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10_Professional-Notes
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p. 1967 (#911) #
PROFESSIONAL NOTES
PREPARED BY
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER H. W. UNDERWOOD, U. S. Navy
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
DRIDI
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1968
1970
1972
1974
anean
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1975
1977
1980
1980
1981
1983
1985
1988
GREAT BRITAIN
The Naval Program ..
British Naval Plans Criticized at Home .
The Royal Dockyards ..
Maintaining the Fleet ......
FRANCE
New French Command in Mediterranean
Progress of Aviation in France .....
Trade Expansion .
New Mine-Laying Submarine ......
ITALY
The Economic Situation in Italy..
JAPAN
The Commercial and Industrial Position in Japan ......
.....
UNITED STATES
Another Side of the 5-5-3 Argument........
The Great Pacific War .....
AERONAUTICS
Commercial Airports and Airways .............
Superchargers ......
Inaugural Flight of Goodyear Pilgrim ........
ENGINEERING
The World's Marine Engineering Situation ...
The Propelling Machinery Controversy.
Selecting Lubricating Oils for Navy Use
Navy to Make Tests with Pulverized Coal
MERCHANT MARINE
Fleet Corporation and Shipping Board Affairs
Motor Passenger Liners .
Motor Liner Asturias .....
Flettner Rudder ....
MISCELLANEOUS
Combat Methods of the Japanese ........
Australia's Apprehensions
Seven "Danger Spots" Still Disturb World
Peace by Cooperation is Institute's Message..
ige....................
CURRENT PROFESSIONAL NOTES AND PAPERS ........ .........
1990
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1999
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2003
2004
2007
2008
2010
2011
2013
2015
2021
2023
2029
2035
p. 1968 (#912) #
1968
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
GREAT BRITAIN
The Naval Program
The Engineer, 31 July, 1925.— Particulars of the new shipbuilding program
for the navy, which the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons
last week, are given in a White Paper issued on Monday night. Under
this scheme it is proposed to lay down each year for the next five years
certain craft which are needed to replace older vessels that are rapidly
becoming obsolete. To those who make a study of current naval affairs
it has long been evident that' the system we have pursued since the war of,
as it were, living on our capital in respect of warship material could not
go on indefinitely unless we were prepared to accept a subordinate position
in the ranks of the great sea powers. Such a position would, of course, be
intolerable for many reasons. No party in the state and no responsible
member of any party would recommend as a deliberate policy the surrender
of that measure of naval strength which has justly been regarded as vital
by successive generations of British statesmen, with the whole-hearted
support of the people. It is true that the role of the navy as our first line
of defense has been somewhat modified by the conquest of the air. Our
insular situation, no longer confers the complete immunity from oversea
attack which we formerly enjoyed by virtue of a powerful fleet. Under
present circumstances the navy of itself cannot guarantee our coasts against
insult. Science has evolved a weapon by which the afortime invincible
cordon of sea defense may be evaded, and telling blows be delivered at the
very heart of the empire. But, to argue that because the navy has ceased
to be a sure shield in every sense of the term it is not worth preserving
at a given standard of strength, seems to us to betray a singularly imperfect
appreciation of realities. While it may be true that the Navy exists
primarily to defend our shores from attack, and only secondarily—though
this point has been warmly disputed—to protect the seaborne trade upon
which we as a nation are absolutely dependent for our living, it is obvious
that a naval force too weak to perform the first function would be equally
incapable of fulfilling the second. It is no less clear that security from
air attack, if purchased by developing the air fleet at the expense of the
navy, would avail us little in the event of war with an opponent who could
deploy a superior force at sea. Air raids, on however large a scale, could
affect but a minor section of the populace, but any prolonged interruption
of our food supplies would cause universal distress and must eventually
compel our unconditional submission. We would apologize for dwelling
on these elementary truths were it not that they are so often ignored by
present-day critics of the navy, who seem to think that the whole problem
of national defense is open to solution by the simple expedient of abolishing
sea power and building up a great air force.
Granting the premise that existing circumstances still demand the main-
tenance of a respect-compelling navy, the case for a new naval program is
easy to defend. We have lately been treated to a bewildering mass of
statistics by two schools of thought-the first concerned to show that our
cruiser resources are quite adequate, and would remain so for years to
come, even if no new keel were laid down; the second endeavoring to prove
that the deficiency of cruising ships is already so grave as to demand heroic
measures. The truth, we think, lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Upwards of fifty cruisers are now on the navy list. Of these vessels, a
round dozen are too old and to slow to be of any serious fighting value.
A further twenty, although of later design, were completed during 1915-17
and thus subjected to the excessive stress and strain of war service, which
must have curtailed very considerably their normal span of useful "life.”
The balance consists mainly of small ships of the C and D class, rather
deficient in speed and nautical qualities, but not without a distinct value for
p. 1969 (#913) #
1925]
1969
Professional Notes
fleet duty; four larger and more powerful vessels of the improved Birming-
ham class, and the two E class units, which were specially designed for
great speed. Besides these, we have five County cruisers on the stocks, and
two more of the same type will shortly be laid down for the Australian
Navy. Finally, there is the cruiser-mine layer Adventure. Applying the
new standards of cruiser efficiency set up by the Washington compact-which
has virtually stereotyped the future cruising ship as a vessel of 10,000 tons,
mounting 8-inch guns—it will be found that the empire has, built and build-
ing, eleven ships which belong, more or less, to this major type; three of
the second class, and eleven or twelve suitable for work with the fleet, but
not for independent ocean cruising. This establishment may seem meager
enough in view of the multifarious duties that would fall to it in war time,
including the patrol of trade routes which aggregate a distance of 80,000
miles; and so, indeed, it is. On the other hand, there has not, so far, been
any marked development of the oceanic cruiser type in other navies, and
in ships of this class under construction or completed we have still a decided
margin over all the other powers together. This lead will, however, be
appreciably reduced if the foreign programs now in hand are in each case
carried out in full. The United States alone has eight 10,000-ton ships
projected, Japan has four, France six, and Italy five. With all these powers
our relations are quite friendly, and nowhere is there any sign of a deliberate
challenge to our naval position. This fact notwithstanding, it is of the
first importance that the navy shall be kept strong and efficient, and not
least that branch of it which would be responsible in war for the safety
of our floating commerce. Experience should have taught us that cruisers
are cheaper than commerce raids. So long as we can give a reasonable
degree of protection to our shipping there will be little or no scope for the
exploits of a future Emden or an Alabama. It is unfortunate that the
modern ocean cruiser should be as expensive as a pre-war battleship, but
heavy as the cost of building up a large fleet of these vessels may be, we
are convinced that it will be more than recompensed by the security afforded
to our seaborne trade.
Turning now to the details of the new program, we find that it is
proposed to lay down in the current financial year four A class cruisers-
that is, ships of 10,000 tons. Next year two of the A class and one ship
of the B class are to be started. In subsequent years, from 1927 to 1929
inclusive, the annual quota will be three ships, one being of the A and two
of the B class. The latter, a new design prepared on the basis of 8,000 tons
displacement, is an intermediate type, bridging the rather wide gap between
small fleet cruisers and the big "treaty” ships. It is represented abroad
by the American Omaha, the Japanese Furutaka, and the French Dugilagi-
Trouin, and in our own service by the Emerald. Whether a ship of this
character could engage a "treaty" cruiser without being summarily defeated
is a question for naval men to determine. If it could not, then the design is
open to serious criticism, for it should be an unvarying principle of British
naval policy to build only such vessels as are equal in fighting power to
the strongest of their class being built elsewhere. But, until some details
of the B type cruiser are available, it would be profitless to carry the dis-
cussion further. If the program is completed according to plan, the empire
will possess in 1932 a fleet of sixteen A class cruisers-or twenty if the
Hawkins and her consorts are rated as such—and ten ships of the B class.
Provided that no large additions are made to foreign navies in the mean-
while, this force of thirty ocean cruisers should be adequate. The cir-
cumstances in which the plan was adopted by the Cabinet leave no doubt
that the Admiralty regards it as the minimum commensurate with Imperial
needs. It is a relief to find some provision being made for the methodical
replacement of destroyers and submarines, the building of which has been
practically in abeyance for years past. We have fewer patrol submarines
today than the United States or Japan, and will soon be outdistanced by
p. 1970 (#914) #
1970
Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
France. Our destroyers are mostly of old design, very few of them compar-
ing favorably with the latest foreign productions. Twenty-seven destroyers
are to be laid down in the three years beginning 1927-28. The replacement
of submarines is to start next year with a batch of six O type boats, pre-
sumably similar to the 0-1, of 1,480 tons, which is now under construction
at Chatham. Each year thereafter for the next three years six additional
submarines will be laid down, but one of the group projected for 1929-30
is to be of the fleet type. In that year, also, a new aircraft carrier is to be
begun. Other material provided for in the five-year building plan com-
prises five gunboats, four motor launches, two submarine depot ships, one
net layer, a repair ship, and a floating dock. The total cost, estimated at
£58,000,000, is likely to extend over a period of eight years.
The program as it stands is clearly a compromise between the rival
claims of naval defense and national economy. Its acceptance by the Board
of Admiralty can only mean that the supreme naval authorities consider
it adequate. Otherwise they could scarcely have remained in office. The
community will benefit directly by the increased activity in numberless
trades affected by naval shipbuilding and the consequent mitigation of un-
employment. At least 70 per cent of the total sum involved will be ex-
pended in wages; nor must the political effect of the program be ignored.
It signifies to the world at large that Great Britain lacks neither the means
nor the resolution to uphold that sea power which is not only essential
to her national being, but is a proved bulwark of peace.
British Naval Plans Criticized at Home
By Hector C. Bywater, Baltimore Sun, 13 August, 1925.— Newspaper com-
ment on the government's cruiser program is, on the whole, unfriendly.
Excepting the Morning Post, which quaintly hails it as a naval triumph
comparable to the Battle of Jutland, the tone of ministerial organs is one
of tepid approval, qualified by outspoken misgivings as to how the taxpayer
will take this latest addition to his already tremendous burden.
By opposition papers the program is denounced with a vehemence which
obviously does not spring from party motives alone. Many stanch Unionists,
holding this to be a singularly unfortunate moment at which to resume war-
ship construction on a large scale, confess their disappointment with the
Prime Minister for yielding to Admiralty pressure.
It is the almost universal opinion that the government has committed a
blunder of the first magnitude, for which it will pay dearly. The adoption
of a naval scheme which involves a capital outlay of $290,000,000 at a
period of acute economic crisis could only be justified, it is argued, by some
grave and pressing menace to the national safety, yet even members of the
government are compelled to own that no such menace is in sight.
From the purely naval viewpoint there is much to be said for the program.
Though the British cruiser fleet looks formidable on paper, it consists in the
main of material which the progress of design has rendered obsolete. As
the First Lord of the Admiralty told Parliament yesterday, if no new ships
were begun this year the British Empire would have seven cruisers of post-
war design, the United States eighteen, Japan twenty-one and France nine.
Four years hence the position with regard to cruisers armed with 8-in. guns
would be: British Empire seven, United States eight, Japan eight, and
France six. At to speed of ships exceeding 30 knots, the empire would
have seven, the United States eighteen, Japan twenty-five, and France nine.
These figures are to some extent arbitrary, ignoring as they do four
British ships (Raleigh class) which mount a battery of seven 77/2-in. guns,
and because they accept the trial speeds of American and Japanese ships as
the actual sea speeds. The fact that several new American cruisers are to
have their machinery modified and that more than one Japanese cruiser has
p. 1971 (#915) #
1925)
1971
Professional Notes
broken down when driven at maximum speed suggests that performance on
trial is not always a sure guide to performance in service.
But, on the part of the general public there is a growing and healthy
tendency to examine naval problems in a broader light than that of mere
technique. The old ton-and-gun system of measurement is discredited.
Scarcely anyone looks twice at comparisons of British and American cruiser
strength because scarcely anyone believes in the possibility of war with
America, and, unless war is envisaged as a possible contingency, compari-
sons of armed strength lack reality.
There remain only Japan and France as potential foes, but, to the man in
the street Japan is little more than a geographical expression. You cannot
make his flesh creep by dilating on the military power of a country half a
world away. This generation was bred in the tradition that only from the
continent of Europe is any serious challenge to British sea power to be
apprehended.
In my own youth the navy was organized for the specific purpose of
dealing with a coalition of the French and Russian fleets-the original touch-
stone of the two-power standard-but, only in the present century the naval
outlook had changed completely. Russian sea power was destroyed in the
war with Japan, while the conclusion of the entente cordiale removed
France from the list of prospective enemies. From that time forward the
one naval pre-occupation of this country was to keep an ample margin of
supremacy over the German fleet.
Now that the German fleet has been swept from the board, the British
Navy has no serious rival in European waters.
Rightly or wrongly, the public here does not regard French naval activity
with any alarm, despite the somewhat formidable number of submarines
which are constructing across the channel. It is infinitely more concerned
about the growth of French air power. A shipbuilding program aimed
against France would find no popular support. It follows, therefore, that
British naval policy today lacks a definite objective, at least so far as the
warding off of any tangible menace is in question.
Hence, the widespread opposition to the Admiralty's cruiser program.
Fears are expressed that, by inaugurating a new era of competitive ship-
building, it may undo the good work of the Washington Conference. There
is reason to fear that other powers may consider it expedient to build
more ships in order to preserve the status quo.
Already the French press is clamoring for an expansion of the 1922 navy
law, and rumors of a new Japanese program persist in the face of denials
from Tokio. Nor can the probability of a renewed naval agitation in
America be overlooked.
In these circumstances it is natural that the idea of a conference for the
further restriction of sea armaments should be gaining ground. Members
of Parliament are advocating this course, and journals of every political
complexion are taking it up. A resolution passed by the League of Nations
Union implores the government to take the initiative in summoning a con-
ference, "preferably through the League of Nations," with a view of avert-
ing an "inevitable competition in armaments among the naval powers,
which unless checked, will be a serious menace to peace.” Some news-
papers hold that Japan would be more likely to cooperate if the invitation
came from London instead of Washington.
Paris dispatches indicate that France no longer cherishes the ambitious
plans of submarine development which wrecked every attempt to ration
auxiliary craft at the first conference. It is further pointed out that since
the limitation of battleships probably would have failed but that America
had something substantial to bargain with the obvious policy for Great
Britain now is to announce her readiness to scrap this new building scheme,
p. 1972 (#916) #
1972
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
provided the other powers will agree to a fixed ratio of strength in cruisers
and other auxiliaries.
One thing is certain: If President Coolidge feels disposed to revive his
plan for a new naval conference, he may count on the whole-hearted support
of British public opinion. The government itself would welcome it as a
means of escape from an embarrassing situation while the nation at large
would acclaim any action that promised to avert a new race in naval arma-
ments, with all the evil consequences, fiscal and political, to which it must
give rise.
The Royal Dockyards
The Engineer, 14 August, 1925.--In return for the government's approval
of the shipbuilding program, the Admiralty has pledged itself to effect such
economies in other branches of the naval administration as will obviate the
necessity of a supplementary vote for new construction during the current
financial year. How these economies are to be effected has not yet been
made public. There is, no doubt, some scope for retrenchment within the
Admiralty office itself, the cost of which far exceeds the pre-war figure,
in spite of the much smaller navy we are now maintaining, but, while a
cut in administration expenses would be welcomed for the principle of the
thing, the largest sum likely to be saved in this way would bear an insig-
nificant relation to the impending bill for new construction. A more promis-
ing expedient, which the Admiralty is understood to favor, is the closing
down of certain of the Royal Dockyards at home which have become
superfluous: namely, Chatham, Sheerness, and Pembroke. Owing to its
position in an area which has ceased to be strategically important, the
dockyard at Rosyth is also of limited utility, but since it is at present
the only government yard in the country where H.M.S. Hood and other
large bulged ships can be docked, that establishment is in no immediate
danger of being discarded. The other yards referred to have no important
docking facilities. Sheerness, which is only a repairing base for small
craft, might well be dispensed with. Chatham is of more importance; it
has specialized for years past in submarine construction and has a fairly
up-to-date plant for the building of larger vessels, the cruiser Kent being
now on the stocks there; but Chatham, like Sheerness, has become super-
fluous. A cogent objection to the retention of these two establishments is
their vulnerability to aerial attack, though that objection might be said
to apply to Portsmouth as well, and even to Devonport. Pembroke has a
reputation for excellence of workmanship, some of the finest cruisers of the
pre-war navy having been built at that yard. Its plant was partly modern-
ized during the war, and is now, we believe, fully competent to undertake
the building of cruisers of the latest type; but Pembroke is not con-
veniently placed for the needs of the present-day feet, and in recent years it
has had a very limited amount of work in hand.
The estimated expenditure this year on the yards at Chatham, Sheerness,
and Pembroke is £1,063,968. It does not by any means follow, however,
that this sum would be saved to the country if the three yards were closed.
Such action would involve the dismissal of many thousands of workers,
skilled and unskilled, the greater number of whom would at once proceed,
and of necessity, to draw unemployment pay. Nor would that be all. The
closing of any dockyard must be disastrous to the locality in which it is
situated, inflicting hardship on numberless people who are not directly con-
nected with the establishment, but whose livelihood depends, nevertheless,
upon its existence and prosperity. Residents of the dockyard towns know
only too well the widespread distress that resulted after the war, when the
discharge of surplus personnel began on a large scale. Though the naval
budget might show a considerable saving if the redundant dockyards were
p. 1973 (#917) #
1925]
1973
Professional Notes
closed, we fear that the nation as a whole would lose more than it gained,
In this period of economic stress it is vital that broader issues than mere
departmental convenience should be duly weighed before decision is reached.
So far as the navy is concerned, its requirements could probably be met by
Portsmouth and Devonport alone. That much is admitted by a service
journal which has always upheld the interests of the dockyards, but which,
in its latest issue, frankly owns that Chatham, Sheerness, and Pembroke
are “not really necessary;" and yet, for the reasons outlined above, we
doubt whether the government will take the drastic step of closing them.
The problem of the smaller dockyards is, in truth, a thorny one, not to be
solved by the rough-and-ready measures that appear to the zealot for econ-
omy. The question of whether they are essential for the navy, though
certainly an important issue, is not the only one to be considered. Judged
by that test, none of the small yards could hope to survive. The work
they are now doing could be performed with equal efficiency and probably
at a reduced cost by the private shipyards. To the best of our knowledge
it has never been claimed that the royal yards can build or repair ships
more cheaply than independent establishments. The brief post-war experi-
ment of constructing merchant vessels in the dockyards was a signal failure
from the financial point of view. It may be urged, however, and with
justice that the prime function of a state yard is the repair and maintenance
of the King's ships, their construction being quite a secondary matter.
But, even on this basis, it would be difficult to present a convincing case
for retaining such yards as those at Pembroke, Chatham, and Sheerness.
The fleet of today is very much smaller than the fleet of 1914, nor is there
any prospect of a substantial increase in its dimensions within the dis-
cernible future. Over a long period of time our battle fleet is restricted by
treaty to a certain number of ships. Ten years hence we shall have only
sixteen capital ships all told, and from 1936 to 1942, presuming the Wash-
ington compact to remain in force so long, only fifteen ships. Considera-
tions of expense will effectively prevent any corresponding expansion
of the non-capital fleet. With every new cruiser costing £2,000,000, every
destroyer £250,000, and every submarine £400,000—vide an answer returned
in the House of Commons last week—there will be no incentive to build
above the irreducible minimum in any one of these types. It is therefore
extremely probable that the present numerical strength of the navy, small
though it be, will tend rather to diminish than increase. Now, the dock-
yards we possess today were created and organized to meet the needs of
a Aleet very much larger than that which remains to us, and of a fleet,
moreover, which was designed in the first place to operate in the Narrow
Seas. Barring some wholly unforeseen development in international
politics, the contingency of a future war in Europe, in which Great Britain
would be a belligerent, is happily remote. The importance attached to the
new Singapore base, together with the systematic building up of oil fuel
stations along the main oceanic routes, points unmistakably to an Ad-
miralty conviction that the next war, if it does materialize, will be fought
in some zone thousands of miles from home waters. In the event of such
a conflict, the first business of the home dockyards would be to repair
and fit out ships destined for the front. That much accomplished, there
would be little left for them to do, since the task of maintaining and re-
plenishing ships in the war zone would devolve on such dockyards as were
suitably placed for the purpose. The ability of our feet to keep the seas
would depend chiefly on the base facilities available at Singapore, Trin-
comali, Sydney, and Malta. Pursuing this line of argument to its logical
extreme, we reach the conclusion that the money now spent on all save the
most necessary establishments at home should forwith be diverted to the
improvement of our naval bases oversea. That, we believe, is the Ad-
p. 1974 (#918) #
1974
[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
miralty's view, albeit for the reasons explained it may not be practicable to
give it effect in the immediate future.
For the present, so it seems to us, the problem of our superfluous dock-
yards does not lend itself to any satisfactory solution. To close them
down would be to aggravate unemployment in a branch of industry which
suffers more than most from the prevailing depression. To keep them open
is to impose a charge on the state for which there is no adequate return,
yet the second alternative is probably the lesser evil. Sooner or later there
must be a reversion to healthier economic conditions, with a consequent
reduction in the number of unemployed. When that occurs a demand will
arise for workers in every trade, including shipbuilding and ship repairing,
and an opportunity may thus be given of absorbing into private industry
part of the thousands of men for whom work is now literally being “made"
in the smaller dockyards. This will be the proper moment at which to close
the redundant establishments. We can only trust that the government then
in office will have sufficient resolution to take such a course, regardless
of the political pressure brought to bear by the small but influential group
of "dockyard members," to whose joint effort is due, in no small part, the
continued maintenance at heavy expense of naval establishments which con-
tribute nothing to our naval strength.
Maintaining the Fleet
The Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette, 8 August, 1925.—Shorn of its
political significance and of the interchanges of party warfare, last week's
naval debate brought out clearly one vital fact, that this country is de-
termined to maintain the navy up to a one-power standard, that its strength,
in other words, shall not be allowed to deteriorate below that of any other
nation. It would have been well had someone challenged the opposition
parties on this issue. If they accept this principle, much of their criticism
is automatically silenced. The rebuilding of the feet, as Mr. Churchill
truly said, is a charge that must fall upon any government or any board
of admiralty in one form or another. Refusing to be led away by high-
sounding phrases such as that about our standard of naval strength being in
strict adherence to some promise expressed in the covenant of the League
of Nations—that our defense forces should be reduced to the minimum con-
sistent with national safety—the governments have faced the position fairly
and squarely, and their decision does them credit. That they have earnestly
striven to keep expenditure down to the lowest possible limit is shown by
the fact that their five-year program will give us, with the ships already
in hand, twenty-three cruisers. The Amery program of two years ago
would have provided thirty-three at a cost of from 15,000,000 to 20,000,000
more. The changed situation abroad justifies this retrenchment, and in-
ternational agreement between the powers may render still further economies
possible later on.
In the meantime, what the Admiralty critics entirely fail to see is that
it is the cabinet which determines policy. It is the government which says
what our fleet shall be maintained for. Having thus a certain responsibility
placed upon them, it is the board which says what forces are necessary
to discharge that responsibility. The lucid statement of Mr. Churchill as
to the negotiations which led up to the new program renders extremely
foolish the talk about insubordinate Admirals, to which even Lloyd George
found it desirable to lend himself. On one point at least he is quite mis-
taken--that for admirals to stand by their program is quite a modern
innovation, and that the old admirals never put forward such a claim. The
reverse is the case, as many examples could prove, one of the best known
being when the board under Lord Spencer, which included Admirals
Richards, Kerr, and Fisher, stood to their program and wrecked Mr.
Gladstone's last ministry. The events of the last few weeks have merely
followed well-established precedent.
p. 1975 (#919) #
1925]
1975
Professional Notes
Another point in which the critics were ill-in formed was as to the need
for cruisers in peace-time. It was suggested that as no great war is likely
for ten years-a pure speculation which it suits many people to accept as
an accomplished fact-therefore no ships need be built until it is upon us.
A closer examination of events since the Armistice would show the manifold
uses of cruisers in normal times. China, Mexico, Honduras, Tangier,
Chanak, and a host of other places have all been glad of the presence of a
British cruiser, and the value to the empire of the policing of the seas which
the navy performs year in and year out is incalculable. It promotes trade,
empire fellowship, and international good will. More than the battleship,
the cruiser is one of the principal agents of this work, and all friends of
the navy will rejoice that twenty-three of the war-built vessels, many of
them but fragile supertorpedo craft, are now to be replaced by up-to-date
ships, better designed and equipped for service in the outer oceans.
FRANCE
New French Command in Mediterranean
The Naval and Military Record, 5 August, 1925.-Admiral Dumesnil, on
being replaced by Admiral Violette, in the command of the Toulon squadron,
will assume the responsible duties of Inspecteur Genéral des forces maritimes
de la Mediterranee, a new post giving him rights of supervision over the
shore defenses and seagoing formations of Toulon, Corsica, Bizerta, Algiers,
and Oran, without mentioning the aerial stations of St. Raphael, Cuers,
and the Syrian naval stations. This command is by far the most important
in the French naval service, and for such comprehensive functions it is
agreed Admiral Dumesnil is the right man in the right place. Words are
unnecessary to praise a chief who showed in action under extremely critical
circumstances what he was worth. The 4,700-ton croisseur-cuirassé
Latouche-Tréville, earmarked for condemnation in July, 1914; and so worn
out that she was crawling home at seven knots, Commandant Dumesnil
turned into the most efficient and daring fighter in the Dardanelles contest,
and her exploits he related in his well-known book, Souvenirs de Guerre
d'un Vieux Croiseur. M. Dumesnil's exceptionally brilliant career is due
solely to his tried merit, and the thing is unusual enough in the Marine
Républicaine. He has brought Pescadre de combat to a high degree of
efficiency, employing in tactics and strategy and in training his commanders
that directness of purpose and quick decision that are the marks of great
chiefs. Eloquence, verbiage, literary attainments, witty but negative criticism,
and anything that is not action and impedes action he despised and promptly
brushed aside in the ordinary discharge of fleet duties and in dealing with his
commanders. In this respect his influence has been great on the formation
of many promising commanders.
This placing of France's Mediterranean sea power under the supervision
of so experienced and active an admiral, who for the past two years has
lived mostly at sea, all the problems of the command of the Mediterranean,
will have the effect of benefitting France's position in waters which she must
be assured of commanding in wartime under penalty of losing her African
empire and her rank as a great nation. The massing of the supreme British
Armada in the Middle Sea, the steady increase of the Italian fleet, that
excels the French in the matter of torpedo and aerial flotillas, the general
unrest in the Moslem world, and signs of brewing strife in Balkan and
Turkish quarters are so many faits nouveaus that call for an immediate
and substantial strengthening of the inadequately-equipped naval and aerial
bases in Tunisia and Corsica.
Admiral Docteux (fifty-seven years of age), on relinquishing the com-
mand of the Channel Division and flotillas, which he trained remarkably,
p. 1976 (#920) #
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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
will assume the functions of Director du Personnel Militaire at the Paris
Admiralty. Rear Admiral Brigson (fifty-seven years of age) becomes
chief of the Defense Department of the important Toulon port militaire,
he previously commanded a battle division. There are at the present
moment only thirty-four Aag officers on the active list (instead of seventy-
five, and of these orly seven are employed at sea, which is truly a small
proportion and not favorable to efficiency. Too many fine men of action
with gold stars on their sleeves are pining, fretting, and rusting in bureau-
cratic berths on the plancher des vaches, anxious for any chance of getting
out to sea, the home of true marines. The commissioning within the next
few months of three 8,000-ton cruisers, six 2,400-ton destroyers, and twelve
1,500-ton torpilleurs d'escadre, without mentioning submarines, will supply
the means of satisfying the longings for sea of the three or four more flag
officers. Rear Admiral Herr (fifty-two years of age), a distinguished
officer and fervent believer in speed and torpedoes, is expected to take the
command of the six Chacals (2,400 tons, five 5.1-in. guns, six torpedo
tubes, and 36 knots), that would form one ultra-fast patrolling and scouting
flotilla to be placed at the disposal of, the commander-in-chief at Toulon,
but with Bizerta as ordinary headquarters. Destroyers of 1,500 tons
(Simoun type) would be used as florilla leaders to the fifty-odd torpilleurs
d'escadre in commission, duties they could well perform, since they, too,
carry the new 5.1-inch caliber and the 550 mil. type of torpedoes, and will
do 34 knots on trials. They are a match for most Italian destroyers or
Aotilla leaders.
The six 36-knot Chacals, if true to expectations, would have nothing to
fear from any Mediterranean cruiser, and, besides, they could form an
escadre rapide with the three 35-knot Duguay-Trouins although expert
opinion is hostile to the closing up of these fine cruisers, well suited to
colonial defense, in the narrow Mediterranean waters. The Tigre (Chantiers
de Bretagne) has carried out promising preliminary trials in the Atlantic;
her turbine de croisière, despite the very small place it occupies on board.
gave easily 20 knots (with over 6,000 h.p.), instead of 18, and the Rateau
turbines worked satisfactorily, as usual, and leave no doubt as to the contract
figures being excecded by a good margin in the official trials to take place
shortly. The five boilers produced more steam than bargained for, and
justified the Admiralty decision to fit only four boilers in the three 2,650-
ton contretorpilleurs just ordered. The behavior of the Tigre in the choppy
waters of the Bay of Biscay was good, and life on board was comfortable,
although ito men and petty officers are somewhat crowded in two spacious
living quarters in the fore part of the ship, just as in English destroyers
officers are lodged at the extreme after part of the ship in comfortable and
relatively roomy quarters, very light and pleasant.
In several respects, habitability on board the Chacals and Tigre marks a
progress on anything yet achieved in that line in the French Navy. Sanitary
arrangements are practical, and thoroughly hygienic; lavatories and bathing
quarters are roomy and supplied with hot and cold water, and ventilation
in living rooms and motor quarters has been the object of special attention.
A thirty-six cubic-meter refrigerating room under the bows contains meat
and other articles of diet for three months, and the supply of drinking
water is ample. In the matter of food and other stores these 2,400-ton
so-called destroyers have been endowed with the endurance of cruisers, and
would be available for maintaining safe communications with colonies.
There are on decks five different kitchens of up-to-date practical design,
besides a bakery, producing 330 lb. of bread per day. On the initiative
of Commandant Brohan, the able commander of the Chacal, who believes
(with the first American admiral, Paul Jones) that contentment is the soul
of efficiency, cooperative canteens have been added to the list of board
p. 1977 (#921) #
1925)
1977
Professional Notes
comforts that will provide "matelots” with all "extras" they may wish for,
which is a proof that Frenchmen, just like Englishmen, prefer fighting on a
full stomach.
Progress of Aeronautics in France
Bulletin of "French Bureau of Information," New York City, 12 August,
1925.-Commercial aviation has made considerable progress in France since
the war. At the beginning of the present year there were no less than
thirty-seven aerial lines running on regular schedules.
The activity of the Transports Aériens Company, at first connected with
the War Office, made possible the creation of a state secretaryship for
aeronautics. The different branches of aeronautics, however, have not been
united yet, and the four sections of aviation, military, naval, colonial, and
commercial, are still connected with four different ministries, war, navy,
colonies, and aeronautics. A connection between them is established, but
rather imperfectly, through three central services under the control of the
State Under-Secretary for Aeronautics: Technical Service of Aeronautics,
Manufacturing Service, National Office of Meteorology. Nevertheless, air-
plane manufacturers being thus encouraged and advised, and production
being to a certain extent supervised, the output is more regular and the
aeronautical industry is now working on a safer basis.
Aerodromes and emergency stations with telephones and repair shops
have been built.. Landing places are of three kinds, emergency landing
grounds, stations, and aerial ports.
An emergency landing ground usually covers about twenty-five hectares
(about 62/2 acres) and has a watchman with his residence on the spot.
Airmen find there a telephone, the necessary equipment for summary repair
work, and also a supply of gasoline and oil.
A station has a better equipped repair shop, a more important supply of
gas and oil, shelters, and a wireless station. Stations close to the borders
have a custom office besides.
An aerial port is nothing else than a station, but its equipment is more
complete and the landing ground is much larger.
At the present time, there are in France and in North Africa, one main
port, two secondary ports, nineteen stations, twenty-three emergency land-
ing grounds, seven bases and one seaplane port.
A scientific coordination of all aviation services and also improvements
in industrial methods have given very good results. Aerial transportation
is now no less secure, and just as regular, as any other. The percentage
of punctuality for the whole year is as high as 98 per cent. Accidents are
less frequent. In 1922, twenty accidents causing loss of human life occurred,
while the distance covered was 3,500,000 kilometers. In 1923, there were
twelve accidents for a distance of 3,900,000 kilometers, which represents
one person killed for a Aight eight times around the world.
The coefficient of security for 1924 is three times higher than in the
preceding year. Such splendid records are a sure proof that French air
machines are more and more reliable, that the aerial service is methodically
organized, while the professional ability of pilots is an additional guarantee
of security.
During the year 1924, French aviation made new records and audacious
fights, among which the following are particularly remarkable. Captain
Pelletier-Doisy made the memorable flight Paris-Hanoi-Peking-Tokyo;
Paris-Shanghai (16,450 kilometers--or about 10,220 miles, in ninety hours
of actual Aight, with fourteen stops; Paris-Tokyo (21,000 kilometers--or
about 13,000 miles) in 122 hours of actual flight, with twenty stops. From
Paris to Shanghai the flight was made with the same planes, the same
p. 1978 (#922) #
1978
(Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
motor (not one part being replaced) the same pilot and one mechanic. It
is one of the most remarkable achievements in aeronautics.
In 1925, Captains Lemaitre and Arrachard made a non-stop flight of
3.400 kilometers or about 2,100 miles from Etampes (France) to Villa
Cisnéros (750 kilometers or about 465 miles from Dakar, Africa). This
non-stop flight is the official world record.
Such records speak well for France's airplane industry, which turns out
machines remarkable for their fine workmanship and their sturdiness. Im-
provements in the motors and a considerable increase in power also are
factors of 110 small importance. A few figures given here below sum up
the technical progress made since the war.
1919
1924
Power of motors ................ 300 H.P. 480 to 500 H.P.
Duration of flight .............. 50 hours 200 hours (commercial)
Average speed
.......kilometers per 600 hours (maximum)
hour 180 to 220 kilometers per
110 to 130
hour
1923
Non-stop flight (commercial) .... 310 miles
1924
373
A model aerial line is now being created and it may be taken for granted
that the work will be performed with the most painstaking care. France
already possesses at Le Bourget, which is the aerial port of Paris, one of
the best equipped aerial ports in the world. Its equipment includes a large
building in which are located offices for the management, a waiting roon
for passengers, a reading room, post office, an exchange office, and so forth.
Lately, a restaurant and custom offices have been established. Besides, and
in order to make sure of the physical fitness of pilots, an office for physio-
logical tests and studies has been created at Le Bourget.
It is obvious that landing stations on aerial lines cannot have as im-
portant an equipment as aerial ports. However, some landing grounds and
aerial depots are being created close to some big cities on convenient spots :
for instance, after having established the aerial port of Marignano, the city
of Marseilles, at the suggestion and under the supervision of its chamber of
commerce, is studying plans for the organization of commercial aviation on
a larger scale.
At the present time, the five state subsidized companies for aerial trans-
portation are trying to establish connections between Paris and the main
capitals of the world, and to organize a Mediterranean aerial system so
as to connect France with the Near-East and South America.
The Société Air Union takes care of the traffic on the line Paris-London.
The Société Générale de Transports Aériens operates the line Paris-Brussels-
Amsterdam.
Airplanes of the Compagnie Franco-Roumaine make the run Paris-
Prague-Warsaw and Paris-Prague-Constantinople.
Seaplanes of the Aero-Navale connect Antibes, France, with Ajaccio,
Corsica, and will shortly make the connection with Bizerte, Tunis.
Airplanes of the Compagnie Générale d'Entreprises Aéronautiques
(Latécoère lines) fly from Toulouse to Casablanca stop at Perpignan from
where there is an aerial connection with Marseilles and again Casablanca.
Morocco.
There are also the lines Alicante-Oran and Casablanca-Oran.
p. 1979 (#923) #
1925]
1979
Professional Notes
From 1920 to 1925, the results of the aerial lines operation have shown a
steady increase:
Years
Trips Distance Passengers Freight Alail
1920 ........... 2,386 853,959 1,771 77,038 15,660
1921 ....
2,353,455 10,619 261,890 34,840
1922 .......... 7,361 2,798,366
9,502 556,370
167,680
1923 ........... 9,720 3,389,195 11,638 969,001 328,440
1924 ...........11,563 3,647,826 16,729 877,591 532,777
These figures are sufficient to demonstrate the progress made by French
aviation. We purposely refrain from mentioning in this brief study, the
prospects now envisaged and the steps taken for their realization.
The French Customs' service has just made public the figures concerning
France's foreign trade during the first six months of 1925. In these
statistics the amount of imports and exports for June, as compared with
the preceding month, appears as follows:
Imports:
May, 1925
June, 1925
(in 1,000 francs)
Foodstuffs
561,220
642,584
Raw material for industry ........ 1,976,822
1,932,214
Manufactured articles
430,630
416,445
Totals
........2,968,672
2,991,243
Exports:
Foodstuffs
Raw material for industry ........
Manufactured articles .......
Parcel posts .......
239,071
956,030
2,241,885
203,201
252,754
933,849
2,157,094
162,837
Totals
3,640,187
3,506,534
The above figures show that in June, 1925, the value of imports was
higher by 23,000,000 francs than in May. A decrease in value of 134,000,000
francs is recorded for exports.
Concerning imports, the increase affects only foodstuffs (81,364,000
francs). Purchase of raw material and manufactured articles abroad show
a slight decrease, 44,000,000 and 14,000,000 francs, respectively, as compared
with the May figures.
Concerning exports, the decrease affects raw material (24,000,000 francs),
manufactured articles (84,000,000 francs), and parcel post (40,000,000
francs); exports of foodstuffs only show a slight increase of nearly
14,000,000 francs.
The visible trade balance for June, 1925, thus shows an excess of exports
amounting to 515,000,000 francs as against 071,500,000 francs in May, 1925;
in June, 1924, imports were in excess of 300,000,000 francs over exports.
The following table gives the weights (in metric tons) of imported and
exported merchandise for May and June, 1925:
Imports:
Foodstuffs ........
.........
Raw material for industry ........
Manuiactured articles
May, 1925
318,861
3.392,377
108,215
June, 1925
323,658
3,305,604
101,169
Totals
· 3,819,453
3,730,431.
p. 1980 (#924) #
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[Oct.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Trade Expansion
Engineering, 31 July, 1925.--Since the restitution of Lorraine the iron and
steel production of France has increased to 11,000,000 tons a year, and the
home consumption is about 4,500,000 tons, thereby leaving a huge surplus
output, which must be disposed of in foreign markets. Before Lorraine was
restored to France, the total quantity produced at the mills and forges was
absorbed by Germany, but until a treaty of commerce between the two
countries is signed, that market is practically closed to Lorraine firms.
Under the arrangements which will come into operation on the signing of
a treaty Germany will allow the free importation of 800,000 tons of
iron and steel from the Saar, and producers in that district have undertaken
to indemnify partially the Lorraine mill and forge owners by paying them
a certain sum per ton of iron and steel exported to Germany as a rebate
upon the duties which have to be paid on the Lorraine products. In this
way it is hoped that the Lorraine industry will be able to export an
appreciable quantity of iron and steel to Germany under favorable conditions.
There will, however, still remain a large surplus, which will have to be
disposed of by other means. The French Government has been investigating
the situation very closely with iron and steel firms, and the result is the
inauguration of a new policy which arises out of the special requirements
of Italy in raw material. On account of the considerable development of
the metallurgical trades in Italy, that country has been taking from France
all the scrap iron available. Last year the total quantity amounted to
400,000 tons. The French Government recently decided to restrict the
exports of scrap iron, and an arrangement has been entered into with the
Italian Government whereby the quantity of scrap iron exported to Italy
will depend upon the Italian purchases of French rolled iron and steel. For
every 120,000 tons of scrap iron Italy will have to take 15,000 tons of rolled
iron and steel. Should Italy purchase more than that amount of manu-
factured material, it may take one and one-quarter tons of scrap iron for
every ton of rolled steel. When the Italian purchases of rolled material
exceed 90,000 tons, scrap can be supplied at the rate of one ton for every
ton of rolled iron and steel until the total reaches 150,000 tons, when the
amount of scrap iron authorized to be exported to Italy will be one ton to
every two tons of rolled steel. At the same time it is hoped to arrange for
the free importation into Italy of French rolled iron for building purposes
in return for the suppression of the proposed export duty on scrap iron.
This arrangement has not yet come into force, but it is giving the greatest
satisfaction to French mill and forge owners, who see in the ingenious
method of forcing the hands of foreign buyers a safe way of disposing of
their surplus production of rolled iron and steel.
French Mine Laying Submarine Boats
Engineering, 14 August, 1925.—The mine-laying submarine boat Pierre-
Chailley, of the French Navy, has cost slightly over 7,000,000 francs. Her
length is 70 m. (229 ft. 8 in.); her surface displacement is 900 tons, and her
displacement immersed, 1,200 tons. For laying when immersed the boat
carries 64 mines, weighing 508 kg. (10 cwt.) each, placed in 32 cells amid-
ships between the two hulls, 16 on each side. The armament consists of
two torpedo-launching tubes and one 10-cm. (3.937-in.) gun. The boat is
propelled by two engines of 900 h.p. each. The surface speed is 14 knots,
and the radius of action close upon 3,000 miles. The Moniteur de la Flotte,
which gives these figures refers also to the Mauricc-Caillot, another French
mine-laying submarine boat, which has recently completed in the Mediter-
ranean an endurance test of fifty days' duration. Her surface speed is 16.2
knots, the speed immersed being 10.4 knots. The Maurice-Caillot has a dis-
p. 1981 (#925) #
19251
1981
Professional Notes
placement of 932 tons on the surface, a radius of action of 3,150 miles at
II knots, and when immersed the boat can cover 112 miles at 5 knots. The
armament consists of six torpedo-launching tubes and one 75-mm. (2.953 in.)
gun. The boat carries for laying when immersed 27 mines, arranged at
the upper part, above the inner hull and ballast, disposed in three lines
of 9 mines each. The mines are so placed that the axis of the anchoring
weight is horizontal, the float being toward the bow of the submarine; the
mines rest on six friction rollers on their frame, on two rails made of angle
bars fixed to the hull. An endless chain passes under each line of mines
and serves to move the mines aft for laying. In travelling aft on the guide
rails the mines are ultimately inclined 60° to the horizontal previous to
their release, the required motion being given by two electric motors whichi
act by gearing on the three lines. The motors are designed to lay the mines
of one line at the rate of one every twelve seconds, and a speed of 5 knots
for the boat; this corresponds to an interval of 30 m. (98 ft.) between
each two mines laid. The three sets of mines, or any two of them, can be
laid simultaneously, when the mines are suitably spaced apart, or any single
line can be laid separately. The movement of the mines to the stern and the
action of laying have no appreciable affect upon the trim of the boat.
ITALY
The Economic Situation in Italy
Engineering, 14 August, 1925.—The two economic factors chiefly re-
sponsible for Italy's increasing commercial and industrial prosperity are,
firstly, the country's wealth in water power, which, in all probability, will
eventually render her industries largely independent of coal supplies; and,
secondly, the satisfactory way in which she has managed to settle, tempo-
rarily, if not finally, her labor troubles. These two questions are among
those alluded to in a report recently issued by the Department of Overseas
Trade. This report shows that down to December 31, 1923, as many as
4,129 concessions for the exploitation of water power had been granted by
the authorities, the estimated horsepower available reaching the total of
3,430,209. Furthermore, quite 60 per cent of the equipment was completed
and in full working order by the date above mentioned. The progress being
made in the development of the country's hydro-electric resources is illus-
trated by the fact that twenty-four of the generating stations now in the
course of construction will generate 2,209,000,000 kilowatt-hours per year,
while a further number of fifty-six stations, capable of generating
3.908,000,000 kilowatt-hours, is being planned. One of the most recent of
these hydro-electric installations, the Tirso plant in Sardinia, which was
described in Engineering, vol cxviii, page 632, was completed in 1923, and