions as possible test out these theories. There
is thus an evolution in progress before our eyes—speculation,
theory, and test. There is only one element lacking, and that is
the direct physical opposition of an opponent.
Thus it has been since history began. Seeds of ideas have
been sown from which have sprung up harvests of returns. Some
thinker, dreaming far ahead of his time, has answered the ques-
tions of "why" and "how" to the benefit and advancement of his
time. Each advancement of thought or science has acted as the
center of an ever-widening circle, each point of which, in turn,
serves as the center of a new circle. The circles interweave, and
here and there we find one theory confirming another, as in the
closely related studies of the physicist and the chemist, until little
by little we are able to mark definite and unquestionable advances.
These points of consolidation have only been achieved by the


  p. 1884 (#828)                      #

1884
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
most painstaking study and experiment. The greater the man
the less often does the word “impossible” occur in his vocubulary.
There seems to be nothing which cannot be accomplished if the
time and expense are provided.
For the general purpose of argument, mankind can be divided
into two main classes, those who labor for the physical reward,
such as money or power, and those who labor for the mental
satisfaction of having achieved. These two classes furnish the
material means by which the world has emancipated itself from
the shackles of practically individual slavery, and advanced in an
ever-increasing ratio. The scientist, assisted by the mathematician,
has given us the natural laws upon which the trader, the manu-
facturer, the soldier, and the sailor bases his art, business, or
profession. Each art or business has its strategy of man and ma-
terials. The painter must be careful in the mixing of his colors
if he would not have them fade. The trader senses the forth-
coming demands of his purchasers, whether it be due to personal
or climatic changes, and the manufacturer must plan his work
with a view ahead of the assured sources of his materials, the
machines for their fabrication, and the skillful operators to man
them.
One of the common human characteristics is the distaste for
change. Elihu Root is quoted as saying “.... you cannot make
any improvement in this world without overriding the satisfaction
that men have in things as they are and of which they are a satis-
fied and contented part.” Some individuals have sufficient breadth
of vision to be able to discern the real strength of a new develop-
ment, but by far the greater part require a demonstration to con-
vince them, and often this delay spells the difference between suc-
cess and failure. We owe a debt of gratitude to the people with
imagination for their wisdom. How.often it happens that inven-
tions have been proposed, or theories have been conceived too far
ahead of their times to have them accepted by the world. When
actuated by real danger or necessity most of us will accept un-
hesitatingly any chance for safety, and will clutch at anything that
gives promise of relief. With the advances that have taken place
in the realms of arts and sciences in the last quarter century, the
minds of men are becoming more flexible and more ready to
visualize projected accomplishments, even though they are not yet


  p. 1885 (#829)                      #

1925]
1885
The Wise Man Knows His Tools
tangible. The wonders of radio transmission of speech are ac-
cepted as facts and the radio transmission of motion pictures is not
far removed; yet such advances are received with none of the re-
actions which caused advocates of similar revolutionary ideas to be
burned at the stake for witchcraft only a few generations ago.
The nation or the persons open to them, by reason of their in-
tellect, their physical condition, and their resources, are the ones
who will become the leaders of the future.
There are notable examples of industrial leaders in many nations
who conceived a basic truth, envisioned the practicability of it,
and then threw their life into its accomplishment with the result
that they acquired dominating positions in their country's affairs.
The manufacturer or the business man can do this. He needs ask
no other's consent or counsel, but if his ideas fail he only is in-
volved. No instrumentality of the government has such freedom.
Its growth is erratic, dictated by internal or external conditions.
Inasmuch as any risk incurred is to be shared by the whole nation,
progress must ordinarily be slower than if the risk were assumed
by one man. The nation's defense is an ever-present requirement,
and into its safeguarding no element of chance must enter. This,
however, does not prevent us from utilizing the best developments
that the progress of science affords. Mankind has developed
through competition. At first it was between individuals, then
cities, then states, and, finally, nations. If it were agricultural
competition, better knowledge of tilling or the selection of seeds
constituted an advantage—if it were trading, better knowledge of
markets and sources contributed to success, and, in warfare,
better utilization of resources, more comprehensive training, and
coordinated strategy gave victory.
As the theaters of war and commerce expanded and water came
to be used as a highway for transport, navies came into being,
necessitated by need for the carrying of fighting men and to resist
attacks on such transports as well as on sea-going traders. When
the galleys and triremes were driven by brute force, much knowl-
edge of seamanship was not needed, but upon the advent of sail,
physical endurance no longer determined the operating radius of
the traders and war vessels. The areas of operation shifted from
the bays and the coasts to the open ocean, where the natural
elements had to be met and conquered. To withstand the ocean


  p. 1886 (#830)                      #

1886
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
voyages, the form of the ship gradually altered as well as the
form of the sails and their rigging. From the primitive hollowed
out tree trunk, to the canoe with its gunwales and frames and
plating, if we may call it so, of hides or bark, was evolved the
heavier wooden frames and planking. The towers and tops,
which were necessities of the days of crossbowmen, archers, and
fire throwers gave way to the smooth sheer, as the distance at
which gunpowder and shots were effective, rendered these former
vantage posts unnecessary. The sails and rigging were also
adapted to give the ships better all-round maneuvering power,
seaworthiness, and speed. The square sail and the fore and aft
sail were products of evolution from different parts of the world.
The square sail was an open ocean sail, heavy and safe, and with
the wind abaft the beam, was the chief dependence on ocean
voyages. In certain southern countries, however, where coastal
trade was carried out with the aid of off-shore or on-shore winds,
a fore and aft sail had been developed. The ocean-going ship
eventually adopted each of these types, and thus became composite
at an early stage. No doubt the square rigger captains objected
to the first introductions of these new types of sail which later
are found in the trysails and the spankers. Thus we find our
frigates at the advent of the newer type of propulsion-steam.
A striking example of the dependence of a people upon its ma-
terial and industrial resources is shown by the maritime history
during this first period of transition from wood and sail to steel
and steam. Great Britain was ready with her coal and ore to
start the production of the iron needed for the early ships. This
country had not developed its resources and transportation was in
its youth, with the consequence that it was for a long while out-
stripped in the production of iron and steel, and the machines into
which their fabrication largely entered. Just as gunpowder or
"villainous saltpetre," as it was called, was found hard of ac-
ceptance on its introduction, just so was the suggested substitu-
tion of steam power for sail vigorously opposed by those who
had been trained in the school of sail. It must not be taken for
granted that this opposition arose from the natural distaste of a
smart seaman to have his clean spars and sails begrimed from the
soft coal smoke, and have his decks filled with what were then non-


  p. 1887 (#831)                      #

1925]
1887
The Wise Man Knows His Tools
combatants. We must concede that the only thoughts of those
officers then, as now, were for the best interests of the Navy. As
with any new development, the steam machinery of those days was
not reliable. Metals and designs were in their infancy. Those
laws of steam and mechanics, which we accept without question
today, were still undiscovered, and countless inventors were press-
ing forward on all sides, each with his own pet idea or mechanism.
Such a story is not confined to those days. We have recently
witnessed the same scene enacted. The path of the electrification
of railroads came to a crossroad some fifteen years ago, when
various systems were urged on the companies without due study of
the basic needs for each, with the result that the railroads were
more confused than aided. We are even now in such a similar
epoch when we consider the Diesel engine.
Then, too, the performances of the various types of engines had
not been such that predictions could be made which would aid
flag officers in making a proper tactical utilization of their ships.
Speed-controlled speed—was something new to naval strategy.
It was a tool whose use was not understood. A naval engagement
in those days meant the seizing of the opportunities of wind and
wave and the better seaman won—the admiral who could obtain
'and hold the weather gauge. Strategy of position came first, before
the limited offense of the early armament could be utilized. The
forsaking of the sail for the doubtful value of a slow speed,
engine-driven ship, although the speed could be controlled, did
not appear to be sound, especially since with the heavy sparred
frigates plenty of wind and sea room was all that a good seaman
asked. Steam driven men-of-war were being developed, however,
which showed the possibilities of this form of propulsion.
Notable among them was the Wampanoag, about which Bennet
said "It was the fate of the Wampanoag to live too soon.” The
average sea speed of the transoceanic liners in those days was
about 14 knots, and her speed of over 16 knots was phenomenal.
The value of sea speed as a strategical point of superiority in a
campaign was not realized until over twenty years later.
Further growth of the steel navy awaited the industrial growth
of the country. Not until we could fashion our own steel frames,
plating, armor, guns, and machinery could it be said that our


  p. 1888 (#832)                      #

1888
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Navy was an established fact. Its development paralleled that
of the merchant marine, insofar as conditions permitted, with
this exception, that warships had to be self maintaining. There
was no promise of a friendly port at the end of a specified run.
Speeds were not to be maintained steadily hour after hour. A
warship's speed had to run the gamut from bare steerage way to
full power. Development at this time was largely due to the close
cooperation between the designers at the Navy Department and
the shipbuilders, as land industries had little to offer in the way
of similar equipment, the nearest examples being those of the
heavy duty, slow speed pumping engines, and the larger engines
for driving generators, although these lacked many features which
were peculiar to the marine engines--the necessity for reversal,
and the variations of speed.
The steadily increasing size of the ships and the demands for
higher speed pushed the design of the reciprocating engine to its
limit. In spite of all refinements possible, a point was finally
reached where physical limitations prohibited any further increase.
At this point a new era in the development of naval vessels com-
menced, namely, the direct partnership of the naval engineer and
his brother engineer on land. Although it was seen that land tur-
bines, as then constructed, could not compete economically with the
best reciprocating engines on board ship, yet they had the im-
mediate possibility of an increase of power. The trial boards of
the Navy Department had meanwhile accumulated a vast amount
of data which furnished such a variety of conditions and per-
formances that, from the uncertainty of cut and try methods there
began to emerge definite laws and principles by which the per-
formance of each design could be predicted with a real degree of
accuracy. The physicist was meanwhile establishing quantitative
thermodynamic laws, on which could be based rather exact heat
transfer calculations, while the chemist was contributing investi-
gations on combustion, gas analysis, and so forth. The horizon
of the field of contributory engineering was thus being constantly
enlarged. The manufacturer was realizing the value of research
to himself, and hardly had a new process or a new material been
brought out before it appeared in his practice, and then in naval
ships.
Although the direct connection of the turbine to the propeller
shaft resulted in a serious loss in efficiency for the combination,


  p. 1889 (#833)                      #

1925)
1889
wesele His Tools
The Wise Man Knows His Tools
no means of separation was then offered. With the introduction
of mechanical gearing came the possibility of high speed turbines,
and manufacturers who had been steadily developing this form
for land generating stations were quick to see the adaptability of
their present designs. At first these high speed turbines were in-
troduced as cruising turbines, which resulted in a considerable gain
in economy at lower speeds. Their first use in any quantity was
on the destroyers where the light weight of the high speed machine
was a necessity, and since that time they have been enlarged, until
on the scout cruisers a unit on one of the four propeller shafts
will deliver upwards of 25,000 horsepower, more than both the
main reciprocating engines of one of the earlier battleships.
The development of the engineering plant of the Navy now
having arrived at a point where it was nearly independent of the
former restrictions imposed upon it by the peculiar conditions
attached to marine propulsion, scientists and manufacturers took
a greater interest in naval engineering. The problems of the
naval engineer began to receive from their hands a new touch
which had been impossible to bring about before. Electric pro-
pulsion was one of the first of the peculiarly land developments
taken over almost bodily from shore practice, but only after
searching investigation of the various electrical characteristics of
the installation. From the results of the experimental ship, the
Jupiter, it has been possible to predict ship and motor performances
which have been very successfully applied to the later ships cul-
minating with the machinery of the airplane carrier designed to
produce a total of 180,000 shaft horsepower. It is a far cry from
the early steam engines of Ericcson with their numberless connect-
ing and valve rods, to the smooth running electrical equipment of
today, it being almost impossible to see any moving parts until the
propeller shaft is reached.
From being a hit or miss guess, the design of the boilers and
furnaces is almost as exact a science today as is the design of the
turbines and the generators. Laws governing the transfer of heat
from the furnace to the water have been developed and applied;
the production of uniform and reliable metals has permitted effi-
cient and safe designs, and the studies undertaken in connection
with the combustion of coal and fuel oil have so far progressed
that the performance of the whole machinery plant of a ship can
be predicted to an accuracy of within 2 per cent.


  p. 1890 (#834)                      #

1890
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
All of this development in steam machinery and the other allied
auxiliaries on board ship tending to promote the efficiency of the
ship and the welfare and comfort of the crew has progressed with
the sole idea of making each individual piece of machinery a
direct contribution to the ship's mission. It may appear to one
visiting a ship for the first time that there is an excess of mechan-
isms or installations, but when each is examined by itself it will
be seen that each contributes its own individual part in a highly
efficient and reliable manner without any extra outlay of material
or weight. There is, however, this difficulty to be encountered in
the development of efficient apparatus of this kind, namely, that
it must not be developed too far ahead of the personnel that
operates it. A modern warship is the exemplification of the high-
est form of engineering. From the delicate chemical tests for
powder stability and water salinity to the heavy rotating masses
stressed to loads inconceivable two decades ago, it encompasses
the whole range of mechanics and science. Remember that an in-
stallation may represent the ideas of countless engineers or scien-
tists focused on the solution of the particular problem for that
installation and that the latest laws of science or the latest products
of the metallurgists are taken advantage of to produce this effect,
and, unless the personnel who operate it have the basic under-
standing of the ideas underlying the reason for the functioning
of each component part, the maximum efficiency for which the
installation was designed cannot be attained and a point is reached
where further developments must wait upon training of the per-
sonnel and the problem then passes from the ship designer to the
ship operator.
The advancement of civilization has been dependent upon the
development and intelligent use of tools. The most important link
between human minds waited for the development of the printing
press. Without that indispensable tool, mankind would still be
handing down its history in the form of sagas or ballads. Com-
munication at a distance would be impossible save through the use
of couriers.
The agriculturalist developed and used his plows, harrows, har-
vesters, and threshers. The fisherman likewise extended his re-
sults by seines, trawls, dredges, and other devices. Manufacture
today would be impossible without its furnaces, presses, machine


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The Wise Man Knows His Tools
tools, and gages. The availability of a tool is of no use unless it
be used intelligently. Investigation is constantly being made as to
the limits to which a tool may be worked, and a difference between
profit and loss can often be traced to the fact that one manufac-
turer has, by investigation and test, made his tools accomplish
more than those of a competitor.
The intelligent use of tools also depends upon the skillfulness
of the user. It is of no use to put into the hands of an apprentice a
lathe of high accuracy, capable of producing work to the accuracy
of a ten-thousandth of an inch, if his training and manual limita-
tions will only permit him to work to a thousandth of an inch.
This skillfulness can only be obtained through study and training.
An expert mechanic knows his tools intimately—he has studied
them, tried them out under all conditions, and has that feeling of
confidence in them and in himself which is only possible through
such experience.
A factory is laid out to do a certain class of work. The intelli-
gent manager realizes his possibilities as well as his limitations,
and should know what he cannot do, as well as what he can do,
with the tools at his disposal. However, a few slight changes
might make it possible for him to adapt his present machines to
accomplish a different class of work. These possibilities he
should know also.
A fleet is much similar to any such organization. It is planned
to accomplish a rather definite kind of work. The commander-
in-chief is chosen as the head. He has various departments, each
under its own commander. In civilian establishments these ad-
mirals would probably be executive vice presidents. Instead of
the motive power or passenger traffic departments, we have the
battle fleet and the scouting fleet. Now the departments have to
be outfitted with tools which are built to accomplish their part of
the special product. The heavy presses, rolls, and so forth, might
be represented by the battleships, while the automatic screw ma-
chines or the milling machines might represent the destroyers.
So the superintendents in charge of the various subdivisions
are furnished these tools. They must get out of them all that is
humanly possible, and, in the final test, enough more than the
opponent to insure victory. It is not enough to order a thing
done—the order must have the experience behind it that will with-


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
out any possibility of misinterpretation get the work done in a
coordinated manner. One section of a shop cannot work to
thousandths of an inch, and another section work to hundredths
and have the parts produced by each shop work satisfactorily
together.
The shop from which the commander-in-chief must draw his
product—the ships—are furnished by the bureaus, their builders,
with a variegated assortment of tools, each for its own purpose,
and each designed, from long experience, to be the best of its
kind for the duty imposed. First we have the hull, likened to the
factory building. Each type of factory demands thorough con-
sideration of its needs. It all depends upon the nature of the work
to be performed, whether large or small, the size of the individual
pieces, and the nature of the roughing and finishing processes. So
with a ship—it must be of such a form as will best enable it to
carry with the least expenditure of fuel the various tools it must
use, and be so arranged that these tools can be used in the most
expeditious way.
The ultimate mission of a naval ship is the destruction of an
opponent. To accomplish this, we must give the commanding
officer the tools best adapted to his purpose. We have in the shop
forges and presses which take the rough castings and forgings and
reduce them to a size which can be readily machined. Then the
work passes to the lathes, millers, and grinders which give the
ultimate accuracy desired. The ultimate measure of a ship is
the accuracy of delivery of its salvos on the deck and sides of an
adversary. The ultimate means for accomplishing this is by the
projectile. But, in getting that projectile against its target, two
very definite stages are necessary. At the start, the ship may be
thousands of miles from its opponent. The gun will not propel
the projectile over that distance; the ship will have to carry the
projectile to within a range where it can complete the last stage
of its travel by air. Thus there are two distinct trajectories of
the shell—one in the magazine, and one in the air. The engineer-
ing department of the ship is responsible for the accuracy of the
first trajectory, and the gunnery department for the second, and
they are equally important, though this fact is not generally rec-
ognized. If the roughing process of a press is faulty, no later
machine work will repair the error, and if a ship cannot get within


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The Wise Man Knows His Tools
the range of the enemy it does no good to vainly waste the
ammunition.
With the ever-increasing demands for specialized machinery,
whether it be the latest development in vacuum producing equip-
ment, fuel oil burning, or low pressure distilling, there is created
a demand for personnel who must likewise specialize in their
operation. As was said before, the knowledge of countless scien-
tists may be compressed into one piece of simple machinery, taking
advantage of the latest discoveries in natural laws. Each part of
the equipment contributes some definite portion of the efficiency
and the operator must learn by both theory and practice the varia-
tions in the performance of his piece of machinery which will result
from any disturbance of the conditions under which it is operating.
Does it not seem that due attention to the machinery of our ships
on the part of the executive personnel, the line of the Navy, is an
essential today as it was in the time of sail? Mobility, tactical
advantage, strategical position, all mean the same thing in the
hands of the skilled officer.
Such is the nature of the tool which the material bureaus place
in the hands of the command afloat. Evolved through years of
trial, failure, and success, adapted to the conditions that the ad-
mirals in command have demanded through their similar experi-
ence in trial, failure, and success, the efficient operation of these
specialized tools, battleships, destroyers, aircraft, and submarines
must be the common aim of both the designer and the operator.
In battle, forces being equal, professional fitness, worthiness of
the crew, familiarity with the problems of war, combine to insure
victory. Material conditions, such as give greater gun power,
greater numbers of ships, greater machinery power, do not, in
themselves, bring victory. The thing that is of most importance
is the character of the personnel. The living spirit of service
underlies the Navy. By devotion in time of peace such as the
giving up of shore leave for the purpose of repairing a pump or
involving the performance of disagreeable duty, a fitness is
achieved that is otherwise unobtainable and secures the ability to
meet emergencies in time of need that may render the otherwise
impossible, easy to accomplish. To obtain the maximum efficiency
from our ships, everyone concerned with their operation must
have a clear conception of the function, the limitation, and the


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
possibilities of each component part at his command. In war,
there is no time to gain this knowledge. The performance of each
unit of his command must be known to the commander of the
ship or unit in a manner which is as automatic as that of the
driver of an automobile who knows the action of his engine,
clutch, or brakes through long use and familiarity. The knowledge
must be such as to enable the commander to visualize the per-
formance of the unit even before he gives the order respecting its
use. Can this be accomplished by any officer who is unfamiliar
with the means of obtaining reliable mobility; with the means of
determining the range of action of the units of his fleet; with the
means of maintaining maximum reliability in the mobility which
forms the primary distinction between coast artillery and the
navy? Is it not a fact that the actual performance of a particular
duty repeated frequently makes for an improvement in the pro-
fessional fitness of men and of officers ? Otherwise, why do we
drill? Along the same line, it seems to me that the maintenance
of our machinery by the fleet repair forces meticulously adhered
to as a principle in time of peace, develops a certain character and
fitness and worthiness in the navy personnel that is otherwise
unobtainable.
A new development brings with it a host of optimists. The
imagination of its friends knows no bounds. New obstacles are
easily surmountable in the wild clamor of enthusiasm which a
new toy engenders. The immutable law of growth is overlooked.
Science and art must have a steady and healthy growth to endure.
All along the pathway of naval development we see wrecks of
shattered hopes. We have seen the torpedo and the torpedo boat
heralded as the destroyer of the battleship. We have seen the
ram develop and then become obsolete. We witnessed the brilliant
flash of the dynamite gun, only to lose it as quickly, and now we
are confronted with the devastating effect of the aircraft bomb
and are told of the absolute helplessness of the battleship. No
officer would be worthy of his commission if he did not believe
that the duty he was performing was the most important that he
could do. We must expect those who are charged with the de-
velopment and use of each of our tools to foster their growth and
use by all possible means. At times we are in the midst of a wood
so thick that we cannot see it for the trees. Popular enthusiasm


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The Wise Man Knows His Tools
is easily aroused by lurid descriptions, especially when they are
of the fantastic nature which always appeals to and thrills the
imagination. But, it is a hard task to see any romance in some-
thing which has become so familiar with us that we accept it as
commonplace. For many years we shall be confronted with con-
ditions which will be hard to master. We shall see our battleships
unchanged but always growing older. Our tours of duty will take
us from one to the other until they, too, will become commonplace
and their romance will be lost and those with imagination will be
flocking to the standards of any that promise a new form of ex-
citement. The enthusiasm and optimism of those charged with
new developments is to be envied and will be envied by those
whose routine must follow in the wake of the treaty program.
Due to the widespread interest that the Navy has created through-
out the whole country, and the intensive studies of naval needs
resulting from the late war, development has been exceedingly
rapid in the past few years. New types of ships have followed
each other in quick succession, each with the attraction of some
new problem to be solved. As they become older they lose their
novelty, but their possibilities have not yet been reached. We can
imagine a time when new types of ships and planes are no longer
forthcoming, and we shall then be confronted with the necessity
of examining the equipment we have, and studying it in the
detail which time did not before permit. More and more are we
delving into the study of the value of each part of a ship and as
we discover, we begin to evaluate. Our evaluation today has
hardly been more than superficial. We have not really studied or
analyzed to such a degree that we can commence to evolve our
own basic laws as regards the fundamental value of the various
tools at our command. There is no time like the present for such
studies. Economy of expenditures which, in turn, means efficiency
of personnel and materials is made so extremely necessary these
days, to maintain our present force, that any results which will
return a gain in economy in any form will multiply itself many
times in the future. The tools are furnished us and we must get
out of them their maximum value. The more we understand
about all the laws that govern the strategy of the sea the greater
will be the field offered to the commander-in-chief.


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
If the commander-in-chief engaged in making an estimate of
the situation is ignorant of engineering conditions that may deter-
mine the possibility or impossibility of the execution of a definite
plan at a particular distance from the base of repairs or of sup-
plies, he must depend upon someone else for such information.
As this is at least one of the basic considerations underlying any
plan or decision, would not the subordinate, equipped with the in-
formation that the commander-in-chief lacks, be a better man to
make the estimate of the situation and to form the plan? In
other words, is it not possible that ignorance on the part of high
command of engineering may lead either to a rubber stamp ad-
miral relying entirely upon information furnished by the subordi-
nates or, in the case of admirals who are of the opinion that the
"will of the wind” is all, will it not lead to such disasters as the
loss of the Chesapeake?


  p. 1897 (#841)                      #

THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN NAVY
By Captain Waldo Evans, U. S. Navy, COMMANDANT 9TH
NAVAL DISTRICT
THE American Navy has been the outgrowth of the desire
to protect our merchantmen lest the swarming pirates be
thereby made more acrimonious than ever; secondly, to
compel the warring nations of Europe to treat us justly. There
is rampant today the feeling that a "strong Navy incites a nation
to go to war," and yet, if we turn back the finger-stained pages
of history, we find the contrary to be true. For eleven years prior
to the War of 1812, the American people, striving to carry on
without a navy, suffered every indignity with enormous and in-
calculable losses of property, life, and happiness.
The influence of the American people has always been exerted
for the promotion of peace, and this influence has been effective
in proportion to the strength of our Navy.
This paper has not a desire to quote sayings of some of our
famous fighting Navy men, and yet, the saying of John Paul
Jones, “I have not yet begun to fight,” or of Commodore Perry,
“To windward or to leeward, they shall fight today," or of Dewey,
"You may fire when you are ready, Gridley," will go down in the
annals of American history as the acts of men who faced an enemy
for the love of home and country.
When the liberty of the colonies was threatened, it was unani-
mously declared by the Rhode Island Assembly “that the building
and equipping of an American fleet as soon as possible would
greatly and essentially conduce to the preservation of the colonies.”
This idea was not considered very popular in the minds of the
peace-loving members of the Congress of the colonies. It was even
thought to be “the maddest idea in the world.” On November 2,
1775, Congress appropriated $100,000 for the fitting out of armed
vessels and ships of force. On November 25, rules for the regu-
lation of the Navy of the United States Colonies were considered
* Address delivered by Captain Evans before the Kiwanis Club of Chicago.


  p. 1898 (#842)                      #


Bureau Aeronautics Photo
Navy SEAPLANE ON CATAPULT ABOARD U.S.S. "TENNESSEE"


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Development and Growth of American Navy
and adopted. This little Congress used for the first time the term
“Navy of the United Colonies.” The first vessel to sail under the
central authority was the cruiser Lee.' Her commission was signed
by President Washington and not by Congress.
The Second Committee of Congress met on December 13, 1775,
and authorized the construction of five ships of thirty guns; five
of twenty guns, and three of twenty-four guns, making a total of
thirteen ships. The cost of each of these ships did not exceed
$66,666. Before the end of the Revolutionary War, the colonies
had sixty-four ships in service. With these ships—and a squadron
loaned by the French to John Paul Jones, the founder of our
Navy, we safe-guarded our liberty and freedom and planted the
seed for a navy that is now a decorous flower to American man-
hood and a respected organization to the world. Before this seed
took root it was threatened by the winds and frosts of internal
and external contention, but, planted by the hands of an honored
and honest people, it received strength and vigor by the repeated
acts of sacrificial heroism. These American farmers left home,
wife, mother, and sweetheart, not to strike for dominion, but for
a deathless principle; not to bleed for gold, but for'a priceless
ideal; not to satisfy blood lust, but to prevent oppression; not to
fight against a people, but to destroy a monstrous system; not
to prolong a bloody conflict, but to roll back theostone of despotism
and recall peace from her crimson grave to immortality. These
men fought to win and consecrate this continent to the principles
of political and religious liberty. On December 22, 1775, we
formally organized the first American fleet, consisting of two ships,
the Alfred and the Columbus; two brigs, the Andrew Dorea and
the Cabot. We afterwards borrowed 400 muskets from the Penn-
sylvania Committee of Safety. Then the schooners, the Fly and
the Wasp, and the sloop Hornet were added. From first to last,
the salt water navy of the Revolution included forty-seven vessels.
The first navy ships were thirteen frigates ordered on December
13, 1775. It is interesting to note that while the guns on these
ships were mounted on wooden carriages, it was with considerable
effort that they were loaded, aimed, and fired. Elevating was done
by means of a handspike under the breech where a wooden wedge,
called a "quoin," was inserted when the desired angle was reached.
There were no gun sights as we have today, because ships fought


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
at close quarters. Firing was done on some ships by flint locks,
but they missed so often that the priming quill was more popular.
This was a split quill, full of powder, inserted in a touch hole of
the gun. The cartridges had already been punctured by a sharp
wire thrust through the touch hole, so that when a slow match in
the hands of the captain of the gun touched off the powder in the
quill the discharge followed almost instantaneously.
From the beginning of the Revolutionary War, there were
swarms of American privateers and state navies. The state navies
were maintained by all the states except two, for the protection
of their coasts. These vessels were small and of shallow draft,
designed for river and harbor defense. The work of the privateers
was of vast importance. In 1775 Congress provided for commis-
sions to be issued to privateers and while many, even Franklin,
realized that privateering was merely legalized piracy, the people
as a whole contended that privateering was not only permissible
but praiseworthy. During the war, Congress bonded 1699 priva-
teers. Salem, Massachusetts, alone had 150; Boston, 365. In
fact, Massachusetts had more than 600 privateers. While the
privateers were bonded at a great expense, it seems now that if
the privateer forces could have been properly concentrated and
handled, they would have swept the enemy from the American
coast and then from the seven seas. Greed blinded patriotism and
statesmanship then as it does now. There is no instance on record
where such splendid power was wasted as was the sea power of
the United States in the War of the Revolution. These facts
demonstrate the importance of building the most powerful ships
possible. The work of the privateers was lauded so highly that
it was felt that they were adequate to defend the nation from
every kind of aggression. When to this faith was added the
hatred of a standing army that had had so large a part in the
development of the revolutionary spirit, the mass of the people
concluded that the maintenance of a navy would be a menace to
American liberty.
When the Revolutionary War ended we had left as a nucleus
of a navy, our best frigate—one ship—the Alliance. But this ship,
too, met the fate of an unbelieving people and was sold as a mer-
chantman. Her bones lie today in the Delaware. With the ves-
tige of protection gone, we became slaves to the hordes of African


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Development and Growth of American Navy
despots and pirates. Like an unprotected child, we were a hope-
less prisoner chained to the dark dungeon floors of despotism.
Our white breasts were covered with blood and were it not for
the fact that we paid those pirates the sum of two million dollars
in tribute, our fires of life might have been quenched.
On March 27, 1794, in order to protect the commerce of the
United States against Algerian cruisers, the President signed an
act providing for five frigates. These were the President, United
States, the Chesapeake, the Congress, and the Constitution. How-
ever, before these frigates were built, a treaty with the pirates
was issued, costing the government a huge sum in buying the
treaty and ransoming prisoners. The act which legalized the
construction of these ships are, nevertheless, the beginning of
the permanent American Navy. Upon the accession of John
Adams as President, not only did Congress agree to complete
the frigates costing $1,141,160, but, on April 20, 1798, $950,000
was voted for the purchase and equipment of an additional
naval force. We were by this time imbued with the fact that,
after all, a navy was at least a guarantee to our commerce.
On April 30, of the same year, the Navy Department was estab-
lished. Various activities sprung up with enthusiastic alertness.
On May 4 the President was authorized to procure cannon and
build foundries and armories. This act was soon followed by the
appropriation of $80,000 for galleys to be used as porcupine quills.
With what was already appropriated, the President was authorized
to accept, if offered by private citizens, six frigates and six sloops
of war, and to pay for them with government bonds. We were
no longer an easy object-nor defiant—but we at least were con-
vinced that we were our own best friends. We were no longer
like the proverbial "groundhog,” afraid to show his shadow. We
decided to show ourselves. In some respects, the most important
act ever passed by Congress took place at this time, when the
President in June, 1798, authorized naval ships to "subdue, seize,
and take any armed French vessel which shall be found within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States or elsewhere on the high
seas." I say important, because it became a law at the beginning
of the work of the new Navy and it declared that if we were to
compel an enemy to do us justice, we must not depend on harbor
galleys but must send ships fit to keep the sea in search of the


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
enemy in his own waters. The new American Navy—three fri-
gates and twelve converted merchantmen—was ordered forth to
fight for the flag.
No more tribute and ransom. In the hope of peace, we had
submitted to every outrage upon the life and the liberty as well
as the property of our citizens. Now, like hunted beasts driven
to a corner, we had turned and shown our teeth.
When the war with Napoleon began, Thomas Jefferson was
President. He had seen in the work of President Adams an
effective method of ending such troubles. He had also read a
report to the House of Representatives under date of January 12,
1801, in which he said:
"When the United States owns twelve ships of seventy-four
guns and double the number of strong frigates . . . . confidence
may be indulged that we may then avoid those wars in which we
have no interest and without submitting to plunder. ...."
However, while Mr. Jefferson intended to coerce, he never
thought of doing so with guns afloat. His first act was to lay up
five frigates on the basis that he wished to avoid taxing the in-
dustry of his fellow citizens for the support of the Navy. The
work on six ships of the line which Congress had authorized was
suspended. President Adams, in 1800, spent $3,448,716 on the
Navy, and in 1802 Mr. Jefferson spent $915,562. Once more we
were a prey to vultures. In 1812, when we cowered under the
party lash, we finally changed to a growl that was unmistakably
heard. When everyone knew that the nation was wholly unpre-
pared for war, when the ships in the British Navy numbered
1,042 and those in the American Navy numbered seven, when
great losses were inevitable and the utter destruction of the nation
was really to be feared, the American people brushed aside every
sordid appeal and demanded a war for the vindication of right.
At the outbreak of the War of 1812, we had sixteen serviceable
war vessels; among them there was not a single one of the line.
True indeed, we had three splendid frigates of forty-four guns :
viz., the United States, the Constitution, and the President. We
likewise had 207 gunboats. These, however, were built for coast
defense and were utterly useless as sea-faring ships. We all
recall the victory of the Constitution over the Guerriere but per-
haps we do not know that this victory saved the nation and made


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Development and Growth of American Navy
permanent the establishment of the Navy and induced the govern-
ment to give the ships their share in the fighting.
In the years following the war with Tripoli, many prominent
citizens were in favor of doing away with the Navy entirely, as
had been done after the Revolution. The administration, having
no confidence in its ships when opposed to the overwhelming
forces of England, was inclining to the course by preventing their
capture by holding them locked in fortified harbors. The victory
of the Constitution changed this. When she came into port the
exultant shouts that arose along the shore swelled to a mighty roar
that was heard and felt to the uttermost parts of the nation.
Once more the national spirit was resurrected, which made possi-
ble the success of the war for the Union in 1863.
In 1814, in the memorable battle of the Essex and the English
squadron, we had exemplified the necessity of speed. Had the
Essex the necessary power to give her the needed speed, Admiral
Porter might have won the day. From this dates the need of
steam-propelled ships. We hear it said on all sides today that
speed is a craze and that the quality most needed in a fighting ship
is ability to stay in the battle line. If we are to invite the enemy
to come to our shores to do the fighting, then speed is of no con-
sequence. But, the men of the Navy who can be trusted to force
the fighting in time of battle are a unit in demanding ships that
will have power to reach the fighting line, and that when there,
will have guns with which to demonstrate the truth of the words
of Farragut, “The best protection against the enemy's fire is a
well directed fire from our own guns."
Prior to and during the War of 1812, naval battles were fought
between ships of sail. However, on account of serious blockades
on the Atlantic coast at will and the further fact that New York
suffered continually, steam ships appeared.
In 1813 Congress authorized the building of a battleship with a
single paddle wheel, having a speed of 5.5 knots an hour. This
ship was built by Fulton and was called by him Fulton the First.
However, this steamer was not completed in time to take part in
any war. On July 4, 1829, she was destroyed by the explosion
of her magazine. By an act of Congress, 1816, authority was
given to construct a steam warship. However, it was not until
1837 that the hull of this ship was launched. Engines that de-


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
veloped 625 horsepower were installed which drove her at a sus-
tained speed of 12 knots. This was, properly speaking, the first
ship of the steam Navy of the United States. In 1839 three steam
vessels were constructed by an act of Congress, each displacing
3,200 tons. They were completed in 1842. In 1849, John Erics-
son, an Englishman, constructed a screw propeller ship instead of
paddle wheels, with her engines entirely below the water line. This
ship was known as the Princeton. The need was felt in 1854 for
the construction of screw propelled ships capable of long cruising,
on account of European nations reaching out for more possessions
on the American continent. We were desirous of keeping the
Monroe Doctrine. As we did not have a sufficient number of
ships of the steam type, Congress passed an act for the construction
of eighteen ships “which shall combine the heaviest armament and
greatest speed compatible with their character and tonnage."
The question of guns was now considered. It will be remem-
bered that in the War of 1812 our guns threw a spherical cast-iron
ball weighing twenty-four pounds. After the war we substituted
thirty-two-pounders—guns with a six-inch bore. In 1845 we in-
troduced eight-inch guns into the Navy. In 1850, John A. Dahl-
gren submitted plans for a nine-inch gun that was immediately
cast. Soon after, an 11-inch gun was ordered, weighing 16,000
pounds, a shot weighing 166 pounds and a shell of 136 pounds.
These guns and the steam propelled vessels played an important
part in the Civil War.
In this war the cast of ships was of different structure than that
of former wars. The need of ironclads was important, for the
Civil War was fought along the coast of the Atlantic and within
range of fort guns. At the outbreak of the war the Navy was in
a wretched condition. When Lincoln took office there were in
commission, including supply ships and tenders, forty-two vessels,
twenty-three of which were propelled by steam. The home squad-
ron consisted of twelve, but of these five were available. The
Navy, when the crisis came, was utterly unprepared. To meet the
emergency, numerous ships and gunboats were hastily constructed
at an expense of $45,000,000. It was President Lincoln's plan to
blockade the coast from Alexandria, Virginia, to the Rio Grande.
This was in miles, 3,549, exclusive of 189 harbor openings. The
task was discovered to be an impossible one. It could not be accom-


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Development and Growth of American Navy
plished in a month nor in several months. We did not have the
ships. Out of ninety vessels on the Union naval list, fifty were
ships of sail. Two of the forty steamers were on stocks, two were
tugs, and one was on Lake Erie. In all, there were twenty-four
serviceable steamers, of which seven were in the home squadron.
While the national Navy was inadequate for any kind of war, the
Federal administration was much better off than the Confederate.
The South had no shops nor did they have mechanics, and yet,
unprepared as were both parties, the Civil War marks the end of
the old in the ships and guns of the Navy and the beginning of
the new.
At this time and a few years before this date, all rifled guns
were muzzle loaders. In 1875 breech loading guns made their ap-
pearance. Rifled cannon, beginning in Russia about 1836, were
essential in the Civil War on account of the armor on ships. These
guns had the advantage of greater penetrating power, greater
range, and increased accuracy. The Parrott guns of 100 and 300
pounders were used almost exclusively.
In ship construction, there was but one important innovation
since the War of 1812. That was the introduction of steam as the
propelling power. Ships were still built on the general lines of
frigates and sloops of war and were fully rigged, for it was sup-
posed that warships would ordinarily use steam power only as
auxiliary power. There were in existence a few side-wheelers but
ships of the latest type built in the United States had screw pro-
pellers. In launching the first steam man-of-war, the Fulton, in
1814, and the first screw propelled warship, the Princeton, in
1843, the United States had the distinct honor of leading the navies
of the world.
By the introduction of steam as the motive power, ships not only
gained in speed but could be maneuvered regardless of the wind.
In consequence, they were much better able to attack or pass forts,
and command harbors and rivers. Furthermore, they were adapted
for a new mode of attacking other vessels, that is, by ramming.
This method of fighting was virtually a return to the tactics of
the Greek and Roman galleys and it proved very effective in the
confined spaces of rivers and narrow bays. It was the Confederate
Navy, realizing that it had no ships, shipbuilders, or seamen, which
brought to light new effective implements—the torpedo boats and
the ironclad.


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1906
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The ironclad had its beginning in the Crimean War. The
Merrimac, the first of our ironclads, was 263 feet long and was
covered amidships with a shield of 178 feet, the sides of which
slanted at an angle of thirty-five degrees and rose, when she was
trimmed for battle, seven feet above the water line. The shield
was made of rafters of yellow pine, fourteen inches thick. Super-
posed on the wood was a layer of rolled iron bars eight inches
wide and two inches thick. The whole was bolted through and
through. Thus the vessel had an armor which was four inches
of iron supported by twenty-two inches of wood but which, hori-
zontally, gave a thickness very much greater. The knuckle where
the arinor joined the keel and the two ends of the vessel were
submerged to a depth of two feet, rendering those parts invulner-
able. The rudder and propeller were protected by a heavy solid
deck or fan tail. The armament consisted of ten guns; of the
eight comprising her broadsides, six were smooth bore. The
Merrimac was further armed with a cast-iron beak, wedge shape,
weighing 1,500 pounds.
Probably no naval conflict in the history of the world attracted
so much attention as the battle between the Monitor and the Merri-
mac. It revolutionized the navies of the world and showed that
wooden ships, which had long held control of the ocean, were of
no further use for fighting purposes.
For a brief interval at the end of the Civil War, the monitors
with their Dahlgren guns made the American Navy the most
powerful in the world, but when not in danger of conflict, the
Navy was neglected. The ships that had done good service in the
war wore out. Repairs became expensive. Ten years after the
Civil War the American Navy was the standard of inefficiency
among the seamen of the world. On account of our weakened
condition, we were again denied the respect of foreign nations.
Eight years after the Civil War American ships were captured by
Spanish coast guards. American citizens found on a Cuban fili-
buster were shot to death without trial. Our prestige was gone.
In the period since 1850 the United States Navy had been revo-
lutionized. The wooden frigates were supplanted by ironclads
propelled by steam. Three centuries had not effected such great
changes as had the brief quarter of a century ending in 1865.
These revolutionary changes were mainly the invention of the
rifled gun, the heavy smooth bore Dahlgren, and the torpedo, the


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1925)
1907
Development and Growth of American Navy
introduction of the ironclads and the application of steam to ships
of war. Of all these changes, perhaps the greatest was the sup-
planting of sail by steam. This made possible the revival of the
ram which had gone out after the war galleys were succeeded by
the sailing vessels. The first forms of the steamships, the side-
wheelers, were exceedingly vulnerable; but a great advance was
made by the invention of the screw propeller which permitted the

Bureau Aeronautics Photo
Navy SEAPLANE LEAVING CATAPULT ON U.S.S. "RICHMOND"
defense of the machinery by submersion, and by the armor plating
on the sides. The next natural step was the torpedo which was de-
vised for use against the underwater body, the only vulnerable
part of this latest type of ironclad. Thus began the race, still
going on between armor and ordnance. An inventory of the ships
made after the Civil War showed that most of them were unfit
because of faulty design, the use of unseasoned lumber, and the
hurried construction. A process of weeding out took place and
the few vessels that remained, Congress regarded as sufficient for


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1908
[Oct
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
a peace footing with the addition of monitors. These monitors
were built in Civil War style with wood heavily plated with iron.
In 1874 they had rotted so badly that they were ordered broken
up and rebuilt in iron. Congress subsequently stopped the work
of reconstruction and for twenty years the United States had not
a single armored ship. During the administration of President
Hayes, our Navy was inferior to that of any nation of Europe;
even Chile's two ironclads would have been more than a match
for all of our ships combined. All naval appropriations that could
be got out of Congress was designed to keep the existing ships in
repair. The Navy Department was forced to rebuild ships under
old names, paying for them out of the proceeds from the sale of
condemned hulls and out of the appropriations for repairs. The
year 1874 marks the lowest point to which the Navy has ever
sunk since the days when the United States had to pay ransom to
Algiers. Out of 140 vessels of the Navy, twenty-five were tugs
and only a few of the rest were in condition to make a cruise.
Not a single ship was fit for warfare, and yet, 1881 marks the
turning of the tide.
The first step toward a new Navy was taken by Secretary Hunt
with the approval of President Garfield in the appointment of an
advisory board. This board recommended the construction of thir-
ty-eight unarmored cruisers, five rams, five torpedo boats, ten
cruising torpedo boats and ten harbor torpedo boats. The smaller
vessels were to be all of steel and of the cruisers it was recom-
mended that eighteen were to be of steel and twenty of wood.
There were some who opposed the use of steel and recommended
iron on the ground that we had no plants capable of producing the
steel required. The new market created new plants to meet its
needs and the decision of the majority resulted in the rapid de-
velopment of one of the greatest American industries, the manu-
facture of steel. The house naval committee urged the building of
two cruisers capable of an average speed of 15 knots; four
cruisers capable of a speed of 14 knots, and one ram. Congress,
on August 5, 1882, called for two steam cruising vessels of war
to be constructed of steel of domestic manufacture—then Congress
neglected to make any appropriation for them. A second ad-
visory board was appointed and recommended five vessels, one of
4,000 tons; three of 2,500 tons—all of steel—and one ram dis-
patch boat of 1,500 tons.


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Development and Growth of American Navy
On March 3, 1883, an act was passed providing the construction
of these ships with the exception of one of the smaller cruisers.
These four, the first of the “White Squadron,” were the Chicago,
the Boston, the Atlanta, and the Dolphin. By the contract with
the Bethlehem Iron Company in 1887, facilities for making the
best of steel armor and forgings for the largest of steel guns were
provided.
Between 1881 and 1887, it was demonstrated that we had to
build steel mills before we could build modern battleships, and it
was demonstrated that even with the best of facilities, it was not
possible to build a battleship in less than a year. The impetus
following gave us ship yards, enabling us to build the best fighting
machines in the world.
In 1890 manufacturing plants were developed in America capa-
ble of turning out the highest type of large caliber and machine
guns, as well as the other requisites for the construction of a
modern battleship. An offspring of this period was the lamented
Maine. In the same year, 1890, the government took a long stride
in naval construction. Hitherto, there were no ships larger than
cruisers, but in this year Congress authorized three first-class
battleships, the Indiana, the Massachusetts, and the world famed
Oregon.
In 1898 our successes in the war with Spain gave the Navy a
tremendous impetus which has since put the United States, for
the first time, in the front rank among the naval powers of the
world. The ships built in 1890 were built for coast defense. While
they displaced nearly 10,000 tons and had a speed of 15 knots they
had a small coal capacity. Consequently, ships of this kind had
to stick closely to the coast. Our Navy at this time consisted of
four battleships of the first class, two battleships of the second
class, two armored cruisers, sixteen cruisers, fifteen gunboats, one
ram, one transport steamer and five torpedo boats. One subma-
rine boat was under construction. The battleships were the Ore-
gon, the Massachusetts, the Indiana, and the Iowa. The New York
and the Brooklyn were the cruisers. The Olympia was the so-
called protected cruiser.
The Porter was the largest torpedo boat in commission and
the first destroyer to be equipped with a wireless. She was 175
feet long and made 28.63 knots an hour. She was likewise armed
with tubes for firing torpedoes.


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19ΙΟ
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
With the building of the new ships, we also built guns adopted
from plans obtained from Europe. These were of wrought steel
tubes and were breech loaders. The largest of these guns weighed
sixty tons. They were forty feet long, the bore was thirteen
inches in diameter, and the wrought projectile weighed 1,100
pounds.
In 1899 we brought out the ships of the Virginia class with four
12-inch guns, eight 8-inch, and twelve 6-inch guns. These ships
were up to date beyond question. In 1902, the Louisiana and the
Connecticut were armed with four 12-inch, eight 8-inch, and
twelve 7-inch guns, besides twenty most excellent 3-inch guns.
With our ship development, we likewise took a step forward in gun
development. In our war with Spain less than 3 per cent of the
shots fired from our ships hit the enemy. Under a system of train-
ing adopted after the war, especially after Theodore Roosevelt
became president, our gunners became so expert that we had a
trophy ship in the American Navy in 1907 having a record of
75.782 per cent of hits with all guns at target practice.
At this time, the 12-inch gun was fired twice in a minute with
much more accuracy than was obtained when it was possible to
fire it but once in five minutes. At long ranges, it has been found
that the 12-inch gun is more accurate than guns of small caliber ;
the trajectory of the big gun is flatter. Now, small guns were
mounted because of the supposed greater accuracy with which
they could be fired. It followed, therefore, that when twelve hits
could be made in twelve successive shots from the 12-inch gun-a
record actually made in the Navy, there was no longer any need
for the 7- or 8-inch guns.
In 1910 we had two dreadnaughts of 20,000 tons displacement
carrying ten 12-inch guns in turrets. A battery of 5-inch guns
was provided against torpedo attack. Those ships were capable
of making 21 knots. In armored cruisers we had eight of the
North Carolina class. At the same time we had three scout
cruisers, displacing 3,750 tons and making 24 knots. These ships
were turbine driven ships using the Parsons and the Curtis tur-
bines. All these ships were coal burners. Owing to an unfor-
tunate mishap, the idea of using oil solely was discontinued until
ships of the Nevada and Oklahoma class were launched. Today
practically all capital ships of the American Navy consume oil


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1925)
1911
Development and Growth of American Navy
solely. Electric driven ships took the place of reciprocating en-
gines at the appearance of the Jupiter, now the aircraft carrier
Langley. In battleships, the New Mexico was the first one to use
electricity exclusively as a driving power.
We have today in our Navy eighteen battleships which are all
that we are permitted to have by the Washington Treaty.
These ships have a displacement of about 32,000 tons. Of these
eighteen ships, seven are driven by electric power and have four
propellers, developing a horsepower of about 29,000 and giving a
speed of about 21 knots. Eight others are propelled by steam
turbines with four propellers each, developing a total horsepower
of about 30,000 and giving a speed of about 21 knots. The other
three have reciprocating engines. Of these battleships six are
coal burners and they are to be converted into oil burners. All
of these eighteen battleships are armed with a main battery of
guns ranging in size from twelve to sixteen inches, and with a
secondary battery of 5-inch guns to be used against destroyers and
eight 3-inch anti-aircraft guns to be used as protection against
airplane attack.
In cruisers we have ten modern vessels of 7,500 tons each.
These are all driven by steam turbines with four propellers, the
total horsepower being about 90,000 and the speed being about
33.7 knots. Those light cruisers are armed each with twelve
6-inch guns and four 3-inch anti-aircraft guns. They are also
equipped with four torpedo tubes. Besides these modern light
cruisers we have a number of older cruisers that have no great
military value but are useful in time of peace to protect our in-
terests abroad and to show the flag.
In destroyers we have 274, of which only 110 are in full com-
mission, the remainder being tied up to the docks in reserve owing
to insufficient personnel to man them. These destroyers are of
about 1,200 tons displacement and are driven by steam turbines
with two propellers, producing a horsepower of about 26,000 to
29,000, giving a speed of about 33 to 35 knots. Each of these
destroyers is armed with four torpedo tubes and four 4-inch guns,
together with one anti-aircraft gun."
In submarines we have built or are building seven of the larger
type of a little over 1,000 tons displacement. These vessels have
a surface speed sufficient to permit them to accompany the battle
*Five of these destroyers have 5-inch guns.


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1912
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
fleet. Besides these fleet submarines we have about ninety sub-
marines of less than 1,000 tons which are useful for coast defense
work only.
In addition to the foregoing types there are a number of aux-
iliary vessels and one aircraft carrier, the Langley. The Langley
was formerly the collier Jupiter and she is the first vessel in which
the Navy installed the electric drive. She is equipped to mount seven
planes on her landing deck and to stow eighteen planes below.
She has a landing platform extending her complete length from
which the planes can depart and return. By an ingenious method,
the planes on lighting are brought to a quick but gradual stop.
Before the Washington Conference we were building six battle
cruisers of 43,500 tons each with a horsepower of 180,000 which
was to give them a speed of about 3374 knots, but, as a result
of the Washington Conference, all of these vessels had to be given
up except two, the Lexington and the Saratoga, which are being
made into aircraft carriers. These two are to have electric drive.
Much of interest might be said about the battleships. They
have a complement each of about 1,200 men and about sixty
officers. Ships of this type are practically huge machine shops
operating completely by electricity. Their electric power consists
of some four to six turbo-driven generators of 300 kilowatts each.
There are three anchors, each weighing about ten tons, which are
hoisted by electric winches. Each has two electric cranes with a
lifting capacity of twenty tons for the handling of boats and heavy
weights.
It may not be generally known that one of these great ships con-
tains the same facilities and necessities that are found in any town
or city for the welfare and comfort of the people. In addition to
the natural ventilation system there is a forced ventilation. Certain
electric blowers take in fresh air on deck and other electric blow-
ers pump out the foul air. In the galleys all cooking is done on
ranges which burn oil. The bake shops are equipped with electric
dough mixers and two electric bake ovens with a capacity of 2,400
pounds of bread a day. Two 3-ton ice machines manufacture all
ice used, insuring the preservation of meats and other perishable
foods with a great degree of certainty. Each ship is equipped with
telephone exchanges with about 200 connections throughout the
ship. Each ship has a completely equipped laundry. Each ship


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1913
Development and Growth of American Navy
also has a modern hospital provided with twenty-four beds, a
complete operating room, an isolation ward, and a dental office.
Each has its own post office which is authorized by the post office
department. All fresh water, unknown in the old navy except for
drinking purposes, is made on the modern vessel from sea water in
the evaporating and distilling plants. This system dates from
1882. The salt water is first evaporated which deposits the salt,
and the steam is then condensed into fresh water. The modern
plants aboard the present capital ships are capable of making
20,000 gallons of water per day.
An important adjunct of our fighting fleet is our aircraft. Each
major ship and cruiser carries a hydroplane which is used prin-
cipally to spot the fall of shots and give information to the firing
ship. This is necessary owing to the fact that the ranges at which
we now fire our guns have increased to 30,000 yards and from
the guns the target is often not visible. All of the guns are fired
by what is known as the director method. By this method the
aim at the target is taken from a station aloft, and by electric
means pointers at the guns are moved and the men at the guns
lay the guns to correspond to these pointers. From the station
aloft the target can be seen at long ranges while at the gun it
cannot be. The airplane flies over the target or the enemy ship
and keeps the firing ship informed of whether the shots are hitting
or going over, or short, and so forth, and the director can then ad-
just his aim accordingly.
The Lexington and Saratoga, which are now being made into
airplane carriers, will carry from seventy to eighty planes, will
have landing platforms as has the Langley, and will have a speed
that will permit them to accompany the fleet.
It is perhaps difficult for the average individual to realize just
how necessary are auxiliary vessels. However, a modern battle-
ship is helpless without them. Some are specialized and must be
part of the regular Navy. These include such units as hospital
ships, supply ships, repair ships, transports, oil carriers, colliers,
and cargo vessels. In 1907, President Roosevelt sent an American
fleet around the world but had no auxiliary colliers to accompany
the ships. To meet the need the government hired merchant ships
and colliers from foreign lines.


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1914
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
It has been the endeavor of this paper to describe briefly the
development of the Navy from the whaling ships to the modern
super-dreadnaughts, a development that has kept a steady pace
with our national emergencies, a development that has arisen in
order to preserve our national integrity and to keep this beloved
land of ours in preparation for any crisis.
Without this preparation, no degree of heroism, no amount of
fortitude, no fertility of resources, could suffice for meeting a
crisis adequately. In the development on the material side, the
United States Navy has an enviable record of originality and
leadership.
Today our Navy is more modern, better organized, of heavier
tonnage and greater strength, more completely manned and more
intelligently served than ever before in its history. The great
European war has brought home to all alike the need of prepared-
ness and never again should this nation repeat the fallacies of the
past in naval policy that have in more than one period of years
allowed its naval strength to deteriorate.
If we are to retain our prestige; if we are to keep our place as
one of the great custodians of civilization; if we are to preserve the
heritage of our freedom and our institutions and transmit that
heritage unsullied to our descendants; if we are to guard our
families and firesides, let us keep in our hands the power that God
has given us and renounce once and forever the sophistries that
would shear the Navy of its strength.
Such ships as we have are at least the equals of corresponding
types in any navy in the world and the country has as much reason
today to be proud of its ships and its guns, its officers and men, as
in the days of old.
A navy that takes the seas with a preponderance of naval power
rules the sea almost as if the opposing navy did not exist. Its
lines of commerce and of military supply are practically un-
interrupted. Its industries are suffering from no lack of raw
material and the markets of the world are as freely open to it as
if the war did not exist.
It is interesting to note the frequency with which naval warfare
is "revolutionized" in the minds of the laymen. The introduction
of armor was followed by many predictions that the sides of the
ships could never again be pierced. The development of the gun


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1915
Development and Growth of American Navy
to the point where it overmatches the heaviest armor led to the
confident announcement that armor was useless and that the war-
ship of the future would dispense with it altogether. The success-
ful development of the torpedo was held to make large ships worse
than useless until the net was introduced and hailed as reducing the
torpedo to impotence. So the struggle goes on—and through all
its changes the backbone of the fleet has continued to be the fight-
ing ship of large and steadily increasing size with powers of
offense and defense evenly balanced on the whole, recognizing the
menace of secondary enemies and guarding against them as best
it may, but seeing its real opponent in the battleships and dread-
naughts of the enemy. The dreadnaught of today has succeeded
through gradual, not revolutionary, development of the line of
battleship of two centuries ago. It may be that this type is soon to
become obsolete, but the evidence that this is so, appeals far more
strongly to the popular imagination than to the seasoned judg-
ment of students of naval warfare.


  p. 1916 (#860)                      #

THE ARRAY AGAINST SOVEREIGNTY
By CAPTAIN Wat T. CLUVERIUS, U. S. Navy
W E OWE our national existence to a struggle for inde-
W pendence and frequently, since that initial struggle, have
we been called upon to maintain our sovereignty by the
same means. As a people, we have been remarkably successful in
vanquishing the foe who would destroy it and, as intended, this
nation continues to be the mecca of the world's oppressed peoples
and the goal of those who seek both happiness and prosperity. But,
today, with a world upset and the ashes of a universal conflagration
still smoldering, the Republic is confronted with the most serious
menace to her sovereignty she has yet encountered and of which
the danger is scarcely realized.
I refer to a rapidly increasing enemy from within, already
allied with alien forces and spreading its sinister influence to
school, forum, and church, in every hamlet, town, and city of the
nation.
On all sides there is growing criticism of our fundamental na-
tional institutions ; disregard of civic duties; demands for complete
disarmament; repudiation of obligation; and everywhere, preach-
ings of perpetual peace and of the spread of the brotherhood
of man.
What does all this mean? Is it the natural reaction of a highly
favored nation recently emerged triumphantly from a war in which
it helped to stamp out the ambitions of a lustful monarch who
marked America also for destruction ? Naturally not.
Let us inquire elsewhere, recalling that a nation is made up of
groups of individuals of the same or assimilated blood. These
groups have certain interests. They form a government in order
to safeguard these interests to all concerned. A nation that thus
governs itself exercises its sovereignty. There are many such
groups on the earth's surface today possessing dissimilar char-
acteristics, and, as these groups grow, they make contacts with
*Written for the National Republic.


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1925]
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The Array Against Sovereignty
other groups and the interests often overlap and are in conflict.
Every properly constituted government has an instrument where-
with it transacts these external affairs by means of conference,
treaty, or arbitration. With us, it is called the Department of
State, an executive department under the Chief Executive. When
this department, through failure of its efforts, is unable to main-
tain the national will and the nation is suddenly plunged into
hostilities and war is declared; then, and not until then, other ex-
ecutive branches of the government are called into play—the
Army and Navy. The flames are extinguished, order is restored
out of chaos, and the nation's sovereignty is again placed out of
jeopardy.
Here are the agencies on the side of sovereignty and it is to
the honor of our citizens that these agencies have ever been able
to maintain them and their rightful goods in security. Moreover,
the President of the United States has recently said that he wants
the armed forces of America to be considered by all peoples "as
the contribution which is made by this country for the maintenance
and security of the world.” A dignified mission, and certainly
worthy of all acceptance.
Now, what of the forces allied against our national solidarity?
To the careful observer these forces are not hidden as was that
new and dreadful agent of destruction, the German submarine,
destroying warship and innocent merchant ship, alike, with in-
credible ruthlessness. The foe now arrayed against us leaves a
distinct trace of its operations in the propaganda which invests
every walk of life. The ranks of this army are composed of pro-
fessionals: its files are amateurs. The leaders are pacifists, so-
cialists, communists, and humbugs. They are organized into
various societies masquerading under high sounding titles and
interlocking in apparently high ethical and humane endeavor. In
every case it is necessary to look for an ulterior motive. In-
evitably there is such a motive which varies from a mere money-
making scheme—an ethical swindle—to the deliberate misguidance
of honest citizens for the purpose of producing disaffection and
thus undermining our institutions. The consummation of such an
object is anarchy and the consequent destruction of all national
resources. Invariably, also, no matter what the variation in type
of those engaged in these activities, or the character of the motives,


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1918
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
getting other people's money is always a feature of the job. It is
required in great quantities in order to spread these influences just
as much as it is required to effect nefarious ends in corrupt politics.
Americans are idealists: they are easily touched.
The term “pacifist” has been brought into disrepute, as all good
citizens are real pacifists; that is, they abhor war. They are
really concerned with perpetuating peace which is "war's only
legitimate object.” The personnel of the Army and Navy are
outstanding examples of real pacifists for it has first-hand in-
formation of the horrors of war and the life work of the armed
forces of our country is in the undivided interest of peace. Church-
men and scholars are pacifists. It is these, so often sentimentalists,
who are being influenced by the masquerading pacifists in most
alluring and successful appeal, and with what result ?
It is becoming fashionable to state that war is simply unthink-
able; that it can be outlawed by decree and thus avoided. What
need, we are asked, of any defense? Who can attack? Why not
disarm so that others may surely follow? This sounds fine. Such
reasoning has been drilled into our people by forces working
quietly and incisively who well know that the history of the world
bears out none of this reasoning ; that human nature has been but
little changed in the many centuries known to mankind; that greed
and avarice and thievery still abound; that differences in many
viewpoints can never be reconciled; and that until moral forces are
strong enough among humankind to counteract all these very hu-
man frailties, little change can be expected in the conduct of
nations which are themselves individuals. All this is well known
but cleverly concealed in the appeal. The object of the promoter
-in addition to the incident of making a livelihood—is really to
sell us out. This was brazenly patent in one of the recent national
(save the mark!) political platforms. We will outlaw war. How?
By avoiding war. How? By rendering our armed forces im-
potent. Disarmament again, and why always harping on the
United States ? Very simple, for we are the great creditor nation.
Without might in this very human world today, what would right
do toward effecting the return of billions of our people's money
most unsparingly poured into their government's hands—to give
away? What would become of every commercial treaty with other
nations wherewith the products of the hand of our people are


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The Array Against Sovereignty
marketed to all the world? What would become of the precious
instrument of government which has made so much possible to
its people? The answer is that ungovernment would replace it
and our treasure would be divided up among the hoboes of the
earth.
Here is what eventually becomes of the simple little thing put
forth by the learned and well-meaning teacher of our children.
Nothing more nor less than communism, all of it emanating from
alien sources beneath the contempt of the sovereign government
of the United States.
There are no less than 200,000 of this one type actively engaged
within our borders and bountifully supplied with gold—hard
earned, good American gold at that. Pretty work!
Now consider for a moment a clear example of the inconsistency
of the amateur responding to this stuff which of itself is a really
saving grace.
Among the founders of the Republic—those who had struggled,
remember—were many who had been driven out of Europe
through religious persecution. These saw to it that the Constitu-
tion stressed religious liberty. There was thus made possible the
development of great protestant bodies as unquestioned forces for
spiritual welfare. Shortly after the Great War, one of these
denominations, in convention assembled, demanded an instant dis-
bandment of our armed forces on land and sea. The very next
year this same organization just as strongly demanded the chastise-
ment of a nation, with whom we were at peace, for its treatment of
Armenians. “War with Turkey” was the cry that year. Last
year, this same great spiritual host was on the verge of threatening
the United States with refusal to serve the nation if called up in
its extremity—the country, remember, that had made this church
possible.
The Navy Department at Washington is bombarded with writ-
ten demands from church congregations, east and west, to stop
the maneuvers of our fleet in our own waters—the only way to
produce efficiency—in order not to provoke Oriental powers. In
the same mail, similar organizations demand most anxiously the
protection of their missionaries in the Orient. Heart and reason
are at variance and the heart is certainly improperly stimulated
and reason stultified.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Then, too, these insinuating agencies that cause this state of
affairs reach into other fields in propagating the tenets they repre-
sent. The fields, however, adjoin. For instance, the notable
communist nation is atheistic. God is decried in this form of
government. It is to the interest of such a nation, in furthering
this degree, to enter into all religious disputes no matter where.
Scientists and intellectuals are made interested and their services
used. Lecturers are sent broadcast under a glowing banner with
illuminating subject thereon. Unknown to many of those engaged,
the organization they represent is controlled by an outlawed asso-
ciation—I mean an association whose very meetings are broken up
by police. At present such a league in America is supporting the
so-called Modernist Cause and the lecturers are establishing
branches throughout the country. Little do many of them suspect
that these branches are naturally nuclei of communistic councils
whose ulterior object is to disrupt all the churches of the United
States in their struggle for universal class supremacy.
The Dayton episode is a side issue. Even that is believed to have
the backing, financial and otherwise, of these apparently benevolent
aggregations. On the plea of intolerance, as evidenced by the
Tennessee statute, an uncommonly well financed outfit, whose out-
standing cry is for civil liberty (and, naturally, we all believe in
civil liberty) is conducting an educational campaign through civic,
professional, religious, and (never fail) womens' organizations.
Now, while this campaign is on, another affiliated organization sug-
gests in an open forum that the time is opportune also for stirring
up industrial strife and this organization decided to import paid
organizers into desired locations in order to create dissension
among the workers. Here we have both the intelligentia and the
proletariat being appealed to for the same purpose.
Along with all this, the straight-forward communistic groups
are organizing the youth for athletics and physical culture likewise
in the interest of class struggle and for revolutionary purposes and
so state—avowedly, to make the working class well disciplined and
efficient as a fighting force. You see, a fighting force again.
On the last Flag Day, in June, a daily communist paper pub-
lished in Chicago and widely distributed, called upon its readers
to denounce any participation in boosting for “the flag that never
protected interests of workers” and this paper proclaimed what it


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The Array Against Sovereignty
called a “Red Week” with instructions to “Agitate.” This week
culminated on July Fourth, the anniversary of an occasion that
brought into being the very lives of those who prate of a “Red
Week” in America and behind which is an actual Red Army, well
drilled and well armed-in Europe.
Perhaps these are not really Americans thus engaged. At a
recent meeting of a society, the first word in whose name is
“American,” of more than 500 persons, eighteen per cent stated
that they were born in the United States. When asked who were
born in Europe, the remainder of those present rose in a body.
The bond between these plainly anti-government masses and the
seemingly innocent and peace loving bands of brothers and sisters
is beautifully interlocked. All have contacts at the seat of our
National Capital. In fact, the literature of many protests received
from various agencies on almost any movement this country sees
fit to make in transacting its own rightful business is traceable to
the activities of a single executive secretary of one of these or-
ganizations whose headquarters is in sight of all of the executive
offices of the government of the United States, and Washington
is acknowledged to be a fruitful place for conventions of all sorts.
The president of a most influential college recently declared in an
open conference in Washington, called to find a cure for war, that
everybody had joined (something or other) "except the United
States and a few other trifling nations.” This conference talked
for a week without result. General Miles, a faithful servant just
called to his reward, in an interview of twelve words, gave the
real solution: "The only cure for war is to eradicate sin from
the world."
The great associations for the well-being of our youth, church
clubs, Bible leagues, temperance unions, all appear on the
letter heads of many clearly propagandist organizations. They
have been led into camp-nothing more, nothing less. They do not
realize it and may not until it is too late to prevent the desecra-
tion of our hearth stones. Can anything be more illustrative of
existing conditions than the Pageant of Lexington, written in con-
nection with the Boston celebration of the Bunker Hill Anni-
versary this year? The text was lauded by a revered Boston paper,
which said that through it ran "a purposeful motif translating
Lexington's Day into the usage of today and tomorrow in Ameri-


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
can life.” Here is a part of the appeal of this poem to Americans:
You people!
Stand up for your rights !
To hell with your duties !
Do you want Freedom?
Well, then, organize !
Wealth is labor!
Property is labor!
Capital is labor!
Organize!
The same author wrote, less than a year before: “I cannot
today imagine the circumstances under which I would again fight
for this or any other country.”
These are the words of the recognized spokesman of the patri-
ots of Lexington, so said a member of the American Defense
Society, patriots whose forbears first voiced American Independ-
ence by declaring that “if they mean to have war let it begin here!"
A grave danger is that all of these radical organizations are merg-
ing. It is an easy matter to disintegrate small bodies when exposed
to the searching rays of the sun. But, truly, in union there is
strength. If our real citizenry, made up of the basic fabrics of
the nation, comes to realize that it is being duped, the danger will
be avoided. This requires just as much education as the propa-
gandist uses and he is using it well. He has a grand argument
and it is penetrating. It has won many converts. The talk of
universal peace is soothing in the extreme.
A peace-loving gentleman and a splendid sailor, formerly in
command of our country's feet and now soon to retire to life in
quietude among his friends, said:
"I beg of you not to be deceived by a dream of eternal peace. The
same passions, prejudices, and selfishness exist today as have always ex-
isted, and will have similar results. This nation of ours achieved its in-
dependence, preserved its integrity, and extended its borders by force. If
we are to enjoy the fruits of the labors of our fathers, we must be prepared
to use the same instrument.”
There is no need here to make a plea for the forces which keep
us a nation. The United States goes the ultimate limit in its
efforts for peace. She welcomes every step looking toward peace.
The whole world owes her a debt of gratitude. She maintains


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The Array Against Sovereignty
an armed force in defense of her lawful rights when, despite all
these efforts, they are encroached upon. She renders her good
offices to weaker nations whenever they are imposed upon. In
time of peace her flag covers her people who are doing their share
of the world's work no matter where they may be. That flag
extends her humanitarianism to every nation under the sun. We
seek no one's territory. Our very altruism is often our weakness.
We cannot see the forces arrayed against us unless they face
our guns.
One glance about the world today will show how much there is
to be done before real peace comes and how great is our share
of it. Even then, when the world is entirely recovered from the
last devastation, how can universally perfected morality be in-
sured ? It is international morality alone that can prevent strife
among nations.
The great Washington in a message to the Congress wrote:
"The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, con-
trary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a
distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of
every other nation abounds.”
Americans only at their peril can ignore the precepts of their
First President.


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U.S. Navy Photo
GENERAL VIEW OF NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, BELLEVUE, D.C.


  p. 1925 (#869)                      #

THE NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
By CAPTAIN Paul Foley, U. S. Navy, TECHNICAL AIDE TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE Navy
THE NAVAL Research Laboratory is, broadly speaking,
concerned with investigations in the field of physical and
technical science as applied to the special requirements of the
naval service.
The idea of such an institution had its inception at the time of
the organization meeting of the Naval Consulting Board on Octo-
ber 7, 1915. The distinguished members of this board were quick
to realize that in order to secure the best results from the work
which they proposed to undertake along scientific and inventive
lines, the construction of a suitable laboratory would be imper-
atively necessary.
There was not at this time, it will be remembered, any provision
in the naval establishment for research work as such. Navy
yards and their facilities were fully occupied with the active work
of construction and maintenance of the fleet as their primary
function. Anything in the nature of research or experimental
work was necessarily subordinated to the exigencies of the pri-
mary function and suffered accordingly. The result, in general,
was that service interest was limited to that which was finished and
for sale upon the market without regard to whether or not it might
be best for the naval purpose.
On March 15, 1916, Secretary Daniels, Mr. Edison, Dr. Beake-
land, Mr. Coffin, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Saunders, members of the
Naval Consulting Board, appeared before the Committee on Naval
Affairs of the House Representatives, and subjected themselves to
a thorough examination as to the purposes of the laboratory and its
necessity. They convinced the committee that substantial sav-
ings would accrue if means were provided to permit determination
of naval needs by original investigation rather than by the dictum
of the manufacturer.
Accordingly, there was incorporated in the appropriation act


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
for the year ending June 30, 1917, the sum of $1,500,000 for
laboratory and research work on the subjects of gun erosion;
torpedo motive power; the gyroscope; submarine guns; protection
against submarine, torpedo, and mine attack; improvement in
submarine attachments; improvement and development in sub-
marine engines, storage batteries, and propulsion; airplanes and
aircraft; improvement in radio installations; and other necessary
work of similar character for the benefit of the government service,
including the construction, equipment, and operation of a lab-
oratory; and the employment of scientific civilian assistants as
might become necessary.
The enabling act was fortunately broad and comprehensive,
particularly in the feature of establishing the new activity as a
branch of the Secretary's office, available to the entire naval estab-
lishment, rather than as an appendage of the technical bureaus.
Based upon a study of the considerations that should determine
site, the more important of which were proximity to navigable
streams; general climatic conditions and labor market; availability
of other government machinery and facilities; accessibility to
civilian scientists, and to institutions of parallel character, com-
bined with secrecy and efficiency of operation, and safety from
enemy assault, the laboratory was finally located at Bellevue, on the
Potomac River, four miles below the Washington Navy Yard.
The principal buildings, all of which are of the most modern
steel and concrete construction, include a research building 200 x
60 ft.; a machine shop 300 x 82; a foundry and smith shop; pat-
tern shop and power plant. There is also a barracks to house the
marine guard and enlisted personnel assigned to the station. The
shop and laboratory equipment is elaborate in character and ade-
quate for the service required.
General direction of the establishment centers in the office
of the Technical Aide to the Secretary of the Navy, with an
assistant director, a line officer supervising the physical operations
on the ground. The technical personnel numbers about fifty, as-
sisted by a shop force of about the same number.
Placed in formal commission in July, 1923, the laboratory has
in the second year of operation, established a gratifying record
of constructive performance which fully confirms the vision and
judgment of its sponsors.


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There have been organized to date a Radio Unit under the
general supervision of Dr. A. H. Taylor, formerly of the univer-
sity of Wisconsin; a Sound Unit under Dr. H. C. Hayes, formerly
of Harvard; a Light and Heat Unit, under Dr. E. O. Hulburt,
formerly of Johns Hopkins; and a Ballistic or Pressure Unit,
under Dr. H. H. Moore.
1. ACTIVITIES OF THE RADIO UNIT.—In radio the outstanding
research achievement has been determination of the laws which
govern the formation of radio waves of very high frequency,
and of the mechanism of their propagation through space. This
study has extended over two years. From the knowledge gained
the laboratory is now in position to proceed with the development
of inexpensive and relatively low power transmitting apparatus
which will assure reliable communication over far greater range
than is possible with an existing installation. Incidentally, it has
contributed additional scientific information regarding the upper
layers of the earth's atmosphere, confirming the existence and
establishing the altitude of the so-called Kennerly-Heaviside layer
of maximum ionic density-in popular language, the ceiling of
the sky.
The mass of experimental data from which these deductions
were made was accumulated through the cooperation and as-
sistance of amateur radio operators of the American Relay League,
and their co-workers in foreign countries. These gentlemen have
voluntarily given their time and services in making observations
and reports on experimental transmissions, and in so doing have
played an important part in advancing the radio art.
Research work of almost equal importance has been carried on
in connection with piezo-electric crystals, principally quartz.
The well-known principle of crystal oscillation at fixed fre-
quency seemed of value in controlling the frequency of radio trans-
mitters and receivers. Before practical use of this principle could
be made it was found necessary to investigate more fully the
factors controlling such oscillations. While much remains to be
accomplished, sufficient information is now available to permit
the construction of crystal controlled transmitters and receivers.
Crystals intended for control of this character can be and are
prepared at the laboratory permitting the fixation of oscillations
at any desired number ranging from 20,000 to 11,000,000 per


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
second; and such crystals will oscillate at the determined rate
with a variation of only a few hundred per second. When con-
trolled by such a crystal, a transmitter will have a fixed frequency
regardless of inevitable minor changes in circuit conditions, a
feature which it is impossible to obtain with apparatus not con-
trolled in this manner.
Receivers also can be fitted with crystal control and quickly
brought into step with the transmitter. By thus definitely fixing
the frequency band over which transmission and reception take
place, the number of channels through the ether over which com-
munication is possible is very largely increased.
The principles enunciated have been given practical application
in the construction of an experimental 10K.W. crystal controlled
high frequency (4200 k.c.s.) transmitter built at the laboratory.
This transmitter has been found suitable for direct night traffic
with distant stations, and has been used by the Naval Communica-
tion Service in handling traffic with the west coast, Panama,
Honolulu, Samoa, and European stations, thus taking practically
the entire night load of the highest powered Naval Radio Station.
The economy resulting can be realized when it is considered that
power costs alone have been reduced from about $12.00 to $1.00
per hour, and that the transmitter itself represented but a small
fraction of the costs of the high powered station. Another 1 K.W.
high frequency set has been used by the Navy Department for
daylight traffic, and on occasions messages have been carried
through with this set when those from a 350 K.W. arc set were
indistinguishable because of static interference. It can now be
authoritatively stated that a high frequency transmitting station
can be built at a cost of $60,000 giving better service and longer
range than present high power stations costing $2,000,000, while
the cost of operation and upkeep will be correspondingly reduced.
Additional radio apparati devised to date include a heterodyne
frequency meter, long and intermediate wave receivers, and an
intra-fleet set. Inexpensive and compact air condensers for
shore purposes have been constructed, as also apparatus for the
elimination of losses in trunk circuits, and apparatus for permit-
ting single antennae multiple reception on board ship. A field
transmitting set for use by the Marine Corps has been constructed,
as also an automatic recording apparatus for radio messages. Con-


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The Naval Research Laboratory
siderable work has been devoted to perfecting a better receiver
for coastal radio stations, and in eliminating interference in
arc sets.
Numerous patent applications in adaption of knowledge gained
have been filed, insuring protection to the naval service of work
done and making available to all government departments the free
use of such developments.
A few months ago when the flight of the Shenandoah over the
polar region was under consideration, radio apparatus of special
type was developed and manufactured as an emergency measure.
From data gathered in subsequent flights it has been possible to
remodel at slight cost the installations originally devised, giving
a steadier wave and greatly increased range of daylight communi-
cation. This data permits the design of much more efficient
apparatus than heretofore thought possible for heavier-than-air
craft.
Studies in high frequency communication from lighter-than-
air craft have resulted in the development of apparatus insuring
long range communication with less weight and power than here-
tofore used even for short distances. A sending and reception
schedule arranged with the MacMillan Arctic Expedition has been
astonishingly efficient in performance. Endeavor is also being
made to eliminate reception interference on air craft due to igni-
tion disturbances.
2. ACTIVITIES OF THE SOUND UNIT.—The development of a
simple sonic depth finder has been completed and one model is
undergoing service tests. This depth finder will give accurate
soundings as low as ten fathoms with a possibility of further re-
ducing this to about five fathoms. The device is much simpler
in design and more effective in operation than any now in use,
and will cost less than one-third to manufacture and install. The
saving for each installation will be about $100,000. Work is
under way in development of an automatic visual indicator by
means of which depth indications will be made immediately to the
commanding officer without the intermediary of a special operator.
The development of more effective means of communication
between vessels by the use of the underwater sound waves using
both sonic and super-sonic principles is well advanced. Two
barges intended for use in testing sound apparatus have been fitted


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
up and will be moved in the near future to a location on deep water
where conclusive tests will be made of installations designed and
built for communication purposes during the past year.
Work on the development of a loud speaker for use in trans-
mitting messages on board ship has been undertaken and several
models built. While satisfactory as a loud speaker, it is not
felt that anything so far developed will fully meet the exacting
requirements imposed by conditions on board ship. Several new
principles have been used in the development work. One applica-
tion of experimental data so far obtained will be the design of
an electro-magnetically driven iog signal replacing the present
steam whistle on surface craft, and the compressed air whistle on
submarines and light vessels.
The detection of air craft by acoustical methods has been given
considerable attention, in extension of the work carried on by
others. No actual work is considered warranted until a new and
untried scheme giving promise of success presents itself.
3. ACTIVITIES OF THE HEAT AND Light UNIT.—This unit in
the first six months after establishment is primarily concerned with
investigations of a confidential character in connection with ultra-
violet and infra-red rays. It has also carried on intensive in-
vestigations concerning properties of quartz crystals, and of
apparatus necessary in conjunction with working quartz on a pro-
duction basis.
The unit has undertaken work in connection with the sputtering
of metals, the development of thermo-couples, and the use of the
photo-elastic process for determining the stresses occurring in
metallic structures; also in the laws underlying color combinations,
shapes, and so forth, for visual flag signals.
4. ACTIVITIES OF THE BALLISTIC UNIT.—This unit has accom-
plished the development and manufacture of long range, high
speed cameras for use in connection with projectiles in flight, and
of shell bursts. It has developed, also, cameras for use in anti-air
craft spotting. Calibration tests to determine the velocity of pro-
jectiles before leaving the muzzle of the gun, as opposed to the
velocity in air have been completed. The ejection velocities of
the West Virginia turret guns have been established as from
thirty-five to fifty feet per second less than the muzzle velocity.
Reliable information concerning the pressure developed under


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The Naval Research Laboratory
various conditions in the hydraulic steering gear of battleships
has been obtained.
5. The TREND OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.—The next step in
the orderly expansion of the laboratory activities will be the estab-
lishment of a metallurgical and chemical unit.
The Limitation of Arms Conference imposed a limitation upon
the size of future construction expressible in terms of weight
alone, that is, displacement. Every ton which, by the use of
lighter and stronger metal, can be saved in the weight of the
hull structure may be applied to add to the strictly military charac-
teristics of the design.
The investigation of metals, especially of the non-ferrous alloys
with regard to lightness, strength, resistance to vibration, to corro-
sion, and climatic changes is one of the most important problems
confronting the naval service.
Negotiations are in progress, also, for the employment of a dis-
tinguished mathematical physicist whose services are urgently re-
quired in the solution of the intricate mathematical problems
arising from day to day in connection with the work of the other
units.
6. AssociATED ACTIVITIES.—The Bureau of Navigation has
established at the laboratory under the supervision of selected
officers a radio class, normally consisting of thirty-five enlisted
men selected from the fleet. The course of instruction is twenty-
two weeks. Advantage is taken of the available radio experts
and equipment to instruct the students in the principles underlying
the design of radio and sound apparatus. Two classes have been
already graduated which have given an excellent demonstration in
subsequent performance afloat.
There are normally attached to the laboratory, also, during the
summer months a number of postgraduate officers which in time
will make the work being carried on more familiar than it now is
to the naval service.
7. CONCLUSION.—The outstanding characteristic of the Re-
search Laboratory contrasted with anything existing elsewhere in
the naval establishment, is that, by reason of the high character
of its technical personnel, and of the shop personnel recruited for
the most part from the Naval Gun Factory, it is possible to work
directly from the mind of the scientist to the hand of the mechanic,


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
eliminating entirely the drafting room. The draftsman has no
place in the picture until the apparatus has passed the development
stage and is ready to pass to a production basis.
Pride of performance is the going principle. No consideration
of money or working hours or weather influences the personnel in
the accomplishment of purpose. Much of the work herein out-
lined has necessarily been accomplished in the small hours of the
night. The chairman of the House Committee on Naval Appro-
priations took the opportunity upon the occasion of the committee
hearings to thank the technical staff in the name of the Congress
for the splendid services it was rendering to the Navy Department
and to the government of the United States.


  p. 1933 (#877)                      #

UNIFIED PROCUREMENT OF GOVERNMENT
AIRCRAFT
BY COMMANDER E. E. Wilson, U. S. Navy
ROPONENTS of the United Air Force idea list, as one of
the advantages of the proposed system, unity in the purchase
of aircraft and aeronautical material. Such a proposal has
considerable popular appeal and appears rational until a critical
examination is made. It is the purpose of this paper to make a
brief analysis and, to this end, it is important that we realize in
advance the essential differences between organization and admin-
istration. Organization is a plan for administration. Administra-
tion itself is the executive act. It is, of course, common knowl-
edge that any reasonable plan will be successful with competent
administration and that the best plan will fail with incompe-
tent administration. With this view established, it is interesting
to analyze the unified air force proposal from the standpoint of
procurement.
In general, the Army and the Navy constitute two separate task
organizations. A fundamental requirement for the administration
of any task organization is that its commander have authority
commensurate with his responsibility. During the World War,
there were reported to be instances of different branches of the
government bidding against one another in the procurement of
supplies. The solution lay not in a separate department of pro-
duction charged with procuring supplies for all branches, but in
coordination and cooperation on the part of different procurement
agencies. This solution was fundamentally sound since the com-
mander of the task organization, who has the responsibility for
accomplishing his mission, must, of necessity, have the authority
to accomplish that mission. Both the Army and the Navy use the
same sugar. Through lack of cooperation in the beginning, they
were in competition with one another. Through cooperation at
the end, they eliminated their difficulties, while at the same time


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
each task organization retained authority over the procurement,
for its own needs, of even such a standardized article as sugar.
This principle is the fundamental one on which the unified air
force idea fails insofar as procurement is concerned. The Navy
will require aircraft and aviation material in completing its mission
of maintaining command of the sea. The War Department will
require aviation material in carrying out its mission of defense
against invasion. If, now, either the War or Navy Department
is dependent upon a separate department for its supplies, one or
the other is likely to suffer, depending upon which one is less
dominant in the counsels of defense. This situation will become
all the more acute when it is appreciated that a third department
of the air will, judging by past performance, insist that it alone
can win the war. It will, therefore, be reluctant to release aircraft
to either of the other departments. The result may be so serious
as to bring about the loss of the war.
It may be interesting now to discover just what the proponents
of unified procurement may expect to attain by this unity. It is
conceivable that a single department might bring about some
saving through standardization of equipment, and through placing
a single order to meet the requirements of the army, navy, and air
forces bring about a reduction in price. The fundamental objec-
tion to this is that aircraft for army, navy, and commercial branches
cannot be standardized at the present time. It is impossible even
to standardize the aircraft for one of these departments, much
less for all of them. The requirements which aircraft must meet
are totally different in the three activities.
There is a common impression that an airplane is an airplane
and can therefore be adapted to meet the different requirements.
This is certainly not a fact. Naval aircraft must, in general, be
seaplanes; for carrier use they will also be employed as land-
planes. This requires that they be convertible from landplane to
seaplane and this, in turn, necessitates some structural changes.
It is necessary that naval aircraft be designed to withstand the
loads of catapulting and this requires stiffening. These are essen-
tial details.
A broader difference lies in the fact that aircraft produced for
shipboard are limited in size because of limitations of stowage
space and are restricted in weight because of catapult limitations.


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Procurement of Government Aircraft
These restrictions do not exist for military airplanes. Within
limits, military airplanes can be as large and as heavy as desirable,
but naval airplanes must be reduced both in weight and size to the
absolute minimum consistent with the performance required. This
limitation may bring about the necessity for a larger number of
small airplanes rather than a smaller number of large airplanes.
As a general thing, then, military and naval planes are different
each from the other, and both are different from commercial
planes. Any attempt to standardize the three would bring about
limitations in each, and any attempt to standardize either of the
types at the present time would simply retard development.
One of the essential facts of the late controversy is that the
Army and Navy have been criticized because they have spent a
lot of money and have relatively little to show for it in numbers
of airplanes. This does not indicate incompetency, but rather that
airplanes are extremely expensive. If, now, we had a large quan-
tity of airplanes on hand, they would most certainly be obsolescent
and we would be subject to criticism for having spent a large
amount of money on something which became obsolete almost be-
fore it was delivered. In time of peace, it is the function of the
Army and the Navy to restrict their procurement to the state of
readiness required by national policy, and to devote their efforts
to improvement in quality rather than in quantity. At the same
time, plans must be made for quantity production in time of emer-
gency. The two services, therefore, find themselves between the
devil and the deep blue sea-criticized on one hand for having
failed to purchase large numbers of aircraft when they would be
equally subject to criticism on the other hand had they purchased
large numbers of aircraft. On the whole, it is to our credit that
we have not on hand a larger number of obsolescent types.
The two possible advantages of uniform procurement are im-
possible of attainment. No unified procurement branch could
standardize types and it could not therefore, as a general thing,
bring about a reduction in price by purchase in quantities.
There is, however, a way of accomplishing the desired result,
and there is nothing new about this. It has been in force for a
number of years. In December, 1922, both the Navy and Army
purchased a large number of Curtiss D-12 engines. The price on
this contract was based upon a joint order. The Navy Department


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conducted the inspections. The engines were delivered and the
advantage of quantity production was reflected in the price. In
1924 the Army and the Navy purchased 130 sets of fuselages and
wings from the Boeing Airplane Company. Since this equipment
was required for the same purposes by both services, the Air
Service purchased the material for the Navy and turned it over.
When it became necessary this year to purchase racers for the
Pulitzer and Schneider Cup events, a joint contract was entered
into in such a way that the quantity required was greatly reduced.
There are many instances of smaller purchases made jointly. This
is the rule rather than the exception. Wherever the same article
will meet the requirements of the specified services, joint arrange-
ments are made. Great strides have been made toward standard-
izing this equipment wherever possible, with a view to joint pro-
curement. The motive behind this is the desire on the part of
each service to get the most for its money. In other words, the
Army and the Navy, through cooperation, had already attained
the results claimed for the united air force and at the same time
have maintained authority over their purchases commensurate with
the responsibility involved.
The agitation for a united air force has produced an impression
that there is little cooperation between the Army and the Navy.
On the contrary, there is a very close cooperation. This is brought
about by the Joint Aeronautical Board. No projects are under-
taken by either the Army or the Navy, as a rule, until each is
satisfied that no duplication will result. Wherever possible, coordi-
nate purchases are made. Excellent examples of this have been
listed above and, in addition, we have a recent concrete example
in the purchase of water-cooled engined fighters from the Boeing
Airplane Company and the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Com-
pany. Through a joint order in the first case, and simultaneous
but separate orders in the latter, it was possible to get all the
benefits of semi-quantity production on these orders.
Another concrete example of mutual cooperation came with the
preparations for the polar flight. Both the Army and Navy had
orders for new Loening amphibians. The army airplanes had
higher priority on the list, but General Patrick graciously waived
the priority and furnished the Navy with three complete airplanes
for the polar flight. In the meantime, the Army had had enough


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1937
Procurement of Government Aircraft
experience with these airplanes to point out certain defects. The
Army promptly furnished the material necessary to make the
modifications and gave every assistance in an engineering way in
attaining the desired results. In general, then, we have long been
attaining unity of procurement not through changing the organiza-
tion, but through coordinating the administrations of the task
groups.
The unified procurement idea introduces certain defects inherent
in itself. The British aeronautical trade journals are full of criti-
cism of the technical staff of the Royal Air Force. It is pictured
as a bureaucratic ogre which sits on the throne and through its
know-it-all attitude, hampers the development of aviation. The
best evidence of this domination is the fact that few, if any, avia-
tion records are held in Great Britain, while the development of
new types of aircraft and new types of engines in Great Britain
has been slow. The friendly competition that exists between the
Army and the Navy in this country is the healthiest possible thing
for the industry. A change in organization will result in confusion
for some time. During this time, development would be retarded
and the history of the Royal Air Force indicates that it is resumed
with difficulty. Furthermore, a unified air force, anxious to justify
itself, would certainly be tempted to purchase large numbers of
aircraft which would very likely be obsolescent before delivery.
To summarize, a change in organization to bring about unified
procurement is both unnecessary and undesirable—unnecessary
because unity is already attained, and undesirable because such a
change in organization deprives the task group of authority over
procurement which is necessary to carrying out the mission. Fur-
thermore, it is extremely likely that this unified procurement or-
ganization would carry with it inherent complications which would
serve to defeat its end. The idea is fundamentally unsound in
conception and impossible of attainment.


  p. 1938 (#882)                      #

NEW LEASE OF LIFE FOR OLD IRONSIDES
By HERMAN F. KRAFFT
LD IRONSIDES, the gallant frigate Constitution, is in
imminent danger of falling to pieces. But, rescue from
ruin is at hand, for Congress has given to the children the
privilege of volunteering for its preservation. Patriotic societies
under the leadership of the Daughters of 1812 called attention to
the deterioration in the ship's timbers. The Secretary of the Navy,
himself a graduate of the Naval Academy in the days when the
Constellation, sister ship of the Constitution, took the cadets on
their annual cruises, made a personal visit to the Constitution in
July, 1924. The board of inspection appointed by him reported
at that time that the Constitution's timbers and planking below the
water line were honeycombed with dry rot, and that the cost of
rebuilding her would be $500,000. Above the water she is appar-
ently in sound condition. She is like a house built on sand.
An appeal was at once made to Congress, which, in the closing
days of the last session, incorporated a resolution in the omnibus
bill authorizing the reconstruction of the old ship, but appro-
priating no money for the purpose. To carry on the work of re-
building, the Secretary of the Navy is authorized by Congress to
receive voluntary contributions from the people of the United
States. Accordingly, Secretary Wilbur has started the "Save the
Constitution Fund.” As an inspiration and an object lesson of
the glorious days of 1812 to the boys and girls of today, the invi-
tation to contribute to Old Ironsides' restoration is addressed first
and foremost to the children of America—that the privilege and
honor shall be theirs.
In the last year of Washington's administration the Constitution,
better known as Old Ironsides, was launched. With more fights
to her credit than any two of our other historic men-of-war, after
128 years of service she still floats, and the purpose is to prolong
her inspiring existence.
Reprinted from New York Times of July 26, 1925, by permission.


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1939
New Lease of Life for Old Ironsides
She was Preble's flagship at Tripoli when Decatur and his mid-
shipmen in daredevil fashion set fire to the frigate Philadelphia
and singed the Bashaw of Tripoli's beard. In the War of 1812
she destroyed after memorable duels two of the finest frigates in
the British Navy, the Guerriere and the Java. Thus she helped to
win the "second war of independence," and before its end she had
also captured single-handed the two British ships Cyane and
Levant.
After the close of hostilities the Constitution was the innocent
cause of spilling almost more ink than she had seen of blood in
battle. After bitter political controversy she was repaired and
rehabilitated, and thenceforth wore at her prow a carved wooden
image of President Jackson—who had been anything but wooden
or a figurehead in life. During many years the Constitution con-
tinued cruising in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with a look-
out for blackbirders. Two of her fighting commanders, then
growing old, Isaac Hull and Charles Stewart, watched with senti-
mental interest her later career.
After her last cruise as a man-of-war, in connection with the
breaking up of the African slave trade, the Constitution undertook
preparedness duty, serving as training ship for midshipmen, her
valiant traditions, which recalled all that was most glorious in the
days of sail, inspiring their young devotion. In 1897 in Boston,
where she still rests—the same port from which she set forth so
often on her cruises and to which she returned after triumphing
over the Guerriere and the Java—Old Ironsides is still stanch
enough to be the stimulating figure in the celebration of the one
hundredth anniversary of her own launching. When the school
children of America have succeeded in the campaign to preserve
this historic frigate against the ravages of time there will be
another festival in her honor.
During the Tripolitan War the Constitution was the flagship of
Commodore Preble. His men, called his "schoolboys,” had learned
their profession under one of the most rigid and efficient com-
manders of the navy of that day, also under the inspiration of
such deeds in the fleet as that of the ketch Intrepid, in which a lot
of the “boys” blew up the corsairs' gunboats, along with them-
selves. That was the deed that the British Admiral, Nelson, him-
self most strikingly fearless, called the most daring act of the age.


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Of Commodore Preble's schoolboys, three, Isaac Hull, William
Bainbridge, and Charles Stewart, were destined a few years later
to command the Constitution in her memorable battles in the course
of the War of 1812.
Under command of Isaac Hull at the outbreak of this war, the
Constitution escaped from a British squadron of five frigates. By
drenching her canvas with water, by warping her ahead during
spells of calm with a kedge anchor fastened to a mile of hawsers,
and finally by shortening sail in apparently panicky haste at the
approach of a squall, Hull outwitted his pursuers. At the instant
the squall covered him from the enemy's sight, he again unfurled
all sail. Hull's resourceful seamanship won the day, and his crew
took their first rest after a race that had lasted sixty hours.
Soon afterward Hull fell in with the British frigate Guerriere.
They fought like two duelists. Hull's quick movements gave the
Constitution the advantage. She raked with deadly fire the
Guerriere's decks, yet by swift maneuvering skillfully avoided
being raked by the British ship. On the first of these occasions,
when one of the Guerriere's masts crashed overboard, a seaman on
the Constitution shouted to another: “Damn it, Jack, we have
made a brig of her.” Another sailor, who had noticed that the
British shot bounded harmlessly from the Constitution's sides,
gave her the name she has borne ever since—“Huzza, her sides
are made of iron!"
When Captain Dacres of the British ship came up the gangway
of the Constitution, Captain Hull greeted him with the words,
"Dacres, I know you are hurt; give me your hand.” Thus began
in the heat of battle a friendship that lasted till Hull's death in
1843.
Toward the end of 1812 the unluckiest of officers, William Bain-
bridge, who had spent years in dungeons in Guadaloupe and
Tripoli, took command of the lucky ship of the navy, Old Iron-
sides. In her, off the Brazilian coast after a fight as brilliant in
seamanship and gunnery as Hull's, he captured another British
frigate, the Java. When the latter's brave skipper, mortally
wounded, was about to be taken ashore, Captain Bainbridge, him-
self suffering from severe wounds and supported by two sailors,
came on deck to bid Captain Lambert goodbye and to return his
sword. Once more the Constitution carried to Boston the news


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1925)
1941
New Lease of Life for Old Ironsides
of victory. It electrified maritime New England and changed the
spirit of apathy to intense patriotism. In this sense Old Ironsides
won the war.
Although both British and American commanders in distant
waters had a suspicion that peace had been made, news traveled
slowly, and Captain Charles Stewart, who commanded the Consti-
tion in 1815, was anxious to add one more laurel to her record.
Toward the close of February, off the Madeiras, he fell in with
two smaller enemy ships, the Cyane and the Levant, and today the
latter's flags hang in the halls of the Naval Academy at An-
napolis. Those two ships were beaten by what a midshipman has
called the "three great ships” of the War of 1812—seamanship,
marksmanship, and leadership. England, in the midst of her
triumphs on the sea against Napoleon, with a thousand sails to
America's twenty-one, felt terribly the losses inflicted during this
war by “Yankee trickery.” Despite our unpreparedness in 1812,
this conflict with England marks a brilliant page in our naval
history.
After the war Old Ironsides underwent a long overhauling. In
the thirties the discussion of her first restoration made the Secre-
tary of the Navy decide to scrap her on the ground that her repairs
would amount to more than her first cost. It was then that a
young law student in Boston, Oliver Wendell Holmes, dashed off
his indignant protest :
Nail to the mast her holy flag,
Set every threadbare sail,
And give her to the god of storms,
The lightning and the gale!
His poem brought immediate response. Under her former
commander, Isaac Hull, despite all opposition, the Constitution
was restored. Her live oak timbers, still sound, had needed little
replacing, but with glistening bright-work and a new set of sails
and rigging she once more looked like her clever old self.
Andrew Jackson being at this time, 1834, President, Captain
Jesse D. Elliott of the Boston Navy Yard conceived the idea of
interesting the West in the traditions of the sea by replacing Old
Ironsides' billet-head, which she had worn on her prow throughout
the War of 1812, by an effigy of "Old Hickory" Jackson.


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1972
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Instantly there arose in New England violent anti-Jacksonian
cries against it, for Jackson was cordially disliked by Whiggish
New Englanders. Elliott barely escaped a coat of tar and feathers
(and was finally persecuted out of the Boston Navy Yard), yet
despite opposition he put the Jackson figurehead in place. Then
a young merchantman captain, Samuel Dewey, on a bet, quietly
rowed out one squally black night to the Constitution, which was
moored between two ships-of-the-line, to maim the image of Jack-
son. During the thunder storm Dewey sawed and chipped away,
finally cutting the head off. For months afterward those who were
in the secret met in a club, dined, and drank toasts, while the
wooden head of Jackson adorned the center of the banquet table.
When the club members met on the streets they stroked their chins
in token of recognition. Only after much effort was young Dewey
dissuaded from presenting the head to President Jackson himself.
On a promise of immunity for his partisan vandalism he was
induced to surrender it to the Secretary of Navy. In some Wash-
ington circles there was much secret jubilation over the insult to
Jackson. Of course, some old sea dog might have made a more
appropriate adornment for a man-of-war than a soldier, but ships
had been known to bear the effigies of Presidents. Besides, "Old
Hickory,” like Old Ironsides, had come out of the War of 1812
with untarnished record, which was more than some soldiers and
ships of this period could boast of themselves.
Captain Elliott covered the mutilated figure of Jackson with a
canvas bag, painted on it five stripes in allusion to New England's
indifference during the first part of the war, sailed the Constitution
to Philadelphia and there fitted on a new Jacksonian head. That
she wore for forty years; today it is preserved, a curious reminder
of partisan intolerance, on the grounds of the Naval Academy.
Just before the Civil War Old Ironsides was relegated from
warship to training ship for the Naval Academy. On the occasion
of the embarkation of the midshipmen for their first cruise on the
famous old frigate, some of them wrote to Commodore Charles
Stewart, still hale and hearty and commandant of the Philadelphia
Navy Yard at the age of eighty-two, to invite him to Annapolis
to dedicate the Constitution to her new duties. In his reply the
Commodore says: "I have received your very flattering and kind
invitation to visit you in your new School Ship (Old Ironsides).


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1943
New Lease of Life for Old Ironsides
.... You do me the honor to remind me that I was one of the
many who trod her deck on one occasion of her distinguished
service. It would afford me great pleasure to meet your wishes,
but my short remaining time is so pressed upon by my public and
domestic duties that I am obliged to forego the honor of your
distinguished invitation.”
Noteworthy as have been Old Ironsides' sea fights, they are not
as great as her spiritual victories. In 1812 after her returns from
the Guerriere and the Java duels she aroused the patriotism of
America as nothing else could. During the latter part of the last
century thousands of navy officers gained new inspiration for their
chosen profession when they put foot on her decks. Even in the
recent World War there were some older officers, who as mid-
shipmen had made their initial cruises on this frigate, which in
age and historic significance is for America what Nelson's flag-
ship, the Victory, is to Britain.
Let the school children of America enshrine Old Ironsides. For
similar reasons, as symbol of American progress, she is as worthy
of veneration, as, let us say, Faneuil Hall or Independence Hall.
What though not a timber nor a spike of her old self remains in
her frame, her spirit is immortal, a continuing national inspiration.
The "Save the Constitution" movement now under way is spon-
sored by various patriotic societies in their respective states. Rear
Admiral Louis R. de Steiguer, commandant of the First Naval
District, Navy Yard, Boston, Massachusetts, in whose bailiwick
the Constitution lies, has been designated by the Secretary of the
Navy to be chairman of the "Save the Constitution Fund.” Those
cooperating with him are Mrs. Samuel Preston Davis, national
president of the Daughters of 1812, and A. C. Ratshesky, president
of the United States Trust Company, Boston, who is treasurer of
the fund. W. D. Towner, who, like Mr. Ratshesky, has been
actively connected with Red Cross and other philanthropic move-
ments, has also volunteered his services as secretary of the fund,
with headquarters at the Navy Yard, Boston.


  p. 1944 (#888)                      #

THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED MERCHANT
MARINE
By Leigh C. PALMER,
President, United States Fleet Corporation
THE origin of the present war-built merchant fleet of the
United States is so well-known that it is needless to review
it here. Suffice it to say that shortly after the close of the
World War the United States found itself in possession of a
merchant fleet far in excess of its normal economic requirements
and faced the difficult problem of utilizing it to the best advantage.
In any consideration of the merchant marine it is well to keep
in mind the fact that Congress in no unmistakable terms has de-
clared the natural policy of the American Merchant Marine to be
in part as follows:
"That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper
growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United
States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most
suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of
its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of
war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated
privately by citizens of the United States. . ..."
That is our national policy, and it is significant that no political
party, no section of the country, no important element of public
opinion has voiced any objection to it. Probably no act of Con-
gress has been more favorably accepted.
Let us consider for a moment why this pronouncement was
made by the Congress. It is quite generally understood that the
national prosperity is largely dependent upon our finding a market
for our surplus products. While in time of peace it may be prac-
ticable to depend to a certain extent upon foreign-flag carriers for
our imports and exports, such dependence is most undesirable
since it places our trade facilities largely in the hands of our
competitors; and in time of war foreign-flag vessels are likely to


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1945
The Government-Owned Merchant Marine
be withdrawn from their usual trade routes for war purposes or
for more lucrative employment. In times past, when this country
was a negligible factor in the deep sea carrying trade, we have
experienced such withdrawals of tonnage from our shores and the
results have been very costly to our importers and exporters, and
to the people in general. With a large merchant fleet of our own
this condition would be minimized. In addition, with a large fleet
of vessels under the American flag, millions of dollars which
formerly went out of the country to foreign ship owners would
be kept at home and used to our own advantage.
Then there is the further fact that the national defense requires
a strong merchant marine as an adjunct to the navy. How can
we prosecute a foreign war without vessels for the transportation
of troops and our munitions ? To answer this query, one has but
to recall our experience in the late war when we were dependent
on Great Britain, in large part, for such services.
The merchant marine of the United States divides itself natur-
ally into three groups: that in the coastwise and intercoastal trade,
that in the near-by foreign trade, such as the West Indies and
Caribbean, and that in the overseas trade. Fortunately, our coast-
wise and intercoastal shipping has been protected by law and has
been reserved to vessels built in the United States and flying the
American flag; therefore, it is not to be wondered at that this
particular division of the merchant marine, being free from foreign
competition, is on a safe business footing. The near-by foreign
trade shipping of the United States is in a similar situation, since
while the trade itself is not protected, yet the advantages accruing
to American-flag ships in this trade, such as the proximity of home
ports and the opportunity of engaging in part in our coastwise or
intercoastal trade, more than offset the higher operating costs of
American ships as compared with foreign competitors.
The third division, that employed in the overseas trade, is that
to which the government has given particular attention, and it is
here that our real problem lies, for it is here that our ships must
meet the competition of cheaper foreign labor and cheaper operating
costs in general, as well as compete with vessels which have been
constructed more cheaply in foreign yards. Our problem applies
equally to privately-owned and government-owned vessels in this
trade, and I do not wish to give undue prominence to the govern-


  p. 1946 (#890)                      #

1946
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ment fleet in its relation to our merchant marine. While the gov-
ernment fleet is the larger and is more in evidence because of the
problems it presents to the public, the private fleet is going its way
and doing its work quietly and inconspicuously.
At the time of the post-war inflation of trade and shipping the
shipping board services were being carried on by nearly 200
managing operators and most of the government fleet was in use.
Many of the services overlapped and competed with each other as
well as with private American lines. Only a few of our lines were
of the nature of pioneer services, most of them having been estab-
lished along the major trade routes on which a very considerable
commerce normally flowed, although most of it before the war had
been under foreign flags. Later, when the period of deflation set
in, many services were discontinued, many vessels were laid up,
and the number of operators was reduced until, about a year and
a half ago, the active fleet comprised approximately 350 vessels
and the managing operators had been reduced in number to forty.
However, there were still too many over-lapping services which
created an unbusiness-like situation and it was evident that a
general readjustment was necessary. This the Fleet Corporation
undertook to accomplish by consolidating overlapping or conflicting
lines and forming a single comprehensive line of each route.
In making these consolidations every endeavor was made to
obtain a combination of the organizations of the managing opera-
tors concerned, because it was desired to retain experienced op-
erating personnel and because it was undesirable to eliminate any
managing operator who had rendered good service to the govern-
ment and who was a potential purchaser of shipping board ton-
nage. In most cases, unfortunately, this proved impracticable.
In furtherance of our announced policy to dispose of the lines
to private owners, in consonance with the mandates of the Mer-
chant Marine Act, 1920, we desired to make every effort possible
to place them on a sound business footing. This end was accom-
plished to a considerable extent through the consolidation program
above mentional. Such consolidations made possible the with-
drawal from service of the least efficient services, resulting directly
in important economies; they placed a larger fleet in the hands of
a single managing operator and gave him a larger regional area
in which to operate. This resulted in greater flexibility of service,


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1925)
1947
The Government-Owned Merchant Marine
enabled the operator to route his ships to better advantage, short-
ened the time of the ships' voyages, and materially decreased op-
erating expenses without curtailment of service.
In consolidating services none of the essential trade routes were
abandoned and on many of them no reduction of tonnage was
made. On some of the routes, which are highly competitive, our
services are and will be maintained with a view to giving only such
frequency of sailings as may be necessary to protect American
commercial interests and to hold our position in the trade until
conditions improve. As trade conditions improve and better freight
rates are obtainable the services can be gradually expanded to
meet additional demands. The additional tonnage should not be
put on with a view to maintaining an artificially low scare of rates,
that, in effect, would be giving a subsidy to shippers at the expense
of the merchant marine and would prevent the lines from be-
coming self-sustaining and, therefore, salable.
The efforts of the Fleet Corporation are being directed not only
toward the improvement of the lines but also to other matters
which afford opportunity for reducing expenses without impairing
efficiency. In the last eighteen months the annual payroll of the
corporation has been reduced by more than two million dollars.
We have reduced stevedoring costs materially through new and
more favorable contracts; important economies in fuel consump-
tion have been realized through the education of ships' personnel
and the institution of a system of competition among the engineers.
Most important of all, perhaps, has been the establishment of a
budget system by which our disbursements are governed in ac-
cordance with the usual business practices. But, while much has
been accomplished, there is yet much to be done to place our lines
on an efficient commercial basis.
In connection with the subject of consolidation of trade routes
and reduction of tonnage, it may be of interest to know that we
have carried as much cargo during the last year, with the reduced
number of ships, as was carried during the previous year, before
consolidations were effected, while the loss of the entire fleet has
already been reduced from $50,000,000 a year to about half that
amount, and a further reduction is now under way.
Most business men agree that the government has no place in
the shipping business. I would qualify that by saying that the


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1948
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
government should be in the business only as a means to an end-
that end being to salvage the war-created fleet to the best advantage
and to promote the national trade interests, at the same time at-
tempting to get as many of the ships as possible into private Ameri-
can hands for permanent service on the essential trade routes.
The question is not merely whether or not it is wise for our gov-
ernment to maintain shipping lines at very considerable cost-it is
broader than this; it is whether the government shall, by its main-
tenance for a time of certain important services, bring about the
establishment of our privately-owned interests both commercial
and defensive. Such security is certainly worth paying for but
we should not let it cost the country more than is absolutely
necessary.
The entire country is coming to realize more and more that the
problems of the merchant marine are not sectional; that it is a
matter of vital concern to the western farmers as well as to the
eastern industrialists whether or not we are maintaining adequate
services to the chief markets of the world for the carriage of our
surplus products, and our essential imports. No country, however
rich in resources, is or can be self-sufficient; it must look beyond
its borders for the commodities it lacks and find markets for the
surplus products of its industries. It follows that no country
vitally dependent on international commerce for its prosperity and
progress can afford to rely unduly on other nationals for the
handling of its surplus products, for the reason that these other
nationals are usually its rivals in the world's markets. It is self-
evident that we cannot leave the carrying of our goods to our
rivals, nor can we afford to depend on them to give primary con-
sideration to our needs in an emergency. It is obvious that if
access to foreign markets is controlled by alien interests they have
it within their power to minimize the advantages of American
products and in a large measure eliminate our exports from suc-
cessful competition with the products of other countries.
In order to take care of the needs of our foreign commerce, the
Fleet Corporation maintains cargo services which extend to every
part of the world where there is any considerable trade with the
United States, except on those routes which are adequately served
by private American lines, it being the fundamental policy of the
Shipping Board to avoid competition with private American ser-
vices.


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1949
The Government-Owned Merchant Marine
Regarding the national policy that “the United States shall have
a merchant marine of the .... most suitable types of vessels
sufficient to carry the greater portion of it commerce and serve
as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emer-
gency,” it should be mentioned that during the past year the Presi-
dent appointed a committee to consider certain matters relating to
the merchant marine, which committee was composed of the fol-
lowing members: Chairman of the Shipping Board, Chairman of
the Committee, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, Sec-
retary of the Navy, Secretary of Commerce, and the President of
the Fleet Corporation.
Among other things, the committee made a careful estimate of
the number and types of vessels that the merchant marine might
be called upon to furnish for the use of the Army and Navy in
the event of a war of such character as might involve the national
safety. The following may be given as a summary of this study.
Comparing the estimated requirements with the available ton-
nage, it was found that :
a) Our merchant marine is deficient in large, fast passenger
vessels which would be suitable for airplane carriers and fast
cruisers.
b) There is a considerable deficiency in combination passenger
and cargo vessels suitable for troop transports, and so forth, if a
large armed force were to be transported a considerable distance;
but this deficiency could be largely made up by utilizing available
cargo vessels.
c) There is a large surplus of cargo vessels, and a sufficient
fleet of tankers.
On the whole, the army and navy requirements could be met
fairly satisfactorily, and there would remain sufficient vessels to
carry on a considerable portion of our commercial business.
In time of war it would be essential that this country should
continue adequately to move two characters of imports: (a) ma-
terials necessary for a reasonable measure of comfort of our
civilian population; and (b) materials essential for the manufac-
ture of articles necessary to the prosecution of the war. Modern
war is so much an affair of whole nations and there is so little
demarcation between civilian industry and military industry that
a differentiation between (a) and (b) is possibly academic.


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Similarly, the country must, during war, export goods for two
primary reasons: (a) to maintain as favorably as possible its trade
balance and hence its currency and foreign credit ; and (b) to sup-
ply the raw materials which are essential to foreign industries
which, either normally or by reasons of our expended war-time
needs, are supplying us with vital manufactures.
There are two methods of effecting the necessary transportation ;
in our own vessels or in those of neutral nations. Carriage in our
own bottoms is advantageous in that presumably our vessels will
render more faithful and loyal service and their direction and
control will be simpler and more effiacious than any which we could
exert over neutral shipping.
There will be routes on which it is essential that commerce be
conducted in our own bottoms. There will be routes where the
danger of raid or interruption is great. Such ships will, of neces-
sity, be largely under naval supervision, even though commercial in
purpose. They will be drawn from the best vessels remaining after
the direct military needs have been met, and the military services
themselves must, in setting up their requirements, have such ser-
vices in mind.
Neutral carriers will be available in sufficient number to handle,
at a price, our commercial transportation in time of war provided
that such neutrals are protected to a reasonable degree against de
struction by the enemy. It must not be forgotten that the bulk
of our commerce is still an export commerce and that many of
our exports are almost essential to foreign nations, especially to
those nations possessing considerable tonnage of merchant ship-
ping. Though it is essential to us in time of war to market a
reasonable amount of cotton, grain, and petroleum it is almost
equally essential on the part of consuming nations to continue to
receive such commodities. They must, therefore, if our ships are
withdrawn, send their own or suffer internal demoralization. Since
their ships most come for exports, they will ordinarily be in a
position to bring to us needed imports.
The first step in supplying the sea-borne commercial require-
ments of the nation engaged in war is to secure "command of the
sea.” That is to say, enemy forces must be destroyed or contained
in port to such an extent that the great majority of our commerce
may move without hindrance by the enemy. This step is naval


  p. 1951 (#895)                      #

1925]
1951
The Government-Owned Merchant Marine
and not commercial. Without command of the sea no known
means can be found of supplying our overseas commercial re-
quirements.
The entire commercial shipping of the United States must be
under a centralized control by experienced shipping men, in order
that the most flexible and efficacious use can be made of all ton-
nage. It will probably be desirable that this centralized control
shall act as a selecting authority to meet the needs of the Army and
Navy, as the Shipping Control Committee acted during the last
war.
Returning to the subject of our efforts to put the government-
owned fleet on an economical basis, a little more than a year ago
we were operating 320 cargo vessels at an average loss of more
than $25,000 a voyage. During the year ended last June, the
average loss was reduced to about $20,000 and at the end of that
period it had fallen below $17,000. After careful analysis of the
factors of expense and revenue, we feel that the loss can still fur-
ther be reduced to about $8,500 per voyage, even if the present
low freight rates continue, and that this last figure represents about
the best that should be expected under government ownership. If
and when this result is reached, the total operating loss of the
cargo fleet would be only about $10,000,000 a year, which, how-
ever, does not include interest and depreciation charges, which
must be included if proper comparison is to be made with private
operating results.
The figure of $8,500 loss indicates our present goal. The pres-
ent loss of about twice that amount shows that we still have a long
way to go in improving our revenues and reducing our expenses.
Our study of 1,200 voyages to all parts of the world in a twelve
month period indicates that, if under the best practicable operating
conditions the government losses (including interest and deprecia-
tion) were $13,500 per voyage, the average capable private Ameri-
can owner of this tonnage could reduce that loss to about $4,500.
Further, the same fleet on similar services, if operated under
British conditions, would about break even. In other words, the
differential between the operating results of government-owned
and privately-owned vessels is estimated to be about $9,000 per
voyage, while the differential between operating results of private
American and British vessels, operated with equal efficiency, is
believed to be about $4,500.


  p. 1952 (#896)                      #

1952
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
This last figure, $4,500, may be taken as an approximate meas-
ure of the amount of government aid that would be required to
place American vessels on a competitive footing with British ves-
sels. For a cargo fleet of the size of that operated by the Fleet
Corporation, about 2,500,000 deadweight tons, this aid would
amount to about $5,000,000 a year, and extending this to include
all American cargo vessels in foreign trade, the total might amount
to $7,500,000. This, as stated before, does not include passenger
services, each of which constitutes a more or less special problem
so far as government encouragement or aid is concerned. Passen-
ger and mail lines are usually aided by means of mail subventions,
or subsidized on the basis of naval defense requirements, and the
amount of such subventional aid cannot be estimated in advance
of the determination of the national policy regarding such lines,
but probably it would be somewhere between $5,000,000 and
$10,000,000 a year, or say $7,500,000. Thus it would appear that
the total amount of government aid necessary to put the American
Merchant Marine in foreign trade on a competitive footing would
be about $15,000,000 a year.
Under continued government ownership, a fleet of the present
proportions would cost not only the $10,000,000 operating loss
above referred to, but also a large sum annually for replacements,
for if the government is to continue indefinitely in the shipping
business, the necessity of replacing gradually the present fleet with
new and improved vessels must be faced.
The life of our ships may be assumed to be twenty years; they
are now about six years old. Replacements should be made
gradually since it is unwise to allow a fleet as a whole to deteriorate
to the point of obsolescence and then to completely rebuild it.
Owing to the gradual improvement in types of vessels, their ma-
chinery, and equipment, the fleet can be kept up to date only
through continuous replacement of the oldest and least efficient
ships with new ones.
What would a replacement program cost the government? We
may say that the average replacements would be about twenty
vessels per year when the replacement program is fully under way.
In a large fleet of vessels distributed over the various trade routes
of the world, there would be a considerable variation of types.
They would range from the ordinary, comparatively slow cargo


  p. 1953 (#897)                      #

1925)
1953
The Government-Owned Merchant Marine
vessel of around 8,000 tons to the faster, superior equipped cargo
liner of 10,000 to 15,000 tons. Most, if not all, of them would
be motorships, and a considerable number might be provided with
limited passenger accommodations. Their cost probably would
range from around $800,000 to $1,500,000 each; therefore, if our
replacement program calls for twenty vessels a year, the cost would
average about $20,000,000 per year for new construction for the
cargo fleet alone.
As for passenger liners and combination passenger and cargo
vessels, of which we are operating a total of fifteen, the replace-
ment cost would range from $5,000,000 to $15,000,000 per vessel,
and would average probably $10,000,000 a year. .
Thus, unless the government can find a way to transfer its fleet
to private ownership, as contemplated by the Merchant Marine
Act, we face the definite prospect of having to spend about
$30,000,000 a year continuously for replacements alone. With the
improved administration and higher efficiency toward which we
are working, the operating loss of this fleet may be reduced to
about $10,000,000. Therefore, the prospective cost of continued
government maintenance of a fleet of about the present size is
about $40,000,000 a year.
To summarize, our country faces three alternatives in respect
to the merchant marine in foreign trade: first, continued govern-
ment operation costing ultimately around $40,000,000 a year;
second, government aid to private shipping amounting to about
$15,000,000 a year; or third, the gradual but certain disappearance
of our flag from the international trade routes, and a return to
our pre-war condition when less than 10 per cent of our foreign
commerce was carried in American vessels.


  p. 1954 (#898)                      #

COMPARATIVE NAVAL DATA FOR
THE TREATY NAVIES
(Correct as of September 1, 1925)
Table I–PERSONNEL (Unlimited)
REGULAR
ESTABLISHMENT
(INCLUDING THOSE
OF DOMINIONS)
REGULAR
ESTABLISHMENT
ON BASIS OF
5-5-3-1,67-1.67
RATIO WITH
JAPAN
INCREMENT
NECESSARY TO
ATTAIN THE
5-5-3-1.67-1.67
IN REGULAR
ESTABLISHMENT
ACTUAL RESERVE
PERSONNEL
POWER
Officers
Men
Officers Men
Officers Men
Officers Men
UNITED STATES.... 8,148 86,000 | 12,200 106,452 | 4,052 20,452 | 4,286 17,473(e)
BRITISH EMPIRE.... 9,347 (a) 98,552(b) | 12,200 106,452 2,853 7,900 2,377 44,418(d)
JAPANESE EMPIRE.. 7,320 63,871(f) 7,320 63,871 None 2,506 35,799
FRANCE...........
3,496 55,000 4,075 35,555 579 None 8,375 96,700
ITALY.............
2,188 40,591 4,075 35,555 1,887 None 4,514 60,000(c)
a) These figures include 1,044 officers and 8,439 men of the British Royal Air Force that are performing
duties similar to those performed by the personnel of the U. S. Naval Aviation. The Royal Air Force
is a separate Department ranking with the Army and Navy and has in round numbers 3,365 officers
and 28,880 airmen and 7,815 civilians. Sincc in the United States, Japan and France, naval aviation
personnel forms an integral part of the Navy, it seems only fair that the personnel of the British Royal
Air Force performing duties in connection with naval aviation should be classed in this comparison,
b) Includes 4,113 civilians manning auxiliaries and yard craft for which regularly enlisted personnel
are required in cases of other powers.
c) There is no organized naval reserve of men in Italy, but men who have served in Navy may be
called to colors by levy.
d) Does not include 7,459 retired officers of all ages nor 18,405 pensioners under fifty-five years of
age, who form an additional reserve.
e) Does not include 1,348 retired officers of all ages, nor 261 retired enlisted men, under fifty-five
years of age, who form an additional reserve.
f) An increase in round numbers of about 1,000 enlisted men over May 1924.
ACTUAL RATIOS Enlisted men.........
JOfficers, Regular Establishment..
U. S. Brit. EmP. JAP. EMP, FRANCE ITALY
3.34 3.81 3.00 1.43 0.89
4.04 4.63 3.00 2.59 1.91
5.00 5.00 3.00 1.67 1.67
RATIO APPLIED TO CAPITAL SHIPS BY TREATY.....


  p. 1955 (#899)                      #

1925)
1955
Comparative Naval Data for Treaty Navies
Table II—Capital Ships (Limited)
SCRAPPED UNDER Treaty TERMS
RETAINED
POWER
OLD SHIPS
New SHIPS
TOTAL
TONNAGE
TO BE
ARRIVED TRUE
AT IN RATIO
1941
No.
Tons No. Tons No.
Tons No.
Tons
UNITED STATES....117 267,740 11 465,800
BRITISH EMPIRE... | 24(a) 500,000 None
JAPANESE EMPIRE J 10 163.312 | 2 80.979
FRANCE......
None
None
ITALY.............. None None
28 733,540
24(a) 500,000
12 244.290
None
None
18 525,850 525,000 5.00
20(b) 558,950 525,000 5.00
10 301.320 1 315.000 3.00
(c) 9 197,670 175,000 11.67
(d) 7 135,100 175,000 1.67
a) Includes the King George V, Ajax, Centurion and Thunderer to be scrapped early in 1926.
b) Includes the Nelson and Rodney now building: will probably be completed early in 1926.
c) The battleship France, 23, 500 tons, foundered in Quiberon Bay in August, 1922, thus decreasing
the actual number of capital ships retained by the Republic of France as per treaty from ten to nine.
d) The battleships Leonardo da Vinci, V. Emanuele, and Regina Elena, were voluntarily scrapped in
1922-23, thereby reducing the actual number of ships retained by Italy as per treaty from ten to seven.
TABLE III-AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (Limited)
BUILT
BUILDING
TOTALS
TOTAL
TONNAGE
ALLOWED
TREATY
POWER
INCREMENT
NECESSARY
TO ATTAIN
ALLOWANCE
No.(a) Tons
No.
Tons
No.
Tons
No. Tons
UNITED STATES...
BRITISH EMPIRE..
JAPANESE EMPIRE
FRANCE........
ITALY.....
1 12,700
3 48,190
19,500
2 66,000
| 3 56,300 (b)
1 2 53,800
1 24.000
1 5.000
3
| 6
3
1
i
78,700
104,490
63,300
24,000
5,000
135,000
135,000
81,000
60,000
60,000
2 56,300
1 30,510
1 17,700
1 36,000
2.55,000
None
None
a) Number arrived a by dividing by 27,000—the maximum tonnage allowed for aircraft carriers
hereafter laid down.
b) One additional aircraft carrier authorized by Australia (6,000 tons) is not included in tabulation.
U.S. BRIT. EMP. JAP. EMP. FRANCE ITALY
ACTUAL RATIO, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, (Tons).... 2.91 3.87 2.34 0.89 0.00
ALLOWED RATIO, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, (Tons).. 5.00 5.00 3.00 2.22 2 .22
TABLE IV-Light CRUISERS COMPLETED OR Laid Down SINCE 1912
(Unlimited)
BUILT
POWER
AUTHORIZED AND
APPROPRIATED
TOTALS
FOR, OR
BUILDING
No. Tons | No. Tons
TONNAGE TO ATTAIN
ON BASIS 5-5-3-1.67-1.67
OF RATIO WITH
5-5-3. BRIT.
1.67-1.67 No.(c) Tons
No.
Tons
UNITED STATES.... 10 75,000 | 2(a)
BRITISH EMPIRE...48 233,520 | 10
JAPANES E EMPIRE... 16 82,200
FRANCE.......
4(b) 18,200 15
ITALY...........
10(b) 38,730
20,000
94.850
73,995
44,000
20,000
12 95,000 318,370
57 318.370 | 318,370
25 156,195 | 191,022
9 62,200 | 106,335
12 58,730 | 106,335
22 223,370
None
4 34,827
5 44,135
5 47,605


  p. 1956 (#900)                      #

1956
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
a) The sixty-eighth Congress authorized eight 10,000 ton cruisers, appropriating only for two.
b) Some of these are vessels taken over from Central Powers.
c) Number obtained by dividing by 10,000 tons, the maximum size cruiser allowed under terms of
the Naval Treaty.
ACTUAL Ratios, MODERN LIGHT CRUISERS..... U.S. BRIT. EMP. JAP. EMP. FRANCE ITALY
Tonnage............................. 1.82 6.12 3 .00 1.19 1.06
No. Vessels........................... 1.44 6.84 3.00 1.08 1.44
CAPITAL SHIP RATIO ........................ 5.00 5.00 3.00 1.67 1.67
TABLE V-DESTROYER Tyre. First LINE VESSELS (Unlimited)
TOTALS
POWER
BUILT
AUTHORIZED AND
APPROPRIATED FOR
OR BUILDING
LEADERS
DESTROYERS LEADERS DESTROY LEADERS DESTROYERS
ERS
No. Tons No Tous No. Tons No. Tons No. Tons
No. Tons
UNITED STATES... None 289(a) 340,620 None None None | 289(a) 340,620
BRITISH EMPIRE . . 18(b) 31, 310 183(c) 209,315 None 2 2,700 18 31,310 185 212,015
JAPANESE EMPIRE None | 71 75.625 None | 21 30,255 None | 92 105,880
FRANCE..........i 2,400 21 20,105 | 6 14,382 18 25,200 17 16,782 39 45,305
ITALY.....
6 10,752 3530,395 2 4,400 14 17,930 8 15,152 49 48,325
Characteristics-DESTROYER LEADERS, 1st line, 1,500 tons plus; 27 knots plus.
DESTROYERS, 1st line, 800-1,500 tons; 27 knots plus.
a) Includes fourteen light mine layers of destroyer type. Very nearly all of these 289 boats, which
give the U. S. a preponderance in this type, were laid down during the World War in an emergency
program to combat the German submarines, many of them are of hasty construction. Only 105
destroyers and six mine-layers, total 111, are kept in commission.
• b) Includes one mine-layer.
c) Includes one mine-layer.
ACTUAL RATIOS, MODERN DESTROYER TYPES.... U.S. Brit. EMP. JAP. EMP. FRANCE ITALY
Total Combined Tonnage.
a Tonnage............... 9.65 6.89 3.00 1.76 1.80
Total Combined No. Vessels ............ 9.42 6.62 3.00 1.50 1.86
CAPITAL SHIP Ratio......
............. 5.00 5.00 3.00 1.67 1.07
Table VI-FLEET SUBMARINES, First LINE OVER 1,000 TONS Each;
20 Knots Plus (Unlimited)
TONNAGE
ON BASI
5-5-3-
1.67-1.67
AUTHORIZED
AND
APPROPRIATED
BUILT
FOR, OR
BUILDING
No. Tons | No. Tons
TO ATTAIN
THE 5-5 3.
1.67-1.67
Ratio WITH
JAPAN
No. Tons
POWER
TOTALS
No. Tons
UNITED STATES ......
BRITISH EMPIRE....
JAPANESE EMPIRE....
FRANCE.........
ITALY........
1 2,105 5 8,424 (a)
8(b) 16,460 11 1,480
2 2,800 | 21(d) 35,640
None
Nonele)
None | 4 5,200
6
9
23
10,530
17,940
38,440
None
5,200
64,065
64,065
38,440
21,398
21,398
| 26 53,535
23 46,125
None
| 11 21,398
8 16,198
4
a) Does not include tonnage of the V-4 fleet submarine mine-laying type, details unpublished.
b) Does not include three 1,600-ton monitor submarines, M.1, M-2, M.3.
c) Number arrived at by assuming an arbitrary boat tonnage of 2,000 tons.


  p. 1957 (#901)                      #

1925]
1957
Comparative Naval Data for Treaty Navies
d) Includes three 1,000-ton mine-layers.
e) A 3,000-ton submarine, projected to be laid down in 1925, and a similar one in 1926.
ACTUAL Ratios, FLEET SUBMARINES...... U.S BRIT. EMP. JAP. EMP. FRANCE ITALY
Tonnage.....
.......... 0.82 1.40 3.00 0.00 0.43
No. Vessels......................... 0.79 1.17 3.00 0.00 0.52
CAPITAL SHIP RATIOS .................... 5.00 5.00 3.00 1.67 1.67 .
TABLE VII—SUBMARINES, FIRST LINE, 700 Tons Plus, 13 KNOTS Plus
(Unlimited)
POWER
BUILT
AUTHORIZED AND
APPROPRIATED
FOR OR
BUILDING
No. Tons
TOTALS
TONNAGE TO ATTAIN
ON BASIS THE 5-5-3-
5-5 3. 1.67-1.67
1.67-1.67 WITH JAPAN
No. (a) Tons
No.
Tons
No.
Tons
UNITED STATES.... 48 41,923
906 | 49 42,829 54,355 13 11,526
BRITISH EMPIRE... 32 31,030(b) 2(c) 1,780 34 32,810 54,355 25 21,545
JAPANESE EMPIRE | 35(d) 28,620 4 3,992(e) 39 32,612 32,612 None
FRANCE........... 18 16,148(1) 11(g) 13,323 29 29,471 | 18,154 None
ITALY............. 10 8.028 1 6 4,755 116 12,773 | 18,154 1 6 5,381
a) Number arrived at by assuming an arbitrary boat tonnage of 850 tons.
b) Includes three monitor and three mine-laying submarines.
c) Does not include two 1,000-ton submarines authorized by Australia
d) Does not include three 665-ton submarines completed 1923-24, or two 689-ton submarines com-
pleted 1920
e) Does not include one 665-ton submarine.
f) Includes three of mine-laying type.
g) Does not include twelve 600-ton submarines now building.
ACTUAL RATIOS, SUBMARINES, 1st Line.... U. S. Brit. EMP. JAP. Eme. FRANCE ITALY
Tonnage........................... 3.93 3.02 3.00 2 .71 1 .17
No. Vessels. ........................ 3.82 2.62 3 .00 2.23 1.23
CAPITAL SHIP Ratios.................... 5.00 5.00 3.00 1.67 1.67
TABLE VIII-Data REGARDING OBSOLESCENT, OR OBSOLETE, VESSELS
STILL RETAINED
UNITED | BRITISH | JAPANESE FRANCE L ITALY
STATES EMPIRE EMPIRE
No. Tons No. Tons No. Tons No. Tons No. Tons
11 139,450 | 0
-
6
54,672 | 10 121,166 | 3 31,800
11 39,975 | 2 10,490
3 12,512
3 13,762
0
-
CRUISERS (8-in guns plus;
8,000 tons plus; 27 knots
minus; completed before 1912
LIGHT CRUISERS, (8-in.guns
minus; 3,000-8,000 tons; 27
knots minus; compleled before
1912...............
DESTROYERS, 2nd line, 4-in.
guns minus; 500-800 tons; 25
knots plus................
SUBMARINES, 2nd line, 3-in.
guns minus; 700-tons minus;
10 knots plus ............
FLEETSUBMARINES, 2nd line,
3-in. guns; 1,000 tons plus;
20 knots minus............
MINE-LAYING SUBMARINES,
2nd line, 3-in. guns, 800 tons
minus; 8 knots plus.......
8
5,936
6
4,200
12
7,850 | 22 17,616 | 14 10,150
65 31,282
25
10,808
12
4,637
26 11,195
31
8,785
3
3,318
i
1,200 | 0
-
1 1
2,060 | 0
-
0
-
-
1 0
0
-
1 3
1,525 | 2
800


  p. 1958 (#902)                      #

1958
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Table IX–NAVAL VESSELS OF THE THREE PRINCIPAL POWERS
IN COMMISSION
United States
British Empire
Japan
Active In Reserve Active In Reserve Active In Reserve
18
4(a)
None
2
None
None
None
None
32
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
11
Capital Ships.
Aircraft Carriers......
Cruisers, (Armored, 8,000 tons) Old
2ndline.................
Light S Modern, 1st line.........
Cruisers Old, 2nd line............
Flotilla leaders .......
Destroyers Destroyers, 1st line....! 105
Destroyers 2nd line... | None
(Light mine-layers.....
(Large (over 1,000 tons
Submarines ? Ist line, 700-1,000 tons)
(2nd line,700-tons minus
Miscellaneous Types .............. 178
None
42
None
28
None
None
Nonc
None
None
48
None
None
None
20
12
240
135
None
68
70
406
264
186
452
264
123
IN RESERVE...............
123
Totals.
407
716
3091
a) Four ships to be replaced by Rodney and Nelson, which will be active in 1926.
Table X-NAVAL AIR STRENGTH (Unlimited)
Note: The tables compiled herewith indicate the airplanes which may be carried with the different
combatant ships of the fleets away from a coast defense area of 1,000 miles. No fairer com-
parison of naval air strength can be made than that based on the plane-carrying capacity of
the fleets at sea. In this connection, it is assumed that aircraft carriers will carry a balanced
force of airplanes-such as bombing, combat, observation planes. In case aircraft carriers
should carry only the smaller types of planes (combat planes) the carrying capacities would be
naturally increased.
| TOTAL
PIANE-CARRYING
CAPACITY
PLANE-CARRYING
CAPACITY
POWER
BUILT
BUILDING
PLANE- TO ATTAIN
CARRYING THE 5-5-3-
CAPACITY 1.67-1.67
ON BASIS CAPACITY
5-5-3 WITH
1.67-1.67 JAPANESE
EMPIRE(I)
Aircraft Battleships Aircraft Battleships
Carriers and Cruisers Carriers (a) and Cruiser
30
74
116(b)
UNITED STATES...
BRITISH EMPIRE..
JAPANESE EMPIRE
FRANCE.
ITALY......
144
216
144
(e)
120(d)
18
248
542
226
112
14
38
377
377
226
112
126
129
None
None
26
72
14
(c)
10(d)
112
a) Total tonnage of aircraft carriers limited by Treaty. (See table for Aircraft Carriers.)
b) Does not include capacity of four battleships to be scrapped in 1926 on commissioning of Rodney
and Nelson,
c) No information available.


  p. 1959 (#903)                      #

1925]
1959
Comparative Naval Data for Treaty Navies
d) Estimated.
e) United States will build two cruisers, plane-carrying details un published.
f) Possible to attain capacity by(1) building aircraft carriers to total tonnage allowed by treaty and
(2) building cruisers to a 5-5-3 basis.
ACTUAL Ratios, NAVAL AIR STRENGTH... U.S. Brit. Emp. JAP. EMP. FRANCE ITALY
Plane Carrying Capacity ............ 3.297 .20 3.00 1.49 0 .33
CAPITAL SHIP Ratios................... 5.00 5.00 3.00 1.67 1.67
FUTURE BUILDING PROGRAMS OF FOREIGN POWERS
ADDITIONAL TO SHIPS BUILDING in preceding tables.
According to Press Reports.
BRITISH EMPIRE
(Passed by House of Commons)
JAPANESE EMPIRE
(Proposed to be acted upon in coming
Diet.)
British building 5 year program-cost
£58,000,000
9 class A cruisers, 10,000 tons each
7 class B cruisers, 8,000 tons each
27 destroyers
23 submarines type 0-1
5 gunboats
4 mine layers
1 submarine tender
1 repair ship
1 net layer
1 Boating dock
40-ship building program for fiscal year
1926-30, including-
4 10,000-ton cruisers to replace four light
cruisers completed one in 1910, three in
1912, total tonnage of 18,950
3 special service ships. (Presumably
tenders)
20 (about) first class destroyers of approx-
imately 1,500 tons each.
12 (about) fleet submarines of about 2,000
tons each.
FRANCE
3
8
ITALY
(Projected but not yet authorized)
Light cruisers--no data
Destroyers to be built between 1925-28
Authorized but not appropriated for-
submarines over 485 tons.
(Passed Senate)
1 10,000 ton cruiser
3 2,500 ton destroyers
4 1,500 ton destroyers
8 1,500 ton submarines
2 mine-layers
1 aviation transport
8


  p. 1960 (#904)                      #

To the Institute's Members:
IT IS BELIEVED THE FIGURES
ON THE INSIDE BACK COVER
THIS ISSUE ARE EXTREMELY
IMPORTANT IF THE CORRECT
INTERPRETATION IS PLACED
UPON THEM.
They show that the officers who have
reached flag rank after at least 37 years of
service are the ones who consider it worth
while to give your Institute their support.
IF THE FLAG OFFICERS SHOW
BY THEIR EXAMPLE THEIR
INTEREST IN OUR
NAVAL INSTITUTE
CAN NOT ALL OF US DO THE SAME?
We need not make a drive. It is suggested,
however, that each commanding officer of
any unit in the line or staff of the Navy
and Marine Corps as well as any member
bring to the attention of non-members the
advisability of their joining.
With the limitations placed upon the Navy
by the Conference for the Limitation of
Armament, it is more important than ever
before in our history that our commis-
sioned and enlisted personnel be of the
very highest efficiency.


  p. 1961 (#905)                      #

DISCUSSION
Excellence of Naval Material
(See page 1573, September, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
COMMANDER C. S. McDowELL, U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Commander
Craven has given us a paper which contains so much truth and so many
thought provoking facts that it should be carefully read by all in the naval
service. I have found it difficult to obtain the author's exact viewpoint at
all times, due to his unusual use of terms. In particular, I wish he had
found some substitute for "conception" and "conceptive." This, though,
does not vitally affect the value of the paper. The author's title is mis-
leading, for, though he does logically cover naval material in considerable
detail, the real purpose of the paper evidently is to present reasons for
reorganizing the entire Navy Department.
I am in hearty agreement with the author's proposal to organize the
material part of the Navy Department under functional duties. He has
pointed out the glaring example of electrical material which is now handled
separately by six bureaus. There would undoubtedly be a considerable
saving in funds and better material obtained if all electrical engineering
questions and electrical material were handled by one group.
The author proposes two major subdivisions of the Navy Department,
to be known as “Naval Operations” and “Naval Material.” It is noted that
this follows closely the present navy yard organization except in the use of
terms, which, of course, are of no great importance. The retention of the
designation "bureau" as the name for the subdivisions under the major
departments is believed undesirable. It would possibly create the belief
that a certain bureau under the new organization was simply a former
bureau transferred to a new setting. This would endanger the smooth
functioning of the reorganization, by personnel endeavoring to carry over
former duties to their new bureau. The Navy is not bureaucratic and a
better term than "bureau" can undoubtedly be found.
I recognize very clearly the need of technical officers in the Navy, but
I do not see the need of a technical corps in the Navy, provided officers
are assigned to the duties which they are best fitted to fill, and the only
criterion for promotion is whether or not they have performed satisfactorily
the duties which have been assigned them. As I understand the
author, he proposes that the technical officers shall be employed on research,
development, design, and production of all types of naval craft, naval
apparatus, and naval material. The officers would be scientific engineers,


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
or applied scientists, capable of diligently searching for facts and putting
the results of their search into practical use. It is my opinion that the
Navy possesses a large number of technical officers who are now in the
line. I might even go further and say that I believe that all of the best
of our line officers are essentially technical officers. I have served at sea
on the staff of four admirals, as a technical member of the staff, and I
know that those four admirals were each technical officers themselves,
capable of performing technical work of a high order. One of these flag
officers, Admiral A. W. Grant, has carried out eminent technical work since
his retirement. Experience and special training are important factors in
the making of a technical officer, but of greater importance is the desire to
investigate and the will to persevere until bedrock facts are obtained,
coupled with the ability to interpret facts and put them into use. Interest
enters very strongly into the making of an efficient technical officer. I
feel that it is impossible to take a graduate, a couple of years after he
leaves the Academy, put him into a technical corps and be certain that he
should remain a technical officer throughout his service. Possibly in the
course of a few years he might be better back in the line and, conversely,
an original line officer better in his place.
If there are no corps, except the Medical Corps, officers can be assigned
to technical duties or line duties, depending upon their particular aptitude
for different kinds of work. This gives a flexible arrangement and permits
of officers being used where most needed at the time during their careers.
Many officers would undoubtedly be kept on technical work throughout their
entire service. Other officers could be detailed to technical duties at times
and at other times to line duties.
During the war I directed the work of several hundred scientists. These
numbered among them some of the most eminent research men in the
country and several of them were internationally known for their brilliant
achievements. It was the greatest pleasure to work with these men and
see how unselfishly and whole-heartedly they devoted themselves to their
problems. Much time was lost, however, in getting practical results, due
to the fact that these scientists did not know the service conditions which ap-
paratus would have to meet. As a result of this experience I am thoroughly
convinced that naval technical work must be directed and much of the work
actually done by technical officers. These officers should be kept in touch
with the service conditions afloat by periodic tours of duty at sea. These
tours of sea duty need not be lengthy, but they should be fairly frequent
so that the touch of the sea will not be lost in their investigations, designs,
and developments.
Lieutenant Commander Craven is to be congratulated on the great
amount of study he has given to his subject and on the logical deductions
he has obtained. It is to be hoped that this paper, and some of the other
papers lately appearing in the PROCEEDINGS, will stir up service opinion and
result in concrete improvements.


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Discussion
Excellence of Naval Material
(See page 1573, September, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
CAPTAIN B. B. WYGANT, U. S. Navy.—The most important part of
Lieutenant Commander Craven's article seems to be in the conclusions,
which may be generally stated thus:
A reorganization of the Navy Department is required, comprising (1)
a division of naval material which should perform the material functions
of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Ordnance, Engineering, Navi-
gation, Aeronautics, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks; (2)
division of naval operations very much as at present constituted, but in-
cluding personnel ; (3) “The Secretary's Office,” which is further sub-
divided into the budget section, accounting section, and general board.
It is, of course, plainly obvious that the present system results in con-
fusion and waste of money, and that a division into co-equal parts based
on functional activities is essential to the proper conduct of the next war.
As for the particular division that Lieutenant Commander Craven has
selected, it is certainly in the right direction, although a somewhat different
division of the organization might be conceived that would be more in
keeping with the generally accepted ideas of efficiency in military
organization.
The further segregation of the material division into
1. Conception,
2. Design,
3. Production,
4. Maintenance,
5. Operation,
appears to be a logical one.
There are certain "high spots" in this article that deserve to be emphasized.
In speaking of the indirect factors which determine the composition of the
fleet, he says:
"Surrender to the limitations of money is as dangerous a compromise
as any."
This fact is often neglected by those who pride themselves on having of
practical minds. Naval officers should bear in mind the fact that in war
they enter the market place and bid for a certain commodity called victory
and, unlike commercial bidding, no price can be too high, and no other
market place is available than the battlefield. The price must be paid: so
much in lives, so much in money. If the legislators prefer to pay later in
lives than presently in money, that is their business, but they should not do
it with connivance of naval officers.
Another sentence deserving mention is the following:
"It is no more necessary that an officer shall command a battleship
to be qualified to command a fleet than that he should also command a


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(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
mine layer. This is because no officer is really qualified to command in
war until he has had general tactical training."
This statement is a truism to those who look upon a fleet in the broad sense,
and who realize that he who commands a fleet successfully must command
tactical units and not ships. This statement, however, is subject to the
limitation that since battleships usually form the major unit, familiarity
with their maneuvers is of somewhat greater importance than familiarity
with the maneuvers of subsidiary units.
Excellence of Naval Material
(See page 1573, September, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
COMMANDER C. W. FISHER, (CC), U. S. Navy.—This paper is a timely
and valuable addition to the literature on a subject which, whether we like
it or not, will shortly become of vital importance to the Navy. I hope to
see an increasing number of similar articles from different points of view
so that the service at large may begin to realize the varied aspects of the
problem that confronts it.
I am in general agreement with Lieutenant Commander Craven's analysis
and conclusions to such an extent that I do not wish to cloud the importance
of the main question by differences as to details. His arrangement of the
Navy Department differs somewhat from that proposed by me (see
"Proposed Administrative Changes in Navy Department,” page 357, March,
1925 PROCEEDINGS), and his treatment of the whole problem is broader
than was mine. Many solutions can doubtless be found. The vital thing
is that responsibility, authority, and control of funds must form one un-
broken chain.
It has been said that "Cooperation is where I do what you want me to
do." Such cooperation has been the basis of the relations among the
existing bureaus of the Navy Department. The establishment of the Office
of Naval Operations was an attempt at coordination of departmental effort.
It has been successful in part-up to the point where its activities begin to
infringe upon bureau control of funds, at which point the bureaus clamor-
ously protest, and it is at exactly that point, the control of funds, where
forcible coordination is most needed. Naval Operations and the present
bureau system are inherently antagonistic.
The Navy Yard Division represents another attempt at coordination.
So long as the Navy Yard Division voiced only the unanimous opinion of
the bureaus, and required no money, it was a welcome addition to the bureau
family; but it has failed thus far in every attempt to execute its duties in
the face of a single opposing bureau vote, and, furthermore, during its
four years of life has, (with perhaps one recent exception) been equally
unsuccessful in exercising any authority whatsoever that touched the all-
important question of bureau funds.
Going a few years farther back we find sad memories of an aide for
material, an aide for inspections, and an aide for navy yards. The life of
each was short. Why?


  p. 1965 (#909)                      #

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Discussion
Lieutenant Commander Craven has given us the answer. All these
functions relied upon cooperation instead of coordination. There was no
power behind them. Secretaries issued orders, regulations were changed,
offices were established, but the vital thing was missing-power—the power
inherent in the control of appropriations; and until that power is made
part of any departmental re-organization it cannot stand.
But is any such re-organization needed? Lieutenant Commander Craven
from a coldly analytical study of the functions of the Navy proves with
irresistible logic that it is. Attacking the question from a different point of
view I reached the same conclusion. There is an ever increasing group of
officers who are progressively reaching this identical conclusion. The
establishment of extra-bureau offices, referred to above, indicates that others
thought so many times past. How long shall we wait for the correct
solution and the necessary action? How long can the Navy wait?
The rumors of another drastic cut in the Navy's budget estimates to be
presented to Congress this fall seem to show the urgency of immediate
action. If personnel is to remain at its present strength, then any cut must
necessarily fall upon the maintenance appropriations in greatly magnified
proportions. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that such a condition
might spell the break-down of the present departmental organization.
National Strategy
(See page 1343, August, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
BROCK HOLST LIVINGSTON.-Lieutenant Commander Frost's paper proves
that he has joined the ranks of the advocates of cooperation between the
State and Navy Departments. Since he comes so ably equipped through his
extensive study he is consequently a most welcome adherent.
In this latest paper he suggests that in war time the State Department
be made the agency "to guide our work and the definite diplomatic and
propaganda plans to attack the enemy morale.” He advises a defense
council under the President and composed of the Secretaries of State, War,
and Navy, and economic administration. “These agencies," he writes, "are
just as important now in peace time as in war." The defense council which
he urges is, indeed, as important in peace as in war. It would serve as the
clearing house of national strategy. " Therein could be formulated national
policies only as powerful as could be backed by our armed forces. Within
its meetings could be decided the strength which would be needed to support
proposed national policies. A defense council would serve the purpose of
an exchange of departmental policies. It would increase or, might I say,
bring about, cooperation between the departments.
"A real coordination of our national forces in the next war will be
worth many army corps and battleships.” Let us carry this even further.
A real coordination of our national forces in peace may prove the prevention
of war.


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START OF INAUGURAL FLIGHT OF GOODYEAR "PILCRIM" AIRSHIP, AT AKRON, Owo


  p. 1967 (#911)                      #

PROFESSIONAL NOTES
PREPARED BY
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER H. W. UNDERWOOD, U. S. Navy
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
DRIDI
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1968
1970
1972
1974
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1975
1977
1980
1980
1981
1983
1985
1988
GREAT BRITAIN
The Naval Program ..
British Naval Plans Criticized at Home .
The Royal Dockyards ..
Maintaining the Fleet ......
FRANCE
New French Command in Mediterranean
Progress of Aviation in France .....
Trade Expansion .
New Mine-Laying Submarine ......
ITALY
The Economic Situation in Italy..
JAPAN
The Commercial and Industrial Position in Japan ......
.....
UNITED STATES
Another Side of the 5-5-3 Argument........
The Great Pacific War .....
AERONAUTICS
Commercial Airports and Airways .............
Superchargers ......
Inaugural Flight of Goodyear Pilgrim ........
ENGINEERING
The World's Marine Engineering Situation ...
The Propelling Machinery Controversy.
Selecting Lubricating Oils for Navy Use
Navy to Make Tests with Pulverized Coal
MERCHANT MARINE
Fleet Corporation and Shipping Board Affairs
Motor Passenger Liners .
Motor Liner Asturias .....
Flettner Rudder ....
MISCELLANEOUS
Combat Methods of the Japanese ........
Australia's Apprehensions
Seven "Danger Spots" Still Disturb World
Peace by Cooperation is Institute's Message..
ige....................
CURRENT PROFESSIONAL NOTES AND PAPERS ........ .........
1990
1994
1999
2000
2003
2004
2007
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2011
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2015
2021
2023
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  p. 1968 (#912)                      #

1968
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
GREAT BRITAIN
The Naval Program
The Engineer, 31 July, 1925.— Particulars of the new shipbuilding program
for the navy, which the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons
last week, are given in a White Paper issued on Monday night. Under
this scheme it is proposed to lay down each year for the next five years
certain craft which are needed to replace older vessels that are rapidly
becoming obsolete. To those who make a study of current naval affairs
it has long been evident that' the system we have pursued since the war of,
as it were, living on our capital in respect of warship material could not
go on indefinitely unless we were prepared to accept a subordinate position
in the ranks of the great sea powers. Such a position would, of course, be
intolerable for many reasons. No party in the state and no responsible
member of any party would recommend as a deliberate policy the surrender
of that measure of naval strength which has justly been regarded as vital
by successive generations of British statesmen, with the whole-hearted
support of the people. It is true that the role of the navy as our first line
of defense has been somewhat modified by the conquest of the air. Our
insular situation, no longer confers the complete immunity from oversea
attack which we formerly enjoyed by virtue of a powerful fleet. Under
present circumstances the navy of itself cannot guarantee our coasts against
insult. Science has evolved a weapon by which the afortime invincible
cordon of sea defense may be evaded, and telling blows be delivered at the
very heart of the empire. But, to argue that because the navy has ceased
to be a sure shield in every sense of the term it is not worth preserving
at a given standard of strength, seems to us to betray a singularly imperfect
appreciation of realities. While it may be true that the Navy exists
primarily to defend our shores from attack, and only secondarily—though
this point has been warmly disputed—to protect the seaborne trade upon
which we as a nation are absolutely dependent for our living, it is obvious
that a naval force too weak to perform the first function would be equally
incapable of fulfilling the second. It is no less clear that security from
air attack, if purchased by developing the air fleet at the expense of the
navy, would avail us little in the event of war with an opponent who could
deploy a superior force at sea. Air raids, on however large a scale, could
affect but a minor section of the populace, but any prolonged interruption
of our food supplies would cause universal distress and must eventually
compel our unconditional submission. We would apologize for dwelling
on these elementary truths were it not that they are so often ignored by
present-day critics of the navy, who seem to think that the whole problem
of national defense is open to solution by the simple expedient of abolishing
sea power and building up a great air force.
Granting the premise that existing circumstances still demand the main-
tenance of a respect-compelling navy, the case for a new naval program is
easy to defend. We have lately been treated to a bewildering mass of
statistics by two schools of thought-the first concerned to show that our
cruiser resources are quite adequate, and would remain so for years to
come, even if no new keel were laid down; the second endeavoring to prove
that the deficiency of cruising ships is already so grave as to demand heroic
measures. The truth, we think, lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Upwards of fifty cruisers are now on the navy list. Of these vessels, a
round dozen are too old and to slow to be of any serious fighting value.
A further twenty, although of later design, were completed during 1915-17
and thus subjected to the excessive stress and strain of war service, which
must have curtailed very considerably their normal span of useful "life.”
The balance consists mainly of small ships of the C and D class, rather
deficient in speed and nautical qualities, but not without a distinct value for


  p. 1969 (#913)                      #

1925]
1969
Professional Notes
fleet duty; four larger and more powerful vessels of the improved Birming-
ham class, and the two E class units, which were specially designed for
great speed. Besides these, we have five County cruisers on the stocks, and
two more of the same type will shortly be laid down for the Australian
Navy. Finally, there is the cruiser-mine layer Adventure. Applying the
new standards of cruiser efficiency set up by the Washington compact-which
has virtually stereotyped the future cruising ship as a vessel of 10,000 tons,
mounting 8-inch guns—it will be found that the empire has, built and build-
ing, eleven ships which belong, more or less, to this major type; three of
the second class, and eleven or twelve suitable for work with the fleet, but
not for independent ocean cruising. This establishment may seem meager
enough in view of the multifarious duties that would fall to it in war time,
including the patrol of trade routes which aggregate a distance of 80,000
miles; and so, indeed, it is. On the other hand, there has not, so far, been
any marked development of the oceanic cruiser type in other navies, and
in ships of this class under construction or completed we have still a decided
margin over all the other powers together. This lead will, however, be
appreciably reduced if the foreign programs now in hand are in each case
carried out in full. The United States alone has eight 10,000-ton ships
projected, Japan has four, France six, and Italy five. With all these powers
our relations are quite friendly, and nowhere is there any sign of a deliberate
challenge to our naval position. This fact notwithstanding, it is of the
first importance that the navy shall be kept strong and efficient, and not
least that branch of it which would be responsible in war for the safety
of our floating commerce. Experience should have taught us that cruisers
are cheaper than commerce raids. So long as we can give a reasonable
degree of protection to our shipping there will be little or no scope for the
exploits of a future Emden or an Alabama. It is unfortunate that the
modern ocean cruiser should be as expensive as a pre-war battleship, but
heavy as the cost of building up a large fleet of these vessels may be, we
are convinced that it will be more than recompensed by the security afforded
to our seaborne trade.
Turning now to the details of the new program, we find that it is
proposed to lay down in the current financial year four A class cruisers-
that is, ships of 10,000 tons. Next year two of the A class and one ship
of the B class are to be started. In subsequent years, from 1927 to 1929
inclusive, the annual quota will be three ships, one being of the A and two
of the B class. The latter, a new design prepared on the basis of 8,000 tons
displacement, is an intermediate type, bridging the rather wide gap between
small fleet cruisers and the big "treaty” ships. It is represented abroad
by the American Omaha, the Japanese Furutaka, and the French Dugilagi-
Trouin, and in our own service by the Emerald. Whether a ship of this
character could engage a "treaty" cruiser without being summarily defeated
is a question for naval men to determine. If it could not, then the design is
open to serious criticism, for it should be an unvarying principle of British
naval policy to build only such vessels as are equal in fighting power to
the strongest of their class being built elsewhere. But, until some details
of the B type cruiser are available, it would be profitless to carry the dis-
cussion further. If the program is completed according to plan, the empire
will possess in 1932 a fleet of sixteen A class cruisers-or twenty if the
Hawkins and her consorts are rated as such—and ten ships of the B class.
Provided that no large additions are made to foreign navies in the mean-
while, this force of thirty ocean cruisers should be adequate. The cir-
cumstances in which the plan was adopted by the Cabinet leave no doubt
that the Admiralty regards it as the minimum commensurate with Imperial
needs. It is a relief to find some provision being made for the methodical
replacement of destroyers and submarines, the building of which has been
practically in abeyance for years past. We have fewer patrol submarines
today than the United States or Japan, and will soon be outdistanced by


  p. 1970 (#914)                      #

1970
Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
France. Our destroyers are mostly of old design, very few of them compar-
ing favorably with the latest foreign productions. Twenty-seven destroyers
are to be laid down in the three years beginning 1927-28. The replacement
of submarines is to start next year with a batch of six O type boats, pre-
sumably similar to the 0-1, of 1,480 tons, which is now under construction
at Chatham. Each year thereafter for the next three years six additional
submarines will be laid down, but one of the group projected for 1929-30
is to be of the fleet type. In that year, also, a new aircraft carrier is to be
begun. Other material provided for in the five-year building plan com-
prises five gunboats, four motor launches, two submarine depot ships, one
net layer, a repair ship, and a floating dock. The total cost, estimated at
£58,000,000, is likely to extend over a period of eight years.
The program as it stands is clearly a compromise between the rival
claims of naval defense and national economy. Its acceptance by the Board
of Admiralty can only mean that the supreme naval authorities consider
it adequate. Otherwise they could scarcely have remained in office. The
community will benefit directly by the increased activity in numberless
trades affected by naval shipbuilding and the consequent mitigation of un-
employment. At least 70 per cent of the total sum involved will be ex-
pended in wages; nor must the political effect of the program be ignored.
It signifies to the world at large that Great Britain lacks neither the means
nor the resolution to uphold that sea power which is not only essential
to her national being, but is a proved bulwark of peace.
British Naval Plans Criticized at Home
By Hector C. Bywater, Baltimore Sun, 13 August, 1925.— Newspaper com-
ment on the government's cruiser program is, on the whole, unfriendly.
Excepting the Morning Post, which quaintly hails it as a naval triumph
comparable to the Battle of Jutland, the tone of ministerial organs is one
of tepid approval, qualified by outspoken misgivings as to how the taxpayer
will take this latest addition to his already tremendous burden.
By opposition papers the program is denounced with a vehemence which
obviously does not spring from party motives alone. Many stanch Unionists,
holding this to be a singularly unfortunate moment at which to resume war-
ship construction on a large scale, confess their disappointment with the
Prime Minister for yielding to Admiralty pressure.
It is the almost universal opinion that the government has committed a
blunder of the first magnitude, for which it will pay dearly. The adoption
of a naval scheme which involves a capital outlay of $290,000,000 at a
period of acute economic crisis could only be justified, it is argued, by some
grave and pressing menace to the national safety, yet even members of the
government are compelled to own that no such menace is in sight.
From the purely naval viewpoint there is much to be said for the program.
Though the British cruiser fleet looks formidable on paper, it consists in the
main of material which the progress of design has rendered obsolete. As
the First Lord of the Admiralty told Parliament yesterday, if no new ships
were begun this year the British Empire would have seven cruisers of post-
war design, the United States eighteen, Japan twenty-one and France nine.
Four years hence the position with regard to cruisers armed with 8-in. guns
would be: British Empire seven, United States eight, Japan eight, and
France six. At to speed of ships exceeding 30 knots, the empire would
have seven, the United States eighteen, Japan twenty-five, and France nine.
These figures are to some extent arbitrary, ignoring as they do four
British ships (Raleigh class) which mount a battery of seven 77/2-in. guns,
and because they accept the trial speeds of American and Japanese ships as
the actual sea speeds. The fact that several new American cruisers are to
have their machinery modified and that more than one Japanese cruiser has


  p. 1971 (#915)                      #

1925)
1971
Professional Notes
broken down when driven at maximum speed suggests that performance on
trial is not always a sure guide to performance in service.
But, on the part of the general public there is a growing and healthy
tendency to examine naval problems in a broader light than that of mere
technique. The old ton-and-gun system of measurement is discredited.
Scarcely anyone looks twice at comparisons of British and American cruiser
strength because scarcely anyone believes in the possibility of war with
America, and, unless war is envisaged as a possible contingency, compari-
sons of armed strength lack reality.
There remain only Japan and France as potential foes, but, to the man in
the street Japan is little more than a geographical expression. You cannot
make his flesh creep by dilating on the military power of a country half a
world away. This generation was bred in the tradition that only from the
continent of Europe is any serious challenge to British sea power to be
apprehended.
In my own youth the navy was organized for the specific purpose of
dealing with a coalition of the French and Russian fleets-the original touch-
stone of the two-power standard-but, only in the present century the naval
outlook had changed completely. Russian sea power was destroyed in the
war with Japan, while the conclusion of the entente cordiale removed
France from the list of prospective enemies. From that time forward the
one naval pre-occupation of this country was to keep an ample margin of
supremacy over the German fleet.
Now that the German fleet has been swept from the board, the British
Navy has no serious rival in European waters.
Rightly or wrongly, the public here does not regard French naval activity
with any alarm, despite the somewhat formidable number of submarines
which are constructing across the channel. It is infinitely more concerned
about the growth of French air power. A shipbuilding program aimed
against France would find no popular support. It follows, therefore, that
British naval policy today lacks a definite objective, at least so far as the
warding off of any tangible menace is in question.
Hence, the widespread opposition to the Admiralty's cruiser program.
Fears are expressed that, by inaugurating a new era of competitive ship-
building, it may undo the good work of the Washington Conference. There
is reason to fear that other powers may consider it expedient to build
more ships in order to preserve the status quo.
Already the French press is clamoring for an expansion of the 1922 navy
law, and rumors of a new Japanese program persist in the face of denials
from Tokio. Nor can the probability of a renewed naval agitation in
America be overlooked.
In these circumstances it is natural that the idea of a conference for the
further restriction of sea armaments should be gaining ground. Members
of Parliament are advocating this course, and journals of every political
complexion are taking it up. A resolution passed by the League of Nations
Union implores the government to take the initiative in summoning a con-
ference, "preferably through the League of Nations," with a view of avert-
ing an "inevitable competition in armaments among the naval powers,
which unless checked, will be a serious menace to peace.” Some news-
papers hold that Japan would be more likely to cooperate if the invitation
came from London instead of Washington.
Paris dispatches indicate that France no longer cherishes the ambitious
plans of submarine development which wrecked every attempt to ration
auxiliary craft at the first conference. It is further pointed out that since
the limitation of battleships probably would have failed but that America
had something substantial to bargain with the obvious policy for Great
Britain now is to announce her readiness to scrap this new building scheme,


  p. 1972 (#916)                      #

1972
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
provided the other powers will agree to a fixed ratio of strength in cruisers
and other auxiliaries.
One thing is certain: If President Coolidge feels disposed to revive his
plan for a new naval conference, he may count on the whole-hearted support
of British public opinion. The government itself would welcome it as a
means of escape from an embarrassing situation while the nation at large
would acclaim any action that promised to avert a new race in naval arma-
ments, with all the evil consequences, fiscal and political, to which it must
give rise.
The Royal Dockyards
The Engineer, 14 August, 1925.--In return for the government's approval
of the shipbuilding program, the Admiralty has pledged itself to effect such
economies in other branches of the naval administration as will obviate the
necessity of a supplementary vote for new construction during the current
financial year. How these economies are to be effected has not yet been
made public. There is, no doubt, some scope for retrenchment within the
Admiralty office itself, the cost of which far exceeds the pre-war figure,
in spite of the much smaller navy we are now maintaining, but, while a
cut in administration expenses would be welcomed for the principle of the
thing, the largest sum likely to be saved in this way would bear an insig-
nificant relation to the impending bill for new construction. A more promis-
ing expedient, which the Admiralty is understood to favor, is the closing
down of certain of the Royal Dockyards at home which have become
superfluous: namely, Chatham, Sheerness, and Pembroke. Owing to its
position in an area which has ceased to be strategically important, the
dockyard at Rosyth is also of limited utility, but since it is at present
the only government yard in the country where H.M.S. Hood and other
large bulged ships can be docked, that establishment is in no immediate
danger of being discarded. The other yards referred to have no important
docking facilities. Sheerness, which is only a repairing base for small
craft, might well be dispensed with. Chatham is of more importance; it
has specialized for years past in submarine construction and has a fairly
up-to-date plant for the building of larger vessels, the cruiser Kent being
now on the stocks there; but Chatham, like Sheerness, has become super-
fluous. A cogent objection to the retention of these two establishments is
their vulnerability to aerial attack, though that objection might be said
to apply to Portsmouth as well, and even to Devonport. Pembroke has a
reputation for excellence of workmanship, some of the finest cruisers of the
pre-war navy having been built at that yard. Its plant was partly modern-
ized during the war, and is now, we believe, fully competent to undertake
the building of cruisers of the latest type; but Pembroke is not con-
veniently placed for the needs of the present-day feet, and in recent years it
has had a very limited amount of work in hand.
The estimated expenditure this year on the yards at Chatham, Sheerness,
and Pembroke is £1,063,968. It does not by any means follow, however,
that this sum would be saved to the country if the three yards were closed.
Such action would involve the dismissal of many thousands of workers,
skilled and unskilled, the greater number of whom would at once proceed,
and of necessity, to draw unemployment pay. Nor would that be all. The
closing of any dockyard must be disastrous to the locality in which it is
situated, inflicting hardship on numberless people who are not directly con-
nected with the establishment, but whose livelihood depends, nevertheless,
upon its existence and prosperity. Residents of the dockyard towns know
only too well the widespread distress that resulted after the war, when the
discharge of surplus personnel began on a large scale. Though the naval
budget might show a considerable saving if the redundant dockyards were


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1925]
1973
Professional Notes
closed, we fear that the nation as a whole would lose more than it gained,
In this period of economic stress it is vital that broader issues than mere
departmental convenience should be duly weighed before decision is reached.
So far as the navy is concerned, its requirements could probably be met by
Portsmouth and Devonport alone. That much is admitted by a service
journal which has always upheld the interests of the dockyards, but which,
in its latest issue, frankly owns that Chatham, Sheerness, and Pembroke
are “not really necessary;" and yet, for the reasons outlined above, we
doubt whether the government will take the drastic step of closing them.
The problem of the smaller dockyards is, in truth, a thorny one, not to be
solved by the rough-and-ready measures that appear to the zealot for econ-
omy. The question of whether they are essential for the navy, though
certainly an important issue, is not the only one to be considered. Judged
by that test, none of the small yards could hope to survive. The work
they are now doing could be performed with equal efficiency and probably
at a reduced cost by the private shipyards. To the best of our knowledge
it has never been claimed that the royal yards can build or repair ships
more cheaply than independent establishments. The brief post-war experi-
ment of constructing merchant vessels in the dockyards was a signal failure
from the financial point of view. It may be urged, however, and with
justice that the prime function of a state yard is the repair and maintenance
of the King's ships, their construction being quite a secondary matter.
But, even on this basis, it would be difficult to present a convincing case
for retaining such yards as those at Pembroke, Chatham, and Sheerness.
The fleet of today is very much smaller than the fleet of 1914, nor is there
any prospect of a substantial increase in its dimensions within the dis-
cernible future. Over a long period of time our battle fleet is restricted by
treaty to a certain number of ships. Ten years hence we shall have only
sixteen capital ships all told, and from 1936 to 1942, presuming the Wash-
ington compact to remain in force so long, only fifteen ships. Considera-
tions of expense will effectively prevent any corresponding expansion
of the non-capital fleet. With every new cruiser costing £2,000,000, every
destroyer £250,000, and every submarine £400,000—vide an answer returned
in the House of Commons last week—there will be no incentive to build
above the irreducible minimum in any one of these types. It is therefore
extremely probable that the present numerical strength of the navy, small
though it be, will tend rather to diminish than increase. Now, the dock-
yards we possess today were created and organized to meet the needs of
a Aleet very much larger than that which remains to us, and of a fleet,
moreover, which was designed in the first place to operate in the Narrow
Seas. Barring some wholly unforeseen development in international
politics, the contingency of a future war in Europe, in which Great Britain
would be a belligerent, is happily remote. The importance attached to the
new Singapore base, together with the systematic building up of oil fuel
stations along the main oceanic routes, points unmistakably to an Ad-
miralty conviction that the next war, if it does materialize, will be fought
in some zone thousands of miles from home waters. In the event of such
a conflict, the first business of the home dockyards would be to repair
and fit out ships destined for the front. That much accomplished, there
would be little left for them to do, since the task of maintaining and re-
plenishing ships in the war zone would devolve on such dockyards as were
suitably placed for the purpose. The ability of our feet to keep the seas
would depend chiefly on the base facilities available at Singapore, Trin-
comali, Sydney, and Malta. Pursuing this line of argument to its logical
extreme, we reach the conclusion that the money now spent on all save the
most necessary establishments at home should forwith be diverted to the
improvement of our naval bases oversea. That, we believe, is the Ad-


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1974
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
miralty's view, albeit for the reasons explained it may not be practicable to
give it effect in the immediate future.
For the present, so it seems to us, the problem of our superfluous dock-
yards does not lend itself to any satisfactory solution. To close them
down would be to aggravate unemployment in a branch of industry which
suffers more than most from the prevailing depression. To keep them open
is to impose a charge on the state for which there is no adequate return,
yet the second alternative is probably the lesser evil. Sooner or later there
must be a reversion to healthier economic conditions, with a consequent
reduction in the number of unemployed. When that occurs a demand will
arise for workers in every trade, including shipbuilding and ship repairing,
and an opportunity may thus be given of absorbing into private industry
part of the thousands of men for whom work is now literally being “made"
in the smaller dockyards. This will be the proper moment at which to close
the redundant establishments. We can only trust that the government then
in office will have sufficient resolution to take such a course, regardless
of the political pressure brought to bear by the small but influential group
of "dockyard members," to whose joint effort is due, in no small part, the
continued maintenance at heavy expense of naval establishments which con-
tribute nothing to our naval strength.
Maintaining the Fleet
The Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette, 8 August, 1925.—Shorn of its
political significance and of the interchanges of party warfare, last week's
naval debate brought out clearly one vital fact, that this country is de-
termined to maintain the navy up to a one-power standard, that its strength,
in other words, shall not be allowed to deteriorate below that of any other
nation. It would have been well had someone challenged the opposition
parties on this issue. If they accept this principle, much of their criticism
is automatically silenced. The rebuilding of the feet, as Mr. Churchill
truly said, is a charge that must fall upon any government or any board
of admiralty in one form or another. Refusing to be led away by high-
sounding phrases such as that about our standard of naval strength being in
strict adherence to some promise expressed in the covenant of the League
of Nations—that our defense forces should be reduced to the minimum con-
sistent with national safety—the governments have faced the position fairly
and squarely, and their decision does them credit. That they have earnestly
striven to keep expenditure down to the lowest possible limit is shown by
the fact that their five-year program will give us, with the ships already
in hand, twenty-three cruisers. The Amery program of two years ago
would have provided thirty-three at a cost of from 15,000,000 to 20,000,000
more. The changed situation abroad justifies this retrenchment, and in-
ternational agreement between the powers may render still further economies
possible later on.
In the meantime, what the Admiralty critics entirely fail to see is that
it is the cabinet which determines policy. It is the government which says
what our fleet shall be maintained for. Having thus a certain responsibility
placed upon them, it is the board which says what forces are necessary
to discharge that responsibility. The lucid statement of Mr. Churchill as
to the negotiations which led up to the new program renders extremely
foolish the talk about insubordinate Admirals, to which even Lloyd George
found it desirable to lend himself. On one point at least he is quite mis-
taken--that for admirals to stand by their program is quite a modern
innovation, and that the old admirals never put forward such a claim. The
reverse is the case, as many examples could prove, one of the best known
being when the board under Lord Spencer, which included Admirals
Richards, Kerr, and Fisher, stood to their program and wrecked Mr.
Gladstone's last ministry. The events of the last few weeks have merely
followed well-established precedent.


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1975
Professional Notes
Another point in which the critics were ill-in formed was as to the need
for cruisers in peace-time. It was suggested that as no great war is likely
for ten years-a pure speculation which it suits many people to accept as
an accomplished fact-therefore no ships need be built until it is upon us.
A closer examination of events since the Armistice would show the manifold
uses of cruisers in normal times. China, Mexico, Honduras, Tangier,
Chanak, and a host of other places have all been glad of the presence of a
British cruiser, and the value to the empire of the policing of the seas which
the navy performs year in and year out is incalculable. It promotes trade,
empire fellowship, and international good will. More than the battleship,
the cruiser is one of the principal agents of this work, and all friends of
the navy will rejoice that twenty-three of the war-built vessels, many of
them but fragile supertorpedo craft, are now to be replaced by up-to-date
ships, better designed and equipped for service in the outer oceans.
FRANCE
New French Command in Mediterranean
The Naval and Military Record, 5 August, 1925.-Admiral Dumesnil, on
being replaced by Admiral Violette, in the command of the Toulon squadron,
will assume the responsible duties of Inspecteur Genéral des forces maritimes
de la Mediterranee, a new post giving him rights of supervision over the
shore defenses and seagoing formations of Toulon, Corsica, Bizerta, Algiers,
and Oran, without mentioning the aerial stations of St. Raphael, Cuers,
and the Syrian naval stations. This command is by far the most important
in the French naval service, and for such comprehensive functions it is
agreed Admiral Dumesnil is the right man in the right place. Words are
unnecessary to praise a chief who showed in action under extremely critical
circumstances what he was worth. The 4,700-ton croisseur-cuirassé
Latouche-Tréville, earmarked for condemnation in July, 1914; and so worn
out that she was crawling home at seven knots, Commandant Dumesnil
turned into the most efficient and daring fighter in the Dardanelles contest,
and her exploits he related in his well-known book, Souvenirs de Guerre
d'un Vieux Croiseur. M. Dumesnil's exceptionally brilliant career is due
solely to his tried merit, and the thing is unusual enough in the Marine
Républicaine. He has brought Pescadre de combat to a high degree of
efficiency, employing in tactics and strategy and in training his commanders
that directness of purpose and quick decision that are the marks of great
chiefs. Eloquence, verbiage, literary attainments, witty but negative criticism,
and anything that is not action and impedes action he despised and promptly
brushed aside in the ordinary discharge of fleet duties and in dealing with his
commanders. In this respect his influence has been great on the formation
of many promising commanders.
This placing of France's Mediterranean sea power under the supervision
of so experienced and active an admiral, who for the past two years has
lived mostly at sea, all the problems of the command of the Mediterranean,
will have the effect of benefitting France's position in waters which she must
be assured of commanding in wartime under penalty of losing her African
empire and her rank as a great nation. The massing of the supreme British
Armada in the Middle Sea, the steady increase of the Italian fleet, that
excels the French in the matter of torpedo and aerial flotillas, the general
unrest in the Moslem world, and signs of brewing strife in Balkan and
Turkish quarters are so many faits nouveaus that call for an immediate
and substantial strengthening of the inadequately-equipped naval and aerial
bases in Tunisia and Corsica.
Admiral Docteux (fifty-seven years of age), on relinquishing the com-
mand of the Channel Division and flotillas, which he trained remarkably,


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
will assume the functions of Director du Personnel Militaire at the Paris
Admiralty. Rear Admiral Brigson (fifty-seven years of age) becomes
chief of the Defense Department of the important Toulon port militaire,
he previously commanded a battle division. There are at the present
moment only thirty-four Aag officers on the active list (instead of seventy-
five, and of these orly seven are employed at sea, which is truly a small
proportion and not favorable to efficiency. Too many fine men of action
with gold stars on their sleeves are pining, fretting, and rusting in bureau-
cratic berths on the plancher des vaches, anxious for any chance of getting
out to sea, the home of true marines. The commissioning within the next
few months of three 8,000-ton cruisers, six 2,400-ton destroyers, and twelve
1,500-ton torpilleurs d'escadre, without mentioning submarines, will supply
the means of satisfying the longings for sea of the three or four more flag
officers. Rear Admiral Herr (fifty-two years of age), a distinguished
officer and fervent believer in speed and torpedoes, is expected to take the
command of the six Chacals (2,400 tons, five 5.1-in. guns, six torpedo
tubes, and 36 knots), that would form one ultra-fast patrolling and scouting
flotilla to be placed at the disposal of, the commander-in-chief at Toulon,
but with Bizerta as ordinary headquarters. Destroyers of 1,500 tons
(Simoun type) would be used as florilla leaders to the fifty-odd torpilleurs
d'escadre in commission, duties they could well perform, since they, too,
carry the new 5.1-inch caliber and the 550 mil. type of torpedoes, and will
do 34 knots on trials. They are a match for most Italian destroyers or
Aotilla leaders.
The six 36-knot Chacals, if true to expectations, would have nothing to
fear from any Mediterranean cruiser, and, besides, they could form an
escadre rapide with the three 35-knot Duguay-Trouins although expert
opinion is hostile to the closing up of these fine cruisers, well suited to
colonial defense, in the narrow Mediterranean waters. The Tigre (Chantiers
de Bretagne) has carried out promising preliminary trials in the Atlantic;
her turbine de croisière, despite the very small place it occupies on board.
gave easily 20 knots (with over 6,000 h.p.), instead of 18, and the Rateau
turbines worked satisfactorily, as usual, and leave no doubt as to the contract
figures being excecded by a good margin in the official trials to take place
shortly. The five boilers produced more steam than bargained for, and
justified the Admiralty decision to fit only four boilers in the three 2,650-
ton contretorpilleurs just ordered. The behavior of the Tigre in the choppy
waters of the Bay of Biscay was good, and life on board was comfortable,
although ito men and petty officers are somewhat crowded in two spacious
living quarters in the fore part of the ship, just as in English destroyers
officers are lodged at the extreme after part of the ship in comfortable and
relatively roomy quarters, very light and pleasant.
In several respects, habitability on board the Chacals and Tigre marks a
progress on anything yet achieved in that line in the French Navy. Sanitary
arrangements are practical, and thoroughly hygienic; lavatories and bathing
quarters are roomy and supplied with hot and cold water, and ventilation
in living rooms and motor quarters has been the object of special attention.
A thirty-six cubic-meter refrigerating room under the bows contains meat
and other articles of diet for three months, and the supply of drinking
water is ample. In the matter of food and other stores these 2,400-ton
so-called destroyers have been endowed with the endurance of cruisers, and
would be available for maintaining safe communications with colonies.
There are on decks five different kitchens of up-to-date practical design,
besides a bakery, producing 330 lb. of bread per day. On the initiative
of Commandant Brohan, the able commander of the Chacal, who believes
(with the first American admiral, Paul Jones) that contentment is the soul
of efficiency, cooperative canteens have been added to the list of board


  p. 1977 (#921)                      #

1925)
1977
Professional Notes
comforts that will provide "matelots” with all "extras" they may wish for,
which is a proof that Frenchmen, just like Englishmen, prefer fighting on a
full stomach.
Progress of Aeronautics in France
Bulletin of "French Bureau of Information," New York City, 12 August,
1925.-Commercial aviation has made considerable progress in France since
the war. At the beginning of the present year there were no less than
thirty-seven aerial lines running on regular schedules.
The activity of the Transports Aériens Company, at first connected with
the War Office, made possible the creation of a state secretaryship for
aeronautics. The different branches of aeronautics, however, have not been
united yet, and the four sections of aviation, military, naval, colonial, and
commercial, are still connected with four different ministries, war, navy,
colonies, and aeronautics. A connection between them is established, but
rather imperfectly, through three central services under the control of the
State Under-Secretary for Aeronautics: Technical Service of Aeronautics,
Manufacturing Service, National Office of Meteorology. Nevertheless, air-
plane manufacturers being thus encouraged and advised, and production
being to a certain extent supervised, the output is more regular and the
aeronautical industry is now working on a safer basis.
Aerodromes and emergency stations with telephones and repair shops
have been built.. Landing places are of three kinds, emergency landing
grounds, stations, and aerial ports.
An emergency landing ground usually covers about twenty-five hectares
(about 62/2 acres) and has a watchman with his residence on the spot.
Airmen find there a telephone, the necessary equipment for summary repair
work, and also a supply of gasoline and oil.
A station has a better equipped repair shop, a more important supply of
gas and oil, shelters, and a wireless station. Stations close to the borders
have a custom office besides.
An aerial port is nothing else than a station, but its equipment is more
complete and the landing ground is much larger.
At the present time, there are in France and in North Africa, one main
port, two secondary ports, nineteen stations, twenty-three emergency land-
ing grounds, seven bases and one seaplane port.
A scientific coordination of all aviation services and also improvements
in industrial methods have given very good results. Aerial transportation
is now no less secure, and just as regular, as any other. The percentage
of punctuality for the whole year is as high as 98 per cent. Accidents are
less frequent. In 1922, twenty accidents causing loss of human life occurred,
while the distance covered was 3,500,000 kilometers. In 1923, there were
twelve accidents for a distance of 3,900,000 kilometers, which represents
one person killed for a Aight eight times around the world.
The coefficient of security for 1924 is three times higher than in the
preceding year. Such splendid records are a sure proof that French air
machines are more and more reliable, that the aerial service is methodically
organized, while the professional ability of pilots is an additional guarantee
of security.
During the year 1924, French aviation made new records and audacious
fights, among which the following are particularly remarkable. Captain
Pelletier-Doisy made the memorable flight Paris-Hanoi-Peking-Tokyo;
Paris-Shanghai (16,450 kilometers--or about 10,220 miles, in ninety hours
of actual Aight, with fourteen stops; Paris-Tokyo (21,000 kilometers--or
about 13,000 miles) in 122 hours of actual flight, with twenty stops. From
Paris to Shanghai the flight was made with the same planes, the same


  p. 1978 (#922)                      #

1978
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
motor (not one part being replaced) the same pilot and one mechanic. It
is one of the most remarkable achievements in aeronautics.
In 1925, Captains Lemaitre and Arrachard made a non-stop flight of
3.400 kilometers or about 2,100 miles from Etampes (France) to Villa
Cisnéros (750 kilometers or about 465 miles from Dakar, Africa). This
non-stop flight is the official world record.
Such records speak well for France's airplane industry, which turns out
machines remarkable for their fine workmanship and their sturdiness. Im-
provements in the motors and a considerable increase in power also are
factors of 110 small importance. A few figures given here below sum up
the technical progress made since the war.
1919
1924
Power of motors ................ 300 H.P. 480 to 500 H.P.
Duration of flight .............. 50 hours 200 hours (commercial)
Average speed
.......kilometers per 600 hours (maximum)
hour 180 to 220 kilometers per
110 to 130
hour
1923
Non-stop flight (commercial) .... 310 miles
1924
373
A model aerial line is now being created and it may be taken for granted
that the work will be performed with the most painstaking care. France
already possesses at Le Bourget, which is the aerial port of Paris, one of
the best equipped aerial ports in the world. Its equipment includes a large
building in which are located offices for the management, a waiting roon
for passengers, a reading room, post office, an exchange office, and so forth.
Lately, a restaurant and custom offices have been established. Besides, and
in order to make sure of the physical fitness of pilots, an office for physio-
logical tests and studies has been created at Le Bourget.
It is obvious that landing stations on aerial lines cannot have as im-
portant an equipment as aerial ports. However, some landing grounds and
aerial depots are being created close to some big cities on convenient spots :
for instance, after having established the aerial port of Marignano, the city
of Marseilles, at the suggestion and under the supervision of its chamber of
commerce, is studying plans for the organization of commercial aviation on
a larger scale.
At the present time, the five state subsidized companies for aerial trans-
portation are trying to establish connections between Paris and the main
capitals of the world, and to organize a Mediterranean aerial system so
as to connect France with the Near-East and South America.
The Société Air Union takes care of the traffic on the line Paris-London.
The Société Générale de Transports Aériens operates the line Paris-Brussels-
Amsterdam.
Airplanes of the Compagnie Franco-Roumaine make the run Paris-
Prague-Warsaw and Paris-Prague-Constantinople.
Seaplanes of the Aero-Navale connect Antibes, France, with Ajaccio,
Corsica, and will shortly make the connection with Bizerte, Tunis.
Airplanes of the Compagnie Générale d'Entreprises Aéronautiques
(Latécoère lines) fly from Toulouse to Casablanca stop at Perpignan from
where there is an aerial connection with Marseilles and again Casablanca.
Morocco.
There are also the lines Alicante-Oran and Casablanca-Oran.


  p. 1979 (#923)                      #

1925]
1979
Professional Notes
From 1920 to 1925, the results of the aerial lines operation have shown a
steady increase:
Years
Trips Distance Passengers Freight Alail
1920 ........... 2,386 853,959 1,771 77,038 15,660
1921 ....
2,353,455 10,619 261,890 34,840
1922 .......... 7,361 2,798,366
9,502 556,370
167,680
1923 ........... 9,720 3,389,195 11,638 969,001 328,440
1924 ...........11,563 3,647,826 16,729 877,591 532,777
These figures are sufficient to demonstrate the progress made by French
aviation. We purposely refrain from mentioning in this brief study, the
prospects now envisaged and the steps taken for their realization.
The French Customs' service has just made public the figures concerning
France's foreign trade during the first six months of 1925. In these
statistics the amount of imports and exports for June, as compared with
the preceding month, appears as follows:
Imports:
May, 1925
June, 1925
(in 1,000 francs)
Foodstuffs
561,220
642,584
Raw material for industry ........ 1,976,822
1,932,214
Manufactured articles
430,630
416,445
Totals
........2,968,672
2,991,243
Exports:
Foodstuffs
Raw material for industry ........
Manufactured articles .......
Parcel posts .......
239,071
956,030
2,241,885
203,201
252,754
933,849
2,157,094
162,837
Totals
3,640,187
3,506,534
The above figures show that in June, 1925, the value of imports was
higher by 23,000,000 francs than in May. A decrease in value of 134,000,000
francs is recorded for exports.
Concerning imports, the increase affects only foodstuffs (81,364,000
francs). Purchase of raw material and manufactured articles abroad show
a slight decrease, 44,000,000 and 14,000,000 francs, respectively, as compared
with the May figures.
Concerning exports, the decrease affects raw material (24,000,000 francs),
manufactured articles (84,000,000 francs), and parcel post (40,000,000
francs); exports of foodstuffs only show a slight increase of nearly
14,000,000 francs.
The visible trade balance for June, 1925, thus shows an excess of exports
amounting to 515,000,000 francs as against 071,500,000 francs in May, 1925;
in June, 1924, imports were in excess of 300,000,000 francs over exports.
The following table gives the weights (in metric tons) of imported and
exported merchandise for May and June, 1925:
Imports:
Foodstuffs ........
.........
Raw material for industry ........
Manuiactured articles
May, 1925
318,861
3.392,377
108,215
June, 1925
323,658
3,305,604
101,169
Totals
· 3,819,453
3,730,431.


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1980
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Trade Expansion
Engineering, 31 July, 1925.--Since the restitution of Lorraine the iron and
steel production of France has increased to 11,000,000 tons a year, and the
home consumption is about 4,500,000 tons, thereby leaving a huge surplus
output, which must be disposed of in foreign markets. Before Lorraine was
restored to France, the total quantity produced at the mills and forges was
absorbed by Germany, but until a treaty of commerce between the two
countries is signed, that market is practically closed to Lorraine firms.
Under the arrangements which will come into operation on the signing of
a treaty Germany will allow the free importation of 800,000 tons of
iron and steel from the Saar, and producers in that district have undertaken
to indemnify partially the Lorraine mill and forge owners by paying them
a certain sum per ton of iron and steel exported to Germany as a rebate
upon the duties which have to be paid on the Lorraine products. In this
way it is hoped that the Lorraine industry will be able to export an
appreciable quantity of iron and steel to Germany under favorable conditions.
There will, however, still remain a large surplus, which will have to be
disposed of by other means. The French Government has been investigating
the situation very closely with iron and steel firms, and the result is the
inauguration of a new policy which arises out of the special requirements
of Italy in raw material. On account of the considerable development of
the metallurgical trades in Italy, that country has been taking from France
all the scrap iron available. Last year the total quantity amounted to
400,000 tons. The French Government recently decided to restrict the
exports of scrap iron, and an arrangement has been entered into with the
Italian Government whereby the quantity of scrap iron exported to Italy
will depend upon the Italian purchases of French rolled iron and steel. For
every 120,000 tons of scrap iron Italy will have to take 15,000 tons of rolled
iron and steel. Should Italy purchase more than that amount of manu-
factured material, it may take one and one-quarter tons of scrap iron for
every ton of rolled steel. When the Italian purchases of rolled material
exceed 90,000 tons, scrap can be supplied at the rate of one ton for every
ton of rolled iron and steel until the total reaches 150,000 tons, when the
amount of scrap iron authorized to be exported to Italy will be one ton to
every two tons of rolled steel. At the same time it is hoped to arrange for
the free importation into Italy of French rolled iron for building purposes
in return for the suppression of the proposed export duty on scrap iron.
This arrangement has not yet come into force, but it is giving the greatest
satisfaction to French mill and forge owners, who see in the ingenious
method of forcing the hands of foreign buyers a safe way of disposing of
their surplus production of rolled iron and steel.
French Mine Laying Submarine Boats
Engineering, 14 August, 1925.—The mine-laying submarine boat Pierre-
Chailley, of the French Navy, has cost slightly over 7,000,000 francs. Her
length is 70 m. (229 ft. 8 in.); her surface displacement is 900 tons, and her
displacement immersed, 1,200 tons. For laying when immersed the boat
carries 64 mines, weighing 508 kg. (10 cwt.) each, placed in 32 cells amid-
ships between the two hulls, 16 on each side. The armament consists of
two torpedo-launching tubes and one 10-cm. (3.937-in.) gun. The boat is
propelled by two engines of 900 h.p. each. The surface speed is 14 knots,
and the radius of action close upon 3,000 miles. The Moniteur de la Flotte,
which gives these figures refers also to the Mauricc-Caillot, another French
mine-laying submarine boat, which has recently completed in the Mediter-
ranean an endurance test of fifty days' duration. Her surface speed is 16.2
knots, the speed immersed being 10.4 knots. The Maurice-Caillot has a dis-


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Professional Notes
placement of 932 tons on the surface, a radius of action of 3,150 miles at
II knots, and when immersed the boat can cover 112 miles at 5 knots. The
armament consists of six torpedo-launching tubes and one 75-mm. (2.953 in.)
gun. The boat carries for laying when immersed 27 mines, arranged at
the upper part, above the inner hull and ballast, disposed in three lines
of 9 mines each. The mines are so placed that the axis of the anchoring
weight is horizontal, the float being toward the bow of the submarine; the
mines rest on six friction rollers on their frame, on two rails made of angle
bars fixed to the hull. An endless chain passes under each line of mines
and serves to move the mines aft for laying. In travelling aft on the guide
rails the mines are ultimately inclined 60° to the horizontal previous to
their release, the required motion being given by two electric motors whichi
act by gearing on the three lines. The motors are designed to lay the mines
of one line at the rate of one every twelve seconds, and a speed of 5 knots
for the boat; this corresponds to an interval of 30 m. (98 ft.) between
each two mines laid. The three sets of mines, or any two of them, can be
laid simultaneously, when the mines are suitably spaced apart, or any single
line can be laid separately. The movement of the mines to the stern and the
action of laying have no appreciable affect upon the trim of the boat.
ITALY
The Economic Situation in Italy
Engineering, 14 August, 1925.—The two economic factors chiefly re-
sponsible for Italy's increasing commercial and industrial prosperity are,
firstly, the country's wealth in water power, which, in all probability, will
eventually render her industries largely independent of coal supplies; and,
secondly, the satisfactory way in which she has managed to settle, tempo-
rarily, if not finally, her labor troubles. These two questions are among
those alluded to in a report recently issued by the Department of Overseas
Trade. This report shows that down to December 31, 1923, as many as
4,129 concessions for the exploitation of water power had been granted by
the authorities, the estimated horsepower available reaching the total of
3,430,209. Furthermore, quite 60 per cent of the equipment was completed
and in full working order by the date above mentioned. The progress being
made in the development of the country's hydro-electric resources is illus-
trated by the fact that twenty-four of the generating stations now in the
course of construction will generate 2,209,000,000 kilowatt-hours per year,
while a further number of fifty-six stations, capable of generating
3.908,000,000 kilowatt-hours, is being planned. One of the most recent of
these hydro-electric installations, the Tirso plant in Sardinia, which was
described in Engineering, vol cxviii, page 632, was completed in 1923, and
was formally opened by the King in April, 1924.
The linking up of power stations situated in different parts of the country
forms a noteworthy feature of Italian hydro-electric installations. In mid-
winter, when the water derived from the melting snows in the Alpine
regions is at a minimum, the rainfall on the slopes of Appenine Range is at
a maximum ; at other seasons conditions have, therefore, been interconnected
with plants located in the Appenines, the two sources of power thus comple-
menting one another whenever necessary. By this means a continuous
supply of electrical energy is assured in industrial districts at all seasons.
This coordination scheme is gradually being made more complete, and the
connecting up of many of the remaining stations is being pushed forward.
The coal and coke imported into Italy amounted to over 11,000,000 metric
tons in 1924, as compared with 9,000,000 tons in 1923, and 10,000,000 tons in
1912. In view of the increasing utilization of the water power resources
of the country, it is somewhat surprising to find that the consumption of


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
coal in 1924 is greater than was the case in pre-war days. This indicates
that, not only is an important revival taking place in Italian industry, but
also that developments have arisen in many new directions. Increased hydro-
electric power facilities have created new industries for which coal is a
necessity. On the other hand, the opinion has been expressed that although
the quantity of coal imported is likely to be maintained at the present level
for a number of years to come, and may indeed increase still further, the
time will eventually come when the available water power has been harnessed
to the fullest extent, and the need for solid fuel will diminish. In 1912 the
percentage of British coal imported amounted to 86 per cent of the total :
in 1923 this figure had fallen to 71 per cent, and in 1924 a further fall to
52 per cent was registered. This state of affairs is chiefly due to the im-
portation of German coal on reparation account (amounting, in 1924, to
over 3,500,000 tons). On the other hand, quantities received from Germany,
other than reparation coal, and from the United States are steadily increasing.
As has been indicated above, one of the most potent of the factors con-
tributing to the improved economic situation of Italy, is the lack of strikes.
In 1919, nearly 19,000,000 working days were lost to the nation owing to
labor troubles; in 1923, the number of days so lost amounted to only 295,929.
Again, unemployment, although subject to seasonal influences, has steadily
fallen since February, 1922, when there were 600,000 unemployed persons,
the maximum for the post-war period. The number of unemployed workers
on November 1, 1924, totalled only 117,059. A piece-work rate agreement,
introduced in 1920 by a large engineering firm in Northern Italy, as a result
of negotiations between employers and workmen, has been very successful.
Each employee is paid a fixed wage according to his rating and trade; over
and above this, a collective piece-work bonus is granted. The latter is a
premium on collective efficiency in the various shops, and is calculated on
the rapidity of output over a certain accepted standard. Taken as a whole,
the system has much to recommend it; it undoubtedly has the effect of
promoting the esprit de corps as well as the efficiency of the workers.
The artificial silk industry has made very rapid strides in recent years,
and it is now claimed that Italy takes second place in the world production
of this commodity. It is one of the country's most important industries.
The textile industry generally, is also in a prosperous condition. The Italian
rubber industry is steadily growing in importance and exports, which
consist chiefly of motor tires, are steadily increasing. Metallurgical centers
located chiefly in Northern and Central Italy produce a fair proportion of
the country's requirements in pig-iron and steel. Large quantities of the
materials are, however, imported annually, and the United Kingdom has a
good share of the trade in cast iron. Imports from France have, never-
theless, increased rapidly, and, in 1923 and 1924, they succeeded in surpassing
the British figures. In semi-manufactured products such as iron and steel
bars, rods and sheets, Great Britain has lost ground in recent years. In
1924, France practically monopolized the trade in bars and rods, and the
United States and Czecho-Slovakia, that in sheets. It is satisfactory to
note, however, that imports of British tin plate are increasing and are far
above those from all other countries. Large consignments of iron and steel
scrap enter Italy annually and, here again, imports from British are very
small compared with those from France. The demand for British machine
tools is very limited and is confined to special articles, the bulk of this trade
goes to Germany, who has dominated this section of the market for some
years past. Most of the requirements in agricultural machinery are supplied
by Germany, although competition from the United States and from France
is growing keen. In the matter of spinning machinery, however, British
manufacturers, who only held a small share of the trade in 1922, now head
the list of importers by a substantial margin. Supplies of electric apparatus


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Professional Notes
generally are chiefly obtained from Germany. With regard to imports of
machinery, it is pointed out in the report that the high price demanded for
British goods is, in some measure, due to the elaborate packing rendered
necessary by the long journey by sea. This difficulty would, it is suggested,
be to some extent overcome by a more extended use of the Harwich-
Zeebrugge train ferry.
During the year 1924, eleven vessels representing a gross tonnage of
79,200, a considerable increase over the previous year, were launched from
Italian shipbuilding yards. These comprised seven steamships, the gross
tonnage of which was 47.990, and four motorships, fitted with Diesel engines,
having a gross tonnage of 31,300. At the end of 1924, seventeen steamers
and eight Diesel-engined motorships were in the course of construction.
Although both the number and the tonnage of ships, launched or begun, in
1924 were greater than in 1923, the improvement was not so great as had
been expected.
The administration of the state railways was recently taken over by the
newly-formed Ministry of Communications, which has pursued a policy of
rigid economy in order to diminish the working deficit. In the financial year
ending June 30, 1924. the expenditure exceeded the revenue by 298. I
million lire, and it is the 'aim by the new ministry to make accounts balance
as soon as possible. These has been a substantial increase in traffic receipts
during the past year, and appreciable reductions in expenditure have been
effected in various directions. The total length of normal gauge track ad-
ministered by the State measures 15,745 km., a further length of 670 km. is
under construction. Some 780 km. of line have been electrified and are in
operation, and another stretch of 810 km. is in course of electrification.
Taken altogether, the economic position of Italy is considered to be
stronger at present, than at ary other time since the war. The internal
national debt is less and the revenue from taxation has not only increased,
but has been placed on a more stable footing. The increase in the importa-
tion of raw materials and the decrease in imports of manufactured goods
denote a revival of industrial activity. Furthermore, this renewed activity,
which is taking place in almost every line of production, is certain to add
to the national wealth and may, at some future date, become a factor in
creating an increased demand for the finer and more finished goods produced
in British factories.
JAPAN
The Commercial and Industrial Position in Japan
Engineering, 31 July, 1925.---Apart from the great loss of life and the
extensive material damage caused, the earthquake which befell Tokyo and
Yokohama on September 1, 1923, was a very severe blow to Japanese
prosperity. The government was obliged, on the one hand, to vote sums for
reconstruction purposes, and, on the other, to make allowance for a reduction
in revenue consequent upon the disaster. The decrease in tax receipts due to
the catastrophe amounted to 130,000,000 yen, and, in order to avoid serious
disturbance of the national finances, public works were postponed, and ex-
penditure was cut down in every way possible. While the earthquake
undoubtedly exerted a profound moral effect on the people, the productive
power of the nation was not greatly affected because the devastated areas
were largely residential, and main industrial centers such as Kwansai and
Kyushu remained intact. There was, however, a decrease in exports during
1923 and a considerable increase in imports. According to the Financial and
Economic Annual of Japan for 1924 issued by the Department of Finance,
exports amounted to 1,448,000,000 yen in 1923, and imports for the same
year totalled 1,982,000,000 yen, The figures for 1922 were 1.367,000,000 yen


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
and 1,890,000,000 yen respectively. Thus, the excess of imports over exports,
already considerable in 1922, appears to have been further intensified by the
earthquake in the Kwanto District
In the matter of imports it is interesting to note that in 1923 British
India supplied more than a third of the requirements in "pig-iron and steel
blooms and billets”; China took second place. Imports from Great Britain
in this section have decreased rapidly since 1919, and the share held by the
United States has dwindled still more quickly. In "iron and steel bars, rods,
plates, sheets, wire goods and tubes,” trade with Great Britain has increased
steadily since 1921, chiefly at the expense of the United States, although
Germany and Belgium are serious competitors. The import trade in
machinery and machine parts, which was very steady during the years
1920-22, decreased in 1923. The United Kingdom supplied goods to the
value of 36,000,000 yen in 1923 and 42,000,000 yen in 1922; the values of
goods supplied by the United States were 42,000,000 yen in 1923 and
57,000,000 yen in 1922. Imports from other countries are small in com-
parison, although here again German trade is increasing. Since 1917, the
first year quoted in the annual, United States manufacturers have had the
motor car import trade entirely in their hands. In 1923, cars to the value
of 13,000,000 yen were imported, nearly 10,000,000 of which were received
from American concerns. Building materials are largely supplied by the
United States, the only competitor worthy of note in the year 1923 being
Germany. Other imports include raw cotton and cotton goods, foodstuffs,
and wool and woollen goods. British India supplies more than half the
raw cotton, Australia has three quarters of the wool import trade, while
Great Britain has for years practically monopolized the market in cotton and
woollen tissues. Exports consist chiefly of silk goods of all descriptions,
together with manufactured articles of a very varied nature and foodstuffs.
Some coal is exported, China and Hongkong being the two chief customers.
Agriculture holds an important place in Japan, and large areas are
devoted to the cultivation of such crops as rice, barley, and wheat; a con-
siderable income is also derived from the State forests. The silk industry
is steadily growing, the total raw silk produced in 1922 being 24,000,000
kilograms as compared with 14,000,000 kilograms in 1913. Tea planting
is another important branch of industry. Turning to mineral products,
the annual shows that, whereas outputs of silver, copper and lead have
fluctuated and, in the main, have diminished since 1914, the production of
pig-iron and steel has increased enormously. In 1914 the outputs of pig-iron
and steel were relatively insignificant; the figures were 74,049 metric tons
and 15,385 metric tons, respectively. This tonnage rose during and after
the war almost without a break, and for the year 1923 the output of pig-iron
was 530,536 metric tons, and that of steel 495,433 metric tons. The quantity
of coal mined in 1914 is recorded as 22,000,444 metric tons; the output for
1923 was 29,000,000 tons, showing a steady increase. On the other hand, the
production of crude petroleum has decreased from over four million
hectolitres in 1914 to less than three million in 1923.
Although introduced at a comparatively recent date, the Tokyo-Yokohama
section having been laid down as a government undertaking in 1872, railways
in Japan are extending rapidly. In 1905, there were 4,778 miles of track,
and a point of interest is that, out of this total, 3,247 miles are owned by
thirty-eight different companies. The main trunk lines themselves are
controlled partly by the state and partly by private companies. Economic
expansion demanded greater efficiency than was possible under these con-
ditions and, in 1906, a railway nationalization bill was passed; under this
measure the government acquired nearly 3,000 miles of privately owned
roads. In 1923, the mileage open to traffic measured over 9,000 miles, as
compared with 6,500 in 1913; in the same interval the number of locomotives


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Professional Notes
increased from 2,700 to 4,300. During the same decade the number of
passengers more than trebled, and the goods traffic nearly doubled.
The territories constituting Greater Japan-Korea (Chosen), Formosa
(Taiwan), Japanese Saghalien (Karafuto), and Kwantung Province are all
undergoing development.Korea is largely an agricultural and pastoral
country, but iron and mild steel are also exported, although quantities have
fallen off somewhat since 1921. Korean railways are expanding, and the
weight and value of traffic of all descriptions are steadily increasing. In
addition to gold and silver, zinc, copper, lead, iron, tungsten ore, graphite,
coal and koalin are also found. The country is especially rich in gold, iron,
graphite and anthracite. Afforestation is encouraged, and is making great
headway; the fisheries are also important. Industry in Korea is, it is stated,
in a promising condition generally. The chief products of Formosa are
derived from its agriculture, and its fisheries, but in the northern portion
of the island are situated deposits of gold, silver and copper; petroleum and
coal are also found. The latter commodity holds an important position
among the exports of the island. Extensive beds of coal have also been
found in Saghalien. Three important seams have been discovered-northern,
central and southern. Of these the central is the most extensive; it is sixty
miles in length, and is from three feet to nine feet thick. Mining operations,
however, have only just begun, and are at present conducted on so small
a scale as barely to satisfy the needs of the island. Petroleum has also
been located, and the matter is being further investigated. The South
Manchurian Railway Company, created for the purpose, is fast increasing
its importance, as the following figures show. The passengers carried in
1914 and 1923 were 3,600,000, and 8,760,000, respectively, the tonnage of
goods hauled was 5,700,000 in 1914, and 13,370,00 in 1923, while the net
income increased from just under 15,000,000 yen in 1914 to nearly 56,500,000
yen in 1923.
As is the case with the majority of other nations, the after effects of war,
and of the boom period immediately following it, still exercise an influence
upon the commercial and industrial welfare of the Japanese people. There
has been no remarkable fall in the price of commodities, and wages are, on an
average, three times as high as they were in 1912, with a tendency to further
increase. Moreover, the national debt, which in the years 1915-18 stood at
2,500,000,000 yen, reached a total of over 4,000,000,000 yen in 1924. Taxes
averaged thirteen yen per head of the population in the year 1923-24, or
about double the pre-war figure. Taken altogether, however, the situation in
Japan is one of progress, and the outlook is promising.
UNITED STATES
Another Side of the 5-5-3 Argument
By Captain Dudley W. Knox, U.S.N., Ret., Scientific American, August,
1925.—That the American battleship fleet is substantially stronger than the
British battleship fleet is the principal contention of an article by Mr. J.
Bernard Walker in the May issue of the Scientific American.* In conclusion,
presumably on account of such alleged superiority, he limits his recommenda-
tion of what should be done to our battleships to "repair work.”
It should be understood that the last Congress, following the recommenda-
tions of the Secretary of the Navy and the President, authorized extensive
“modernization" of six of our oldest battleships. Nine million dollars, one
half of the total amount ultimately necessary, was appropriated for this
specific purpose.
The modernization plan is much beyond the scope of anything which could
be characterized as “repairs.” It amounts to extensive alteration of design.
* This article was copied in the Professional Notes in the June issue.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The deck is to be armored as a protection against aerial bombs and the
plunging effect of modern long range gunfire. The underwater hull is to
be protected against damage from mines, torpedoes, and bombs, by fitting
"bulges" or "blisters," which, as their name indicates, are structures built
on outside the old hull. They project ten feet or more beyond the original
underwater side of the ship and extend longitudinally through most of her
length.
Another large item of modernization is the conversion of boilers and
bunkers so that oil fuel may be used instead of coal. This will increase
not only the maximum distance which the vessel can steam, but also her
dependability for sustained high speed-a very important feature in battle.
All of these large alterations of design are intended to increase the
fighting power of the ships—to bring our fleet more nearly to a 5-5-3 ratio
in battleship strength which it is now below. Naval officers and civilian
officials recommended increasing the elevation limits of our battleship guns
to give them greater range as an additional item of modernization necessary
to the same end. The British Government considered that this would be a
violation of the Naval Treaty. French and Japanese authorities supported
the American view as to treaty interpretation. President Coolidge main-
tained that we had a legal right to elevate the guns but settled the con-
troversy by striking the gun elevation item out of the modernization program
on the ground of national economy.
Mr. Walker has revived the gun elevation controversy after it had been
settled for several months. There would be little need of my further
perpetuating it herein, except that his argument to prove that we did not
require greater gun elevations furnishes equally good reasons against the
other items of modernization. If our fleet is already above the standing
of five in the 5-5-3 ratio, if we already “have the whip hand," as he claims,
there is little reason in our spending $18,000,000 for the purpose of attaining
that ratio, in the face of a firmly held national policy of economy.
The three principal fallacies in Mr. Walker's exposition of the relative
strength of the American and British battleship forces pertain to questions
of (1) maximum firing range, (2) speed, and (3) tactics. In order to
demonstrate these fallacies the more clearly I will refer to his own tabular
statements.
With regard to the question of maximum firing ranges eight of the
British capital ships listed have the ability to shoot about 5,000 yards farther
than stated. No such correction can be applied to any of the
American battleships. The discrepancy arises from the fact that the five
ships of the Royal Sovereign class, together with the Repulse, Renown, and
Warspite, are equipped with "bulges" or "blisters.” As explained above,
these queer structures are for the .primary purpose of protection against
underwater damage from mines, torpedoes and bombs, but they offer an
important additional advantage of permitting the ship to be easily heeled
over a few degrees, by pumping the oil or water, which they normally
contain, from the blister on one side while leaving the other side filled.
The manifest effect of this upon guns pointed outboard is to increase the
angle between their axis and the horizontal, and thus permit them to shoot
farther.
This is not an ideal way of gaining increased range, but it is much better
than no way. The disadvantages are a temporary reduction in speed and
impaired armor protection on account of lifting the lower edge of the armor
belt close to or above the water-line. The latter disadvantage disappears
when the enemy guns cannot reach. Special appliances for quickly flood-
ing or emptying compartments, such as are commonly employed in sub-
marines, may make it possible to promptly rectify the disadvantages when-


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Professional Notes
ever circumstances so demand. As early as 1915 the British used this
general method of increasing the range of battleship guns while in action
against German ports on the coast of Belgium.
In addition to the eight British ships named as being already able to
shoot about 5,000 yards farther than shown, we must count a similar increase
for four more in the near future, since according to British handbooks
the Admiralty intends to fit all ships of the Queen Elisabeth class
with "bulges." This will make a total of twelve ships of 5,000 yards greater
maximum range than stated.
But, even this is not the whole story of British gun range in relation
to the need of our modernization to prevent falling farther behind in the
theoretical 5-5-3 ratio. The British are now building two battleships stronger
than anything afloat. Each will carry nine 16-in. guns, which, in all proba-
bility, will outrange anything that we have. These new ships, begun in
1922, should be completed next year and will replace the four old British
battleships standing at the bottom of the list.
The average maximum range of their fleet after the above mentioned
changes will be about 28,600 yards, as compared with 24,600 yards for our
fleet at present. The addition of "blisters" to six of our ships should
enable the American fleet to average about 26,000 yards, leaving the British
an advantage of about 2,500 yards in fleet range. This gunnery aspect of
the comparison is also greatly affected by the aggregate weight of the pro-
jectiles fired in each broadside, which gives an index of the damage to be
expected from hits. These figures are, British 315,000 pounds, and American
262,000 pounds.
Let us now pass to a consideration of speed, an element of great im-
portance in getting guns to a position from which they can reach an
enemy. From this viewpoint oil-burning ships have become almost a
necessity. Large fleet battles last a long time and require much high-speed
steaming. In coal-burning ships boiler grates, furnaces, and uptakes become
foul and firemen become tired, sometimes cutting down the maximum speed
several knots. On the other hand, oil-burning ships can maintain their
maximum paper speed without difficulty.
We now have six coal-burning battleships and the British, four. All of
these carry a small amount of oil for emergency use—the British ships twice
as much as ours. But, in about a year the British coal burners will be
scrapped and replaced by the Rodney and Nelson, when their entire fleet
will be on an oil-burning basis. Their slowest battleships already have a
battle advantage of about i knot over ours, which will become greater when
their new ships come out. Unless we modernize, this disparity will be
greater and the difficulty of a large proportion of our ships getting into
action will be increased.
This matter of speed also enters very vitally into the final question to be
discussed—that of tactics. It will be noted that the entire American fleet
closely approximates 21 knots maximum speed, whereas nearly half the
British ships are capable of doing 25 knots. Four of their ships are rated
around 20 knots-a very high speed for capital ships. This gives to the
British fleet a great tactical advantage readily convertible into terms of
range and gun power.
Mr. Walker's conception of a fleet battle being fought in two parallel
columns is more than 100 years out of date. For centuries such was the
practice rigidly required by official fighting instructions. It took a Nelson
to explode the old fallacies and to demonstrate the crushing effect of applying
afloat the well-known land practice of concentrating superior forces against
a part of the hostile formation. Since Nelson's day that has been the great
cardinal objective in naval tactics. By a successful concentration on the


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Russian flank at the battle of Tsushima the Japanese fleet quickly annihilated
with small losses to themselves the theoretically stronger Russian fleet.
One can search the diagrams of the battle of Jutland in vain for any
reasonable approximation to a parallel column position as between the two
main fleets. From the beginning to the end of this long battle, Admiral
Jellicoe's principal tactical object was to get on the German flank, where
all of his broadsides could bear on the few German ships which could reply
from the end of their line. Jellicoe reached this advantage position three
times but failed to reap the advantage of it, principally on account of the
misty weather.
It is true that a slow fleet may seek to bring on a parallel fight-but only
as a measure of self defense to prevent the fast feet from reaching the
coveted flank position. In the case under discussion the nine fast British
ships have such a great superiority of speed that they should normally be
able to gain the American flank in spite of anything the latter fleet can do.
Naturally, they would choose the particular flank nearest to the remaining
eleven slower British ships. Thus, one American Alank would be subjected
to the concentrated fire of the entire British feet, while the other flank
would be out of range. Such a tactical concentration would inevitably
mean an early sweeping and British victory.
To sum up: The approved modernization of the American fleet can
serve only to reduce the existing superiority of the British fleet-a superi-
ority which otherwise would be even greater when British modernization
now in hand has been finished. With the modernization now in progress
for both fleets completed the British will then have a superiority of about
2,500 yards in average range, twenty per cent in weight of broadside fire,
and a very marked tactical advantage incident to speed. The logic of
modernizing our ships is apparent.
The writer is not one of those who believes that war is probable between
this country and Great Britain. He does believe, however, in the principle
of equality of naval power with our cousins, which principle was formally
subscribed to at the Washington Conference. Such equality seems more
likely to preserve peace between the two great leaders of the world than
any substantial difference in sea strength, since equality means a greater
mutual respect for each other's interests in the trade rivalries which seem
certain to continue.
The Great Pacific War
H. C. Bywater's New Work, Naval and Military Record, 5 August,
1925.-Readers of Sea Power in the Pacific will remember the surprising
insight into the problems of the Pacific, and the strength of the Japanese
and American Navies, shown by the author. In that book Mr. Bywater
discussed at some length the problems which would confront the United
States in the event of a war with Japan. He has now written another book
which further develops this subject. Instead of an abstract strategical
treatise, the new book takes the form of the history of a war between the
United States and Japan, which takes place between 1931 and 1933.
The main purpose of the book is to prove that, notwithstanding the
handicaps of distance, and, on America's side, the want of naval stations in
the western area of the Pacific, means might still be found of establishing
contact between the main belligerent forces and thus forcing matters to a
decisive issue. In his preface Mr. Bywater says: “It is often averred that
war between the United States and Japan is out of the question, if only
because their respective fleets, divided as they are by thousands of miles of
ocean and with no intermediate bases of supply, could never get sufficiently
close to engage. This, however, is probably a delusion, as I have endeavored
to show."


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In the body of the history, strict attention has been paid to the tactical
possibility of all movements and to accurate descriptions of all islands and
harbors, and no effort has been spared to ensure technical accuracy through-
out the narrative.
The book opens with an account of the causes that led to the war.
Japan, torn by internal dissension, and jealous of American influence in
China, forces a quarrel on the United States. The Japanese people rally
to the national emergency, and the internal disorder ceases. Before the
formal deciaration of war a Japanese freighter blows up in the Panama
Canal, completely blocking the Culebra Cut and preventing the Atlantic
naval bases from being of any use.
Cable and radio communication between the United States and the
Philippines are interrupted. The formal declaration of war is almost
unnecessary, for a few hours after the commencement of hostilities the
American Asiatic Squadron is completely destroyed by a Japanese battle
cruiser squadron. This action proves the futility of manning foreign
stations with ships which are too weak to fight and too slow to run away.
Two invading forces land in the Philippines, not without appalling loss of
life, and the small American force is cut to pieces and the remnants are
forced to surrender. After a spirited defense, the island of Guam falls
into the hands of the Japanese, who also carry on a campaign against the
American trade with the Far East. The Japanese observe the rules laid
down at Washington with the regard to the treatment of non-combatants.
At this stage a surprise raid on the coast of California is made by two
Japanese submarines, with an aircraft carrier and fuel-ship. This rouses
the American people and huge shipbuilding schemes are launched.
A foolhardy attempt by the Americans to found a base in the Bonin
Islands is frustrated, and a commerce-raiding campaign is commenced by
the Americans in the western Pacific. The Americans continue to attempt
to take a suitable base for their main fleet within striking distance of Japan,
and succeed at last. The Japanese are confused by the presence of a fleet
of dummy battleships. Several of these are sunk, and the Japanese are
deceived into thinking that the strength of the American fleet is less than
it actually is. Too late they discover their mistake, and are involved in an
action with the American main fleet. They are crushed by the superior
weight of metal. The losses are, on the American side, two capital ships; on
the Japanese five.
The tide now turns. Chinese armies overrun Manchuria, Guam is taken
by the Americans, the Philippines are retaken, and an armistice is signed
after two and a half years of war. In the peace which follows neither side
benefits, and all conquests are returned. Both sides are exhausted.
Many interesting points come out in the course of the narrative, and the
account of the fleet action is particularly illuininating Aircraft enthusiasts
will be interested in the account of the attack by the American aircraft
at the outset of the battle. “..... At 3:20 P.M. fifty planes, the
majority being bombers and torpedo-carriers, took off from the Lexington
and Saratoga, with orders to .... attack the leading battleships of the
first column they sighted.
"In forty minutes they were within view of the Japanese fleet and were
rushing to attack, when suddenly a powerful flight of enemy machines, which
had been patrolling at a higher level came dropping down to intercept them.
To give a detailed account of this scrimmage in the air would be impossible.
In the first minute of the fierce mêlée nearly a dozen machines went down
out of control. Thrice amidst the crackle of machine-gun fire did head-on
collisions take place, the Japanese aviators never hesitating to ram when
otherwise baulked of their prey, preferring to immolate themselves rather
than allow the American bombs to reach their ships. Less than half of the


  p. 1990 (#934)                      #

1990
[Oct.
U. S. Navul Institute Proceedings
American machines broke through and made for the Japanese fleet, which
received them with a hurricane of fire.
"How different now were the circumstances from those which aviation
enthusiasts, deceived by artificial peace tests against helpless targets, had
pictured! From the ships below turning and twisting at high speed, came
a varitable stream of shell, the incessant detonations of which caused the
planes to rock as in a gale of wind. The air was alive with steel splinters
and poisoned with acid fumes. Still the indomitable pilots held on, and
were almost in range, when six Japanese machines crossed in front of them
at lightning speed, leaving a thick curtain of yellowish vapor in their
wake as they passed. As the American fliers drove through this curtain
they were instantly conscious of a choking sensation, accompanied by rack-
ing head pains. Through some culpable oversight they had not been
equipped with gas masks. The omission was fatal. All but two of the
machines dived headlong into the sea, their pilots having been disabled by
the noxious fumes."
This is a book of special interest both to the naval officer and to the
student of naval warfare, and can be recommended to those of the general
public who desire to form an accurate impression of modern naval warfare.
The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign
of 1931 to 1933, by Hector C. Bywater. Constable and Co., London. Ios. 6d.
AERONAUTICS
Commercial Airports and Airways
By Hiram Bingham, U. S. Senator from Connecticut, U. S. Air Services,
August, 1925.—The great need of the hour is not faster or larger airplanes.
Commercial transport planes are now in operation which carry 1,000 pounds
of mail and express a distance of 300 miles in three hours. It is already
possible to save fully half of the time now used up in railroad transportation.
We all agree that time is the most precious thing in the world. The only
way to enjoy more time is to save what we have. We know that an hour
saved is an hour earned. Time flies. If you want to catch up with it, you
must fly, too. The question is how to do it, how to develop commercial
aviation. The answer is not better planes but better airways-not faster
aircraft but real airports. We do not need more practical planes. We do
need more navigable routes. We do not need safer airships. We do need
reasonable aids to navigation. America is slow in developing commercial
aviation because Americans think in terms of railroads and motor transport
rather than in terms of navigation. We built railroads before we had
depots. We used motor cars before we had public garages or even service
stations. So we think we should be able to use airplanes before there are
airports, yet we did not have ocean liners until we had safe harbors. We
had no ocean commerce until we developed seaports. We shall have no
air commerce until we develop airports.
Today commercial aviation does not need rare aeronautical inventive sense
so much as it needs the application of common marine sense. We do
not need brilliant inventors so much as we need the courage and foresight
of foreign traders. Our problems are the problems of ocean shipping.
In shipping circles they understand the difference between a port, a
harbor, and an anchorage. If we want to save time by using commercial
aviation, we must learn the difference between an airport, a flying field,
and a landing field.
The landing field is only an anchorage. There your ship may stay
under certain favorable conditions, but will avoid it if she can. An
anchorage is better than nothing; so is a landing field, even though small
and restricted.


  p. 1991 (#935)                      #

1925]
1991
Professional Notes
A flying field is only a natural harbor. Grassy plains make good
landing fields, but the existence of grassy plains no more satisfies the air
pilot looking for good terminal facilities than does a natural harbor satisfy
the demands of a sea captain looking for good port facilities.
An airport is like a seaport. It has to be constructed by man to meet
the needs of aircraft. Seaports attract ocean commerce. It takes real
airports to attract air commerce. Nature has provided Aying fields and
landing fields, but man must build hangars and shops and provide run-
ways, night lights, radio service, weather data, and other facilities. Then
will commercial aviation make great strides and those cities which have
adequate airports will flourish accordingly. New York, San Francisco,
and Seattle are blessed with wonderful natural harbors. When they took
advantage of what Nature had given them and built adequate docks, they
became great seaports. If they are to become great airports, they must
speedily study the requirements and build accordingly.
The mere fact that a town is on the seacoast and the waters near it
extend to all parts of the earth, does not mean that town will become a
great seaport. The mere fact that a town is swept by the winds and
breezes which flow freely around the earth does not mean that that town
can easily become an airport. It takes foresight and community effort.
The problem of providing an adequate airport for New York City is a
very serious one. It has been suggested that a small landing field might be
provided by placing a flat roof over such a structure as the Pennsylvania
Railroad Terminal, but this would involve enormous expense. While it
would provide a landing field for passenger and mail planes within a
few minutes of the center of the financial district, there would be no room
for hangars or shops and these would have to be provided somewhere in the
suburbs. Furthermore, the air over a great city is always very rough
and adds to the danger of landing. Those who have landed in a small
boat on a rough and rocky coast can imagine something of the difficulty.
I have sometimes thought that in the Hackensack Meadows, New York
possessed the possibilities of creating a great airport at relatively low
expense within a few minutes' run of Broadway and Fifth avenue. It
almost seems as though Nature had kept man from making any extensive
use of the Hackensack Meadows in order that when the need came there
might here be developed one of the world's great airports without the
necessity of tearing down many buildings or making very expensive changes.
Another possibility would be to persuade the federal government to
transform Governors Island into a great federal airport. Since airports,
like seaports, will ultimately benefit everybody, the government ought to
aid in their procurement. In the past, towns have built municipal docks,
states have built magnificent roads, and the nation has provided aids to
navigation and improved the navigable waters. In the future, towns must
build municipal airports, states must provide safe air routes and the
nation must furnish aids to air navigation and improve navigable airways
and air harbors.
There are so many air routes capable of being developed that we can
not expect the federal government to do much more than provide a few
large airports for the great centers of population, and lighthouses and
beacons for those airports which are developed by states and municipalities.
I would like to see a law passed authorizing the United States Bureau of
Lighthouse to establish lighthouses for air navigation wherever proper air-
ports have been completed by states and cities. This bureau is well equipped
to render this kind of aid to night flying.
It should be a state matter, on the other hand, to make the ap-
proaches to airports safe and to provide an adequate number of landing
fields along recognized air routes. The states of the Union should authorize


  p. 1992 (#936)                      #

1992
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Lustitute Proceedings
their highway commissioners to order wires to be placed underground
when they are a real inenace to air navigators in entering or leaving an
airport. States must also prevent obstacles from being erected or trees
irom being permitted to grow on lands which serve as entries to the air-
port. Today we recognize the government's right to prevent any citizen
from erecting anything which shall be an obstruction to navigation in our
navigable waters. Reasonable restrictions must be made to the surround-
ings of state and municipal airports. There are many purposes for which
lands in the immediate vicinity of an airport can be used without inter-
fering with aerial navigation. Such are the questions which our law makers
must begin to study and prepare to solve. This is the kind of aid which
the authorities of our government must be prepared to give to air naviga-
tion rather than subsidies.
Heavily laden ocean steamers carrying precious cargoes to the ends of
the earth avoid coast towns where the water is shallow, the harbors un-
protected in time of storm, landing facilities poor, charts inaccurate, buoys
missing, and submerged rocks unmarked. They need deep safe channels and
all the aids to navigation which man can devise and provide. Similarly,
heavily laden air transports will avoid those cities and towns where it is
impossible to make safe landings; where the navigable air is restricted by
high buildings, wires, and other obstructions; where the necessarily slow
climb of the commercially profitable heavily laden air transport finds it
impossible to reach the open air without flying too long near that dangerous
"lee shore" the far too solid earth.
A small fast motor boat, carrying a few people and a few pounds of
cargo, can easily utilize a great many natural harbors without great ex-
pense. Similarly, a small airplane, carrying one or two passengers and a
few pounds of freight, can utilize small flying fields without incurring
great danger or expense. On the other hand, a commercially profitable
ocean-going steamer, carrying many passengers and much freight, must be
provided with the requisite port facilities before it will come to your city at
all.
Similarly, the profitable commercial air transport must have good port
facilities before it will come to your city at all. Not only must there
be a large open field, having long runways, north, south, east, and west, so
as to take advantage of whatever wind is blowing, but there must be level
spaces beyond the landing fields so that the heavily laden cargo plane will
not be obliged to climb rapidly. The more rapidly a plane must climb in
order to reach the safe and open air, the less load it can take. The more
room a plane has in settling down to earth, the more safely can it land with
a heavy load.
The more one studies the question the more striking becomes the resemh-
lance between aviation and navigation. Accidents at sea are due in part
to storms, very rarely to defects in seagoing vessels, and most frequently
to dangerous coasts and to lack of safe harbors when one is driven by storm
on a lee shore without sufficient power to head out into the open Ocean.
Most accidents in the air are due to similar causes; very few are to detec
in the plane; most are due to being driven by loss of power down toward
"lee shore” where there are no safe harbors, no landing fields to ma
the airways safe. These must be provided.
Ocean routes through safe, navigable waters between two well-equippe
ports along well-charted coasts are relatively safe, and the insurance charges
are low. Similarly, air voyages between two well-equipped airports over a
well-charted route provided with frequent landing fields are relatively sale
and should have a low rate of insurance.
Ocean voyages between some of the South Sea Islands are dangerous
and the insurance rates are very high, even though each island may hay
a
have


  p. 1993 (#937)                      #

1925)
1993
Professional Notes
a good natural harbor. The insurance rate is high and the risk is great
because the route is through uncharted seas, where there are few light-
houses, many shoals, no warning beacons, and no good harbors.
The United States, desirous of enjoying the benefits of ocean trans-
port, has spent large sums of money deepening harbors, charting coasts,
and providing many aids to navigation. If we are desirous of enjoying
the benefits of air transport, we must similarly spend large sums of money
broadening flying fields, charting navigable airways, and providing all
possible aids to aerial navigation.
As exporters, your interest in saving time may be divided into two
parts: that which concerns the time consumed in going or sending to the
port of embarkation, and that which is consumed between the time your
cargo leayes America and its arrival at a foreign port. For the first
part you now rely largely on motor cars or trains, and for the second
part you rely on steamships or sailing vessels. Some cargoes you are
willing to entrust to the slowest vessels ; for others you seek the fast ex-
and most expensive. For some things you use the mails and fast ex-
press, and even then regret they are not faster. For such things the niodern
airplane offers you great assistance and great possibilities.
The commercial transport plane will save you at least 50 per cent
of the time as compared with the fastest trains or motor cars, and
probably the time is not far distant when this saving will be increased.
Bills of lading, commercial papers, small articles of great value but little
bulk, can all be safely sent by airplane if proper terminal facilities are
provided at either end and a proper airway is provided over which to fly.
In other words, the pilot and the airplane are ready to help you but they
can not do it until aids to navigation similar to those which exist for
ocean commerce are provided by the federal government for air commerce,
and until your city provides an airport.
As regards the second part of the journey in which you are interested,
it does not seem likely that the airplane will be able (certainly not in the
near future) to afford you much practical assistance. Professor Warner,
the aeronautical engineer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
warns us that anything in the nature of commercial operation of airplanes
over a nonstop route having a total length of more than 600 miles, is still
far distant. On the other hand, the airship, or lighter-than-air craft, is
capable of offering you great assistance, but here again this assistance must
always depend on the nature of the terminal or port facilities which are
provided.
Ocean vessels which are lighter than the water they displace can safely
cross the ocean. Airships which are lighter than the air they displace may
safely cross the ocean. Repairs to the power plant can be made without
descending. Recent experiments have shown that properly constructed air-
ships can ride out very considerable gales. Rigid balloons of the Los
Angeles or Shenandoah types can make sixtyor seventy miles an hour.
This does not enable them to compete with railroad trains over land, or
with the transport airplane capable of going nearly twice as fast. On the
other hand, the airship's speed of sixty miles an hour is more than twice as
fast as the fastest ocean liners. Airships can therefore save you at least
50 per cent of the time consumed in sending mail and express over seas.
I believe that successful commercial aviation over land depends on the
use of airplanes and in meeting their requirements. Successful commercial
flying over seas depends on using rigid airships and meeting their require-
ments. An airport suitable for the use of Zeppelins is totally different
from one suitable for the use of commercial transport planes. They
have, in fact, little in common, and their possibilities of competition are
very different. I should like to see our navigable military lighter-than-air


  p. 1994 (#938)                      #

1994
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
craft given over entirely to the Navy and not divided between the Army
and Navy as at present.
A comparative study of the difficulty involved in safely bringing the
airplanes of the World Flyers across the Atlantic and the bringing of the
rigid airships, the R-34 and the Los Angeles, across the Atlantic shows
forcibly what is meant regarding the advisability of using the lighter-than-
air ships for overseas service. The R-34, in July, 1919, took only two
days to cross the Atlantic and only two days and a half to return to Eng-
land. The only serious difficulties encountered were those due to lack of
proper terminal facilities at this end. On the other hand, as I hardly need
to remind you, the world flyers spent weeks in getting across the Atlantic,
and were repeatedly delayed by fog and ice in their courageous efforts to
find a comparatively safe airway via Iceland, Greenland, and Labrador.
In conclusion, permit me, then, to call to your attention certain things
which must be done if we are to enjoy the enormous saving of time which
commercial aviation will permit. In the first place, we must plan to use
airplanes over land and airships over sea. In the second place, we must
recognize the absolute necessity of proper terminal facilities. There must
be adequate airports if there is to be much air commerce. There must also
be suitable flying fields as air stations and frequent landing fields to use
as anchorages in time of storm and stress. In the third place, we must
realize the necessity of developing navigable airways and providing them
with adequate charts, lighthouses, buoys, beacons, radio, and other neces-
sary aids to navigation. Finally, our municipalities must aid by furnish-
ing airports. Our states must aid by providing airways. Our national
government, through a bureau of air navigation in the Department of
Commerce, must do as much to aid air commerce as it has done to aid ocean
commerce. Time flies. If you would catch up with it you must fly, also.
Superchargers
Aviation, July 27, 1925.-The basic factor which determines the power
output of an internal combustion engine is the weight of fuel burned in
a given time. However, for proper combustion a fixed ratio must be said
that the power depends directly on the weight of air used. The volume
of air used at each stroke is constant, but the weight depends upon the
engine speed, throttle opening, resistance through the intake valves, etc.
Concurrent with the development of the internal combustion engine, at-
tempts have been made to increase the weight of air burned in any given
engine by some external device. For example, most Diesel engines have
separate cylinders in excess of the quantity that these cylinders would
ordinarily suck in. A supercharger is simply an external air pump designed
to supply this extra air. In an aviation engine it is used to maintain con-
stant density of intake air as higher altitudes are reached and the sur-
rounding atmospheric pressure decreases.
For a supercharger to be economically applied to an airplane engine
three factors must be considered : namely, weight, bulk and fuel consump-
tion. The Liberty engine weighs with water approximately 920 lbs. and
develops 420 b.h.p. At 25,000 ft. this brake horsepower is only 162.5 or
38.7 per cent of the sea level power. The weight per horsepower at this
altitude is 5.66 lb. per h.p. The actual weight of a supercharger to maintain
approximately sea level power on the Liberty engine is 182 lb, which
includes the increased weight of the cooling system. The total weight of
the supercharged Liberty engine is 1102 lb., the power output at 25,000 ft.
is 400 hp., and the weight per horsepower is 2.75 lb., or less than one half
of that of the unsupercharged engine. The power of the unsupercharged
Liberty would have to be increased to 246 per cent to bring it up to that
of the supercharged engine. It is obvious that such an increase would


  p. 1995 (#939)                      #

1925)
1995
Professional Notes
be impossible without greatly increasing the weight and bulk of the engine.
In fuel consumption the supercharged engine has a decided advantage,
as the constant density of intake air maintained by the supercharger keeps
the specific fuel consumption at approximately the normal rate, while the
specific fuel consumption of the unsupercharged engine increases 12.8 per
cent in 25,000 ft.
From the foregoing it is apparent that a supercharger can be economically
applied to an aviation engine and is an actual necessity for high altitude
flying.
As a supercharger is nothing more or less than an air pump, there are
several types available for consideration. First, is the piston type or
compressor. This operates at low speeds, is complicated and bulky mechani-
cally, and, although having a high efficiency, is altogether too large and
heavy to be considered for aviation purposes.
The second classification is the rotary blower, such as a gear pump, vane
pump, or Roots blower. Pumps of this type are less bulky than the piston
type, operate at speeds as high as 5,000 r.p.m. with an efficiency of perhaps
Engine Exhaust
Pipe to Turbine
Turbine Exhaust A
Exhaust Intake
Discharge ......
Yalre Yare
By-pass Valve.
Intake
Pipe
Air Compressor
Housing ........!
Nozzle
Carburetor
Air Intake
tahes
Rotor
Turbine
Housing
Air Impeller.
Member
Air Discharge
to Carbureter
SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF A TURBO SUPERCHARGER
60 per cent. The Roots blower has certain mechanical disadvantages due
to the gear train necessary to give the two rotating impellers the proper
angular rotation. The clearances must be sufficient to prevent the impellers
from rubbing together, or from rubbing against the compressor housing and
yet must be small enough to prevent excessive leakage of air. As the
pressure rise with this type of pump is independent of speed, it is used
with some success as an automobile supercharger.
The third classification is the centrifugal compressor which consists
simply of an impeller rotating in a closed casing. It is extremely simple
mechanically as it has only one moving part; it operates at very high speeds
and has a slightly better efficiency than the rotary blower. The type of
pump used for the compressor must be considered in connection with the
method of drive. In large multi-engine airplanes it is possible to use a
separate driving engine such as a 150 h.p. Hispano engine of similar engine
with a pump which supplies air both to the driving engine and to the other
engines of the airplane. A separate drive of this nature is equally as
reliable as the other engines installed in the airplane and the failure of the
supercharger will not affect the operation of the other engines at low
altitudes.


  p. 1996 (#940)                      #

1996
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The supercharger may also be geared directly to the engine which it
supercharges and, in this case, its reliability is dependent upon the gear
drive. A rotary blower, such as the Roots, can be built to operate at
crankshaft speed; however, a double set of gears, one on each side of the
two impellers in the Roots blower, are necessary to provide the proper
angular rotation of the blower and keep the impellers from rubbing. These
gears are necessary regardless of whether or not the blower is driven at
crankshaft or higher speeds. While some experimental work has been
done by the National Advisory Committee on this type of blower, it is not
yet possible to draw any definite conclusions as to its ultimate success
in large units, and it certainly offers more mechanical complications than
the centrifugal type.
When the centrifugal blower is driven by direct gearing from the
engine a gear ratio of from 8-1 to 15-1 is necessary as the blower must
operate at speeds between 20,000 and 30,000 r.p.m. in order to reduce the
size of the compressor and to provide a sufficient compression ratio. The
high speed of the impeller when geared directly to the engine involves con-
siderable difficulties in the gear train and bearings due to the inertia of the
moving parts. The Engineering Division has done a great deal of ex- ·
perimental work along these lines and has had no difficulty with gear trains
operating at pitch speeds as high as 7,000 ft./min. Ball and roller bearings
have been used in these installations to maintain accurate gear centers and
to reduce the friction and lubricating difficulties. The problem of ball
bearings at these high speeds is one of centrifugal stress in the bearing
itself rather than loads imposed by the operation of the supercharger. It
is yet uncertain whether or not it will be possible to successfully operate
anti-friction bearings at such high speeds and still have them thoroughly
dependable over a long period of time. The inertia of the impeller and the
moving parts and the fact that they are directly geared to the engine
causes frequent fatigue failures, due to the transmission of engine vibra-
tion and torsional vibration of the crankshaft through the gear train. In
the smaller sizes, geared superchargers have operated quite successfully
without mechanical difficulties and have shown reasonable reliability over
long periods of time.
Another method of drive is by means of a gas turbine developed first by
M. Rateau of France and later by the General Electric Company for the
Air Service. It offers probably the simplest and most reliable method of
drive for an airplane supercharger with the necessary speed of a centri-
fugal compressor, and as developed by the Engineering Division at the
present time the superchargers are reliable and run practically without
attention. As there is no mechanical connection between the supercharger
and the engine it is not affected by variation in engine speed, or by vibra-
tion within the engine itself. The control is extremely simple and the
installation rugged and reliable.
Either a geared or turbo supercharger used with the Liberty engine to
maintain sea level pressure at 20,000 ſt. requires approximately 56 h.p. In
the geared supercharger the power is taken directly from the crankshaft of
the engine, and therefore a Liberty engine to maintain its full power output
at 20,000 ft. must develop at the crankshaft 476 h.p. The power required
to drive the supercharger is partially recovered, as the engine has its
carburetor air supplied at 14.17 lb. per pressure and exhausts at only 7 lb.
per sq. in. pressure. The combustion space at the end of the exhaust stroke
is therefore filled with gas at only 7 lb. pressure and on the intake stroke
the engine takes in not only the volume of air equal to the displacement of
the piston but also sufficient volume to fill the combustion space up to the
pressure of the intake air. The additional volume of gas taken into the
cylinders and the low atmospheric pressure of the exhaust produces an


  p. 1997 (#941)                      #

1925]
1997
Professional Notes
increase in the mean effective pressure which practically compensates for
the power required to drive the supercharger. At lower altitudes, however,
this is not the case. Take for example flying just at sea level. There is
a minimum power required to drive the supercharger, which in this case is
between 20 and 30 h.p. At sea level the supercharger is not supplying
additional power to the engine, so the actual output of the engine will be
420 h.p. less this minimum power required to drive the supercharger. In
other words, a gear driven supercharger develops less than normal horse-
power at low altitudes and will maintain approximately full normal horse-
power at the rated altitude of the supercharger.
The turbo supercharger derives its power from the residual heat and
energy left in the exhausted gas at the end of the expansion stroke. The
gas is collected in a manifold, discharged through a series of nozzles onto
a turbine wheel mounted on the same shaft as the impeller. At altitude, the
exhaust gas is kept slightly above sea level pressure, and expands through
the nozzles to an atmospheric pressure of approximately 7 lb. per sq. in.
The energy taken from the gas during this pressure drop is sufficient to
drive the turbine and supply a full charge of intake air at sea level
pressure. The control is by means of a gate which allows the unused por-
tion of the exhaust gas to discharge directly to the atmosphere. At the
ground the gate is kept wide open and the exhaust is discharged at
atmospheric pressure, so that the supercharger places no load on the
engine at sea level. It should also be noted that at altitudes the power
output of the engine does not exceed its normal output on account of the
supercharger, whereas in the gear drive the crankshaft must transmit not
only the normal horsepower of the engine but also the necessary horse-
power required to drive the supercharger. The first problem in the design
of a turbo supercharger was the extreme heat of the exhaust gas. This is
in the neighborhood of 1,500 ° F. Difficulty was encountered with the
manifolds and nozzle boxes used to convey the gas to the turbine wheel.
The joints between the exhaust ports and manifolds, and between the
various parts of the manifolds would crack and leak, the nozzle box and
nozzle ring would warp and distort and frequently rub against the turbine
wheel. The turbine buckets rotating at better than 20,000 r.p.m. were
severely stressed and as the elastic limit of their material was reduced
by the high temperature of the gas in which they operated the buckets
frequently pulled out and broke. In the compressor end difficulties were
met with the bearings, methods of mounting, and minor construction details.
The Engineering Division after five or six years steady development
and experimental work on the turbo supercharger has overcome practically
all former difficulties. The manifolds are joined together by flexible ex-
pansion joints wrapped with asbestos tape and covered with a steel clamp.
These joints maintain the necessary pressure and are flexible enough to allow
for expansion and contraction without stressing the manifolds or other
structure. The supercharger has been mounted on the side of the airplane
with the turbine wheel overhung, and exposed to the slipstream of the
propeller. In this way the buckets are kept cool, the exhaust gas is dis-
charged freely to the atmosphere without unnecessary back pressure, and
the operating conditions are much more favorable than in the former
nose type supercharger. The bearings have been simplified and at the
present it is very unusual to have any bearing trouble, in spite of the fact
that speeds as high as 34,000 r.p.m. have been maintained. Developments
are now under way to replace plain babbitted bearings of the turbo super-
charger by ball and roller bearings which will be packed with lubricating
fluid and will remove the necessity for pressure oil feed to the super-
charger, and drain lines from the bearings. This will simplify the instal-
lation and make it unnecessary to consider the lubrication of the super-


  p. 1998 (#942)                      #

1998
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
charger except at long intervals, when the lubricant in the bearings will be
renewed by means of a grease gun, such as the Alemite or other high
pressure system.
The early difficulties in supercharging were not with the supercharger
alone, many changes were found necessary in the engines to which the
supercharger was applied. In fact, overcoming of these latter difficulties
was equally as important as the development of the supercharger itself.
When air is compressed its temperature is raised due to the heat of
adiabatic compression. As the supercharger is not 100 per cent efficient, the
turbulence, friction losses, and so forth, increase the temperature of the
compressed air. When this air was pumped to the carburetors the result-
ing mixture temperature was so high that preignition would occur on full
throttle running at altitude. The obvious solution was the addition of an
air cooler, located between the supercharger and the carburetors, to reduce
the air temperature to a point at which the engine would run satisfactorily
without preignition or detonation. In spite of the air cooler, the mixture
temperature at altitude is hotter than the mixture in an unsupercharged
engine. It has been found that spark plugs with small electrodes soon
become incandescent and are themselves a contributing factor to preigni-
tion. Plugs with larger electrodes having adequate cooling surface over-
came this trouble. In a number vi cases where spark plugs with the
porcelain insulation were used, the porcelain cracked, pieces fell in the
engine cylinder and were blown out with the exhaust gases into the turbine
wheel and the pieces of porcelain striking the buckets moving at very high
velocity completely wrecked them. For this reason, mica plugs are used
on all turbo-supercharged engines.
The next serious difficulty was with the fuel systems. On the old
machines the pressure system was used, but as the engine was super-
charged and the pressure in the carburetor bowl increased, an excessive
pressure was required in the gas tank to force the fuel in the carburetor
against the supercharger pressure. Fuel pumps were then tried but it was
found that they would not work satisfactorily unless they were located
lower than the level of the fuel in the tank, as at high altitudes the fuel
would vaporize and could not be lifted to the level of the pump. The
present satisfactory fuel system consists of a gear pump driven by a
flexible shaft and located lower than the fuel tank. Fuel flows to the pump
by gravity and is pumped through a supercharger relief valve to the
carburetors. This relief valve consists of a spring loaded valve on which
is maintained the same air pressure as the supercharger maintains in the
carburetor. The valve therefore keeps a constant differential between fuel
in the feed line and in the carburetor float bowl.
The additional power output of a supercharged engine requires ap-
proximately 30 per cent increase in the radiating surface, for, although
the air temperature at altitudes is much lower than that at the ground, the
density of the air is so much lower that the cooling effect per square
foot of radiator surface decreases. Eighty degrees C. is an ideal operating
temperature for an airplane engine. If this temperature is maintained
at high altitudes, a point is reached where the water commences to boil
due to the lower atmospheric pressure. It is therefore necessary to seal the
entire cooling system and have a pressure relief valve which will not
open until a pressure greater than atmospheric is reached.
The torque of a supercharged engine is practically constant with increas-
ing altitude and as the propeller torque decreases with altitude, the propeller
will speed up. For this reason, a larger propeller must be used which holds
down the engine r.p.m. at the ground and allows it to speed up and main-
tain its normal r.p.m. at the designed altitude of the combined unit.


  p. 1999 (#943)                      #

1925)
1999
Professional Notes
In the earlier tests no suitable oxygen system was available and a small
hand controlled system was made up using compressed oxygen in bottles.
The pressure was reduced as through a Rego reducing valve, and the
oxygen delivered directly to the pilot's mouth through a flexible rubber
hose. This system is reliable and, although somewhat wasteful of oxygen,
it has not been replaced up to the present time . Ithough the Material Section
has achieved some success with a liquid oxygen system, which is more
pleasant to use than the compressed oxygen as there is no taste whatsoever.
In order to relieve the pilot of the necessity of continually watching his
supercharger operation, an automatic control has been devised which will
maintain sea level pressure at any altitude without attention on the pilot's
part. The first of these controls worked satisfactorily up to 10,000 to
12,000 ft., but was not sufficiently powerful to maintain constant adjust-
ment above that altitude. Tests are being carried on and it is quite possible
to build an automatic control in the light of our present knowledge which
will satisfactorily relieve the pilot of the necessity of continually adjusting
the supercharger.
In connection with the supercharger, two special instruments are used.
One is a differential fuel pressure gage which shows the difference in
pressure between the fuel in the feed line and in the carburetor float
chamber. The other is a pressure gage which s.'ows the supercharger air
pressure either in lb./sq. in. or in feet altitude. The former gage is now
replacing the latter type and the pilot by operating the supercharger control
maintains the carburetor pressure at sea level, or 14.7 lb. per sq. in.
The application of the supercharged engine to airplanes increased the
performance which it was possible to obtain. For pursuit work the first
installation was made on an Orenco having a 300 h.p. Hispano engine. The
ceiling of the ship unsupercharged was approximately 22,000 ft., and with
the supercharger, somewhat better than 33,000 ft. The ceiling of the
Martin Bomber without load has been raised from 14,000 ft. to ap-
proximately 28,000 ft. by means of the supercharger, while the ceiling with
full military load has been increased from 7,000 to better than 12,000 ft.
A DH4 with full military load and supercharger will reach an altitude of
28,000 ft. against approximately 18,000 ft. unsupercharged. It should be
noted, however, that all of these installations have been made on existing
airplanes, and that, with one exception, no airplanes have been designed
to take full advantage of the supercharged engine. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that even better results will be obtained when this is done. The
one exception the Kerber-Boulton C05, which was designed around the
supercharged engine, successfully broke the world's altitude records, carry-
ing weights of 250, 500 and 1,000 kg. In addition, it had a ceiling of around
34,000 ft. At the present time all new aviation engines are being designed
to accommodate either a gear driven or turbo supercharger and practically
all engines that are used in the Air Service from now on will be equipped
with some type of supercharger.
Inaugural Flight of Goodyear “Pilgrim,” World's Smallest
Lighter-than-air Craft
Aviation, 24 August, 1925.- The Pilgrim, the world's smallest airship
and the first commercial lighter-than-air craft to be inflated with helium,
was christened and sent on its inaugural flight in Akron, Ohio, July 18 by
its builders, the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.
The little airship, designed for P. W. Litchfield, first vice president of
Goodyear, while intended for pleasure cruising, is regarded by the manu-
facturers as largely a demonstration ship and will be used in certain tests
and experimental work.


  p. 2000 (#944)                      #

2000
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The Pilgrim is 110 ſt. long, 45 ft. high, and has a capacity for 50,000 cu.
ít. of helium, being approximately one-fiftieth the size of the Zeppelin
Los Angeles.
Powered with a 60 h.p. Lawrence radial engine, the small air cruiser has
a maximum speed of almost 60 mi./hr. and a cruising radius of from 10 to
20 hr., the economy in fuel consumption being pronounced.
Besides the pilot and motor mechanic, facilities for the transportation
of two passengers are provided for in the streamlined cabin suspended
directly under the envelope and entirely enclosed.
A portable mooring mast has been devised which can be set up any-
where that 250 ft. of level ground is available, and attached to the mast
the airship will revolve with the wind. Other masts are also in the con-
struction stage in the Goodyear factory.
Mr. Litchfield believes that the future of this type ship may bring
mooring masts at country clubs and on private estates and even the holding
of airship regattas in the same way that motor boat and yachting clubs now
have similar events, bringing all the pleasures of yachting to those who live
inland.
The general use of these small airships is conditioned on helium. There
is plenty of the inflation gas available in the ground and Congress last year
authorized the sale of surplus helium for commercial use.
The helium supply in the past has been limited by government ap-
propriations but with a market for helium the government plant could
be kept in operation throughout the entire year making possible all the
helium commercial or private owners want.
The Pilgrim will be operated in the vicinity of Akron during the
remainder of the summer and early fall, Mr. Litchfield announced.
ENGINEERING
The World's Marine Engineering Situation
Marine Engineer and Motorship Builder, August, 1925.—Lloyd's Register
Shipbuilding Returns for the quarter ended June 30 show that the tonnage
under construction in Great Britain and Ireland-1,093,587 tons-is about
72,000 tons less than at the end of March, 1925, and about 423,000 tons
less than the tonnage building twelve months ago, and it should be pointed
out that the tonnage on which work was suspended at the end of June,
1925, amounts to 76,000 tons, as compared with only 52,000 tons at the end
of June, 1924. The average tonnage building during the twelve months
immediately preceding the war was 1,890,000 tons, i.e., 796,000 tons more
than the present total. A slight decrease is shown in the tonnage commenced
during the quarter, namely, 189,805 tons, as compared with 202,352 tons
during the first quarter of 1925, and the tonnage launched during the present
quarter-298,161 tons-is 40,959 tons lower than that for the previous three
months.
The tonnage of vessels now building in the world which are to be fitted
with internal-combustion engines amounts to 1,129,912 tons, while the
tonnage of steam vessels under construction is 1,212,525 tons. The motor
tonnage thus equals over 93 per cent of the steam tonnage, showing the
remarkable development which is taking place in the adoption of this system
of propulsion. The tonnage of motorships building at the end of June in
Great Britain and Ireland-399,070 tons-amounts to 58 per cent of the
steam tonnage under construction. In Denmark, Germany, Holland, Italy,
and Sweden the motor tonnage under construction greatly exceeds the
steam tonnage, the combined totals for these five countries being 216,257
tons of steamers and 645,600 tons of motorships. The world figures include
115 motorships each of between 5,000 and 10,000 tons ; five of between
10,000 and 15,000 tons; and seven of between 15,000 and 25,000 tons.


  p. 2001 (#945)                      #

1925)
2001
Professional Notes
MARINE ENGINES UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE WORLD*
This table shows the country of build, the type, number, and horsepower of engines (intended for the propulsion of
seagoing vessels) which are either under construction at the works or being installed on board vessels at the end of June, 1925.
Oil Engines
Total
Country of Build
Steam Engines
Reciprocating
Turbines
No. Indicated No. Shaft
Horsepower
Horsepower
No.1 Indicated
Horsepower
No. 1 Horsepower
201
158,114
274
C..........................
Great Britain and Ireland ..
Denmark......
France. ....
Germany...
Holland.....
Italy........
Japan........
Norway.......
Sweden .......
Switzerland....
United States...
Other countries ...
344,315
2,100
67,700
39,775
28,980
18,950
15,170
17,150
2,530
67,000
28,000
3,000
44,000
ha mal-Il www la
206,773
125,950
21,100
227,026
62,465
36,720
6,100
2,800
57,000
46,940
14,790
600
709,202
128,050
155,800
294,801
94,445
99,670
21,270
19,950
62,460
46,940
66,840
21,950
2,930
5,450
17,850
46,600
3,500
Total .......
323
559,970
|
353, 144
284
808,264
641.
1,721,37
* This being the first publication of a statistical table on these lines, it has not been possible to obtain in time complete information
particularly as regards steam engines for vessels of small tonnage building abroad and not classed with Lloyd's Register. The horsepower is
compiled from figures furnished by the engine makers.


  p. 2002 (#946)                      #

2002
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
For the first time since these returns have been issued by Lloyd's Register,
figures have been compiled showing the number and the horsepower of the
marine engines (intended for the actual propulsion of vessels) under con-
struction in the world. The new table, reproduced herewith, shows that the
total horsepower of the engines building or being installed on board vessels
at the end of June, 1925, amounted to 1,721,378 h.p., of which 709,202 h.p.
are building or were built in Great Britain and Ireland, 294,801 h.p. in
Germany, 155,800 h.p. in France, 128,050 h.p. in Denmark, and 433,525 h.p. in
other countries. These totals, as stated in the return, are not quite complete
as regards steam engines for the smaller vessels building abroad and not
classed with Lloyd's Register. Excluding engines of less than 500 h.p., the
average horsepower of each set of engines reaches 3,356 h.p., the average
for reciprocating steam engines being 1,995 h.p., for oil engines 4,027 h.D.,
and for steam turbines 10,387 11.p.
Tables Nos. 6 and 7 show:
The type of machinery used for the propulsion of vessels.
Particulars of the oil tankers, of the trawlers and other fishing vessels,
and of the steamers fitted for burning oil fuel.
The following summary will not be without interest :
The first table shows the great development which has taken place in the
use of steam turbine engines and of internal-combustion engines. There are
now 1,404 steamers of 9,100,274 tons fitted with turbine engines and 2,145
vessels (including auxiliary vessels) of 2,714,073 tons fitted with internal-
combustion engines, as compared with 730,000 tons and 220,000 tons re-
spectively in 1914. It may be stated that while during the last twelve
months the tonnage of steamers fitted with reciprocating steam engines has
actually decreased by about 152,000 tons, there has been an increase of
738,000 tons in the tonnage of motorships and of 305,000 tons in the tonnage
of vessels fitted with steam turbines.
An analysis of the type of machinery now employed shows that there are
now recorded in Lloyd's Register twenty-eight vessels with a total tonnage
of 440,000 tons, which are fitted with a combination of steam turbines and
reciprocating engines. Another interesting particular is that in the case of
thirty-six vessels, with a tonnage of 110,000 tons, a comparatively new
system of propulsion has been adopted: viz., electric motors connected to
the screw shaft, these motors being supplied with current from generators
which are driven either by steam turbines or oil engines. Of the 939
tankers (of 1,000 tons and upwards) with a total tonnage of 5,177,630
tons, 315 of 1,708,978 tons are registered in Great Britain and Ireland and
374 of 2,281,324 tons are registered in the United States. Of the 3,490
steamers of 17,804, 1 22 tons fitted for burning oil fuel, 730 of 4,679,695 tons
are registered in Great Britain and Ireland and 1,855 of 8,999,050 tons are
registered in the United States of America.
The figures in these two tables enable a comparison to be made between
the respective employment of coal and oil fuel at the present time as
compared with 1914.
1914
1925
Per Cent of Per Cent of
Total Gross Ton- Total Gross ton-
nage
nage
Sailing vessels and sea-going barges
8.06
Oil, etc., in internal-combustion en-
0.45
4.20
gines
Oil fuel for boilers ...,
2.65
27.54
Coal
64.76
3.50
88.84
100.00
100.00


  p. 2003 (#947)                      #

1925)
2003
Professional Notes
It will thus be seen that only 64.75 per cent of the tonnage of the
merchant marine now depends entirely upon coal, while in 1914 the per-
centage was nearly 89. The tables show the total tonnage of certain types
of vessels, which information would be most useful in estimating the
tonnage available for general cargo and passenger purposes. The tonnage
of the tankers of 1,000 tons gross and upwards amounts to 5,178,000 tons,
and in addition there are some 50,000 tons of vessels of less than 1,000 tons
each. The tonnage of trawlers and other fishing vessels amounts to 796,000
tons.
The Propelling Machinery Controversy
The Shipbuilder, August, 1925.—While there has been an increasing
tendency to regard the internal-combustion engine as the prime mover of
the future for ship propulsion and the percentage of new tonnage equipped
with this type of engine continues to increase, there is still a large volume
of opinion which holds that the possibilities of the steam engine are not
exhausted and that improved steam installations will eventually prove at
least as good as, if not better than, oil engines. The latest phase of the
controversy began with the paper read by Sir John H. Biles before the
spring meetings of the Institution of Naval Architects on the relative
commercial efficiency of internal-combustion engines and steam engines for
high-speed passenger vessels. In this paper the author stated that his own
investigations as to the relative merits of these different methods of provid-
ing power to propel ships did not confirm a statement made by Sir
Fortescue Flannery, and endorsed by Lord Bearsted, that the use of
Diesel machinery for marine propulsion would become so common that only
for special purposes would the steam engine be able to hold its own. In
the paper referred to, Sir John outlined proposals for geared turbines
taking steam at 500 lb. pressure and 700° temperature from water-tube
boilers, and gave figures for the intermediate liner and the high-speed
channel types which showed considerable commercial economy for the
proposed steam installations compared with Diesel machinery. For these
high-pressure and high-temperature proposals, Sir John quoted the au-
thority of Sir Charles Parsons. These innovations have been successfully
introduced on land; and the Parsons Marine Steam Turbine Company have
since developed the proposals for Parsons high-efficiency installations to
cover other types, as, for instance, an installation of 5,000 S.H.P. for a
14-knot vessel, as mentioned in the last issue of this journal.
The proposals of Sir John Biles led to an animated correspondence with
Lord Bearsted and Sir Fortescue Flannery published in the Times. When
authorities differ so widely it is difficult to come to any conclusion, and in
the present stage of development of the Diesel engine it is evident that no
hard and fast decision can be reached. In the newspaper correspondence
Sir John adhered to the figures which he gave before the Institution of
Naval Arcchitects for the proposed improved steam engine, which, he stated,
had not so far been challenged, and which seemed to show to some that
the steam engine was still a more economical instrument for the propulsion
of ships. When this fact was fully appreciated, Sir John added, it would
inevitably follow that the production of Diesel engines would decrease.
He held that the advantage the steam engine possessed over the Diesel was
that it was much lighter and cheaper, while the advantage the Diesel type
had was that it required less weight of fuel.
In endeavoring to hold the balance between the disputants, it must not be
overlooked that the proposed high-efficiency steam system has yet to under-
go the test of actual experience under service conditions at sea. It does not
necessarily follow that satisfactory land practice will be equally satisfac-
tory at sea. Sir Charles Parsons himself condemned electrical propelling


  p. 2004 (#948)                      #

2004
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
machinery as unsuitable for marine purposes. Moreover, water-tube boilers
have now been available for use on merchant ships for many years, and their
use with the high pressures now proposed.
To revert to the case of the Diesel engine, it must be borne in mind
that this type is of comparatively recent adoption and has not the history of
the steam engine behind it. If the possibilities of steam have not yet been
exhausted, it is likewise true that the Diesel engine is as yet more or less
in its initial stage. Rapid as its development has been, the field for improve-
ment is still great, and with the experience now available there is no doubt
that in the next few years the Diesel engine will prove a still more
formidable rival. Designers of Diesel engines are working with the
object of reducing weight and cost to those of steam installations, and it
is only a question of time before they succeed, as the fundamental advantage
of fuel economy possessed by the Diesel engine is too important to lose,
not only in regard to the beneficial effect on ship design, but on the con-
servation of oil supplies. The fact that this country has to draw its oil-
fuel supplies from abroad is a disadvantage so far as the price of oil com-
pared with that of coal is concerned.
With the position as it is, there is room for both the steam engine and
the Diesel engine. In short-distance trades the steamship is a better
commercial proposition at the moment. In the long-distance trades the
Diesel engine, even in its present stage of development, shows a marked
commercial superiority. In the case of the large, high-powered passenger
ships now being equipped with Diesel engines, experience in service alone
will show whether they are superior to steamships. It would appear that
the development of the Diesel engine for this type of vessel will probably
be in the direction of faster running units in conjunction with gearing, as
has been the case with steam turbines. For the highest powers the steam
turbine in conjunction with gearing still holds the field; and if the next
development of such powers is higher steam pressures and temperatures, a
new phase of marine engineering will have been inaugurated. Such a
development, however, will not stop the progress of the Diesel engine, as its
advantages in many respects are so marked; and the friendly rivalry now
existing between designers of steam and Diesel engines augurs well for
the improvement of both.
Selectina Forced-Feed and Motor-Cylinder Oils for Navy Use
By J. G. O'Neill, Chief Chemist, Engineering Experiment Station, An-
napolis, Md., Power, 4 August, 1925.-In order to determine whether a
lubricating oil has been properly refined, it is necessary to subject it to a
large number of tests. Since crude oils from different sources have
different properties, so also do the refined oils from these crudes have
different properties.
To judge properly of the qualities of lubricating oils one must be
familiar with the characteristics of crude and refined oils from various
sources. When this information is available, all tests conducted on lubricat-
ing oils are of value, but lacking such information, not many of these are
of much worth. In other words, capable testing of lubricating oils is
comparable to the intelligent testing of any other engineering material; ac-
count must be taken of the limitations of the material and its suitability for
the purpose intended.
For instance, consider the method of testing forced-feed oils for Navy
use. The oil is first given a thorough chemical examination to show its
freedom from any of the chemicals used in the refining process, its freedom
from organic acids and corrosive compounds, the absence of tarry or
asphaltic matters, the absence of constituents which cause it to emulsify


  p. 2005 (#949)                      #

1925)
2005
Professional Notes
with steam and the absence of excessive quantities of unsaturated com-
pounds, which would tend toward the formation of asphaltic matter or
sludge by oxidation during use.
The physical properties show the source of the oil, whether or not it
has the proper flash and fire points, its property of remaining liquid under
different ranges of temperature, and its ability to maintain a lubricating
film under various conditions of temperature and pressure. The non-
emulsifying or demulsifying properties of the oil with distilled water, salt
water, caustic solution and boiling distilled water are determined in order
to find the resistance of the oil to the formation of emulsions with these
solutions, should it become contaminated with any of them when used aboard
ship.
An endurance test is also conducted, which is equivalent to practically
1,000 hours' service aboard ship; this gives the frictional properties of the
oil, an exact knowledge of the changes which the oil undergoes in service,
the tendency, if any, to gum or sludge, and information of the ability of
the oil to maintain a lubricating film under the most severe conditions it
could possibly meet in service. In addition to these the oil is given a
practical test aboard ship in order to know positively that it is suitable in
all respects for the intended purpose, and also to test the ability of the
refiner to deliver large quantities of the same grade of oil.
Practically the same procedure is carried out in the testing of motor
cylinder or aviation engine oils, with the exception that the practical test
of aviation oil is conducted on a 400-h.p. Liberty aviation engine, mounted
on a test stand. The test is run for five hours with full throttle opening
and all engineering data taken. The remaining used oil is given a complete
examination after the run; from the condition of the used oil the perform-
ance of the engine and the specific consumption of gasoline and oil, the
suitability of the oil is determined.
The choice of a lubricating oil is dependent on a number of conditions:
namely, the temperature of operation, bearing pressure, journal rubbing
speed, clearances of bearings, skill of operator, condition of machinery,
possibility of contamination or dilution of the oil in service, vibration of
machinery and the ability to maintain oil pressure.
In forced-feed lubrication there is formed a film of oil between the
bearing metal and the rotating shaft and the friction generated is between
the molecules of the oil as they tend to slide over each other; very little
friction is due to metallic contact of the shaft and the bearing metal. The
viscous lubricating oils give a thicker lubricating film than the less viscous.
They require more power to shear the oil film and consequently produce
more friction and heat.
The proper viscosity should be that which is only slightly more than is
necessary to prevent metallic contact so that the power consumed by friction
is at a minimum. Since the viscosity of mineral oils varies with the
temperature, the temperature of operation in forced-feed systems controlled
by a cooling means should be sufficiently high so that the friction is low,
yet that the oil has sufficient body to maintain a perfect lubricating film.
The viscous or heavy oils produce a thick lubricating film, and it is for
this reason more difficult to squeeze the heavy oils from between bearing
surfaces. Such oils are used where the bearing pressures are high, the
clearances large or the temperature of operation high.
In a high-speed bearing it is necessary to use a thin oil because it gives
the minimum of friction and because the friction generated by the high
rubbing speed of the journal would be abnormally increased by the use of
a heavy oil. In high-speed bearings the bearing pressure is generally light,
which permits a thin oil.


  p. 2006 (#950)                      #

2006
Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Conditions which favor oils of slightly higher viscosity for marine
practice than for shore practice are, the losses from leakage and splashing
decreasing with the increasing viscosity of the oil used, the greater possi-
bility of the presence of vibration which necessitate the presence of a
thicker cushioning film and the great diversity of service that one grade of
oil is called upon to give since it is objectionable to carry a supply of many
different grades.
The care used in the manufacture of the machinery and in its installation
plays an important part in the choice of the proper lubricating oil. It has
been found that very carefully manufactured and installed machinery may
be lubricated with a much thinner oil than would otherwise be possible.
Invariably, inferiority of machinery, poorly installed machinery and
machinery allowed to get in bad condition require the use of heavier grades
of lubricating oils.
Forced-feed and motor-cylinder oils for Navy use are classified as
follows:
Viscosity, Saybolt
Class Universal at. 130° F. Used for Lubrication of
Light .............
100-115
Turbines (bearing only) turbo-
generators up to 100 kw.,
dynamos and sight-feed gaso-
line engines.
Medium ......
125-145
Turbines, turbo-generators, 300
and 500 kw., reduction gears
of small turbines, blowers and
general machinery.
Heavy .......
180-200
Main engine turbines of battle-
ships, and destroyers, reduc-
tion gears, reciprocating en-
gines with forced-feed lubri-
cation.
Extra heavy .....
240-260
Diesel engines of submarines.
Ultra heavy ...... 300-320
High-power and high-speed
gasoline engines with forced-
feed lubrication.
Viscosity at 210° F.
Aviation, winter... 75-85
Aviation engines operating in
cold climates.
Aviation, summer. 90-100
Aviation engines operating in
warm climates.
Forced-feed oils in use increase in viscosity due to the evaporation of the
lowest in viscosity. This is because each of these oils is composed of a
number of different oils of widely varying viscosities and boiling points.
The presence of a large percentage of unsaturated compounds in the oil
will also tend to increase the viscosity of the oil during use, owing to the
fact that these compounds break up and oxidize, producing compounds of
greater viscosity. Unsaturated compounds such as acetylene are so called
because of characteristics of chemical formula indicating instability.
All lubricating oils in service darken in color, due to oxidation of the
oils and the production of asphaltic resins or asphaltic matter. These dark-
colored compounds are produced by the oxygen of the air or oxygen in the
oil itself acting on the unsaturated compounds under condition of heat and
pressure. They are precipitated from the oil by the addition of 88° Baumé
gasoline.
Recently, a mineral lubrication oil of viscosity of 85 sec. at 130° F. was
subjected to the 100-hour test in the endurance testing machine. It con-


  p. 2007 (#951)                      #

1925)
2007
Professional Notes
tained 38 per cent of unsaturated compounds. At the end of the test the
oil was examined and found to contain 19 per cent asphaltic matter by
volume insoluble in 88° Baumé gasoline.
A well-refined mineral oil of the same viscosity, containing not over
8 per cent of unsaturated compounds and subjected to the same test, will
not show more than a trace of matter insoluble in 88° Baumé gasoline. The
asphaltic matter produced in forced-feed oils during use does not tend to
sludge out to as great an extent as that produced in motor cylinder oils.
Sludge produced in motor cylinder oils consists largely of free carbon
either from decomposition of the lubricating oil, or partial combustion of the
fuel and cracked products from the lubricating oil. The carbon is insoluble
in the lubricating oil and settles out; also the oils are contaminated with
gasoline, which exerts a precipitating action on the heavier asphaltic bodies
in the oil and ends to throw them out as sludge.
Forced-feed oil show considerable acidity after long use because the
asphaltic resins produced by oxidation are acid in nature. Motor cylinder
oils are not subject to such a long period of use as forced-feed oils and do
not show the presence in the used oil of as great acidity.
Well-refined forced-feed oils retain their non-emulsifying properties for
a long period after being put into use, provided the lubricating oil system
is clean and all bearings are well fed with oil. Motor cylinder oils, however,
in service rapidly become emulsifying owing to the finely divided condition
of the insoluble matter in the oil.
There is no advantage in the addition of animal oils, vegetable oils or
fatty acids to forced-feed oils, and there are many disadvantages caused by
the emulsifying or corrosive properties of these materials. Neither are
there any good effects from their use in motor cylinder oils, with possibly
the exception of oils of too heavy viscosity, when they may assist the spread-
ing properties of the oil and render slightly better lubrication.
Graphite should not be used, since it greatly assists in the formation of
sludge in both forced-feed and motor cylinder oils and does not reduce the
frictional properties of the oils.
It is believed that with improvement in operation and design of motor
cylinders the same methods of testing and choosing lubricating oils will
apply to motor-cylinder oils as at present apply to forced-feed oils. In the
future, a comparatively few grades of mineral oil may be used for lubricat-
ing purposes instead of the innumerable brands and grades in use at the
present time.
Navy to Make Tests with Pulverized Coal
The Nautical Gazette, 22 August, 1925.-Exhaustive tests to determine
the feasibility of using pulverized coal as marine boiler fuel are to be made
shortly at the League Island Navy Yard under the auspices of the Navy
Department, Bureau of Mines and Shipping Board. The plan for the tests
has been recommended by the Fuel Conservation Committee of the Shipping
Board and is practically certain of adoption, as it is known that all three
departments are anxious to have the trial made. The only question remain-
ing to be settled is as to who shall furnish the coal, of which about 500 tons
will be required for the proposed tests.
It is estimated that the use of pulverized coal will mean savings of from
10 to 15 per cent and possibly even more from present costs of bunker coal
and it is stated that if the tests work out as well as anticipated the intro-
duction of the new fuel will be one of the greatest steps taken in many
years toward the economical operation of ships. It is understood that
burners of several different types are to be used in the proposed tests.
Pulverized coal is now being used very successfully and economically in
large power plants on shore and in these cases a pronounced saving has been


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2008
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
made as compared with existing mechanical stokers firing with the ordinary
sizes of coal. Accordingly, it is expected that a still greater saving will be
shown as compared with hand firing as now practiced on coal-burning ships.
Shipowners are greatly interested in the possibilities of the new develop-
ment and it is expected that an invitation will be extended to private ship-
owners to have representatives of their engineering departments witness the
tests and satisfy themselves of the practicability and economy of the new
system.
. MERCHANT MARINE
Fleet Corporation and Shipping Board Affairs
The Nautical Gazette, 22 August, 1925.-Since President Palmer of the
Fleet Corporation has been permitted by the Shipping Board to take the
initiative in conducting negotiations for the sale of ships real progress has
been made in the disposition of the tonnage. It was only about a month ago
that President Palmer was given this authority but more has been accom-
plished in liquidating the government's shipping properties in that time than
during the past two years. The managing operators of government vessels
have responded with alacrity to President Palmer's hint that they acquire the
ships and services allocated to them, and this week the sale of two of these
services has been consummated. The Carolina Company of Charleston,
South Carolina, has purchased the American Palmetto Line, in which six
ships are involved, and Henry Herberman, president of the Export Steam-
ship Company, has purchased the American Export Line in which service
eighteen ships are operated. The purchasers are to be congratulated on
their action, for they have demonstrated in a practical manner their faith
in American ability to operate American ships in foreign trade. By ac-
quiring these ships and services they have given strength to the American
merchant marine. In selling these services the Shipping Board has acted
wisely, for by so doing the day of the government's withdrawal from the
shipping business has been brought nearer. Other operators are negotiating
for the purchase of their services and it is to be hoped that these negotia-
tions will be brought to a successful conclusion. It has been clearly proved
that the managing operators are the potential purchasers of government
tonnage and the Carolina Company and the Export Steamship Corporation
have set an excellent example for the other operators to follow. We wish
the Carolina Company and the Export Steamship Corporation every success
in their undertaking to operate privately owned American ships in foreign
trade, and hope that their highest expectations will be realized. ,
These are great days for the American Merchant Marine—the days for
which American shipowners have been waiting. The government's obsolete
ships are being sold for scrap, its active ships and services are being trans-
ferred to private hands and its miscellaneous shipping properties are being
disposed of. In other words, the government is rapidly getting out of the
shipping business and the Shipping Board is trying to carry out the provi-
sions of the Merchant Marine Act. Despite all this there are some dis-
gruntled persons who are now beginning to oppose the sale of the ships
and services. So far as we are aware there has not been a single commer-
cial organization in the country which has supported the policy of govern-
ment ownership and operation of vessels. The opinion has been unanimous
that the government should withdraw from its shipping activities. Obviously,
if the ships cannot be sold the government must continue to own and
operate them, and it is surprising that the steps which are now being taken
to liquidate the government's shipping properties and to end the govern-
ment's participation in the shipping industry should be criticized. It goes
without saying that certain individuals and organizations have profited finan-
cially from the operation of government vessels, and it is only natural that


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2009
Professional Notes
these should resent the removal of this source of profit. But, we cannot
understand why the Middle West Foreign Trade Committee should entertain
and express the fear that the board's present ship sales policy is likely to
result in the discontinuance of the services. It is clearly set forth in the
contracts of sale that the purchaser must guarantee to operate the vessels
on the specified routes for a term of years and there is no reason to believe
that the buyers will violate the terms of their contracts. Furthermore, the
Shipping Board has announced its intention of protecting the private lines
from rate cutting competition by foreign lines. If foreign competitors
start rate wars with the object of putting the new private American lines
out of business the Shipping Board will take back the lines sold and operate
them until Congress considers the question of protecting American ships.
There is thus small likelihood of any of the young American companies
being driven off the sea by unfair foreign competition. The fears of the
Middle West Foreign Trade Committee and others are really groundless,
and the Shipping Board should be commended rather than condemned for
its present ship sales policy. The Board has no alternative but to sell its
ships. Its hand is being forced by the administration's economy program,
Its appropriation is being cut this year to a point where it cannot possibly
operate all its vessels and keep them within the appropriation. The board
is selling its ships for economy's sake.
To President Palmer of the Fleet Corporation is due the credit for placing
the government's shipping interests on a more business-like basis. When
he assumed office nearly two years ago he began to reduce expenses, and he
has carried on this work ever since with amazing success. He has cut down
the personnel, he has instituted more satisfactory and cheaper methods of
financing, he has devised ways and means whereby the managing agents
could show better voyage results, and he has reorganized the staff of the
Fleet Corporation in this country and abroad until today the organization
is more efficient than ever it has been. It was he who worked out and car-
ried into effect the scheme for consolidating the government's services
whereby the number of operators and active ships could be reduced without
impairing any of the services or the government's interests. Through Ad-
miral Palmer's clever handling of the Fleet Corporation and the managing
operators the Shipping Board will come very near living within its appro-
priation of $24,000,000 this year, which will be a saving of approximately
$10,000,000. Everyone will agree that this was no mean undertaking and
that high praise is due Admiral Palmer for these excellent results. In the
face of these achievements, certain parties are attacking Admiral Palmer
and questioning his motives. The Chamber of Commerce of Portland,
Oregon, has a foreign-trade committee whose chairman is Frank L. Shull.
According to press reports this Mr. Shull addressed the members of the
chamber a few days ago and took occasion to assail Admiral Palmer. The
dispatches state that Mr. Shull charged that Admiral Palmer is dominated
by British shipping interests who are attempting to throttle America's new
steamship lines and concentrate all the trade in the large ports controlled
by their organizations. Being in a public position, it is natural that Presi-
dent Palmer should be open to criticism, but such an attack as this is as
unfair and as unsportsmanlike as it is unwarranted. The results of Ad-
miral Palmer's stewardship speak for themselves. He stepped into the
Fleet Corporation affairs at a critical time and has skillfully steered the
government's shipping affairs from the rocks of disaster. He has accom-
plished more in solving the government's shipping problems than any of his
predecessors, and the future operation and care of the government's ships
can be safely left in his hands. He has the confidence of American shipping
A


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2010
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
men, who know something of the problems he has had to face and of the
masterly way in which he has solved them, and that is all that matters.
The government needs Admiral Palmer's services now more than ever
before. The Budget Bureau has served notice on the Shipping Board that
the estimates for the next fiscal year for the operation of the government's
ships must be cut to $15,000,000. This is a drastic reduction and fears are
expressed that the board cannot get along with this small appropriation.
The commissioners estimate that $22,000,000 will be required, but Admiral
Palmer is convinced that the present number of ships can be kept in opera-
tion on an appropriation of $18,000,000. If the president of the Fleet Cor-
poration can cut down expenses so that he can come within $3,000,000 of
the appropriation then his real worth will be proved. Chairman O'Connor
of the Shipping Board has expressed the opinion that if the appropriation
is cut to $15,000,000 it will be found necessary to tie up the Leviathan and
the other vessels operated by the United States Lines. Such action would
be disastrous and would greatly undermine America's prestige on the ocean
and should be avoided at all costs. Therefore, if Admiral Palmer can save
the situation and prevent the withdrawal of any vessels on an appropriation
of $18,000,000 he should be given a free hand, Admiral Palmer expects to
dispose of several more of the government's services, and by so doing and
eliminating the losses to the government on these services he will be able
to keep the Fleet Corporation's expenses within the reduced appropriation.
The Leviathan must not be tied up, and rather than resort to such a meas-
ure, the Shipping Board will surely give Admiral Palmer the opportunity
to carry into effect his plans for reducing expenses.
Motor Passenger Liners
The Marine Engineer and Motor Ship Builder, August, 1925.---Another
milestone in the history of the motorship was reached on Tuesday, July 2,
when Harland and Wolff, Ltd., launched from their Belfast yard the large
passenger and mail liner Asturias, which is intended for the Southampton-
South America service of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. This
vessel, when completed early next year, will have the distinction of being
the first British motorship employed on the South American service, and
she will also be at the time of her completion the largest vessel in the service
of her owners. In all probability the honor of being the first motorship to
trade across the Atlantic will be divided equally between the Asturias and
the Gripsholm, at present completing at the Walker Shipyard of Sir W. G.
Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, for the Swedish-America Line,
Gothenburg, but in both cases the type of propelling machinery is the same
although the more powerful units are fitted in the Asturias. The only large
passenger and mail liner at present on service is the trans-Pacific Aorangi
of 18,500 tons gross, and she is propelled by single-acting engines of two-
stroke cycle type driving four lines of shafting. Both the Gripsholm and
the Asturias will be twin-screw vessels, and their propelling machinery will
be of Burmeister and Wain four-stroke cycle double-acting type.
For many years it was considered not only by antagonists of the internal-
combustion engines, but also by some of its strongest protagonists, that the
production of a practical double-acting Diesel engine was a very difficult
feat to accomplish, if not an impossibility, and it reflects great credit on
both designers and constructors of these engines that practical sea-going
units have now been evolved. Antagonists of the double-acting Diesel engine
said that it would be impossible to evolve an engine which would operate
satisfactorily on the under side of the cylinder and that great trouble would
be experienced owing to the fact that the piston rod would necessarily pierce
the bottom cylinder cover. Some experimenters set out to overcome this


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1925]
2011
Professional Notes
difficulty by constructing a forked connecting rod, so that the under side of
piston, to all intents and purposes, operated exactly the same as the top
side of the piston. These experimenters went further than the experimental
stage and produced an extremely successful practical working engine. Other
people, among whom were Burmeister and Wain and their licensees, decided
that it was perfectly reasonable and possible to get an engine to work with
the piston rod piercing the bottom cylinder cover, and the difficulties of
combustion space were overcome by arranging what is virtually a space
extraneous to the cylinder itself, in which all the valves work. That is,
broadly, the principle upon which the Burmeister and Wain four-stroke cycle
double-acting engine works. It cannot be criticized on the score of compli-
cation, since there is only one camshaft at mid-cylinder height, and that is
fitted with a double set of cams (i.e., two groups, one for top and one for
bottom) which drive, through push rods, the valve levers for top and bot-
tom. Reversal is carried out in the ordinary way by shifting the camshaft
in a fore-and-aft direction. The Gripsholm is fitted with two sets of six-
cylinder double-acting engines of this type, but the Asturias has two sets of
eight-cylinder engines, and when completed she will be the highest-powered
twin-screw motorship afloat, her engines developing collectively a maximum
of about 20,000 i.h.p. In conjunction with this main machinery installation.
electric auxiliaries are to be fitted, and with the exception of a small boiler
which is intended to drive a small emergency air compressor and to generate
steam for cooking purposes, and so forth, there will be no steam in the
ship at all.
The South American trade is considered one of particular suitability for
motorship operation, and the Hamburg-South American Line, for example,
already maintains a passenger and cargo service from Hamburg to the
River Plate, with the Monte Sormiento and Monte Olivia, two well-equipped
vessels, which are propelled by Diesel machinery of approximately 7,000
i.h.p.; the former, it is interesting to recall, is driven by trunk piston engines
operating two screws through mechanical reduction gearing. The Asturias
is one of a series of large motor liners building at Belfast for the Royal
Mail Steam Packet Company, and the Union-Castle Line, and in the minds
of many far-thinking people these vessels appear to usher in a definitely
new era in marine engineering. Whether this is an exaggeration remains
to be seen, but the construction and completion of these vessels certainly does
point to the fact that the double-acting Diesel engine is rapidly coming into
its own. Whether all large ships of the future will be propelled by double-
acting Diesel engines of four-stroke cycle type is a matter which at the
present it is rather difficult to say. There are many enthusiasts for the two-
stroke Diesel engine of this type, and certainly it has a great number of
advantages, but what the shipowner has to consider is reliability and first
cost, and the engine which is definitely more reliable, and, with that relia-
bility, cheaper than others, is the one which in the long run will unques-
tionably prove the favorite.
The Motor-driven Mail and Passenger Ship "Asturias"
The Shipbuilder, August, 1925.—The launch of the Royal Mail Steam
Packet Company's twin-screw motorship Asturias from the East Yard of
Messrs. Harland and Wolff, Ltd., Belfast, on July 7, was an event of out-
standing importance in the annals of British shipbuilding and marine engi-
neering, as the vessel is the largest and most powerful motorship afloat, and
she will also be one of the first propelled by double-acting oil engines to
take up her regular service.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Intended for the South American trade of her owners, the ship complies
with all the requirements of the Board of Trade and Spanish laws. The
leading particulars are as follows:
Length B.P.
655ft. Sin.
Breadth moulded ......
78ft. oin.
Depth moulded .........
45ft. oin.
Gross tonnage, about ....
22,000
Passengers (1st, 2nd and 3rd) and crew.
1,700
Indicated horse-power ..
20,000
The vessel has a straight stem and cruiser stern, with lofty deck erec-
tions amidships. Eleven watertight bulkheads divide the hull into twelve
main compartments. The double bottom is continuous fore and aft, and is
arranged for the carriage of fresh water or water ballast.
The first-class main staircase forward, of the double spiral type, extends
through six decks, and from the orlop deck to the top of the skylight is
about 60 ft. in height. Communicating with the swimming bath on the
orlop deck, it mounts deck by deck to the social hall on E deck, passing
en route the entrance to the dining saloon on A deck, the lounge entrance
on B deck (at which level embarkation and disembarkation take place), and
C deck entrance, where a shop is installed. Upon the next level, D deck,
is situated the inquiry bureau. A similar staircase at the after end of the
accommodation gives access to other apartments, such as the smoking room,
winter garden, children's playroom, etc.
The first-class dining saloon, in the style of the French Empire, is 94 ft.
long by 74 ft. broad, and is planned with a central hall 60 ft. by 40 ft by
17 ft. high, occupying two decks in height, while the remainder is one deck
high. Seating accommodation is arranged for 412 passengers at tables for
numbers varying from two to twelve.
The main portion of the social hall, which is of Georgian character, rises
to a height of about 19 ft. At the forward end a stage has been introduced
for theatrical and other entertainments, and the whole of the floor is of
polished oak parquet to facilitate dancing.
The lounge is based on the state apartments at Houghton House, Nor.
folk, in Kent's middle period.
The reading and writing room is painted white in the style of the Robert
Adam's work at Harewood, Yorkshire.
The first-class smoking room, in the William and Mary period, is pan-
elled throughout in cedarwood after the rooms at Belton House, Lincoln-
shire.
The walls of the winter garden, on the top deck, are in alternate hori-
zontal bands of red and white in stone finish in the Spanish Moresque style
of Cordova.
The swimming bath is in the Pompeian style, with marble and tile floors
and red majolica columns round the bath. It is planned in two heights,
the upper one with dressing boxes on a broad balcony. The bath pond is
29 ft. long by 17 ft. broad and 8 ft. deep.
The children's room, on F deck, is laid out on the lines of a Kate Green-
away cottage and garden.
There are four main 400-kw. Diesel-driven generators; also one of
75 kw., placed above the margin line, for use at any time the main genera-
tors are out of action. There are some 4,000 lights in all distributed
throughout the vessel. A feature of the ship is the ample ventilation, there
being over fifty large fans for delivering cold air to the accommodation, in
addition to which there are over 500 cabin and ceiling fans throughout the
staterooms and public rooms. The heating throughout is electric, there


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1925]
2013
Professional Notes
being some 500 heaters in the accommodation. Electricity is also employed
in the galley ranges, hospitals and barbers' shops.
The whole of the auxiliary machinery in the engine room is electrically
driven, including three maneuvering compressors each of 180 b.h.p. In addi-
tion to these, the refrigerating plant consists of two compressors, each
driven by a 110-b.h.p. motor, together with electrically-driven circulating
pumps and fans in connection therewith.
The pumps for supplying the hydraulic cranes are also placed in the
machinery space, and are each of 110 h.p.
On the decks the electrical equipment includes a 135-h.p. warping winch,
two 150-h.p. capstans, and a 136-h.p. windlass, together with the motors for
the electric-hydraulic steering gear.
Seven electrically-operated lifts and hoists are installed, as well as a
complete system of bells and telephones.
The propelling machinery, constructed by the shipbuilders at Belfast, con-
sists of two Harland B. & W. eight-cylinder, four-stroke cycle, double-
acting Diesel engines, which are the highest powered units yet constructed
for marine propulsion, each engine being capable of developing 10,000 i.h.p.
at 115 r.p.m. The cylinders have each a bore of 33 in, and a piston stroke
of 59 in.
Compressed air for fuel injection is provided from three-stage air com-
pressors, mounted in tandem at the fore end of each engine and driven off
an extension of the crankshaft. The engines have forced lubrication
throughout, and the cylinder jackets are cooled with fresh water, oil being
used for piston-cooling.
Maneuvering air at 25 atmospheres is stored in six steel reservoirs, the
latter being charged by three-stage electrically-driven air compressors.
As stated in the description of the electrical equipment, four 400-kw.
electric-generating sets are fitted, each driven by a four-cylinder, four-
stroke cycle, single-acting Diesel engine.
All the engine-room auxiliaries are driven by independent electric motors,
but for emergency use a small steam-driven compressor is fitted.
Two oil-fired vertical boilers are installed for generating steam for cook-
ing purposes, and so forth.
It is interesting to add that a sister ship of the Asturias, namely the
Alcantara, is being built for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company; while
on an adjoining berth there is also under construction a motor liner of
similar dimensions, named the Carnarvon Castle, for the Union-Castle Mail
Steamship Company, Ltd.
The Flettner Rudder of the Motorship “Sorrento”
The Shipbuilder, August, 1925.—The single-screw motorship, Sorrento,
which is equipped with a Flettner rudder of the underhung type, as illus-
trated, has recently undergone satisfactory steering trials on the River Elbe.
This vessel, which has a deadweight carrying capacity of about 2,700 tons
and a horsepower of about 1,050, has been built to the order of the Ham-
burg shipowners, Rob. M. Sloman, Jr., and Company, for the Mediterranean
service.
According to a report signed by the owner's representatives on the trials,
the steering proved a complete success, it being possible for one man to hold
the vessel on its course quite comfortably by hand. In altering course, the
rudder responded in a very remarkable manner, without any unnecessary
effort being exerted on the hand steering wheel. Turning circles were made
both to port and starboard, and were estimated to have a diameter of only
twice the length of the ship. Furthermore, while steaming down the river
at full speed, the helm was put hard over, so as to bring the ship practically
across the stream. The ship was immediately brought back on her course


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2014
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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
without in any way reducing the speed. These difficult maneuvers convinced
everyone on board as to the steering efficiency possible with the Flettner
rudder.
The report draws special attention to the tests carried out at slow speeds,
particularly in regard to the steering of the vessel after shutting down the
engines. While entering Hamburg with the tide, or, in other words, with
the current running in the same direction as the ship, and notwithstanding

THE FLETTNER RUDDER OF THE MOTORSHIP "SORRENTO,"
SEEN FROM STARBOARD
the fact that the wind was adverse, the vessel was still capable of being
steered for seven minutes after the engines had stopped; that is to say,
going absolutely dead slow. Furthermore, it was possible to bring the ship
right into the harbor and up to the quayside without any assistance from
tugs.
The Flettner rudder control gear in the wheelhouse, the report continues,
was absolutely noiseless and gave entire satisfaction.


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Professional Notes
MISCELLANEOUS
Combat Methods of the Japanese
By Colonel C. E. Kilbourne, C. A. C., The Coast Artillery Journal,
August, 1925.—To those who would appreciate the basic causes of the
success or the failure of a campaign no royal road can be pointed out. The
study of a nation's doctrines of war, of her field service and drill regula-
tions is valuable but not conclusive. If accepted at face value these may
lead to erroneous conclusions, that, in turn might lead to erroneous action
on the battlefield. Two nations may announce the offensive, the objective,
and cooperation as being the principles most important to insure success of
an engagement, but their interpretation of these terms may be quite differ-
ent. Again, two nations may state that the infantry is the primary arm, one
expecting to attack with the bayonet under cover of such artillery support
as may be obtainable, the other expecting to shatter the enemy with
artillery fire, using the infantry to mop up and occupy the position so gained.
The relation between distinctive combat methods and announced doctrines
can be learned only by a detailed study of campaigns in which the student
is willing to examine all orders and decisions and to trace the effect of these
down to the smallest unit. This will frequently indicate the persistence of
certain methods and principles in spite of character of terrain, of develop-
ment in mechanical means of warfare and of enemy reaction. It is on such
a detailed study that the following notes on the Japanese army are based.
Doubtless selected instances may appear to contradict conclusions drawn,
but it is believed the impressions conveyed are, on the whole, reliable.
As to organization we know the larger features but are in doubt as to
details. The Japanese endeavor to keep their organization secret and ques-
tions are met with polite evasion. The following, therefore, is not to be
taken as absolutely accurate.
The Japanese discard the army corps, building the field army direct from
divisions. As with us, the G. H. Q. directs the armies, and, in the Russo-
Japanese War, continued this direction successfully with a number of armies
our present doctrine would lead us to believe so great as to demand the
formation of army groups. Their average of three divisions to an army
gives the field army approximately the numerical strength of our typical
army corps, but it is, in conception, and by the permanent assignment of
army troops, essentially an echelon for independent operations.
The Japanese division differs from that of any other great power. Re-
taining the square formation—two brigades each of two regiments—for the
infantry, their artillery consists of a single regiment of three battalions. In
rifle (bayonet) power it is the strongest of all; in artillery and automatic
fire the weakest. A regiment of cavalry, of about the strength of our
squadron, is assigned. There is no organic air service. The division is
complete as to engineers, communication troops and trains. Numerically
it is something less than 85 per cent of our war strength division.
During the Russo-Japanese War independent infantry brigades, some of
infantry only, others "reinforced,” were used as army troops and G. H. Q.
reserves. They were assigned to armies and withdrawn in accordance with
the mission and situation, just as we assign and withdraw G. H. Q. artillery.
They were used to enable army commanders to hold out a cohesive reserve
and without necessity for disrupting any division. They could replace a
brigade that had been exceptionally heavily engaged thus enabling the divi-
sion to continue its effort. They were used on missions not demanding a
complete division, and could make progress (living mainly on the country)
in terrain where supply difficulties would tend to immobilize a complete
division. For flank protection, for lines of communication, and for many
duties requiring the detachment of small forces they saved calls on the
divisions, leaving these, and the armies of which they were component parts
undisturbed as to normal organization and combat capacity.


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
They were not "provisional" brigades, but were duly organized from the
beginning with permanent commanders and staffs. They had a distinct
organization esprit; many will live in history.
Apparently these units have disappeared. They were known as "kobi"
brigades, being organized from kobi (first reserve) troops and at present
we hear only of "kobi" divisions. The writer believes that independent
infantry brigades will reappear as G. H. Q. reserves in another war. They
proved their value too conclusively to have been discarded. Sustaining this
belief is the fact that, in Japanese maneuvers are found independent infantry
units (regiments) in reserve; also it has been noted, in conversation with
Japanese officers, that there is a distinct reaction when the operations of
kobi brigades is discussed.
A consideration of the foregoing indicates that the Japanese are not
imitators of the organization of any European nation, just as a study of
their operations will show they are far from following blindly the doctrines
and methods of any nation in campaign and combat. There seems no doubt
that they have studied all and given all due weight, but that organization,
strategy and tactics are distinctly their own.
Comment is made from time to time that the Japanese are conservative
and slow to change. Their history is contradictory in this. Certainly no
nation stood still for so long a period as did Japan under the Shogunate of
the Tokugawas. On the other hand they changed from a feudal to a modern
state in a generation, their military system keeping pace. They have been
criticized for "failing to profit by the lessons of the World War," the rela-
tively small artillery strength, the small percentage of automatic weapons
and the practical absence of motor transport being cited. But, their atten-
tion to air development and the submarine, considered in connection with
their past record for careful planning leads to the logical conclusion that
they have not only studied the World War but have applied the lessons to
be learned therefrom to their own problems and with the characteristics
of the area they wish to control prominently in mind. We should remember
that Grant sent the bulk of his army artillery to the base in the campaign
of 1864. He could not bring it into action nor supply it. It is probable that
Japan has designed her organization for a special theater, and to bring into
action the maximum force, all things considered, in that theater. Tables
of organization do not win battles.
As to leadership the number of armies controlled successfully from a
single headquarters direct has already been commented on. The success
of this control appears to have been due to the thorough understanding by
all commanders of the objective, to complete instruction of each in the mis-
sion of the others, to the maximum of personal consultation of commanders
during engagements, and to the use of cavalry for liaison purposes. Among
army commanders there was absolute loyalty to the objective, combined with
initiative. There are instances where commanders, anticipating the desires
of the supreme command, prepared the orders for the next movement of
their own troops, and, when the directive was received from General Head-
quarters, were able to issue the orders so prepared with little or no altera-
tion.
Cooperation among commanders was a matter of course. We find army
commanders, without orders or request, voluntarily detaching a brigade to
assist another army, possibly thirty miles away. We find regimental com-
manders (themselves engaged) sending a battalion to the aid of another
unit they believed more heavily pressed. Again and again, when informa-
tion was received that a certain organization had been repulsed or was being
counter-attacked, we find contiguous units attacking on their own initiative,
or reserves deflected from a local mission to some operation that would tend
to relieve the pressure on the threatened unit.
Confidence in commanders seemed to be ingrained, due probably to thor-
ough training and to the loyalty referred to. We are taught that, in a field


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order, no alternative is admissible; in the Japanese orders directives as
"will endeavor to capture," "will occupy - if possible," were habitually
to be found. It was assumed that commanders would do their utmost. As
a corollary we find commanders perfectly frank in expressing doubts of
success. Again and again division and brigade commanders reported that
they could not carry objectives assigned, and, occasionally, that they doubted
their ability to resist counter-attack-and this without apparent fear of
reproach or punishment. Higher commanders responded to such reports by
sending reserves if any were available, or by directing that ground gained
should be held to the last man, or that the attack must be continued at all
hazards. The writer has found record of only one general officer being
relieved from command; there was no Limoge or Blois.
Just as there appears to have been no fear of punishment in event of
failure, there seemed no thought of self-advancement and no jealousy. In
the Russo-Japanese War there were no indications of indecision, and none
of hasty, ill-thought-out action. Calm and deliberate planning, combined
with energetic execution seems to have been the rule, and an enormous
capacity for personal exertion, continued with practically no intervals for
sleep, was notable for division and brigade commanders.
Much has been written of the Japanese soldier, of his courage and en-
durance. Certainly the assaults at Port Arthur equal any in history for
daring and determination. The operations of the Twelfth Brigade, Twelfth
Division at the Sha-ho set a standard of endurance. This unit fought all
day October 11; assaulted and captured Sanchengtzu hills the night of the
eleventh-twelfth, carried the ridge to the north on the twelfth, crossing a
valley 600 yards broad in three rushes; were reorganized for another attack
when recalled for a new mission; marched ten miles through a heavy rain
storm the night of the twelfth-thirteenth; attacked a Russian force on the
hills guarding a pass the following morning making several unsuccessful
assaults; reformed to resist attack on the approach of reinforcements to the
Russians; took up the pursuit when the enemy began retiring on the four-
teenth; then marched eighteen miles over mountain trails to rejoin the divi-
sion on the fifteenth.
While the Japanese were pioneers in application of modern methods of
massed artillery fire, concealment and indirect fire, there were instances to
show that the same aggressive spirit shown by the infantry actuated also
officers and men of the artillery. Their artillery was outranged, but they
pushed it forward and generally succeeded in besting the superior artillery
of their opponents. The initiative of a junior officer in bringing his moun-
tain guns into an advanced position enfilading Gershelmann's line contributed
greatly to the success of Kuroki's first day's operations at Liao Yang.
On the other hand, there are plenty of instances of Japanese soldiers
being stopped by accurate fire, and a few of their failing to respond to their
officers' call for an advance; and, as the war progressed, the instances of
reckless daring in mass diminished. They are admirable soldiers, will
attack with zest and resist to the end ; they are cheerful under hardships;
they have great endurance. But, it is not believed that they differ from
soldiers of other races who have enthusiasm for the cause and confidence
in their leaders, and they have produced no army of higher spirit or greater
endurance than the American army that marched to the Rhine.
A picture has been drawn of skillful, aggressive and unselfish leadership
and of loyal response from the troops that is believed justified by the facts
of history. But, while these traits, combined with the absence of organiza-
tion and consistent leadership of their opponents, gave them an unbroken
series of victories in the last war, an analysis of their methods seems to
indicate that the same careful staff work and an equal fixity of purpose on
the other side might have reversed the results.
Oyama may have been influenced but certainly was not dominated by the
doctrines and maxims of other leaders. He did not hesitate to plan and


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execute a strategic concentration upon the selected battlefield under condi-
tions that made it certain his plan would become known. His plan yielded
to the enemy the advantages of interior lines, with far better means of
supply and movement. By all rules his armies should have been beaten in
detail long before they could effect their concentration facing Liao Yang.
Not one of them but was immobilized from time to time by supply difficul-
ties, while the railroad and better roads left the Russians free to move.
In the larger engagements we find conclusive evidence of planning the
action in detail, and depending upon the success of each step contributory
to the final object. Instances multiplied where a perfectly logical reaction
on the part of the Russians would have forced a complete change of the
rather complicated plan and with grave danger of disaster.
The double envelopment has been condemned for the smaller force.
Oyama did not hesitate to use it, and it is to be seen also in some of the
independent operations of Kuroki.
All great leaders have stressed the importance of saving reserves until
the crisis of the action. We find, not only Oyama, but all of the subordinate
commanders committing reserves very early in an engagement, invariably
before the outcome could be foretold and frequently in the first contact of
the main forces. In all of the larger battles there were periods when the
Japanese had put in practically every unit, and in all (except the Sha-Ho)
they were over-extended at the same time, while the Russians still had large
(though rather disorganized) reserves of fresh troops.
We are told that the greatest effort is to be made in the decisive direction
and area—this maxim had, apparently, no weight with Oyama. At Liao
Yang and to a lesser degree at Mukden he concentrated his mass in a por-
tion of the field where no decision could be expected logically, where no
great result could come from success, depending upon comparatively small
forces to influence the retreat of the enemy; forces so distant as to be
almost beyond his immediate control.
On the other hand, he followed the maxim about adherence to a plan
once adopted. None of his subordinate commanders received contradictory
orders, none left idle. In his brief written orders, regardless of success or
failure in attaining the day's objectives, and regardless of what the enemy
might be attempting, the following phrase is generally to be found: “The
intentions of the Commander-in-Chief are unchanged."
Neither he, nor his army commanders, would ever yield the initiative.
Should the enemy develop great strength and aggressiveness in one portion
of the field, even though success might have serious results, the action was
always to expedite, and (if reserves were available) to strengthen the attack
elsewhere.
Oyama opened neither of his main offensive battles in the direction he
expected to obtain a decision. In both he developed an attack of sufficient
strength to appear serious on the opposite flank and continued it until it
was apparent that his opponent had committed many of his reserves. Then
came the decisive movement, a wide turning or a double envelopment, unless
he decided upon an intermediate stage consisting of a holding attack in the
center with light, extended forces. Both at Liao Yang and Mukden a well
planned counter-attack through the center would have separated the Japanese
forces and cut off supplies from at least one wing.
Only rarely was the Japanese attack as strong as it seemed; the enemy,
not unnaturally, could not credit the fact that, in the opening of a long
engagement, their enemy would commit practically all reserves to the line.
They could not believe that Kuroki (at Liao Yang) isolated on the north
of the Tait-zu, would extend four brigades over a ten-mile front in the
endeavor to outflank and threaten the retreat of superior forces then vigor-
ously counter-attacking him in a direction where failure to hold would cut
him off from hope of reinforcement. Almost invariably the Russians exag-


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gerated the strength of the forces along the entire line, whereas the simplest
staff work should have shown them the true condition.
In the lesser battles the same strategic and tactical conception is to be
observed. In only one of the engagements (Tashihchiao) was a frontal
attack depended upon for a decision. In all others the frontal attack held
attention while a large portion, if not the bulk, of the forces were sent on
wide turning movements or (Motienling) a double envelopment. Even in
the smaller affairs (see Chiao-Tou) this method was habitual. A counter-
attack delivered from four to six hours after the first advance of the Jap-
anese would frequently have found only a small force in front and covering
the line of communications. The remaining forces were generally scattered
in small detachments with poor means of communication and such supplies
as could be packed over inferior trails.
Another noteworthy characteristic was the night movement and attack,
especially in terrain where artillery support could not be assured. The
night attack, also, almost invariably followed failure of the day assault,
provided success at that point was essential to the plan. Oyama's evening
orders frequently contained the directive "Such unit will endeavor to carry
- tonight." Had the Russians, after repelling a day attack, assembled
and disposed reserves to meet a night attack they would have saved many
a key point; and, in those cases where the night attack did not follow, had
they utilized the reserves so assembled for a determined advance the fol-
lowing morning they would have found, almost invariably, only a shell in
front; that the bulk of the forces that had attacked the day before had
been withdrawn for use elsewhere.
There is no doubt that this shell would have fought bitterly. It is to
be noted that when the Japanese infantry retired, they did so on a position
that was marked to be held, that where the position occupied was really
important they did not retire. One company held against a battalion at
Motienling, and, near Chiao-Tou, a single company fought against eight,
and, strengthened by the arrival of two more companies, fought for four
and a half hours until relieved. A larger example is that of the Twelfth
Brigade and Guard Kobi Brigade at the Sha-Ho, opposing the First and
Third Siberian Corps, reinforced by the cavalry of Rennenkampf and
Samsonoff. Frequently the Russians had the force to overwhelm them,
but lacked the staff to analyze their enemy's combat methods.
Considering the character of the terrain and the scarcity of telephone
communication, the liaison was remarkable. It is astonishing to see how
promptly Oyama gathered information of events, and how quickly reaction
in one portion of the line followed success, failure, or threatened reverse
in another. Doubtless another war will find far more extensive use of
electrical communications, and it may well be that the Japanese cavalry will
gain in prestige by those brilliant surprise actions we expect of that arm
in open warfare. But we should not criticize success, and the Japanese
cavalry did their full share in the success of these battles ; incidentally its
use tends to confirm the view that the Japanese are not tied down by pre-
vailing ideas; that they prepare what they need and use it as they deem
most advisable. As noted they still have a considerable cavalry detachment
with the division.
It has been frequently remarked that in no battle did the Japanese exploit
their success, that invariably the Russians made good their retirement, and
that only at Mukden was the retirement seriously threatened ; in brief, that
the Japanese were capable of any exertion up to the time the full fruits of
victory were to be gathered, then failed of the final effort. Our principle
of the objective-the destruction of the enemy armed forces—was not fol-
lowed out. The Clausewitz doctrine-that the army which inflicts the
greatest losses really wins regardless of who holds the battlefield and pro-
vided both are left intact to fight again—was equally discarded. The Jap-
anese were satisfied with actual mastery of the battlefield.


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History may show a possible explanation of this. There is no recorded
instance of a Japanese army losing a battle to a foreign enemy. Minor
reverses, yes, as witness the capture of Tsusima by the Koreans; the aban-
donment of a campaign, yes, as witness the many failures to hold Korea;
yielding the fruits of victory, yes, as witness the retirement from Port
Arthur and the Liao Tung after the Chino-Japanese War, on demand of
the European powers; but a pitched battle of opposing forces-never. Jap-
anese troops have fled in panic, but it was in civil wars when their opponents
were also Japanese.
This tradition of invincibility when facing a foreign foe may be the
explanation of the failure of the Japanese to exploit their victories in the
Russo-Japanese War. It would be a very unusual man who would risk
being the first soldier of his race to lose a battle to a foreign army. Only
in some of the smaller engagements were the Russians decisively defeated ;
in most of the battles they retired from the field when there was still plenty
of fight left in the men. If cornered, they might turn the tables; once they
were definitely known to be retiring they were permitted to do so.
In this record of unbroken victories there is an element of weakness as
well as of strength. While it undoubtedly enhances the morale of all ranks,
it may explain the grave risks taken and the heavy losses accepted, some-
times without justification, considering the benefits, in order to ensure the
actual occupation of the disputed field, and it may explain, as intimated
above, why the final effort was not made. The plea of exhaustion cannot
be accepted; all Japanese units had not made such efforts as that described
for Matsunaga's brigade at the Sha-Ho. There was some other reason.
It may be that Oyama realized that he could not afford to lose a battle
on account of the effect upon Japanese prestige. Japan depended upon loans
to finance the war. Continuous success meant continued confidence, while a
reverse might tighten the purse strings of Europe. This might have been
the reason for resting satisfied with the appearance of victory rather than
risking all to attain the reality; all well knowing that no complete analysis
could be made till after the war. The history of the Japanese move for
peace, and the reasons that government took the initiative in seeking peace,
tend to confirm this view. To have followed the directive from the home-
land, rather than to follow his own instincts as a general, is not beyond
what is known of Oyama's character and that of his army commanders.
To sum up:
The Japanese infantryman is an ardent fighter with preference for the
bayonet. He is capable of prolonged exertion, of extremely long charges
and he will not yield ground he is ordered to hold;
The artillery is well trained and will take great risks to support the
infantry;
The cavalry does not attempt the role we deem basic-its most valuable
function is contact and liaison ;
The organization is built to enable the maximum strength, all things con-
sidered, to be developed in a terrain of inferior communications.
Their leaders are skillful, tireless, calm, and daring. Personal ambition
seems lost in devotion to the general success;
Night movement and night combat are habitual;
There is a singular uniformity of maneuver, and of reaction in case of
success or failure;
There is a tendency to complicated plans capable of disruption if oppo-
nents combine energetic leadership with skillful staff work;
There is great determination in adhering to a plan and thorough mutual
confidence among leaders;
They will not yield the initiative regardless of danger at critical points;
Small reserves and early commitment of these is the rule;


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They will risk anything, will drive their men to the limit and accept any
losses rather than yield a battlefield; but will take no chance of forcing a
counter-attack once the enemy definitely breaks off action and retires;
They are careful and analytical students of the doctrines, methods, or-
ganization and equipment of others, but accept the use only those that seem
best fitted to their own problems.
Australia's Apprehensions
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 29 July, 1925.-
we regarded the German Navy before the Great War. She thinks it is the
one real menace to the peace of the Pacific, and that she herself is directly
concerned in the designs which form the guiding policy of Japanese sea
power. It is true to say that if there were no Japanese Navy there would
be no visible possibility of a disturbance of the peace of the Pacific. We
should continue to maintain light cruiser squadrons in the Far East, and
the "hundred per cent" American Navy mght roam about the South Seas
and proclaim the hegemony of them as much as it pleased without the least
risk of any other nation troubling itself in the least. Australia would feel
that her “All White" policy was not likely to prove a source of serious
trouble, and that blessed phrase "the Yellow Peril” would never have been
born.
But, since there is a very big and very efficient Japanese Navy, and since
both this country and the United States are giving increased attention to
the Pacific as a naval zone, it is rather interesting to review the assumptions
upon whch is based the conclusion that war is inevitable, sooner or later.
War in this age can only spring from very definite causes, and when these
causes are clearly examined and understood we are in a position to consider
whether it may not be possible to compose them without recourse to armed
force at all.
The policy which the United States and Australia are pursuing seems to
be a policy which is bound to result in war with Japan. It is a policy of
the exclusion of the Asiatic. I do not propose to discuss the wisdom or the
justification of this policy: I simply take it as a clearly established principle.
That national sentiment in Japan should be very resentful of this attitude
is intelligible enough, but sentiment alone is not going to form a casus belli.
A nation, like an individual, may be deeply annoyed in being told by an
erstwhile friend to clear out and keep to herself, but she is not going to kick,
scratch, and bite simply for the sake of compelling acquaintanceship. Japan
would much prefer to turn her back with quiet dignity and return to that
long seclusion from which, by the irony of fate, the United States first
forced her, but she has reached-indeed, has passed-a stage of national
development when this is quite impossible. Necessity is forcing her into an
attitude distasteful to her temperament. Let me give some figures which
will explain the real seriousness of the outlook if the United States and
Australia persist in their present door-closing policy-and they certainly
will persist.
The Japanese Empire has an area of 148,756 square miles and a popula-
tion of 70,000,000. This gives 356 people to the square mile. China has an
area of 1,896,500 square miles, and a population of 428,000,000, giving 225
people to the square mile. Australia has an area of 2,974,581 square miles
and a population of 5,500,000, which gives it 1.8 people to the square mile.
New Zealand, with its population of 1,239,000, shows 10.8 people to the
square mile. Japan is at the bursting point of self-containment. She looks
west, toward China, and the United States exclaims “hands off! You
mustn't go there and spoil our markets !” She looks south toward Austra-
lia, which cries out, "Begone! We will have none of you !” She looks
east, toward California, and sees the gate banged in her face—and so she


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polishes her weapons and says that since her honorable race must have
standing room on the face of the earth she must very soon take by force
that which is denied to her by what the white races choose to call destiny.
Here is the whole gist of the Pacific menace. The needs of her people is
Japan's plea; she does not want territorial expansion for the sake of ag-
grandizement, but for housing accommodation. I believe that this question
is better and more sympathetically understood in England than in any other
country; hence, we do not pay very much heed to hair-curling prophecies
about the Yellow Peril. We are developing Singapore because we realize
that it is quite possible the United States may force a conflict with Japan,
or, worse still, Australia may challenge attack. In the one case we should
have to protect our Empire interests; in the other, we should immediately
declare war. But, Great Britain does not want to go to war with Japan,
whom she has always liked, and therefore does not contemplate the prospect
seriously, and because I believe it equally true that Japan does not want
to go to war with Great Britain, she will not attack Australia if she can
possibly get breathing space somewhere or anywhere without being shot at.
I confess that the growing tendency of the United States to regard
China as a new Monroe parish seems to me to hold the most disquieting
possibilities. Japan does not seriously dispute that the Australians have a
right to Australia. But she is prepared to very seriously dispute that the
Americans have any right to China. She is in an extraordinary favorable
strategical position for entering upon a naval war against the United
States-on her own terms. Manila and Guam she would naturally seize
as a preliminary step, and American expert opinion is pretty unanimous
that this would be inevitable. The Inland Sea would be her Scapa Flow, and
the long string of "mandate" islands her intermediate and submarine bases.
Singapore would be a very nasty thorn in the side, but then Singapore is
British, and not American.
The strategic position of Japan in relation to Australia is still more ad-
vantageous, and probably it is rather from realization of this fact than from
any real misgiving as to Japanese intentions that Australia is rendered so
uneasy. Relatively speaking, Japan did remarkably well out of the Great
War, and she did quite well out of the Washington Conference. She played
her rôle faithfully as an ally, but that rôle did not impose any great degree
of sacrifice. Her reward was definite, and, in a naval sense, very sub-
stantial indeed. Germany perfectly well knew the strategical value of the
islands which Japan has now annexed, and if they were of strategical value
to Germany, how infinitely more so to Japan? As the suzerain of the
Marshall, the Caroline, and the Ladrone Islands, Japan has advanced very
near to Australia.
I do not like the Japanese Treaty with Soviet Russia. She has been
largely driven into it by the sense of isolation which followed upon the
abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, chiefly at the behest of America.
It recalls the prediction of Sun Yat-sen, made at Canton, in January, 1924.
that: “Within a decade China, Japan, India, Russia, and Germany will
join hands against those who are now victorious in the world. .... This
alliance is already in the making.” I think we may eliminate Germany
from this sketchy forecast, and the idea of China allying herself with a
country which is seeking to peacefully absorb her is rather novel. But, the
compact with Russia is a fait accompli, and would prove a tremendous asset
to Japan in the event of a Pacific War.
Let us look the situation fairly and squarely in the face. Not today nor
tomorrow, but in the very near future, Japan must have more elbow room
on the face of the earth. She casts a languishing eye on the wide vacant
spaces of Australia, but the forces against her are too great, and she
knows she cannot establish herself in Australia. She looks toward Man-
churia, and sees no reason why she should not establish herself there. The
United States declares that there is a reason: that it will not permit


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Manchuria to become another Korea Japan is not yet articulate in her
attitude toward this doctrine, but a day may come-will come—when she
will tell the United States that she has quite as much right to exploit
Manchuria as the United States has to try and keep her out of Manchuria,
and probably just a little more so. Then the crisis will be upon us, and
the peace of the Pacific will tremble in the balance.
Great Britain will use her utmost endeavors to avert a rupture, but it is
rather difficult to see just what she can do. Japan will be inexorable in her
necessitous demands. The imperiousness of the United States will brook of
no intervention, but whether she will be quite as ready to fight as she is to
talk about fighting must remain to be seen. Australia will be wholly on
the side of the United States, and this will seriously complicate the situation
so far as Great Britain is concerned.
We are still in the "calm and dispassionate" stage. Let us look at the
whole problem calmly and dispassionately. Let us realize that Japan is
building submarines and cruisers and generally preparing for war not be-
cause she wants war, but because she foresees herself being denied room
for expansion in the world. We cannot keep a proud, resolute, and
courageous nation of 70,000,000 inhabitants pent up within its own straining
fence even if we want to. Surely, the job is one for diplomacy rather than
for war. I am not a holder of Chinese securities, therefore I have no
arrier pensé when I say that since China is manifestly incapable of running
herself, let Japan go there on the understanding of equal commercial
rights to all nations. She will go there ultimately in any case, even if it
be over the sunken hulls of a vast armada and the dead bodies of invad-
ing armies.
Seven “Danger Spots" Still Disturb World
International Experts at the Williamstown Institute of Politics Describe
Leading Territorial and Economic Points of Dispute That Cause Great
Armaments and the Fear of War in Europe, Asia and America, By Russell
Porter, New York Times, 9 August, 1925.-Williamstown, Massachusetts.-
Despite the peace treaties, the League of Nations, the Washington Con-
ference, the Dawes plan and all the organized movements for peace and for
the outlawry of war, the world is still upset by war talk, preparations for
war and actual hostilities. This is evident to any one who reads the dis-
patches from China, Morocco and certain parts of Europe.
It is brought home with special force to those who have followed the
discussions in the first two weeks of the Institute of Politics, that annual
clearing-house of international affairs now meeting in the Berkshires. From
all parts of the globe experts have come to explain the problems of peace
and war that threaten the happiness and prosperity of mankind. A sum-
mary of the lectures, open conferences and round-table talks already held at
Williamstown shows that a great many of these problems still remain to be
solved that there are numerous "danger spots” on the earth's surface and
no lack of "danger ideas" among the peoples of the world.
Lest the review of these discussions seem alarmist in tone and give the
false impression that the world is going to the dogs, it should be made
clear at the beginning that the prevailing opinion among the leaders at the
institute is that the economic and political conditions of the world as
a whole have shown much progress since the close of the war, especially
during the last year.
The Dawes plan and other constructive efforts to repair the damage
of the war are recognized steps in the right direction, but are seen as no
more than steps. It is realized that the general problem consists of a great
many individual problems, each one of which must be solved before the
final "Q. E. D.” can be written.
The greatest immediate source of danger to world peace is recognized as
the widespread feeling of insecurity which affects virtually all European


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nations in consequence of the general unrest and impoverishment caused by
the European war. Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, who was Chief
of Operations on the British General Staff in the war, put his finger
on it, in one of his round table discussions of "Limitation of Armaments,"
when he said that the great trouble with Europe was not militarism or
imperialism, but plain "funk."
"By the treaties of peace drastic limitation has been imposed upon the ex-
enemy countries." General Maurice said. "The German Army has been
reduced from 866,000 in 1913 to 100,000 in 1925, and after making all
allowances for loss of troops and population due to the war the reduction
of the armed forces maintained in time of peace in the ex-enemy countries
amounts to at least 760,000 men.
"One would expect, then, to find at least a corresponding reduction in
other countries; but, in fact, the total number of armed men in Europe today
is approximately the same as it was in 1913. It is commonly supposed that
this is largely due to the action of France, and talk about the enormous
French Army is common. The army of France is, of course, the most
powerful in the world today, but it has been very materially reduced as
compared to 1913. In 1913 the French Army numbered 760,000; in 1925 it
numbers 675,000. The 766,000 were all Frenchmen; today the number of
Frenchmen is only 435,000. There has been a large increase in the native
(colonial) army, but this has been largely due to the great increase in
French territory in North Africa and Syria. Recent events in Morocco is
one of the reasons for the increase in the native army.
“The fact of the reduction in the French Army and that quite recently
further portions of the Ruhr have been evacuated by French and Belgian
troops shows that the authorities in France do not consider the German
forces an immediate menace. They are looking toward the future and see
with anxiety that the German population is increasing, while their own
is stationary.
“The real cause of the failure to limit armaments in Europe as com-
pared with 1913 is due less to the attitude of France and Germany than to
the creation of a whole crop of new armies in the nations which have
been created as a result of the peace treaties. Poland, Rumania, Finland,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslavia all today have formidable armies. The reason
is that they see themselves surrounded by neighbors from whom territory has
been taken. They have in their own borders large minorities of other
nations, and they are obsessed with the sense of insecurity.
"It is the feeling of insecurity, perfectly natural in countries that have
seen their fields ravaged by war, which is today the main cause of the main-
tenance of armies in Europe, and it is because that is so that the statesmen
of Europe have agreed upon a formula for the approach to the problem of
world peace in which they designate security, arbitration, limitation of
armaments, placing the three steps toward the ultimate goal in that order.
In a conversation with the writer General Maurice pointed out that the
security pact now being negotiated would guarantee the eastern frontiers
of France and Belgium against another German invasion, but that it would
leave other problems unsolved. He said that Poland and the smaller
countries bordering on Russia would still insist upon the maintenance of
large armies because of the fear of invasion by the Red soldiers, although he
remarked that the Russian Army, while large, was poorly equipped and had
inadequate transportation facilities.
Overpopulation has been stressed here as another possible cause of
future international strife. According to Professor Edward M. East, Har-
vard authority on population problems, the world is facing a very serious
situation. In fifty years at most, he said, the populations of the great
agricultural countries in the temperate zone will have increased to such a


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size that these countries will have difficulty in feeding their own inhabitants,
let alone exporting food as they do at present. The United States is in-
cluded among these countries, as well as Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and Argentina.
“This is a serious situation," said Professor East, "for in the meantime
the rate of increase of population in Europe has been very great. During
most of the nineteenth century the nations of Western Europe have had an
excess of births over deaths of at least thirteen per 1,000 annually. The
result has been an immense number of people who must be fed on imported
food. During the war Sir Henry Rew, the English food controller, testified
that England produced only 40 per cent of the food necessary to support
her people. Little Belgium produces only 35 per cent of her food require-
ments, Holland about the same. Food must be supplied to support 35 per
cent of the population of Italy, 30 per cent of the population of France and
28 per cent of the population of Germany. In the remaining countries of
Central and Western Europe the import-export ledger just about balances.
"The problem boils down to this: Western Europe has 85,000,000 of
excess population which must be supported by overseas commerce, and the
political difficulties arise from trying to enlarge the commerce to meet these
requirements if the countries previously supplying the necessities of life
are less and less able and willing to do it. Conditions are not hopeless, by
any means, but if the statesmen of Europe have any vision whatsoever it is
hoped that they will see their problem in its true light instead of magnifying
the petty political differences among them into major questions.
"Russia will recover. Of this there is no doubt. But, Russia will recover
slowly. She will export food; but the chances are that she will never again
become the exporting nation that she was formerly. Her own population
in the pre-war days was increasing nearly as rapidly as that of Canada.
If the current governmental returns are accurate, the population has again
started on the upward trend. In a limited number of years, therefore, how
many no one can say, Russia also must be removed from the list of food
exporters. It is just this period of time, perhaps thirty years, perhaps fifty
years, which may be taken as a respite for Western Europe, a period during
which she must set her house in order.
“During this time she must remove her cancerous overgrowth of popu-
lation to her colonies. This will be a temporary relief. The cure, if she is
to have a cure for her present trouble, can come only when the population is
standardized at such a figure, through birth control, that the people of each
political unit are supported by the products of its soil. Other remedies are
merely sugar-coated pills whose virtues are largely imaginary."
Closely connected with the population problem is that of raw materials.
Professor Charles K. Leith, of the University of Wisconsin, a noted
geologist, who is conducting a round table on the relation of mineral re-
sources of world affairs, predicted that "it is certain that wars will result"
unless an intelligent solution is found for the problem of the control of
minerals by a comparatively few countries.
He pointed out that a few strong combinations dominated the entire
mineral resources of the world and that the United States and England
alone, by agreeing on the disposition of the minerals they control, could
determine the general course of the mineral industry of the world. About
90 per cent of the world's steel production, for example, is centered in
three places—the Lake Superior region in the United States, England and
the Ruhr, because in no other parts of the world are there sufficient deposits
of coal and iron ore to make a big steel industry profitable.
These fundamental problems of over-population and lack of raw materials,
as has been shown at the institute, are sometimes linked with political move-
ments such as extreme nationalism, imperialism and militarism. In the


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opinion of many students of international affairs, that is true of Italy, which
is regarded here as the most important "danger spot" in the world today.
Italy is densely overpopulated, has insufficient colonies in which to settle
her surplus inhabitants, has seen her emigration to the United States cut
off, lacks coal and other essential resources, and, according to General
Maurice, has the third largest standing army in Europe, only France and
Russia having larger armies.
Count Antonio Cippico, Italian Senator and Fascist, who delivered a
series of lectures here, has denied that Italy has any imperialist ambitions.
He has insisted that Mussolini and modern Italy desire nothing but the
peaceable solution of their problems. The solution he has suggested is that
the other nations supply Italy with colonies as an outlet for her excess
population, or allow Italians to settle in foreign countries without giving
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THE CHIEF INTERNATIONAL "DANGER SPOTS" ON THE WORLD MAP
As Described by Speakers at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown
1. Italy, overpopulated and without sufficient colonies to provide an out-
let for her surplus inhabitants.
2. The Dantzic corridor, with the related territorial question of Upper
Silesia, has aroused intense feeling in Germany and Poland.
3. Saloniki, in which the Serbs demand a larger free zone and control of
the connecting railway. The ramifications of this Greek-Serbian dispute
extend throughout the Balkans.
4. Bessarabia is a potential source of trouble between Russia and Ru-
mania.
5. Austria, which apparently desires to become a part of the German
Republic, a project that the peace treaties forbid and that Czecho-Slovakia
and France oppose.
6. China, where a pronounced sentiment of nationalism has resulted in
growing restlessness under foreign control of ports and customs.
7. Mexico's oil wealth, her backward state of economic development and
her difficulties with the United States over mineral ownership, make this
country an international problem.
up their Italian citizenship and without abandoning their political ties with
Italy. He has indignantly rejected the birth control suggestion for his
people.
Drawing a picture of Italy as "a prisoner in her own sea" (the Mediter-
ranean) because of English control of the Straits of Gibraltar and the
Suez Canal, the Fascist spokesman told the institute:
"In view of her geographical position, her almost complete lack of raw
materials and her ever-expanding population, Italy is today the gravest
problem of the Mediterranean. It is not imperialism or nationalistic egotism
which guides the acts and aspirations of the Italian Government and people.
It is a necessity, growing every day more urgent, to insure to the nation


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H
tranquillity in its political and economic life, freedom of movement, and
outlets suited to the needs of its ever-expanding population and industries.
By studying this problem in time, and in the light of present political reali-
ties, it may be possible to find a peaceful solution."
After Italy, the most serious European problem at present is the dispute
between Poland and Germany about Dantzic, the Dantzic corridor, and
Upper Silesia, according to Professor Bernadotte Schmitt of the University
of Chicago, who is conducting a round table on European political problems.
Professor Schmitt, who visited the various European "danger spots” re-
cently, said that the temper on both sides in the Dantzic corridor con-
troversy is rising, with the Poles insisting on the retention of the corridor
because it gives them direct access to the sea, and the Germans protesting
because it separates the main body of the German State from East Prussia.
As to Dantzic itself, the Poles maintain that Germany is putting every ob-
stacle in their way to prevent them from using it as a port, whereas the
Germans assert that the Poles are working to install a Polish garrison and
to make the city Polish.
The Upper Silesian trouble, according to Professor Schmitt, is caused by
German resentment at the award made by the League of Nations in 1921.
He said the Germans contend that the whole of Upper Silesia should have
been turned over to Germany, because she had an overwhelming majority in
the plebiscite, and that the division of the area between the two countries has
destroyed its economic unity, making it impossible for the industries de-
pending on Upper Silesian coal to compete with the Ruhr industries. In
addition, he said, there are repeated complaints of ill treatment of Germans
on the Polish side of the line, and of Poles on the German side, resulting
in the recent widespread expulsions.
Count Alexander Skrzynski, Foreign Minister of Poland, who spoke
twice before the institute, emphasized the dilemma of democratic Poland,
wedged between Bolshevist Russia and nationalist Germany, as the ex-
planation for her large standing army, the fourth largest in Europe.
The next most inflammable question after that of Poland, Professor
Schmitt went on, is that of the port of Saloniki on the Ægean Sea. The
Serbs demand a larger free zone in the port, as well as control of the
railway running to Saloniki, in the same way that the Poles control the
Dantzic corridor, and the Serbs are making acceptance of their demands
a condition of the renewal of the alliance between Greece and Yugoslavia.
As a result, negotiations for the renewal are deadlocked.
The Serbian-Greek quarrel has complicated the situation in Macedonia,
where the Serbs are trying to Serbianize the population, which is generally
regarded as predominantly Bulgaria. If the negotiations between Greece
and Yugoslavia break down completely, Professor Schmitt said, the Serbs
may be forced into a rapprochement with Bulgaria. This would strengthen
Bulgaria enough to insist on a territorial outlet on the Ægean, and might
bring about a dangerous situation in the Balkans.
Another sore spot in Eastern Europe, said Dr. Schmitt, is the Bessarabia
question between Russia and Rumania. He pointed out that if this dispute
should lead to an attack on Rumania by Russia, a general European war
might be entailed because of alliances. Poland, because of her alliance with
Rumania, would have to attack Russia. This might tempt Hungary and
Germany to attack Poland in order to regain Transylvania and the Dantzic
corridor respectively. Whether France would hold back Germany, and
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia would hold back Hungary, he said, was a
question.
Professor Schmitt said that the agitation in Vienna for a union between
Germany and Austria was another potential source of trouble. Such a
union would be contrary to all the peace treaties, and Czechoslovakia is
firmly opposed to it, but the majority of Austrians probably would welcome


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it, he said. In the present state of affairs, he predicted, an attempt to carry
out the union would lead to instant action by Czechoslovakia, and probably
by France and Italy. The only way to get the idea out of Austrian minds, he
said, was to hasten the completion of the economic rehabilitation of Austria
under the supervision of the League.
“Finally," Dr. Schmitt added, "the question of minorities looms up danger-
ously across the entire belt of territory from the Baltic to the Ægean.
The whole eastern frontier of Poland is studded with minorities-Lithu-
anians, White Russians, Ukranians. There is the eternal German question in
Czechoslovakia. The Magyars complain of their treatment in Czecho-
slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The Bulgarians complain of the treat-
ment of the Macedonians by the Serbs and of the Bulgarians in Dobrudja by
the Rumanians.”
Problems of the Pacific are being discussed before the institute by Profes-
sor George H. Blakeslee, of Clark University, leader of the open con-
ference on the recent foreign policy of the United States, who recently re-
turned from the Institute of Pacific Relations at Honolulu.
"The first danger point in the Pacific," said Professor Blakeslee, “is
found in the rapid development of a strong, intelligent nationalism through-
out China. According to all accounts, this has increased very greatly, even
in the last few months, and is based upon a more conscious realization of the
extent to which China is held under foreign control, and an insistent de-
mand that this control shall be done away with. The Chinese resent the
limitation of their right to levy customs duties above 5 per cent, the
privileges of extra-territoriality enjoyed by foreign nations and the extreme
rights of foreign concessions, especially in Shanghai.
"Japanese and American goods cannot be taxed over 5 per cent in Chinese
ports, while Chinese goods are taxed in many instances from 30 to 60 per
cent in the ports of Japan and the United States. As to extra-territoriality,
a number of states have already given up this privilege, including Russia,
Germany and Austria, and a number of other states have never enjoyed
it, including the new states of Europe and many of the Latin-American
states. With respect to foreign settlements, the Chinese are most resent-
ful of the situation in Shanghai, where there is a population of 1,000,000
Chinese who pay 75 per cent of the taxes and have no part whatever in the
municipal government.
"For these reasons China is getting to the boiling point and is in danger
of blowing off the lid. If nothing is done by the strong treaty powers to
meet the situation, the immediate result will be to aid Russia in her effort
to get more complete control of China. There is no question of the very
great influence which Russia has already gained in China, doubtless due,
in the main, simply to the fact that Russia has given up her control in
China, and, as the Chinese view it, is treating China as a nation, of equality.
Communism has gained some influence on a basis especially among the
younger element and the students. According to various reliable accounts,
the Russians have been spending large sums of money in propaganda, and
have been taking groups of Chinese students to Moscow for propaganda
training.
"Thoughtful Chinese do not really expect immediate abolition of the
various forms of foreign supervision, but they do demand that some steps
be taken in the immediate future to moderate this control."
Another danger in China, Dr. Blakeslee went on, came from the lack of
a stable central government. If China continues to break up, he said, the
American Far Eastern policies—the open door and the integrity of China-
would be imperiled. He said this was a more difficult problem to solve.
"As to Japan," Professor Blakeslee continued, “it is clear that she still
feels deeply injured over what she regards as the affront of the statutory
exclusion provisions of our 1924 Immigration Act. Many thoughtful Japa-


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nese realize the political, social and economic difficulties of the United
States in dealing with this problem, and the unlikelihood that the law can
be repealed, at least in the immediate future; but they consider that it would
be a great help if the United States could give some 'gesture of friendship’
to Japan.
"It would appear clear that the Japanese Government is still anxious to
cooperate with the United States in carrying out the open-door policy in
China, but there is a difficulty in that a minority element in Japan is so re-
sentful at the treatment by the United States and the British Dominions re-
garding issues of racial equality that they favor an alignment with China,
Russia and possibly other powers, making up a Pan-Asiatic group, which
they would lead."
Coming nearer home, the most serious danger spot in the Western Hem-
isphere, as pointed out in Williamstown, is to be found in Mexico. The
new awakening of the Mexican people, who are in a less advanced state
of economic development than the people of the United States, has put
emphasis on the distinction that the United States is an exploiting and
Mexico is an exploited nation. This, it has been shown, has caused a dead-
lock in negotiations for the exploitation of the Mexican oil resources, which
are of the utmost importance to the United States in view of the fact that
we have passed the peak of our own oil production. Owing to the un-
settled political conditions in Mexico, and the new Mexican laws dealing
with exploitation of mineral resources, which interfere with American com-
mercial relations, it is the opinion here that Mexico will remain a serious
problem for a long time to come-perhaps fifty years.
Expressions of sympathy toward Mexico by nations in Central and South
America has given rise to a fear among Latin-American authorities that
the smaller nations south of the Rio Grande might combine against what
they regard as the dominion of the United States, thus bringing about a
balance of power and threatening the same kind of disaster with which the
European balance of power ended in 1914. Dr. Leo S. Rowe, Director Gen-
eral of the Pan-American Union, who heads the Round Table on "Inter-
American Relations," told the institute that our policy in Latin-America
should be against any such balance of power and for what Woodrow Wil-
son described as "a community of interest."
Peace by Cooperation Is Institute's Message
Williamstown Meeting Stressed the Idea That Wars Will Cease When
Nations Learn to Work Together-Summary of Experts' Proposals That
Round Tables Discussed, By Russell Porter, New York Times, 23 August,
1925.-Williamstown, Massachusetts.-Having been in session a month, the
Institute of Politics closed its fifth annual meeting here last Friday. The
emphasis of the meeting was laid on peace. Speakers analyzed the various
problems that threaten the peace of the world and offered constructive pro-
posals for preventing war and preserving international peace.
Many plans were put forward-some practical, others idealistic. Some
aimed at immediate correction of specific evils in different parts of the
globe, others held out utopian hopes for the far-distant future. None was
recommended in the form of a resolution, for the function of the institute,
as expressed by its chairman, Dr. Harry A. Garfield, in his opening address,
is solely to enlighten public opinion through the exchange of information
and criticism.
The mere fact that so many proposals for the preservation of peace were
put forward at the institute, it is felt here, indicates a state of mind that is
encouraging for the future. It is also regarded as significant that people
are no longer talking about universal panaceas for peace, as in the first few
years after the armistice, but are now working forward step by step in the


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realization that the task is much more complex than was at first believed.
The chief plans proposed during the institute have been summarized below
according to the conferences or lecture courses in which they were set forth.
At this open conference, headed by Dr. George H. Blakeslee, Professor
of History and International Relations at Clark University, the Coolidge
Administration's plan for promoting peace in Europe was outlined in an
authoritative statement by William R. Castle, Jr., Chief of the Division of
Western European Affairs of the Department of State.
"The aim of American policy toward Europe," he said, “is helpfulness
without impertinent interference; cooperation without entanglement; avoid-
ance of promises which cannot be fulfilled and the scrupulous fulfillment of
engagements. The aim of the Administration, first, last and all the time,
is to promote peace, a peace that will be permanent because based on a
sympathetic understanding of common problems and on recognition of na-
tional rights. This policy must always continue thoroughly American, in
that it must be based on the fundamental interests of the United States.
Mr. Castle said that the attitude of this government on war debts was
that of "an honest and generous creditor," that it insisted on payment, but
would be lenient as to terms. It was the policy of this country, he went on,
to encourage loans to European countries that show a will to peace and
discourage them to warlike nations. Under the Harding-Coolidge-Hughes
reservations, he added, the Administration favors our application for mem-
bership in the World Court. Without yielding its position against our
entering the League of Nations, he said, it plans to cooperate with the
League whenever this "appears to be the best method of getting results."
The government, he continued, was interested in disarmament, "gradually and
wisely accomplished"; substitution of judicial procedure for force in more
and more causes; the growth of arbitration and the elimination of causes
of dispute.
Both American and foreign speakers differed with Mr. Castle as to how
the United States could best promote international peace with respect to
the League. Dr. William E. Rappard, Swiss member of the Permanent
Mandates Commission of the League and Vice Rector of the University of
Geneva, welcomed the indications of our forthcoming entry into the World
Court, but insisted that we could not exert our maximum influence for world
peace without becoming a full-fledged member of the League. The influence
of this country would then have much greater weight in obtaining inter-
national justice and fair play, he said.
Dr. Edwin F. Gay, Professor of Economic History at Harvard Univer-
sity, urged complete international cooperation by the United States through
the League for the sake of future world peace, saying that danger of un-
foreseen commitments had been swept aside by the interpretations which
have been put upon Articles X and XVI of the Covenant. The hope of
the world, he went on, is that Europe would not abandon cooperation and
slip back into the old game of balance of power before the United States
decided to join what he called “the only effective insurance against another
world war." He advocated a spirit of cooperation between American and
British commercial interests engaged in world trade in order to prevent
business rivalries from enflaming national antipathies.
How to prevent the present nationalist and anti-foreign movement in
China from leading to chaos and a war that might pit Asiatic against West-
ern civilization was the subject of recommendations by Dr. C. C. Batchelder,
Professor of International Relations at New York University and former
acting Commercial Attaché in China. Mr. Batchelder advocated a "Dawes
commission" to reorganize the industry, commerce and finance of China
along modern lines. Hand in hand with this work, he went on, should go a
modification of the old treaties by which the foreign powers interested in
China should give up some of their rights of extra-territoriality and con-


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cessions, and should allow China greater control of her courts and customs.
Dr. Rappard said he thought the League could carry out such recom-
mendations if China requested its intervention and if the United States as-
sured her cooperation. Dr. Blakeslee urged that this country make the
strongest possible efforts to obtain the cooperation of the foreign powers
especially Great Britain and Japan, in order to secure the maintenance of the
open door and the integrity of China as safeguards for peace in the Pacific.
As to our relations with Japan, Dr. Blakeslee suggested that the best
policy for the United States to pursue was to abandon all organized move-
ments to remove the statutory exclusion of Orientals from the Immigration
Act of 1924. His reason was that such agitation would certainly fall and
would revive the anti-Japanese sentiment on the Pacific Coast. If the
people of California believe that the immigration question has been settled, at
least temporarily, he argued, they probably will repeal their discriminatory
legislation against Oriental residents. Repeal of the California legislation,
he continued, would be regarded by the Japanese people as "a gesture of
friendship" and would lessen their resentment toward the Immigration bill.
Lionel Curtis, of London, editor of The Round Table, was leader of this
open conference. He advanced his plan for a world commonwealth of
nations, composed of strong self-governing units, on the model of the
British Commonwealth, and governing by the unanimous consent of its
members. Such a world state, he went one, was a vision of the far-distant
future, depending on the education of the masses in all countries and the
training of backward countries in self-government. He contended that the
British Commonwealth was a great agency for peace in the world, because
of the cooperation it inspired "among its self-governing parts" (Australia,
New Zealand, Ireland, Canada) and because of the peaceful interests of its
members.
A recommendation for preventing trouble in one part of the British Com-
monwealth was put forward by F. A. Smiddy, Minister of the Irish Free
State at Washington. He said that the outstanding problem in Ireland is
that of the boundary dispute between the Irish Free State and Ulster, and
that it could be settled permanently only in one way-by Ulster's joining
the Free State. If Ulster would come in and transfer the powers now held
by Westminster to the Irish Free State, he said, she could retain the same
degree of autonomy she now enjoys.
The solution for India's problem is not membership in the British Com-
monwealth, but is independence of England, without severance from the
British Empire, said Professor J. J. Cornelius of the University of Lucknow.
a native Indian. He said that the Indians desired more local government and
a national status as a member of a federation of nations.
Ishmail Kamel Bey, First Secretary of the Egyptian Legation at Wash-
ington, said that the Egyptians wished to settle their difficulties with the
English over the Sudan in a way that would not imperil their newly won
independence and that would promote the interests of both countries. The
most likely plan to accomplish these ends, he went on, was an alliance be-
tween England and Egypt to maintain peace and to keep the Mediterranean
and the Suez Canal open for free traffic to all nations.
With respect to Africa, James Hardy Dillard, President of the John H.
Slater Fund of New York City, said that the task of the British Common-
wealth in order to maintain peace there was to deal justly with the natives
in taxation, to spread knowledge of sanitation and to educate the masses.
Dr. Leo S. Rowe, Director General of the Pan-American Union, leader
of this round table conference, laid down a constructive program for promot-
ing good relations between the United States and the republics south of the
Rio Grande. He defined Pan-Americanism as "an attempt to develop a
continental system based on cooperation and community of interest, a
system from which fear of aggression has been eliminated and in which


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physical power is not the dominating influence." Its foundation, he said,
was the Monroe Doctrine, preventing the American Continent from becom-
ing the scene of European rivalries for economic and territorial expansion.
He put forward three other necessary doctrines for the preservation of
peace in this hemisphere-acceptance of the principle of non-aggression, no
future territorial acquisition to be obtained by means of war or under the
menace of war, and judicial settlements of international disputes. He urged
the spread of culture influences between the United States and Latin America
and of financial, industrial and commercial factors in order to develop closer
understanding.
A different attitude was presented by Victor M. Cutter, President of the
United Fruit Company, speaking for American big business in the develop-
ment of Latin-American natural resources. He laid greater stress than
Dr. Rowe on the importance of commercial relations in developing better
understanding and urged a stronger policy on the part of our State Depart-
ment in order to insure respect for our citizens and property in Latin-
American countries. At the same time he deprecated economic imperialism
or attempts by American concerns to exploit Latin Americans without
giving them a just share in the profits.
Dr. Bernadotte Schmitt, Professor of History at the University of
Chicago, conducting this round table, said that the policy of exchanging
minorities, which has been carried out by Turkey and Greece, might become
a remedy for the minority problems of Central Europe. He thought the
expulsion of Germans from Poland might be in pursuance of this policy.
The Germans in Czechoslovakia, the Magyars in Czechoslovakia, Rumania
and Yugoslavia and the Bulgarians in Rumania all might have their collective
grievances settled in this manner, it was pointed out, although it might be
hard on the individuals.
It was suggested by Marshall Montgomery, Taylorian lecturer in Ger-
man at Oxford University, that the situation, if left as it is, and if both
sides were encouraged to cultivate patience, cooperation and the avoidance
of hostile propaganda, might settle itself.
For the problem of Dantzic and the Polish corridor, which is causing
increased ill feeling between Germany and Poland, Robert M. Wernaer of
Cambridge, Massachusetts, suggested that Poland bargain with Germany for
other port privileges, possibly at Bremen or Königsberg, in exchange for the
corridor. As to the question of Upper Silesia, the only solution suggested
was that economic pressure in time might bring the Germans and the Poles
together for the sake of mutual advantage.
A possible method of preventing new trouble in the Balkans was by
means of an entente between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia which would give
Bulgaria a territorial outlet on the Ægean Sea, hitherto denied to her by
Greece. This, it was pointed out, would allow both Bulgaria and Yugo-
slavia to use Saloniki as an outlet to the sea and would make it unnecessary
for either nation to take up arms to get what it wanted.
Throughout Europe as a whole Professor Schmitt urged a revision of
school textbooks to eliminate national propaganda. He advocated an inter-
national commission to supervise textbooks for this purpose.
Professor Gay, of Harvard, leader of this round table, declared that
Europe's ability to pay her debts to this country depended upon a decrease
in her imports of agricultural products or an increase in her exports of
manufactured goods, or both. He thought the problem would be solved
largely through the steady growth of industry throughout the world. That,
he said, would provide markets to absorb an increasing amount of European
manufactures, especially iron, steel and textiles.
Emphasis was placed upon the need for avoiding the creation of "eco-
nomic Alsace-Lorraines” up in Southeastern Europe. These seemed to be
arising because the Succession States were trying to smash forever the


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ties that formerly bound them to Austria and were opposing the forces
that would unite the Danube basin into a single economic factor. The
separation of political and economic interests was urged in order to prevent
"economic minorities” from causing trouble.
Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, of London, leader of this round table,
showed that the fundamental approach to a solution of the difficult problems
of the Mediterranean was the realization that this area was occupied by
peoples of three groups or civilizations—the Islamic group, the Eastern
Christian group and the Western Christian group. He pointed out that all-
Western Christian and Eastern Christian peoples have obtained independence
on national lines, whereas the Islamic peoples have become subject in large
measure to the Western powers.
The great problem of the day in the Mediterranean area and in the Near
East, he said, is the development of nationalism and a desire for independ-
ence among the Islamic peoples-in Turkey, Morocco and elsewhere. His
solution was a compromise by the Western peoples that would allow the
more advanced Islamic leaders to persuade their followers to adopt Western
ideas, as has Japan, instead of playing into the hands of the extremists, who
urge a complete overthrow of Western civilization and a reversion to their
Islamic past.
Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, who was Chief of Operations on
the British General Staff during the war, headed the round table on limita-
tion of armaments. He explained the formula by which European states-
men now hope to remove the spectre of war raised by great military and
aerial forces. Instead of hoping for a solution through a general disarma-
ment conference, he said, Europe is trying to solve this problem by steps,
the first of which is to give a feeling of security to those countries that fear
aggression from their neighbors-France from Germany, Poland from
Russia, for example.
If the security pact now being negotiated by France, Germany and Great
Britain is successfully put through, the French and Belgian frontiers will
be protected from German aggression, but still other frontiers must be made
secure, he went on. Next will come the question of arbitration, to add a
sense of legal security to that of physical security, and only then will it be
possible to hope for a general reduction in armaments. The hope of the
world in this respect, he said, was for the nations to be made to feel secure
that they would voluntarily cut down their armies in order to lighten the
burden of taxation,
Dr. Edward M. East, Harvard University expert on population problems,
leader of the round table on this subject, advanced birth control as the only
ultimate solution of the rapidly increasing population of the earth. Basing
his statements on "the inexorable law" of Malthus, Dr. East pointed out that
85,000,000 people in Europe now depend on food shipped from agricultural
regions in the temperate zone. In the next forty years, he went on, colonial
powers like England, Belgium and Holland, which are overpopulated, must
have a breathing spell in which to shift a large part of their populations to
tropical possessions, where new food supplies may be grown, and must
become self-sustaining for their remaining population.
The United States and other large food-producing countries in the tem-
perate zone, he continued, will have reached a point where they will need all
their food to supply their own populations and can no longer export it. If
future wars caused by overpopulated countries stretching out for territorial
expansion to feed their inhabitants are to be avoided, he concluded, mankind
must restrict the birth rate. Overpopulation in the long run, he said, will
lead to a higher death rate through lack of enough food to go around, if
It does not lead to war.
Other possible solutions of the overpopulation problem advanced at this
conference were the manufacture of synthetic foods and the use of more
scientific agricultural methods, especially in the United States.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Dr. Charles K. Leith, Professor of Geology at the University of Wis-
consin, advocated universal adoption of the open-door policy for the ex-
ploitation of natural resources in backward countries. This would be the
first step toward the internationalization of such resources in order to pre-
vent wars caused by the desire of countries poor in resources to seize
territories which would enable them to engage in economic competition on
equal terms with their richer rivals.
He pointed out that the closed-door policy pursued by European nations in
the exploitation of natural resources in Europe, Asia and Africa might make
it impossible some day for the United States to obtain all the petroleum she
needs, especially in view of the geologic surveys indicating that we have
passed the peak of our oil production.
Dr. Rappard delivered a course of lectures on the League, under the
title “International Relations as Viewed From Geneva." Future peace, he
asserted, depends on the nations organizing themselves into a world state on
the model of the League.
“The essential aim of the League, the substitution of law and order for
chaos in international relations," he said, "is so absolutely beneficial and so
clearly in the line of human evolution that no one but a madman or a
criminal can repudiate it. At in the course of history the instinct of
preservation drove individuals into organizing their groups into states, so,
I am convinced, states cannot indefinitely live together on the globe without
organizing themselves into some kind of larger political unit for the mutual
protection of its component parts. That, as I see it, is but a matter of time.
As a citizen of a country (Switzerland) that witnessed at close quarters the
destructive fury of the last war, I would add that it is high time that they
did so, if civilization is to survive.
"It appears to me that this larger political unit in its first stages must
inevitably, in its structure and functions, resemble the present league, as
outlined in the covenant. This league is yet very far from fulfilling the
purpose for which it was created, and in spite of many admirable and useful
efforts its present status and achievements still fall far short of the hopes
and ambitions raised by its founders. This is due in part to the fact that
the mills of history grind very slowly, whereas human imagination flashes
as lightning when once it has been stirred by intolerable suffering or fired
by great visions. It is also due to many unfavorable circumstances sur-
rounding the birth of the League, the most decisive of which has been the
absence of Germany, Russia and, above all, the United States."
Count Antonio Cippico, Italian Senator and Fascist, who lectured on
"The Mediterranean Area and Italy," proposed as a solution for Italy's
problems-overpopulation, absence of raw materials and lack of overseas
colonies to which she can ship her surplus inhabitants—that the other powers
should provide Italy with colonies, or allow Italian immigrants to live and
work in groups within foreign countries without sacrificing their Italian
citizenship or cutting their political ties with their homeland. A peaceable
solution of this nature, he intimated, is necessary if the problems of Italy are
to be settled without war.
"There are, over the world, waste areas, underpopulated and under-
developed, crying for labor," he said. "Italy is almost the only country that
can supply it. The advantages of Italian labor are so great that the country
which receives it should be prepared to make generous concessions."
In particular he urged that France give Italy the right to expand by
emigration in North Africa, especially in Tunis.
Robert Masson, Director of the Credit Lyonnais, French banking institu-
tion, lecturing on "Peace Problems of France," suggested that the creditors
of France give her a five-year moratorium after her war debts are funded, in
order that she may devote the reparation payments she receives from Ger-
many under the Dawes plan to the completing of her reconstruction program.


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Professional Notes
He said that France already spent about $9,500,000,000 on this work, and
needed to spend about $1,000,000,000 more, particularly in rebuilding homes.
Regarding criticisms of French expenditures on arms he said that, com-
pared with days before the war, France has reduced expenditures for arm-
ament, including colonies, by 14 per cent, while the United States has in-
creased such expenditures 97 per cent, and Great Britain had increased them
40 per cent.
Count Alexander Skrzynski, Foreign Minister of Poland, who lectured
on Poland, proposed for Europe a "Pax Americana," which would suppress
traditional antagonisms and lead to "real brotherhood” and “the obliteration
of the physical barriers of fear, suspicion and hatred.” He expressed the
hope for an "Americanization" of Europe, a “United States of Europe" on
democratic lines, for the protection of the Continent from Bolshevism on
one hand and nationalist militarism on the other.
Felix Valyi, Hungarian by birth and editor of the Revue Politique Inter-
nationale, which was published in Paris before the war and in Switzerland
during the war, declared in an address that the great problems of the future
depend upon Asia, because the Western nations cannot continue to exist
without food from the Orient; and that the peaceable solution of these ques-
tions depends upon the recognition of Islam as a spiritual force on the
basis of moral equality.
CURRENT PROFESSIONAL NOTES AND PAPERS
"Oil Pollution and Separatora" (Report of British Board of Trade).
The Marine Engineer and Motorship Builder, August, 1925.
“Ordnance Activities in Hawaii.” Army Ordnance, July-August, 1925.
"Some Future Problems in Engineering.” The Journal of the Franklin
Institute, August, 1925.
“The Present Meteorological Needs of Aeronautics.” U. S. Air Services,
August, 1925.
"Tests of Some Rust Prevention Materials for the Protection of Stored
Material.” Engineering, July 31, 1925.
“Relations of Land and Sea Power.” The Coast Artillery Journal, May
and August, 1925.
“Corps Anti-Aircraft Artillery on the Defensive.” The Coast Artillery
Journal, August, 1925.
“Determining the Vacuum Correction Curves for Turbine Units.” Power,
August 11, 1925.
The Great Pacific War. H. C. Bywater, Constable and Company, London.
“Pulverized Fuel in its Relation to Modern Power Plant Design." En-
gineering, July 31, 1925.


  p. 2036 (#980)                      #

NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FROM AUGUST 7 TO SEPTEMBER 7
PREPARED BY
PROFESSOR ALLAN WESTCOTT, U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY
FRANCO-GERMAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE DECIDED UPON.–Following an exchange of
notes at the close of August, Germany agreed to take part in a conference
of legal experts in London on August 31 to draw up treaty projects that
might serve as a basis of future discussion. It was expected that Foreign
Minister Stresemann would meet the Allied foreign ministers at Lausanne
about September 15 and arrange for a security conference to be held probably
in Brussels during October.
The French note to Germany iwas made public on August 26. It was
friendly in tone and constituted practically a proposal that Germany open
direct negotiations. The note took up three main points. First, as regarded
possible modification of existing treaties, it was reiterated that "the security
pact could not affect the provisions of the Versailles Treaty relating to the
occupation of the Rhineland.” Second, Germany must enter the League of
Nations without special conditions. Third, the arbitration treaties to be
negotiated between Germany and the states on her frontiers should provide
for arbitration of political as well as strictly juridical questions. The state
refusing to arbitrate would automatically become the aggressor. The part
of the note relating to Germany's entry into the League was of especial
interest in view of the opening of the League Assembly at Geneva on
September 7.
The German reply was brief and expressed merely Germany's preference
for oral discussions and agreement to send representatives to London.
FRANCE
PEACE OFFERS TO RIFF WITHDRAWN.-On August 20 France and Spain
decided to withdraw their peace offers to the Riffian chief Abd-el-Krim,
and so informed their delegates who had been for a month awaiting Riff
emissaries at Melilla. Spanish reinforcements having arrived in Morocco
and the French forces increased to about 120,000, it was believed that
offensive operations in the autumn would bring the Riff leader to terms.
The aims of Abd-el-Krim, as stated in various sources, appeared to be to
force France and Spain to recognize an autonomous Riff state. His peace


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Notes on International Affairs
conditions, published in the Paris Quotidien on July 23, were substantially
these :
That the Riffs' independence be recognized and guaranteed by the League
of Nations, with a status similar to that of Afghanistan; that the governor
of the Riff shall have the title of Ameer and be nominally subject to the
Sultan of Morocco; that certain boundaries approximating those held by the
Riffian troops at present shall be recognized Riffian frontier; that Spain
may retain Ceuta and Melilla with sufficient surrounding territory for their
defense; that the Riffian Government shall be permitted to maintain a stand-
ing army, the size of which shall be fixed by experts; that Pan-Islamic
propaganda in the French Protectorate shall cease; that no reparations shall
be exacted on either side ; that the League of Nations shall grant the Riffian
Republic a moderate credit to enable it to carry on temporarily until a fiscal
system can be established. Certain minor conditions are attached.
DEBT AGREEMENTS
BELGIUM Signs Debt FUNDING TERMS.—On August 18 the Belgian and
United States commissions negotiating a settlement of the Belgian debt to
the United States reached complete agreement. According to the terms of
settlement signed on that date, the total amount to be paid is $727,830,000,
of which $246,000,000 is post-Armistice debt, $171,780,000 is pre-Armistice
debt, and the remaining $310,050,500 is interest on the post-Armistice debt
at 3.5 per cent. Owing to the "weighty moral obligation" recognized by the
United States negotiators in view of President Wilson's promises to Belgium
at Versailles, all interest charges on the pre-Armistice debt were canceled.
Treasury officials, however, made clear that this moral obligation would not
obtain in the case of other nations.
According to the agreement, payments are spread over a period of sixty-
two years, being smaller during the first ten years, and amounting to about
$12,700,000 annually thereafter.
TENTATIVE FRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENT.-On August 26 it was an-
nounced from London that the British and French Commissions, headed
respectively by Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill and Finance
Minister Caillaux, had reached conditional agreement on terms for payment
of the debt of France to Great Britain. The terms of this agreement pro-
vide for sixty-two annual payments of £12,500,000, or a total of £775,000,000.
Great Britain's acceptance of these terms, in which the interest rate is only
2 per cent, is made conditional, however, upon acceptance of similar terms
for payment of the French debt to the United States. In other words, to
secure these terms from England, France must persuade the American Debt
Commission to accept a 2 per cent interest rate on the French debt to the
United States, whereas the rate secured from Belgium was 3.5 per cent.
Thus the question whether or not the debt of France to her allies is to be
treated on a purely business basis is "put up” to the American Commission.
Other conditions of the agreement are that payments shall be purely from
French resources without drawing upon French receipts from Germany
through the Dawes plan, and that a moratorium shall be granted till 1930.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
• The agreement was preceded by a reduction of the British demands from
£20,000,000 a year to £16,000,000, and a French counter-proposal of
£10,000,000 a year.
..
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
AMERICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.According to a summary in the
Literary Digest of August 8, the total investments of American capital in
foreign government and industrial securities amounted to $9,522,000,000,
which was more than three times the amount at the beginning of the World
War. Thus, said the Wall Street Journal, "whether we like it or not, com-
merce and finance have forever disposed of the doctrine of isolation. With
such a stake in other countries, we.cannot remain aloof."
Figures of the Department of Commerce show foreign investments of
United States capital (classified geographically, and excluding inter-govern-
ment war debts) as follows:
1. Government guaranteed obligations-
Canada and Newfoundland. .................... $1,125,000,000
Latin America ....
915,000,000
Europe ...
1,665,000,000
Asia and Oceanica..........
442,000,000
Total .............
$4,147,000,000
2. Industrial securities and direct investments-
Canada and Newfoundland..
$1,420,000,000
Latin America ....
........... 3,225,000,000
Europe ....................
........ 450,000,000
Asia and Oceanica ........
280,000,000
.....
......
.......
$5,375,000,000
Total .........
In total the figures are as follows:
Canada and Newfoundland.
Latin America ...................
Europe .......
Asia and Oceanica..........
$2,545,000,000
4,140,000,000
2,115,000,000
722,000,000
. . Total ..........
$9,522,000,000
ENGLAND AND Mexico RESUME RELATIONS.—It was announced on
August 28 that the British Government had decided to renew diplomatic
relations with Mexico, and that the British Consul General in Mexico City
would be appointed Chargé d'Affaires pending the appointment of a Min-
ister. There has been no British Minister in Mexico since 1914, and the
British Chargé was withdrawn last year after difficulties with the Mexican
Government.
FAR EAST
CHINESE Customs CONFERENCE.—In the middle of August the Chinese
Government extended invitations to a customs conference to assemble at
Peking on October 26, in accordance with the terms of the Nine Power


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Notes on International Affairs
Treaty adopted at Washington in 1922 and recently ratified. The nations
participating will include the nations signatory to the treaty (United States,
Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, and
China), and other nations which have announced adherence, including
Spain, Denmark, Norway, and Peru. The original purpose of the confer-
ence was to grant China a 21/2 per cent increase in customs duties, but it is
expected that China will ask for a 5 per cent further increase and for com-
plete customs autonomy.
On August 25 it was announced that the treaty powers were in agreement
respecting their reply to the Chinese notes of last June asking for a general
revision of the so-called "unequal treaties," and that a reply would soon be
delivered, the exact phraseology to be determined by the diplomatic corps
at Peking. The reply will not take up the question of the Shanghai riots,
which will be treated in another note, but will cover the question of the
scope of the coming customs conference and the views of the powers on
the convening of a commission to investigate the question of extra-terri-
toriality.
China TURNING TO Russia.—In an address at Williamstown on August
14, Dr. Charles K. Edmunds, Provost of Johns Hopkins University and
former resident for twenty years in China, made the following points re-
garding the relations between China and the western powers:
China is coming strongly under the influence of Russia, although not
primarily through Bolshevik propaganda.
The reported present stand of the British Government toward China is
illogical, unjust and dangerous. That stand is said to be that no interna-
tional action can be taken on China's complaints against extra-territoriality
until a reliable central government is established and conditions at treaty
ports become normal.
The powers, in exceeding their treaty rights, are assisting the growth of
friendship between China and non-treaty nations-Germany, Austria, and
Russia.
France's failure to ratify the treaty formed at the Washington Confer-
ence to give China relief from foreign tariff manipulations has exposed the
good faith of the powers to serious question in Chinese minds.
The task of foreign powers in China for the next five years will be to
convince China of the sincerity of their willingness to give up special privi-
leges, and also of the wisdom of relinquishing them only as China shows
herself capable of carrying the increased responsibility.
The influence of Russia in China today is due primarily not to Bolshevik
propaganda but to the generous way in which Moscow has voluntarily aban-
doned the special privileges formerly enjoyed by the Russian empire in
common with other imperialistic powers.
She has given up the claim to immunity from the Chinese law, still en-
joyed by British, Americans, Japanese and others. She has relinquished
her territorial concessions, with the exception of the railway across Man-
churia, which, being a link in the trans-Siberian line to Vladivostok, is more
justifiable than any of the other railway concessions in China.
She has remitted all claim to the Boxer indemnity and other debts due
to the Czar's Government. She no longer shares in the control of China's
finances, as the other powers do. Soviet doctrine has gained a hearing be-
cause of Russia's conduct toward the Chinese nation. We should be fair


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(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
enough to admit that except for the content of their message the methods
of the Soviets do not differ essentially from those of the Christian missions.
With China thoroughly worked up, it is putting the cart before the horse
to say, as Britain is reported, that no consideration will be given complaints
until law and order are restored. Until China is given adequate authority
over territory nominally Chinese, no central government can accomplish what
the powers seem to demand. To establish a workable permanent under-
standing between China and foreigners, there is need for the powers to
scrutinize their own acts, to adopt a most scrupulous regard for the rights
of the Chinese people as distinct from the claims of the successive temporary
central governments, and thus definitely to allay the Chinese belief that
China is being used only to produce wealth for outsiders.
Concerning foreign control of Chinese tariff, Dr. Edmunds declared that
China never knowingly granted any such control as now prevails and places
China in a unique position among the nations. At the time of the Washing-
ton Conference (1921-22) China had been bound eighty years by treaty to a
nominal tariff on imports of 5 per cent; in practice, 3.5 per cent. Having
asked for an increase to 12 per cent, he said, she obtained an effective 5
per cent as of January 1, 1923, with a promise of further increase, to be
decided upon by a conference within three months after ratification. Until
China should agree to pay her Boxer indemnity in gold instead of paper
francs, France refused to sign this treaty.
Discussing the working of the extra-territorial system, Dr. Edmunds
declared that it was objectionable to the Chinese because it was a derogation
of their territorial sovereignty and a national humiliation. Not only does
it interfere with the proper functioning of the Chinese courts, he said, but
it has disadvantages for the foreigner. As long as it prevails, he showed,
foreign residence, except for missionaries, trade and manufacturing, are
limited to the treaty ports. To Russians, Germans and Austrians, and the
nationals of all non-treaty nations the entire country is open.
Preparatory to the rendering of effective justice in the event of the abo-
lition of extra-territorial rights, Dr. Edmunds said China has been framing
five new codes of lawy, some of which have been in provisional force since
1921. A law codification commission composed of able and experienced
Chinese justices, has been sitting since 1914, assisted by French and Japanese
experts. The criminal code was published in English in 1919 and in French
in 1920. Civil and commercial codes are in preparation.
WILLIAMSTOWN INSTITUTE OF POLITICS
Fifth SESSION IN AUGUST.—The fifth session of the Institute of Politics
at Williamstown, Massachusetts, took place during the month of August.
Round table discussions and conferences were held on United States Foreign
Policy, Inter-American Relations, Economic Recovery of Europe, the Med-
iterranean Area, Mineral Resources, International Justice, the British Com-
monwealth of Nations, and other topics of current international interest.
Among points raised in the discussions may be noted the following:
Necessity of War.–Senator Count Cippico of Italy declared that war
was "a cruel necessity." "Each nation has to defend its own right to exist,
to remedy the defects of its geographical, political, or economic situation
in the world, to make good its own individual civilization as opposed to the
inferior civilizations of other peoples.” In support of this view and in oppo-
sition to the belief that reduction of armaments would bring peace, Rear
Admiral W. W. Phelps, U. S. N., said that “Disarmament talk is foolish-


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Notes on International Affairs
ness while economic conflict remains. War is a continuation of national
policy."
Balkan Situation.—Dr. Bernadotte E. Schmitt of Germany, head of the
Round Table on European Problems, pointed out that more or less binding
agreements now exist between ten of the fourteen states between the Baltic
and the Ægean, and that the next fifteen or fifty years might see the other
four (Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania) brought into this rela-
tionship. Dr. Valyi, editor of the Paris Revue Politique Internationale,
contended that the Little Entente of Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, and Jugo-
Slavia was maintaining a "spirit of distrust and disequilibrium" in Central
Europe, and visualized a "Hungarian peril" that did not really exist.
Immigration. In opposition to the appeal of Count Cippico of Italy for
outlets for Italy's surplus population, Professor E. M. East, of Harvard,
declared that birth control rather than emigration was the only rational
solution of Italy's population problem. In support of the restriction of
immigration to the United States he offered the following decalogue of
arguments :
1. Emigration forced as an economic necessity by population density
affords no permanent relief to the homeland, because the ensuing birth
release re-establishes the old equilibrium.
2. Conditions in this country are today and will continue to be such that
newcomers will meet increasingly bitter competition, which must be accepted
under unfamiliar conditions and often with a linguistic handicap.
3. Immigrants who come with a lower standard of living tend to reduce
our own standards.
4. Immigrants who are relatively incompetent when compared with the
native—and there are many such-are expensive employes because of our
tendency to think in terms of a minimum wage.
5. Incompetent immigrants are expensive fellow-citizens, because they
add to the tax rates; that is to say, they require more than a fair share of
the public money to be spent for benevolent institutions.
6. Huge numbers of foreign-born lead to a foreign policy based on ex-
pediency rather than sound principles. There are numerous groups to
placate.
7. Large groups of foreign-born prevent us from developing a unified
national culture.
8. Excessively rapid growth leads to the dissipation of natural resources
too quickly.
9. Immigrant competition tends to sterilize the native population.
10. Immigration, when forced by economic necessity, tends to lower the
biological quality of the race.
Suez Less Vital in British Strategy.-Major General Sir Frederick
Maurice, of London, at the open conference on "The British Commonwealth
of Nations," said that the British no longer regarded the Suez Canal as
vital from the viewpoint of military strategy.
"Strategy," he went on, “depends on time and space, which have changed
enormously in the last twenty years, wireless and every kind of improvement
altering the relation of time to space. In consequence of the changes in
locomotion, it is not true today that the Suez Canal is a vital artery. That
was proved by a demonstration during the war, because the Mediterranean
being a closed sea with any number of inlets and small harbors, became a
happy hunting ground for submarines, and so dangerous for the transports


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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
and supplies from Australia and New Zealand that we were forced back
into using the Cape route.
"The actual distance around the Cape is in round figures 10,000 miles, and
by the Suez Canal it is 8,000 miles, and you have got the delay of getting
through the canal. The time distance around the Cape, as compared to the
canal from a military point of view, is not more than three days longer.
"As regards the route to Australia, the conditions are even more favor-
able to the Cape route. The actual distance from Southampton by the Cape
to Melbourne is 11,000 miles and the route through the Suez canal is 10,300
miles—700 miles difference.
“But the real point is this: It is a matter of supreme importance that
this route, the route across the Indian Ocean, should not be flanked by any
power coming out of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the points that are
vitally strategical are the issues from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic
and into the Indian Ocean. That is to say, Gibraltar and Aden are really
the vital defense of the Indian Ocean, not the Suez Canal.”
Roads to Peace.-Summarizing the conclusions of the Round Table on
Disarmament, of which he was chairman, General Sir Frederick Maurice
of England said that the failure of the Geneva proctocol and the treaty of
mutual guarantee showed that the machinery of the League was incapable
of settling the disarmament question by a general treaty. On the other
hand, he asserted, the negotiation of separate security compacts which would
remove the fear of attack in European countries will remove the obstacle
to disarmament. When the European nations feel safe, he declared, they
will reduce armaments in order to reduce the tax burden and to remove the
danger of militarism.
Dr. Rappard, of Switzerland, declared he did not agree with General
Maurice that the machinery of the League had proved unfit to deal with the
problem of disarmament, and that he did not think any one security compact
would bring about disarmament. Arguing on behalf of a general treaty
instead of separate compacts, he pointed out that the British had refused
until a month ago to consider anything but a general agreement, and that
some of the British Dominions, notably Canada, oppose the security compact
on the grounds that the problem should be handled by the League and that
a general agreement would put them in less danger of becoming entangled
in another European war
"Prima facie, there is an advantage in dealing with a large number of
States rather than a small number when you deal with security," he said.
“There is another advantage if you deal with security with a view to se-
curing disarmament, and that is that the British have always consistently
maintained that there can be no disarmament except a general one."
Captain C. L. Hussey, United States Navy, attacked disarmament by
"artificial control” as of "doubtful efficiency," and urged Americans to
consider their national interests ahead of international questions.
"Heretofore,” he said, "limitation of armament has been governed largely
by natural forces, national in character. Now it is proposed to introduce
artificial control, international in character and of doubtful efficiency. Does
your own knowledge of world conditions lead you to believe that any nation
not compelled to do so should embark on such an 'adventure in faith'? What
evidence is there of any change in the basic policies of the world powers,
however dormant they may be at present by force of economic necessity ?
"Economic necessity has forced more and more dependence upon means
other than armed force for the support of policy. Let us, for convenience,
refer to these other means as the “unarmed forces.' As limitation of arma-
ment progresses, the unarmed forces become more and more important.
"Have the warm advocates of limitation given the same careful considera-


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1923]
2043
Notes on International Affairs
tion to the strength, character and organization of the 'unarmed forces' that
they have given to armaments? I beg Americans to do this before they
entrust voluntarily their security to an international organization. Can we
not retain control of our forces, our resources, and particularly American
standards of living, and through the powerful moral influence of which the
Williamstown Institute of Politics is such a worthy exponent contribute in
a larger measure to international welfare?
"Before reaching conclusions on international questions it will be well for
us to reflect upon our homes, our churches, our nation—the 'promotion of
American general welfare and common defense'-to quote from the preamble
of the Constitution of the United States of America, which our wise fore-
fathers left as a legacy for our guidance."
The phrase "Adventure in Faith" is that of Alanson B. Houghton,
American Ambassador at London, who is the "spiritual author" of the
present security compact, according to Professor Bernadotte Schmitt of the
University of Chicago, an institute round table leader. Ambassador Hough-
ton in a recent speech said that peace was an adventure in faith.
General Maurice, who previously had pointed out that President Coolidge
had given a "general blessing" to the security compact negotiations, re-
minded Captain Hussey that Great Britain and the European nations could
not refrain from limitation of armaments without breaking treaty obliga-
tions to do so.
Rear Admiral Huse, retired, urged the conscription of capital and labor
as well as man power in time of war, saying that France was on the eve
of adopting this plan. This kind of conscription, he went on, would act as
"a brake against war" and would "tend toward a reduction of fixed arma-
ments more than almost anything else.”
“This plan,” he continued, “invites the approval of military men because
it makes the nation enormously more powerful and therefore adds to its
security. It invites the approval of all lovers of peace—and this includes
all the military men I have ever met–because it tends to array both capital
and labor against war. Thus, on account of the great power it gives a
nation, such a nation is not likely to be attacked, and because of the oppo-
sition of capital and labor, such a nation is not likely to provoke war."
Miss Emily Green Balch, of Boston, economist, cautioned against adoption
of this plan, saying she believed it would work in favor of an outbreak of
war. It was pointed out here that the plan had been before the public for
some time, having been approved by the American Legion, and also that
Bernard Baruch of New York recently guaranteed at least $250,000 to the
Walter Hines Page School of Johns Hopkins University for a scientific
study of the question.
Sir Robert Borden, former Prime Minister of Canada, closed the debate
with the statement that while plans for international disarmament and arbi-
tration may be ineffective in preventing war they will be at least helpful and
will lead up to "the real great mission of the League—to bring about that
moral and spiritual disarmament without which all these other movements
are in vain."
American Foreign Policy.—The attitude of the United States toward
the League of Nations, China, and Latin-America was debated at the open
conference on "Recent Foreign Policy of the United States."
Professor George H. Blakeslee of Clark University, the open conference
leader, questioned two statements made about American foreign policy at
previous meetings. As to charges that the United States showed a reluc-
tance to define its foreign policies, he pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine
and the open door principle had both been officially defined during the life
of the present Administration. He also challenged the statement that this


  p. 2044 (#988)                      #

2044
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Instiute Proceedings
country had been inconsistent in its foreign policy, citing our unchanging
support of the Monroe Doctrine.
Commenting on the trend of events that bring America into European
problems, Professor Blakeslee pointed out that the agreement this country
signed in Paris last January gave it a "stake" of $600,000,000 in the success
of the Dawes plan, and might tempt the United States in the future to use
its political and economic influence to see that the plan succeeds.
He defined the general foreign policy of this country as "regional." It
was held, he went on, that the League of Nations is primarily a European
political organization, which was called upon, except for the mandates,
almost exclusively to deal with local European issues, and that the United
States ought not to participate with the League in such matters.
Arbitration, limitation of armament, the holding of special conferences
and the dealing with specific controversies as they arise, he went on, was
America's official formula for promoting the peace of the world.
Suggesting that the United States might solve its problem if dealing with
world affairs by becoming an "associate" member of the League, Professor
Blakeslee said:
"There must be a grouping of nations to serve at least as a forum to dis-
cuss international problems before they cause war. Such is the belief of
the majority of the world, and the only existing international organization
is the League. The United States, because of its policy of political isola-
tion toward Europe, cannot join the League. The opinion is held by some
that the United States should become an associate member of the League,
avoiding issues local to Europe and dealing only with problems that threaten
a world war."
Professor Blakeslee pointed out that a serious problem arose from the
membership of eighteen of the twenty Latin-American republics in the
League, while the United States remained outside.
"If Latin America," he said, “should have its disputes dealt with regu-
larly at Geneva, and its common interests passed upon there, it would largely
destroy the leadership of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. It
is also possible that irritating international difficulties may develop if the
League attempted to enforce Articles X and XVI of the covenant in the
case of war between two Carribean American republics.
"Should the League attempt to boycott a Central American republic or
to induce European and Asiatic warships and troops to come to the protec-
tion of a Latin American republic near the United States, it might not be a
violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but it would doubtless be strongly re-
sented by the Government and people of the United States."
Professor Blakeslee hoped that the League and the Pan-American Union
would supplement each other instead of coming into conflict, and suggested
that the League give an elastic interpretation to the Monroe Doctrine as a
means to this end.


  p. 2045 (#989)                      #

BOOK REVIEWS
A COMPANION TO THE AZIMUTH TABLES. By H. B.
Goodwin, M.A., F.R.A.S., formerly Examiner in Navigation
and Nautical Astronomy under His Britannic Majesty's Board
of Education. Glasgow: James Brown and Son, Nautical Pub-
lishers, 1925.
REVIEWED BY G. W. LITTLEHALES, HYDROGRAPHIC ENGINEER
The reputation of Professor Goodwin as the leading author in pointing
the way to improvements in the applications of astronomy to the practice
of navigation in the present generation is fully sustained in this excellent
work, the contents of which are worthy of the fine execution which makes its
issue a credit to the nautical publishing house of James Brown and Son,
of Glasgow. A master of clear and pleasing presentation, drawing upon the
rich accumulations of a career devoted to improving the insight of navigators
into those applications of science without which no cargo is ever exported or
brought home across the sea, here brings to the understanding of seafarers
a knowledge of the varied ways in which the tables that have been provided
for their use may be made conveniently to subserve their requirements in the
practice of navigation.
It is of great practical advantage to the navigator to learn to be recource-
ful in the use of equipment-to know, for instance, how the solar azimuth
tables may serve to yield values of the azimuth of celestial bodies beyond
ecliptic limits, and how the tabulated values of the azimuth may be employed
to find the course to be steered in pursuing a great circle route in any
latitude. Looking beyond the present great importance of the azimuth in
finding the error of the compass and indicating the direction of the Sumner
line of position, there are indications of the endeavor to employ the observed
value of this element in combination with the observed altitude of the same
celestial body in finding in a single operation both the latitude and longitude
of the observer: Thus it is that ample justification exists for regarding
as important the considerations which the author has introduced with
reference to conditions favorable to each of the various methods of finding
the azimuth.
His fructifying touch has not been reserved alone to the British azimuth
tables, but has been bestowed also upon the altitude and hour angle tables
of recent times to show the expedients, in the form of convenient inter-
polation tables, that may be employed for their more perfect use.


  p. 2046 (#990)                      #

2046
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Those interests which take account of the necessities of aviation at sea
from the fleet as a base will welcome the inclusion in this book of an
exposition of the original manner in which astronomical position-finding in
flight over the ocean was made to succeed by Rear Admiral Carlos Gago
Coutinho and Commander Sacadura Cabral in the airplane voyage which
these two Portuguese naval officers made from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in
the spring of the year 1922.
Indeed, to take the time to read the one hundred or so pages of this book
opens one of the most direct avenues toward becoming well read in the
resources available in the practice of nautical astronomy.


  p. 2047 (#991)                      #

SECRETARY'S NOTES
Membership New members joining since last report:
Pogue, W. G., Ensign, U.S.N.
Hussey, A. Rodman, Mr.
Scarborough, J. B., Prof., U.S.N.A.
For those interested in international
Williamstown Institute
politics, attention is invited to the Pro-
of Politics
fessional Notes and International
Notes in this issue, containing articles on the Williamstown In-
stitute of Politics.
The Institute desires articles of interest to all branches
Articles of the service, including the reserve force. Non-
members as well as members may submit articles, and
authors receive due compensation for articles published. Com-
pact, well digested articles are more likely to be accepted for
early publication. In accepting articles for publication, the In-
stitute reserves the right to have such articles revised or rearranged,
where necessary, in order to bring them up to the required stand-
ard of articles published in the PROCEEDINGS—the cost, if any, to
be deducted from the compensation due the author.
Contributors are requested to observe the following special in-
structions in preparing articles for the PROCEEDINGS:
(a) In writing names of ships put only the initial letters in
capitals and underscore the names. The underscoring sig.
nifies to the printer that the word is to be in italics. The
same applies to names of publications. Foreign words not
anglicized should also be italicized.
(b) In preparing tables and computations employing fractions,
sub-numbers, etc., do by hand that part which cannot be
made perfectly clear by the typewriter.
(c) In typing the script use double space between lines.
(d) When a quotation is included in an article the editor should
be assured by appropriate notation that the writer has care-
fully verified the quotation as presented.


  p. 2048 (#992)                      #

2018
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The Naval Institute wishes to announce
1863 Edition
to the membership that the Institute's
of
Library has been presented with an 1863
Luce's "Seamanship”
P edition of Luce's “Seamanship," by Lieu-
tenant John M. Gill, U.S.N.R., which had been in his family for
many years. The title page shows that it was printed when the
Naval Academy was moved to Newport, R.I., during the Civil
War.
"Naval Ordnance, 1921” is now under revision. The
New
new book will be ready for issue about November 15,
Books
and will be known as “Naval Ordnance, 1925." It will
retail at $8.00 per copy, postpaid.
In the past, many errors have resulted from the
Address of
habit of changing an officer's address as soon
Members
as his transfer orders are published in the papers.
No change will be made in the future except upon receipt of
notification by the member concerned. Reliance upon the former
method may, in extreme cases, mean a delay of almost four
months. To insure the prompt delivery of the PROCEEDINGS and
other communications from the U. S. Naval Institute, it is essen-
tial that members and subscribers notify the Secretary-Treasurer
without delay of every change of address. No responsibility can
be accepted for failure to receive the PROCEEDINGS, where mem-
bers fail to comply with this rule. Changes of address should
reach the Institute by the 20th of the month, to be effective for the
issue of the PROCEEDINGS of the following month.
The Institute desires to obtain a copy of
Jane's
Jane's "Fighting Ships, 1924," the edition
“Fighting Ships”
of which is exhausted; and requests that
(1924)
anyone wishing to dispose of a copy com-
municate with the Naval Institute, stating price desired and con-
dition of book.
H. A. BALDRIDGE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Secretary-Treasurer.


  p. 2048 (#993)                      #

neering
OCT 3 1 1920
VERDEN
United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings
VOL. 51
NOVEMBER, 1925
NO. 273


NST
AL
CD
NAD
NAVAT
ACADEMY
U.S. a
POJAS
TE
CX
SUN
SCIENTIA
CONTENTS
.
.
.
.
·
The Three Craftsmen.-Eller . . . . . . .
The Attempted Mutiny on the U. S. Brig "Somers."—Hunt .
Engineering Economy on Auxiliary Vessels.-Smith . . .
Standing One.-Weber and Styer . . . . . . . .
Post-Treaty Naval Design-Bywater and Prendergast. .
Vest Pocket Ballistics.-Wright. .
The Navigator's Notebook.–Weems . . . . . .
Radio Vision.- Jenkins . . .
Discussion . . . . . . .
Professional Notes . .
Notes on International Affairs .
Book Reviews . . . . .
Secretary's Notes . . . . . . . . . . . .
2049
2062
2101
2110
2125
2138
2139
2150
2156
2175
2212
2218
2229
· ·
::::
·
·
.


  p. 2048 (#994)                      #


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  p. 2048 (#995)                      #

United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings
November, 1925
Edited by H. A. Baldridge

CONNU
IN
NS TO
VAL
U.S.NET
TUT
lo 1 873
U. S. Naval Institute
Publication Office: Menasha, Wisconsin
Editorial and Business Office: Annapolis, Maryland


  p. 2048 (#996)                      #

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