7_0_July_1925

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United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings
July, 1925 - Dec.
Edited by H. A. Baldridge

ovou
LIN
VAL
TIT
U.S.N
TUT
1873
U. S. Naval Institute
Publication Office: Menasha, Wisconsin
Editorial and Business Office: Annapolis, Maryland


  p. 1100 (#8)                       #

COPYRIGHT, 1925
BY
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
The Collegtate Press
GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING CO.
MENASHA, WIS.


  p. 1101 (#9)                       #

Library
Engineoring
1925
JUL 9
United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings

VOL. 51
JULY, 1925
NO. 269


INST
AL
KAVA
NAVAL
ACADEMY
U.S. N
TUTE
IDENS
SCIENTIA
873
CONTENTS
A Balanced Fleet for the United States Navy.-Taussig . . 1107
Sanity in Aviation.-Wood . . .
• . . . . . . 1133
What Might Have Happened at Jutland.-Hart . . . . 1143
Armament by Example and Arbitration.—Brandt . . . . 1152
“Lest We Forget.”—Underwood . . . . . . . . 1166
The Gas Mask and the Next War.-Walton . . . . .
1172
Matthew Fontaine Maury.—Coxe . . . . . . . . 1193
Maury's Genius Shown in Old Letter.—Brandt . . . .
Some Notes on Destroyer Handling Alongside.—Thurber . 1202
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships—A Military Necessity.—Proctor 1217
Some Physical Aspects of Flying.-Davis . . . . . . 1225
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Professional Notes . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Notes on International Affairs . . . . . . . . 1312
Secretary's Notes . . . . . . . . . . 1317
1197


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It Was The Idea Of Progress That
Brought The Naval Institute
Into Being
Columbus was a dreamer-but behind his dreams there was a
definite practical purpose. The wealth of Cathay, the spices and
perfumes of the East Indies were at the feet of the man to dis-
cover a new route to those lands. Intense study and a logical
process of reasoning had convinced Columbus that this planet upon
which we live is round. His was a mind years in advance of his
times. It was difficult to convince men of the soundness of his
project and the means for the accomplishment of his dream were
impossible to obtain for a long period. But, it was his idea which
gave this man the unbounded courage and untiring perseverance
to accomplish a quest even greater than that which he had
anticipated.
It was this idea of seeing beyond the times that led to the
organization of the Naval Institute. In the Navy, perhaps, more
than in any other profession, men with vision and far-sightedness
are needed. It is only by study, exchange of ideas, and an ability
to impart our ideas to others that any progress is made. For this
reason the Naval Institute has, through the publication of its
PROCEEDINGS, always encouraged officers to think along naval lines
and helped them to present their ideas to the Navy in a suitable
form. Articles in the PROCEEDINGS have been forerunners of
many of the great improvements in our Navy. But Progress
demands that we never stand still. The Naval Institute dreams
of greater advancement in years to come.
To accomplish the maximum amount of good it is desired that
every officer in the Navy be a member of the Naval Institute and
a subscriber to the PROCEEDINGS. To advance with one's pro-
fession one must keep acquainted with every move in that pro-
fession. The Naval Institute offers to officers of the Navy the
simplest method of doing this. The annual membership dues are
$3.00 (including subscription to the PROCEEDINGS). A check
payable to the Secretary of the Naval Institute, Annapolis, Mary-
land, will bring immediate attention.
The above was written by Midshipman (now Ensign) Harry Wagner of
the class of 1925, U.S.N.A., who won first prize for the most acceptable
advertisement for the Naval Institute-to appear in the 1925 Lucky Bag.
The Lucky Bag staff, ineligible in the contest, determined the prize winner.


  p. 1103 (#11)                       

UNITED STATES
NAVAL INSTITUTE
P R O C E E D I N G s
VOL. No. 51, No. 7
JULY, 1925
WHOLE No. 269
Contents
1143
A BALANCED FLEET FOR THE UNITED STATES Navy. BY
CAPTAIN J. K. TAUSSIG, U. S. NAVY................. 1107
SANITY IN AVIATION. BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER RALPH
Wood, U. S. Navy............
1133
What Might HAVE HAPPENED AT JUTLAND. BY CAPTAIN
Thos. C. Hart, U. S. Navy......... .........
ARMAMENT BY EXAMPLE AND ARBITRATION. BY LIEUTEN-
ANT COMMANDER E. S. R. BRANDT, U. S. Navy....... 1152
"LEST WE FORGET.” BY COMMODORE E. B. UNDERWOOD,
U. S. NAVY, RET....................................
1166
THE GAS MASK AND THE NEXT WAR. BY LIEUTENANT
COMMANDER DUNCAN C. WALTON (MC), U. S. Navy 1172
MATTHEW FONTAINE MAURY. BY COMMANDER LEWIS
Coxe, U. S. Navy.........
............. 1193
MAURY'S GENIUS SHOWN IN OLD LETTER. BY LIEUTENANT
COMMANDER G. E. BRANDT, U. S. Navy.............. 1197
SOME NOTES ON DESTROYER HANDLING ALONGSIDE. BY
LIEUTENANT H. R. THURBER, U. S. NavY............. 1 202
DIESEL ENGINES FOR CAPITAL SHIPs—A MILITARY NECES-
SITY, BY CAPTAIN A. M. PROCTOR, U. S. Navy....... 1217
SOME PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF FLYING. BY LIEUTENANT
COMMANDER R. G. DAVIS (MC), U. S. Navy........
DISCUSSION ...
1231
PROFESSIONAL NOTES ....
1249
NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS...
1312
SECRETARY's Notes..
1225
S......................
1317
The writers only are responsible for the contents of their respective articles
Editor, Captain H. A. Baldridge; Assistant Editor, Lieutenant Com-
mander R. S. Field.
Copyright, 1925, by U. S. Naval Institute.
Published monthly at 450 Ahnaip St., Menasha, Wis.
Executive, Editorial, and Business Offices, U. S. Naval Institute,
Annapolis, Md.
Entered as second-class matter at the post-office at Menasha, Wis.,
April 4, 1922, and at the post-office at Annapolis, Md., under Act of Aug. 24,
1912. Acceptance for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for
in section 1103, Act of Oct. 3, 1919, authorized Mar, 13, 1922.
Membership dues (including Proceedings), $3.00 a year.
Subscription Rates, $5.00 a year. (Foreign postage extra.) Single
copies, 50c.


  p. 1104 (#12)                       

OFFICERS OF THE INSTITUTE
President
REAR ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON, U. S. Navy
Vice-President
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD H. JACKSON, U. S. Navy
Secretary-Treasurer
CAPTAIN H. A. BALDRIDGE, U. S. Navy
Board of Control
REAR ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON, U. S. Navy (ex officio)
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD H. JACKSON, U. S. Navy (ex officio)
BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE RICHARDS, U. S. Marine CORPS
CAPTAIN W. T. CLUVERIUS, U. S. Navy
CAPTAIN W. G. DUBOSE, (CC), U. S. Navy
CAPTAIN P. B. DUNGAN, U. S. Navy
COMMANDER BYRON McCANDLESS, U. S. Navy
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER W. G, GREENMAN, U. S. Navy
CAPTAIN H. A. BALDRIDGE, U. S. Navy (ex officio)
UNGAN, UNDLESS, WMAN, U.
PAST PRESIDENTS
ADMIRAL DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. Navy, 1873
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN L. WORDEN, U. S. Navy, 1874
REAR ADMIRAL C. R. P. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, 1875-78
COMMODORE FOXHALL A. PARKER, U. S. Navy, 1878-79
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS, U. S. Navy, 1879-82
REAR ADMIRAL C. R. P. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, 1882-83
REAR ADMIRAL THORNTON A. JENKINS, U. S. Navy, 1883-85
REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD SIMPSON, U. S. Navy, 1885-87
REAR ADMIRAL STEPHEN B. LUCE, U. S. Navy, 1887-98
Rear ADMIRAL WM. T. SAMPSON, U. S. Navy, 1898-1902
REAR ADMIRAL H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. Navy, 1902-04
Rear ADMIRAL C. F. GOODRICH, U. S. Navy, 1904-09
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. Navy, 1909-11
Rear ADMIRAL BRADLEY A, FISKE, U. S. Navy, 1911-23
Rear ADMIRAL WILLIAM L. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, 1923-24


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Waar
Matthew FontainE MAURY


  p. 1107 (#15)                       

UNITED STATES
NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS
Vol. No. 51, No. 7
JULY, 1925
WHOLE No. 269
A BALANCED FLEET FOR THE UNITED
STATES NAVY
By CAPTAIN J. K. TaussIG, U. S. Navy
Motto: A just man armed keepeth his house in order.
EDITOR's Note: The author wrote and submitted the following article
in December, 1924, before the publication of the report of the special board
appointed by an order of the Secretary of the Navy, to consider a policy
of the Navy Department "with reference to the up-keep of the Navy in
its various branches."
LOREWORD.—The Navy is a complex organization. It is
i composed of the fleet and the shore establishment, both of
which are inseparably involved with the heterogeneous mat-
ters of personnel, material and supplies, together with all of their
complications of organization, administration, maintenance and
command.
The shore establishment is for the fleet. Various political and
economical factors enter at times to becloud this fact. Neverthe-
less, in the main, the magnitude and complexities of the shore es-
tablishment are dependent on the size of the fleet together with the
numbers, character and disposition of the vessels that compose it.
The fleet, then, having the foundation on which the entire naval
organization is built, it is evident that the composition of this fleet
is a matter of the greatest importance to the Navy and to the
country.
The fleet in itself is an intricate organization, made up of many
diversified elements. But, in the popular sense, the fleet is only
the ships that compose it. It is in this popular sense that the sub-


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1108
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ject of a balanced feet will be considered in this paper. What will
be examined into is for the purpose of determining the character
and the number of the combatant ships that should compose our
fleet in order that it will be most efficiently able to perform the
duties required of the Navy should there be another war.
Policy and the Navy.—The fleet being that part of the Navy
through which its power is exerted, it is essential, before taking
up its functions, to determine exactly what the Navy is for. It is
asserted and conceded that the Navy is the country's first line of
defense, but this expresses, only in a limited sense, the true reason
for the existence of the Navy. It has functions which are much
broader than that signified in the popular phrase, “First line of
defense.”
In 1922 the Secretary of the Navy directed the general board to
formulate a United States naval policy. The completed work,
which was approved by the Secretary, begins with a definition of
naval policy as follows:
Naval policy is the system of principles, and the general terms of their
application, governing the development, organization, maintenance, training
and operation of a navy. It is based on and designed to support national
policies and American interests. It comprehends the questions of number,
size, type and distribution of naval vessels and stations, the character and
number of the personnel, and the character of peace and war operations.
The second paragraph of the general board's report defines the
"fundamental naval policy of the United States” in the following
sentence:
The Navy of the United States should be maintained in sufficient strength
to support its policies and its commerce, and to guard its continental and
overseas possessions.
We thus see that the real reason for having a Navy is for the
purpose of supporting the policies of the government. The pro-
tection of American interests, the supporting of commerce, and the
guarding of our continental and overseas possessions are, broadly
speaking, the basis on which our more definite national policies are
formed. It is these definite national policies, having an inter-
national significance, which form the basis for our naval policy.
The fundamental naval policy of the United States requires the
maintenance of the Navy in sufficient strength to support the na-
tional policies. Therefore, in order to determine this strength,


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1925]
1109
A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
we must ascertain whither the supporting of these policies may
lead us. For illustrative purposes we will consider only two of
them: the Monroe Doctrine, and the Open Door in China.
The Monroe Doctrine has been in operation for a century. It
is for the purpose of keeping the Americas for the Americans.
It denies to the Old World countries the right further to colonize
or to attain land on this continent. For any foreign nation or
nations to overthrow this policy it would be necessary for them to
bring their armed forces to, or near to, us. If this were the only
foreign policy which might in the future involve us in war, it
could reasonably be argued that the Navy of the United States
must be maintained only for defensive purposes.
On the other hand, an entirely different situation is presented in
considering the Open Door. This national policy is for the pur-
pose of maintaining the integrity of China and for insuring to all
countries equal rights and opportunities in their dealings there.
To many Americans the adherence to such a policy is extreme
foolishness. This feeling is due to a failure to understand the
significance of events which led up to its announcement by Mr.
John Hay. With accurate vision he saw what it means to the
United States to have an Open Door in China. There is a country
of 400,000,000 peoples, the markets of which are being opened to
the world. European powers were taking every means, honorable
and otherwise, to gain spheres of influence in China which would
not only give them political dominance but also commercial and
economic control over this vast empire. The Open Door policy
announced by Mr. Hay was asserted for the purpose of insuring
to the United States equal rights for carrying on trade there. As
the United States becomes more and more thickly populated, and
as manufacturing increases as a means of supporting our people,
we must go farther and farther afield to obtain markets for our
goods. China, as a field for commercial enterprise is of great im-
portance to this country, and this importance will continue to grow.
Suppose, then, foreign opposition to this policy should involve us
in war. Could we enforce our will in regard to the maintenance of
the Open Door by having a navy built only with the view to de-
fending our own shores and possessions ? Could we win such a
war by keeping our fleet at home? It does not take much per-
spicacity to realize that in order to support our policy against


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ΙΠΠΟ
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
opposition in China we would have to exert power in the Far East.
The only way to exert such power, after diplomacy has failed, is
through our armed forces—first the Navy and then the Army. In
other words, in order to support such a national policy as the Open
Door, we do not want a navy primarily for defense, as in the case
of the Monroe Doctrine, but, if need be, we must have a navy for
offense also. And this condition must be accepted as a truism as
long as there are any national policies involving international
affairs that may lead to a war, the theater of operations of which
will not be near our home shores.
These two examples have been cited for the purpose of demon-
strating the fallibility of the general popular belief that the Navy
is only for our first line of defense. In the political sense this is
true in the meaning that the Navy is for the support or defense of
our policies. In the naval or military sense this idea holds true
only when the conflict in policy which may lead to a war is one in
which the war will be fought out near or on our own shores.
The Function of the Fleet.—The fleet being that part of the
Navy which embodies the kinetic power for waging war, its com-
position, insofar as ships are concerned, must depend upon the
kind of war we may be called upon to wage. It has been shown
that the Navy as a whole, while primarily for the defense of na-
tional policies, must be maintained so as to be able to carry on
either defensive warfare or offensive warfare in accordance with
the conflict in international policy that may bring on the war.
Defensive and offensive warfare in this broad sense refer to what
are generally known as campaigns, the significance being that the
Navy operates either on the broad strategic defensive or on the
broad strategic offensive. The distinction between strategic and
tactical action must be emphasized in order clearly to understand
the true function of the fleet.
Strategy, in general, deals with all operations prior to an en-
gagement. Tactics deals with the battle after the fleets are within
contact. Good strategy results in obtaining suitable initial positions
in sufficient strength, from which to begin the fight. Good tactics
results in taking advantage of the positions so as to win the fight.
History has shown, the game board shows, and wars in the
future will show, that whatever strategic attitude the Navy assumes
in any campaign, be it defensive or offensive, the tactical attitude,


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19251
IIII
A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
'
when it comes to fighting, must be offensive if the battle is to be
won. A purely passive defensive has never yet won a battle. It
neglects the great advantage to be gained by initiative. It is similar
in its action to that of a prize fighter who protects himself only
by covering up. He may delay to some extent the ultimate defeat,
but he does not hurt his opponent. In order to injure the adver-
sary he must strike out, he must take offensive action as exempli-
fied in aggressive tactics. It is thus with fleets. If fleets are to
win battles they must strike and strike hard. It will not avail to
cover up in defensive attitude.
In the last analysis, then, the chief strategical function of the
fleet is to gain and maintain control of the sea. The chief tactical
function, whatever may be the strategic attitude of the navy as a
whole, is to win battles. In order to win battles, the fleet must
fight offensively. In order to fight offensively to the best advantage
it must be so constituted that the elements which compose it bear
the proper relationship to each other. It is this relationship that
forms the basis for determining what vessels should constitute the
balanced fleet.
Surface Ships Versus Submarines and Aircraft.-In order to
obtain and maintain a suitable balance between the vessels which
ccmpose the fleet, it is first necessary to establish the general
classes of vessels required. A majority of those who have made a
study of naval developments and naval warfare assert that surface
ships, as exemplified by the battleship type, are still the backbone
of the fleet. However, there is a growing school in support of the
contention that the capital ship has seen its day, and is to be re-
placed by aircraft and subsurface craft. Perhaps a brief historical
review of the developments of various naval weapons and their
effect on the fleet up to the present time may aid in forming judg-
ment as to whether there are sound reasons for supporting the
contentions of those who hold that the battleship is doomed..
For many years the gun with its carrier has been the chief naval
weapon. Periodically, there is brought to the fore a new instru-
ment either in the form of what may literally be termed a weapon,
or which taken in conjunction with its carrier is a weapon in the
figurative sense, the sponsors of which, in each case, shout the
shibboleth: “The battleship is doomed.” The chief of these
weapons are the ram, torpedo, bomb, torpedo boat, submarine, and


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III2
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
now, aircraft. In each case, whatever may have been the naval
support, there was considerable popular and political backing,
owing to the ever-recurring endeavor to get a cheap substitute for
the expensive surface ships which were continuously increasing in
size, power and cost. Many of the most ardent advocates of these
various weapons were, and still are, those who, no matter what
the available evidence, always hope to get something for nothing.
In each of the aforementioned weapons it looked for a while as
if the success proclaimed for it would be met. Some of them did
undeniably meet with considerable initial success, due to the his-
torical fact that in warfare new implements of offensive have, in
the beginning, been one stride ahead of the means of defense.
When the new offensive weapon demonstrates an ability to inflict
damage, and not until then, are the antidotes developed.
The sponsors of the ram caused the building of a special ship,
the Katahdin, which had only this means of offense. Then came a
period when all of the chief naval powers required their marine
architects to design nearly all fighting ships with ram bows. There
were a number of visionaries who depicted a swarm of small
Katahdins sinking the fewer larger enemy ships by ramming. But
the threat of the ram was met in the increased speed of the larger
ships, and in improved gun fire. The ram soon passed into a state
of innocuous desuetude where it has since remained.
The bomb had sufficient advocates to force the building of the
special dynamite ship, the Vesuvius. The great destructive effect
that would be produced by the hurling of these immense explosive
projectiles through the air was visualized. But here again the
advance in gunnery denied to the bomb-carrying vessels the priv-
ilege of getting close enough to the larger ships to be dangerous.
So the bomb in naval warfare passed into oblivion, there to remain
until the recent developments in aircraft have again brought it to
the front.
The automobile torpedo, which, unlike projectiles hurled through
the air, has its medium in the water, was introduced. A realiza-
tion of its potential effectiveness was immediately appreciated, pro-
vided the handicap of its short range could be overcome. This
led to the development, first of the torpedo boat, and then of the
submarine, as conveyors for the torpedo. What has been the his-
tory of these vessels ?


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1925)
: 1113
A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
Consider the torpedo boat. Originally these were small, com-
paratively (for those days) high-speed vessels, which, through
stress of numbers and by reason of their maneuverability, were
expected to attain positions that would enable them to overwhelm
the larger ships. This threat was effectively met in a number of
ways. The defensive and offensive qualities of the larger ships
were improved by giving them added speed, additional underwater
protection, and better secondary battery guns, both as to rapidity
of fire and ballistic qualities. Then, following the well known
axiom that like kills like, larger torpedo boats were built to prey
upon the smaller ones, and then again still larger ones, resulting
finally in the destroyer which has now entirely removed the tor-
pedo boat from the field. The destroyer has remained as the chief
carrier of torpedoes on the surface. However, it has remained not
as the successor of the battleship, but as an auxiliary to that vessel.
As to the submarine. Even prior to the Great War, while the
underwater craft were still much undeveloped, there were those
who held that the advent of the submarine proclaimed the doom of
the surface-fighting ship. However, except in the early stages of
the war, prior to defensive means having been developed, the sub-
marine did not do much effective work against surface-fighting
ships. It was the allied surface ships that prevented the German
surface ships from operating against commerce. This forced the
Germans to employ submarines as commerce destroyers, but these
submarines could not prevent the Allies from continuing to use
surface vessels in the theater of operations. It was these Allied
surface vessels which, in the main, eventually caused the failure of
the submarine campaign and the ultimate defeat of the Central
Powers. The offensive employment of numerous surface craft
fitted with depth charges, the arming of merchant ships, the de-
velopment of listening devices, the development of the convoy
system-all these together, made the employment of the submarine
against surface craft less and less effective. There will long con-
tinue to be heard the voice of those who proclaim that the sub-
marines almost won the war for Germany. Be that as it may, it
was simply due to the new offense being initially ahead of the
defense. That the German submarines did not win the war for the
Germans was due entirely to the Allied surface craft--the smaller
ones, in their kinetic power, and the larger ones in their potential


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III4
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
power, thereby enabling the smaller ones to operate unmolested by
German ships.
The submarine is developing and will continue to do so. Like-
wise, the offensive means to be used against it will improve. This
type of vessel has not yet been employed tactically in a fleet action.
Up to the present it must still be regarded as a weapon of oppor-
tunity against capital ships. It has come to remain, like the de-
stroyer, as an adjunct of the fleet, but not to replace the surface
vessels. The submarine will not displace the capital ship as the
chief element of the fleet until such time as it develops speed,
power and maneuverability that will enable it to exert the power
embodied in the battleship. This time is not yet in sight.
With the advent of aircraft, the bomb, which had fallen by the
wayside owing to the lack of suitable conveyance to get it within
striking distance of its selected target, returned to give those who
are forever seeking the Nemesis of the battleship another oppor-
tunity for publicity. Again is heard the shibboleth, “The battle-
ship is doomed.”
The prediction of supremacy for aircraft in the future is based
on two assumptions. The first of these is that airplanes have
reached the stage of development which permit them to carry
bombs containing sufficient explosive power to destroy surface
craft. The second is that the offensive power of the planes appears
superior to the defensive developments against them.
Many base their conviction of the supremacy of aircraft on the
destructive effect of the bombs as exemplified in experiments
against undefended surface vessels. Bombs were dropped which
sank ships. The ships were relying only on their structural
strength to keep them afloat. They were making no offensive-
defense. Therefore, no sound conclusions can be reached in re-
gard to such experiments other than the already well known fact
that sufficient high explosives brought into contact with any body
will destroy that body, whatever may be the carrying medium. The
claim for the supremacy of aircraft over surface vessels is based
solely on a one-sided argument. There is a failure to appreciate
that under the same conditions for the attack, a single destroyer
or a single submarine could sink the ship in less time than was done
by a whole flight of aircraft, and with much less expense and
waste of ammunition.


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1925]
1115
A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
For those who are banking on the present seemingly superior
offensive properties of aircraft in comparision with the defensive
means, the history of the torpedo boat and the submarine are over-
looked. As the damaging effect of the torpedo has been lessened
by improved under-water construction of the larger ships, just so
can we reasonably expect the damaging effect of bombs to be les-
sened by improved above-water, as well as under-water, construc-
tion. As the carrier of the torpedo has met with increased difficulty
in getting within striking distance of the larger ships owing to
increased efficiency of secondary battery guns, just so can we be
insured of increased difficulty for aircraft to get their bombs with-
in striking distance of their targets owing to increased efficiency
in anti-aircraft guns. As the menace of the surface and subsur-
face torpedo-carrying craft was met by the employment of similar
craft against them, just so can we rely on the menace from air-
planes to be met by the employment of airplanes against them.
Aside from the immediate destructive effect that may be em-
bodied in Aying vessels under conditions especially favorable to
them, there are many things which are fundamentally against
them. Some of these are the effect of weather, their employment
teing limited or even impracticable under many conditions when
surface craft can operate with success; their reliance on surface
ships as bases when operating at long distances from shore; the
effects of derangement of machinery, which, when they occur, im-
mediately put them out of action. In fact, successful aircraft
operations in force across the sea cannot be conducted without the
aid of surface vessels, while the surface ships are not dependent
on aircraft. There will continue to be wonderful advances in the
science of Aying; but until the time comes when in war we can
rely on aircraft to carry the men, the stores, the fuel and the guns
that were carried by surface craft of all descriptions in the last
war, it is unreasonable to expect Aying machines to make the sur-
face vessels obsolete. The aircraft have come to remain, both for
commercial purposes and for naval purposes. In the latter sense
they have come not to replace the surface ships, but, like the de-
stroyer and the submarine, to remain as useful and indispensable
auxiliaries to the surface vessels.
Thus our fleet to be efficient and prepared must be composed of
surface ships, submarines and aircraft. Owing to inherent ad-


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
vantages of reliability, habitability, capacity for power and gen-
eral all-round capability the surface ships are, and will continue to
be, the main reliance for carrying on successful warfare. To in-
crease the effectiveness of their operations and in some cases, to
make their operations possible, the surface vessels must be aug-
mented by submarines and aircraft.
The Backbone of the Fleet.--It has been concluded that the sur-
face vessels form the general class of ships on which main reliance
must be placed for carrying on successful warfare. The next step
in ascertaining the composition of the balanced fleet is the deter-
mination of what type of surface ship should form the nucleus or
backbone around which the fleet is to be formed.
It has been shown that the ram, torpedo and bomb, together
with their carriers as exemplified in the torpedo boats, submarines
and aircraft, are secondary to the gun which is carried by all types
of vessels—surface, subsurface and above-surface. The gun is
still the greatest of the offensive weapons. As our tactics in a
fleet engagement are to be offensive, the vessels around which the
fleet is to be formed must be those ships which can carry the most
powerful guns. These vessels are what today are known as capital
ships. Even should they not actually take part in a fleet action in
the next war, we must judge from historical precedent that they
will be the ultimate and determining factor in obtaining and main-
taining control of the sea. Even had there been no Battle of Jut-
land, which admittedly was indecisive, the British and American
battleships at Scapa Flow and other North Sea bases, together
with the presence of a division of American battleships at Bere-
haven in Ireland, were the deciding factor in maintaing the control
of the sea for the Allies, and it was this control of the sea that de-
termined the outcome of the Great War.
To win a war power must be exerted. The gun is the most
powerful weapon of the day, and, insofar as can be seen, of the
future. The bigger the gun the more power it embodies. Only
the capital ships can carry the most powerful guns. Therefore,
this class of vessel exemplifies the essence of naval strength and
must be considered the backbone of the fleet.
The Effect of the Limitation of Armament Treaty.—Prior to
the promulgation of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Arma-
ments, it was practicable to determine the numbers and classes


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1925)
1117
A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
of vessels necessary for a balanced fleet without international re-
striction. This is no longer possible. The balanced fleet for the
United States Navy no longer depends only on what naval officers
would like to have it or what tactically or strategically might seem
the best to meet the world situation from our own point of view.
It depends greatly on the restrictions injected by the treaty. This
was recognized by the general board in formulating the naval
policy which is our guide. The following significant extract taken
from the approved naval policy is quoted, owing to its importance
in determining the composition of our fleet:
U. S. Naval Policy Based on Treaty for Limitation of Naval Armament.
Preface: The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, when
promulgated, will be the supreme law of the powers party to the treaty
governing their naval armaments as to capital ships and aircraft carriers.
The spirit of the treaty indicates two elements of international import :
A general desire to avoid competition in naval armament. A partial recog-
nition of a ratio in naval strengths as a means of avoiding competition.
Were any power now to undertake a program of expansion in unrestricted
classes of naval vessels or in personnel not consistent with the treaty ratios
of capital ships, a new competition in naval strengths would thereby be
initiated.
Until such time as other powers by inequitable conduct in international
relations as to U. S. interests or by their departure from the idea of a sus-
pended competition in naval armaments, indicate other procedure, the navy
of the United States may be governed in naval strengths by the spirit of
the capital ship ratios, otherwise it will be necessary appropriately to
readjust our naval policy.
To quote further from the same source, the first sentence under
the heading of General Naval Policy is :
To create, maintain and operate a navy second to none; and in con-
formity with the ratios for capital ships established by the Treaty for the
Limitation of Naval Armaments.
The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments defines
capital ships as follows:
A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel
of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons
standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding eight
inches.
Under this definition there can be only two classes of capital
ships. These are the battleship and the battle cruiser. A modern
fleet which is not provided with battle cruisers operates under a
,


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
decided handicap. Not only are such vessels of great value tac-
tically, but they may be of inestimable value in strategic campaigns
where offensive operations in the form of attacks on the enemy
scouting forces or raids against enemy bases may have an impor-
tant bearing on deciding the success or failure of the campaign.
As an example of the value of battle cruisers for certain important
classes of operations that might occur in any war, the destruction
of Von Spee's squadron off the Falklands is cited. Battle cruisers
were the only type of vessel that could put a stop to such opera-
tions as the German squadron was carrying on. If Great Britain
had not possessed ships of this type, Von Spee would have con-
tinued to be an irritating thorn in the flanks of the Allies for an
indefinite period.
Battle cruisers may also be a factor in the ability of aircraft
carriers to operate under various conditions. The carriers them-
selves must be comparatively lightly armed. They might be
accompanied by cruisers which also are comparatively lightly
armed. The only sufficiently heavily armed vessel with adequate
speed that can be employed for accompanying and safeguarding
aircraft carriers are the battle cruisers. The United States Navy
possesses no vessels of this type. By the provisions of the treaty
we gave up such as were under construction, and accepted the
prohibition of not having any until such time as the replacement
program can begin. It is then that the decision will have to be
made as to whether the conditions warrant the new construction
to be battleships or battle cruisers, or both.
As our eighteen battleships now constitute the full treaty
strength of our capital ship allowance, it is these vessels which
form the nucleus or backbone of the fleet around which we must
assemble the auxiliary combatant vessels. This being a fact, it
needs no argument to support the assertion that the first essential
for our balanced fleet is to keep these eighteen battleships in the
finest material condition. Where improvements in offensive power
can be obtained by increasing the range of their guns, such altera-
tions should be made. The only legitimate restrictions that can
be placed on making such desirable changes as will produce this
effect are that the caliber of the guns be not increased, and that the
general type of mounting be not changed. Where improvements
in defensive strength can be obtained by equipping the ships with


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A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
additional under-water and above-water protection against tor-
pedoes and bombs, such should be immediately effected. Where
improvements can be made in steaming qualities by a change from
coal to oil fuel, they should be commenced at once.?
The Limitation of Armament Treaty, while specifying the ratio
of capital ship tonnage between Great Britain, the United States,
and Japan as 5-5-3, contemplated in spirit that this ratio should
represent the actual fighting strength in this class of vessels. Fight-
ing strength is composed of two main factors: i.e., the ability to
inflict damage and the ability to withstand damage. There is no
question but that our capital ships in toto are inferior to those of
Great Britain in fighting strength and that they are not superior to
those of Japan in the ratio of five to three. Therefore, every en- '
deavor should be made to bring about the prescribed ratio of 5-5-3
in fighting strength. There can be no legitimate grounds for claim-
ing a violation of the spirit or the letter of the treaty in so doing.
Cruisers.-On the basis of the battleships being the nucleus
around which the feet will be formed, we can now proceed with
the other fleet elements as represented by the auxiliary surface
fighting vessels, submarines and aircraft.
The Treaty for Limitation of Armaments having fixed the ratios
only for capital ships and aircraft carriers, the importance of the
auxiliary fighting craft becomes greatly enhanced. This was rec-
ognized by Great Britain as evidenced by the unwillingness of her -
statesmen to limit the tonnage in cruisers, of which ships that
nation had considerable preponderance. This has been further evi-
denced by the program for additional construction of this class of
vessel since the terms of the treaty became effective.
As our naval policy requires that the United States "create,
maintain, and operate a navy second to none,” it is necessary, in
view of the fixed ratio in capital ships, that the auxiliary fighting
ships be equal in strength to those of any other nation. Great
Britain, of all the powers, possesses the greatest cruiser strength,
and is taking steps to augment this strength. Japan is more power-
'Since the writing of this paper Congress authorized the conversion to
oil fuel for the six coal-burning battleships. Authorization has also been
given for improving their defensive protection against bombs and torpedoes.
Authority has not been obtained to increase the gun elevation of any of
the battleships.


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ful in cruisers than is the United States. That country is also in-
creasing her cruiser strength. The United States alone, of all the
naval powers, is neglecting this type of ship. Our ten modern
light cruisers, representing a total displacement of 75,000 tons,
make a pitiable showing alongside the thirty-seven British light
cruisers of 169,000 tons. We have no vessels of this type under
construction, while Great Britain has eight of 75,000 tons on the
ways, supplemented by two of 10,000 tons each, which have been
authorized by Australia. In addition Great Britain has announced
a policy embodying the construction of fifty additional light
cruisers of 10,000 tons each, five to be laid down each year for the
next ten years.
An examination of the Japanese light cruiser situation shows
that nation now possessing fifteen modern vessels of this type, of
77,000 tons total displacement. Under construction she has eight
ships with a displacement of 60,000 tons. In addition, two ships
of 10,000 tons each have been authorized. There are indications
that Japan has adopted a building program that will further in-
crease her cruiser strength.
It is seen from the foregoing that while the United States is
being "governed in naval strengths by the spirit of the capital ship
ratios," as stated in our approved naval policy, other nations are
not so considerate in respect to light cruisers. Therefore, it be-
comes "necessary appropriately to readjust our naval policy” in
this respect, if our fleet is to be equal to that of Great Britain and
superior to that of Japan in the ratio of 5 to 3.
Great Britain argues, and rightly so, that a large cruiser force
is essential to her national interests, owing to her world-wide em-
pire, her extensive and valuable trade in all parts of the world,
and for the protection of the trade routes and of her citizens
wherever they may be. These certainly are valid reasons for the
maintaining of a large number of cruisers. But have we not the
same valid reasons for having an equally large number of cruisers ?
While our trade values may not be quite as large as those of the
British Empire, they are just as wide flung, requiring the same
amount of protection along the routes. While our outlying pos-
sessions are not as widely scattered as those of Great Britain, we
have colonial interests at great distances from our home lands.
Great Britain has fortified naval bases in nearly all parts of the


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A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
world, while we have no such thing outside of the continental
limits of the United States excepting in the Canal Zone and the
Hawaiian Islands, thereby needing additional ships for the pro-
tection of bases. So, from the point of view of world-wide in-
terests, the United States needs a large number of light cruisers!
to the same extent as does Great Britain.
But the light cruiser question is one of sufficient importance to
go even further into the matter than trade values and the protec-
tion of commerce, colonies and citizens. We must look into the
value and importance of this class of vessel in a strategic campaign,
and in a naval engagement should there be another war.
The theater of operations in any war will depend on the conflict
of policy that causes the war. It is possible that the United States
may be forced into a war in which an extensive overseas campaign
is involved. In such an event naval power as embodied in the fleet
with its train must cross the ocean. The fleet must be prepared to
fight at all times. There must be scouting, and protective and de-
fensive screening. There should be vessels available for offensive
screening. Troopship and storeship convoys must be escorted. In
many respects the light cruisers are the most efficient type for
these operations. They would have to be augmented by destroyers,
submarines and aircraft, but the successful operations of all these
types will largely depend on the number of light cruisers available
to support them. While in theory there may be a definite balanced
ratio between capital ships and cruisers, in practice a fleet cannot
have too many light cruisers. The lack of sufficient vessels of this
type has been felt by the naval commanders in nearly every war.
We can repeatedly hear the echo of the frequent cry of Nelson :
"Were I to die at this moment, want of frigates would be stamped
upon my heart”; “No words of mine can express what I am suf-
fering for want of frigates”; “The last fleet was lost to me for
want of frigates”; etc., etc. It is a certainty that the commander-
in-chief of the United States fleet engaged in an overseas cam-
paign, and having only our present meager supply of light cruisers,
would suffer even more from this want than did Nelson.
Let us consider the rôle of light cruisers in a fleet engagement.
First comes the tactical scouting. The class of vessel best suited
for this work is one in which great speed is essential. Such ships
must have more gun power than do destroyers and destroyer leaders


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
which may be met at any time. They must be well equipped for
getting the information obtained to the coinmander-in-chief, their
immediate commander, and to certain vessels of the fleet. The light
cruiser is the only type of vessel with all these characteristics to
an efficient degree. When the battle line is formed these ships will
· take station for supporting the destroyers in attacks against capital
ships, and in preventing destroyers from gaining positions from
which to launch their torpedoes against our battle line. The great
advantage over our fleet accruing to any nation having a superior
cruiser force is apparent. In fact, the superiority which many
think would go with our fleet owing to our large number of de-
stroyers, is pure imagination. The effectiveness of a great part of
these destroyers would be nullified in an action with a fleet having
a supremacy of cruisers, as their attempts to obtain suitable attack
positions would be frustrated. If our destroyers are to be effective
we must have supporting ships for them in the shape of light
cruisers, and they should be equal in number to those of any pos-
sible adversary.
To summarize: The cruiser type of vessel, owing to speed,
steaming radius, secondary gun power, and ability for gaining in-
formation, has an immense field of operation. Independently, they
are the best commerce destroyers. Operating with the fleet in a
strategic campaign they are the most suitable vessels for distant
scouting, and for screening, both protectively and offensively.
When feets are in contact, with a battle imminent, they are the
best fitted type for tactical scouting. During an engagement they
are essential for supporting destroyer attacks and for denying
suitable attack positions to the enemy destroyers. They are ideal
escort vessels. The cruisers are, in fact, the most important
auxiliary to the capital ships. They are the fleet element which the
United States has most neglected.
The approaching superiority of our Navy in capital ship
strength was the main factor that made possible the limitation in
battleship and battle cruiser strength. Our inferiority in cruisers
prevented the acceptance of the proposal to limit this class of ves-
sel. If there is really a desire on our part to limit the cruiser
strength of the great powers, the only way we can hope to bring
it about is to adopt a cruiser building program which will balance
our feet and eventually make us superior to all other nations in
this respect.


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A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
So it behooves this country immediately to initiate a cruiser
building program. This is necessary not only to balance our feet
strategically and tactically, but also to balance it with respect to
the 5-5-3 strength ratio with Great Britain and Japan which our
naval policy asserts as essential. Not less than fifty new light
cruisers are required. They should be vessels of 10,000 tons dis-
placement which is the largest permitted by the treaty. They
should have the highest practicable speed and carry as heavy a bat-
tery of eight-inch guns as possible on this displacement. Owing to
the present superiority of the British and Japanese fleets in respect
to cruisers, and owing to the announced British policy to build
fifty new cruisers, laying them down at the rate of five per year,
this country should immediately start a building program of fifty
light cruisers which should be laid down at the rate of ten per year.
In no other way can a balance in cruiser strength be obtained.?
Destroyers and Destroyer Leaders.-Although there has been a
gerferal lack of appreciation in this country of the value of the
light cruisers, no such condition has existed with respect to the
importance of destroyers. We have 267 modern first line vessels
of this class. Like the cruiser we cannot in practice have too many
destroyers. In a great war adequate employment would be found
for all in service, and there would still be need for more. In our
Navy there has been an attempt to make this class of small vessel
take the place of light cruisers. There is no question as to their
unsuitability for this. The destroyer is essentially a torpedo carry-
ing vessel, and its main rôle is for offense against the larger ships
and against submarines. In a strategic campaign they are inval-
uable for protective and defensive screening; but even here they
would be employed on the offensive-defensive in denying to sub-
narines the opportunity to get within striking distance of the fleet,
train, convoy, or whatever vessels they might at the time be escort-
ing or screening. If large numbers of destroyers are well or-
ganized, well directed, and adequately supported in a fleet action,
they will bear an important part in the outcome of the battle.
We now have sufficient destroyers to balance our fleet both stra-
tegically and tactically, and to more than balance it with respect
to the navies of Great Britain and Japan on the 5-5-3 basis. But,
? The last Congress authorized the construction of eight cruisers, but
provided funds only for the construction of two of them. This is but
slight appreciation of our need for vessels of this class.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
we have not the facilities or means either for properly directing
them nor for adequately supporting them. It has been pointed out
that our lack of light cruisers in the face of an enemy having a
superiority in that class of vessel, greatly nullifies the otherwise
advantage that should accrue to a greater number of destroyers.
When consideration is given to the means for directing this class
of vessel, the unsatisfactory condition of our Navy immediately
becomes apparent. We concede that for each three or four battle-
ships and for each four to eight cruisers there must be a flag officer
and adequate staff for whom suitable quarters and facilities are
available on one of the vessels. On the other hand, for a long time
we attempted to direct large units of destroyers by placing them
under the senior commanding officer who not only had to handle
his own ship, but also, perhaps, to command a squadron of eighteen
destroyers without the aid of any staff whatever. We have lately
come to recognize that destroyers cannot be efficiently directed
in this way. In consequence, there has been added to each squad-
ron an additional destroyer which carries the commander of the
squadron and a small staff. This was a move conducive to better
direction of the destroyers, but even this is not sufficient for really
efficient command in action. In the first place a destroyer having
on board its war complement is over-crowded. There are not
available adequate living quarters for a squadron commander and
his staff. Secondly, a destroyer has neither the space nor the
facilities required by a squadron commander for properly direct-
ing a large number of units. There is only one remedy for this
state of affairs. That is to build a special class of vessel known as
destroyer leaders. Great Britain and Italy have long recognized
their importance. The former now possesses fifteen and is build-
ing two more. The latter possesses six and is constructing two
additional. France has recently come to recognize their value and
is now constructing six destroyer leaders to supplement the single
one now possessed. Japan has no vessels classed as such, but it is
important to note that she has under construction nine destroyers
each of which is of a greater displacement than any of our de-
stroyers. In addition, fifteen 1,400-ton destroyers have been
authorized. 3
* Recent reports from Japan indicate that that country is contemplating
the building of a number of 3,000-ton destroyer leaders armed with guns of
5.5-inch caliber.


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A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
Our fleet will never be balanced until we construct a suitable
number of destroyer leaders. Great Britain has one leader for
each twelve destroyers. With our organization of fifteen squad-
rons, each composed of eighteen destroyers, there should be fif-
teen leaders, one for each squadron. These destroyer leaders
being for the purpose of leading and directing destroyers in action
niust be primarily torpedo carrying craft. An efficient battery of
guns is essential; but torpedoes must not be sacrificed for the gun.
Destroyer leaders in performing their function in battle must of
necessity encounter light cruisers. It is not expected or intended
that they can defeat light cruisers. But, under the conditions of
encounter, the cruisers will probably be engaged with a large num-
ber of destroyers the guns of which are not of sufficient caliber to
materially damage the cruiser. The destroyer leaders, therefore,
should carry a gun, the projectiles of which on hitting a cruiser
will inflict sufficient damage to make them worth while. As the
6-inch gun is the smallest one which possesses this qualification
our destroyer leaders should be designed to carry guns of this
caliber.
Our fifteen destroyer leaders, then, should be vessels of between
2,500 and 3,000 tons displacement. They must have not less than
twenty-five knots speed and a long steaming radius. They should
carry a battery of four triple torpedo tubes, at least two of which
should be on the midship line; three 6-inch 50-caliber guns all on
the midship line; anti-aircraft gun, and offensive means against
submarines. Above all, they must possess the capacity and facili-
ties that permit of a commander and adequate staff for properly
directing a squadron of eighteen destroyers.
We now have sufficient destroyers to balance our feet in this
respect from both the strategical and tactical standpoint. We are
ahead of the 5-5-3 ratio in destroyer strength. Many, however,
are deteriorating, owing to lack of personnel to care for them. All
of our first line destroyers are of the same vintage. In conse-
quence all will become obsolete at the same time. Therefore, our
chief concern with the destroyers is in keeping fit the large number
which are out of commission, in preparing a suitable replacement
plan, and in providing for them a number of leaders so as to insure
their being efficiently directed.


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Submarines. The conferences which preceded the final drafts
of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armaments and of the Treaty Re-
lating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,
clearly indicated that the representatives of the foreign nations
concerned did not adopt the purely idealistic attitude of our own
statesmen, but were, to a great extent, influenced by the advan-
tages or disadvantages which would accrue to their own country
by the adoption of each of the proposals. As an example of this
we see the British representatives pleading for the outlawry of
the submarine in any form, and the French representatives main-
taining the necessity of continuing this type of vessel as a weapon
of warfare. The outcome was the second five power treaty, the
terms of which outlaw the submarine as a commerce destroyer.
This treaty does not become effective until ratified by all the sig-
natory powers, and as France has not ratified it, its provisions are
not in effect as international law.
Whether or not the submarine treaty is finally ratified, it affects
only the use of subsurface vessels as commerce destroyers and has
no bearing whatever on their use in warfare against combatant
ships. Submarines have not been employed as yet in a fleet' en-
gagement. However, with their rapid development in size, power,
maneuverability, and means of communicating, there is the prob-
ability that they will hold an important place in the battle lines of
the future.
In a strategic campaign the field of operations of submarines is
large. With the advent of aircraft as parts of fleets the submarine
gains value as a scouting and screening vessel. It is the ideal type
of ship for reconnaissance. Any fleet engaged in an overseas cam-
paign needs submarines of sufficient speed and adequate habit-
ability as auxiliaries for screening. Not only is the submarine a
good vessel for protective screening: i.e., to give warning of the
approach of an enemy, but conditions can be visualized where they
might be of great value in offensive operations against the enemy's
information service. In order to balance our fleet for such opera-
tions that might be required in another war submarines are an
essential. In future international conferences held for the purpose
of further limiting naval armaments, should an attempt be made
to outlaw the submarine as a combatant ship, it is hoped that our
idealistic tendencies will not govern to the extent of agreeing to


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A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
such a step. The abolishment of the submarine would have a de-
cidedly weakening effect in the ability of our fleet to carry out a
prolonged campaign.
Great Britain is the only navy which has what are known as
monitor submarines. These are few in number and have only very
limited capabilities. It is doubtful if additional vessels of this type
will be constructed as hereafter they must be included in the capital
ship tonnage owing to their carrying a gun of a caliber greater
than eight inches. Both Japan and the United States exceed Great
Britain in effective first line submarines, their numbers being :
Japan, thirty-three; United States, forty-four; Great Britain,
twenty-six. But of the larger type, classified as feet submarines,
Great Britain possesses eight, to five for Japan and three for the
United States.
Under construction Great Britain has only two first-line sub-
marines and one fleet submarine; Japan has three first-line, four
second-line, and twenty-two fleet submarines; the United States
has six first-line, and three fleet submarines with an additional
six of this latter class authorized, but construction held in abey-
ance. Thus, when the present authorized building programs are
completed, Japan and the United States will be about on a parity
in the total of modern first-line submarines, while Great Britain
will be considerably weaker.
With our battleships not maintained in condition to insure a
fighting strength superior to that of Japan in the ratio of five to
three; with Japan having a cruiser force of greater strength than
ours; with the advantage of our large number of destroyers greatly
nullified by reason of our weakness in cruisers, and not having any
destroyer leaders; it is essential if we are to maintain a fleet ratio
of five to three with respect to Japan, that our submarines be su-
perior to those of Japan in that ratio. Japan has a total of sixty-
six modern effective submarines built and building. In order to
balance our fleet it is necessary that we have a total of not less than
110, which number is forty-five more than our present effectives,
built, building and authorized. These new submarines should be
of two types. At least half of them should be of sufficiently high
surface speed to enable them to accompany the fleet in battle and
have a steaming radius, at moderate fleet speed, as great as that
of our destroyers. The remainder should be of moderate surface


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speed, fairly high submerged speed and have sufficient fuel capacity
to be self sustaining for a period of from six weeks to two months.
Aircraft and Aircraft Carriers.—The accepted inference that
aircraft are to form an integral part of a modern fleet is not based
on actual performances in the past. During the Great War the
operation of flying machines in conjunction with the fleets was
very limited. They took no part in the Battle of Jutland. The
plans of Admiral Scheer contemplated the employment of Zep-
pelins for scouting prior to the sortie of the German High Seas
Fleet. This sortie was not made with a fleet action in view but was
for the purpose of covering certain raiding operations on the Eng-
lish coast, fathered by the hope that a detachment of the British
fleet would be trapped. But weather conditions prevented the use of
the Zeppelins, and in consequence Scheer had to change his plans.
Heavier-than-air craft were used independently of the fleets
chiefly as patrols, and as escorts of convoys as protective measures
against submarines. The development of flying machines has gone
forward with such rapid strides, their future employment in much
wider spheres than were undertaken during the Great War has
become apparent. The possible uses of air craft extend into the
field of scouting, screening, patrolling, escorting, bombing and
spotting. In each one of these classes of operations they will be
involved with surface ships. Heavier-than-air flying machines
have not yet acquired the capacity of operating at great distances
from land without the necessity of having surface craft bases.
Lighter-than-air ships have had their possible effectiveness greatly
increased by the replacement of hydrogen by helium. They are
capable of operating at great distances over the sea without the aid
of surface craft. So, in determining as to what aircraft are re-
quired for our fleet, it is necessary to consider the heavier-than-air
machines in connection with the surface vessels on which they
will be carried, or by which they will be tended, while the lighter-
than-air ships can be decided on independently of surface vessels.
We have come to recognize that airplanes should be carried on
as many of the combatant surface ships of the fleet as can be done
without otherwise lessening their offensive characteristics. The
number of such planes is, therefore, determined by the number of
these ships that can carry them, but the fleet requires many more
planes than can be carried on board the regular combatant ships.


  p. 1129 (#37)                       

1925]
1129
A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
This is recognized by all nations. Its importance was made evi-
dent by the provisions of the Limitation of Armament Treaty
which placed the ratio of airplane carriers allowed to the United
States, Great Britain, and Japan on exactly the same basis as the
capital ships. The treaty defines an aircraft carrier as:
A vessel of war with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons standard
displacement designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying
aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom
and landed thereon, and not designed and constructed for carrying a more
powerful armament than that allowed to it under Article IX or Article X
as the case may be.
The articles referred to limit the caliber of gun that may be car-
ried on aircraft carriers to eight inches. In the case of the two
carriers permitted with a displacement greater than 27,000 tons,
only eight 8-inch guns may be carried. All other carriers may
carry ten of these guns.
The total aircraft carrier displacement authorized for the three
nations which are concerned in the 5-5-3 ratio are 135,000 tons
each for the United States and Great Britain, and 81,000 tons for
Japan. This permits of the two former each having five carriers
of 27,000 each, and Japan having three carriers of this displace-
ment. The fleets of the three nations can profitably employ all the
aircraft that can be attained. Their respective navies will even-
tually be governed in this respect by the limitations placed on the
carriers by the treaty. It is apparent that the United States fleet,
in order to be made as effective as possible should maintain the full
aircraft carrier strength permitted by the treaty. For a proper
balance it should, at all times, he equal in this respect to Great
Britain, and superior to Japan in the ratio of five to three.
There is in existence only one completed aircraft carrier, classed
as of the first line. This belongs to Great Britain. Of experi-
mental or second line ships, which, in accordance with the terms
of the treaty may be replaced, the United States and Japan each
have one, while Great Britain has two. The building programs of
the three nations show that Great Britain has three under con-
struction with a total displacement of 56,300 tons; the United
States, two, with a displacement of 66,000 tons and Japan two,
with a displacement of 53,900 tons. It is thus seen that in this
important fleet element the United States is not keeping pace with


  p. 1130 (#38)                       

1130
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Great Britain, nor are we ahead of Japan in the ratio of five to
three.
The indications are that the control of the air will be an im-
portant factor in any future naval battle or overseas campaign.
Therefore, in order to balance our fleet so as to give it at least an
equal chance in this respect, there should immediately be a pro-
gram which will provide for the full 135,000 tons of aircraft car-
riers as provided for in the treaty.
In regard to the growing importance of aircraft, certain features
as laid down in the treaty while not at present appearing impor-
tant, may become so at a future date. One of these is the specifica-
tion that a vessel is not classed as an airplane carrier unless of a
displacement greater than 10,000 tons. It is within the realm of
possibility that some nation or nations may attach sufficient im-
portance to the air to start a building program of vessels to be used
exclusively for carrying aircraft with displacements less than
10,000 tons. Such ships, in accordance with the letter of the
treaty, would not be aircraft carriers and need not be included in
the limit of displacement authorized for such vessels. Whether or
not their construction violates the spirit of the treaty would un-
doubtedly depend on which nation started the construction.
Another feature is the treaty definition of an aircraft carrier
which states that the vessel must be designed for, “the specific and
exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft.” It is well within the realm
of probability that some nation or nations will design vessels with
the specific purpose of carrying aircraft, but not with the exclusive
purpose. If these vessels should have guns of greater caliber than
eight inches, or if they should displace more than 10,000 tons they
would be classified as capital ships and would have to be included
in the authorized capital ship ratio.*
* Since writing the above announcement has been made to the effect that
the two new British capital ships which are to be called the Rodney and
Nelson will embody the features of the present day capital ship and of air-
plane carriers. They are to have a battery of 16-inch guns all placed forward
of the foremast, and there will be a flying on deck abaft the smoke-stacks.
These vessels cannot have a displacement greater than 35,000 tons to con-
form with treaty requirements. They must be classed as capital ships as
they carry 16-inch guns. They are not aircraft carriers within the treaty
classification because of the large guns, and because they are not for the
"exclusive” purpose of carrying aircraft. There must be a sacrifice in some


  p. 1131 (#39)                       

1925)
1131
A Balanced Fleet for the Navy
While these two special cases do not influence our balanced fleet
of today, there is the possibility that they may influence it as soon
as our first replacement program or the replacement program of
some other nation begins. It therefore seems fitting that they
should be given some thought at this time.
There is nothing in the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval
Armaments for preventing a nation from building as many lighter-
than-air ships as may be desired. In this country the value of
such vessels becomes certain by the advent of helium. The infor-
mation service of the fleet, especially in view of our weakness in
light cruisers would be greatly enhanced by a number of airships.
The recent successful long distance flights of the Shenandoah and
the Los Angeles are impressive as being indicative of the future
value of this class of ship in naval campaigns. The fleet should be
augmented by at least five additional lighter-than-air ships, which
should operate with the fleet as a part of such. Whether or not
further additional airships should be built must depend on the re-
sults obtained in these operations.
Non-combatant Vessels.—The necessity of a fleet train is ap-
parent. No fleet can carry out a successful campaign without
certain noncombatant auxiliaries that are necessary for its logistic
requirements. There must be ships for carrying fuel, water, am-
munition, food and supplies of all sorts. There must be tenders
for the care of destroyers, submarines and heavier-than-air craft.
There must be repair ships and hospital ships. In addition there
are required certain smaller vessels which might in a way be classi-
fied as combatant ships, such as mine sweepers, mine layers, patrol
vessels and tugs. As pointed out at the beginning of this paper
only the character and the number of the combatant ships that
should compose our fleet would be examined into. Therefore, the
numbers of all these different types of train vessels which are
necessary for a fleet, will not be determined here. Suffice it to say
that their numbers depend on the composition and size of the com-
batant fleet.
military quality, which, it is ventured to suggest will be in the weight of
side armor. The unusual design of these ships leads to the supposition that
they may be intended for use as fleet flagships, and that the hybrid char-
acter which they feature may be intended only for these two vessels, and
may not be included in future designs.


  p. 1132 (#40)                       

1132
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Conclusion.—The balanced feet for the United States Navy
requires :
I. Eighteen battleships, all maintained in the highest state of
efficiency. This necessitates in the cases of some of them: (a)
An increase in the elevation of guns. (b) A change from coal fuel
to oil fuel. (c) Increased protection against torpedoes and bombs.
2. Sixty modern light cruisers. In order that our strength in
this respect may equal that of Great Britain and be superior to that
of Japan in the ratio of five to three, there should be authorized a
building program of fifty new vessels, ten of which should be laid
down each year for the next five years.
3. Two hundred seventy destroyers (our present number).
As all of these vessels are the same age, and, in consequence, be-
come obsolete at practically the same time, a replacement program
should be immediately initiated.
4. Fifteen destroyer leaders. There are no vessels of this type
in the fleet. All of them should be provided for at once.
5. One hundred ten modern effective submarines. In order to
obtain this number a building program of forty-five new vessels is
necessary. All new submarines should be capable of operating as
a part of and with the fleet.
6. Five first-line airplane carriers. There are two under con-
struction. Three additional should be laid down as soon as prac-
ticable.
7. Six lighter-than-air ships. As the Los Angeles is only, for
commercial purposes, provision should be made to augment the
Shenandoah by five new dirigibles.
8. Sufficient train vessels to insure the efficient operation of the
combatant fleet.
This country prides itself on the justice of its proclaimed poli-
cies. We still recognize that a reasonable amount of armament is es-
sential. This armament can best be incorporated in a balanced fleet.
"A just man armed keepeth his house in order."


  p. 1133 (#41)                       

SANITY IN AVIATION
By LIEUTENANT COMMANDER RALPH WOOD, U. S. NAVY
THERE has recently reoccurred a flood of wild statements
and loose generalization relative to aviation in general and
naval aviation in particular. This has been occasioned by
the rather passionate though misguided efforts of those addicted
to the phantom of a so-called United Air Service. In every age it
appears that some human hope reaches out for its moon of uni-
versal panacea. Just now if we could believe, we are assured that
a "united air service” will cure all of our ills, do away forever with
the necessity of an army and navy, reduce taxes and generally
bring in the millenium.
One of the misleading ideas which has been advanced by avia-
tion enthusiasts, and one which, having been accepted by the public
has done real harm to aviation, is the widely published statement
that aviation is cheap; that it is an inexpensive method of warfare.
Careful study of available figures does not bear out this statement.
The idea that one plane with one bomb can completely destroy
one battleship, in view of the fact that the plane costs but $20,000
while the battleship costs $40,000,000 apparently presents an im-
mediate solution of the financial problems attending national in-
surance. However, upon investigation, we find that to get this
one bomber into position requires the services of many other
planes. In the first place, to insure that a reasonable number of
planes reach their objective it is necessary that a whole squadron
ranging in strength from eighteen to thirty-six be launched. To
protect this squadron in its mission, combat planes in the propor-
tions of two or three to one must be provided. Furthermore, such
is the present state of the art of aviation in regard to reliability
and operating radius that in order to keep one plane in the air,
four planes must be available. One begins to notice now how our
one plane has suddenly multiplied itself into the hundred class.
Then with this number of planes to maintain we find it necessary
to retain the services of still more planes at headquarters for mes-


  p. 1134 (#42)                       


STA
THE U.S.S. "LANGLEY," THE Navy's EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER, WITH THE FLEET OFF THE Coast
OF CUBA. NOTE THE PLANES ON THE FLYING DECK OF THE "LANGLEY," READY TO TAKE THE AIR,


  p. 1135 (#43)                       

1925)
1135
Sanity in Aviation
senger and liaison service. Also, if the enemy is not obliging
enough to disclose his whereabouts, we must have squadrons of
scout planes to go out and find him.
Going still farther, we see that a base must be provided for all
of this aerial equipment which includes large landing areas, numer-
ous big hangars, gasoline storage tanks, trucks, store houses for
spares, barracks for mechanics and guard troops. The personnel
as one can imagine is not small. For one thing, aviation demands
a much larger proportion of officer strength than does any other
combat arm. There is at least one officer in every plane and, in
many, two are required. About this time we find also that our
$20,000 plane has vanished, for planes to do the work outlined
range from $20,000 up to $100,000 so that our average cost rises
to approximately $40,000 or $50,000. Our attention is also drawn
to the fact that, whereas the “official” life of a battleship is ac-
cepted as fifteen years, a plane's life is but three. Furthermore,
during that three years the plane's different parts will have been
replaced at least once. In other words, at the end of three years
we will have to write the plane off our books at twice its original
value. Without complex analysis it is still readily apparent that
our aviation endeavor is going to cost very nearly as much as does
the target.
The above assumptions have followed in general the ideas of
masses of planes with which our aviation enthusiasts so easily
darken the skies, and furthermore consider the easiest problem,
that in which the enemy calmly comes into our immediate vicinity
courting combat.
Suppose, however, he is inconsiderate enough to stay a few
hundred miles at sea and from this position throttle the commerce
and world-wide communications of the country? It is true that
proponents of the plane (extremists) blithely send the planes over-
seas to where the enemy may happen to be, but in practice this is
not so easily done. The army world cruisers (a modified navy
type torpedo plane) may be accepted as a fair sample of a modern
plane. The longest flight made by these planes was approximately
900 miles. To achieve this distance extra tanks of gasoline were
built into the plane. This increased weight precluded the possi-
bility of carrying any military load such as bombs, torpedoes, guns
and ammunition. In order to accomplish a strictly military mis-


  p. 1136 (#44)                       

1136
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
sion this peace time overseas travel melts like snow in the sun. In
placing the machine guns, ammunition, bombs and bomb sights in
the plane, gasoline must be sacrificed. When the machine is thus
equipped we find her capable, at her most economical speed, of
traveling about 400 miles, 200 off shore and 200 back. Not so good
if that is our sole reliance against ships that roam the seven seas.
In order then to bring our aviation threat to the enemy ship we
are forced to the consideration of an airplane carrier. Let us see
what that procedure involves. We can build two real carriers
under the treaty, with a possibility of development some time in
the future of a carrier within the treaty restrictions of 10,000
tons. On each of these large carriers, costing by the way a matter
of forty to forty-five millions each, we can crowd seventy assorted
planes. Not all can be bombers because some fighting planes must
be provided. If the carrier is to be used to seek out and engage
our enemy battleship, our hordes of planes shrink to 140, of which
possibly one third are bombers. And as these planes must be man-
handled from holds and hangar decks onto the flying deck and from
there flown off, proper allowance in time must be made for this
maneuver. From the time the first plane takes the air until the
last is off may take an hour at a minimum. To recover the planes
will take no less time so that one hour is cut off the cruising time
of the planes. This means that our carrier must approach that
much closer to the target. In doing so she naturally subjects her-
self to the ordinary hazards of torpedo and gun attack with the
added possibility that one or two enemy planes with light bombs
may so cripple her large flying deck as to prevent the recovery of
our planes.
The easiest problem for the defense was shown to be costly but
the second problem is more costly still. We see that the lure of
cheap warfare held out by aviation extremists vanishes like mist.
We can dispense with the cheapness idea of aviation. It is most
decidedly not a cheap weapon but a very expensive one.
There are two other statements advanced from time to time in
regard to naval aviation which will not bear the light of actual fact.
One is that the older and directing heads of the Navy are antag-
onistic to and oppose the progress of aviation. Also that the
younger officers are so muzzled that the true condition (asserted


  p. 1137 (#45)                       


New Navy Long Distance PATROL SEAPLANE, TYPE PN-7


  p. 1138 (#46)                       

1138
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
to be backward) of naval aviation is not permitted to be known.
Neither of these statements is true.
In performance of his aviation duty the writer has had at vari-
ous times contact with many naval officers of high rank. Unfail-
ingly and without exception, these officers have evidenced in speech
and action their sincere interest in the advancement of the art of
aviation. They have been most sympathetic in their attitude toward
the demands of naval aviation and have gone much more than
half way in fostering and encouraging this arm of the Navy. How
anyone in a responsible position could be more liberal minded and
interested in the development of aviation than the present com-
manders-in-chief of the United States fleet and battle fleet and still
be human it is hard to see. Such officers have many factors to con-
sider in the proper rounding out of their duties and it is safe to
say that aviation has received and is receiving more than its pro-
portionate share of their attention. They recognize the fact that
aviation although important is but one factor among many that
must be considered when modern warfare is contemplated.
As for the statement that younger naval officers are muzzled, the
writer from experience knows nothing further from the truth.
From his own observation during eighteen years of naval service
he has never elsewhere observed the latitude allowed and sympa-
thetic interest taken in the ideas advanced by younger officers. This
is true not only within the aviation specialty itself, but in contact
between such specialists and older line officers who have previously
had little operating contact with aviation.
One conclusive proof of the interest which the older and ex-
perienced officers have taken in regard to aviation may be cited
in the matter of war plans. All that the writer has seen and is
familiar with have made careful and far-sighted provision for the
proper developnient of naval aviation facilities and employment.
Not only this, but these practical minded sailors have gone one step
farther, and in accepting the prophecies of our own aviation ex-
perts, have made proper and ample provision for the advantageous
employment of such advance in naval aviation as it is possible to
conceive today.
Those charged with the material development of aviation in the
Navy have been far from lagging in their efforts. In fact, the
United States Navy is responsible for a considerable part of the


  p. 1139 (#47)                       

1925)
1139
Sanity in Aviation
advance which has been made in aviation since the war. With
characteristic navy attitude no great shouting has accompanied
these accomplishments. Being slightly irritated by the constant
buzzing and stinging of irresponsible critics, the Navy decided to
publish some of their accomplishments. So stopping the regular
grind for a short time the Navy went out and annexed the record
for the fastest land plane in the world, then the record for the
fastest seaplane in the world, (we already had the Atlantic flight,
by Commander Read under our belt), and then one after another
numerous duration, weight and altitude world records. Then we
went back to work and left the rest to shoot at our marks. The
Navy has not considered it worth the cost to keep actively in the
racing game. Our money is expended in service craft and their
operation. But when called upon we need take nobody's slip
stream. The Navy has developed the first reliable rigid, a system
of water recovery from exhaust gases, reliable air cooled motors
and several special aeronautical engines which for ruggedness and
performance are well to the front. The Navy has further per-
fected the catapult to the point where the commander-in-chief,
battle fleet, is justified in publishing the following comment:
The commander-in-chief, battle fleet, is pleased to note that catapulting
of planes has now progressed sufficiently to warrant such operations when-
ever opportunity permits and plane service is desired.
This progress has been made possible only through the concerted efforts
of all concerned and the general confidence of the fleet's personnel results
from the many successful catapult shots to date.
The commander-in-chief, battle fleet, desires that every effort be made
to continue this development and that no failures or casualties, particularly
those involving material and possible of predetermination, occur to mar the
established good record or shake the confidence of the operating personnel.
When critics state that the Navy has not kept and is not keeping
abreast of aviation advancement they are right only in that the
Navy is leading in much of it.
Finally, those personally interested in a so-called "united air
service” talk in large round generalities of the savings and econ-
omies to be realized by an amalgamation. Careful analysis will
not disclose these economies. It is a fact which will not down that
air mail, army and navy requirements are different one from the
other, that the equipment proper for one is improper for the other,
'In connection with the Army and the Bureau of Standards.


  p. 1140 (#48)                       


AL
The World's Fastest SeaPLANE. THE NAVY "R-2-C-2,” WHICH IN UNOFFICIAL TRIALS HAS MADE OVER 225 MILES
PER Hour. The Racing Plane IS A FLYING LABORATORY FOR FIGHTING PLANE DEVELOPMENT.


  p. 1141 (#49)                       

1925]
1141
Sanity in Aviation
that the personnel of one performs duties almost totally different
from the others. For mind you, the ability to conduct a plane
about on its legitimate business is the least of a properly trained
aviator's duties.
To discuss the naval arm simply, we take our men and officers
from the same training and concentration centers as do the other
naval branches. Naval aviators must be familiar with ships and
be sea-going, they must understand the tactics and strategy of
scout ships, destroyers, submarines and battleships and their har-
monious employment as fleets. They must have an intimate knowl-
edge of the methods of gun control, because one of their important
jobs is in connection therewith.
A so-called "united air force” would be required to supply per-
sonnel as well fitted to naval needs, and in addition, personnel to
serve the Army in its manifold duties. Is one man to be able to
do both? Very improbable. There is a limit to human endeavor.
If two sets of personnel are to be developed within one organiza-
tion with all the special equipment demanded by the circumstances,
the organization will be much like a hen attempting the rearing of
one chick and one duck. There will be plenty of distraction.
Some people stress present duplication of effort and feel this
will be cured by amalgamation of all aviation. But is there dupli-
cation ? And if there is, will it be cured? As a matter of fact
there is practically no duplication of effort as regards the present
administration of aviation under the Army and Navy. Planes
and engines, ordered from manufacturers are not similar for the
two services, nor are they likely to be except in special instances.
Amalgamation of repair stations would not effect economies.
Against a prevalent belief that manufacturing under one head is
economical, we find that little or no manufacturing is done by the
services. Repair and overhaul consists mainly in replacement and
adjustment of parts and men qualified to work on one engine may
not be qualified to work on another.
On the other hand, amalgamation of the two air services would
immediately introduce duplication from the top to the bottom.
First, we duplicate a whole new department in the government
with a secretary, assistant secretaries, heads of bureaus, office
space, clerks and messengers. There would be another recruiting
bureau and staff, another academy, similar to West Point and


  p. 1142 (#50)                       

1142
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Annapolis, for the training of officer personnel and training depots
for the enlisted men. We would find the need for a corps of flight
surgeons, a corps of quartermasters or pay officers, a corps of de-
signers. The new service would take over some of the present air
stations but there would immediately arise the need for acquisition
. of new sites. New and more buildings, motor boats, trucks and
horses formerly supplied gratis by the mother services must be
purchased. And finally there must be obtained carriers and tenders
with all the appurtenances under control of the new service. If
this does not entail duplication, what does ? And then picture the
air commodore and the fleet admiral getting together to give battle
to the enemy. Or the commanding general and air commodore in
land warfare! Each would be independent and yet each needing
the other. What, without economy and lacking efficiency, is the
excuse for this new service?
Every weapon has not only its possibilities, but also its limita-
tions. Those who would master a weapon must be familiar with
those limitations if they are to develop that weapon's utmost ex-
ecution. In discussing aviation, enthusiastic proponents have
drawn largely from future possibilities but have neglected the in-
herent limitations of aircraft. The limitations of aircraft are
many, and realizing this fact, the Navy has busied itself in incor-
porating the aviation branch within the fleet so that strength is
afforded aircraft where they are weakest in order that they may,
when the opportunity presents, deliver their maximum war effort.
Those who maintain that the Navy is derelict in its development
of aviation within the limits set by the state of advancement of
the art and the money provided by Congress do so with no founda-
tion in fact. It is well for the country to know this. It is also
well for the country to remember that the personnel operating our
aircraft have passed all tests required for other naval personnel ;
they have performed the same duties on the bridge, in the turret
and in the engine room. They know from experience the kind of
service the Navy demands and are prepared and anxious to give it.


  p. 1143 (#51)                       

WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED
AT JUTLAND
By Captain Thos. C. Hart, U. S. NAVY
UR title does not indicate any intention to parody a certain
article on Jutland by a very able author of our service who
was early in the field. Since his work, such a mass of
literature has been produced on the subject that it is difficult to
justify an attempt to add to it. Much of the writing, particularly
that of late date, is largely controversial and tending to create or
keep alive the disputes between high commanders which seems to
be a rather characteristic aftermath of great naval battles. This
effort is not an attempt to engage in or contribute to such con-
troversies.
It is safe to say that there never has been a great battle in which
mistakes were not made, and also, that in most of them some high
commander has made errors of considerable import. It is fairly
easy for even ordinary minds to discover these mistakes and to
express criticism. Moreover, it is entertaining to do so, at least
so for him who writes on it. Perhaps such entertainment is the best
excuse that can be advanced for this attempt, which is made with
full realization that some reticence is becoming in criticizing the
actions of high commanders, after the events.
Unlike most of the real literature on Jutland, our criticism is
directed at the German side. What is being put forward is largely
fiction, as befits our title.
It will be recalled that the German high seas fleet went to sea
for an operation planned, in its essence, to bring on an engagement
with a portion only of the British grand fleet. Certainly, in the
light of what actually occurred, there can be found no fault in the
conception, the plan or in the initial disposition of forces to carry
it out. On the morning of the battle, the German submarines sent
Admiral Scheer certain information concerning movements of
British forces to seaward. His reaction to that information is
expressed in his book: ".... showed a possibility that our hope


  p. 1144 (#52)                       

SI
Screen
S
st
2105
(4 )
กxt กนี
55'in
-----
2000s
Serle
Yaros
-
SDI
(50)
---
PLATE I
Positions at 442, when BC Fand HSF make sight contact
Tracks of leaders of 8 CF and VBS and of HSF and SDI
shown from 348 onward


  p. 1145 (#53)                       

1925)
1145
What Might Have Happened at Jutland
of meeting with separate enemy divisions was likely to be ful-
filled. We were, therefore, all the more determined to keep to our
plan.” Thus far, all was well on the German side.
What the Germans were to do upon such a meeting is not alto-
gether clear. Admiral Scheer was, of course, planning to fight in
superior strength. It was to be expected that any British detach-
ment likely to be met would be of fast capital ships, battle cruisers
or Queen Elizabeths, or both, with accompanying light forces.
That is, the British detachment being sought was very likely to be
either more powerful or faster than the German force which would
make the first contact with it. In such situation, the tactical prob-
lem which the Germans had to solve was how to apply their su-
periority of strength, in order to destroy that British detachment,
which was the recognized tactical objective. The Germans were
not out for a mere indecisive brush; actual destruction of a sizable
portion of the British fleet alone would serve their immediate
purpose.
Given the tactical characteristics of the forces, it is clear that
the Germans could be sure of success only by acting on the ham-
mer-and-anvil principle. That is, the thing could be done with
certainty only by some degree of division of forces, possibly to an
extent which under ordinary circumstances could be held to be
tactical heresy. Whatever the extent to which Admiral Scheer
was willing to divide his forces, it is at least clear that he did have
the “hammer-and-anvil” idea. The evidence bearing thereon will
appear later.
The events of the first phase of the Battle of Jutland are com-
mon knowledge. It is now known that the results, up to the time
when Admiral Beatty sighted the German battleships, were: two
British battle cruisers sunk and one damaged, (Lion had one turret
knocked out and was out of the line for some time); one German
battle cruiser considerably damaged and one somewhat injured ;
two or three destroyers lost on both sides. Summing up, Admiral
Von Hipper had bested a British force of superior material fight-
ing strength and at least equal speed. For it, the German Navy
has been highly praised, and justly so. Also, an end-to-end junc-
ture was made between Admirals Scheer and Von Hipper and the
latter consequently "saved,” for which both those commanders
have been praised. But what about the German plan? The British


  p. 1146 (#54)                       

1146
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
detachment is at this stage about to turn and run out of danger;
its destruction is what the Germans came to sea for.
On Plate I there is shown the familiar course of the battle
cruiser action, from 3:48 to 4:42. There is also shown, as well as
may be, the movements of Admiral Scheer's own force during the
same period. It is quite evident that this force was not in tactical
readiness to carry out the German plan. At 3:35, Admiral Scheer
learned that Von Hipper had found just what they were looking
for and rather confidently expecting, and since the scouting force
had found it, the discovery at that particular place should not have
been a surprise. At the time, the German battleships were in one
long column, with ships at 700 meters and with 3,500 meters be-
tween squadrons; the fastest squadron was leading and in the far
rear was the very much slower squadron II. It is manifest that
the tactical readiness which the plan called for lay in a formation
normal to the point where it was expected to first encounter the
enemy; in other words, a line of squadrons, or even divisions,
normal to the German battle cruisers' position. It does not look
like a very serious error and probably is not. But—the first step
was to reduce distances in the battle fleet and, to do so, the head of
the column had to wait for the rear ship, a slow pre-dreadnought at
that, to close 8,800 meters or nearly five miles. That took time
and, although Admiral Scheer heard at 3:45 that six British battle
cruisers were being drawn toward him, it was not until 4:05 that
his own command seems to have done anything except to close up.
The lost time evidently did not worry Admiral Scheer for even
then he proceeded at only 15 knots. It is well now to quote from
Admiral Scheer's official report on the Battle of Jutland, as it is
given in his book :
The message received at 3:45 from the chief of reconnaissance that he
was engaged with six enemy battle cruisers on a southeasterly course showed
that he had succeeded in meeting the enemy, and as he fought was drawing
him closer to our main fleet. The duty of the main fleet was now to hasten
as quickly as possible to support the battle cruisers, which were inferior as
to material, and to endeavor to hinder the premature retreat of the enemy.
At 4:05, therefore, I took a northwesterly course at a speed of 15 knots,
and a quarter of an hour later altered it to a westerly course in order to
place the enemy between two fires, as he, on his southerly course, would
have to push between our line and that of the battle cruisers." (Italics by
the author.)


  p. 1147 (#55)                       

1925]
1147
What Might Have Happened at Jutland
The opinion is ventured, parenthetically, that Admiral Scheer's
book is a conscientious attempt at true portrayal, at least from the
personal standpoint; it does not appear to be in the nature of ex-
cuse or justification of own acts. There is believed to be much
significance in the above quotation. We see in it a purpose to ad-
here to the original plan and a realization that some application of
the hammer-and-anvil principle should be made. But, we also see
concern for the security of the German battle cruisers. Under the
circumstances, any leader might well have been so concerned.
Nevertheless Admiral Scheer, rather tardily it is true, maneuvered
his immediate command in furtherance of the plan. While doing
so, his perturbation may very well have been such that he needed
assurance from his seemingly over-matched detachment. He got
the other thing.
Before the long German column had completed its course change
to west, or a little after 4:20, the commander-in-chief received a
message to the effect that four (or five) British battleships had
"joined in the fight." The actual story of the result of that mes-
sage also appears in Admiral Scheer's report : "The situation thus
was becoming critical for scouting division I, confronted as they
were by six battle cruisers and five battleships. Naturally, there-
fore, everything possible had to be done to get into touch with
them, and a change was made back to a northerly course."
The succeeding phases of the battle are history. They by no
means followed the German plan, the tactical essence of which
was abandoned when the battleships turned north to succor the
battle cruisers. Such was the direct consequence of the one and
only message which Admiral Von Hipper is known to have sent
after the battle really began. We know what was the actual situa-
tion at about the time the message must have been sent but don't
know how that situation appeared to the sender. How should or
could it have appeared to him?
Given five ships against six, a two-ships-to-one concentration
was to be expected. It occurred and was against the German flag-
ship Lutzow; yet she not only withstood it without serious injury
but had also driven one of her adversaries out of the line. Ad-
miral Von Hipper was in position to know the probable worst,
which was clearly at his own end of the column. At the rear end
of it, Von der Tann had sunk her opponent. None of the German


  p. 1148 (#56)                       

Gr Fl.fr BCF
50 mit 5 10
348
25ks
ADS
, 3-LCS
5.10
(400
HLCS(400
5 10
Wind
2-3
5.00
CL
SDI (4(L)
(286
)
6 10
10DD
VBS
• 174
B.SI
5.00
24.000....
...
000 OSO
Flot I
Floty
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.
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.
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.
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.
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510 1200
21051
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...28 ODD
BST
510
Fl-
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4 00
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(105)
B.SI
6005
Lowledge
Flot III
Scole in yords
21k
PLATE I
Possible Positions of 5.10. Sight Contacts with BSI
and I would be between 500 and 510 B.S-I not yet een
Trocks of Leoders of Capitol Ship Units only are shown


  p. 1149 (#57)                       

1925)
1149
What Might Have Happened at Jutland
cruisers were showing loss of speed and there was no visible evi-
dence of any injury more serious than Lutzow's, and there had not
been such. Before 4:10, there must have been considerable evi-
dence available on the flagship which indicated that the British
battle cruisers were being beaten. Why did not Von Hipper
reassure his commander-in-chief at least to that extent?
Four British battleships had “joined in the fight”; but at a very
extreme range. It could at least have been seen that they were far
abaft the beam, and known that they had not the speed to improve
their position. Why should not the actual situation, as regards
those battleships, have been made known, instead of a statement
so framed that it was bound to be alarming? In short, at the time
the actual message was sent, the German cruisers were up against
four cruisers and not six, plus four or five battleships, as Admiral
Scheer was led to believe. The situation required a message not
only reassuring but distinctly encouraging to the German com-
mander-in-chief; and there is no reason to suppose that he would
not then have adhered to the plan. Before Lion got back into the
fight, at about 4:30, the Queen Mary blew up. News of that lat-
ter success would have strengthened a German resolve to carry
the thing through as they started. Finally, why did Von Hipper,
who must have been indoctrinated in applying the principle of co-
operation, commit an error of such far-reaching consequences, by
means of the only message which he sent while his flagship was
engaged?
Admiral Von Hipper's immediate adversary, Admiral Beatty,
has been accused of improperly, and very incompletely, informing
his commander-in-chief during those phases of the action in which
he was the combat leader. We have then both the seconds in com-
mand possibly guilty of the same mistakes, serious mistakes in
that they were directly against the principle of co-operation. Yet
these two officers stood among the leaders in their profession. The
coincidence makes us wonder if the blame should rest on individ-
uals or upon naval systems. In modern land battle, a serious diffi-
culty confronting leaders is to keep in touch with the combat suffi-
ciently for exercising good judgment in making the decisions
required. In naval battle, are the high leaders not much too close
to the fighting to carry out their true functions and was not that


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1150
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
condition at fault, rather than individuals? However, to get ahead
with our fiction.
What Might Have Happened.-Plate II is constructed on cer-
tain fictitious assumptions but is based on the actual disposition of
forces that was in effect when the battle began. Assume that Von
Hipper had run as straight as the engagement permitted and had
kept his chief informed of events, results and the actual situation
as regards positions, courses and speed; assume, in consequence,
that Admiral Scheer had adhered to the plan and also had taken
such farther risks, in separating his battle squadrons, as were
necessary to apply fully the hammer-and-anvil principle; in effect,
thus to construct a broad-faced anvil. The German positions shown
on the plate give the dispositions which would have resulted had
the four principal squadrons maneuvered in about the way that
best fitted the situation.
No particular assumptions are necessary for the British side.
Admiral Beatty's own acts clearly indicate the probability that he
would have plunged straight into the German trap. The trap
would begin to spring somewhere between 5:00 and 5:10, with the
grand feet fifty miles away. The possibilities in the case are very
entertaining to the conjecturer. It is safe to guess that British
light cruiser squadrons I and III would escape for they had the
speed to do so and they demonstrated a fair degree of prudence
during the real battle. The four Queen Elizabeths, with attached
light forces, could escape if they turned left immediately. Under
the circumstances, it is not at all likely that their commander would
have so turned unless and until so ordered by Admiral Beatty. By
the time such order could have been given it would have been too
late; it is much more likely that the Queen Elizabeths would have
gone into the trap with their battle cruisers. Three general courses
would then have been open to the British:
(a) To the eastward, fighting their way over Von Hipper and
with his three destroyer flotillas in fine position for attacks.
(b) To the southward, over the German predreadnoughts,
which could very well have been thus expended; in any event, the
British detachment would have a very long run-around before they
would be clear of the trap.
(c) To the southwestward, German battle squadron I would
not yet have been sighted but would soon be in range.


  p. 1151 (#59)                       

1925)
1151
What Might Have Happened at Jutland
We will leave readers, if any, to do their own guessing on the
probable results from such a line-up, following any likely courses
of action by the British. It is enlightening roughly to game-board
the situation, particularly so if it be remembered that the Germans
showed at least equality in gunnery and that the British ships did
not survive very much hitting. Anyhow there would have been
inside the trap, or have been destroyed before it was sprung: six
battle cruisers, four battleships, six light cruisers and twenty-seven
destroyers, the cream in speed and power of the British fleet.
What "might have happened” is the absolute destruction of that
detachment and with scant loss of German ships. Admiral Scheer
could have called it a day, returned to port and left Admiral Jelli-
coe nothing to do but pick up the pieces.
This fiction has already run far and it is just as well not to try
to imagine what the effect of such a battle would have been upon
the World War as a whole. This much we may say: In looking
back over the turns of events of the whole war, where one error
or another swung over the victory pendulum, and supposing that
it is still the open season for criticizing high naval leaders, why is
not the much and justly praised Admiral Von Hipper also one of
those who lost the war?


  p. 1152 (#60)                       

ARMAMENT BY EXAMPLE AND
ARBITRATION
By LIEUTENANT COMMANDER E. S. R. BRANDT, U. S. NAVY
I THILE modern Jeffersonians in America are preaching
“Disarmament by Example” and persuading an amazing
number of Americans possessing (what one scientist calls)
a female complex, to believe in it, other nations are gradually
bringing their peace armaments up to date and, incidentally, send-
ing their disarmament-preaching pacifists to lecture in America,
where a more fertile field for this sort of fad exists. Armament
is now going on in Europe and in Japan but it is not analogous to
that pre-war race for military and naval supremacy initiated by
German pretentions to European hegemony, a race which resulted
in armaments now mostly gone, either wasted in war or scrapped
as obsolete in post-war peace. Pre-war governments added battle-
ships and battalions year after year to already huge establishments
in preparation for war. The nations of Europe are now preparing
against war by arming with a carefully calculated supply of the
latest and most effective weapons, these as a means of obtaining
peace from those aggressively inclined and as a means of obtain-
ing respectful consideration and fair play in the coming race for
opportunities to reach markets and to develop the natural and vir-
gin wealth of the world as yet scarcely touched in Asia, Africa
and South America. The wealth of Europe is so heavily mort-
gaged as a result of the war that it is only by the development of
new wealth through commerce that war debts can be paid and the
burden of taxation lifted. Neither indemnities nor reparations,
which are unnatural methods of financing, can provide such finan-
cial sinews as concessions and commerce.
Europe is through colonizing in the political sense. Free trade
and commercial opportunity throughout the world are recognized
as necessary to future European prosperity by the people of
Europe themselves who are saying so in no uncertain terms with
parliamentary overthrows in those governments which persist in


  p. 1153 (#61)                       

1925)
1153
Armament by Example and Arbitration
looking backward instead of forward. Free trade is a principle
unpopular in the United States.
Never before in the history of Europe have there been so many
representative governments functioning. With the advent of more
universal popular control of government, has come the end of
much secret diplomacy typical of former European chancelleries
and the elimination of many causes for war bred by it. Europe is
arming moderately from popular conviction that the way to end
aggression and the remaining threats of war is to make war cer-
tain and destructive for an aggressor. Such armament is more
an appeal to an alien people than a threat to their government.
Every battleship and bayonet today is a warning to keep the peace.
There is hardly any nation now enjoying independence and a
representative government which would deliberately make war
without exhausting almost every possibility of peaceful solution
through diplomatic prevention, economic or financial pressure,
arbitration or popular referendum. Only the most unusual com-
bination of difficult factors involving a nation's economic existence
or compromising its basic policy of self preservation would make
resort to war inevitable. Yet the constant threat of war remains.
The autocratic governments are gone. The people are in the
saddle of every government but Soviet Russia, the one government
openly maintaining a military establishment for aggressive pur-
poses when the time shall be ripe. With the defeat of Germany,
any immediate military menace disappeared from the western
world. Present and prospective armaments cannot be said to be
menacing but rather encouraging as indicative of budget balancing
and clearer international perspective. Of armies and unsatisfied
national ambitions there are a plenty in the world and especially
in Europe but, since whole nations went to war on the firing line,
in the factories, in the banks, and even in the fields and homes,
Europe has discovered that war is too expensive for either winner
or loser, for in Europe wars cannot be localized. It can hardly be
claimed that any European nation is now arming in the sense that
Germany armed from 1866 to 1914. Nevertheless, European na-
tions are deliberately arming with the latest agents of war, not for
the purpose of precipitating conflicts, but with a grim determina-
tion to retain what they have, to acquire what they legitimately
can, and as preventive preparedness against another such war as


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1154
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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
the last one. This armament is judicious, methodical, and ex-
presses the majority will of the people, who though socialistically
inclined, are alive for the first time, as responsible citizens, to the
importance of peaceful international relations. They are deter-
mined to provide for their future national security and to maintain
military and naval establishments to give weight to their national
aspirations. These European people, with their recently increased
civil and national rights, have recognized the responsibilities in-
cidental to the preservation of self government. Moreover, they
want no wars fought within their own borders and they are more
than willing, almost bankrupt as they are, to insure a period of
peace by the method of "Armament by Example” which, in effect,
is a warning that aggression, though not war, henceforth is out-
lawed. A very healthy respect is growing up among these Euro-
pean peoples for each other since they have come out in the open,
as peoples rather than governments, with their policies and their
armaments.
We have in Europe the unusual spectacle of governments, purg-
ing themselves of almost every individual of importance who had
anything to do with the prosecution of the war, which are socialis-
tic as never before, overwhelming their military and naval estab-
lishments, and strengthening them in a most scientific way.
Government in Japan, though more liberal than it was, is still un-
changed, still militaristic and a fairly good mirror of popular
sentiment. It would appear that no pre-war monarch, premier, nor
lord of the admiralty, was more jealous to maintain his country's
strength or prestige than are these new governments of the people.
There is this difference, though: The foreign policies of the vari-
ous nations are no longer the foreign policies of autocratic gov-
ernments but of the people themselves. The day when sovereigns
declared war for non-national reasons and carried on war with
funds acquired by oppressive taxation or forced loans, is over.
War of that sort became too extravagant and inefficient, and too
dangerous to dynastic permanence. It has dawned on the Euro-
pean peoples who actually go on the firing line to face shot, shell
and steel, that a nation need not go to war unless it is the collective
will of a people to do so and that where that will exists, the whole
nation may be expected to take part in the winning of the war.
These new socialistic governments of European people are curi-


  p. 1155 (#63)                       

1925)
1155
Armament by Example and Arbitration
ously alike in putting forward blunt and bold warnings to each
other to keep the peace and to check aggressive pretentions. To
back up their words of warning, they are making no secret of their
new cruisers, submarines, airplanes and regiments. While the fear
of the Red army is an important factor in the maintenance of
comparatively large armies by the new states of eastern Europe,
jealousy of each other has been the determining factor in diverting
public funds for this purpose. They are all seeking an economic
foothold. They must have peace to consolidate their economic
gains for they must put the greater part of their population to
work or starve. To do this, they are maintaining armies larger
than would be necessary were Europe stabilized but no larger than
they consider necessary at present to discourage aggression or to
protect the working population in their tasks of industrial and
commercial reconstruction; and this protection includes the sup-
pression of communism, especially in the countries where socialism
is most strongly intrenched in the government.
Europeans, who in war time were thought to be treasonable
pacifists, became in post-war days the heads of their respective
governments. They graduated from pacifism. They now realize
that it is the function of government to protect the whole people
and with that idea of protection is indissolubly linked the idea of
strong government. It is impossible for even a pacifist in power
to conceive of a benevolent government ruling without the means
of defending itself from internal or external danger. The pacifist
out of power seeks to weaken an established government by curb-
ing its military strength, effecting (to him) a change to a more
acceptable government even though he thereby delivers the citizens
of his government over to their external enemies and may, in the
end, saddle them with a worse rule. The pacifist, so far-sighted
that his vision is focussed on infinity, is essentially an anarchist,
in that he works innocently or otherwise to overthrow government.
A pacifist is a practical worker only in this quasi-anarchism. He
is impractical in assuming that the demilitarization and consequent
probable overthrow of government necessarily implies a change
for the better and a new era of observance of the Golden Rule.
The pacifist in power is as anxious to preserve his power as any
militarist and becomes a logical target in his turn for the pacifist
out of power. It is possible that the elevation to power of the


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1156
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
notorious pacifists of England has done more to counteract paci-
fism in England than all of the heroic records of the war put to-
gether. The same seems to be true in France.
There is no evidence that any of the quasi-socialistic govern-
ments of Europe are convinced that the scrapping of certain battle-
ships satisfied the spirit of the Limitation of Armaments Treaty of
1921. The scrapping of ships has been accompanied by the build-
ing of newer and better ones. No one but ourselves thinks of main-
taining only the resulting navies of 1921 which static state, it was
thought, the Limitation of Armaments had accomplished. Even
the pacifists repudiate it as contentment with a poor job only half
done. Only national indifference to national welfare will ever
prevent armaments. There is one thing a socialist government is
not, and cannot afford to be indifferent to, and that is national wel-
fare. Socialism is militaristic at heart.
Europe has cast aside certain governmental traditions among
which was the obsession that the people themselves could not be
trusted to formulate foreign policy. Legislation is usurping many
of the former functions of government in Europe where no Su-
preme Courts exist to check unconstitutional legislation. The will
of the majority is law in parliamentary government. An auto-
matic check does exist, however, in the plurality of political parties
which are active in all such governments. There were fourteen
political parties participating in the last election in France and
over 100 parties in Italy. In England the break-up of coalition
government resulted in such party jealousy that each of the major
parties preferred to support a minority labor party rather than
accept defeat at the hands of each other. The result was a very
satisfactory temporary government in which the proletariat were
governing by and with the consent and advice of those more ex-
perienced. In Italy, dissatisfaction with a government which was
weakly compromising the communism, led to a popular demand for
strong government which would promote the national prestige
abroad and guarantee the suppression of class control at home.
The leader of fascism is apparently a dictator. As a matter of
fact, his power is only that delegated to him by a majority of the
people and his pedestal is as insecure as the temperament of
Italians is mercurial. Fascism governing through a responsible
dictatorship gave the Italians what they wanted and is more truly


  p. 1157 (#65)                       

1925)
1157
Armament by Exainple and Arbitration
representative of the Italian soul and body than an elected legis-
lature would be. Through Mussolini, Italy is bluntly and boldly
telling the world to beware of encroaching on Italian rights. A
revival of military spirit has accompanied the acquisition of power
by the people. The Italians, having no natural resources of their
own, are about to expand industrially and seek world markets.
They are planning to regain supremacy in the Mediterranean in
an attempt to revive the Pax Romana of 2,000 years ago and are
already cultivating friendly relations wherever possible in the
south of Europe. They are also showing a truculent attitude
toward such as seem inclined to check reasonable Italian aspira-
tions. Europe believes that the Italians will fight if they can't
get a square deal, and consequently Italy is getting one.
Diplomacy is no longer secret because the diplomats are no
longer responsible only to individuals in power no matter what
their credentials say. The premiers get together nowadays and
tell each other what the temper of their respective nations are and
what sort of diplomatic agreements can be ratified. Diplomats are
mouth pieces and little else. Their responsibility is now primarily
to the people of the nation they represent and their duty of a dis-
tinctly negative character in that they must do nothing to commit
their governments to anything which has not had the sanction of
legislation. Nor must they initiate anything or precipitate any
situation requiring legislation. Diplomacy now begins at home and
the voice of the people as heard in their own legislative halls is
the only safe guide for another people to listen to in formulating
foreign policy. Properly to interpret the will of the people from
what goes on in their parliament is probably the most important
duty an accredited minister has. To attempt to influence parlia-
mentary opinion directly or officially is probably the worst of
modern diplomatic crimes. Diplomats who work overtime at diplo-
macy now are soon recalled. When wars were more the result of
intrigue and non-national in character, it was important to know
just to what extent nationals as a whole would support such a war.
Since the World War it has become evident that war, when it
comes for any reason, will be supported by a whole nation with
every ounce of resource it has. Since the people themselves may be
expected to declare war in the future, it may be expected that they
will intend to prosecute it as a people. Not even a diplomat would


  p. 1158 (#66)                       

1158
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
be able to discover an ulterior motive behind a future declaration
of war. It will be evident from before the firing of the first gun
that a situation exists beyond the possibility of diplomatic help.
Two peoples will have decided that only the sword can bring a de-
cision, presumably after a genuine effort has been made to arbi-
trate. War, unless strictly localized, is bound to become such a
general nuisance to the rest of the world (since it has been found
impossible to preserve the rights of neutrals) that combatants will
probably be forced to discontinue their war by concerted action of
other nations hastily organized as a vigilance committee.
The very fact that a war must be popular in the future to receive
the support necessary to its successful prosecution makes arbitra-
tion much more likely to succeed in preventing war. It is unlikely
that a recourse to arms will ever again be popular enough to pre-
vent an acceptable decision by arbitration, unless the real casus
belli is inflamed racial antipathy. Arbitration seeks to effect a
stable settlement of international disputes though it is questionable
whether such settlement can include the removal of basic causes.
In effecting a stable settlement, the commission or court of arbi-
tration in session must take into consideration a number of factors
which have to do with the respective abilities of the contestants to
maintain such settlement. A disarmed nation should not be given
wealth or responsibilities that it cannot or will not protect, no
matter how theoretically just its cause may be. It is idle to give a
decision based on theoretical justice if it imposes impossible re-
sponsibilities and duties. An example of the sort of arbitration a
defeated country may expect was the decision to make a wholesale
transfer of nationals to their respective countries recently effected
Ly Turkey and Greece. Such a typically Oriental procedure, while
apparently strictly impartial and equally just, is, in effect, inter-
ference in legitimate personal and national liberty, which has for
its inspiration ulterior and illegitimate motives repugnant to mod-
ern civilization. This precedent is not likely to be followed in the
future.
With the passing of secret diplomacy and the advent of definite
national aims laid boldly on the table, it is possible to arbitrate with
some chance of success. Arbitration is necessarily a compromise.
If intelligent, it seeks to create stable conditions where trouble
exists. Stable conditions are secured when the most vital interests


  p. 1159 (#67)                       

1925)
1159
Armament by Example and Arbitration
are satisfied and the more temperamental and sentimental interest
involved are permitted to save face. Vital interests are those on
which a nation's foreign policy is based. Too general resort to
arbitration on comparatively trivial issues will tend to keep the big
issues "out of court” as these must be settled, not on technicalities,
but in a way which disposes of the issue involved. An inter-
national court of justice has very little “law” to work with in the
first place. The more it has to invoke, the more will its decisions
be technical and the less will it settle issues brought before it.
Upon what a court of arbitration must base its findings and de-
cision is the ability of the contestants to maintain amicable rela-
tions as a result of the decision. And here comes in the test of the
good faith of the contestants. Were a court of arbitration to base
its findings purely on theoretical justice to all nations considered
as equally responsible regardless of the mental equipment and
peculiar racial characteristics of the nationals, a direct invitation
to small and poorly governed nations to nurse extravagant preten-
tions and to bring them up for arbitration is offered.
Arbitration should be the final peaceful attempt to obtain a
mutually satisfactory settlement before war is considered to be
inevitable. When the vital character of the respective clashing
interests makes mutual adjustment impossible, then arbitration
should be invoked. Nations which cannot adjust their difficulties
between themselves must expect that adjustment by arbitration
will be somewhat in the interests of the rest of the world. As an-.
noyed neutrals, the rest of the world will be interested should ad-
justment fail and war result. It is nothing new in history or
government for individuals voluntarily to surrender individual
rights to a higher power in return for better protection in the exer-
cise of remaining individual rights. This is the basis of self gov-
ernment. It will be the basis of future peace and of future
international law and order. If arbitration is generally resorted
to as the final court of international appeal to which only the vital
issues are presented for settlement, and, if the decisions of such a
court are such as promote the general welfare in their execution,
a refusal to abide by such a decision, which results in war, will
automatically outlaw that war as aggressive and give ample author-
ity for a combination of neutral nations to suppress such war by
force, and this without in any way imposing on them the blame


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
for starting general hostilities. It is only by making arbitration
representative of international welfare and by the enforcement of
its verdicts that aggressive war can be practically outlawed.
The awards of arbitration are bound to be disappointing to both
contestants where each have vital interests at stake. It will, how-
ever, be easier for one of the disputants to surrender claims in the
interests of world welfare than to surrender them at the bayonet's
point of an adversary and entirely in the interests of that adver-
sary. It is infinitely better to concede with a saved face than to
lose with a black eye. So long as the aggressor is free from inter-
ference by the rest of the world, so long will he discount either
losing or the black eye, and will go ahead to seek a decision by
war. Should arbitration show him the way out peacefully and he
refuse to take it, and should a decision to fight insure that he can
gain thereby only isolation and hard knocks, he will have nothing
to gain by war and everything to lose.
Assuming that arbitration will have its awards enforced, it can
so limit the scope of intelligent though belligerently inclined
people as to make war futile. However, arbitration must be an
appreciable and evident asset to the world in general if it is to
have the requisite international backing. Law is developed by
human beings for the safe conduct of mutual relations. Hence,
we have the policeman to prevent infractions of the law and to
insure its observance. International law is developed by inter-
national agreement for the protection of neutral and nonbelliger-
ent rights and for the conduct of war as humanely as possible.
Common law presupposes a state of peace which it seeks to pre-
serve. International law presupposes a state of war which it seeks
to ameliorate. Each seeks to limit the scope of prospective dis-
turbance, the policeman by the timely application of his prestige as
an agent of force or by the application of the force itself legally
at his disposal. International law has only its prestige to compel
observance, a prestige accumulated through centuries of warfare
in which humanity again and again has asserted itself. Certain
laws are fundamental in nature and are obeyed instinctively by all
peoples. The great majority of statutes are man-made to cover
particular weaknesses in government, society, or economic con-
ditions. As such, they require enforcement. International law,
though idealistic, is no less man-made and requires enforcement


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1925)
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Armament by Example and Arbitration
if it is to be effective in a world of nations in which crowd psy-
chology is still likely to take charge in a warlike direction. Just as
international law is based on common agreement, so it must be en-
forced either by common action in support or by the establishment
of an international military force. An international army is dis-
pleasing to any responsible government. It is the essence of the
mercenary spirit and the forerunner of a world state with all the
communistic stagnation which that implies. Concerted action in
support of the awards of arbitration, forceful if necessary, is the
only possible and acceptable method in sight for the establishment
of international law as an instrument capable of outlawing
aggression.
In spite of what some theorists and pacifists say, peace is not
at present a normal state of society. It is, however, very necessary
that civilization should have the benefit of longer and longer
periods of peace if peace is to become normal. The virus of war
persists in a dormant state for several generations.
Peace, like law, must be practicable to be enforced. Like law,
it must be enforced for a period long enough to determine whether
public opinion will be converted into instinctive respect and support
of peace for peace's sake, or whether such peace as exists is found
to be imperfect and not entitled to further support. A peace
which is neither respected nor supported will not last long. There-
fore, peace terms must be as carefully considered as a commitment
to peace, as a declaration of war is a commitment to war. It is
much easier to keep the peace than it is to make peace, as actual
war distorts and inflames official and private judgment to such an
extent that in war time it becomes easier to continue war than to
make peace. Excessive peace-time armament is merely a symptom
of some cause for war for which conflict of unreasonable national
aspirations is responsible. Disarmament in peace time may
equally be considered a symptom of unhealthy conditions provoca-
tive of war. To prevent conflict of national aspirations is to pre-
vent war. That controlled armament in peace time is an aid in
the prevention of unreasonable national aspiration is almost ob-
vious. If armament be controlled by common agreement among
all nations capable of raising armies and building navies, peace is
practically assured, not by equality or ratios of military and naval
strength, but by the demonstration that the various nations can


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
agree on anything so vital to each as their own national defense.
Unfortunately, this happy state of agreement and trust in each
other does not exist, though the Washington Treaty for the Limi-
tation of Armaments was a step in that direction. What does exist
at present is an inclination to outlaw unreasonable pretentions
which harbor the germ of war. There is no evidence, even in
religion, to prove that the world can outlaw war any more than it
can outlaw the weather. Either scheme is so absurdly imprac-
ticable that none but fanatics advocate such futility. The ability
and disposition to fight is inherent in man as a result of centuries
of physical struggles which have made him supreme among the
living things of the world. Fortunately, his reasoning power has
developed as fast as his fighting ability, though it has often been
submerged in vicious wars and prostituted to lethal ingenuity. The
very fact that reasoning power is now developing under the stimu-
lus of science and free from theological dogma at a rate unusual
in former generations, creates, simultaneously with an insight into
the causes of war, a foresight with which to prevent war. This
foresight is developing faster in Europe than it is in the United
States where foresight in international affairs has been stunted
by the rank growth of an isolation policy so long cultivated that
Americans are lazily content to subsist on peace much as a south
sea islander does on bananas. We have neither courted nor
caused wars through our international relations. We have always
fought more or less efficiently when war was thrust upon us. We
have never lost a war, principally because we were always either
plentifully supplied with allies or because we engaged some nation
considerably weaker than ourselves. We have never yet stood on
our two feet alone against a powerful foreign antagonist. We
have never done anything to foresee war, understand its causes,
or prevent war through attempts to understand our international
neighbors and their aspirations. We have never protected our-
selves from a possible war other than to isolate ourselves in hope
that the storm would blow over. We are again sniffing at approach-
ing storm clouds like cattle and turning our tails to the wind. Not
even the shepherd dogs in our Congress, Army and Navy can get
the herd in motion to a place of security. Europe is setting us an
example of "Armament by Example” which we would do well to
follow. Moreover, should Europe be convinced that we are again


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Armament by E.rample and Arbitration
sunk into Oriental dreams of pacifism and neglectful of the po-
tential strength of fighting man power we really possess, practically
the last check on another armament race abroad is removed. By
cooperating with Europe in an intelligent program of adequate
general armament based on the spirit and provisions of the 5-5-3
naval ratio, thereby demonstrating our intention to remain as
strong as the strongest, and by demonstrating our ability to out-
build and outarm any of them at short notice, we become a force
for peace with which every belligerently inclined nation must
reckon.
To have peace we must understand its responsibilities as well
as its benefits. We must tax ourselves and surrender certain
rights to independence of action just as we do when we establish
a government maintaining law and order. Peace is man-made,
man-maintained, and is the result of man's determination to have
peace. Man's method has been, is now, and perhaps ever will be,
to fight for what he gets, including peace, if he can't get it in any
other way. We must recognize this and prevent fighting by elim-
inating cause for it. Woman's way to get anything has always
been to work, to pray, or to argue for it. They are usually suc-
cessful, if clever, but in the final analysis, they can never over-
come their relative inferiority in fighting ability and therefore
never dare to trust a vital decision to battle. What else is pacifism
than this feminine fear of and exasperation with war? A pacifist
and most women are afraid of war for they know themselves to be
incompetents as fighters. They would emasculate their men in
the hope thereby of arousing such general hatred of war as would
feminize the world. There is little reason to hope that this ideal
state of negative virtue would produce peace. There are always
more things wanted than there are things not wanted by either
men or women, militarists or pacifists. It is the wanting of things
which causes conflict. Conflict results in war. Wants are relative
and can be controlled and directed by common counsel and by
common action, enforcement of reason, and by the threat of bloody
and certain defeat. Nations which want war are possessed of a
dangerous mania. We do not give a madman his way. We re-
strain him by force and administer his affairs in trust.
Peace which atrophies the will to fight is a dangerous and de-
generate peace for it destroys its own safeguards and jeopardizes


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
its own existence. Peace is one of the things to be fought for from
time to time. It is but a relative state of conflict in which actual
sanguinary combat is suspended for the temporary exercise of
other competitive methods. When the competitive methods of
peace become unfair and wrongs are perpetrated, resort is had
again to fighting. There is no way to avoid fighting so long as un-
fairness and wrong are tolerated. Unfairness and wrong are also
relative. It is seldom the case that only one party to a disagree-
ment is wrong and the other right. Both are usually wrong if
there is disagreement, but one is more wrong than the other, de-
pending on which puts forth the more preposterous pretentions.
The maintenance of peace or rather of peaceful competition de-
pends absolutely on control of national aspirations and national
pretention within reasonable limits. If there is any better way to
control these causes for war than by making defeat certain for
any nation harboring them, neither history nor ethics have been
able to demonstrate it. In order to make defeat certain for trans-
gressors, there must exist the means for defeating them appor-
tioned among the nations of the world in a ratio which permits to
each nation adequate defense to hold off aggression until such time
as other nations sworn to enforce peace can bring the weight of
their armaments to bear in crushing the aggressor. Man learns
by experience. A few lessons of this sort demonstrating quick and
certain defeat will soon serve to make war unpopular. Such gen-
eral preparedness and common action, impossible without pre-
paredness, will reduce the cost of fighting to that of ordinary
insurance. It may be difficult to get the nations of the world to
agree to common action but it will be much easier to do so if they
have already agreed to limit their armaments and to maintain their
armaments at the agreed ratio. So long as each nation is free to
arm in accordance with its own unchecked ideas of its national
place in the sun or in accordance with its unwarranted fears, so
long will distrust of each other prevent cooperation in a common
cause.
Disarmament or neglect of armament simply transfers the bur-
den of waging war more directly to every man, woman and child
in the country. A defenseless nation has no right to remain un-
molested for it is a poor support in the international frame work
of general peace. A nation which refuses to maintain its pro-


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Armament by E.rample and Arbitration
portionate share of the burden of armaments and at the same time
to enjoy the privileges of peace enforced by the armament of other
nations is a cheat and a parasite besides being a potential source of
trouble which will cause additional armaments in other countries.
Adequate and proportionate armament is the bulwark behind which
a country is given the chance to mobilize when war is thrust upon
it. The better those bulwarks the better the mobilization possible,
the less waste of blood and treasure, and the more hopeless a task
for an aggressor to break through. A nation mobilized behind its
military and naval forces must be destroyed or let alone. To de-
stroy a nation so prepared is a moral and economic crime of which
no future nation or combination of nations will dare be guilty.
To despoil a pacifist nation unwilling to protect itself from aggres-
sion and willing only to enjoy peace without paying for it, is to
follow only the economic laws of man and the immutable law of
nature. It is not possible to destroy a pacifist people as the history
of the Hebrew race for 2,500 years can testify. It is possible to
prevent such people from governing themselves, however, and such
will be the fate of any people who count freedom and self govern-
ment of so little spiritual worth as not to be worth fighting for.
Such people are not even let alone but are herded from country
to country and from occupation to occupation like sheep-always a
problem, sometimes an asset, yet never welcome. How much bet-
ter to rest alertly and securely on one's arms, free to develop and
to practice the arts of peace under a national government congenial
to racial type and temperament.
“Disarmament by Example" is a state of mind. "Armament by
Example” is a state of security. Which will our grandchildren
prefer as a heritage?


  p. 1166 (#74)                       

“LEST WE FORGET”
By COMMODORE E. B. UNDERWOOD, U. S. Navy, RET.
TN MY younger years in the service, some forty or fifty years
1 ago, I used to hear a good deal about "Horse” Tyler and
"P.J." Miller, the former prominent for his dry remarks and
the latter noted as a teller of tall tales. Frequent mention of both
these worthies continued till I was well on into middle life, but
gradually they were quoted with less and less frequency and for a
great many years now I have scarcely heard their names men-
tioned. For a long time I looked to see such well known naval
characters put on record in some service publication, but if this
were ever done, it escaped me. Feeling that some account of the
two ought to be committed to the "permanency of print," I am
undertaking the job myself, although well aware that there are
some of the old timers still living better fitted for the work than
am I.
"HORSE" TYLER
"Horse" Tyler was Hanson R. Tyler, of the class of 1870,
U.S.N.A. I was with him for one year at the Naval Academy, but,
as I was a plebe, I knew him only by sight. He had a long, be-
nignant looking countenance, which characteristic, I have no doubt,
gained for him the name of “Horse.”
After my graduation in 1873, I never was associated with him
either afloat or ashore, though I met him, en passant, at rare inter-
vals. However, I, like everybody else, heard much about him.
He was at one time attached to the receiving ship at Boston, and
one of his shipmates there told me that he and “Horse" once went
to consult a well known Boston medium. When "Horse's” turn
came, the medium asked him with whom he would like to com-
municate, and "Horse” replied “Charlotte.” After several un-
successful attempts to make the connection, the medium said,
"Perhaps if the gentleman will give me the lady's full name, we
can do better," to which “Horse” solemnly replied, “Charlotte
Russe," and was very properly invited to leave the room.


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Lest Wc Forget
My informant also told me that the paymaster of the receiving
ship was one of the good natured kind who allowed “Horse” to
draw his pay every day, which shows that he always sailed close
to the wind. He was, however, always willing to contribute in a
small way, the only way possible, to any charitable cause, provided
he could sign for the amount and have it taken off the books! It
is to be inferred, then, that "Horse” was witty, improvident and
charitable. He was also convivial.
I can still remember one or two of the stories told about him.
One time when he was officer-of-the-deck, he had to hoist a piano
on board, about which he had evidently received precise instruc-
tions. He successfully accomplished the task, and just before land-
ing the instrument, he gave the unmusical order, “Teeth aft, boys,
teeth aft, slew her a bit !"
At another time he was attached to a ship, the commanding offi-
cer of which took great interest in a rain gauge that he had had
mounted on the starboard quarter of the ship. (The command-
ing officer, by the way was, if my memory does not play me false,
the late Adimral Sampson.) All of the watch officers had been
cautioned to give special care to this gauge. One night when
"Horse" was officer-of-the-deck, the ship got to rolling deeply.
Somebody had evidently cast off the spanker sheet, for the boom
made a full sweep to starboard, demolishing the gauge and knock-
ing part of it overboard. “Horse” called the orderly and directed
him to report the occurrence to the commanding officer, and then
he added the caution, “And break it to him gently, orderly, break
it to him gently!”
Poor old "Horse !" His customary salutation on taking a drink
with a friend was “Happy Days.” But his own happy days were
not so long as they should have been, for he began to break early.
In 1896, he was relegated to the retired list, and in 1900 he died,
being then only about fifty years of age. He is now little more
than a memory, a memory ever growing fainter and fainter.
“PL."
"P.J.” (Philip J. Miller) was a boatswain, who died about fifty
years ago. He was an efficient boatswain but not more so than
some of his fellows. Nevertheless, he was one of the best known


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
officers of the Navy, and, as already intimated, his fame was based
on his ability as a teller of marvelous yarns.
I had a contact with him, for I made the summer practice cruise
in 1870, it was a foreign cruise, in the old sailing sloop-of-war
Savannah, of which he was boatswain. In the second dog watches
at sea, he generally had a large and attentive group of midshipmen
gathered around him listening to his yarns. I will say for him
that, barring a little profanity, he never told us anything dis-
reputable.
I know nothing of “P.J.'s" early history, but I know that he
received his warrant as boatswain in 1856, and I presume that to
get it he traveled the enlisted route as was customary then and I
believe is still so. I know not what duty fell to his lot during the
Civil War, but I am sure that such duty was faithfully and patri-
otically performed. As already intimated, I first made his acquaint-
ance in 1870.
"P.J.'s” yarns were always of a laughter-provoking nature and
they generally had a nautical flavor. An analysis of them would,
I think, show three leading characteristics—gross exaggeration,
great detail, and a modicum of profanity. And now for a few of
his yarns, or yarns about him.
Once when “P.J." was attached to one of our ships on the China
Station, the Prince of Wales, then making a tour around the world,
remained in a certain port for several days visiting his brother, the
Duke of Edinburgh, who was in the English Navy and attached to
a ship on that station. One evening "P.J.," who had been ashore,
returned to the ship with a bundle under his arm. The officer-
of-the-deck happening to ask what he had there, received the in-
formation that he had been to call on his friend, the Prince of
Wales, who had given him a cashmere shawl to take home to Mrs.
Miller. Saying this he started to step over the hatch coaming in
order to descend the ladder, and the motion dislodging his pack-
age, it fell to the deck and opened, disclosing two dried codfishes.
These "P.J." gathered up and fled below in great confusion. An
account of this occurrence was evidently conveyed by "P.J.'s"
captain to the Prince of Wales, through the Duke of Edinburgh.
The next day when the Prince returned the call the captain had
made on him, after greeting the captain, he appeared to look cas-
ually around and catching sight of "P.J.” with his whistle in his


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Lest We Forget
hand, stepped up to him and with great cordiality, said, “Why,
Mr. Miller, I am delighted to see you again.” It was reported
that, for once in his life, “P.J.” was so embarrassed that he could
not utter a word.
"P.J." used to tell of an occasion when he was making a cruise
with Admiral and Mrs. Farragut, in the frigate Franklin, if mem-
ory serves. A strong gale was blowing and the admiral was on
the poop with his storm clothes on. When "P.J." related the story,
he used to say, “Pretty soon he saw me getting up the preventer
braces, and he immediately went below. When he reached the
cabin, Mrs. Farragut remarked, 'Why, Dave, I thought you never
came below in this kind of weather. To which the Admiral re-
plied, 'I saw “P.J." on deck, and I knew there was no need for us
both to be there. The next day when the gale had blown itself
out and everything had quieted down Mrs. Farragut sent for me
to come to the cabin and when I got there she said, 'I want to thank
you, "P.J." for the way you are looking out for the admiral and
me, and if you will go and get me a bottle, I will fill it with attar
of roses that I want you to take home to Mrs. Miller. I went be-
low to the dispensary and got the smallest sized bottle they had and
returned with it to the cabin. On seeing it, Mrs. Farragut said,
""P.J.," what's that you have in your hand ?' I replied, 'That's the
bottle for the attar of roses.' She took it from me and tossed it
out of the port, saying, 'To hell with that, "P.J."; now go and get
a real bottle.' I went below and got an old whiskey bottle and
took it to her. On seeing it, she said, “That is something like,' and
reaching under a transom, she pulled out a five-gallon jimmy-john
of attar of roses, and, filling my bottle, handed it to me saying,
'Now take that home and give it to Mrs. Miller, with my love.'”
I will now add two short yarns of “P.J.'s." These are prob-
ably not his best, but I give them because their authenticity is un-
doubted, they having staid with me since the old Savannah days
of 1870.
The ship to which “P.J." was attached was anchored in from
five to six fathoms of water, with thirty fathoms of chain out, the
day was windless, and, as it was between tides, the ship was riding
to a slack chain. Suddenly a furious wind squall burst upon the
ship from right ahead, causing her to tauten out her chain and


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Ü. S. Naval İnstitute Proceedings
bring up on her anchor with such force as not only to trip it, but,
in addition, to throw it high in air, and in coming down it landed
on the fore topsail yard and jammed there, giving "P.J." great
difficulty when he came to send it down.
Again, he was in a ship at sea, with a gale blowing up stronger
and stronger. The executive officer had taken the deck and got
the topsails close reefed and the storm sails set, when a stronger
blast of wind than usual blew one of the crew overboard and he
was lost, the sea being much too heavy to lower a boat in. The
executive, maintaining himself with much difficulty on the horse
block, gave the order for all hands to crouch below the weather
rail, where they would be out of the wind. This was done and
shortly thereafter an unusual noise was heard to windward, when,
in the words of "P.J.," "Curiosity got the better of the starboard
mainmastman, no, I'm a g-d-liar, it was the captain of the port
watch of afterguard, and he stuck his head above the rail, and just
at that moment an extraordinary hard gust of wind took him in the
face and blew every last one of his teeth down his throat, so that
ever after the broad of his back looked like he'd had the small-
pox!”
After leaving the Savannah I lost sight of “P.J." till toward the
end of 1875, when the Hartford, which had been our flagship in
China, came home through the Mediterranean, picking up a num-
ber of midshipmen, of whom I was one, due for examination for
promotion. I then learned that “P.J.” had been the Hartford's
boatswain and had died suddenly, probably from apoplexy, when
the ship was at Hong Kong the previous June. I should say that
he could not have been over forty-five years old when he died. He
was buried in the foreign cemetery at Hong Kong and the officers
and enlisted men of the Hartford united in putting up a suitable
stone over his grave. There should have been graven on it, and
no doubt in life "P.J." would not have objected, the couplet that
I have seen in Westminster Abbey on the stone in honor of one of
the old English poets—Gay, isn't it?-- which couplet is said to
have been composed by himself. It runs
Life is a jest and all things show it
I thought so once and now I know it.


  p. 1171 (#79)                       

1925)
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Lest We Forget
Last December, I saw a home-made Christmas card to "one An-
cient Mariner from Another." This is part of the versification
thereon:
Gone are “Horse" Tyler and likewise “P. J.,"
Whose yarns and sayings we thought O.K.,
They're off the stage, their day is o'er,
And we shall see their like no more.
That we are still here
Is our Christmas cheer.
The assertion that "we shall see their like no more" is un-
doubtedly true. Each of them was sui generis, and we shall not
see their equivalents, nor will the generations that come after us
see them.


  p. 1172 (#80)                       

THE GAS MASK AND THE NEXT,WAR
By Lieut. COMDR. DUNCAN C. WALTON (MC), U. S. Navy
TP TO the time of the World War but little attention was
paid to gas masks. A few commercial companies had de-
vised crude apparatus for the use of employees who might
be accidently exposed to injurious gases during certain industrial
processes, but these masks were usually designed to protect against
one gas only and the protection afforded was only intended to last
for a short period. But with the development of chemical war-
fare, from its introduction in 1915 to the end of the war the prob-
lem of the gas mask assumed tremendous importance, and many
of the best scientists of the warring nations devoted their full
energies to the development of better protection for their troops.
How highly succes 'ey were we shall see later.
But this very success has led to an unfortunate situation.
Following the war many statements were issued by the various war
ministries extolling the virtues of their gas masks and in almost
all instances these statements claimed that their masks protected
against all gases. In addition to the above an unfortunate popular
misconception of the value of the gas mask arose from the methods
used during the war in training personnel in the use of the gas
mask. In order that the men should have complete confidence in
their masks and use them on every occasion when gas was present
they were assured that the gas masks protected against any and
all “war-gases.” This was true, as the gases likely to be used
were all known, and as new agents were introduced the mask was
modified to meet the new danger. But with the Armistice a large
number of men were returned to civilian life and permitted to
take their gas masks. They also took with them the idea that the
gas mask was infallible. A considerable number of accidents then
occurred from these men wearing their masks in emergencies
which the masks were never intended to protect against such as
fires in closed compartments and buildings, fumigation accidents,
accidents in closed spaces in which for some reason the oxygen


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The Gas Mosk and the Next War
content of the atmospheric air was reduced below the safety point,
enormous concentrations of lethal gases in chemical fires, etc.
In addition to these accidents in civilian life a small number of
accidents have occurred in the public services from men wearing
the masks into poisonous atmospheres against which the gas mask
was not intended to protect. As a result a slight distrust of the
masks has arisen among some of the personnel, and the intro-
duction of proper gas discipline is impossible unless the personnel
has full confidence in its masks.
A lack of confidence in the mask arising from the above causes
can be easily swept away by any competent gas officer but there
exists at present a more serious cause for popular doubts as to the
efficacy of the war mask. This cause can be found in the "Next
War Fairy-tale." This fairy-tale has been popular for ages and
has varied from time to time with the progress of science and the
parallel progress of the weapons of war. Since 1918, however,
the fairy-tale has taken a new form, and, curiously enough, stuck
to it with a few minor modifications. It can be found frequently
in the Sunday supplements of the yellowr n als and quite fre-
quently in the weekly magazines. In these chevry efforts to peer
into the future the usual sequence of events is as follows. Nations
A and B decide to go to war. A's forces make certain prepara-
tions, using methods which indicate that they richly deserve what
they are shortly going to get, for the higher command appears to
have fallen into the hands of morons. In the midst of these
preparations a B force of hundreds of thousands of airplanes,
miraculously gathered over-night (like Bryan's army) appears,
sweeps away the pitiful resistance of A's planes and then proceeds
systematically to bomb A's forces and cities. In this bombing a .
“mysterious” new gas is always used, a gas that instantly pierces
A's gas masks and causes the immediate death of all exposed. In
some of these stories the gas is released from myriads of tanks
or submarines, whose existence no one had suspected. But in all
cases such factors as weight of gas, distance or weather, never
seem to have any effect on either the clever B or his super-gas.
Now probably ninety-nine out of one hundred readers skim
through these next-war stories and let it go at that. The hundredth
very often is an army or navy officer and the constant reiteration of
this mask-piercing gas myth worries him. And he begins to ask,


  p. 1174 (#82)                       

1174
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
“What use are these gas masks and the constant drills in their use
if in the next war they won't stop a new gas?” This question
brings us at once to the subject matter of this article. What is
a gas mask? How does it work and what principles make it work?
What old or as yet undiscovered gases can pierce it and what are
the reasonable chances of such gases being produced and put over
in a future war? Before the year 1915 gas masks were used to a
limited extent in certain industries. They were of very simple
construction, generally consisting of metallic or rubber facepiece
covering the mouth and nose, this facepiece containing a sponge
or pad saturated with alkaline chemicals if an acid gas was to be
guarded against, or acid chemicals if an alkaline gas such as
ammonia were present. In other industries such as stone-cutting,
cement-works and certain processes of the cotton trade simple dust
filters were provided to protect the lungs from irritant particles in
the inspired air.
Practically all advances in the gas mask date from the intro-
duction of modern gas warfare which occurred on April 22, 1915,
when the Germans delivered the first chemical attack of modern
times. Chlorine was the gas used and the casualties were about
5,000 men; sixty guns were lost, which at that time was an
enormous loss to the Allies. The gas used was quickly identified by
the Allies and measures adopted to guard against future attacks.
Following an appeal by Lord Kitchener the women of England
in twenty-four hours turned out 100,000 pad masks consisting of
five or six layers of flannel or cotton wrapped in muslin. These
pads were to be soaked in a solution of sodium carbonate and
sodium thiosulphate (hypo) just prior to use and were fastened
over the mouth and nose. The chemicals gave excellent protection
for a limited time, but the shape of the mask was poor, and it
required frequent wetting. It was replaced by the black veil
respirator, which consisted of a length of black veiling containing
a pad saturated with a solution of sodium carbonate, hypo, and
glycerin. The glycerin kept the pad moist by its hygroscopic
properties and also prevented freezing. While this was an im-
provement over the first device the shape was not satisfactory,
leaving passageways for gas down the side of the nose. It was
therefore replaced by a flannel helmet with celluloid eye-pieces,
dipped in the same solution as the black veil respirator. No


  p. 1175 (#83)                       

1925)
1175
The Gas Mask and the Next War
sooner had this helmet been issued than it was discovered that
the Germans intended to use a gas, Phosgene, (COC1.,), ten times
more toxic than chlorine and much more difficult to protect against.
The Intelligence Department of the British Army by a remark-
able piece of work were able to report in July, 1915, not only that
the Germans were going to use phosgene but to give the date,
December, 1915, and the sector, Messines Ridge, in which it was
to be used. It became at once necessary to devise means of pro-
tection against this expected attack, and the helmet was further
modified. In fact from July, 1915, up to the present the develop-
ment of the gas mask is comparable to the development of armor
against ordnance; as the use of new chemical agents was either
expected or actually occurred the mask was modified again and
again until the present highly efficient but by no means final form
has been achieved.
To resume, the British prepared for the expected phosgene
attack by dipping their helmets in a new solution consisting of
caustic soda, carbolic acid, and glycerine. An excess of caustic
soda was used, which gave protection against chlorine and some
protection against hydrocyanic acid, the possible introduction of
the latter into warfare being greatly feared at that time. The
caustic soda combined with the carbolic acid to form sodium
phenolate which neutralized, and so protected, against phosgene.
Although the protection given by this helmet was good, and it
saved many lives, it was found that the protection against phosgene
could be improved by the addition of hexamethylene tetramine
(urotropin) to the dipping solution, and this was done. These
helmets did not protect against tear gases and it was necessary
to wear goggles which fitted the skin tightly under the helmet when
in the presence of lachrymatory gases.
The French during this period of the war were using a mask
known as the M2. It consisted of a number of layers of cloth
saturated with a solution very similar to the British mixture with
the addition of nickel sulphate, castor oil and alcohol. This mask
was used by some French troops and by British labor battalions
up to the time of the Armistice.
The early German respirators were pads similar to the early
British pads. They were soon replaced by snout shaped impreg-


  p. 1176 (#84)                       

1176
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
nated cloths which fitted over the mouth and nose and were fairly
efficient.
By the winter of 1915 a number of gases were in use. The
chemists of all warring nations were bending their energies to the
development and production of newer and deadlier compounds,
and those responsible for the designing of gas masks saw that
cloth helmets and pads were doomed, for it was impossible to
continue indefinitely the addition of more and more layers of cloth
impregnated with a sufficient variety of chemicals to neutralize
the infinite number of gases that might be employed, and at the
same time to add enough of each chemical to resist an overwhelm-
ing concentration of any one gas, as the mask would become so
thick that it would be impossible to breathe through it. Therefore,
the gas defense laboratories of the warring nations were compelled
to consider other means of protection, and in all countries the
solution of the problem was fundamentally the same. This solu-
tion consisted in the use of a gas proof facepiece to which was
attached—either directly or by means of a long hose—a canister
containing a mixture of a gas absorbent and a gas neutralizant.
When examined superficially there appear to be as many
different war-masks as there have been designers, but as said
before they are all based on the same principles. No effort will
be made here to consider the different facepieces in use. They are
constantly being modified with a view to affording better vision
and greater comfort, and facepiece designing is a science in
itself. Provided that the facepiece fits properly and is impermeable
to gases, it cannot affect the question of the penetrability of the
gas mask which will then depend altogether on the efficiency of
the canister.
In all the later war canisters the principal absorbent is activated
charcoal in granular form, and in most of them other chemical
granules are added. In the American canisters the second com-
ponent is known as soda lime. But there is a third indispensable
component of the canister. During the early years of the war the
chemical agents used were all put over in gaseous or in vapor
form. In an effort to pierce the allied masks the Germans in
June, 1917, began the use of smokes and toxic solids. These
smokes passed readily through the canister and could only be re-
moved by a mechanical filter. Such filters were soon devised and


  p. 1177 (#85)                       

1925)
1177
The Gas Mask and the Next War
consisted of paper, Turkish toweling, or cellulose pads attached to
the canister in such a way that the inspired air was forced to pass
through it, and in its passage all solid particles were mechanically
filtered out. As many of the toxic smoke particles were infinitely
small this filter had to be of a very fine weave which greatly in-
creased the breathing resistance and made the canister bulky. The
filter was therefore made wider and built into the canister, layers
of paper and Turkish toweling being placed in the bottom of the
canister in addition to the charcoal and soda lime. It was later
found that felt filters were much superior to either toweling or
paper, and felt filters replaced the earlier types in the American
masks.
The above paragraphs narrate briefly the history of the canister
up to the latter part of 1918. Before discussing the protective
value of the present mask and the probable lines along which its
future development may take place it would be well to consider
just what is desired in a canister. These requirements are as
follows:
1. The canister should be as small as possible.
2. The canister should not be fragile. It will have to stand
many hard knocks.
3. The resistance to breathing through the canister should be
as low as possible. Men exercising violently require a large amount
of air and any obstruction produces a sensation of choking. In no
instance should the resistance be over two inches of water at the
normal breathing rate. Very fine mesh granules increase the ab-
sorbent surface opposed to the gas, but increase the breathing re-
sistance unduly, if the layer is deep. In general, it may be said that
large cross-sectional shallow areas of fairly fine granules give
the best results.
4. The canister must remove from the inspired air all toxic
smoke and vapors used as chemical agents in warfare.
5. The absorbent must possess high activity—must purify the
air quickly and thoroughly. A man when exercising inhales about
sixty liters of air a minute. As inspiration occupies about half
a breathing cycle the air must pass through the canister at a rate
of about 100 liters per minute. Considering the size of the present
canister a given portion of the inspired air is only in contact with
the absorbent for about 0.1 of a second, which is a very brief


  p. 1178 (#86)                       

1178
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
space of time in which to purify it thoroughly. This purification
must be very thorough for while the concentration of a gas that
enters the canister may be as high as one half per cent, a leakage
of 0.001 per cent of chlorine would cause serious discomfort and
even smaller amounts would cause injury in the case of other more
toxic gases. The present canister does this removal very
effectively and with a large margin of safety. For example it
will reduce a concentration of 7,000 parts chlorpicrin per million
of air to less than 0.5 parts per million in less than 0.03 seconds.
It is particularly important that any naval canister should have
a high activity as chemical shells bursting in a closed compartment
aboard ship would set up much higher concentration of gas than
is possible in the field.
6. Absorptive capacity. In the field it is impracticable fre-
quently to replace canisters, so the canister must have a long life.
Therefore the canister must be able to absorb low concentrations
of gas over a long period of time—weeks or months—and still be
able to meet an attack with a higher concentration. This feature
is of less importance in naval practice where extra canisters can
be carried on board and issued as required. Another necessary
quality for an absorbent is that it must bind the gas firmly. Many
absorbents take up gases but do not hold them tenaciously and as
breathing through the canister continues, small amounts are re-
leased. The result would be the inhalation of a low concentration
of the toxic gas, which would prove disabling if continued for any
length of time.
7. Versatility. In factory practice it is customary to use a
canister designed especially for the one gas to be met with. Ob-
viously in military practice only one canister can be used and it
must be active against all known chemical agents and should have
qualities that will give protection against possible new and unknown
gases.
8. The absorbent must have great mechanical strength. The
cans will be constantly jostled about and weak granules would
break down and form finer particles and dust.
9. Canisters are often kept in storage for years before issue,
and after issue large quantities of air containing moisture, carbon
dioxide and toxic materials may be breathed in for months. The
absorbent must therefore possess marked chemical stability, that is


  p. 1179 (#87)                       

1925]
1179
The Gas Mask and the Ne.rt War
the components must not react with each other chemically, they
should not be easily oxidized, or affected by carbon dioxide and
should not contain any hygroscopic substance that would cause the
absorbent to become a pasty mass where air of high humidity is
breathed. It must not disintegrate after exposure to any of the
ordinary war gases and must not corrode either its container or
the smoke-filter.
10. When it is recalled that the English manufactured
16,000,000 masks during the war it can be seen that the canister
must be capable of easy manufacture from materials readily ob-
tainable in war time, and must be fairly cheap.
This is a formidable list of requirements to be met and it has
only been met by making certain sacrifices. In the case of soda
lime a certain amount of absorptive activity and capacity has to be
sacrificed in order to add binders which will give the necessary
strength. Other very desirable absorbents cannot be used at all
as they break down in moist air.
Charcoal is the only substance which approximately fulfills all
the requirements. When treated by special processes it becomes
"activated charcoal" which has, in brief, the following remarkable
properties.
It is very active, for the velocity with which it removes an easily
absorbable gas from an air stream passed over it is very high. It
is cheap and can be obtained in large quantities, especially if coal
is used as the raw material for its production. Charcoal has a very
high absorptive capacity, samples having been made in the
laboratory which will absorb more than their own weight of gas.
It is very stable chemically, carbon dioxide does not affect it and
while high humidity causes a decrease in its absorptive power this
is not due to any chemical change. Its versatility is remarkable
as it adsorbs practically all gases or vapors. This adsorption is
slight in the case of permanent gases, but none of them are highly
toxic. Unfortunately a few very volatile toxic gases such as arsine
and cyanogen chloride are not well handled by charcoal alone, but
these are disposed of by the mixture of charcoal and soda lime.
A granule of activated charcoal may be compared to a sponge,
as can other absorbent granules such as metallic oxides and silica
gels. They all contain an enormous number of capillary pores
which give a very large surface to which gases can adhere. It has


  p. 1180 (#88)                       

1180
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
been calculated that one c.c. of activated charcoal would contain
about 1,000 square centimeters of surface. The molecules of gas are
attracted to the surface of the carbon and firmly held, probably
first in a layer one molecule of gas deep, and in the case of carbon
this layer is held much more firmly than on oxides or adsorbent
gels. As more gas is adsorbed by the charcoal the layers of gas
molecules become deeper, and the outer portion of the gas layer is
held less firmly and begins to exert an appreciable vapor tension.
This second and third layer adsorption gradually passes to a third
kind of adsorption which exerts even higher vapor pressures. This
more loosely held gas is merely held by condensation in the fine
capillaries.
In general, the degree to which gases adsorb on substances runs
parallel to their boiling points, or more exactly to their critical
temperatures. For example, if a given sample of charcoal adsorbs
a certain amount of hydrogen it will adsorb five times as much
carbon monoxide which has a critical temperature 100° higher,
and 200 times as much ammonia which has a critical temperature
270° higher still.
There are certain exceptions to the rule, argon being one. And
even among substances with high critical temperatures and which
are readily adsorbed, when compared among themselves they show
irregularities in the firmness with which they are bound. In
general the more reactive gases are more firmly bound, indicating
that specific chemical forces between the charcoal and the gas aid
in the action of the adsorbent.
If a gas is adsorbed on charcoal and then another gas which
is more strongly adsorbed is passed over, a portion of the first gas
may be displaced, and usually a gas of high boiling point will
displace a gas of low boiling point previously adsorbed. When a
mixture of gases is passed over, the partial pressures of the two
gases will largely determine to what extent each will be adsorbed.
Naturally, if the charcoal is saturated with a strongly adsorbed
gas, another gas less strongly adsorbed will soon pass through the
layer, provided it is not soluble in the first gas in which case the
charcoal will adsorb more of the mixture than it will of either gas
separately.
Charcoal adsorbs moisture very rapidly, but gives it up very
easily when exposed to dry air. In this way the moisture of the


  p. 1181 (#89)                       

1925)
1181
The Gas Mask and the Next War
charcoal in the canister soon adjusts itself, and the charcoal is
soon as active as ever; while the moisture is present the adsorptive
power is reduced to a certain extent except against ammonia and
gases very soluble in water.
But while the adsorptive power of the charcoal is decreased, its
chemical activity against many gases is increased by water. Char-
coal can act as a catalyst and accelerates a number of reactions.
Its action is so marked in this respect that there are but few gases
which it does not decompose to some extent. Chlorine is partially
hydrolyzed by moist charcoal to hydrochloric acid, arsine is
oxidized in small amounts. In the case of phosgene the charcoal
catalyzes it into hydrochloric acid gas and carbon dioxide. If the
charcoal is moist the hydrochloric acid goes into solution in the
water present and is retained. However, if too much moisture is
present the charcoal capillaries and surface become merely a
water film, rather than an adsorbent and catalytic surface, and
while some of the phosgene is retained and hydrolyzed the bulk of
it breaks through immediately.
It has been seen that while charcoal acts to a limited extent
chemically and as a catalyst, its principal value comes from its
adsorptive power, so the greater surface it has the better adsorbent
it will be. In activated charcoal one-half its volume consists of
capillary pores, extremely minute in size, their average diameter
being about 5 X 107 cm. The walls of these capillaries must be
of amorphous carbon and great care is taken in the manufacturing
process that the carbon does not become of a graphitic character,
which is much less adsorptive than the amorphous. These walls
must also be cleared of any of the hydrocarbons left on them by
the first charring of the materials; the hydrocarbons consisting
of various oils, resins, etc., form a coating on the carbon which
interferes with its adsorptive activity. The requirements for the
manufacture of an active charcoal are: (1) It must have a high
and fine grained porosity. (2) It must consist of amorphous base
carbon. (3) It must be free from adsorbed hydrocarbons.
There are now several satisfactory methods of manufacture
which produce an excellent activated charcoal, the best being pro-
duced from the carbon from cocoanut shells. At the present time
most of the research work in this field is being devoted to the
development of activated charcoal from coal. Some of the samples


  p. 1182 (#90)                       

1182
[July
U. S. Naval İnstitute Proceedings
produced compare very favorably with the best cocoanut charcoal.
Although charcoal is a remarkable absorbent for most gases it
does not completely satisfy all the requirements, its deficiencies
being as follows: (1) Hydrocyanic acid, phosgene, and other
volatile gases are adsorbed only up to a certain extent. (2) Some
gases are best handled by oxidation and charcoal will not do this
by itself. (3) The gases in charcoal being held almost entirely
by adsorption, they exert a continuous slight vapor pressure and
show a tendency to be given off to the passing air. This is only
true if any considerable amount of gas has been taken up.
These deficiencies in charcoal make the use of an additional
absorbent necessary and this has been done by the use of an
alkaline oxidizing agent, soda lime, sprayed with sodium per-
manganate. These granules hold acid gases in a firm chemical
combination and rapidly oxidize easily oxidizable gases. In the
case of certain gases such as phosgene what occurs is that the gas,
at first adsorbed by the charcoal, is next slowly given up to the
soda-lime granule, which leaves the charcoal free to pick up the
next gas. Thus the soda lime reinforces the action of the charcoal,
acting as a permanent reservoir for the storage of certain gases.
Furthermore, in the case of phosgene it has been seen that the
charcoal hydrolyzes it to hydrochloric acid gas in the presence of
moisture, the charcoal acting as a catalyst. Hydrochloric acid is
very volatile and is not well held by the charcoal and so would
pass through if not held by the soda lime which readily seizes
large quantities of it.
Charcoal and soda lime also balance each other as follows:
when charcoal is heated it tends to give up a certain amount of its
adsorbed gases, and also adsorbs incoming gases much less readily.
The reverse is true of soda lime, which becomes more active with
an increase in the temperature, and so counterbalances the loss in
efficiency of the charcoal. The same is true of high humidity. As
the humidity increases the charcoal becomes slightly less efficient
against most gases, while soda lime becomes more effective.
Fries and West have furnished the following excellent de-
scription of soda lime:
The development of a satisfactory soda lime was a difficult problem.
The principal requirements follow: Its activity is not of vital importance,
as the charcoal is able to take up gas with extreme rapidity and then later


  p. 1183 (#91)                       

1925)
1183
The Gas Mask and the Nert l'ar
give it off more slowly to the soda lime. Absorptive capacity is of the
greatest importance, since the soda lime is relied upon to hold in chemical
combination a very large amount of toxic gas. Both chemical stability
and mechanical strength are difficult to attain. The latter had never been
solved until the war made some solution absolutely imperative.
Composition of Regular Army Soda Lime.—The exact composition of
the army soda lime has undergone considerable modification from time to
time as it has been found desirable to change the raw materials or the
method of manufacture. A rough average formula which will serve to
bring out the interrelation between the different constituents is as follows:
Composition of Wet Mix
Per cent
Hydrated lime ....
Cement .............
14
Kieselguhr .......
Sodium hydroxide ...
Water ......
33 (approx.)
After Drying
Moisture content
8 (approx.)
After Spraying
Moisture content ...........
......... 13 (approx.)
Sodium permanganate content ........................... 3 (approx.)
Within limits, the method of manufacture is more important than the
composition or other variables, and has been the subject of a great deal of
research work even on apparently minor details. The process finally adopted
consists essentially in making a plastic mass of lime, cement, kieselguhr,
caustic soda, and water, spreading in slabs on wire-bottomed trays, allowing
to set for two or three days under carefully controlled conditions, drying,
grinding, and screening to 8-14 mesh, and finally spraying with a strong
solution of sodium permanganate with a specially designed spray nozzle.
The spraying process is a recent development, most of the soda lime having
been made by putting the sodium permanganate into the original wet mix.
Many difficulties had to be overcome in developing the spraying process, but
it eventually gave a better final product, and resulted in a large saving of
permanganate which was formerly lost during drying, etc.
Function of Different Components
Lime.—The hydrated lime furnishes the backbone of the absorptive prop-
erties of the soda lime. It constitutes over fifty per cent of the finished dry
granule and is responsible in a chemical sense for practically all the gas
absorption.
Cement.-Cement furnishes a degree of hardness adequate to withstand
service conditions. It interferes somewhat with the absorptive properties of
the soda lime and it is an open question whether the gain in hardness pro-
duced by its use is valuable enough to compensate for the decreased ab-
sorption which results.


  p. 1184 (#92)                       

1184
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Kieselguhr.-The loss in absorptive capacity due to the presence of
cement is in part counterbalanced by the simultaneous introduction of a
relatively small weight though considerable bulk, of kieselguhr. In some
cases, there seems to be a reaction between the lime and the kieselguhr,
which results in some increase in hardness.
Sodium Hydroxide.-Sodium hydroxide has two primary functions in the
soda lime granule. In the first place, a small amount serves to give the
granule considerably more activity. The second function is to maintain
roughly the proper moisture content. This water content (roughly thirteen
to fourteen per cent after spraying) is very important, in order that the
maximum gas absorption may be secured.
Sodium Permanganate.—The function of the sodium permanganate is to
oxidize certain gases, such as arsine, and to act as an assurance of protec-
tion against possible new gases. The purity of the sodium permanganate
solution used was found to be one of the most important factors in making
stable soda lime. It was, therefore, necessary to work out special methods
for its manufacture. Two such methods were developed, and successfully
put into operation.
Careful selection of other material is also necessary, and this phase of
the work contributed greatly to the final development of the form of soda
lime.
While the percentage of the components of soda-lime is of great im-
portance, the method of manufacture is even more important. Slow
setting and drying in thick slabs, followed by grinding in such a way as to
produce the maximum amount of freshly broken surface on the granules
will produce a highly active granule.
The proportion of charcoal and soda lime to each other varies
in different types of canister. A very common type of canister
filling consists of charcoal sixty per cent and soda-lime forty per
cent.
The third air purifying component of the canister, the smoke
filter, has passed through a long developmental stage and is still
susceptible of great improvement. At first cotton pads were used,
but as methods of generating toxic smokes improved with the
result that very fine particles of the irritant smokes were released,
it was found that these pads did not purify the air sufficiently.
Thin creped wood pulp papers were tried, alternating with layers
of toweling. It was found that the pores in the paper were uneven
and the large pores permitted smoke particles to pass through.
An attempt was made to overcome this by having from forty to
eighty layers of paper, in the hopes that none of the large pores
would correspond in position. With the continual improvement in
toxic smokes it was seen in this country that the protection afforded


  p. 1185 (#93)                       

1925]
1185
The Gas Mask and the Next War
by the paper filters was not sufficient and felt was adopted as a
filtering material. This is very successful but very costly, and
the supply of felt during war-time is limited. The present filter
will remove even the finest particles from air passing through it.
This is accomplished by having a very finely meshed filter.
Naturally this finely meshed filter offers great obstruction to the
passage of air, and such a filter if incorporated in one of the older
canisters would cause too great obstruction to breathing. This
has been overcome in the present canister by wrapping the filter
all around the inner canister, which gives a much greater surface
for the air to pass through and so diminishes the resistance to
respiration. Probably the greatest obstacle to the development of
a smaller and more compact canister lies in this problem of air
resistance from the filter. If a filter could be developed, which
while of smaller cross-sectional area would still remove even the
smallest particles, and yet at the same time cause no greater ob-
struction to breathing than the present filter does, it would be
possible markedly to reduce the size of the present canister.
It has been shown that the present canister contains three purify-
ing components: charcoal, soda-lime and the filter. The following
classification, from the Chemical Warfare Textbook, Vol. 3, shows
what part of the canister is most active in absorbing the best known
war gases of the present time.
Gas
Principal Absorbent in Canister
Arsine.
. Charcoal-soda lime mixture
Arsenic trichloride ..... . Smoke filter and charcoal-soda lime mixture
Bensyl bromide ..............Charcoal
Brombenzylcyanide ..........Charcoal
Bromcyanogen ....... Charcoal
Chloracetone .............
..Charcoal
Chloracetophenone ...... . Smoke filter and charcoal
Chlorine ...............
.Charcoal-soda lime mixture
Chlorpicrin .............
.Charcoal
Cyanogen chloride ...........Charcoal
Diphenylchlorarsine ..........Smoke filter
Diphenylomine chlorarsine ... Smoke filter
Diphosgene (Perchlormethyl-
chlorformate) ........... Charcoal-soda lime mixture
Hydrocyanic acid .............Charcoal-soda lime mixture
Methyldichlorarsine .........Charcoal-soda limę mixture
Mustard gas ............6 ...Charcoal
........


  p. 1186 (#94)                       

1186
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Perchlormethylmercaptan .... Charcoal
Phosgene ......... .....Charcoal-soda lime mixture
Thiophosgene ........ ......Charcoal-soda lime mixture
Xylyl bromide ........ ......Charcoal
It is seen that in many cases the charcoal and soda lime both act
against a gas, reinforcing each other's action. It can also be seen
that the smokes (diphenylchlorarsine and diphenylamine chlorar-
sine) never reach the interior of the canister, being mechanically
stopped by the filter. In general the table shows that acid gases
are largely handled by the soda lime, reinforced by the charcoal,
and that the more stable and more complex substances are absorbed
by the charcoal alone. Furthermore, it can be seen that even after
an extensive attack with one chemical the canister is still perfectly
able to dispose of another different chemical, for example, even
prolonged exposure to a toxic smoke leaves the canister contents
in their original state of activity so far as gases are concerned.
Moreover, it must be strongly emphasized that when canisters
begin to be saturated and so permit gas to come through the
“break” does not come with a rush. For a considerable period
of time the canister operates at say ninety-eight per cent efficiency,
permitting a trace of the irritant chemical to come through and
giving the wearer warning in ample time that the canister should
be replaced by a fresh one.
To what extent does the present canister protect against known
gases and what gases pass through it? An absolutely accurate
answer to this question can not be given as it has never been
tested against many gases. This was considered unnecessary as
a precisely similar filling was tested in the old “H” canister and
the results published by Fieldner, Teague and Yoe. The figures
for the present canister and future possible modifications of it in
shape (not contents) will be very similar to the figures below. In
the following table only the figures relating to the standard filling
are quoted from the original. By "machine test” is meant a flow
of thirty-two liters of the gas-air mixture per minute through
the canister and corresponds to a man doing moderate work. A
“man test” is made by a man at rest breathing through the canister
and approximates 8.1 liters per minute.


  p. 1187 (#95)                       

1925]
1187
The Gas Mask and the Next War
.........
119
64
5,100
41
w
henone
.....
15
30
Average Results of Tests Against Various Gases
Gas
Concentration parts Kind of Life in
per million by volume Test Minutes
Ammonia ..
....... 40,000
Machine
0
Ammonia
5,000
Machine
Ammonia
2,500
Machine
Arsenic trichloride .....
500
Machine
Arsenic trichloride
2,000
Machine
Benzol .................
40,000
Machine
Benzol ................
10,000
Machine 14
Benzyl bromide ........
100
Machine 470
Brombenzyl cyanide
28
Machine
Carbon bisulfide
10,000
Machine
17
Chloracetone
2,000
Machine 226
Chloracetone ..
8,000
Machine
Chloracetophenone
Machine 1,800
Chloracetyl chloride
1,000
Machine 408
Chloracetyl chloride
10,000
Machine
Chlorine
5,000
Machine
Chlorine ..
10,000
Man
125
Chlorpicrin
17,500
Machine
Chlorpicrin.
10,000
Machine
Chlorpicrin
4,000
Machine
Chlorpicrin ........
500
Machine
Chlorpicrin.
4,000
Man
Cyanogen bromide
50,000
Machine
Cyanogen bromide
100
Machine
Cyanogen bromide
1,230
Man
Cyanogen chloride
500
Machine
Cyanogen chloride
1,000
Machine
14
Dichlordiethyl sulfide
100
Machine
Dimethyl sulfate .......
700
Machine 262
Hydrocyanic acid ..
250
Machine 217
Hydrocyanic acid
1,000
Machine
Hydrocyanic acid
........
2,500
Machine
Hydrocyanic acid
5,000
Machine
Hydrogen chloride
5,000
Machine
Hydrogen chloride
50,000
Machine
9
Hydrogen sulfide
10,000
Machine
Methylchlorarsine
2,500
Machine
Methylchlorarsine
Machine
Methylchlorarsine
500
Man
Nitrogen peroxide .......
1,500
Man
Perchlormethylchloroformate
2,000
Machine 56
Perchlormethylmercaptan ...... 1,500
Machine 40
Phenylamido phosgene ....... 250
Machine
754
263
295
60
21
.....
1,980
64
17
74
97
118
5,000
310


  p. 1188 (#96)                       

1188
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
47
297
-
32
70
42
Phosgene
5,000
Machine
Phosgene .........
5,000
Man
Sulfur dioxide
2,500
Machine
60
Sulfur dioxide
5,000
Machine
Sulfur dioxide
50,000
Man
Sulfur monochloride
2,500
Machine
Thiophosgene
5,000
Machine
Xylyl bromide
250
Machine 470
The dichlordiethyl sulfide in the above table is mustard gas, and
the excellent protection afforded against it is to be noted. No
figures are given for smokes as the present filter is quite different
from the one used at the time of the above test. It can be seen
that the mask affords excellent protection against a wide range
of compounds; some, such as Hydrocyanic acid being very volatile,
others as Hydrogen Chloride being very active, and others such
as Mustard being quite inert. By analogy, and knowing the
formulas and characteristics of possible war agents it is possible to
approximately predict what protection the present canister will give
against them.
It is to be noted that almost no protection is given against
ammonia. The same is true of carbon-monoxide, the most actively
poisonous component of illuminating gas and the gases from turret
explosions, fumes in closed compartments and buildings, and gaso-
line engine exhausts. But before considering what gases pass
through easily it would be well to consider what presumably could
occur in a ships compartment if a shell containing one of the better
known chemical agents bursts in it. The case of a shell burst in a
compartment is taken as this would presumably give the highest
concentration of gas to which naval personnel will ever be exposed,
with the possible exception of gases from an airplane bomb con-
taining a chemical agent.
The average gas content of a shell is about as follows: four
inches, 1 pound; five inches, 2 pounds; six inches, 5 pounds; when
the gas is the principal content of the shell. These figures are the
average, and may be too low. Knowing the size of the compart-
ment and the rate of air change in it we can calculate the concentra-
tion to which the gas mask will be exposed under unusually high
concentrations, and see how it will stand up.
If we consider the case of a small motor room in a vessel of
the Colorado class, with a capacity in cubic feet of 10,000 and a


  p. 1189 (#97)                       

1925]
1189
The Gas Mask and the Nert War
ventilation system which supplies 10,000 cubic feet of air per
minute it will take one minute to supply one volume. If a six-inch
shell released five pounds of phosgene in this compartment there
would be established immediately a concentration of eighty ounces
to 10,000 cubic feet or eight ounces per 1,000 which is an enor-
mously high concentration. A low concentration of phosgene
would be 0.05 ounces per 1,000 cubic feet. The ratio of high to
low concentration is 160 to 1. The number of volumes of air to
be supplied by the ventilating system to reduce the concentration
from high to low is found by reduction curve to be five, and the
reduction from high concentration to low will occur in a very
few minutes. Moreover the original concentration of eighty
ounces to 10,000 cubic feet is equivalent to a concentration of 1,976
parts per million, and Fieldner's table shows that the canister will
protect against a concentration of 5,000 parts per million for forty-
seven minutes.
Hydrocyanic acid gas is one of the most deadly of the better
known gases. Under conditions similar to the above case, a six-
inch shell containing hydrocyanic acid would give a concentration
of eight ounces per 1,000 cubic feet, equivalent to 7,248 parts per
million, and the table shows that the older canister reported by
Fieldner gives protection for seventeen minutes against 5,000 parts
per million. Similar figures can be worked up for all gases and it
is found that excellent protection will be given against all known
gases unless the individual exposed is right next to the bursting
gas container. And furthermore, during the process of bursting
a gas shell the high temperature and pressure produced by the
booster-charge will decompose a considerable amount of the toxic
contents. In the event that the ventilating system is disabled the
concentration of gas will diminish slowly, the rate of diminution
varying with the amount of natural ventilation present, but the
prospect of the high concentrations required to pierce the gas mask
remaining for some time is very slight.
The protection afforded by the canister against hydrocyanic acid
is excellent; the protection against cyanogen chloride, a very toxic
gas is not so high. This is of considerable importance even in
peace times as cyanogen chloride is one of the components of the
new gas used by the Public Health Service in fumigating ships.
However, the protection afforded is sufficient to permit of brief


  p. 1190 (#98)                       

1190
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
exposures to the gas, such as might occur in rescuing personnel
accidentally closed in with the fumigant gas. Arsine, AsHz is
another gas against which the canister does not provide as high
protection as it does against such war gases as mustard, phosgene,
etc. Arsine is a highly toxic compound but as it is very in-
flammable it has never been successfully used in war. Calcium
arsenide, a solid, when moistened gives off arsine, and during the
war it was suggested that shells containing calcium arsenide should
be fired into the enemy lines on rainy or snowy days, in the hope
that a cloud of arsine would be generated within the enemy lines,
thus producing a very high concentration of the toxic agent where
it would do the most good. So far as the author knows this genial
idea was never put into execution.
As stated before, the war canister gives absolutely no protection
against carbon monoxide. While highly dangerous—as shown
every day by the deaths from illuminating gas—carbon monoxide
has never been used as a war gas as it is very light and is highly
inflammable. It was responsible for a large number of military
casualties during the war, especially among the troops engaged in
sapping and mining. On numerous occasions the tank-crews were
overcome by this gas, due to leaks developing in the engine exhaust
which resulted in the gas being liberated in the small and ill-
ventilated body of the tank. Machine gunners in concrete pill-
boxes were also overcome on occasion by the blow-back of gases
from their own guns. The numerous gas accidents on board ship
following either the detonation, or more often still, the deflagration,
of high explosives is so well known as to require no further com-
ment. However, it can never be sufficiently emphasized that the
war-mask should not be relied upon to enter compartments where
a fire is being fought, or to enter turrets in which an explosion
has recently occurred. The high percentage of carbon-monoxide
present in either of the above emergencies is sure to lead to
casualties if any gas mask is relied on for protection.
Thus far we have shown the extreme difficulty of breaking
through the canister even when enormous concentrations of the
present war gases are used, concentrations which are almost im-
possible to build up in the field. This brings us to a consideration
of what methods might be used by an enemy in developing an
agent which would pierce the canister and so lead to an enormous
number of casualties.


  p. 1191 (#99)                       

1925)
1191
The Gas Mask and the Next War
The following methods have been suggested as offering possibili-
ties. The author does not pretend to be the originator of them,
they are the results of a number of informal discussions with
investigators in the field of chemical warfare.
Recent developments in the smoke filter indicate that it will be
very difficult to get a toxic solid smoke through it in quantities
sufficient to cause irritation. It is believed that if a good liquid
toxic smoke could be developed it would possibly penetrate the
filter by eventually saturating it. Liquid smokes are known to
exist, tobacco smoke and “oleum” a screening smoke much used
during the World War being common examples. While a liquid
smoke might eventually saturate the filter the amount required
would be so large that this method does not seem practicable in
the field, the only place where it counts.
The use of toxic alkaloids as war agents has been suggested.
These substances are poisonous in the highest degree, a dose of
1/150 grain of aconitin being dangerous. These alkaloids are very
difficult to manufacture, some of them never having been made in
the laboratory. The difficulty and high cost of manufacture pre-
vents their production in quantities sufficient for use in war. If
released as smokes they would be stopped by the smoke filter, and
if it were possible to release them as gases, which is very difficult,
the large size of their molecules would lead to their being promptly
absorbed by the canister contents.
Another method that has been suggested for piercing the canister
is what might be called a saturation method. That is to say, a
prolonged and very concentrated cloud of some gas of high boiling
point is released against the enemy and eventually the charcoal of
the canister becomes partially saturated with this gas. It has been
seen before that as a rule charcoal will absorb a gas of high boiling
point in preference to one of low boiling point. If this prolonged
preliminary gasing is immediately followed by a cloud of another
gas of low boiling point and rather inert chemically there is a
possiblity of piercing the mask. But in this case, again, the
weight of material required for this procedure is very great.
The present mask gives almost no protection against ammonia,
but for a number of reasons the use of this gas as a war-agent is
impracticable. In general it is believed that the canister will not
protect against alkaline gases, but almost none of these exist.


  p. 1192 (#100)                      #

1192
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Methyl amine, CH NH,, di-methylamine, (CH3)2NH, and ethyl-
amine, C,H,NH, are all alkaline gases and will presumably pass
through the mask. No highly toxic derivatives of these gases are
known, and in general it may be said that even if developed they
would be too unstable for war use. It can be stated that the
development in the immediate future of an alkaline war gas is
impracticable.
New compounds are constantly being produced by the chemist.
Some of these are highly poisonous and it is probable that the
chemical agents to be used in the next war, if chemical warfare is
used, will be derived from these compounds. As a rule these
compounds are liquids or solids with a large molecule or a high
boiling point or both, and their passage through the canister is
not to be feared.
To summarize, it has been shown that the physical and chemical
properties of the canister contents are such that excellent pro-
tection is given against all the known war gases. It has also been
shown that the remarkable protection afforded by the filter pre-
cludes the passage of toxic solid or liquid smokes unless quantities
are used which would require an amount of material difficult to
transport and release. The avidity with which charcoal and soda
lime seize many chemicals assure us that they would similarly seize
any agents with a chemical structure that would cause them to be
toxics.
The present gas mask is by no means a finished article. It is
constantly being improved, in the same way that armor is con-
stantly being improved. As new chemical agents are developed,
and as new methods of releasing them on the enemy are found,
the canister will have to be modified to meet the new menace, and
work along this line is being carried on in many countries; but the
chemical and physical theories which form the basis for modern
canister design are sound, and slight additions and alterations to
the present canister would suffice to meet any emergency.
In conclusion, the author desires to express his obligations to
Mr. P. O. Rockwell of the Anti-gas Department of Edgewood
Arsenal for valuable aid and criticism during the preparation of
this article.


  p. 1193 (#101)                      #

MATTHEW FONTAINE MAURY
BY COMMANDER LEWIS Coxe, U. S. Navy
T THE top of all pilot charts issued by the Hydrographic
A Office of the Navy Department appears the legend "Founded
upon the researches made and the data collected by Lieu-
tenant M. F. Maury, U. S. Navy." Who was Lieutenant Maury,
and what did he do? Even among members of his own profession,
the Navy, it appears that considerable uncertainty exists as to who
the man was, when he lived and how he came to make the ex-
haustive studies and investigations necessary to assemble the vast
detail of hydrographical and meteorological data contained in the
pilot charts of the seven seas.
The comment about a prophet being not without honor save in
his own country seems to apply to Maury with particular force,
as his work was recognized and rewarded by foreign governments
in greater measure than by his own. It is not unlikely that cir-
cumstances connected with the Civil War were responsible for this
fact, but, in all events, his accomplishments showed such a high
degree of professional ability and were of such lasting importance
to all mariners that his name and deeds should be known and
respected by all naval officers.
Matthew Fontaine Maury was born near Fredericksburg, Vir-
ginia, in 1806, and joined the Navy at the age of nineteen. His
first duty afloat was on board the frigate Brandywine which con-
veyed General Lafayette to France and remained for some time
in European and Mediterranean waters. His next assignment was
to the sloop-of-war Vincennes, Captain C. Wilkes, U. S. Navy,
commanding. On this vessel he spent four years in circumnavi-
gating the globe on a then-famous expedition for the determination
of meridian distances and the study of oceanography (1826-30).
This cruise was followed by several years on the Pacific station
during which time, as a result of his studies and practical experi-
ence, he produced a treatise on navigation that was long the official
textbook of the U. S. Navy.


  p. 1194 (#102)                      #

1194
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
In 1839 Maury suffered a severe accident which caused perma-
nent lameness and disqualified him for further active service afloat.
He was, accordingly, retired as a lieutenant but continued his
studies and writings of naval topics. His Scraps from the Lucky
Bag, a series of articles dealing with much needed naval reforms,
attracted wide attention at the time and led to considerable im-
provement in existing conditions.
In 1842 he was placed in charge of the Depot of Charts and
Instruments, (now the Hydrographic Office and Naval Observa-
tory), at Washington, D. C. This assignment gave him the oppor-
tunity to pursue the investigations which later brought him
world-wide fame as a scientific student of the sea.
· From the first his active mind had been attracted to the study of
the laws governing meteorological and hydrographical phenomena
and he was among the few fully to realize that, in consequence of
definite laws, the winds, currents, tidal waves, temperatures, etc.,
moved in an orderly procession and could, therefore, be predicted
and charted.
He instituted a system that is still in effect today, for obtaining
reports of winds, currents and other important navigational data
from the masters of ships of all nations. From thousands of these
reports, which he personally studied and classified, he constructed
his Wind and Current Charts and Sailing Directions which showed
the mariner the most favorable sea routes to follow at different
seasons in all parts of the globe.
Maury realized that these subjects were of such vast importance
to the seafaring world and of such varied and multitudinous detail
that international cooperation was necessary for favorable prog-
ress. Through his efforts an international conference was held in
Brussels in 1853 for the purpose of "devising a uniform system
of meteorological observations at sea and of concurring in a gen-
eral plan of observation on the winds and currents of the ocean
with a view to the improvement of navigation, and to the acquire-
ment of a more correct knowledge of the laws which govern those
elements.” Sixteen maritime nations were represented at this con-
ference and their deliberations brought about a marked improve-
ment in navigational knowledge and practice.
It was at this time that Maury published his best known works.
His Letters on the Amazon and Atlantic Slopes of South America


  p. 1195 (#103)                      #

1925)
1195
Natthew Fontaine Maury
appeared in 1853. The following year he produced Lanes for
Steamers Crossing the Atlantic, and the first bathymetrical map of
the North Atlantic ocean giving contours up to 4,000 fathoms. In
1855 he published Physical Geography of the Sea. These works,
especially the last named, won him an international reputation and
were translated into the principal European languages, He was
honored and decorated by emperors, kings and presidents and re-
ceived degrees and memberships from the universities and scientific
societies of many nations.
The United States Government promoted him to the rank of
commander, a not over-generous recognition of his signal achieve-
ments, but he is still almost invariably referred to by his earlier
title of lieutenant.
Maury's interests and anibitions were not, however, confined to
scientific study and research. One of his most cherished schemes
was the uniting of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the construc-
tion of a canal at Panama, but in this he was too far ahead of his
time. He also invented improved methods of deep-sea soundings
that made possible the laying of the first Atlantic cable.
When the Civil War broke out Maury cast in his lot with his
native state and resigned from the federal service. He was com-
missioned a commodore in the Confederate Navy but his physical
disability precluded any active participation in the conflict. His
one contribution to actual hostilities was the invention of an elec-
trical torpedo. But again his mind was too far advanced for the
practical uses of his day.
The Confederate government sent him to England as a special
agent to look out for their foreign interests. Here he was ap-
proached by both the French and Russian governments who made
him flattering offers to continue his former scientific work in their
respective countries, the French offering him the directorship of
the Imperial Observatory at Paris. But Maury could not be
tempted away from his allegiance to the "Lost Cause."
Upon the termination of the war he found himself an exile in a
foreign land. He was tendered, and accepted, an appointment by
the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico to the post of Imperial Com-
missioner of Immigration in that country. This was in the expecta-
tion of a large exodus from the Southern States to Mexico but,
as it failed to materialize, the plans for colonization were aban-


  p. 1196 (#104)                      #

1196
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
doned and Maury returned to England. Here he resided for a
time, during which he was the recipient of numerous honors, in-
cluding a testimonial raised by popular subscription and the degree
of LL.D. from Cambridge University.
In 1868 Maury took advantage of a general amnesty to return
to his native state where he was appointed to the chair of physics
at the Virginia Military Institute. He held this position until his
death in February, 1873, at Lexington, Virginia.
Maury was possessed of a romantic temperament and his years
of exile had intensified his love for the land of his birth. During
his enforced residence on foreign soil he had often expressed the
desire to be buried with those who fell in the southern ranks at
Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, and that his body be
conveyed there through the beautiful Goshen Pass at the time when
"the laurel burst its buds."
His wishes were complied with and, after a temporary inter-
ment at Lexington, his remains were finally laid to rest the follow-
ing June among his own dead in Hollywood Cemetery at Rich-
mond.
In Goshen Pass, among the laurels, there was erected in June,
1923, a simple granite column with an anchor at its base and bear-
ing a bronze tablet on which are inscribed the words:
“MATTHEW FONTAINE MAURY,
The Pathfinder of the Sea.”


  p. 1197 (#105)                      #

MAURY'S GENIUS SHOWN IN OLD LETTER
How the First Superintendent of the Naval Observatory Saved
Fifty Years
By LIEUTENANT COMMANDER G. E. BRANDT, U. S. Navy
THE Secretary of the Navy has given new evidence of appre-
ciation for the scientific work of the late Lieutenant Matthew
Fontaine Maury by assigning to the oceanographic research
now being planned, the name Maury U. S. Naval Oceanographic
Research.
The recent revival of interest in ocean study has thrown into
prominent relief the career of Lieutenant Maury, who rightly has
been called the Pathfinder of the Seas. More than ordinary in-
terest, therefore, is attached to the finding of an old letter written
by Maury to the Secretary of the Navy, disclosing a very interest-
ing side of his genius.
In 1847, Lieutenant Maury was Superintendent of the Naval
Observatory. The scientific world was singing his praises for
those masterful inventions and researches in winds and currents
which placed hydrography on a scientific basis and gave us our
valuable pilot charts.
About this time, there rose to fame in France, a young astron-
omer named Leverrier who, puzzling over the erratic behavior of
the planet Uranus, determined by mathematical calculation that it
must be under the influence of an undiscovered planet located in
a certain part of the heavens. He had no telescope powerful
enough to find the planet so he wrote to an astronomer in Berlin
and asked him to direct his telescope to a certain given point in the
heavens and to search for the planet. The German astronomer
followed the directions of Leverrier with the result that within a
half hour after the search was begun, the planet we now know as
Neptunel was discovered.
*Called Leverrier in Maury's letter.


  p. 1198 (#106)                      #

1198
. (July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Because of the slow movement of the planet Neptune, many
years would be required to collect from observations sufficient data
to define the planet's orbit. At this point, according to a letter
which has just been found in the ancient files of the Navy De-
partment, Lieutenant Maury stepped in and offered the suggestion,
entirely applicable, that sufficient data might perhaps be obtained
from the records of the past. Maury's speculations proved cor-
rect as shown in the letter which follows and which is here pub-
lished for the first time:
Observatory,
Washington, Feb. 9, 1847.
Sir:
I have the honor to announce the very probable discovery that the new
planet Leverrier was observed as a fixed star by Lalande in 1795.
Astronomers have regarded the discovery of this planet as one of the
proudest triumphs of the age. Everything connected with it therefore has
been regarded with a peculiar interest. It has been attentively watched by
observers in all parts of the earth, with the view of obtaining the requisite
data for its orbit. But the period of its revolution embraces more than a
century and a half, and years of observation would be required to afford
these data with the requisite precision. The world was curious to know
them, and astronomers everywhere were anxious to afford them; for they
are possessed of high interest and exceeding value.
The data which the tedious future is sure to afford, might perhaps be ob-
tained from the records of the past, if perchance this star had been observed
by any of the old astronomers.
As soon as circumstances permitted, the search was undertaken at this
Observatory, and the duty of conducting it assigned to Mr. Walker, who has
acquitted himself of the task in a manner highly satisfactory.
The motions of the planet since its discovery have been altogether insuf-
ficient to afford a set even of approximate elements by the ordinary methods
of calculation. From the 26th Sept. to 26th Dec. 1846, the apparent path
of the planet did not embrace an arc greater in length than one-half of one
degree; a base, (affected as it is by the unavoidable errors of observation),
entirely insufficient for determining the exact elements of the ellipse of
which it is a part.
But as in its first discovery, so it has been here—there was room for the
display of mathematical ingenuity and artifice. By treating this path as
the arc of a circle, by assuming a radius vector which should fulfil certain
conditions, and which was obtained by a sort of tentative process; and then
discussing the problem according to the circular hypothesis, a set of ele-
ments was obtained at the second trial which are as follows:


  p. 1199 (#107)                      #

1925)
1199
Maury's Genius as shown in Old Letter
..............
and elements
165 97030
Ascending node .........
....... 129° 48' 23" 2
Inclination ..
1 45 19 9
Epoch Jan. Ist 1847 ....
326 59 34 74
5 Radius vector Sept. 28th 1846
30.005064
Excentricity (unknown) ..
Semiaxis major .....
30.200585
Mean daily siderial motion ........
21" 37881
True daily motion in the orbit Sept. 28, 1846
21" 65789
Period in tropical years...
100000
The Ephemeris computed from these approximate elements on com-
parison with observation, required the following corrections in longitude
and latitude:
Correction of the Correction of the
Comparison Date
Computed Longitude Computed Latitude
1847 Aug. 8
Sub 0".08 Sub 0."83
Sep. 28
Add 0.49
Add 0. 84
Oct. 4
Add 0.19 Add 1. 51
Oct. 10
Add 0 .22 Add 0. 03
Oct. 18
Sub 1.03 Add 0. 80
Oct. 26
Sub 1.31 Add 0. 56
Nov. 10
Add 1.03
Add 0. 02.
Dec. 7.
Sub 0. 13 Add 0. 12
Dec. 26
Sub 0.16 Add 1. 19
A third trial might perhaps have approximated still more closely but this
was deemed sufficient for our purposes.
Computing back from these elements Besselo zones were entered with
the resulting ephemeris. These zones comprise a catalogue of 75,000 stars,
but among this host, the planet was no where to be found. The next process
was to step back into the last century, compute the place occupied by the
planet at a certain time when Lalande was making his observations for
that celebrated work the Histoire Celeste, and see if, at any time, it had
passed through the field of his telescope. Among the 40,000 stars numbered
by that astronomer, it was discovered that there was one observed by him
on the night of May 10th 1795, which might have been "Leverrier” instead
of a fixed star. The place of Leverrier was carried back to the time on
that night when Lalande saw what has now and for the first time assumed
the character of a suspicious star. The two are:
Mag. Clock Time South Zenith Dist.
Star seen by Lalande May 10th 1795 7.8 14h um 23.55 60°. 07' 19"
Leverrier by its Washington
Ephemeris
do 8 14 1 23.5 60 07 50
The agreement is remarkable. Lalande saw near this place no other star
answering the planet's description. If, however, it were the planet, upon


  p. 1200 (#108)                      #

1200*
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
returning the telescope upon its place as seen by Lalande, a blank spot only
would be seen.
The night-Feb. 2 was cloudy. The night of Feb. 4th was clear, and
upon turning the large telescope of the observatory upon the position in-
dicated, nothing was seen. All the stars in whose company Lalande had
seen the star of the 7.8 magnitude were there, but the star itself was miss-
ing. What is the inference? Clearly one of three. Ist that the celebrated
astronomer saw no star of the 7.8 magnitude--and such a supposition is
hardly admissible. Admitting then that he saw it, the ad inference was,
that it has been blotted out from the heavens, which again is a violent
assumption; and the 3d, that it has changed its place to some other group or
part of the heavens—and is therefore a planet or some other revolving
body—as a comet.
The doctrine of probabilities would seem to indicate that it was a planet.
Supposing it to be the planet Leverrier, and leaving this question to be
finally settled by subsequent facts) the following are its approximate ele-
ments, using its places of May 1oth 1795, and September 28th, Nov. 7th
and Dec. 28th 1846, as referred to the mean equinox of Jan. ist 1847, and
to mean time Greenwich.
From actual Supposing it the miss-
observation i ng Star of Lalande
Longitude of the perihelion ......... Unknown
0° 12' 25".51
Longitude of the ascending node..... 129° 48' 23".20 131 17 35 .80
Epoch of mean longitude Jan. I, 1847 Unknown
328 07 56 .64
True longitude on the orbit Sept. 28th,
1846 ...
326 59 34 .74 326 59 34 .74
Inclination .....
1 45 19.90 I 54 53 .87
Excentricity
Unknown
0.0088407
Mean distance .........
30.200585
30.250420
Radius vector Sept. 28th 1846 ...... 30.005064
30.002596
Mean daily siderial motion ......... 21." 37881
21." 32600
True daily motion in orbit Sept. 28,
1846 .................
....... 21."65789
21.64553
97030
Period in tropical years ....
100000
Should it turn out that the star observed as above by Lalande was really
the planet Leverrier, the discovery of this fact will give to astronomers
the advantage of almost fifty-two years of observation.
After the discovery of the planet Herschell, it was forty years before
the requisite tables for his orbit were completed, and it is only within a few
years past that he has obtained in the Nautical Almanac of England a
place for his ephemeris.
Should we be able to discover among the multitudes of stars that have
been observed by astronomers in various parts of the world between the
years 1795 and 1846, that the new planet was among them, the data for its
......... 165. 100000
166.38134


  p. 1201 (#109)                      #

1925)
1201
Maury's Genius as shown in Old Letter
elements will be complete, and we shall at once know as much of this
mathematical planet as we now do of the oldest of its telescopic brethren.
A mathematical planet it certainly is, for it is the discovery of mathe-
matics, and has reversed the ordinary rules-Hitherto, the telescope, with
its space penetrating power, has discovered the planets, and then referred
them to mathematics. But in this case, mathematics with a space pene-
trating power which has astounded the world, has taken the lead. Reach-
ing far into the depths of space, it has first announced a discovery, and then
appealed to astronomers of Europe with their telescopes to "see and believe."
“Look," said Leverrier, when he had concluded the demonstration of his
problem, "look and you will see the planet well.” At this next greatest dis-
covery with regard to it, the night was cloudy, but though the suspected
star of Lalande was down on the Berlin Star maps "ten to one" was
offered at the Washington Observatory that the large equatorial would
report it missing; and missing it is.
Respectfully,
Your Obt. Seryt.,
M. F. Maury,
Lt. U.S.N.
To the
Honorable John Y. Mason,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington City,
D. C.


  p. 1202 (#110)                      #

SOME NOTES ON DESTROYER HANDLING
ALONGSIDE
By LIEUTENANT H. R. THURBER, U. S. Navy
W E WERE waiting in the cool of the morning for the
V U.S.S. V— to pull away from us at the anchorage to the
west of Culebra. A choppy sea bumped the V— 's star-
board side against us, and a fresh trade wind strained our anchor
chain broad on the port bow. Captain — with bronzed outlay
of two and a half stripes folded over his lee bridge rail, stuck out
his jaw—and pipe-in response to our “Good morning, sir !" He
glanced astern where, a scant 300 yards, lay two pairs of destroy-
ers at anchor. “Let go all lines !” he snapped out. “Both engines !
Back two thirds! Right ten degrees rudder !” And, as an after-
thought, with grandstand flourish, and oblivious to the roaring of
blowers, belching of stacks, and celerity in handling lines, he waved
us a farewell with his pipe, the V- already shooting astern like
an arrow. Almost at our stern the V—_'s bow quivered as she
was dragged to a stop; slowly it drifted past our stern from port
to starboard, and with a dash she scampered past us to starboard
and headed out for her screen position in the day's tactical prob-
lem. “Great seamanship” remarked our skipper, and all on the
bridge agreed. Captain J- was known throughout the squadron
as a dashing ship handler.
That evening we anchored and waited for the 1- to come
alongside. She came sliding up on our port quarter—we all watch-
ing from our bridge with interest. Up alongside she glided, per-
fectly. Then something went wrong. The V did not stop
according to Hoyle, but with a grinding away of sidelights, bridge
windshields, forecastle stanchions and lifelines, she swooped ahead
half a length. Pandemonium broke loose on the V— 's bridge,
men scrambled to the rails, the water astern frothed as her engines
backed frantically. It was a matter of seconds ere the
V l ay
panting alongside, but the net result on Captain J— 's demeanor
was so terrible-eyes flashing wildly, veins starting, pipe and arms


  p. 1203 (#111)                      #

1925)
1203
Destroyer Handling Alongside
waving, and traditionally seamanlike phrases flooding the air-
that we hastened below decks to our stateroom, there to light our
pipe and feverishly compile the following notes on handling de-
stroyers alongside.
These have been edited, expurgated, freed of their fever, and
are presented now with apologies to Admirals Knight, Luce and to
the several destroyer captains whose seamanship has been ob-
served. No exhaustive treatise on destroyer seamanship, this;
just a few "wrinkles” noticed and herewith presented, following
the precepts of very cautious destroyer captains who never have
carried away docks, breakwaters, anchors, or propellers—at least,
not more than once. Lucky men!
General Considerations.--At the risk of boring the reader to
tears, the following general points are laid out. The destroyer
handler should know the length, beam and draft of his ship, and
have a bird's-eye picture in his mind of these dimensions—it won't
do to try to wedge into a twenty-foot crack, secure to a dock with
only seventy-five yards of extreme draft water alongside at low
tide, or make twenty-five knots over a twenty-four foot channel.
In connection with the draft, it should be ascertained how much
the propeller's tips extend below the keel—in certain types of de-
stroyers this projection amounts to as much as one foot, ten and a
half inches below the keel, from which a carpenter's mate will
usually log the draft. During the course of most any well-regu-
lated cruise, the Roman numerals noting propeller draft will be
painted over—besides, to some draft recorders, the darn things
don't mean anything. One captain in my short recollection forgot
his propeller draft and destroyed his steaming multiple for the
month trying to shake loose from a spot in the Potomac River.
The height of the masthead might make some difference in going
under bridges or aerial cables. The width of the foremast yardarm
should be considered in going alongside; some captains prefer
"staggering” their ship, so the yardarm will not mesh with others
alongside in case of a list, due to oiling or a rocking swell. It is
but careful seamanship to note the relative position of propeller
guards, as “locked” or “riding” guards will do some damage, even
to the extent of involving the propellers themselves. The guard
rails should be separated by a fender of sufficient dimension to pre-
vent riding up and down of the rails. A careful seaman will sweep


  p. 1204 (#112)                      #

1204
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
his eye from forecastle to fantail on the "engaged” side to ensure
a clear side—scupper lip extensions housed; sidelights removed ;
boats, davits, torpedo tubes, gangways, windscoops and anchor
flatly rigged. Some urge the “decking' of the inboard anchor as
necessary, even in most favorable conditions, regarding this latter
as an "evolution," which word has found much expansion in the
destroyer force, sounding less ‘irksome, perhaps, than "drill.”
These points seem self-evident, but in time of stress they are apt
to be overlooked; hence, the inclusion.
Definite understanding with the engine room in the matter of
standard speed when getting underway from alongside or when
going alongside, should be made as a special point. The engineer
officer, who, according to the blue book, must be in the master
engine room control station, should be informed of the antics an-
ticipated; emergency gongs should be tested out just before getting
underway and at an appropriate time before going alongside; and
the "getting underway" details should be at their stations. In ex-
tending the remarks on standard speed, please allow the following
excerpt from one destroyer's "Ship Standing Orders” as an illus-
tration of definite understanding :
Standard speed is that speed in knots designated by the commanding
officer. Unless word is received to the contrary, this shall be fifteen knots
when getting underway. Ahead standard is the command for standard
speed ahead.
Ahead one third is one third of standard speed.
Ahead two thirds is two thirds of standard speed.
Back one third is that speed astern resulting from the maintenance of
fifty pounds pressure on the astern turbine steam gage.
Back two thirds is that speed astern resulting from the maintenance of
100 pounds pressure on the astern turbine steam gage.
Back full speed is that speed astern resulting from the introduction of
steam full into the astern turbine, provided that main steam gage pressure
is not carried below 200 pounds.
The following resultants of different combinations of opposite engine
speeds obtain on this ship:
Ahead one third on one engine, back one third on another; resultant
direction of ship, astern.
Ahead two thirds on one engine, back one third on other; resultant direc-
tion of ship, ordinarily pivot, or very slow ahead.
Ahead standard or ahead full speed on one engine, back one third on
other; resultant direction of ship, ahead:


  p. 1205 (#113)                      #

1925)
1205
Destroyer Handling Alongside
Ahead standard on one engine, back two thirds on other; resultant direc-
tion of ship, pivot, or very slow astern.
Other combinations may be deduced and combined with rudder throw.
Generally, this ship will back into the wind, unless at or nearly at full load
fuel condition. Generally, this ship, light, cannot be headed up from a beam
wind into the wind, and for this reason especially in crowded harbors, an
anchor must be ready for letting go to accomplish this end by the simple
expedient of allowing the ship to swing on her anchor up into the wind.
Before relinquishing the topic of standard maneuvering speed,
it may be well to insert one other precaution. When you ring up
"stop," do your throttlemen merely close the throttle valve? Or
do they introduce steam into the opposite motion turbine and bring
and hold the shafts to a dead stop? Without arguing the varying
points in favor of each—let alone the violation of “best engineer-
ing practice”—the writer believes in the first method because: (a)
the ship is not dragged into unexpected quarters by “checking"
(with possible reversing) of the shafts; (b) the engineering mul-
tiple is not ruined by the use of power necessary to hold the shafts;
(c) the writer has seen both methods used, and has observed the
first is as adaptable as the second. It is well, though, in the case
of an initial attempt with a new command, to ascertain which
method is "standard practice.”
Personnel and Material.—Some note should be made here, be-
fore going to actual typical conditions, of the personnel and ma-
terial involved. Under practically all conditions the following
deck stations should be manned as shown below, and checked by
the executive officer before he reports, “All ready for getting
underway, sir!" Personnel on the bridge: chief quartermaster
(or best helmsman) at the wheel ; chief yeoman at engine room
annunciators; one quartermaster at whistle; one quartermaster at
upper bridge searchlight (if at night); speed cone men at cones;
signalmen at flag bags; talker at voice tubes to after deck house
and to main searchlights (if at night); messenger at hand. The
annunciator man should understand thoroughly the use of the
emergency gongs, also, if at night, the use of the truck (speed)
light. The "engaged side" rail of the bridge must be kept clear.
All orders should be repeated back. The executive should man a
small megaphone and stand near the wheel, and emergency gongs.
The navigator should be at hand, of course. Free gangway must
be afforded the ship handler, and to that effect all sight seers


  p. 1206 (#114)                      #

1206
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
should be assigned to the nether regions, if necessary, by the use of
good, round vocal authority.
On the forecastle, aside from the crew at quarters, the first
lieutenant usually oversees the deck force. Preliminary notice of
the engaged side should be given him if the ship is to go alongside,
so his lines may be ready for running, and the engaged anchor
brought in on deck. One small fender should be ready for use at
the billboard and one at the break of the forecastle. Heaving lines
minus lead weights are in favor with those on the receiving end.
For celerity in handling, the bow line should be known as “Num-
ber One," the after spring as “Number Two," and the forward
spring as “Number Three”; and the first lieutenant should have
his men instructed as to the relative difference of "checking,"
“slacking" and "holding" these lines. The capstan should be ready
for immediate use, remembering that much steam can be saved the
main engines by the use of this important auxiliary, with no at-
tendant shame to the ship handler for "wishy-washy" seamanship.
A breast line, known as “Number Four," run through the free-
ing ports or chocks on the well deck after the other lines are se-
cured, is firmly advocated by many captains as a stabilizer in a
tideway, during fuelling and for turning in pairs.
The large cane fender provided destroyers should be slung over
the side of the galley deck house well before going alongside, to
serve as a guard rail buffer.
Some destroyer captains believe in stationing an officer with
megaphone on the engaged side of the galley deckhouse to facili-
tate “emergency” communications aft.
Going aft, the main searchlights should be mentioned. At night,
these may be indispensable, should be tested, and should be en-
sured effective coʻnmunication. Searchlights have unexpected uses
and should be ready for immediate use without having to send for
the chief electrician's mate who may be making his toilet prepara-
tory to walking over the gangplank.
The after deckhouse is the domain of the gunnery officer, and a
good voice tube talker with his ear to the bridge tube. The ord-
nance force on the fantail are required to "cinch in" the stern, and
must realize that, under most conditions, this cinching in is a very
important part of securing with snap. A few "heave in the stern"
conditions will bring a keen appreciation of this point. A fender


  p. 1207 (#115)                      #

1925)
1207
Destroyer Handling Alongside
ready to secure over the propeller guard (permanent guard fenders
are unsightly on a trim destroyer) will often save the paint work,
let alone a dent in the guard, as well as the other fellow's plating.
Of course, if one is so fortunate as to have a kite balloon winch
aft, the stern may be safely hung off and heaved in later. One
more point in regard to the gunnery officer, good seamanship will
teach him to clear bumboats astern, have the clothes lines clear of
clothes, have the garbage chute rigged in, and similar eyesores to
the squadron commander eclipsed.
Of course, "colors” must be shifted with a snap. It often dis-
concerts other ship captains in the vicinity to see some ship free
of the "jack” forward and flying an ensign aft both at the staff
and at the gaff!
For reference, a diagram of lines and fenders is shown herewith.
#1 #3 #2 #4
#6
#5 #7
X e
READY
FENDER
A
FENDER
READY /
FENDER
READY
FENOERI
To Wat
O pod
HOUSED
ANCHOR
Fig. 1
Now to the muttons ! Certain typical conditions will be shown,
with brief outlines of "what do,” but it is hoped that destroyer
handlers will appreciate the "tenderness” of a destroyer and its
"whims," so that in case the solutions do not meet with seemly
success, no blame will be attached to the writer, 'for the solutions
presented have been worked out before his eyes. “A destroyer
frequently does just the opposite of what one thinks it should do,"
is the experience of one captain. Another says, “Don't rely too
much on theory!" And still another states that “an analysis of
what happened after the battle will tend to straighten you out for
future conditions of a similar nature.” Which leads to repeat an
adage particularly applicable to destroyers, “You never find two
alike at any one time, and you never find one alike twice.” Hence,
they call a ship "she.”
Getting Underway from an Anchored Ship-Take the case of
a destroyer getting underway from another ship not secured to a


  p. 1208 (#116)                      #

1208
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
pier. Note carefully the tide, wind and surrounding shipping.
Given, the ideal case of the two ships riding direct to wind and
tide, with no interference ahead or astern. Going ahead is
simple if handled with despatch. The illustration, marked Fig. 2,
is self-explanatory—own ship shaded. As the case is presented,
give, “right fifteen degrees rudder!" Instruct first lieutenant to
hold “Number Three." Let go all other forecastle lines. The tide
20 RIGHT
&P 5 RIGHT
15 RIGHT
MIDSHIPS
FIG. 2
and wind will force the bow out, and Number Three will further
spring the bow away. As the bow starts to work out, let go all
lines and give “Port engine! Ahead one third !" The rudder and
ahead motion will work the stern
* OBSTRUCTION away sufficiently to use both engines.
As stern clears, give, “Rudder
amidships ! Both engines, ahead
two thirds!" Should the stern tend
to swing back toward the anchored
ship (or the anchored ship swing
in), resort to the action shown in
the third phase of the figure.
If there is interference ahead,
the case is resolved as shown in
Fig. 3.
IŠ RIGHT
Here, the wash of the starboard
Fig. 3
screw running into the confined
space between the two ships will at
first force their sterns apart. As own ship gathers sternboard, the
rudder will counteract this and draw own stern across the stern
of the anchored vessel.


  p. 1209 (#117)                      #

1925]
1209
Destroyer Handling Alongside
With wind conditions adverse, the case becomes more compli-
cated. Take a case as follows: wind strong on own exposed beam,
other ship anchored with anchor broad on her bow and across
yours, tide holding ships as shown in diagram, Fig. 4.
HEAVE IN ON
HEAVE \ ANCHOR
in on
NUM BERA
ONE
WIND
RICET
20
LEFT
20 RIGHT
Fig. 4
The problem above is to prevent raking. By "cinching in” the
bow, first housing such obstructions as anchors on both ships, the
stern is cleared for reversing both engines. When all ready to
cast off, the anchored ship might heave in on her anchor, as this
will tend to head both ships up into the wind and tend to keep her
stern clear when lines are cast loose. The two thirds (or full)
astern will clear the ships rapidly enough to prevent the anchored
ship from swinging back. The inboard engine will further separate
the ships by the "wash.” It would be slightly better to reverse the
outboard engine a fraction before the inboard engine to give the
stern an initial set "in," with a consequent set "out" for the bow.
In closing this case, it might be added that an attempt to go out
ahead would be well nigh impossible without "ruining everything."
Another case would be with wind strong on other ship's exposed
beam, with her anchor out to windward as shown below, tide hold-
HEAVE IN ON
NUMBER ONE
WIND
Kaim
S.S.
MIDSHIPY
20 RIGHT
Fig. 5


  p. 1210 (#118)                      #

1210
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ing the ships as illustrated. Fig. 5 shows a method of going out
ahead; Fig. 6, of going out astern, the latter preferable.
In the above case,
the bow would be
kept out by the wind,
Wino
especially if the ship
is light of fuel for-
ward. The problem
is to get the stern out
and keep it out.
15 RIGHT
The problem here is
Fig. 6
to keep the bow out,
as the wind will act
on the ship aft, tending to rake the bow in.
Going Alongside Anchored Ships. Having touched upon solu-
tions of getting away from an anchored ship without scratching
her paintwork, take now some typical examples of going alongside
a ship at anchor. A caution in all cases : do not get your bow or
your stern so close you can't get 'em away! Ready lines, fenders,
efficient communication with after deckhouse (and searchlights),
clear side, special bridge details, and engine rooms! Also, a cau-
tionary signal in ample time to the ship approached! The gen-
erally ideal approach, when possible, is from the anchored ship's
quarter, so that own ship is in relative position as shown in Fig. 7.
ABOUT
20
ROUGHLY,
FOR FORECASTLE LENGTH)
ABOUT
Yos. K
Fig. 7


  p. 1211 (#119)                      #

1925]
1211
Destroyer Handling Alongside
At this point, the ship should be moving slowly ahead. Too
much speed may easily result in dented sides, bent noses, ripped
stanchions, and general ruin, considering the sensitiveness of de-
stroyers when not under deft control, or should there be a casualty
in engine room control. Naturally, wind and tide conditions should
be observed and their effect not only on own ship's action but also
on the anchored ship's, noted.
First, take an ideal condition, with anchored ship riding to wind
and tide. The simplest maneuver to make the side is shown in
Fig. 8. .
STOP
10 LEFT
Fig. 8
This maneuver brings in the stern without involving the inboard
engine at close quarters. If the bow is not "in," the capstan will
remedy that condition. The writer has seen a ship drift alongside
without backing of engines by the captain, who didn't care a
tinker's last about dash, but who did put his ship at the top of the
steaming list.
A more dashing method of making the side has been observed
and is presented—though the last time this was observed, the an-
chored ship's side (ours), received dents from the approaching
ship's propeller guard—which dents, however, “do not affect the
fighting efficiency.” (Hull Report.) It is shown in Fig. 9.


  p. 1212 (#120)                      #

1212
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
15 LEFT
Fig. 9
Three other conditions should be noted briefly in regard to going
alongside. The first is a condition of strong tide, sea, or wind
from ahead. The general approach should be the same as noted in
Fig. 8, with the possible exception that the bow should be pointed
up more to avoid the possibility of tide, sea, or wind carrying the
bow against the anchored ship's galley deckhouse. The other ex-
treme would be that of allowing the bow to get out so far before
a forecastle line is passed to the anchored ship that it would be
impossible to force the bow back into tide, sea, or wind.
The second condition is illustrated in Fig. 10.
ABOUT
10 YOS.
cal
& ↑ J.Stop
WIND
Culo
15 LEFT
Fig. 10


  p. 1213 (#121)                      #

1925)
1213
Destroyer Handling Alongside
The solution of the above condition is based on the action of the
wind on the exposed portion of the ship's side. A caution here!
If own bow is too close to other ship, the wind acting on own stern
may throw the bow into other ship's side.
The third condition is illustrated in Fig. 11.
WIND
STOP
FIG. II
The last backing will partially save the bumping of ships which
would result from the leeway made by own ship, although the
backing might be inadvisable if the stern were in too close. In
most instances of this kind (with a strong beam wind) a relatively
good-sized “bump” may be expected, although the blow may be
softened by having the bow canted out slightly; when the “bump"
occurs, this will permit both ships to cushion it by pivoting on the
galley deck-house fender.
In all the above cases of going alongside, a 4.0 job may be con-
sidered done when own ship comes alongside with guard rails of
both ships two feet apart and with the slightest possible kick astern
on the engines ; also, when lines are handled properly. Don't allow
all hands to let go heaving lines when the ship is two feet too far
off and then spend their time at recoiling them when their use
is really necessary! A caution comes to mind. Do not follow the
solutions presented without watching the ship's movements as a


  p. 1214 (#122)                      #

1214
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
whole-do not hesitate to change speed or rudder promptly when
unusual conditions arise. If you come up parallel too far out from
the other ship, it is very easy to "warp” alongside by light use of
ahead and astern speed on your outboard engine.
Maneuvers at Piers.—Having taken up several typical cases of
getting underway from alongside and going alongside ships, a
word or two might be added with regard to maneuvers at piers.
Practically the only variance of conditions here from those shown
in preceding cases is of a transverse tidal or wind sweep. This
is noticeable at nearly all ports in varying intensities, so no par-
ticular localities will be given. It should be stated though that,
where possible, a request for tug assistance is neither cowardly nor
unseamanlike. Consider the appalled countenance of a destroyer
captain noted for his dash and nerve, who attempted to maneuver
his ship into position between two others at a navy yard dock, and
had the first lieutenant report, after securing that the crew in the
forward living compartment had a new window thirty feet long
and fourteen inches wide, through which to contemplate the glory
of the winter night!
Most all cases of getting underway from a dock with transverse
wind and tide, whether inside a pier or along a pierhead, resolve
into a solution of springing out the stern by breasting in the bow,
letting go all lines quickly when this is accomplished, backing at
two-thirds or full speed until there is open water between pier or
other ship moored to pier, using the rudder as an aid in direction,
and then easing or changing the engine speeds to complete the
maneuver and fair away to the desired heading. Here again, it
might be advisable to point out that in case of doubt, a tug will ease
the mind, if not actually accomplishing much more than could be
done without it.
In practically all cases of going into a pier or a nest moored
alongside the pier, with tide or wind on the beam at the final ap-
proach, tug assistance is recommended unless there is a generous
fifty feet beam space to enter. There are numerous solutions to
these conditions which may be found in any of the old familiar
standard editions of seamanship. The point to be emphasized
here, perhaps, is to plan the approach as shown in Fig. 12, also to
get a forecastle line to the dock promptly, and, as soon as possible,
a line from the vicinity of the motor boat skids, this latter line to


  p. 1215 (#123)                      #

1925]
1215
Destroyer Handling Alongside
act as an all-important temporary spring line. In connection with
this latter line, it would be well to lead it outside of everything,
bending on a heaving line carried to the forecastle, so as to get it
ashore pronto!
The difference between making a land-
ing at a pier and alongside a ship is that
in the case of a ship, it is all-important to
place the bow right, for usually and even-
tually the stern will take care of itself,
the same forces being at work on both
ships. In the case of a pier, it may be all-
important to get the stern in at the same
time. Also, at piers, currents may be
running differently inside the pier-head
line and local conditions may cause eddies
embarrassing to a stranger. Under diffi-
cult conditions, it might be well to land
alongside the pierhead, if possible, and
then to work into the slip by use of lines
Fig. 12
and moderate use of engines.
An Ethic or Two.-In concluding these notes, a hint in the di-
rection of cooperation in handling lines and “preparing the side"
is inserted. When advance notice is received that another de-
stroyer is coming alongside, the side should be cleared promptly, a
spare fender or two and the same number of heaving lines should
be dug up from the forward hold-or, if necessary and possible,
borrowed—and enough crew provided to handle the visitor's lines
with dispatch. If time provides and an anchor Aluke protrudes, the
anchor should be decked if conditions are adverse for the visitor.
It cheers the visitor's eyes to see such consideration, especially
among his own division mates.
If by chance, a slight contretemps occurs in going alongside, it
is but courtesy to send over the carpenter's mate with his “kit” to
repair stanchions and such as may have suffered.
Another point of ethics comes to mind. Conversation, except a
warning of danger, should not be attempted with a ship handler in
action, either from his own bridge or from adjacent ships. It is the
last straw for a nervous man and fills his soul with undying hatred.


  p. 1216 (#124)                      #

1216
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Many more "wrinkles” have flashed across the writer's memory,
but time, space, and patience must be respected. After we had
worried through these notes, chewing meanwhile through our pipe-
stem, we presented the result to Captain J— of the U.S.S.
V- the morning following his experience related. It was a
very cold morning off Culebra, but the nip in the air didn't cool
the writer's ardor one quarter as much as Captain J- 's scowl
as he perused the opening paragraphs. In the next two hours,
however, it was one of those rare occasions our division was at
anchor for the morning—the situation eased, and during the dis-
cussion of destroyer handling, Captain J-- uttered an expressive
fancy which has stuck in our memory and is quoted in closing :
“Destroyers are whimsical crafts, of great power, quick to respond
to keen handling, and a pleasure to those seamen who treat them
with just appreciation of their sensitive natures.”


  p. 1217 (#125)                      #

DIESEL ENGINES FOR CAPITAL SHIPS—
A MILITARY NECESSITY
By CAPTAIN A. M. PROCTOR, U. S. NAVY
ay
THE development of the Diesel engine for marine purposes
1 which began about 1910, has of late been proceeding at an
accelerating rate. There is much evidence, now available,
that it has arrived at a point where it is possible to consider it
seriously for capital ship installations. It is not intended, how-
ever, in this discussion, to touch more than briefly upon this phase
of the subject, but to point out one paramount military advantage
of this engine over all other forms of propulsion. This advantage,
greater perhaps than that which led to the adoption of the water
tube boiler, and that which later led to the adoption of the steam
turbine, may be stated as follows: A Diesel engined fleet will have
a cruising radius which, in any probable campaign, will render it
independent of logistic limitations.
In order to present graphically the evidence upon which this
statement is based the general characteristics of a Diesel engine
installation for the Oklahoma have been worked out, using such
published information as is available. The results are shown in
the accompanying sketches, Fig. I and Fig. 2.
The engine shown in this layout is a double acting two cycle
engine which has a cylinder volume sufficient to develop a power
equal to that of the present installation, with a piston speed and
mean effective pressure within the limits of present practice. This
piston speed can, however, be largely exceeded as will be shown
later.
The weight of the Diesel installation, with the necessary engine
auxiliaries, is based on an estimate of five pounds per cubic inch
cylinder volume. This is about eighty per cent of the weight of
the Worthington double acting engine and, in view of the fact
that this engine is a massively constructed commercial type, is
conservative.


  p. 1218 (#126)                      #

FIGURE
Present Installation.
No. Engine 3:- 2 cyl. triple erb.
Cyk diom J5:55 - 76
Stroke
RPM
120
Speed
20.5 knots
IHP
24500
AH P. (est) 22500
Piston speed 960 ft.min.
Total Mach.wt. 1998 tons.
Propelling Mach
wt=.69 x total 1379 tons
(3088960 lbs)
Wt. ber AMP
at 22 500 AM.P. 136.8 lbs.
with asoo tonsivel 3+ 41.
LE REEDS
diesel Installation,
No. engines - 4 2 cycle Soyl. 0.4.
Cy1 diam
24
Str.*:-
33. ars
R.P.M.
Specat
20.5 Inots.
A.M.
P armelin power) 22 300
Piston Speed 960 It mig.
Mep (Brake) 74 lbs. sq. im
Max. power of SR P.M. 30240
and golás mcp speed 218 trs.
Moc H Pat 1268 H
34360
piston speed (2187.7M)
and 90/bs Meb Propellers
filled lo permit screased
enqine speed)
U.SS ONLANOMA:-Sketch showing possible Diesel
1. Vol.
358300 cm
engine installation in present machinery space.
WI. per cu.in cyl.vel.
5.0 lbs.
Weight saved by Diesel installation - 579 tons.
Tolal weight propelling 1791500 lbs.
machinery
(800 tons)
Normal full fuel capacity (146* Displjo 4000 tons.
Wt.ber B.HP (225w alzost) 796 lbs.
Total luel capacity, utilizing extra
Wt.per B.H.P (34000) 52.7 lbs.
space made available.
5550 tons
Total Machinery Weight 1479 tons.
increased drait due to entra fuel 10 inches
Cruising radius:-95 Anot's 64800 mi. 12.mats 61400 miles.
Present location
15 Inols soooo miles
Alle Oynom Poom
(below pralcctve dece.
nepresent Dyno Roomsterlue |
- This space reclaimed trom uptate rooms
General Work Shop
Space - pre.
Distributio
Boora Poom.
This space
reclaimed' from Eng Room.
is space reclaimed tre
Fire 'Pooms.
Distribution
Boordfrue
Space present Peclaimed from
Engine Ros
avilioricu
Dynamo Poom. Engine poom available (Projected area
for Diesel Generators Mas present
Apreom
This space available for 150 tons -
additional fuel oil.
This spere,reclaimed from Frekvens
available for diesel Generators
and ausiliary machinery.
Foward
Dynamo
(present location)
---Thais
acerolable for 800
tons
92
30
00
66
06 70 02 00 78 76 72 72 zero
Length Engur
Engine Space soll.
(biesel)
--- Length present Logine and Boiler space rasth. -


  p. 1219 (#127)                      #

1925]
1219
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships.
The performance curves shown in Fig. 2 are based on the data
of the trials of the New York and Texas. They are practically
identical with that of the Oklahoma, of which there is no pub-
lished record.
The engine efficiency curve, used in determining the B.H.P.
curve, is plotted from the results obtained by Yarrow in tests of
a torpedo boat engine. These tests show a higher efficiency than
that of any other available record.
The fuel per B.H.P. curve is drawn from the results of a series
of tests made on a 1,000 B.H.P. Fullagar engine by Professor
W. H. Watkinson. The data of other tests shown are plotted as
a check on this curve.
The curve of fuel per B.H.P. has been used because this curve
can be drawn with a fair degree of accuracy below the lowest test
point, since it becomes tangent to the vertical coordinate at zero
power. For a similar reason the B.H.P. curve has been used,
rather than the I.H.P. curve. This curve starts at zero power and
there is no error at low powers due to doubt as to engine efficiency.
There are several interesting points which may be noted from
an examination of these curves: First, the exact coincidence be-
tween the points for the Worthington, the Sulzer and the Augs-
burg engines, with those of the Fullagar engine. Second, the fact
that all of the fuel per I.H.P. curves show a decreasing consump-
tion down to about thirty pounds M.E.P., and that, even at the no
load point, the fuel per B.H.P. is not appreciably greater than at
normal loads. In this respect the Diesel engine shows a marked
superiority over all other prime movers. Third, the curves for the
two cycle engines, both fuel per B.H.P. and fuel per I.H.P., show
a marked break above seventy pounds M.E.P., while the curves
for the four cycle engines show a very slight increase up to about
125 pounds M.E.P. This, however, is unimportant. For normal
powers it is not necessary to go above seventy pounds M.E.P., and
for the higher powers the fuel consumption is of minor importance.
In computing the cruising radius an allowance of five tons per
day has been made for auxiliary consumption. This is based on
the detailed estimate below.
Water distilled, using triple effect evaporators using steam from
low pressure boilers, 12,000 gals. i tb. oil = 14 tbs. steam =
25 IDs. water. Fuel oil per day....
3,840 lbs.


  p. 1220 (#128)                      #

FIGURE 2.
5000 toas fuell
radius 58400 miles
af 9.5 ftnots.
Radius at 12 Knot's
53300 miles
30000
30000
(No allowance has been
This will decrease the swisine
5000
Radius at 15 knots
45 000 miles.
000
gradius-Speed
Mesh El ax 100%
Powet. 92%
(Recip. Steam Engine
Yarrow
35400
EH-% Full Power(1.11.P)
Cruising Radius -mile
-Cowsing Red based
on data from H
this curve. P
KNormal full
powet 120.P.
and 74 lbs, M.E..
U.S.S.Oklahoma:-
performance curves for
Diesel Installation.
1 Worthington 2 Cycle DA
+ Compressor and scaveng
purp included
-- Full agar 2 cycle
opposed piston Compres.
and scoreng pumb included.
-:- B.A. Exp. Icyla
Cycle without compressor,
BA Exp. Allowance for
208 separately driven comp.
TO- Aorangi' 2 Cycle s. Á.
Sulzer. Shop tests. Air
compressors, but no scan.
blowers ,
1504 Horang," 60 hour sea
test, blowers and
Compressors included
* Augsburg a cycle D.A.
full power shop test
with compressor and
blower.
Te +--B.4. Exp. fuel - 1.H.P.
X--- Augsburg, (constant
speed) fuel-1.H.P.
10----Fullegar, fuel - iH.P
25 ---- 4 Cycle engine fyell.n.d
(constant speed."chelaley)
7 orangi" fuel LHP.

15000
HP
Mee
B.H.P -
sols
/B.H.Pas
68763
de-MOA
Fuel - B.H.P. lbs.
betd-/HA
OCH
SOOC
or to
Speed cones-
ponding to lowest
point on' fuel
consumption Curve
' 15.7 knots
RPM -33
o o
Sbeed, nots.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 21
189
30 20
10
90 9 70 60 50 40
Engine Elficiency, %
150
16 . 1
Me pins 89.10 (Brate HP)
15 100
% Full Power (for use with curves Mep and fuel B.NP only)


  p. 1221 (#129)                      #

1935)
1221
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships
1221
Diesel driven generators with 300 K.W. mean load at .60 lbs. fuel
per K.W. hour. Fuel per day.............
Heating and miscellaneous. Fuel per day.....................
4,320 lbs.
3,040 Ibs.
Total fuel (5 tons per day).
11,200 tbs.
The above estimate makes no allowance for the use of the heat of
the exhaust gases. The water allowed is that for crew use alone,
as the large amount required for make up feed is entirely elimi-
nated with the Diesel installation.
The cruising radius shown in Fig. 2 is based on a fuel capacity
of 5,000 tons. The total fuel capacity shown in Fig. I is 5,500
tons. Inspection of this plan will show that an additional supply
of 1,000 tons can be carried by utilizing a part of the space saved
by the Diesel installation, making the total fuel capacity approxi-
mately 6,500 tons. This will give a radius at 76,000 miles at 9.5
knots, 69,000 miles at 12 knots, and 58,000 miles at 15 knots.
The installation here shown is far short of what will be required
in future installations. It has been presented for the purpose of
giving a picture of what might be expected with a Diesel installa-
tion, in comparison with an existing installation. The power de-
veloped in the Oklahoma is far short of that of the later ships,
although the space occupied is about the same.
The maximum power capable of development with the Diesel in-
stallation shown is about 30,000 B.H.P. which is about the same
as that of the latest ships. The space occupied will be about one
half and the weight will be materially less, notwithstanding the
popular impression, based on the weights of slow speed heavy duty
engines, that the Diesel engine is inherently a heavy machine.
Before taking up the question of really large power installa-
tions some recent history of Diesel engine development will be
briefly reviewed. As early as 1910 the German Admiralty became
convinced as to the future of the Diesel engine for naval pur-
poses, and authorized two of the leading builders in Germany to
undertake the development of units of 12,000 B.H.P. per engine.
The efforts of Krupp, one of these firms, resulted in failure, but
a wealth of information was obtained before the work was dis-
continued on account of the war. The other firm was the Nurn-
berg branch of the M.A.N. Two six cylinder engines of 12,000
B.H.P. were built, and overload trials as high as 16,000 B.H.P.


  p. 1222 (#130)                      #

1222
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
were successfully completed. These engines were destroyed in
accordance with the armistice conditions, but as a result of the
experience gained, the present double acting Augsburg engine was
built. This engine has passed through the development stage, and
it is in a study of the results of the trials of the single cylinder
experimental engine that we find the greatest hope that the Diesel
engine for capital ships has arrived. The characteristics of this
engine are as follows:
Cylinder diameter ..
.....31.5 in.
Stroke.
........41.34 in.
R.P.M.
100
Piston speed
.......689 ft. per min.
B.H.P.
... 1,100
I.H.P.
.....1,300
Mechanical eff.
M.I.P.
....90 Ibs. per sq. in.
M.E.P.
........76.5 tbs. per sq. in.
.....
.85%
With a separately driven air compressor the mechanical efficiency
would be about ninety per cent, which is comparable to a steam
engine.
If the power of this engine is below that required for large
power installations, without an abnormally large number of
cylinders, it must be remembered that this engine is conservatively
designed for continuous operation. For the short periods for
which full power is required with naval engines a very much higher
power is practicable. Experience with steam engines indicates
that the power permissible for full power is about double that
which can be maintained continuously. The mean effective pres-
sure of this engine cannot be materially increased. Therefore any
increase in power must be obtained by an increase in the piston
speed. A consideration of this factor brings out a vast advantage
of the two cycle engine over all other types, which is its ability to
run at high piston speeds with moderate bearing loads. Investi-
gation, undertaken with a view to determining the limit of piston
speed, discloses the fact that a two cycle double acting engine can
be run at a piston speed of 1,400 feet per minute with a materially
smaller bearing load than many single acting engines now in suc-
cessful operation. This is due to the fact that, on every stroke,
there is a balance between the inertia pressure and the compres-


  p. 1223 (#131)                      #

1925)
:
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships
1223
sion pressure which relieves, the bearings of a large part of the
piston load. With this value of piston speed the power of the .
engine will be doubled, which brings it within reach of capital ship
installations.
There is one other feature of the Augsburg engine in which we
find justification for the belief that cylinder diameters large enough
for the greatest power requirement are practicable. This is the
method of handling the heat strains set up by the temperature
differences. In this engine a thin cast iron liner is fitted inside of
a steel jacket with the cooling water between the two. This has
the effect of decreasing, by something more than one-half, the heat
drop through the cylinder walls. It can be shown that, without
producing compression strains greater than cast iron can safely
withstand, the tension strains can be practically eliminated in
cylinders up to about forty inches in diameter. The cylinder
diameter is limited by the height available, since the ratio of effec-
tive stroke to cylinder diameter cannot be reduced below unity
without an undue increase in fuel consumption.
In order to keep the engine below the lower protective deck, in
the present design of ships, the cylinder diameter will be limited to
about thirty-four inches. This is not materially greater than the
cylinder diameter of the 12,000 B.H.P. Nurnberg engine, and is
five inches less than the diameter of the single acting 2,000 B.H.P.
Sulzer engine built in 1914, which in the words of Professor
Stodola “ran faultlessly.”
The following table shows what might be expected from a
cylinder with a diameter of thirty-four inches with moderate values
of piston speed and mean effective pressure:
Cylinder diameter ......
Stroke
R.P.M.
Piston speed ..
M.E.P. (Brake) .....
B.H.P.
...........34 in.
..42 in.
.....175
.....1,225 ft. per min.
......90 IDs. per sq. in.
...........2,579
With a four shaft arrangement, with a twelve cylinder engine on
each shaft, the total power would be about 124,000 B.H.P. Under
more extreme conditions, with some sacrifice of propeller efficiency,
a piston speed of 1,400 feet per minute would give about 175,000


  p. 1224 (#132)                      #

1224
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
B.H.P. With a five shaft arrangement, and 1,400 feet piston
speed, the power would be approximately 220,000 B.H.P.
It is not suggested that the Augsburg engine, or any other en-
gine, is available for installation in capital naval ships. The ratio
of height to stroke in this engine is too great to permit its installa-
tion within the available height limit, and it is doubtful if the
scavenging efficiency, necessary for the high mean effective pres-
sure required, can be maintained at a high piston speed. It is sub-
mitted, however, that, with the present state of knowledge, the de-
sign and development of a suitable engine does not present in-
superable difficulties. Considering the present state of the capital
ship industry it is not probable that any private firm would be
willing to undertake this development. It must be undertaken by
a governmental agency. This work will cost a great deal of money,
and require a very considerable period of time. When accom-
plished it will produce a revolution in the design of naval ships
which will justify all of the money, time and energy expended.
In view of the rapidity with which Diesel engine development is
proceeding abroad, it is probable that any ship now designed with
any other form of motive power will be obsolete before completed.


  p. 1225 (#133)                      #

SOME PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF FLYING
By LIEUTENANT COMMANDER R. G. Davis (MC), U. S. Navy
THE degree of success attained in aviation is dependent upon
I the physical and mental make-up of its personnel. Candi-
dates for the Naval Air Service little appear to appreciate
the high standard required by the Department in their selection and
maintenance. A brief discussion of the physical examination with
reference to the special senses and the effects of continued flying
may prove of interest especially to those contemplating entering
this branch of service.
Nationally and internationally the predominant interest in
military preparedness is centering about the development and
perfecting of the various types of aircraft and their relative value
in the first line of defense. The airplane is conceded to be of
indispensable importance in relation to our land and sea 'forces
and will play a leading part in another war, but perfect material
in ample quality and quantity will be of little assistance unless
serious and scientific thought is applied to the heart and brains of
the flying apparatus, namely the pilot.
During the early years of the World War all thought appears
to have been concerned with increasing the mechanical efficiency
of the plane with little or no consideration given to the selection
of the flier. It was a question of nerve among these no longer
fit for the apparently more arduous duties of the infantry and
artillery with the natural result of life measured in hours and a
tremendous loss of both personnel and material.
Unusual demands were put on the unselected material that only
the super-fit were capable of meeting. The physiological aspects
as well as the physical standards were neglected, the problems of
rarified air with its strain on the heart and nervous system were
not understood and the combined statistics of the Allies reveal the
startling fact that among all the crashes niney per cent were due to
defects in the pilots themselves and only two per cent due to the
enemy and the remaining eight per cent to faulty material. It is


  p. 1226 (#134)                      #

1226
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
unnatural for man to fly and the effects of low oxygen on defective
vision, balance and judgment were unappreciated while he was
sent hurtling through the air at terrific speed with his body in
rapidly changing positions. When attention was turned to a con-
sideration of these vital points and a raising of all standards
instituted, a marked decrease in the alarming ninety per cent was
noted and today with an increasing knowledge growing out of a
continued research we are accepting only the highest types of
physical and mental make-ups profiting by our lesson learned from
the bitter experience of the Allies.
The problems of air sickness, oxygen want, and the un-
precedented demands of the heart and nervous system have opened
a new field of preventive medicine investigation. The former
scant knowledge of life conditions at high altitudes obtained in
free ballooning has been greatly expanded by scientific studies on
Pikes Peak in the United States and Monte Rosa in Europe where
excellent data has been secured for comparative studies in physio-
logical change as produced in aviation.
During the war and subsequent years the War Department has
conducted an intensive research at a well equipped laboratory on
Long Island where a trained corps of workers are devoting all
their time to delving into physical problems of aviation both in the
selection and maintenance of the fier. Medical officers of both
services who receive special instruction in this laboratory are
assigned as flight surgeons to the various aviation centers, devoting
all their time to the welfare of the pilots, making frequent tests
and examinations, keeping them fit for the air and ever watchful
for the earliest signs of deterioration that left uncorrected would
result in disaster.
The effects of low oxygen on the heart and circulation are
studied in the low pressure chamber where the barometric pressure
may be reduced to any desired point, or on a rebreathing apparatus
where the percentage of oxygen is gradually lowered correspond-
ing to an actual flight. Thus we have two methods of producing
physiological effects as met with in aviation, the determining factor
being the low oxygen tension of the air. Slight changes from the
normal oxygen may produce incompetence of the circulatory
apparatus and bring to light hidden signs of cardiac insufficiency
and distress which would result in dilitation and collapse as the
strain of ascent increases.


  p. 1227 (#135)                      #

1925)
1227
Some Physical Aspects of Flying
The efficiency of the heart depends on the quality of its muscle,
its nutritive circulation “oxygen content" and an economical action
without unnecessary strain. Under reduced oxygen readjust-
ments and compensations are necessary such as more rapid respira-
tion and increased heart action to maintain the normal oxygen
tension. The optimum or superior physical type who shows no
evidence of strain at great altitudes does not suffer from the
noxious effects of low oxygen so long as his powers of compensa-
tion are equal to their task. Observations have shown that the
optimum type will compensate perfectly with little circulatory
strain and break with great suddenness when the limit of endurance
is reached, above 25,000 feet in the low pressure chamber and at
five and five-tenths to seven per cent of oxygen on the rebreather.
Subjects have stated that there is a feeling of buoyancy and well
being just before unconsciousness or collapse occurs.
Heart strain and nervous exhaustion produce fainting in the air
and rebreather tests confirm a sensitiveness to low oxygen. Similar
results are obtained from temporary indispositions following a bad
cold, recent illness, loss of sleep, fatigue, digestive disturbances
and alchololic excesses. The psychological tests are below normal,
all reactions are slowed and the subject becomes inefficient several
thousand feet below his normal ceiling which would prove fatal
on an actual flight. The break comes too suddenly to give any
safety warning; hence the vital importance of each pilot knowing
his limitations and keeping in the safety zone. The low pressure
chamber and rebreather permit a ceiling determination of all avia-
tion candidates without risk to limb or plane and a classification
of plane type assignment in accordance with the bodily resistance
to a reduced oxygen.
Prolonged strain in continued flying without proper intervals
of rest produce a condition of lowered efficiency known as stale-
ness. Bodily resources are either exhausted or unavailable, a
neurological limitation founded on chemical conditions. This may
appear in a cardio-respiratory type with symptoms of a shallow
and more frequent breathing, weak and increased pulse rate and
cold extremities; a nervous type with poor muscular control,
tremor of hands, eyelids and tongue, increased reflex nightmares
and insomnia; a muscular type showing a tenderness and flabbi-
ness with rheumatic pains. Any of these symptoms in an aviator
calls for an immediate rest, corrective dietetic measures and change


  p. 1228 (#136)                      #

1228
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of environment. Continued duty under symptoms of staleness
may result in the loss of a pilot who otherwise, with appropriate
treatment of the early recognized signs of deterioration would
quickly stage a comeback and be saved to aviation.
Low oxygen has a marked effect on vision and brings out hidden
defects in muscle balance that hitherto have escaped skillful eye
examinations. Stereoscopic vision is essential to a proper judg-
ment of distance, and the depth perception of each eye must be
balanced to insure a proper leveling off for a landing. Visual
reaction time has been estimated at twenty one hundredths of a
second but it may be delayed by fatigue and excesses. Poor
landing causes are invariably and quickly revealed by eye room
tests in the absence of more evident physical disturbances. Visual
acuity is tested by refraction and eye grounds carefully examined
for any pathology or latent disease. The entire sensory equipment
must be acutely developed. Instant coordinated impulses reach the
brain and produce instinctive and intuitive responses. The per-
ception of vision, sound, tactile motion and the deep sensibilities
of muscle, joint and viscera are more intimately concerned with
flying. On the ground all motor coordinations are concerned with
the maintaining of a proper relation between the body and its
supporting element. All motor coordinations are concerned with
the control of the plane dependent upon the acuteness of sensory
perceptions.
The sense of motion is obtained from the inner ear whose
delicate semi-circular canals are arranged in three planes. They
contain a fluid that when set in motion stimulates minute sensory
end organs that impart the proper information to the brain result-
ing in the corresponding motor response to the muscular system.
The sensory nerves are connected with the motor nerves to the
eyes and the motion stimulus is manifested by the ocular move-
ments. Thus motion sense assumes a relatively greater importance
to flying than the other special senses and is thoroughly tested in
candidates by the rotational chair. Large numbers of tests have
established a normal as the subject is turned with the body in
different positions.
Motor responses are further tested by the falling sensations
produced as the subject attempts to correct body positions.
Normal is recorded when in accordance with fact, and dizziness or
vertigo results when contrary to fact.


  p. 1229 (#137)                      #

1925]
1229
Some Physicul Aspects of Flying
The sound producing mechanism comprising the external audi-
tory canal, drum and bones of the middle ear are carefully ex-
amined by inspection and sound tests. Any signs of drum per-
forations, questionable scars or marked retractions are causes for
rejection and histories of any ear trouble or blows on the head
are carefully analyzed. Rapid descents will perforate the thin and
scarred drums. Nasal passages must be free allowing no ob-
struction in breathing. Presence of post nasal catarrh is a cause
of ear trouble through blocking of the eustachian canal leading
from the throat to the middle ear.
The pilot is selected from among those showing a keen desire to
fly, preferably in the twenties, active, alert, quick in reactions
possessing a sporting abandon, yet conservative and balanced in
mental makeup in addition to a sound and robust physique. The
family history is carefully considered and the history from early
childhood up to the present is analyzed. Early environment,
education and social conditions determining the personality trend
and development is traced in all the by-paths. Does the mental
organization as to temperment, intelligence and volition show un-
safe tendencies, and does the candidate react normally to his
environment and what are the personality trends, resistances and
potentialities? Among the points considered entirely favorable for
the optimum type are, youth, negative family history, single, good
scholarship in high school and college, ability in athletics, successes
in civil life, no excesses or dissipations, moderation in the use
of tobacco, no alcohol, normal digestion, robust physique, keen
desire to fly and cooperation of family in all that pertains to flying.
The temperament should be cheerful, stable, aggressive and self
reliant; intelligence, precise, alert and resourceful; volition,
energetic, quick, controlled and with a good tenacity of purpose.
After the flier has successfully passed the searching physical and
mental examination and completed his course of training, the flight
surgeon is concerned with the maintenance of his efficiency. The
effects of fatigue, overwork, loss of sleep, digestive disturbances,
worries, alcohol, etc., that tend to nervous exhaustion are care-
fully explained as each may dull the sensibilities showing the re-
action time to that fraction of a second resulting in a crash, other-
wise avoidable. The flight surgeon is constantly on the flying line
in daily contact with the pilots. He knows each one intimately,
goes aloft as indication arises observing any deviation from the


  p. 1230 (#138)                      #

1230
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
.
normal and at once institutes remedial measures when indicated.
He is ever striving to keep the pilot fit and only recommends
grounding when signs of deterioration are present.
The subject of goggles has been given much thought and numer-
ous types have been tried out with a wide difference of opinion
as to the type that combines all the essentials to a comfortable
and proper protection to the eyes. They should insure a wide
visual field, preferably a lens tinted with yellow-green, non-
breakable and surrounded by a large layer of wool padding to
insure comfort and protection to the frontal sinuses. Indirect
ventilation is necessary to prevent the formation of vapor and
frosting at high altitudes. The nose bridge should be adjustable
to fit the inter-pupillary distance and should not produce pressure
pains. Comfort should be experienced in addition to the other
essential points as the goggles are the one most important aid to
safety in flight.
Few men can continue nose breathing above 10,000 to 12,000
feet and must resort to mouth breathing with increased rate in
order to balance the compensatory changes. An oxygen apparatus
can be supplied the planes allowing for deficiency of high altitude
to insure the pilot possession of his faculties at all times. The
pilot's comfort in his plane is of prime importance. The body
temperature is preserved with heated cock-pits and electrically
heated suits. The former close cowls have been cut away and all
surfaces cushioned that have contributed to fractures of the skull.
Parachutes have been added to the safety equipment and more
and more the conservation of the pilot is resulting as the former
predominant thought of mechanical efficiency has been divided with
the selection and safety of the pilot. The secret of prolonged
usefulness is being kept fit by frequent overhauls when the pilot
shows the first signs of nervous exhaustion.
It is believed that safety flight develops from frequent flying
and one should immediately separate himself from aviation when
the prime requisite for a successful aviator namely, the keen desire
to fly, is waning or absent. After years of intensive research and
study there is a unified conclusion that there must be clearness of
mind, quickness of thought, keenness of judgment and moral
courage to insure the maximum efficiency required in the pilot who
would contribute to a safer aviation.


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DISCUSSION
What Might Have Happened at Jutland
(See page 1143, July, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER H. H. Frost, U. S. Navy.—Many students
of Jutland have doubtless conjectured as to what might have happened
had Admiral Scheer considered it advisable to adhere to his original plan
of trying to catch the British battle cruisers between two fires as they ad-
vanced at full speed to the southeastward in pursuit of Vice Admiral
Hipper. It has now been intimated that the Germans lost a chance to win
the war at Jutland.
The idea of surrounding the enemy and wiping out his entire force has
always been an attractive one. But how often has it succeeded? Hannibal
accomplished it in the open field at Cannae with perfect success; he suc-
ceeded by ambuscade at Lake Trasimene and was partially successful at
the Trebia ; the effectiveness of his combinations was enhanced by the in-
efficiency and carelessness of the Roman generals. Caesar also accomplished
this feat against an half-hearted enemy in Spain more by intrigue than by
fighting. The Germans, with the aid of overwhelming numbers and a
neutral frontier, were able to surround the French at Sedan. Hinden-
burg was able to repeat this feat with partial success at Tannenburg and
in the Winter Battle in East Prussia; Falkenhayn was successful on a
small scale at the Red Tower Pass. This about completes the list of
"Cannaes" in land warfare; even Austerlitz cannot be classed as such a
victory.
In naval warfare no occassion where an enemy naval force on the open
sea was ever caught between two fires comes to mind; that is, a case where
the enemy force was destroyed; there have been some cases where a
flank was partially enveloped without any marked effect.
The reasons why a surrounding attack is almost impossible are readily
apparent.
First, there is the enormous difficulty of coordinating the enveloping
forces. If such handling of military forces is difficult, how much more
complicated must it be to coordinate a number of forces in the attempt
to surround an enemy naval force superior in speed. This is difficult enough
when the commander-in-chief can see all of his forces and the enemy that
he is attempting to surround. If one of his forces is out of sight and he
can obtain its position only by delayed and inaccurate reports, this doubles
his problem; if, in addition, the enemy force must be reported by one of
our forces which does not even know its own position it requires no proof
to show that it is probably one of the most difficult problems in naval


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tactics. We have only to note that Hood, endeavoring to join Beatty, ap-
peared on the farther side of the German fleet, while Jellicoe ran into
Beatty where he did not expect him and found the German fleet in an en-
tirely unexpected position.
Second, if one of our forces is in contact with the enemy, it is liable to
be destroyed if we delay to arrange a trap; this is particularly the case
where our force is inferior in both speed and power.
Third, our separated enveloping forces are liable to be beaten in detail
if there is any failure in the enveloping attack.
Fourth, other forces of the enemy fleet not yet sighted may appear and
attack our separated forces.
As - against these disadvantages, our enveloping forces have the sole
advantage of surprise. The fact that our forces can open fire almost as
soon as they are sighted by the enemy gives us a chance of inflicting dam-
age before the enemy realized the change in the situation; the delay in the
turn-away of the fifth battle squadron at 4:50 is an illustration. This ad-
vantage is decreased by two further facts: first, the enemy may have light
cruisers spread in advance and on the flanks of the force we are endeavor-
ing to surround; second, the use of destroyers and smoke screens provide
a force caught in a dangerous situation with a means of disengaging itself
without heavy loss. The battle furnished illustrations of both these facts.
With these principles in mind, let us now examine the actual tactical
situation.
At 3:45 Admiral Scheer received a despatch from Vice Admiral Hipper
that he was engaging six battle cruisers on a southeasterly course. It
must be remembered that the fifth battle squadron had not been sighted by
Admiral Hipper at this time and no report was made of its presence. By
4:05, the battle fleet having closed up, course was set to the northwest and
speed increased to 15 knots; at 4:20 P. M., course was changed to west.
The purpose of these movements was to "bring the enemy between two
fires."
Just as the last change of course was being made a despatch was re-
ceived which altered the situation completely. "While this alteration of
course of the main fleet was in progress," reports Admiral Scheer, "the
II scouting group reported that a British squadron of five battleships was
joining in the action. The position of the I scouting group, which was
now opposed by six battle cruisers and five battleships, might become
critical. In consequence, everything depended upon effecting a junction
with the I scouting group as soon as possible: I therefore altered course
back to north."
Before the receipt of this signal the conditions had been unusually favor-
able for Admiral Scheer's plan. If the difficulties of coordination were
great and there was not a very large chance of trapping the British battle
cruisers, the Germans themselves were running no risks and if the com-
bination failed they would be little worse off than if they had not attempted
it. In the first place, the German battle cruisers, being in an inferiority


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Discussion
of but five to six in numbers and only about 2 knots in speed, were in no
particular danger while the trap was being prepared. In the second place,
the enveloping forces would be in no danger of being beaten in detail by
such a weak enemy force. In the third place, as only battle cruisers and
light forces had been sighted, the battle cruiser fleet alone was on the
scene, and as no battleships had yet been attached to this fleet, there was
little danger of the dispersed German forces being attacked by superior
British forces suddenly coming onto the battlefield.
Now, however, all this was changed. First, the entrance of the fifth
battle squadron into the engagement did render the situation of the I scout-
ing group critical. Not only might this situation appear critical to Scheer,
but it undoubtedly was critical. “The gunnery superiority,” reads the
official report, "and advantageous tactical position were distinctly on our
side, until ai 4:19 P. M., a new squadron, consisting of four or five ships
of the Queen Elizabeth class, with a considerable superiority in speed, ap-
peared from a northwesterly direction, and took part in the action with an
opening range of about 20,000 meters. This rendered the position of our
cruisers critical. The new opponent fired with remarkable rapidity and
accuracy, the accuracy being partly due to the impossibility of returning his
fire. At 4:26 P. M., the distance between the opposing battle cruisers was
about 12,000 meters and between our battle cruisers and the Queen Eliza-
beth's about 18,000 meters."
It is interesting to note that the fifth battle squadron closed the range on
the German battle cruisers 2,000 meters in seven minutes, thus leading the
Germans to believe that it had a superiority in speed. The official report
of Rear Admiral Evan Thomas shows that he decreased the range to 17,000
yards at one time. Another proof of the critical situation of the I scouting
group is that the second leader of the destroyers ordered all of his available
destroyers to attack to "relieve the pressure" on the battle cruisers. This
he did on his own initiative. It is true that the attacks of the German
destroyers and the turn-away of the German battle cruisers to avoid the
British destroyers did ultimately relieve the pressure. It is also true that,
had he so desired, Hipper might have skirmished at long range with Beatty
instead of voluntarily meeting him in fair fight; in this way he would have
avoided getting caught at moderate range by the fifth battle squadron, but
he would never have won the splendid success over the British battle cruisers
-successes probably greater than any which would have resulted from a
trap and particularly favorable from a moral viewpoint in that they were
won in fair open fight over superior enemy forces.
As the battle actually was fought, Scheer was able to come to the assist-
ance of Hipper at 4:45; in accordance with the proposed form of the trap,
he would not have been able to open fire for thirty additional minutes during
which time a lot might have happened.
Second, the danger of trying to surround a force of eleven capital ships
with twenty-one was very much greater than the plan to trap six battle
cruisers. It must be remembered that Hipper had not been able to inform


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Scheer of the loss of the two British battle cruisers and that the fifth battle
squadron was reported as having five and not four ships. Also, the German
second line battleships, mounting only four 11-inch guns and having but
18 knots speed, could hardly be counted on to surround a force mounting
almost exclusively 13.5-inch and 15-inch guns and having a minimum speed
of 25 knots. Under the changed conditions, it was evident that if Hipper
was to be one of the surrounding forces he would have to be reinforced.
Scheer thus had the problem of simultaneously reinforcing Hipper and using
the remainder for an enveloping attack. It is even proposed to divide the
German battle fleet into three separate detachments, in addition to Hipper's
force. The arrangements to provide for four separate forces simultaneously
surounding two enemy forces of superior speed—and all this on the basis
of delayed eports received from a distance—would certainly have taxed the
skill of a Napoleon and a Nelson rolled into one. If anything went wrong,
the Germans were themselves in danger of having one of their enveloping
forces beaten as the enemy broke through the circle.
Third, the presence of battleships indicated the proximity of the British
battle fleet. This was the first occasion on which the fifth battle squadron
operated with the battle cruiser fleet and even in this case it resulted from
chance and not design. If the British battle fleet were to come upon the
Germans while their forces were dispersed in the attempt to surround
Beatty and Evan Thomas, they would have found themselves in a dangerous
position, particularly as they were inferior in speed.
Fourth, even if the envelopment were made successfully, it is very prob-
lematical as to how many British ships would have been caught, as, with
their superior speed and strong light cruiser and destroyer forces, they could
have disengaged themselves from at least half of the German forces and
could have fought the action on even terms, with the disadvantage, however,
that any of their ships reduced in speed would be lost.
Finally, even assuming that the entire British force were destroyed with-
out loss to the Germans, the battle, while increasing greatly German pres-
tige, would by itself have had no decisive effect. There was no question
of winning the war by such an action. The British would still have had
twenty-eight battleships and five fast battleships or battle cruisers as
against seventeen battleships and five battle cruisers; they had also four
capital ships nearing completion as against three for the Germans. Count-
ing all of these capital ships they had a total of thirty-seven ships against
twenty-five, still a very good margin of superiority. The British also had an
incomparable advantage in the strategic position and a big superiority in
light cruisers, destroyers and second line ships of all types.
Everything considered, it is believed that Scheer made a correct and
normal decision in coming immediately to Hipper's assistance; the risks to
be run in attempting to surround the British forces were out of proportion
to the probable successes to be gained. The admiral later proved that he
was not averse to runing risks, so it is certain that he did not give up his
plan of envelopment because of any lack in resolution.


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Discussion
Now we will consider the conduct of Admiral Hipper during this ep-
isode. He has been criticized because of a signal sent at 4:20 P. M., report-
ing the entry of British battleships into the action. A perusal of the official
German report, however, shows that this despatch was sent, not by Hipper,
but by the commander of the II scouting group in the light cruiser Frank-
furt. Therefore, we have not the slightest information concerning any
despatches sent between Hipper and Scheer in either direction after the
report from Hipper that he was engaging battle cruisers; even this signal
was sent before the action actually began. Did Scheer send any instructions
or even information concerning his plan to catch the British battle cruisers
between two fires ? Did Hipper send any information concerning his move-
ments and those of the enemy? Until we can definitely answer these ques-
tions our criticism and comments will not be worth much. However, if
no such despatches were sent, will it not be charitable to assume, until we
have the facts before us, that there was some good reason why they were
not sent?
While it was Hipper's duty to keep his commander-in-chief informed of
the developments of the battle cruiser action, it must be admitted that a
commander engaged in a desperate fight against overwhelming numbers
has many other even more important things of which to think. If one looks
at the track of the German battle cruisers during this time and notes the
numerous changes of course and formation, it will be recognized that Hip-
per was enjoying a most busy afternoon. The situation was so changeable
that a report of the happenings at any one particular time would have been
of little value, and might even have been misleading, unless supplemented
by a series of reports announcing all of the new events; this was clearly
impracticable from a communications viewpoint and would have given
Scheer a mass of conflicting information; many mistakes must have been
made in the position of the German forces and the information concerning
the enemy forces, as is illustrated by the inaccurate reports of Commodore
Goodenough, who has been justly praised for his excellent work in send-
ing in information,
Could Hipper well have sent a reassuring signal to Scheer at any time
before he disengaged himself at about 4:40, when he was already in visual
touch with Scheer? Did he even know that the two British battle cruisers
had been lost? This is by no means certain. Von Hase states that he did
not notice the loss of the Indefatigable. The Queen Mary could not have
been reported until 4:30, only two minutes before Scheer saw the ships in
action and ten minutes after he had given up his plan to catch the British
battle cruisers between two fires. Even at that, could a commander en-
gaging an equal force of enemy battle cruisers consider the situation re-
assuring when four battleships, armed with 15-inch guns against his il- and
12-inch guns, had gained 2,000 yards in seven minutes and was bringing his
rear ship under fire at 17,000 yards and hitting? Von Hase states that the
Derfflinger was zigzagging to avoid the fire of the British battleships. The
leader of the destroyers and the commander of the IX flotilla both decided


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
to attack on their own initiative to relieve the situation. The situation was
not relieved until Scheer was on the scene.
Furthermore, a statement in the official report, at about 5:20, may have
some significance: "He (Hipper) was unable to report this, as intended, for
a short time previously the main and auxiliary W/T stations in his flag-
ship (Lutzow) had been put out of action by a heavy shell."
Under the circumstances, it would seem somewhat premature to accuse
Admiral Hipper of having caused the breakdown of the German plan at
Jutland. At any rate, it cannot be denied that he did some pretty nice
fighting and maneuvering that May afternoon with results not soon to be
forgotten by the naval profession-results as great, in our opinion, as any
that were probable in an attempt to surround in the open sea a force of ten
capital ships with superior speed, supported by numerous light cruisers and
destroyers, always remembering that the grand fleet might have come upon
the scene and surprised the Germans while in the execution of their plan.
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships—A Military Necessity
(See page 1217, July, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
REAR ADMIRAL C. W. Dyson, U. S. Navy.—I have read with great
interest Captain Proctor's article and am free to confess that he makes
out a very strong case for the adoption of the Diesel engine for capital
ship propulsion.
I am afraid, however, that he is unduly optimistic and counts upon the
availability of this type of power producer for much higher powers than
it can be used for on board ship.
He neglects the question of the propeller entirely except in one paragraph,
where he states, “Under more extreme conditions, with some sacrifice of
propeller efficiency, a speed of 1,400 feet per minute would give about
175,000 B.H.P.”
A four-shaft Diesel arrangement, with revolutions 175, could undoubtedly
be fitted on board our latest battleships if suitable engines could be obtained,
but for any considerable power over that which is now fitted on those
vessels consideration of tip clearances between the propellers and the hull
and between adjacent propellers places such limitations on the diameters
of the propellers that can be carried, that we are driven to increase in
speed of revolutions in order that the propellers with these limited diameters
may be able efficiently to absorb the power,
It is very doubtful whether Diesel engines, arranged on four shafts, can
be used for the development of any propulsive power much in excess of
that of our latest battleships, and it is an absolute impossibility to use them
for such powers as those of our light cruisers and aeroplane carriers, both
on account of the necessary limitations of piston speeds of the engines and
the resultant low revolutions of the propellers.


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Discussion
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships—A Military Necessity
(See page 1217, July, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
REAR ADMIRAL J. K. Robison, U. S. Navy.—Captain Proctor's interesting
and timely article gives the general proposition of machinery for naval
vessels without, it seems to me, consideration of all the factors involved.
The tendency of all engineering progress is toward an increase in the
amount of useful work to be derived from the thermal unit of the fuel.
Upon this basis the future, as Captain Proctor so ardently argues, lies in
the use of Diesel engines. For the Navy, however, the prime essential is
neither efficiency of the thermal engine nor even low weight or cost.
First, naval machinery must be safe to operate; second, it must be reliable ;
it must be possible for a ship's force, composed of such material as we
have on naval vessels, to operate and to maintain naval machinery in such
condition as always to be capable of whatever service it was designed to
render,
Naval machinery is usually operated at a small fraction of its maximum
power. Usually also it is necessary that this machinery be ready to develop
full power upon demand. One of the prime limitations is that of weight
and space required for its installation in a vessel. Machinery should be
such as will permit its being placed entirely below the water line to secure
the most complete protection against the attack of an enemy.
In determining the machinery that we should install upon any new vessel
it is necessary to take into account not only the present state of the art of
machinery design and manufacture, but also such considerations as have been
above suggested. Conservatism may be variously defined either as "old
fogyism” or as safety. Any naval vessel may, at some time, bear in itself
the onus of maintaining the national honor. It is my personal and official
opinion that progress that is enduring is made by steps rather than by
jumps. It is wiser to make improvements than to attempt a possible but
improbable miracle.
Diesel Engines for Capital Ships—A Military Necessity
(See page 1217, July, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
COMMANDER S. M. ROBINSON, U. S. Navy.—This article is a very timely
one as it brings forward for discussion a subject that is being given the
greatest amount of thought and consideration at the present time by all
officers who are interested in or responsible for the design of naval
machinery. The advantages that would accrue to a fleet due to the in-
creased cruising radius of Diesel engine ships are so well known that they
need not be dwelt upon especially.
However, insofar as the methods of obtaining these results are con-
cerned, it is not believed that an installation of the type outlined in this
paper is feasible at the present time, nor is it believed that the tendency of
design points toward that means as a final solution. Experience with Diesel


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
engines on submarines has shown conclusively that the smaller engines are
not only more reliable, but are actually lighter per horsepower than are the
larger engines, and it is believed that installations of high power with
Diesel engines for military ships will be limited to small high-speed engines
using some one of the various forms of reduction gear that are being tried
out at the present time.
Service-Since-Graduation vs. Age-in-Grade Retirement
(See Page 737, May, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
CAPTAIN J. K. TaussiG, U. S. Navy.—Commander McCain has given a
very complete and lucid estimate of the situation in regard to the effect,
or rather the differences in effect, that would be felt by the members of the
class of 1907 should the present laws in regard to forced retirements con-
tinue in force and that which would be produced should the law be changed
to one in which length-of-service retirement is substituted for age-in-grade.
The first thing that impresses one after reading the paper is that, with
the assumptions as given, the same number, or practically the same number
of forced retirements will take place under either system. This is because
the figures are based on an assumption that the lengths of service since
graduation which would be used in a change in the basic law correspond
nearly exactly, for the average age of officers, to the ages at which the
present law requires all officers to retire if not promoted.
It is seen from this that the advocated change from age-in-grade retire-
ment is based entirely on the effect on certain individuals and not on the
effect on the service as a whole. Commander McCain has shown that the
proposed change would not materially affect the total number of officers
of the class of 1907 who are eventually promoted, but that it would very
materially affect the relative chances of some of the individuals in that class.
The writer of this discussion has held right along that the effect on a
few individuals is not the criterion for making a change in the present basic
law. The real trouble for the class of 1907 is not so much with which
individuals, the young or the old men, will have a better chance for pro-
motion, but is in the fact that, whichever method is in force, such a small
percentage of the class will be promoted.
The remedy for this situation is not to be found in the change to
length-of-service retirement. It can not be entirely remedied under any
conditions. But the situation for this class, as well as for all classes, can
be based materially, if, under the basic law, certain adjustments are made in
the various percentages in grades, and in the ages at which forced retire-
ments will take place. Such adjustments will not only benefit the class of
1907, but they would also have a favorable effect on the entire service, not
only insofar as individuals are concerned, but also for entire classes. These
adjustments will require the lowering of the ages at which lieutenant com-
manders and commanders are forced to retire. At present those near the
top of these lists are considerably below the retiring ages, so the sooner


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1925]
1239.
Discussion
these adjustments are made the better it will be. That is these retiring ages
can now be reduced without forcing out unduly large numbers of com-
manders and lieutenant commanders, but if the necessary change is delayed
too long there will be an abnormal disruption the first year it is placed in
effect.
The conclusion drawn is that we waste our time in attempting to obtain
legislation which simply changes the chances for promotion of a few indi-
viduals and does not improve the situation for the service at large. What
is needed is a smoothing out of the promotion curve throughout the entire
service. It has previously been pointed out, and is here repeated on account
of the necessity for emphasis, that the change in basic law which substi-
tutes length-of-service retirement for age-in-grade retirement will not
remedy the situation for the larger part of the service. The only way it
can be remedied is (1) by changing the percentages in the various grades;
(2) by changing the forced retiring ages for lieutenant commanders and
commanders; and (3) by introducing some form of elimination in the grade
of rear admiral and in the grades of ensign, lieutenant (j. g.) and
lieutenant.
It is concluded, therefore, that the service as a whole will be greatly
benefited if legislation can be obtained which will do away with the uneven-
ness, and, in some grades, abnormal number of forced retirements that the
present law will eventually require. A change from age-in-grade to length-
of-service retirement will not produce this desired condition.
There is one sentence of Commander McCain's paper which particularly
attracts attention. This is: “.... Thus it seems that the class (1907)
does have a slight advantage under the present law, but so slight is the ad-
vantage and so marked is the discrimination against individuals that it may
be called a Pyrrhic victory."
To whom accrues the slight advantage which the class of 1907 obtains
under the present law? The answer is simple. The advantage accrues to
several individuals of the class who, owing to their ages, have good chances
for promotion, but who would have this chance materially lessened by a
change to length-of-service retirement. Who are the individuals against
whom the referred marked discrimination of the present law strikes? It
is a few of the older members of the class. But Commander McCain
admits that a greater number of the class of 1907 will be promoted under
the present law than will be under the proposed change. Therefore, the
change would operate unfavorably against a larger number of individuals
than does the present law, from which we see that adherence to the present
law is a "Pyrrhic victory” only insofar as a few individuals are concerned,
but would be a real victory for the larger part of the service.
Why deny so-called benefits to be obtained by certain individuals under
the present law and try to take these benefits away in order that certain
other individuals may obtain them at their expense? It looks as if the
whole agitation for a change in the basic law is due to the effect on a few
individuals and not on what might be the effect on the entire service. This
is certain ; just as long as there must be a large number of forced retire-


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ments, the average number will be the same under either system if the
length-of-service which is to govern retirements corresponds, for the
average officer, to the ages at which retirements are forced by the present
law. But under the present law only a few individuals are adversely af-
fected, while in the proposed change to length-of-service retirement a
larger number of individuals will be adversely affected insofar as actual
opportunities for appearing before the selection board are concerned.
Therefore, the change would be worse for the service as a whole. We had
better stick to our present basic law, making only such adjustments as will
smooth out the curve. This will give assurance of promotion to a larger
percentage of the members of the abnormally large classes, such as 1907.
Commander McCain deals quite extensively with the methods that might
be pursued by the various selection boards. The writer of this discussion
believes that as soon as the situation is presented where a large number of
officers, who, if not promoted, will be retired during the coming year, the
board will discontinue the selection of officers only from the very top of
the lists. Instead, they will give serious consideration to all officers in a
block which ends with the name of the last officer in his normal position
who will be retired during the coming year, if not promoted. The board
must select, “having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the
efficiency of the naval service.” The relative fitness of officers cannot be de-
termined by the individual reports of fitness. These reports are not a true
test. The fitness reports of the large majority of captains near the top of
the list averages so nearly in equality that these reports in themselves can-
not possibly be an accurate gauge. Nor can the "quantity" of favorable
reports be used as a criterien for determining relative fitness. It is well
known that some of the ablest and most efficient officers have very little in
"quantity" in their fitness jackets, but that their limited number of reports
and letters unmistakably demonstrate "quality.” And it is quality that we
are after.
The fitness reports being so nearly on a par, and in most cases being
absolutely impossible for relative classification, the question of "efficiency
of the naval service" comes to the fore. The efficiency of the naval service
demands the selection of those captains whom the board considers would
make the best flag officers. Service reputation, which is determined not
only by the efficient manner in which an officer performs the duty assigned,
but which has behind it the character, class, or kind of duty performed,
the military and moral character of the officer, his willingness to take re-
sponsibility, physical condition, etc., etc., must carry great weight with the
board. It is conceded that when the members of the selection board yote
on which captains are to be selected we may expect to find a more or less
scattered opinion, depending on the basis which the board, or its members,
adopts in making the selections. But, if each member of the board should
place himself in the position of the commander-in-chief of the United
States fleet in a time of strained relations, and from the top twenty or
thirty captains list the six or eight whom he would desire to have as his
subordinate fleet flag officers, it is believed that the general service reputa-


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Discussion
tion of the officers being considered would result in a sufficient consensus
of opinion in the board to select seventy-five per cent of those to be pro-
moted on the first ballot.
It is believed that it will do no good to attempt to determine one's rela-
tive chances for promotion under the present law, because it is inconceivable
that certain features of the law will not be changed within the next few
years. These changes must come not because the basic principle of age-in-
grade is wrong (which it is not) but because the present authorized per-
centages in the various grades and the ages at which forced retirements
are required do not bear the proper relations for obtaining a smooth and
equitable flow of promotion. The remedy is not to be found in a change
of the system from age-in-grade to length-of-service retirement. It can be
attained by making a few simple adjustments in the present law.
Airplane Carriers
Editor's Note: The Washington Post recently published an article on
lighter-than-air aircraft carriers, which was partially quoted in the PRO-
CEEDINGS, Professional Notes (page 848, Volume 51, May, 1925, issue);
and also quoted in U. S. Air Services. The following letter from Lieutenant
Warlick, author of the textbook, Naval Aviation, used by the midshipmen
at the Naval Academy, was published in U. S. Air Services, and is herewith
reprinted because of its bearing upon the Washington Post's article as
quoted in our May issue.
UNITED STATES NavAL ACADEMY,
Annapolis, Maryland.
To the Editor: (U. S. Air Services)
It was with much surprise that I saw your unqualified quotation of the
Washington Post's editorial concerning airship airplane carriers. The
sanctioning by a reputable aviation magazine of such an exaggeration not
only fails to help the cause of aviation but actually hinders it. Aside from
this is the harm done by the shadow of discredit cast upon other articles
of value.
I will give briefly the grounds upon which I base my statements:
The airplane carrier to be of use in war must fulfill certain necessary
requirements. It must be capable of maintaining all its planes in flight for
the duration of air engagement. It must house the crew that fly the planes.
It must supply the planes with fuel to keep them in the air during the battle.
It must supply them with munitions. It must furnish at least a moderate
amount of repair facilities. The exercise, by the carrier, of these functions
requires that a certain amount of weight carrying capacity be sacrificed
to each.
Let us take each of these functions in turn and investigate the carrying
capacity that each will require, considering the airship described-five million
cubic feet, 7,000 miles range at 60 knots, and to carry thirty bombers and
150 pursuit planes.
Each bomber requires two men to operate it. The pursuit planes require
one each. The most meager equipment with which each man could be ex-
pected to exist is twenty-five pounds.


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ONE
Each bomber will certainly require 2,000 pounds of bombs.
Fuel consumption for the following table is computed at the rate of six-
tenths pound per horsepower per hour, and allowing one full endurance
flight per plane—a niggardly allowance :
ONE
BOMBER
PURSUIT PLANE
Plane .........
..6,000 pounds 1,500 pounds
Crew and luggage ... ........ 350 pounds 175 pounds
Fuel for plane ....
.......1,500 pounds 350 pounds
Munitions ...
..2,000 pounds
............
9,850 pounds 2,025 pounds
The thirty bombers with personnel and equipment will weigh 295,500 pounds.
The 150 pursuit planes with personnel and equipment will weigh 303,750
pounds.
The total weight of this equipment will be 599,250 pounds.
Weight of the airship's crew 7,000 pounds.
Dead weight of airship (twice Shenandoah) 164,000 pounds.
Weight of the airship's fuel 200,000 pounds.
Total weight to be lifted 970,250 pounds.
The full weight of this ship, then, when ready to fly, will be 433 gross
tons. This figure does not include such minor weights as food, water,
repair facilities, and anti-aircraft defense armament for the airship.
A craft of this sort would indeed be a formidable weapon for national
defense! Three times the size of the Shenandoah, carrying as many planes
as both the Lexington and Saratoga—and at a cost of only $2,500,000! Why
does not the Navy Department see this?
Here is the reason:
Now that we have built such a splendid “Castle in the Air" let's test its
worth. Return to the laws of physics which made the airship possible and
investigate the aerodynamical properties of this craft.
The total buoyant effort of five million cubic feet of helium is 135 tons !
This is the total effort. But our ship requires 433 tons to lift it from
the earth. In order that it may rise into the air, all the equipment must
be discharged except the airship's crew and fuel. It is even doubtful
whether such a ship could leave the ground with fuel sufficient to carry it
7,000 miles at such high speed as 60 knots.
There is little doubt that airships will in the future act as plane carriers
but they cannot possibly carry many planes and these must be small ones.
For the five-million-cubic-feet ship to carry planes at all it is necessary to
discharge some of the fuel, thus reducing either or both speed and range.
The figures I have given above can be readily verified at either of the
air services.
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) WILLIAM W. WARLICK,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.


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Discussion
Blood Is Thicker Than Water
(See page 91, January, 1925, PROCEEDINGS)
MAJOR E. N. MCCLELLAN, U. S. M. C.—There seems to be so much
discussion about Tattnall's historic exclamation, “Blood Is Thicker than
Water," that it might be well for your readers to have access to the
following report of "Josiah Tattnall, Flag Officer, Commanding, East
India Squadron,” dated “U. S. Steam Frigate Powhatan, Flag Ship, East
India Squadron, Off Peiho River, July 4, 1859," copied from the original
archives in the "East Indian Squadron" Letter Book of Flag Officer
Tattnall, located in the Navy Library:
Sir.
The last despatch which I had the honor to send you reported this Ship,
in company with the chartered steamer Toep-wan, at Sea, off the Yang-tse,
on her way to the Peiho, with our Minister to China, Mr. Ward, and suite
on board.
That gentleman has reported to the Government the result of his inter-
views and correspondence with the Chinese Commissioners at "Shanghae."
I shall only refer, therefore, to that subject, so far as is necessary to your
understanding the circumstances which placed us in a very unexpected
position on our arrival at the Peiho and produced as unexpected results.
The Chinese Commissioners were those with whom our late Minister,
Mr. Reed, concluded the Treaty last year at "Tient-Sin," and with whom he,
subsequently, arranged the tariff at "Shanghae," where they have remained
ever since.
In the interchange of visits between these Commissioners and Mr. Ward,
the latter was escorted by a number of the Officers and sixty Marines of
our Squadron, this being not only suited to the dignity of Mr. Ward, but
intended as a compliment to the Chinese Commissioners, to whom Mr. Ward
wished to extend the greatest consideration.
Mr. Ward informed them that he was on his way to "Pekin,” to exchange
the Treaties, which it was obligatory on both parties to do, on or before
the 18th June, now near at hand.
They replied that having signed the Treaties they must themselves ex-
change them, that they could not reach “Pekin" from "Shanghae" in less
than sixty days, and that by agreement with Lord Elgin, the late British
Ambassador, they were expected to remain at "Shanghae" until the arrival
of the present British Minister, Mr. Bruce.
Mr. Ward then offered to exchange our Treaty at "Shanghae," which
they evaded, on the ground that the Treaty was at "Pekin" and they pro-
posed to Mr. Ward that he should remain at "Shanghae" until the arrival
of the British Minister.
Mr. Ward, although doubting their sincerity, in a spirit of consideration
and forbearance, accepted the proposition, thus having the specified time of
exchange.
The British Minister, on his arrival a day or two after, refused to hold
offical intercourse with the Commissioners, on the ground (as I understood
it) that, “Pekin" was the place specified in the British Treaty for the ex-
change and that he was on his way there for that purpose.
Unsuccessful in their endeavor to detain the British and to re-open the
negotiation at "Shanghae," the Commissioners apparently yielded, and dis-
patched Couriers (who they asserted would arrive in a week) to Pekin to
prepare (as they said) the authorities for the arrival and reception of all
the Ministers and their conveyance to “Pekin," where the Treaties would


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be exchanged by a special Commissioner on the 25th June, the day specified
in the British Treaty.
The commissioners notified Mr. Ward of this arrangement and requested
him to accompany the British and French to the Peiho. To this he con-
sented, thereby, to a certain extent, assuming the same platform with the
latter.
I will here remark that, the sincerity of the Chinese Commissioners was
much doubted at the time, some of their countrymen at "Shanghae" de-
claring that delay was their object, as they were fortifying the Peiho very
strongly, and had placed in command, a Mongal Prince, of high Military
reputation, who was known to be very hostile to the "Treaties.”
We reached the anchorage off the Peiho on the 21st June where we found
the British and French Ministers and their fleet.
On my first interview with the British Admiral, James Hope, I learned
that the Ministers (English and French) had announced to the authorities
on shore the object of their visit and that they should proceed by the river
to "Tient-Sin," on their way to “Pekin," conformably with their “Treaties."
The Chinese had positively refused them the ascent of the river, the
entrance to which they found very strongly fortified, and across which
several lines of barricades had been constructed.
The Chinese declared that this river, which we had all navigated as the
Peiho a year ago, was only one mouth of the “Tient-Sin" river, and
that there was another entrance ten miles to the North, which entrance was
called the Peiho and was the point referred to in the Treaties.
They insisted that the Ministers should remain off this Northern en-
trance until the arrival of the Commissioners from “Shanghae" (which
could not be short of two months) when arrangements would be made to
convey them to “Pekin" by this route.
The British and French Ministers considering this an evasion with a view
to gaining time to strengthen their defences, had referred the matter to
their respective Naval Commanders, who notified the Chinese that, if the
obstructions in the Channel of the river were not removed by the 25th June,
the day for the exchange of Treaties, they would themselves proceed to
remove them.
I will here remark that in the Chinese charts there is a small river empty-
ing into the sea ten miles to the North of this, and which, diverging grad-
ually from the course of the Peiho, as you ascend it, has its source far in
the interior. Some twenty miles from its mouth it is connected with the
river we know as the Peiho by a narrow creek, said to be dry at low, and
having but five feet at high water.
After due deliberation, Mr. Ward and I decided to enter the river we
had known as the Peiho, in the steamer “Toey-wan," as far as the barri-
cades, as though ignorant of access having been refused the English and
French. If the forts should fire across our bows to bring us to, we would
anchor and communicate; if into us, having no guns, we would retire and
act accordingly.
Twelve British and one French steamer, all small, had previously con-
centrated within the bar, at the mouth of the river, just out of gun shot of
the batteries. -
We entered the river in execution of our plan at II A. M., on the 24th
ult., and passing through the British Squadron, without communicating,
pushed up towards the barriers.
At this time not a man was to be seen at the Forts nor a gun in an em-
brasure, nor, although flag staffs were on the parapets, was a flag displayed.
There was nothing to indicate that the Forts were armed or manned.
Subsequent events show this to have been a deception and ambuscade, in-
tended, I do not doubt (in the confidence of their own strength and the


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1245
Discussion
small force of the English) to invite a conflict in order to annul the
Treaties of last year.
We had approached to within three hundred yards of the first barrier, at
which point, should we not be fired on, I had purposed anchoring, when we
grounded, and failed in all our efforts to back off. The tide was falling
fast and our situation was critical, not only from the facility with which
the batteries might demolish us, but as we were on the edge of a steep
bank, from the probability of the Steamer falling over and filling.
At this moment I received from Admiral James Hope, an attention and
kindness which must place me under lasting obligations to him.
Although he had reason to think that she would be fired upon by the
Forts, he sent a Gun Boat to my aid, with the message that, had he known
of my intention to pass up he would have furnished me a Pilot, and that
he expected to see me fired on.
The Gun Boat failed in her effort to extricate me and there being, as I
have said, a probability of the Toey-wan's falling over and filling, the Ad-
miral despatched a second Gun Boat to me, placing her entirely at my dis-
position, with the handsome and generous offer that I should hoist on board
of her the American Ensign and my own personal flag.
I declined the offer, with a just appreciation, however, of the personal
kindness to myself and the delicate compliment to our service.
The Toey-wan was more fortunate than I expected and a favorable wind
having sprung up we got her off at high water.
About two hours after grounding we sent a boat to the nearest Fort
with my Flag Lieutenant, Mr. Trenchard, and the Interpreters, to inform
the Commanding Officer that, the American Minister was on board the Toey-
wan on his way to "Tient-Sin” and “Pekin,” in accordance with our Treaty
and an understanding with the Chinese Commissioners at "Shanghae."
They were met at the landing by an officer, professing to be of low rank,
who said that his orders were, not to permit the removal of the barriers,
and to fire on those attempting it. That he believed that a high officer had
been appointed to meet the Ministers at the North. He also asserted, most
falsely, as subsequently shown, that there were no Troops and only a few
country Militia in the forts.
Although the Interpreters were allowed to get out of the boat for greater
facility of conversation, they were not permitted to approach the Forts.
The Toey-wan floated late in the evening, when I observed that the
British were arranging themselves, apparently, for action. I therefore
dropped down to the mouth of the harbor, and below them, so that my
lights might not interfere with their Signals or my position with their
operations.
The British, in the night, removed, with their boats, a portion of the
lower barrier, but the Chinese restored it in the morning.
At 2:45 P. M., on the 25th, the day specified for the exchange of Treaties,
the British stood up the river for the barriers, Admiral Hope leading in one
of the Gun Boats.
His whole force consisted of ten Gun Boats, including one French, and
three larger steamers, of a class denominated Dispatch vessel, carrying in
all about fifty guns. They also had on board of some Chinese Junks, at
the mouth of the river, a reserve of boats with seamen and Marines.
On the Admiral's reaching the first barrier the Forts suddenly swarmed
with men and a terrible fire from very heavy guns was opened on him from
all the forts on both sides of the river.
Two of his vessels at this moment grounded near the spot the Toey-wan
had grounded the day before.
The British and French fought with the most determined valor but fifteen
minutes sufficed to show me without a hope of success.


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The fire of the Chinese was directed with fatal skill and was chiefly
concentrated on the Admiral and the vessels nearest to him. His Flag
Vessel being disabled and her crew cut up, he shifted his flag to a second
and on her meeting the fate of the first he again shifted it to the Cormorant,
one of the larger (Dispatch) steamers. Here again the fire was concen-
trated on the flag of the gallant Admiral.
By this time, 4 P. M., several of his vessels had been sunk and it was
evident to me that nothing could enable him to extricate himself and retire
from the hopeless conflict, but the reserve of boats and men at the Junks,
but at the time the tide was running too strong for the crowded boats to
stem.
The officer in charge of these boats now visited one. He said nothing
oi aid, but his silent appeal was powerful indeed. In the few moments he
was on board he would look anxiously, alternately at his Admiral and at
the boats.
After he left I held a consultation with Mr. Ward, and he agreed with
me perfectly that, under all the circumstances of our position with the
English and the aid the Admiral had tendered me the day before, I could
do no less than to tow the boats to his relief.
I made the offer which was thankfully and promptly accepted.
While the boats were making fast to hawsers which I veered astern, I
insisted on Mr. Ward and his suite leaving the Toey-wan, and going on
board one of the Junks, for reasons that will be obvious.
He at first reluctantly yielded, and left us, but soon returned in one of
the English boats, declaring that, as the Toey-wan was his home and was
going under fire with his approbation and concurrence, he would remain
in her. I reluctantly yielded to his gallant impulse.
At this time a young British officer came to me from the vessels engaged
to say that the gallant Admiral was dangerously wounded and had but
six men left. He (the officer) had two boats sunk in reaching me.
I towed the boats through the British line to within a short distance of
the Admiral whose flag was flying on the Cormorant, when casting them
off I retired to the rear of the line near the French Gun Boat and anchored
for the night.
I took up this position as it might enable me to aid the wounded and
should boats be sunk to rescue their crews.
After anchoring I thought of the Admiral and of his chivalrous kind-
ness to me the day before, which from an unwillingness to intrude on him
when he was preparing for action, I had in no way yet acknowledged.
I therefore, with my Flag Lieutenant, Mr. Trenchard, went in my barge
to visit him. When within a few feet of the Cormorant, a round shot
struck the boat, killed my Coxswain, and slightly bruised my Flag Lieu-
tenant. We fortunately reached the Cormorant before the boat entirely
filled.
I found the Admiral lying on his quarter-deck, badly wounded. I in-
formed him that I had called to pay him my respects, and to express my
regret at his condition. After remaining on board the Cormorant about
ten minutes I took advantage of an English boat that was passing to return
to the Toey-wan.
The Cormorant after this was sunk and the Admiral shifted his flag to a
fourth vessel, the Coramandel, (a thing I believe unprecedented) thus
evincing an indomitable valor under very disheartening and almost hopeless
circumstances.
At dusk, about 8 P. M., a desperate attempt was made, by landing from
boats, to storm the forts, but they stood in an impassable Morass, and the
assailants were repelled with heavy loss.


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Discussion
On the morning following this day and night of slaughter, the action
still continuing, but the fire more feeble and distant, I found that six of
the English vessels were sunk, and that the remainder had withdrawn to a
more distant and safer position, from which they could easily retire out
of gun shot.
I now prepared to return to the Powhatan with Mr. Ward, but first
called on board the Coromandel to take leave of the Admiral and also on
board the French Gun Boat to enquire after the French Commodore (Tri-
cault) whom I had met on board the Cormorant when I called on the Ad-
miral and who had subsequently been wounded.
I deferred my departure, by request, that I might tow to their Ships at
Sea, two Launch loads of the wounded English.
On reaching the Powhatan I again despatched the Toey-wan into the
harbor, in charge of Lieutenant Johnston (first of the Powhatan) with
orders to remain at the mouth of the harbor, out of fire, and to afford all
aid consistent with our neutrality. After an efficient performance of this
duty for 24 hours he rejoined me.
The Sea Officers with me in the Toey-wan on this service were Captain
Pearson, Lieutenants Trenchard and Semmes, all of the Powhatan, and
Midshipman Merchant of the Germantown. The Engineer Officers were
Messrs. City and Archer, Captain A. S. Taylor of the Marine Corps was
also with me. I have to thank them for their zealous services.
My Coxswain, John Hart, whose death I have to lament, was the son of
John and Mary Hart, now living at Jamaica, Long Island. He was a
widower, but has left a young daughter eight years old.
I shall communicate the sad event to his parents, and as his child whom
he supported will be entitled to a pension, may I beg the favor of you, Sir,
as soon as the proper papers shall be filed at the Department, to direct that
the pension be issued without unnecessary delay.
Hart had been a long time in the Navy, having served under me fifteen
years ago.
The English retired this morning from the river, having recovered and
brought out three of their sunken vessels and destroyed the others.
Their loss is about four hundred and fifty killed and wounded, including
twelve French. Eight officers are killed and twenty-three wounded.
Among the wounded are the four Senior officers, including the Admiral,
and the French Commodore Tricault.
They attacked with about twelve hundred men.
The above report was made to Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey.


  p. 1248 (#156)                      #


H.M.S. "Furious," Which Has Been RECONSTRUCTED AS AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER


  p. 1249 (#157)                      #

PROFESSIONAL NOTES
PREPARED BY
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER H. W. UNDERWOOD, U. S. NAVY
FROM MAY 7 TO JUNE 7
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
GREAT BRITAIN .......
FRANCE ..........
GERMANY .......
UNITED STATES ...
ENGINEERING .
AVIATION
TION .................
MERCHANT MARINE........
MISCELLANEOUS ......
CURRENT NAVAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAPERS.........
I 249
1258
1265
1267
1274.
1286
..
.
.....
.....
...........................
1294
1303
1311
1303
GREAT BRITAIN
Naval Shipbuilding Requirements
The Engineer, 15 May, 1925.-All who appreciate the importance of naval
defense will welcome the new shipbuilding program which the government
is expected to introduce before the Parliament adjourns for the summer
recess. We have put off till the very last moment the provision of new
ships to replace those which are past their prime, and the result is that
our present-day fleet, though sufficiently imposing on paper, contains a
large proportion of second-rate vessels, deficient in speed, armament, and
other essential qualities. Particularly is this the case with our cruisers, of
which no more than a dozen compare at all favorably with representative
ships under foreign flags. The hope that other powers, noticing the virtual
suspension of naval shipbuilding by this country, would refrain from ex-
panding their respective fleets, has not been fulfilled. While it might be
premature to speak of a new race for naval supremacy, there is an un-
mistakable tendency abroad to multiply vessels of which the aggregate
tonnage is not restricted by the Washington Treaty. Cruisers, destroyers,
submarines—all may be built without limit as to number, and since the
relative combatant worth of such craft has been substantially increased by
the reduction of battle fleets, a certain temptation exists to develop these
types on a liberal scale; hence, the large program of so-called "auxiliary"
construction which have come into effect since the Washington Conference.
Taking cruisers alone, it will be found that the five leading powers have
legislated since that event for a total of forty new cruisers, and of this
number only seven are being built for the British Empire. In destroyers
and submarines the British ratio of new tonnage is very much lower. Hay-
ing regard to the magnitude of our sea interests, it is clearly impossible for
us to remain passive in the face of this progressive decline in our naval


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1250
| July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
power. Imperative as the demand may be for economy in state expenditure,
it must not be allowed to override the urgent needs of national defense.
In the case of the navy retrenchment has already been carried to the extreme
limit. From now on it will pay us better to invest money in new ships than
to spend it on the upkeep of material which is largely inefficient.
A study of the Navy List shows that about a score of the cruisers re-
tained for service has ceased to be effective for war purposes. Probably
these vessels would have been paid off long since, but for the shortage of
cruising ships of any description. As it is, they must continue to serve
until replaced by something better, but the expenditure of large sums year
by year on ships of inferior fighting value is bad policy from every point of
view. Thanks to the patriotic action of the Australian Government in or-
dering two ships, seven major cruisers of post-war design will eventually
be at the disposal of the Empire. These, however, can be regarded only as
the nucleus of our future cruising feet, which the Admiralty considers
should attain a strength of fifty-two units. This estimate may be revised
by the government committee which has been investigating the whole ques-
tion of ship replacement, though in our judgment it errs, if at all, on the
moderate side. Whether all the new cruisers should be of the 10,000-ton
type which the Washington Agreement has practically standardized is a
problem of some importance. While is is true that most of the foreign
vessels now under construction belong to this class, both Japan and France
have built ships of considerably smaller dimensions. Cruisers of 10,000
tons seem to us unnecessarily large for duty with the battle fleet, for which
function ships of reduced displacement would probably be of equal use
and much less expensive. It is to be hoped, therefore, that our construc-
tors will not acquire the habit of regarding the maximum tonnage allowed
by the treaty as the basic figure for all new cruiser designs. For reasons
which may be cogent enough-though they are not very obvious to the
uninitiated—the Admiralty chooses to observe a great deal of mystery about
the ships now in hand. We can only trust that this policy of reticence will
be justified by results, but past experience with ships built in a similar
atmosphere of secrecy has not been encouraging. The three French cruisers
of the Duguay-Trouin class, although laid down after the treaty, have a
normal displacement of only 7,900 tons. High speed is their main feature,
to achieve which both armament and protection have been sacrificed. Their
speed is 34.5 knots, they mount eight 6.1-inch guns, and armor is non-
existent save for thin decks and splinter-proof gun turrets. Acclaimed at
the date of inception as wholly admirable, the design has since been con-
demned by some of the foremost French critics. Of greater interest are
the four Japanese cruisers of the Furutaka class, the nameship of which
was put afloat in February and the Kako last month. Displacing only
7,100 tons, they have a legend speed of 33 knots, and are armed with six
8-in guns, so disposed as to permit of a full discharge on either beam and
a bow fire of four guns. In planning these ships Japanese designers seem
to have moved out of the rut in which some of their foreign colleagues
are apparently content to remain. There is not, nor has there even been, any
technical objection to arming a ship of moderate size with a few heavy
guns, instead of a greater number of lighter pieces. Volume of fire was,
no doubt, the cardinal factor in former years, when control methods were
of the crudest, and a ship of fine lines, apt to be lively in a seaway, could not
hope to make effective use of slow-firing ordnance of heavy caliber. But
today, when the gun of medium caliber can be worked as easily, and dis-
charged almost as rapidly, as the quick firer of an earlier period, and when,
moreover, improved systems of fire control ensure a reasonable percentage
of hits under difficult conditions, the cast iron rule of equipping light
cruisers with no guns above 6-inch caliber is, or ought to be, discredited.


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Professional Notes
By disregarding this obsolete rule Japanese designers have evolved in the
Furutaka a ship of considerably greater fighting power than contemporary
vessels of equal and even superior tonnage. Compared with her, the 7,500-
ton American cruisers of the Omaha group, with their twelve 6-inch guns,
appear to disadvantage, and our own ships of the E class—7,600 tons and
seven 6-inch guns—are still worse. Unless the experience derived from
the late war is utterly misleading, neither the Omaha nor the Enterprise
would stand a sporting chance in a duel with the smaller Japanese ship.
We cite the Furutaka merely as a specimen of what may be done on a much
smaller displacement than 10,000 tons, without suggesting that replicas of
the design should be laid down for the British fleet, though it does seem to
us that ships of this class would be more useful than vessels like the Enter-
prise and Emerald. The only British cruising ship that approximates to the
Furutaka in size is the Adventure, which is primarily designed for mine-
laying. Her displacement is 7,260 tons, but although she was launched
nearly a year ago, details of her speed and armament are still withheld by
the naval authorities.
In addition to cruisers, the forthcoming program is expected to make
provision for destroyers and submarines. Of the first named we have 195
boats. Half of them were built during the war, and their normal span
of "life" has been curtailed by the strenuous service they were called upon
to perform. Actually, therefore, we have only about 100 destroyers that
are thoroughly efficient. The design of future boats must perforce be in-
Suenced by current progress abroad, which is all in the direction of increased
tonnage and heavier armament. The new French flotilla leaders, of which
twenty-one are under construction and projected, are vessels of 2,360 tons,
with a speed of 35.5 knots, armed with five 5.1-inch guns. There are no
leaders as powerful as this in our service. Japan, also, is reported to be
planning a series of new "destroyers,” to displace no less than 3,000 tons
and to carry several 5.5-inch guns. The value of the destroyer as an anti-
dote to the submarine was so clearly demonstrated in the late conflict that
the need for maintaining an adequate force of vessels of that type scarcely
requires emphasis. It is true that the Washington Agreement seeks to ban
submarine attacks on merchant shipping, but one of the leading powers
has still to ratify this particular clause of the treaty, and parchment safe-
guards are not, in any case, always effective in time of war. Finally, we
have fewer submarines than either the United States or Japan, though the
type is one clearly destined to play an important part in naval strategy.
A strong case could be presented for laying down a dozen or more new
submarines of large dimensions, to be employed as patrol ships or convoy
guards, on the oceanic trade routes which form the arteries of the Empire.
Apart from the obsolete K class, we have at present only five or six sub-
marines capable of undertaking this essential duty. There will, no doubt,
be an outcry in some quarters when the new shipbuilding program appears,
for the cost is bound to be heavy, but the bill must be faced unless the
country is prepared to sacrifice its sea power, which is synonymous with
its safety, welfare and prosperity.
The Value of Hong-kong
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record. 15 April, 1925.
- I confess that I have never been quite clear as to why the British Gov-
ernment acquiesced so readily at the Washington Conference in the sug-
gested restriction with regard to Hong-kong as a naval base. They agreed
that no more development work should be undertaken; that the dockyard
resources of the place should remain just as they were. Was this conces-
sion intended to ensure sanction to the Singapore scheme? Was it designed


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as a generous gesture to the United States in return for her readiness to
undertake no further fortification of the bases of Manila and Yap? The
former seems a very probable explanation. The latter is a matter which
could have little direct concern for us. But, then, neither could our policy
with regard to Hong-kong have any direct concern for the United States.
Ever since we "acquired” possession of it Hong-kong has been our
dominant naval base in the Far East. At the beginning of the present cen-
tury we had a battle fleet based upon it, consisting of six ships of the Glory
class and the two Barfleurs. The political and strategical reasons which
brought about a reduction of the China fleet to a very small squadron are
a matter of common knowledge, and I do not propose to refer further to
them than to point out that they no longer exist. The need for naval con-
centration in European waters seems very unlikely to recur in our time.
Our alliance with Japan has been abrogated—very unfortunately, I venture
to think. Japan, faced with what she imagined to be a prospect of isolation,
has now entered into a treaty with Soviet Russia, of the full extent of
which we have no knowledge. Whatever the significance of that compact
may be, one thing is certain : it cannot be anything like so friendly to Brit-
ish interests as as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
It was during the days when the British China fleet was, relatively, a
very great force that Hong-kong developed to its present position. Of
course, a great deal of work has been done since, but the general scheme of
the modern naval establishment was evolved during that period. The idea
was to make the port a battleship base of the first order. But, just as even
greater and more important undertakings, such as the Keyham extension
of Devonport Dockyard, have been outclassed within two decades by the
extraordinary growth in warship dimensions, so has Hong-kong failed to
realize this original purpose. The Admiralty No. 1 Dock is 555 feet long,
with 95 feet width of entrance, and 39 feet of water over the sills. It is
therefore inadequate to receiving any capital ship remaining on the effective
list. The New Dock at Quarry Bay, belonging to Messrs. Butterfield and
Swire, is 750 feet long, 88 feet wide, and 34.5 feet of water over the sills,
so that no ship with blister bulges could look at it. The Kowloon Dock is
700 feet long, 86 feet wide, with 30 feet of water. The Hope and Cosmo-
politan Docks are only able to accommodate small cruisers and other craft
of comparatively light displacement.
When I was last in Hong-kong, about two years ago, I was told that
there was no engineering difficulty in the way of developing the big docks
to a degree which would render them equal to any demands ever likely to be
imposed. That such development would have been entered upon, sooner or
later, is pretty certain, otherwise the restrictions of the Washington Agree-
ment under this head become merely pointless.
In point of strategic position it is frequently stated that Hong-kong
cannot compare with Singapore. But strategic position in relation to what?
The tendency to talk in generalities about what really depends entirely upon
specific circumstances is apt to lead to very indefinite conclusions. It is
useless to mince matters in defining strategic values. Both Hong-kong and
Singapore are naval bases of first class importance only in the supposition
of war with a great naval power in the Pacific. There is only one great
naval power whose natural war zone lies in the Pacific, and that is Japan.
Unless we are prepared to visualize the possibility of a conflict with Japan
it becomes almost impossible to estimate the relative strategical values of
Hong-kong or Singapore. Such a war is not going to be brought about
merely by contemplating it as a conceivable event. On the contrary, realiza-
tion of it and preparation for it (under the mask of as much polite camou-
flage as we please) are very much more likely to avert it than the easier
course of declaring it to be "unthinkable.”


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Two broad aspects have to be considered in relation to any question of
the value of a war base. The first is its geographical advantages, as deter-
mined by the probable zone of the active struggle, for the conduct of opera-
tions. The second is the ability to hold it against attempts at capture or
* destruction, which would be the obvious objective of the enemy. As to
operations, the character of these would be dictated in no small measure by
the situation and resources of the base itself. Distance is a governing
factor in strategy.
If it comes to a question of choice between Hong-kong and Singapore
under the conditions of such a presumptive war as to render both of them
bases of first-rate consequence, I think there can be little difficulty in de-
ciding in favor of Singapore. Hong-kong may present certain features of
advantage over the Malaya Island, but by the test of points the balance is
altogether in favor of the latter.
I confess that the Yellow Peril, in the accepted sense of the term, has
never much impressed me. It may become a sinister reality some day, but
that some day is so remote that we may leave worrying about it to posterity.
So far from China and Japan showing any signs of a future coalescence,
forming a threat to the peace of the White World, they are very antag-
onistic just now, but, in order to avoid too pointed a reference to a country
with which we are living on the most friendly relations, let me speak of the
Pacific objective—that objective out of which the Singapore scheme and
Australia's active naval policy have arisen-as the Yellow Peril.
A conflict with the Yellow Peril means not only war upon our commerce
traversing the Pacific, but a tremendous menace to India and Australia, as
well as to numerous lesser territories of the Empire. Indeed, such a war,
should it ever come to pass, would most likely arise out of an attempt at
forcible penetration of Australian terrain under the plea of sheer necessity
to find an outlet for over-population. There are other perfectly possible
causes of war; this is the most definite and the most probable one.
Singapore is more favorably seated than Hong-kong for countering any
naval descent from the China Sea. Moreover, it is a reasonable assump-
tion that the preliminary move to any such descent would be an attempt to
either capture or destroy Hong-kong. The place would not be easy to
defend against a strong military expedition, and with Kowloon in the occu-
pation of the enemy the island would be untenable as a naval base. It
would be the experience of Port Arthur over again.
Singapore is all but invulnerable against attack by land. In the first
place, the peninsula off the southern extremity of which it lies is a British
dominion, and in the second place it would be singularly difficult ground for
military operations on a big scale. The railway and main communications
are frequently within easy reach of long-range gunfire from the sea, and
are closely bordered by dense forests and jungles. A Yellow Peril fleet, in
order to attack Singapore, would have to steam nearly 3,000 miles from
its home bases—too great a distance altogether for capital ship operations,
which might reasonably be expected to extend over a considerable time. In
fact, it would be like carrying out an attack upon New York with Plymouth
as a base.
So in any attempt to estimate the relative values of Hong-kong and
Singapore as first class naval bases we must take into account this very
important question of the ability to hold either in the event of war with the
Yellow Peril. Hong-kong is better situated, strategically, for the delivery
of swift offensive operations, because it is more on the spot. But the
necessity to be on the defensive would be much more urgent than in the
case of Singapore, and to this extent geographical advantage would be more
than neutralized.


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The decision to develop Singapore as the British fleet base of the Pacific
does not imply any minimizing of the value of Hong-kong. We are cer-
tainly not going to give up the latter place because we are making more
of the former. As a point d'appui for submarine and destroyer operations
and for aircraft concentration it would be of vital importance in a Yellow
Peril war-so long as we could continue to hold it. But, it is just because
of this vital importance that we may be sure the Yellow Peril legions
(which we must assume to be as well equipped for war as the White World
legions) would spare no effort to wrest it from us.
As long as it were possible to materialize the traditional doctrine of
the British Navy, to seek out the enemy and attack him swiftly, Hong-
kong has strategical claims superior to those of Singapore, but, when we
pass to the phase of protective warfare, the Malaya base holds the superior
position. It is so much further down the flank of any great movement of
descent, either upon Australia or India, by the Yellow Peril forces that,
in addition to the great enforced extension of their line of retreat on being
brought to action (how valuable this would have proved at Jutland!), the
scope for heading-off tactics is so much more favorable. In a sketchy
way it may be said that Hong-kong would figure more as a base for
chasing, and Singapore for intercepting.
My reference to the possibility of a Yellow Peril descent upon India may
call forth a smile of incredulity, but this idea is no mere figment of fancy,
devised to form a theme upon which to write. During four months of
touring India I was astonished to find how openly and widely the coming
of the Yellow Peril conquerors is being proclaimed, and believed in, in the
native bazaars. I do not suggest that there is any organized government
propaganda in all this, but it must be perfectly well known to the Indian
authorities that there are countless Japanese moving about in the great
cities, telling the credulous Hindus what good times they will have and
how much more prosperous they will be "when we come here as the mas-
ters of India." Perhaps we can afford to laugh at this. A good many of us
laughed very derisively at the idea of the German menace until the bolt fell.
We yet have to see whether the Soviet-Japanese Treaty may not presently
give a new aspect to the value of Hong-kong. The difficulty about accept-
ing such restrictions as are imposed by the Washington Agreement is that
things have to be taken as they then are. It is impossible to foresee changes
which may alter the whole complexion of world affairs. The United States
is realizing this in regard to the prohibition to further fortify or improve
either Manila or Yap. Circumstances alter cases, and the point of view of
today may be radically different from the point of view of tomorrow. Six
months ago the British Government would have ratified the Geneva Protocol
with a loud murmur of self-gratulation. A few weeks ago the British
Government announced that the Geneva Protocol—so far as this country
is concerned- has never been anything more than stillborn.
Cups and Saucers for Seamen
The Naval and Military Record, 6 May, 1925.—The announcement that
cups and saucers are to replace the traditional mess bowl in the Royal Navy
is a very minor matter in itself, but it opens up a distinctly interesting line
of reflection. The customs of the sea have long been one of the great
attractions of the sea life. No disinterested man will pretend that a ham-
mock is as comfortable to sleep in as a four-poster bed, or that being
routed out of the aforesaid hammock in order to stand the middle watch is
as pleasant as all-night in, or that a sheath knife is quite as nice as an ivory-
handled blade, accompanied by an electro-plated fork as a means of attack-
ing bully beef. Yet the youthful imagination finds a glamor of romance


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Professional Notes
in the idea of all this picturesque unconventionality, and the youthful imag-
ination means a tremendous asset in recruiting for the Royal Navy.
There is an old story worth recalling in this connection. In the long
bygone days a certain hard-bitten old Jack did a particularly gallant act,
and the admiral under whom he was serving was so impressed that he asked
him to dine in his cabin. All went well until the dessert stage was reached.
Then Jack raised his finger bowl and lapped up its contents. Very tact-
fully the admiral's servant filled it again. Jack lapped up the second dose.
As the servant was once again pouring in water Jack, in a stage whisper,
said, "Put a drop o' rum in it this time, mate!" The moral is that the
lower deck does not want finger bowls. Does it want cups and saucers?
Is the additional luxury of being able to drink tea with the little finger poised
any real compensation for the blow to tradition ?
George Cupples, in The Green Hand, draws a great picture of the new
midshipman, on the first wet morning down-Channel, coming upon the
poop with an umbrella over his head, "and the hands forward all of a roar."
We do not suggest it is ever likely to come quite to this in the service, if
only that the service itself may be trusted to see that it shall not. Comfort
and cleanliness, by all means, but no grandmotherliness! Since the hon-
orable memberess for Plymouth has failed to abolish the rum ration, the
next best thing she can do is to suggest that it be served in wine glasses.
The Union Jack Club
The Army. Navy and Air Force Gazette, 9 May, 1925.—To those of us
who have been associated with the Union Jack Club from its early begin-
nings, the last annual general meeting presented an unfamiliar feature in
the absence of a former president, Sir Edward Ward. What the council
feels on this subject has been recorded in the report; what the club feels
has been eloquently expressed in the address which the elected members of
the general committee handed to Sir Edward Ward. Members will never
forget the thoroughness and the devotion which characterized his work for
the club.
The club is not a one-man show. It is, according to the figures of last
year, a 288,000 men's show, with a council of men of experience, ability,
and whole-hearted devotion to its interests. The Union Jack Club, as Sir
Walter Lawrence, its new president, remarked, is a wonderful and unique
institution, in that it runs without splash, advertisement and booming, yet
always moving with the times and keeping abreast of the requirements of
the services. Colonel Sir Henry Streatfeild, Sir George Majoribanks, and
Brigadier General Gascoigne and others have done much for this fine
service institution, which has now nearly 700 beds, looks after the leave
men, and has supplied as many as 2,000 meals in one day.
This club depends on two great points. One is finance, and on this
score the club is sound and self-supporting. The second point is the tone
of the club. When Sir Walter Lawrence was asked to draw up the rules
he borrowed from clubs in the West End the rules which now govern the
C'nion Jack Club and, looking back over the years that have passed, one
can say that the tone of the Union Jack Club is one of its greatest assets.
How tone comes is a mystery, but, when once it is established, it grows
strong. It is in the hands of the members, who are jealous guardians of
the honor of the club, which never closes, and is open day and night.
In the old days, when a leave man arrived at Waterloo he had nowhere
to go, and he fell a ready victim to those who made it a profitable business
to meet him when his purse was full. What a change the Union Jack Club
has worked. The trade of the harpies and the confidence men has become
flat, stale and unprofitable. The club has raised the self-respect of the man


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as well as catering for him, and it is a rare thing now to see drunkenness
in uniform, or to witness any man being escorted to a platform by singing
and tipsy undesirables. The clean, manly life in the services and the broader,
better lines of education have an abettor outside of barracks in the help-
ful facilities of the Waterloo Road Club, which has accomplished its
share in the general uplift and performed a truly national service. It en-
joys the fruit of its pioneering days in that it is now an established factor
in the life of the services—a club, a home, a restaurant, a resting place,
bank, safe deposit, and the mustering place for journeys to and fro.
Naval Engineering Training
The Naval and Military Record, 8 April, 1925.—The statement that the
Admiralty are inviting twenty-five candidates to sit for the next examination
of special entry cadets, to qualify as officers of the Engineer branch, lends
itself to some interesting reflections. In no branch of the Royal Navy has
the system of training undergone so many changes since the introduction of
the Selborne scheme twenty-three years ago. About the only thing that
can be said in favor of that scheme, as it originally applied to the engineers,
is that the principle of common entry was good. It did away with the long
standing friction on the subject of status, and with the distinction which had
come down from the days when the "ship's engineers” might, without un-
kindness, be described as more homely than polished. But, common entry
and common training are two very different things. A grounding in the
elements of practical marine engineering might well prove of value to an
executive officer. Time spent in learning seamanship and navigation is little
better than lost to the naval engineer.
It soon became apparent that where the Selborne scheme was presently
going to break was in its relation to the engineer branch. It came into
being almost with the advent of a new era of development in naval en-
gineering, due to the adoption of the turbine, oil fuel, the transition from
the Scotch boiler to the water tube type, the dawn of the internal com-
bustion problem, the expansion of electrical equipment, and the like. Of
course, the Selborne scheme provided for specialist training for the class
of lieutenants (E) which it proposed to create, but the approach to that
specialist training was much too long: too much time altogether was lavished
upon the "Jack of all Trades" business. Thoughtful men began to ask in
what way it was expected that the Selborne scheme was going to prove any
better-or, indeed, was going to prove half as good-as the old Keyham
régime which it superseded. They were told to wait and see, not to pull
up the young tree by the roots in order to find out how it was growing.
I do not propose to trace the history of the innumerable "niodifications"
which have been introduced into the Selborne-Cawdor methods of producing
a class of naval engineers since it first became clear that the young tree was
not growing at all well. This would take up too much space altogether,
however briefly it were done. It ought to be rather interesting, during a
big naval foregathering, for a party of engineer officers to get together and
compare notes as to just what particular phase of the evolution was cur-
rent when they were training.
The fact is the Admiralty had to realize that, under the Selborne scheme,
instead of overtaking the rapid development in the science of marine en-
gineering, which is the essential elementary condition of every sound
principle of training, the rapid development was outdistancing the tardy
progress of the Osborne entries. The navy was coming to rely more and
yet more upon the old Keyham class of engineers as it perceived the portents
of failure in the mode by which they were to be supplanted.
-


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To say that we have completed the cycle which began at Christmas,
1902, and are now back to the old Keyham method of training may not be
strictly true, because things change materially in such a progressive science
as engineering, and had the old Keyham régime remained it would not have
been precisely the same today as it was twenty-three years ago. But, it is
true to this extent: the Selbourne scheme has been modified virtually out
of existence, and in principle, if not in actual practice, we are back to the
specific form of training of the old Royal Naval Engineering College days.
While I suppose we may admit the premise that an engineer can never
know too much about his job, I am not sure that the existent method of
specializing for the engineer branch does not ask rather too much. For this
reason, it probably is that the present-day Keyham system is not yielding a
sufficiency of officers, to meet the requirements of the fleet, so that the
Admiralty have to call for candidates for twenty-five direct entry cadet-
ships. Efficiency is a relative work. In the normal course we judge of it
by the standard of results. Thus we should say that the engineer officers
of the Mercantile Marine are a highly efficient body of men, since the liners
they run come and go with clockwork-like punctuality. Yet I doubt if
there is an engineer officer in the Mercantile Marine who could gain twenty
per cent of marks in the examination which a "dagger” lieutenant (E) has
to pass in order to attain to that symbol. The simple explanation is that
he does not want such obtuse theoretical knowledge. He is a thorough
master of the practical side of his business—and that is enough for him.
The super-specialist in the engine-room of a warship seems to me a sort
of Gulliver among his comrades. There is a great gulf of erudite superiority
between him and the other men who stand on the watch-keeping platform.
Yet does he get much opportunity for the exercise of that profound
theoretical knowledge which he has striven so laboriously to acquire? I
was once shipmate with one of the engineer officers who brought the Cal-
liope out of Apia harbor in the teeth of a violent hurricane, in which sev-
eral other warships failed to escape destruction. The exploit will be
recalled by the older generation of naval men. I asked him how the
Calliope alone managed to get clear, and I remember his answer: "We
knew just what had to be done, and we did it.” Which, to my mind, is the
most effective form of theory of all.
Let me not be misunderstood into implying any disparagement of super-
knowledge (or "dagger" knowledge, if you prefer it) nor of the men who
possess it, but I am venturing to wonder whether the system does not pass
the limits of utility. The vocational value of theory can only be gauged
in relation to its application to practice. I believe it is a fact that a large
number of very eligible aspirants are deterred from entering as engineer
cadets by the apprehension of what lies in front of them. Is it not the fact
that the question of maintaining the supply of engineer officers for the
Navy is causing some concern to the Admiralty ?
I believe direct entry to be the sound principle in the case of the execu-
tive branch, taking the term to imply the starting point of naval training
where ordinary education ceases, but it is by no means certain that the same
principle applies equally to the engineering branch. Mathematics, for in-
stance, which play such an essential part in all engineering, might be studied
rather more intensively than is usual in the course of a general education
by those who design to enter the navy as engineers. The direct entry
executive cadet is not expected to bring any initial professional qualifications
-he is merely the finished schoolboy-but the age of between seventeen-
and-a-half and eighteen is rather advanced for a youth to "take up” en-
gineering on the same principle. Therefore, the age limit might, with
advantage, be lowered in the case of candidates for the engineer branch,
although not to anything like the Dartmouth standard.


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Probably the present Keyham scheme has come to stay, but this is not
to say that it is necessarily at the end of the many modifications from
which it has been evolved. It has so entirely broken away from the Sel-
borne plan that even were the existing Dartmouth régime superseded by a
new order of things (and this is far from unlikely in the not distant future)
there is no reason why it should not continue, but in this event the direct
entry of officers for the engineer branch should cease. These various meth-
ods of attaining a single end savor too much of expedient or experiment.
When two or more systems have been thoroughly tested in practice, one
must have proved itself the best. Granted, it may not be easy to discrim-
inate definitely between methods possessing their own inherent advantages
and drawbacks. The Admiralty are clearly of opinion that the direct entry
candidate may make an efficient engineer on a very much shorter and
simpler course of training than the Dartmouth entry; otherwise, they would
not be announcing vacancies for twenty-five of them at the next examina-
tion. This being so, it is not unreasonable to raise the whole question as to
whether the present regular system of entry and training for the engineer
branch is really on the best possible lines ?
The answer is that it is producing a highly efficient class of engineer
officer. Well, so did the old Keyham régime, but in those days the doctrine
was to turn out a uniform standard of professional attainments. This was
known as the "Keyham standard," and was a splendid groundwork for the
exercise of those brains by which a man gets on in the navy as in every
other walk of life. There was no attempt at "super" grading: no ultra-
specializing; the accepted principle was a uniform high level of proficiency.
Since then there has developed a system of training to inequality. Is this
plan good for esprit de corps within the branch ?
It is a very big question, and one upon which the wise man would be
conjectural and inquiring rather than didactic. I hear a good deal of
criticism in the service itself upon the present method of training engineer
officers, but long experience has taught me that service criticism may not
always prove an infallible mentor. The present system may be the best
it is humanly possible to devise, but, if so, why supplement it by any other
form of entry and training ? The super-specialist may be an invaluable man
as squadron engineer officer, but there is this danger about it: his sub-
ordinates may shrink from appealing to him lest he shall reprove their
ignorance. That such a thing is extremely unlikely to happen is merely a
tribute to the spirit of the service. I do not say that "MacAndrew's
Hymn" embodies the rudiments of modern naval engineering, but the wet
shirt still keeps the ship going. I once made a passage in company with
a "dagger” lieutenant (E), who on one occasion confided to me that it was
really wasting his time to go on to the engine-room watch platform: the
artificers and the mechanicians among them knew their job perfectly, and he
felt he ought to be doing better things. He may have been joking, but I
confess that his remarks set me musing upon whether too much academic
training for a severely practical profession is altogether a wise principle.
FRANCE
French Destroyers and Light Cruisers
The Naval and Military Record, 6 May, 1925.--St. Nazaire, which has
the distinction of having in hand the largest number of torpedo craft of
the new program: viz., the 2,400-ton destroyers, Chacal, Leopard, Lynx,
and the 1,460-ton torpilleur d'escadre Simoun, is making an effort to com-
plete them at an early date. Commanders have been appointed to the new
destroyers, but the unit most advanced is the Simoun, that is having the
finishing touches to her internal and external equipments, and has on board


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part of her crew. She is expected to leave St. Nazaire two months hence
ior Lorient, where she will commission for her trials, that will be watched
with attention by the naval world. The Simouns are remarkable units in
every respect, and, as eighteen of the class are in hand already, and eighteen
more projected, which means they will be an important asset of French sea
power, they are well worth close investigation with a view to elucidating
the question of their fighting worth. In the first place, they mark a depar-
ture from previous French shipbuilding practices, whereas pre-war contre-
torpilleurs of the Bouchier type (of which over twenty units were built)
were inferior in size and caliber of guns and torpedoes to contemporary
British, American, and Italian destroyers, the Simouns, officially described
as torpilleurs d'escadre (a very modest appellation), are superior in most
respects to all British destroyers in commission excepting Aotilla leaders.
In their general design they are copied from the British V and W classes
-similar shape of hull (though in the French the bows are more swanlike,
overhanging and pleasing to the eye, and the sterns also different) and
superstructures. In the Simouns, however, there are three funnels, rather
slender and of inordinate length, closely packed together, the two aft being
very near, which makes them a rather conspicuous target, and is a matter
of criticism among older officiers de vasseau, who question whether tor-
pilleurs so bulky and vulnerable will ever be able to launch their torpedoes
with chances of success. In truth, they are canonnieres rapides rather than
torpilleurs, as the gift of invisibility is totally denied to them. They will
be, in the light of the last conflict, excellent patrol boats for either screen-
ing a battle squadron or watching or blockading a hostile base, and, lastly,
they will be in a position to engage contemporary rivals with fair chances
owing to the superiority of caliber and range of their guns. Boats of such
seakeeping power and endurance French admirals would have welcomed
during the war, and Admirals Dartige du Fournet, Ronarch, for instance,
bitterly complained of the fragility and inferior armament of their contre-
tor pilleurs.
Similar reproaches nobody will think of applying to the Simouns. They
are larger than the British W's by nearly 150 tons, have 3,000 more horse-
power, and four 130 mil, versus four 120 mil. British guns, which means
longer range for the French, that have also the benefit of heavier and more
effective torpedoes. For ships of their class they have the maximum range
and hitting power, and, so far, are the best investment the Marine Francaise
has made in the torpedo boat line. Still, "the proof of the pudding is in
the eating," and the true value of these fine boats will depend on their
robustness and sea speed--two assets that are interdependent to a higher
degree than formerly owing to the tremendous strain on hulls with rates
of going exceeding 30 knots in choppy waters. The Simouns are expected
to develop from 35,000 to 40,000 h.p. on trial, and under favorable conditions
they ought to excel their nominal speed (33 knots) by 3 or 4 knots. Against
wind and seas their speed, of course, will be considerably reduced by their
great amount of top hamper, but even then the peculiar shape of their
sterns (that imitate those of big tugs) ought to be of good use to them.
It is felt that for 1,500-ton ships the 5.1-inch caliber of guns cannot safely
be exceeded; as the Italians have found out to their sorrow with the Aquila
class, that carry three 6-inch weapons, having insufficient command of fire
and being of little use in heavy weather. In the improved Simouns of
1,550 tons in hand, added robustness, speed, and fighting endurance have
been the improvements aimed at. The Simoun type, all points considered,
will be hard to beat by rival designers. The majority of our experts are
satisfied that it will prove a handy instrument of offensive in most circum-
stances of war, especially if its real speed can be increased as well as the
range of its torpedoes. Happily, war experience has taught French officers


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the importance of efficient torpedoes, and torpedo design, construction, and
training are receiving special attention, and schools, laboratories, experi-
mental testing grounds have been created. A similar system is next to be
applied to the mining branch. France is making an effort with a view to
regaining her former supremacy for underwater warfare.
The armament of the Chacal class of destroyers (of which six are com-
pleting afloat and three on the point of being laid down), that was originally
to include six 130-mil. guns (two on twin mountings), has not been ap-
proved by naval opinion. The 5.1-inch gun (27 kilo shell) has no very great
superiority over the 4.7-inch caliber (21 kilo projectile) in the matter of
range and destroying power, and, moreover, twin mountings for small
quickfirers are not to be commended, being especially make-believe in nar-
row and quick rolling boats. In the cramped and crowded deck space of
destroyers even of great length (120) meters in the Chacals, 125 in the
new boats), there is not sufficient room for six gun positions at least with
the present fashion of distributing the whole armament on the axial line. It
is for this reason that British flotilla leaders have only five gun positions.
Even in longer ships, such as the British Delhis, of 4,800 tons, it has not
been easy to find six gun positions, and space is rather limited for the central
6-inch weapons; hence the necessity, if armament is to be strengthened, of
increasing the caliber of weapons rather than their number. It has been
decided, en principe, to mount in the new super-destroyers either 5.5-inch
ordnance (39 kilo shells) or light 6.1-inch guns (50 kilo shell), both cali-
bers assuring advantage of range over all destroyers in existence, and in
reality transforming new contretorpilleurs into destroyers of destroyers
(which was the name the British First Lord, Winston Churchill, gave ten
years since to the British Arethusas). L'Architecture navale est un per-
petual recommencement. Comparative.
In the cruiser line, also, superiority over all comers is what Gallic ex-
perts are aiming at The 8,000-ton Duguay-Trouins, now commissioning
for trials, though valuable on account of their extreme speed (over 35
knots), are undergunned and vulnerable 175 meters long targets; the 10,000-
ton Tourville and Duquesne, that carry 8-inch guns, do not appear to be in
any way better than their British American, or Italian rivals of similar
Washington displacement. Foolish it would be for France to invest her
meager finances in a few copies of rivals four or five times more numerous.
Superior quality must make up for inferior numbers, as it did when great
savants like Dupuy de Lôme and de Bussy (1860-1896), were in charge of
French Navy construction. The Paris Yacht judiciously denounces the
extreme vulnerability to gun, torpedo, and bombs of those 10,000-ton Wash-
ington cruisers of enormous length totally or insufficiently armored, capable
of dealing heavy blows at long range but powerless to withstand the same.
Despite their great age, the 14,000-ton croiseurs-cuirassés of the Quinet
type preserve good value in the face of such opponents.
Battle Cruisers and Croiseurs de Combat
The Naval and Military Record, 20 May, 1925.-Far-reaching conse-
quences for both France and England may be expected from the long-
prepared attack the Boche and Bolshevist subsidized Riffans are so cleverly,
and with such astonishing means of action, leading against the well-trained
but numerically inadequate troops of Marshal Lyautey, the famed con-
queror of Morocco. It is nothing less than a revolt of the Moslem world
against European rule, an extension of the anti-English movement in Egypt
and in India, containing in germs equal perils for our two countries.
Smuggling of arms by sea is the disquieting point. The nominally Spanish
coast must be blockaded; a colonial alliance between Spain and France is


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imperative, as well as a defensive entente between Great Britain and France
for their common safety.
Lieutenant Young's new volume translated into French: A bord des
Croisers de bataille (Librarie Payot, Paris) has attracted attention and
comments in naval circles; it gives a graphic insight into the life of those
great armored mastodons combining calibers and speed that played the de-
termining role in the naval war, a type of ship just now in favor in influential
navy quarters, and, besides, it enabled French naval students to understand
better the commanding personality of Admiral Beatty, the modern ex-
ponent of the Nelsonian doctrine which French experts are unanimous in
considering the true secret of victory. Joindre l'enemi et le battre avec des
forces superieures (Admiral Darrieus) has been the way of the best ad-
mirals of all times, and the greatest victories have been won through
"damning the risks," as Farragut so elegantly said. Trafalgar, Aboukir,
like Ostend and Zeebrugge, have only one explanation and justification :
namely, Audaces Fortuna juvat. In war extreme boldness is wisdom, and
this remains true notwithstanding mines and submarines. Admiral Beatty's
lack of an adequate flotilla force both in number and in size (which ac-
counted for the escape of the baby-killing Hipper squadron after the
Hartlepool and Scarborough bombardments) causes French readers to
appreciate the fighting worth of the fine new torpilleurs de'escadre of the
Simoun type (1,500 tons and 33 knots), of which twelve are practically
ready, and of the 2,400-ton Jaguar series of destroyers, of which six are also
to be commissioned at an early date. On the other hand, details which
M. Young gives in his book as to the several damaging interferences of the
London Admiralty with Admiral Beatty's freedom of action are held to
reflect unfavorably on the soundness of the present French naval organiza-
tion for war, in virtue of which all our squadrons and flotillas are to move
exclusively according to orders from Paris. In the last war Admiral de
Lapeyrére deliberately disregarded orders that Minister Augagneur, an ex-
ceedingly clever surgeon, but totally ignorant of ships, wired him to make
haste and with 20-knot battleships promptly catch the 28-knot Goeben and
Breslau.
The battle cruiser question is anew under investigation in Admiralty
quarters. To compete solely in 10,000-ton Washington limit cruisers would
be for France a losing game, since her present financial straits preclude the
possibility of her ever possessing numbers adequate to her needs. To make
up for inferior numbers French scientific genius must be allowed free scope
of action, as it was when Dupuy de Lôme threw all rivals into obsolescence
by creating the first steam battleship (Le Napoléon) and the first armored
frigate (La Gloire), and when de Bussy achieved similar success with his
epoch-making 6,300-ton Dupuy de Lôme, prototype of all croiseurs cuirasses.
Now, from a technical standpoint we have come back to a situation similar
to that of 1890. In those times there were only two great navies : namely,
the British and the French, and the British was building, wholesale, pro-
tected cruisers designed for broadside fighting. A victorious retort of de
Bussy was to encase completely the hull and armament of the Dupuy de
Lôme in light armor (110 mil.), then proof against 6-inch projectiles at
fighting range, and to distribute the eight single-gun turrets for end-on
tactics, that are, of course, the tactics of the weaker side. The Dupuy de
Lôme was a stroke of genius (in certain respects more original and more
creditable than the Dreadnought, that was mainly a miracle of size).
Retrospective and comparative investigation causes the Dupuy de Lôme de-
sign to be more admired now than she was at the time of her creation.
Thirty years ago British publicists were fond of expending ready wit on the
score of her ugliness (which was beauty when compared with today's
cruisers), but acknowledged her formidable strength.


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Therefore, the problem that the Section Technique is called upon to solve
consists in finding a modern counterpart to the Dupuy de Lôme capable of
throwing into relative obsolescence the two dozen unarmored 33-35-knot
croiseurs leger built or building. A result of that sort cannot be achieved
out of displacements inferior to 10,000 tons. Armored cruisers of under
10,000 tons, which would be enlarged copies of the excellent Latouche-
Treville (4,700 tons, complete armor with eight turrets, rather low free-
board, and reduced visibility), and in which extra protection would be
obtained at the expense both of the number of guns and of speed, would be
a doubtful investment, being powerless both to escape from the deadly grip
of 31-33-knot battle cruisers of the Hood and Renown and Tiger-Kongo
types and to catch 34-knot cruisers of the Kent-Trieste-Omaha classes.
Moreover, the new 8-inch weapons that will arm 10,000-ton Washington-
limit cruisers are vastly superior to the 20 and 21 centimeter guns employed
in the Great War, and it must not be thought that light armoring on pre-war
lines would do against them. Again, the advent of large sea-worthy de-
stroyers and of tempest-proof flying boats render close or even moderate
range unlikely in future contests. On this latter point, however, it is only
right to say that artificial cloud and camouflage tactics open new possi-
bilities and offer wide scope for surprises. Here, indeed, is the best argu-
ment for small tough armored cruisers of some 8,000 tons, 27 knots, and
six long-caliber 203 mil. guns.
A far better solution, however, is open the Section Technique as the
result of the right France has, under the Washington Agreement, to replace
the lost battleship France by 35,000 tons of capital ships. A 35,000-ton
counterpart to the British Nelson-Rodney type would only give emphemeral
worth to the obsolete Toulon battle squadron. Two 17,500-ton croiseurs de
combat of 35 knots, able in a seaway to catch up to 10,000-ton Washington
cruisers of however great paper speed and to crush them under the terrific
salvoes of eight weapons of 12-inch hore in quadruple turrets disposed for
end-on fire and for anti-chemical warfare, would for several years give to
France speed and caliber supremacy combined, especially as two more
croiseurs de combat of that class could be laid down in 1927. Long-range
salvo firing is considered by French specialists to be the key to the artillery
problem, and no longer mere caliber. To that end the quadruple turret is
to be revived, all the more so as recent experiments have shown it to offer,
at a minimum of cost, a maximum of offensive and defensive efficiency.
Of course, it would also be open to France to invest her 70,000 tons of
armored tonnage (1926-27) in six petits cuirassés de croi sière of 11,700
tons, 33 knots, four 9.4-inch long-caliber weapons, outranging the Wash-
ington type of cruisers and, at long range, being proof against 8-inch guns,
but it would be an inferior compromise and more costly in every way.
French Naval Policy
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 20 May, 1925.-
The French Senate has sanctioned a “special credit” for new naval con-
struction during the course of the present financial year. It is a surprisingly
modest contribution, totalling only 33,000,000 francs, or little more than
one third of a million sterling. The program toward which it forms an
instalment comprises one light cruiser, three destroyers of the high sea, four
coastal torpedo boats, seven submarines, two submarine and one surface
minelayers, and one aircraft carrier. Naval construction is, relatively, con-
siderably more costly in France than in this country, and so it is abundantly
clear that very little progress will be made with these proposed vessels dur-
ing the current year.


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Professional Notes
No doubt there is a political reason at the back of this apparent modesty.
France is courting the financial good will of the United States. Apart from
the fact that President Coolidge is reported to be steadily working to bring
about another Washington Conference, if France were to undertake any
heavy naval expenditure at the present juncture she would be manifestly
weakening her plea of inability to pay her debts, and the necessity to in-
crease them.
The naval policy of France must always hold a very direct interest for
this country. True, it is an interest of quite a different character from
that which had existed as an immemorial tradition down to the era of the
entente cordiale. No longer is it the interest of rivalry, but of friendly con-
cern as to how far our next door neighbor is maintaining her place in the
balance of armed sea strength. That such a situation as arose in August,
1914, when the British fleet alone stood between the German Navy and the
French coast, is likely to recur in our time is inconceivable. But some day,
and well in our time, the German Navy will begin to expand again, and it
is eminently desirable that from the very day this process starts France
should not only be a long lap ahead, but in a position to remain so.
The new French program, in a very limited way, follows the doctrines of
the Jeune Ecole—the “Mosquito School," as it has been termed in this
country. It is purely a defensive program. Even as such, it is so inade-
quate, bearing in mind what very trifling progress can possibly be made with
it during the present year, that we must look beyond it and try and form
conclusions as to the French view of sea power. It is true that at the .
present time France has a larger number of submarines, built or projected,
than any other naval power, but she appears to be following very much the
principle that was illustrated in the case of our own Frobisher and Effing-
ham, so that this big underwater armada, categorically shown in the official
returns, is likely to remain only a paper force for some years to come. This
again is probably the result of financial stringency.
What I regard as probable is that France has arrived at a stage of com-
plete dubiety as to the future of naval warfare, and is marking time until
that future begins to unfold. Whether this is a wise policy I am not pre-
pared to say, but it is quite possible that it may react upon other naval
powers.
In the first place it seems tolerably clear that France has renounced the
capital ship. There is a small and influential body of French opinion which
is urging a return to battleship construction, but it is little more than a
voice in the wilderness. The Republic will continue to maintain such battle-
ships as remain to her so long as they are seaworthy (none of them can be
deemed war-worthy now by existing standards), but that she will replace
them as they fall into obsolescence is more than doubtful. Is she not setting
an example in this which may presently bear definite fruit with the other
great sea' powers? Italy has frankly abandoned the battleship, probably
for very much the same reasons which have induced France to do so.
Russia is negligible in this consideration. Germany must remain prob-
lematical for years to come, but I anticipate that the conclusions which in-
fluence the other great sea powers will be precisely the conclusions to which
Germany would come.
In the case of the Big Three, we have come to a hiatus which may yet
prove a definite break. Great Britain is building two battleships: when
they are completed neither she, nor the United States, nor Japan can lay
down any more capital ships for another seven years under the Washington
Treaty, except for the purposes of replacement, under very rigid conditions.
In other words, the Big Three cannot increase their capital ship strength
during the next seven years. When the Neilson and Rodney are ready to


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take their place in the British fleet, four ships of the Iron Duke class have
to be removed from the Navy List.
We have already reached a stage when the value of the capital ship is a
subject of much uncertainty. During the next seven years that phase of
uncertainty may crystallize into definite conclusions. I believe it is true to
say that Great Britain, the United States and Japan are now maintaining
capital ships more from rivalry than from any policy of absolute conviction.
One cannot renounce them unless the others do, and for one to suggest it
may give rise to a mistaken impression.
The alleged view of the late Sir Percy Scott's midshipman, that the
battleship is "no damned good” is, of course, ridiculous, but the whole
tendency of sea warfare is to become more mobile and more elusive. The
stately old fleet action grows steadily more improbable as a decisive feature
of the future naval conflict, if only because of the ever-increasing difficulty
of forcing a reluctant enemy to come forth and accept battle. Meanwhile,
we find the naval ratios changing while the capital ship position remains
static. Captain Knox, of the United States Navy, has pointed out that the
real purpose of the Washington Agreement is becoming entirely neutralized.
Sea power has now to be measured in a new rule of values.
If a new Washington Conference is convened within the next seven
years, and the United States boldly proposes that the capital ship be aban-
doned, it seems more than likely that France and Italy would readily concur.
The attitude of Japan is problematical. The course of events does not sug-
gest that she is likely to receive with enthusiasm any proposals which
emanate from the United States. On the other hand, if America abandoned
the battleship Japan could certainly afford to do so. Her rôle in the Pacific
is likely to be a defensive one. That is to say, in any war into which she
might be drawn, her policy would be to await attack, in the zone of her own
choice, and as remote from all enemy bases as possible. To such a stra-
tegic purpose her present program of "numbers and mobility” is well suited.
Our own position in the matter, I imagine, will be that of a disposition to
agreement. In other words, I can hardly believe that Great Britain would
stand out for the retention of the capital ship if all the other principal naval
powers concurred in the proposal to abandon her. Naturally, there will be
an instinctive recoil from the idea of breaking with such a great tradition,
but no confusion of sentiment must be permitted to obscure the strictly
practical question. The enforced inactivity of the battle fleets during the
Great War was an object lesson which challenges serious reflection. “Silent
pressure" was all very well in the days when it kept the enemy fleet shut
up in his ports, but the submarine, the destroyer, and the fast cruiser have
changed all that. Sea war tends to become more of a guerilla business,
mainly directed against commerce. The grand fleet was impotent to arrest
the German ( boat campaign, which came dangerously near to accomplish-
ing its purpose. France, I believe, clearly realizes the purport of that les-
son, and this is why her naval policy—or more strictly speaking, her naval
building programs—must have a particular interest for other sea powers.
French Foreign Trade
The Engineer, 24 April, 1925.— The returns of foreign trade during the
first three months of the year show a declension in the values of imports
and exports as compared with the figures for the corresponding period of
1924. On analyzing the returns, however, it is seen that they are far more
favorable than could have been anticipated in view of the heavy duties im-
posed upon French goods imported into Germany since the beginning of the
year. If Germany is taking less it is evident that more is being sent to
other markets. So far as imports are concerned the total value of 9,825


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Professional Notes
million francs was 391 million francs below the figure for the first three
months of 1924. There was a decline in foodstuffs and more particularly in
raw material, especially coal. The value of exports totalled 10,920 million
francs, a decline of 53 millions; but this was due entirely to foodstuffs,
many descriptions of which are not allowed to be exported, and the returns
would seem to imply that France is consuming her own agricultural products
instead of sending them away and purchasing others to make up for a deficit.
There was a notable increase in the value of manufactured goods exported,
the total of 6,535 million francs being 154 millions more than in the first
quarter of last year. Raw material exports amounted to 3,035 million francs,
an augmentation of 9,420,000f. The increases in manufactured goods were
due largely to iron and steel, textiles and motor cars. When studying
quantities it is observable that out of a total of 11,440,920 tons of imports
raw material was responsible for 10,130,875 tons, and there was a reduction
in the total of 1,695,053 tons. The exports amounted to 7,883,111 tons, an
increase of 1,304,722 tons. This augmentation was due principally to raw
material, which accounted for 6,493,192 tons, while the quantity of manu-
factured goods sent away was 1,040,251 tons, an increase of 83,517 tons.
GERMANY
Regulation-Lights and Rules of the Road for Rotorships
Hansa, 7 March, 1925.-On January 30, 1925, the Minister for Trade and
Commerce of the Reich addressed the following communication to the
Deutsche Seeschiffahrtstag:
Tests of Flettner's rotor system for the utilization of wind-pressure for
the propulsion of ships on the high seas have now progressed sufficiently to
show that the system is of practical utility, and that the experimental ship
Buckau will make further voyages overseas.
The rotorship is distinguished externally by two revolving turrets or
towers, 15 m. high and about 3 m. in diameter, one of which is fitted for-
ward (on the forecastle), the other aft (on the poop). In addition to the
towers (rotors) the ship is fitted with a motor, which drives a propeller.
On her future voyages the rotorship will meet other ships at sea, more
than hitherto, and it therefore becomes necessary to clearly define the posi-
tion of the rotorship and her action at sea, with respect to the Rules of the
Road, corresponding to the international regulations for preventing colli-
sions at sea.
Legislative enactment of special regulations cannot be hurried, as first
of all practical experience will have to be gained and collected. Therefore,
the following guiding rules are laid down as an experimental measure to
meet the case of applying the Rules of the Road at Sea to rotorships, said
regulations being published in the Nachrichten für Seefahrer (compare with
page 268 of Hansa.)
1. When the ship is using the motor, the vessel is, in the sense of the
Rules of the Road, to be regulated in the light of a steamer, even though
the rotors are also being used at the same time. The regulations for
steamers will be obeyed in every particular.
2. When the ship is sailing solely by wind power with the aid of the
rotors, the vessel is to be regarded as a sailing ship in the sense of the Rules
of the Road, in the daytime, however, excepting the provisions of Article 17.
The regulations for sailing ships will be obeyed with the sole exception
that the rotorship, on account of her greater maneuvering capacity, will,
in the daytime, make way for every other sailing ship.
The black ball hoisted on the light-mast over the stem on steamers, in
accordance with Article 14 of the Rules of the Road, will also be hoisted,
notwithstanding the exception aforesaid.


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At night the rotorship, if using rotors only, will act as a sailing ship,
and will carry sailing ship lights only.
3. In foggy weather the motor will always be used. The ship will act
as a steamer.
All other seagoing ships are advised to take note of these rules carried
out by rotorships, and to maneuver their ships accordingly, in order to
avoid getting into dangerous situations.
I respectfully request that the question of the action of rotorships in the
light of the Rules of the Road at Sea be made the subject of discussion in
seafaring circles, and that the outcome of these discussions be communicated
to me in due course.
The board of the Seeschiffahrtstag remitted this communication to a
committee with the request to report. This committee was composed of the
following gentlemen: President: Captain A. Simonsen, Hamburg, Director
Reichenbacher, Hamburg-American Line, Inspector Peterson, (F. Lacisz,
Shipowner, Hamburg) Chief Harbor Master Oertel, Hamburg, Captain
Coltzan, Hamburg, and reported as follows:
1. Rotorships are to be regarded in the same light as motor sailing
ships (and sailing ships with auxiliary engine), and should be subject to
the same Rules and Regulations, that is to say, a rotorship which sails with
the help of her "sailing turrets” only, is to be considered a sailing ship;
when the ship, however, uses the motor and propeller only or in conjunction
with the turrets, the ship is to be considered a steamer, in the sense of the
Rules of the Road at Sea.
2. Rotorships, when sailing with rotors only (that is to say as sailing
ships), shall hoist, in accordance with Article 14 of the Rules of the Road
at Sea, instead of the black ball, a black cone at least 65ctm. high and in
diameter.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ABOVE PROPOSALS
In re 1) The regulations for rotorships which the Ministry for Com-
merce and Trade proposes to issue (II S No 457 II dng of January 30,
1925) order, that the rotorship is to be regarded as a steamer, in the sense
of the Rules of the Road at Sea, when using engine and propeller, even
when the rotors are also being used. This is in keeping with present regu-
lations applicable to motor sailing ships (and sailing ships with auxiliary
engine). The regulations of the Ministry of Commerce and Trade propose,
however, to impose upon the rotorship the duty, even when sailing solely by
wind power with the rotors, of making way in the daytime for every other
sailing ship, whereas as against steamers, the ship in these circumstances is
to be regarded as a sailing ship. At night, however, under the same con-
ditions, she is to be sailing ship entirely, carrying sailing ship's lights. That
would place rotorships in the position of hybrids, and would lead to all sorts
of confusion and dangerous complications. Then again, the regulation
suggested, that the rotorship, sailing without the engine, shall in the day-
time make way for all sailing ships, but at night shall act as a sailing ship
entirely, would create grave situations on the border line between night
and day (dawn and twilight), inasmuch as, in the moment of sunrise or
sunset respectively, the duty to give way would under certain circumstances
automatically pass from one ship and be imposed upon another.
It is also wrong from the point of seamanship and impracticable to de-
mand of a rotorship, sailing "close hauled" (against the wind) with rotors
only, that she shall give way to sailing ships sailing with a fair wind and
aft. That is a regulation prejudicing the rotorship, for which there is no
justification, as the rotorship is every bit as much dependent upon the wind
as any other sailing ship, even though she can sail closer to the wind than a
ship with yards and square sails, but that is a feature possessed by fore and
aft schooners and yachts also.


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Confused and ill-defined, and consequently dangerous regulations are a
serious menace to the safety of shipping. The regulations suggested, more-
over, constitute an unnecessary oppression and prejudice for rotorships.
The committee has therefore arrived at the conviction that nothing but the
application to rotorships of the regulations as at present in force for motor
sailing ships will assure clear, distinct and unambiguous conditions, and the
committee therefore feels impelled earnestly to recommend the adoption
of the regulations it has proposed, all the more so, as allowance must be
made for the fact, that in all probability there will sooner or later be
rotorships having neither engine nor propeller.
The "practical" experience with the ministry's provisional regulations
would probably have to be dearly paid for by shipping, and prove to be a
serious obstacle in the way of economic exploitation of this new German
invention. It is also not to be expected that the other seafaring nations will
agree to such regulations, and consequently they would be nothing but a
source of trouble and danger for the rotorships.
The regulation that the rotorship shall always use the auxiliary engine
in foggy weather is also an unnecessary burden, and not always practicable,
inasmuch, as we have already stated, as there will be rotorships that have
no auxiliary engines.
In re 2) It is absolutely necessary for other ships to be able to dis-
tinguish at all times and instantly, whether a rotorship is using the engine
and propeller or not. In other words, whether she is sailing as a steamer
or as a sailing ship. As from the bridge of other ships it is impossible to
see whether the rotors are in use, or whether they alone are in use, the
rotorship must carry a signal when sailing with rotors only, and it is sug-
gested that the signal be in the form of a black cone. It appears necessary
to decide upon the cone, as in the prospective “Traffic Regulations for Ger-
man Seawater Ways and Routes, Section I," a black ball has been selected
as the signal for ships at anchor, and a black cylinder as the signal for
right of way.
The committee also feels constrained to express its opinion to the effect,
that Article 14 of the Rules of the Road at Sea, seeing that owing to de-
velopments in shipping it is utterly outpaced and antiquated, calls for speedy
amendment; above all, the following sentence should be stricken out:
".... but sails with funnel upright in position.” Nowadays, many motor
sailing ships do not carry the black ball, simply because they have not got
a funnel, and consequently do not take the regulation as applying to them-
selves. At present, therefore, there is, in the case of a sailing motor sail-
ing ship, no possibility of determining whether she is using her engine
also, and consequently should be treated as a steamer.
A revision of Article 14 is therefore an absolute necessity, and the com-
mittee is of opinion that the consideration of this question should be taken
in hand as soon as possible.
UNITED STATES
America's Naval Policy-A British View
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 13 May, 1925.-
In the course of the next few weeks, on the conclusion of grand maneuvers
around the Sandwich Islands, the United States Pacific fleet is proceeding
to Australia. The tour, of course, is in the nature of a friendly visit. It
was decided upon without consultation with Australia, for on being ques-
tioned upon the matter the Commonwealth Premier said that he had seen
the statements in the press and had written to the Navy Department at
Washington to inquire whether they were correct. No doubt the explana-
tion for this is that the press statements were premature.


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No naval force of the size and power of the Pacific fleet has ever before
visited a foreign country. While the friendly nature of the occasion is
fully realized in Great Britain, it is not unnatural that there should be a
disposition to look rather beyond this aspect of it. “Flag showing" is usually
practiced by single ships or light squadrons. When it is carried out by the
most modern battle fleet in the world, public interest becomes focused upon
the sea power and the sea policy of the navy to which that fleet belongs.
The United States has never, as far as I am aware, vouchsafed any
definition of her naval policy, but we may infer this from her distribution
of naval force and the general character of her naval maneuvers. Since
the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 she has regarded the Pacific as
her cardinal zone. Her Atlantic fleet was reduced in order to strengthen the
Pacific fleet, and under the scheme of war organization the two are re-
garded as a unified command, since under normal conditions they could
link up on either seaboard within a very few days.
That the opening of the Panama Canal imparted a great and progressive
stimulus to American trade with the Far East and Australasia, as well as
with the western South American ports, is a matter of common knowledge.
Possibly, it is not generally recognized in this country how vast this volume
of trade has become, nor how essential it is to American prosperity. Adverse
exchanges are likely to adversely affect the European markets for years to
come. By the time Europe recovers from this economic blight her markets
will be flooded with her own manufactures. Looking east, the prospect is
not very attractive to United States industry; looking west (that is to
say, toward Australia and the Far East) it is far more promising.
Commercial interest, or national prosperity, if a more euphonious term be
sought, is the basis of all modern military policy. National defense simply
means the safeguarding of possessions of such value as to excite the envy of
less prosperous countries. The element of personal quarrels no longer de-
cides war; it has become much too vast and costly an undertaking to be
waged on such grounds. No doubt sentiment makes all the difference be-
tween a popular war and an unpopular one. The decision of this country
to enforce the sanctity of a treaty was a popular one, but behind this direct
casus belli with Germany lay the perception that the doctrine of Deutsch-
land über alles must be scotched, otherwise we should be one of the alles.
On these grounds, then, the Pacific claims the attention of the United
States in just the same way as the Mediterranean claims our attention, but
there is this difference in the comparison, France and Italy having renounced
the relative status of first class naval powers, there is no question of rivalry
in our naval dominance of the Middle Sea. Japan remaining a first class
naval power, and, what is more, a Pacific power, it becomes difficult to
dissociate United States naval policy from the idea of rivalry with her.
Great Britain has interests in the Pacific which are quite as vast as those
of the United States, but there is this distinction. The bulk of British
Pacific trade is with the Empire ; nearly the whole of the United States
Pacific trade is with foreign countries. We have to consider the protection
of great territories; the United States is only concerned with very little
territories. On the other hand, we have this advantage: inter-Empire trade
is not susceptible to prejudicial influences from alien treaties as is foreign
trade. Therefore, Japan as a sea power in the Pacific does not stand in
quite the same relation to ourselves that she does to the United States, unless
indeed we choose to think of her as possibly harboring designs upon British
Empire territories, which is an idea I do not imagine anybody contemplates
very seriously..
Strategically, Japan is so remote from the United States that the notion
of her sea power constituting a menace to her western shores is rather
extravagant. If, in the event of war, she could successfully attack the


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1925]
1269
Professional Notes
Panama Canal, and render it even temporarily impassable, it would cer-
tainly be a tremendous coup, but the "if" is altogether too colossal to be
gravely entertained.
Frankly, I do not see why American naval policy need threaten an ulti-
mate conflict with Japan, save with one reservation, to which I will come
later. A dominant navy must dominate somewhere. The Pacific is the
natural sphere for United States naval activity. It is likewise the inevitable
sphere for Japanese naval activity, but the Pacific is such a vast ocean that
there is room for both navies without any apprehension that an ultimate
clash must necessarily result. From Plymouth to New York is only about
half the distance of from Yokohama to San Francisco, yet both Great
Britain and the United States maintain Atlantic fleets without any idea of
rivalry-unless in the minds of such unaccountable people as Mr. William
Shearer.
But the reservation of which I have spoken is the one shadow on the
horizon. Japanese policy in China is viewed with anything but favor in the
United States. Japan pleads ethnological needs as her justification. Trade
competition is not disposed to admit any justification for a policy which
thwarts it. China is like a weakened giant sinking to his knees. Some day
there may be intervention on the part of the powers to save his body from
dismemberment, and set him on his legs again. This will be the danger
point. Self-interest is bound to disclose itself at such a juncture. Japan
wants, and simply must have, room for the expansion of her over-teeming
population, and she must have trade if her economic future is to develop.
She is finding both in China, and is steadily exploiting opportunity. The
United States has become so imbued with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine
that she resents Japanese penetration of China. She is likely to resent it
more as the effects manifest themselves upon American trade. How far
this situation may become a grave menace to peace none will venture to
say. The time is not yet, although intervention in China might precipitate it.
I believe popular opinion in Australia rather inclines to the American
view in regard to this problem. Australia is distrustful of Japan. She has
no definite cause for being so, only the fact that at any time the Japanese
Navy could have Australia at its mercy. The attitude of Australia on the
Singapore question is pretty good evidence of her frame of mind. Let us
admit at once that were it not for Australia we certainly should not be
troubling ourselves about Singapore.
The United States, of course, is perfectly aware of the Australian view
on the subject of Pacific sea power. America realizes that Australia will
see in the visit of the Pacific fleet a further assurance of security against
any "Yellow Peril." America may also assume that the "Yellow Peril"
itself will take the hint. One thing it is impossible to deny: the visit to
Australia gives very definite point to the strategic scheme of the maneuvers
which the Pacific fleet is carrying out before proceeding there. That scheme
postulates joining issue with Japanese sea power.
The Pacific fleet is perfectly free to visit Australia, and Australia is
perfectly free to warmly welcome the Pacific fleet, without any reference
at all to the Mother Country, yet the British Navy becomes politically in-
volved in the event. Already certain Japanese newspapers have referred to
it as something more than a mere coincidence, following so soon upon the
restoration of the Singapore scheme. Scarcely had the Conference of Ad-
mirals concluded at Singapore before the whole of the United States Asiatic
fleet arrived at the port on a visit of several days' duration. Can we alto-
gether wonder that Japanese national opinion is beginning to find tangible
evidence of an Anglo-American "understanding" on the subject of the naval
hegemony of the Pacific?


  p. 1270 (#178)                      #

1270
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
It may be American naval policy to foster such an impression. In her
portentous "aloofness" the United States tells the little outside world noth-
ing, and therefore opinion must seek its own conclusions. A war with
America, Japan would certainly not like, but she would not shirk it as the
alternative to being “cribbed, cabined and confined" from what she deems
to be her proper place in the world. A war with America and the British
Empire she could scarcely contemplate. The odds are too impossible for
mere heroism and "bushido” to face.
But, there is another point of view not to be wholly disregarded in this
consideration: the point of view of the British Empire. Australia may,
and probably does, concur in the American conception, as I understand it.
Is the presumptive Australian view that the British Navy is not perfectly
adequate, and perfectly ready, to protect Australia an impression to be
allowed to go by default? I do not think that any such conception can be
good for the British Empire. Observe, Singapore is a scheme obviously
undertaken primarily for the benefit of Australia, yet the little settlement
of Hong-kong is voluntarily bearing the cost of the first year's work.
Australia may some day be doing more buying and selling with America
than with Great Britain. That would be quite in the legitimate order of
things, but any policy which implicates the British Navy is the business of
the entire British Empire. The people who cheered the special service
squadron in Sydney a year ago must have felt this at the time.
I may be reading into the pending visit of the Pacific fleet far more than
entered into the contemplation of those who organized it, but a great battle
fleet is an instrument of world significance, and when it does anything out-
side of the normal course, reflection gets busy. In any case, the event is a
great demonstration of American sea power. Australia will enjoy the mag-
nificent sea pageant, although incidentally I should not wonder if harbor
authorities are not a little worried as to how they are to berth or moor con-
siderably over one hundred warships.
We cannot ever divest a warship of her real character. Nelson said that
a British frigate is the best negotiator in Europe, since she always spoke to
be understood. She may be the best possible harbinger of friendship, but
when she goes avisiting, not singly, but in squadrons, she inevitably assumes
a political significance which may be interpreted in more ways than one.
We may employ some of our weapons to salute a neighboring state, but we
do not bring out the bulk of our armory for the purpose. Suppose the
Japanese Minister of Marine were to announce that the entire battle fleet of
his country proposed to pay a visit of friendship to Manila in July next,
I wonder what the United States Press would make of it. I do not question
that the Japanese fleet would receive a most hospitable welcome, but would
there not be just a little consternation at such a prodigious manifestation
of amicable feeling ?
Last Word on the 5-5-3 Ratio
The Scientific American, May, 1925.-We have before us a copy of the
recent hearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appro-
priations-a volume of 1,000 pages—which contains the most complete data
on the Navy that we have ever seen in a document of this character. The
Secretary of the Navy and the officers at the heads of departments were
subjected to a very searching examination, particularly as to the status of
our treaty battleship fleet, and the public is now put in possession of the
facts.
The hearing constitutes a complete refutation of the propaganda of the
past few years, which sought to persuade the American public that our
battleship fleet was far below the standing of five in the treaty allocation


  p. 1271 (#179)                      #

1925]
1271
Professional Notes
of 5-5-3 to the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The most startling
disclosure is that of the enormous range of the guns of the 32,600-ton battle-
ships which would lead our fleet into battle. These ranges are from 34,500
yards to 35,700 yards. So far as we know, this is the first time these figures
have been made public, and they constitute a knockout blow to those who
have claimed that our fleet is outranged and outspeeded by any other fleet.
As a matter of fact, the "boot is on the other leg," for the extreme range
of the latest British battleships is only 24,300 yards, or from 10,000 to
11,000 yards less than that of our leading ships. The enormous significance
of this is seen from the following considerations.
It is universally agreed that, as in the great war, so in any war of the
future, battleship actions will be fought with the respective feets drawn
up in two parallel lines, or, as it is technically known, "in column." No
matter how high may be the speed of individual ships, the speed of the
whole column as such will be governed by that of the slowest ship in the
fleet. This speed is about the same in the two fleets, the slowest American
ship being credited with a speed of 20.5 knots and the slowest British ship
with a speed of 21 knots. It is probable that, in the unlikely event of a naval
battle between us and the British, the two fleets would settle down to a speed
CAPITAL SHIPS OF THE UNITED STATES
Turret Guns
Name of Ship
Diameter of
Bore in Inches
Maximum Angle of
Elevation in Degrees
Length in
Calibers
Range in
Yards
Speed in
Knots
Displacement
in Tons
21.2
.......
West Virginia.
Colorado.......
Maryland.
California .....
Tennessee.......
Idaho..............
New Mexico.
Mississippi
Arkansas ........
Wyoming.......
Arizona .........
Pennsylvania....
Oklahoma......
Nevada
New York....
34,500
34,500
34,500
35,500
35,700
24,000
24,000
24,000
24,350
23,500
21,000
21,000
21,000
21,000
21,000
21,000
22,000
21,600
21.4
21.1
21.7
21.4
21.3
21.1
21.1
21.1
21.2
21.0
21.1
20.6
32,600
32,600
32,600
32,300
32,300
32,000
32,000
32,000
26,000
26,000
31,400
31,400
27,500
27,500
27,000
27,000
21,825
21,825
20.5
Texas...
21.5
21.0
22.1
21.0
Florida
Ulah ........
Grant Total.
525,850


  p. 1272 (#180)                      #

1272
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of about 20 knots. The British line includes five 25-knot ships and four
battle cruisers credited with speeds of 29 to 31.5 knots. Whatever might
happen during the approach of the two feets, it is certain that when they
fell into line for the great test, these faster vessels would have to hold their
speeds down to the fleet fighting speed of 20 knots.
If the weather is clear, and we will suppose it is, and if airplane and
general scouting information has been ample and correct, the two fleets will
deploy into column before they come within range. Thereafter they will
approach each other on more or less converging courses. Now let us see
what would happen. The head of the British line, containing their latest
ships of the Royal Sovereign class, would come under the fire of the head
of our line at a distance of over seventeen and a half miles, or at a distance
where their own 15-inch guns, firing at maximum elevation, would drop
their shells 10 to 11,000 yards, or five to five and a half miles, short of the
American line. They would not dare to come in end-on, because in that
position they would be raked by our salvos, and in spite of the dispersion
of the falling shells, a single eight-gun salvo might drop from three to
half-a-dozen shells upon the deck of any ship thus approaching. Hence, the
approach would be made on a converging course, and instead of fifteen
minutes it would take some twenty-five minutes or more for the British to
get within range. During all that time they would be exposed to heavy
shell fire of a most devastating character to which they could make no reply.
With our system of fire control, and assuming airplane spotting to be pos-
sible, it would be possible to drop between 1,000 and 1,200 shells upon the
leading ships of the British line before they could get in close enough to
return our fire.
It is surely no exaggeration to say that, under existing circumstances,
if our fleet were able to maintain airplane spotting, the head of the British
line would be crumpled up and either severely crippled or put entirely out
of the fight before it could get within hitting range.
At the fleets continued to close in, the British with a range of 24,300
yards, and the next five of our ships with from 23,500 to 24,000 yards,
would engage each other. At this time our eight older ships with 21,000 to
22,000 yards range would be outranged by the opposing British ships by
from 1,800 yards to 2,800 yards. Our own line, of course, would close in
until these older ships could reach the enemy; but for several minutes the
tail end of the British line would have the advantage of ours. But this
temporary advantage of the enemy over our older ships, which would last
for four to six minutes, would not compensate for the fact that for twenty-
five minutes at the commencement of the action the best ships of the British
line had been subjected to an overwhelming gun fire to which they could
make no reply.
The British line would include four battle cruisers, of which the Hood
alone, with guns of 30,300 yards range and 12-inch armor, could stand up
to the fire of the 14-inch and 12-inch guns of our older ships. The other
three, Renown, Repulse and Tiger, with only 9-inch armor, would probably
share the fate of the three battle cruisers, that were sunk by 11-inch and
12-inch gun fire early in the battle of Jutland.
It is for these reasons that we are satisfied that the American public,
on looking a tthese two tables, will agree with us that, far from our fleet
being outranged, and outspeeded, we ourselves have the whiphand, and with
equal gunnery and equal seamanship could very reasonably count upon a
sweeping victory.
And let it be clearly understood that if the proposed elevation of all of
the guns of our fleet to thirty degrees were followed out, not merely our
"big five” but our whole fleet of eighteen ships would have the enemy under
fire for from fifteen up to twenty-five minutes before he could reach us.


  p. 1273 (#181)                      #

1925]
1273
Professional Notes
CAPITAL SHIPS OF THE BRITISH NAVY
Turrent Guns
Name of Ship
Maximum Angle of
Elevation in Degrees
Diameter
of Bore in
Inches
Length in
Calibers
Range in
Yards
Speed in
Knots
Displacement
in Tons
21.6
21.5
21.9
21.6
21.5
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
Royal Sovereign....
Royal Oak..
Revenge . ......
Resolution ...
Ramilies.
Molaya.......
Valiant...........
Barham ........
Oueen Elizabeth
Warspite .......
Hood........
Renown......
Repulse
Tiger .......
Benbow..................
Emperor of India.
Iron Duke
Marlborough.
Thunderer ......
King George...
Ajax.........
Centurion.......
&&&&&&&&&AAAA88888888
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
30,300
24,300
24,300
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
25,750
25,750
25,750
25,750
25,750
27,500
27,500
27,500
27,500
27,500
41,200
26,500
26,500
28,500
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
*22,500
*23,000
*23,000
*23,000
15
25.0
31.5
31.5
31.0
29.0
21.5
21.5
21.6
21.6
21.
21.4
15
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
21.1
21.9
Grand Total..
.580,450
* These four to be scrapped when Nelson and Rodney are completed, when total
will be 558,950, against United States 525,850; the extra tonnage allowed to offset
greater age of British Fleet.
Such a change would vitiate the nice balance which was determined upon
between our officers and those of the British in the selection of the respec-
tive battleship fleets, and would place us at an enormous fighting advantage.
It was brought out at the hearing that, with the exception of the Florida,
the boilers of the ships which had to reduce their speed in the Panama
maneuvers had been repaired and that these ships can now make their trial
speeds. The Florida is in port for similar repairs.
In conclusion, there are two duties which confront the United States-
first, to grant, without any reduction, the appropriations asked by the Navy
Department for repair work; and secondly, to bring our fleet up to treaty
strength in unarmed cruisers, fast scouts, airplane carriers and such vessels
as are not limited by treaty.


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1274
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ENGINEERING
Great Future Predicted for Electric Propulsion
The Westinghouse News, 16 April, 1925.—Electricity, the miraculous
labor saver, wealth producer and greatest agent known to raise the stand-
ards of living, is continuously seeking new fields of application.
At times it brings in fads like radio, and with the swiftness of an over-
right conversion, establishes a new industry appealing to the imagination of
millions whom it daily serves with education, entertainment, comfort and
novelty. In the field of radio, electricity is changing the political aspect of
nations and is swiftly bringing about new international relations, inducing
foreign travel and establishing business and better social relations.
Radio broadcasting was the outgrowth of years of research and experi-
mentation, but the public paid little attention to these trying years. Those
professional organizations that years ago shunned it and tried to hide it for
fear of its probable effect on their systems of communication, today embrace
it closer than a brother as the fear of its power has been changed to a high
regard for its unexpected present and possible future developments.
The public mind is so filled with radio and its achievements that they
quite naturally overlook electricity conquering a new industry, the last one
of the great industries to give it a half a chance to demonstrate its unrivaled
energy, power and ability to achieve.
This industry is the marine industry which in its major part consists of
operating, loading and unloading ships. Tenaciously the ship owners clung
to sail for motive power as wind was the cheapest form of power. When
reciprocating engines were developed its chief opponents were those in favor
of the sail, but their arguments for the cheapest power was gradually over-
come as the faster and more reliable steamships gradually and then quite
suddenly almost entirely replaced the sail ship.
Economic conditions and good business reasons such as running on reg-
ular schedules was a handicap too great for the sail ships.
Electricity, the most restless of all forces, now engages this industry and
is applying its never-failing energy and power in all phases of work from
loading of a ship with greater ease, speed and safety, to controlling and
driving ships of all classes from 138-ton tug to a 43,500-ton displacement
airplane carrier.
Electricity has been installed for propulsion power on sixty-three ships,
according to a paper presented this morning, April 16, 9:30 A. M., by
H. Franklin Harvey, Jr., Electrical Engineer of the Newport News Ship-
building and Dry Dock Company and D. E. Thau, Marine Engineer of the
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company. All of these installa-
tions have been made since 1908 and their number embraces practically all
classes of ships-fire boats, barges, tug boats, ferry boats, auxiliary
schooners, sea-going yachts, river yachts, stern wheel river tow boats,
tankers, seagoing hopper dredges, river boats, dredges, passenger-cargo
ships, cargo vessels, fruit carriers, fuel ships, battle ships and airplane
carriers.
The outstanding feature of electric propulsion which included its various
forms, turbine-electric with alternating and direct current systems, Diesel-
electric propulsion with direct current system with single and double arma-
ture propulsion motors and pilot house control, was included in their com-
prehensive paper.
Practically all forms of ship propulsion, excepting sail, were reviewed in
order to show the advantages of turbine and Diesel-electric propulsion over
those of the reciprocating engine, turbine direct, turbine-gear and direct
Diesel drives.


  p. 1275 (#183)                      #

1925]
1275
Professional Notes
The principle objections to the reciprocating engines, especially for larger
installations, was said to be its weight, space factors and fuel cost. The
turbine-direct drive was declared only 62.75 per cent efficient as the turbines
and propellers must be run at compromised speeds. The direct turbine drive
is also said to have rather poor maneuvering qualities and was slow in stop-
ping when the screws were going full speed ahead. The turbine gear drive,
which is used in the speedy scout cruisers and destroyers, was regarded as
satisfactory where high-speed light turbine and low-speed propellers are
required on account of weight considerations. These considerations like-
wise were said to apply to low-speed cargo vessels where turbine geared
drive is in general lighter in weight, and where transmission efficiency is
probably better than that of the electric drive; the latter, however, was
said to almost equalize in efficiency when the losses in reversing were con-
sidered.
The direct Diesel drive, with its high fuel economy and other advantages,
at the present time has its limitations in size, capacity, reversing charac-
teristics and a slight compromise must be made as the efficient running speed
of the Diesel engine and the efficient speed of a propeller differs, but the
difference between these two is not great enough for the installation of re-
duction gears.
Electric ship propulsion, which has some special outstanding advantages
for all types of craft, finds its greatest advantages for application in ships
requiring a wide cruising radius reliability in machinery, refined control,
reserved power, Alexibility of machinery arangements and low consumption
of fuel when under way and particularly at port, was then discussed in
detail for barges, cable ships, cargo ships, certain naval crafts, coastwise
vessels, dredges, self-propelled, ferry boats, fire boats, fishing boats, lake
boats, liners, light ships, packets, river boats, tow boats, tug boats and yachts.
The outstanding features of the electrice drive included easy and clean
operation, low maintenance costs, accurate control, maneuvering and re-
versing characteristics, efficient speed reductions, quietness of operation and
the greatest power available required when the ship is retarded by heavy
seas, storms or when towing another ship or barges. Likewise the system
of meters recorded the slightest variation of operation making it possible
to correct defects before serious trouble resulted and ease of making re-
pairs at sea.
The torque of propulsion motor which gives additional power when re-
sistance of the propeller is greatest can practically only be compared with
a creek or river which develops the greatest power when it is dammed.
Likewise the propulsion of a tug boat and other electrically propelled craft
develops its greatest power when the ship is retarded by heavy seas and
quick maneuvering.
For turbine-electric drive, alternating current was said to be the most
efficient for high powers, while direct current has been successfully used in
ferry boats. The alternating current permits high voltages with less cur-
rent and consequently smaller inter-connecting cables. The electrical ma-
chinery used for turbo-electric installations are practically the same for
marine as land installations excepting that it is treated to withstand marine
conditions of moisture and salt.
For Diesel-electric drive, direct current has been used with practically all
of the thirty-four installations and was said to be decidedly simpler, more
flexible and reliable, afforded more refined control, provides greater power
in case of casualty to a generating unit and makes possible pilot house
control such as the Ward-Leonard system which is described the most
satisfactory and used in mostly all of the Diesel-electric installations to date.
Pilot house control which has the greatest safety factor where con-
siderable maneuvering is required in close waters, at the present time, is only


  p. 1276 (#184)                      #

1276
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
practical with Diesel-electric drive. On a certain steam tug where it was
necessary for the pilot to signal the engine-room crew for changes of engine
speed and direction, it was found that 566 signals passed between the pilot
house and the engine room during an eight-hour day. With the Diesel elec-
tric tug and Ward-Leonard system of pilot house control, engaged in the
same service, the pilot maneuvered his tug and tow through Cungested
traffic in the river and harbor almost as easily as the taxi driver in a busy
thoroughfare, but without any accidents or collisions as the propulsion
motors can be reversed from full speed ahead to full speed astern without
any danger of stripping gears or otherwise harming the propulsion
machinery.
"Electric drive," said Messrs. Harvey and Thau, "is still in its infancy
and it is to be expected that a longer period of development will still fur-
ther extend its field of application.
"Success of electric drive to date is beyond question and the widespread
interest is conclusive evidence of its indisputable merits and most promis-
ing future.
"The art of electrically propelled ships, while conceived many years ago,
is comparatively new in application and it is, of course, of gratification to
the pioneers that their early predictions are rapidly being fulfilled. After
this system has passed through the lengthy stage of development common
to other types of drive, the expectation of the most enthusiastic will un-
doubtedly be realized."
Aluminum as a Protective Coating for Gratebars
Power. In the March 28 issue of the Zeitschrift des Vereines deutscher
Ingenieure, Robert Hopfeld, director of the Metalisator A. G. of Hamburg,
tells of experiments with gratebars. Bars cast in the ordinary way of gray
iron, and chilled bars of the same shape with a mixture of steel, were used
simultaneously in a furnace in which, owing to the character of the coal,
the bars previously used had burned out rapidly.
After 600 hours of use in the furnace the chilled iron bars, as shown in
Fig. 1, had burned away to such an extent as hardly to be of further use.
The bars of ordinary gray iron were also badly burned, although for
some unapparent reason the wastage in their case was not so uniformly dis-
tributed over the length of the bar.
Although positive conclusions should not be drawn from a single test
in which some accidental condition may have had an important influence, the
evidence, as far as it goes, indicates that the ordinary gray-iron bar is not
more vulnerable than that with the chilled surfaces.
Considering the cause and manner of this rapid deterioration, the author
says that at high temperatures iron, especially wrought iron, is rapidly
oxidized in contact with air. As soon as the layer of oxide thus formed
reaches a sufficient thickness, it peels off and the oxidation continues upon
the newly exposed surface. Cast iron is not so sensitive to this action as
wrought iron, although cast iron oxidizes rapidly at temperatures in excess
of 750 deg C. (1,382 F.).
All coals contain more or less silica, which, combining with the iron
oxide, forms a slag that has a lower melting point than the iron itself. This
slag fastens itself upon the bar, and in consequence of its low melting point
acts as a flux for the as yet unattacked metal. When the spaces between
the bars become obstructed with this slag, the temperature is increased
locally by the consequent diminution of the air flow. The falling of fine
coal through the grate, and its combustion in the ashpit, further aggravates
the condition by heating the incoming air and subjecting the bars to the
heat of a fire below as well as above them.


  p. 1277 (#185)                      #

1925)
1277
Professional Notes
Phosphorus lowers the melting point of the iron. Sulphur in the unused
bar appears as small iron-sulphide crystals having a melting point of 1,210
deg C. (2,210 F.), and in this form does not materially hasten the fusing
of the metal. These crystals, however, in an amount of 0.2 per cent, make
the iron brittle and encourage flaking and the production of cracks and
fissures. For this reason it is desirable that iron that is to sustain high
temperatures should have a low surphur content. Analysis showed, however,
that the sulphur content had increased from 0.09 per cent in the unused t
0.95 per cent in the burnt bars.
From the foregoing it appeared that the life of the bars would be
lengthened if the formation of iron oxide and the increase of the sulphur
content could be prevented. This has been attempted by giving to the bars
a coating of aluminum which hinders, through the formation of aluminum
oxide, the oxidation of the iron and the absorption of sulphur.


FIG. 1-CHILLED BARS AFTER
600 Hours' SERVICE
Fig. 2—METALIZED BARS AFTER
600-HOUR TEST
In applying the process, which consists of spraying the aluminum on in a
molten conditions, the iron should be at a red heat, as the coating applied
to a cold surface is likely to include air, which, by its expansion when the
bar is heated, is likely to impair the integrity of the protective surface and
make the aluminum flake off.
Some of the gray-iron bars were thus treated, about 45 grams of alumi-
num being applied per meter length of bar, and these, simultaneously with
samples of the untreated bars, were subjected to a 600-hour test in the same
furnace. Their appearance at the end of the test is shown in Fig. 2.
Analyses of the sections after this exposure show comparatively imma-
terial changes in the composition of the section, especially as regards the
sulphur content.


  p. 1278 (#186)                      #

1278
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Steam or Oil Engines for Fast Ships?*
The Marine Engineer and Motorship Builder, May, 1925.-It is premature
to talk of the Diesel completely superseding the steam engine. The upper
limit of power of the Diesel engine is much below the upper limit for the
steam engine, so that at present there can be no supersession of machinery
above the Diesel's upper limit of power. High-speed warships of all types
cannot adopt the Diesel engine for this reason. Oil which has made the
Diesel a possibility has much increased the output and the economy of the
steam engine. The advantage of the Diesel over the steam engine is that
the oil has been more efficiently used in the cylinders of the Diesel than in
the furnaces of the boilers which supply the steam for the older type of
machinery, and the steam so produced has not had the same range of tem-
peratures to work in that the oil in the Diesel has had. But developments
are taking place in boilers and steam turbines which promise to remove
some of these differences in economic output. Sir Charles Parsons gave
some figures in a paper read at the World Power Conference in July, 1924,
in which he proposed steam turbines working at 500 pounds per square
inch pressure and 700° F. steam temperature driving propellers, through
reduction gearing, the steam being generated in water-tube boilers fitted with
air preheaters. This system is hereafter referred to as the H.P.T. type. It
is shown that an overall thermal efficiency may be obtained not much in-
ferior to the best results secured by the Diesel. Statesments of this kind
from such a high authority lead to the conclusion that we can either by the
steam or the Diesel engine obtain much more power per ton of fuel carried
and used than can be got in existing steamships.
Before we decide on the relative merits of steam and Diesel engines for
ship propulsion, we have to take into account:
(a) The relative first cost;
(b) The relative cost of Diesel and boiler fuel; and
(c) The relative working costs, including crew and maintenance.
The relative cost of boiler and Diesel oil fuel suitable for ship propul-
sion seems to be a variable quantity. The difference in cost varies from
nothing to twenty per cent in favor of the boiler-fuel oil. There are some
oils of about the same thermal efficiency which can be used in a boiler which
cannot or have not been used in a Diesel engine, and even if they are used
it has been estimated that the cost of the Diesel oil might be nearly twenty
per cent higher without being superseded by the oil suitable for a boiler.
It seems probable that for some time to come the oil fuel for the steam
engine will be cheaper than for the Diesel. The cost of the crew for the
Diesel-engine ship will most probably be less than for the turbine-driven
ship in high-powered machinery, but for powers below 10,000 horsepower
this does not seem to hold. As to the relative cost of maintenance and
repair, it is too early to dogmatize. These costs in the cases of the turbine
and boilers are known, and are not high. The number of moving parts of
a Diesel engine is large, and the liability to wear and damage is not small,
but until the latest types have been run at sea for some time we must wait
for, full knowledge on this subject. It is, therefore, not the Diesel alone
which will make existing steamers obsolete, but also developments in the
steam engine itself are very likely to produce the same results. The gain
in the Diesel over the steam engine is in the smaller consumption of oil per
unit of power, but the cost and weight of the Diesel are much greater than
the turbine installations using high-pressure steam in the way suggested by
Sir Charles Parsons.
* Abstract of Paper read by Sir John Biles, K.C.I.E., LL.D., D.Sc., at the Spring
Meetings of the Sixty-sixth Session of the Institution of Naval Architects, April 1.


  p. 1279 (#187)                      #

1925)
1279
Professional Notes
Take the case of the only Diesel ship of high speed which has been com-
pieted, the Aorangi, and compare its performance with that of a steamship
of about the same dimensions and power. The steamship is all oil-fired with
double-reduction turbines. The following are the leading particulars:
TABLE 1.—COMPARING DIESEL AND STEAM VESSELS OF ABOUT 20,000 Tons
DISPLACEMENT
Diesel (Aorangi) Steam
Dimensions .....
....... 580 ft. X 72 ft. X 546 ft. X 70 ft. X
46 ft. 7 in.
43 ft. 3 in.
Measured
Measured
Sea. Mile. Sea. Mile.
Draught, mean ....
26 ft. 51 in. 24 ft. io in. 25 ft.
Shaft horse-power ................ 12,200 12,400 12,050 13,885
Speed, knots ........ ....... 17.91 18.237 17.2 17.96
Displacement, tons ....
20,740
19,000 19,150
Consumption per shaft horse-power/
hour, in ths...
.......0.395 for main engines
0.036 for auxiliary
— engines
0.431
0.984
Consumption of oil for 3,000 nautical
miles (estimated from sea trial) 393 tons
923 tons
Estimated reserve feed water used
in 3,000 nautical miles ........... 28 tons
350 tons
Total weight of oil and water used
in 3,000 nautical miles .......... 421 tons
1,273 tons
Main gain in speed during voyage
due to reduction in weight of fuel
and oil on board ..... ....0.08 knot
0:23 knot
Equiva lent difference in shaft horse-
power during voyage if vessels run
at same speed .................. 1.4 per cent 4 per cent
Area on five decks due to machinery
openings ....................... about 14,000 sq. ft. 15,500 sq. ft.
Extra length of ship necessary to
give same area of decks exclusive
4.2 ft.
of machinery openings .......
It is claimed for the Diesel engine in passenger ships that more space is
available for passengers than in the steamships. We may judge of this by
observing the relative spaces occupied by machinery openings in the two
cases.
Three different types may now be considered:
(a) Diesel engines.
(b) Steam turbines of existing types of machinery and cylindrical
tubulous boilers.
(c) Steam turbines working at 500 pounds pressure and 700 degrees
temperature from water-tube boilers as proposed by Sir Charles
Parsons, called the H.P.T. type.
The weights of Diesel engines and those of type (b) are very much the
same. The weight of type (c) is from forty to fifty per cent less than (a).
It is generally claimed that the consumption of the Diesel is about 0:4 pound -
per shaft horsepower for the main engines. It is also claimed that for all
purposes in the Aorangi the consumption is 0.5 pound, the difference being
due to the auxiliary purposes for which power and steam are used in the


  p. 1280 (#188)                      #

1280
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
TABLE II.-COMPARATIVE WEIGHTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROPELLING MACHINERY FOR DIFFERENT LENGTHS
OF VOYAGE
Type
(a)
(b)
Steam
(c) (a)
| H.P.T. | Diesel
(b)
Steam
f(c) (a)
(c)
H.P.T. | Diesel | H.P.T.
(c)
Diesel
H.P.T.
20
20
0:7
0.5
27,000
*3.230
4,450
Sea speed, knots.....
Fuel per shaft horsepower ....
Shaft horsepower ...
Distance in nautical miles...
Weight of machinery..
Weight of feed water..
Weight of fuel......
Weight of machinery, fuel and water. . ]
Weight of half fuel and water...
Weight less half fuel and water. ......
Gain over Diesel in weight of machin-
ery, fuel and water........
Gain over Diesel less half fuel and water
20
0.5
27,000
6,460
4,450
109
1,947
6,506
1,028
5,478
20
1:0
28,000
6,460
4,250
1,507
4,037
9,794
2,772
7,022
3,288
loss
1,544
loss
55
27,000
6.460
2,700
727
2,725
6,152
1,726
4,426
354
20
1:0
28,000
3.230
4,250
754
2,018
7,022
1,386
5,636
1,544
loss
672
loss
20
0:7
27,000
3,230
2,700
364
1,362
4,426
863
3,563
1,052
17
0.5
13,500
3,230
2,650
32
572
3,254
302
2,952
17
0:7
13,500
3,230
1,300
214
802
2,316
508
1,808
938
18 .
0.7
16,900
3,230
1,600
253
948
2,801
600
2,201
973
5,478
514
4,964
453
1,052
1,401
1,144
751
Note.-H.P.T.=High-pressure turbine.


  p. 1281 (#189)                      #

1925)
1281
Professional Notes
ship. The amount of steam for auxiliary purposes naturally varies with the
kind of auxiliary machinery and purposes to which fuel is applied. In a
20,000-ton, 20-knot turbine, passenger ship the amount of water evaporated
per pound of oil fuel was measured with the boilers at full power. An esti-
mate of the fuel used for driving the auxiliaries in this ship is 0.15 pound
per oil per hour per shaft horsepower of main engines, and an estimate of
the fuel for auxiliaries in a 20,000-ton Diesel ship of 20 knots gives 0.107
pound per shaft horsepower per hour as the consumption. In the case of
the steamship, steam is used only for feed, air, general service, and circulat-
ing pumps for main and auxiliary condensers, for cooking, evaporator,
ship's heating, brine warming, hot salt- and fresh-water calorifiers. If
0-45 pound is used for Aorangi for all purposes, it seems as if either the
shaft horsepower at which the ship is running has been overestimated, or
that her auxiliaries are very much more efficient than in other ships. In
comparing the Diesel (a) with (b) and (c), the following figures have
been used for auxiliaries :
(a) 0:1
(b) 0.15
(c) 0:1
We may take the consumptions for main machinery as follows:
(a) 0:4
(b) 0.9
(c) 0:6
With sea water at 60 degrees and vacuum 28 inches, the totals for all pur-
poses will be:
(a) 0:5
(b) 1.05
(c) 0.7
Some authorities have determined the amount of make-up feed required
in cylindrical boilers in merchant ships to be three and a half tons per 1,000
horsepower per day. From observations in some recent passenger ships
this amount of water is found to be as much as four tons, no evaporators
being used. In Diesel ships the amount is small and may be taken at about
0.3 ton per 1,000 horsepower per day. This amount will be increased if
fresh water is used in circulation for cooling parts of the engine. This
large difference between the steam and Diesel engines can be reduced by the
use of evaporators. In the steam system (c) it is assumed that two tons per
1,000 horsepower per day will be sufficient, together with evaporators
capable of giving another two tons if required.
The weight of fuel and feed water will vary with the distance between
fuelling ports. Table II gives the totals for these items for different types
of machinery, and for two distances, 6,460 miles and 3,230 miles. It will be
seen that for the longer distance the Diesel and the high-pressure turbine
(or H.P.T.) type are tending toward the same total weight, while the pres-
ent turbine type is about 50 per cent more, the ratios being 1, 1.5, and 0.94.
For the shorter distance the ratio is 1, 1.28, and o-81 for the (a), (b) and
(c) types, respectively. The mean displacement on the voyage will be
affected by the consumption of fuel, and so forth, to the extent shown in
Table II. Table III gives estimates for the different types of machinery
in the same various types of ships, and for various distances run per annum.
The costs of machinery are for the whole installation of boilers, engines,
and auxiliaries as completed in the ships. In the case of 20-knot vessels the
Diesel type of engine costs £13,000 per year more to run than the steam,
while at 17 knots the cost per annum of the Diesel is £7,000 more than that
for the steam. But the cost of running the steam vessel at 18 knots is only
£8,000 per year more than the Diesel at 17 knots. Some investigations have
been made for higher powers which may be of interest. In the case of the
20-knot vessel with the (c) type of machinery, it will be seen that a gain
of 1,052 tons of weight is available in the 3,230-mile voyage. Transforming
this weight into machinery fuel and make-up feed, it is possible to increase
the shaft horsepower to 40,000 and the sea speed to 22 knots. The weight


  p. 1282 (#190)                      #

1282
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
TABLE III.-ANNUAL COSTS FOR VOYAGE OF 120,000 MILES
(a)
Diesel
(6)
Steam
(a)
Diesel
(c)
(6)
H.P.T.
· H.P.T.
H.P.T.
27,000
£460,000
£85, 100
28,000
£380,000
£70,390
27,000
£333,000
£61,605
13,500
£240,000
£44,400
13,500
£175,000
£32,380
16,900
£210,000
£38,850
Shaft horse power....
Cost of machinery..
Interest, depreciation, insurance, and maintenance
per year. ................
Distance steamed per year, miles...
Fuel burnt per year, tons.........
Cost of fuel per year. .........
Lubricating oil per year, tons......
Lubricating oil-cost, per year. .....
Feed water for boilers per year, tons.....
Cost of feed water for boilers per year
Engine-room wages per year..
120,000
36,160
£144,640
337 · 35
£11,554
2,025
£160
£10,000
120,000
75,000
£243,750
7.03
£241
28,000
£2,217
£12,000
80,000
19,853
£64,522
2.66
120,000
50,625
£164,531
6.78
£232
13,500
£1,068
£11,000
80,000
14,180
£56,720
132 · 3
£4,531
80,000
23,472
£72, 287
3 · 14
£108
6,259
£495
£9,000
£71
794
£63
£6,600
5,294
£419
£8,000
Total running expenses. ...
Charges........
£166,354
85,100
£258,208 | £176,831
70,390 61,605
£67,914
44,400
£73,012
32,380
£81,890
38,850
Total...
£251,454 |
£328,598 | £238,436
| £112,314 | £105,392 | £120,740


  p. 1283 (#191)                      #

1925]
1283
Professional Notes
of turbine machinery per shaft horsepower tends to decrease with increase
of power. An estimate of an installation of such machinery for 55,000
horsepower in a 24-knot ship shows that the weight is about 3,600 tons,
which is one third more than that in a 20-knot ship, while the power is more
than double. It is not easy to see how a Diesel installation of this power
could be applied to a ship at the present time, and its weight would prob-
ably be about 8,000 tons. It is, however, in the region of lower powers than
those dealt with that the interest of the large majority of shipowners is
most centered. It cannot be said that the turbine has displaced the recipro-
cating engine in this region. The reduction in weight of the (c) installa-
tion is due in part to the use of high-efficiency water-tube boilers and oil
fuel, which require higher skill in their handling than the ordinary mer-
chant-ship boiler, coal-fired. But a similar consideration has to be kept in
view in the adoption of the Diesel engine in the ordinary type of tramp
steamers. Both types involve the training of more highly skilled engine-
room staffs, which time only can create.
In the case of cross-Channel steamers of high speed the turbine has
completely displaced the reciprocating engine. In this case the weight and
first cost of the installation are the dominating considerations, for the dis-
tances run are short and the amount of fuel carried is comparatively much
smaller than in vessels trading overseas. It is of interest to examine such
a case to see if steam is likely to be displaced by the Diesel engine. The
case of an intallation for a 20-knot vessel of 5,200 horsepower has been
chosen.
The following are comparative figures for twin-screw vessel :
(c)
Item
Diesel
(6)
Present
Turbine
Arrangement
With H.P.
Turbine
Scheme
Power........
Oil consumption, all purposes..!
5,200 s.h.p.
1:15 tons
5,200 s.h.p.
2.09 tons
per hour
5,200 s.h.p.
1.67 tons
per hour
per hour
Oil per shaft horsepower per
hour, all purposes...
Weight of machinery.........
Revolutions per minute......
Cost........................
0.72 lb.
510 tons
0.5 lb.
740 tons
260
£100,000
0.9 lb.
570 tons
260
£62,000
260
£65,000
The question of the practicability of producing reliable machinery of the
(c) type is one for the marine engineer.
Two difficulties will suggest themselves—firstly, that of condenser tubes,
and secondly, that of steam joints. Sir Charles Parsons' proposals are
made by a serious engineer who is ready to carry them out. Other firms
have been consulted who, in this respect, are free from the suspicion of
desiring favor or their own progeny, and they are quite ready to guarantee
results equal to those promised by Sir Charles Parsons, so that there is
solid foundation for belief in the statement of steam efficiency upon which
the comparison with the Diesel engines is based. Further, one firm has
offered equally favorable results in thermal efficiency, first cost, and weight
of installation at a pressure of 265 pounds with an installation in which the
greater efficiency in the method of producing the steam is expected to make
up for the loss of efficiency due to the use of the steam of lower pressure.


  p. 1284 (#192)                      #

1284
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
TABLE IV.-PARTICULARS OF DIESEL ENGINES
Diesel Machinery
Cylinders in Each Engine | Revs.
per
Type of Engine No. Diameter Stroke Min.
B.H.P.
Weight/
B.H.P.
Complete
Installation
Consumption
B.H.P.
Cost per
B.H.P.
Vessel
Builder
In.
In.
22
8
36
120
2,500
T.s. Dolius........... Scott ......... Scott-Still
two-cycle
T.s. Scottish Borderer ... Denny........ Sulzer two-
cycle.....
23.6
141:8
90
2,071
6
125
1,267
38;
38)
125
1,267
S.s. Pinson ........... Beardmore.... bearamote-
... Beardmore.... Beardmore-Tosi
S.s. Pizarro... Beardmore. ... Beardmore-Tosil
T.s. Sycamore.... Richardsons, Beardmore-Tosi
Westgarth..
T.s. Tramore.... Richardsons, Beardmore-Tosi
Westgarth..
T.s. Silurian........... Beardmore.... Beardmore-Tosi
Lb.
10:36 lb./B.H.P./hr.
611
main engines
0.371 lb./B.H./hr. Not given.
all purposes
400 10: 435 lb. includes air, Not given.
main engines scavenge and other
only pumps driven off main
engines
0:42 lb./B.H.P./hr. £31 (1921).
main engines only 7
0:42 lb./B.H.P./hr.
main engines only
0.42 lb./B.H.P./hr.
main engines only
0.42 lb./B.H.P./hr.
main engines only
0.42 lb./B.H.P./hr. £21 10s.
main engines only
(1924).
10.431 lb./B.H.Þ./hr.
400
main engines
0.45 lb./B.H.P./hr.
all purposes
126
6
6
6
381
2,700
2,700
2,700
126
126
Q.s. Aorangi ......... Fairfield....... Fairfield-Sulzer
6
27}
123
12,200
Lb.
452
35. 43
16 1
135
0:379
19.68
19.68
24:8
£31 6s.
£23 18.
35. 43
150
399
S.s. Frem. ............Burmeister
& Wain
T.s. Chastine Maersk... Burmeister
& Wain..
T.s. Tourcoing........ Burmeister
& Wain..
S.s. Centaur (as given Scott....
by Burmeister &
Wain)....
0.376
Burmeister
& Wain
Burmeister
& Wain
Burmeister
& Wain
Burmeister
& Wain
four-cycle
Taken at ?
I.H.P.
I.H.P. 1.15
B.H.P. 8625
I.H.P. 2,300
B.H.P. 1,725
I.H.P. 5,400
B.H.P. 4,050
I.H.P. 2.000
| B.H.P. 1,500
43:7
120
393
0: 377
£18.
24.8
|
54 • 18
110
0° 404
£30.


  p. 1285 (#193)                      #

1925)
1285
Professional Notes
In this installation coal can be used. Yarrow and Company have built
boilers of 400 pounds pressure and 700 degries of superheat, for use in elec-
trical power stations, and they have designed a Yarrow boiler of 500 pounds
pressure and about 700 degrees of superheat for marine engines. James
Howden and Company have proposed and are building a boiler of the
cylindrical and water-tube type combined, which will have 315 pounds
pressure and 700 degrees temperature, and with which they expect to get
very high efficiency. Both these boilers can be arranged to use oil or coal
as fuel
In overseas high-speed vessels the weight is only in favor of the Diesel
for a length of voyage considerably above 6,000 miles, and even in such
cases the mean displacement on the voyage may be three per cent or more in
favor of the steam vessel. For voyages of 3,000 miles there is a gain of over
1,000 tons in weight to be carried, and a gain of five per cent in the mean
displacement on voyage in the steam vessel. In cross-channel vessels the
weight and cost make the Diesel prohibitive compared with the turbine. In
all these cases steam is superior to the Diesel in commercial efficiency.
The employment in marine installations of three turbines in series con-
nected by gearing to the propeller shaft is especialiy appropriate to these
high-pressure schemes, since it enables the high-pressure part of the expan-
sion to be effected in a turbine of small diameter, running at the speed of
revolution most conducive to efficiency. Thus it it proposed to employ an
arrangement giving 27,000 s.h.D. on two shafts. The turbines are coupled
to the shaít through double-reduction gearing, the high pressure at 4,000
revolutions and the intermediate pressure at 2,700 revolutions driving one
primary gear and developing, respectively, twenty per cent and thirty per
cent of the total power. The remaining fifty per cent is developed in the
low-pressure turbine, which runs at 300 revolutions and drives the other
primary gear. The main wheel is then symmetrically driven by two sec-
ondary pinions of equal power and speed, coupled one to each primary wheel.
The heat of the auxiliary exhaust steam is utilized to heat the feed water
to a temperature of 200° F. Further feed heating can be effected by bleed-
ing steam from the turbine, say, at a pressure of 120 pounds per square inch,
to raise the feed temperature to about 310° F. The whole of the heat of the
flue gases is available for pre-heating the furnace air, thus raising the
efficiency of the boiler. To remove the objection that has sometimes been
raised to the use of water-tube boilers for marine work, having regard to
the possibility of leaky condenser tubes admitting salt to the feed system,
it is proposed to subdivide the condensers, fitting two or more condensers
to each turbine exhaust, of a large total capacity, with means to isolate
each condenser, both on the steam and water side, so that on any indication
of leakage of salt it may be effectively dealt with without appreciably re-
ducing the speed of the ship. Suitable instruments would be fitted for the
detection of salinity of the condensate of each condenser. With a boiler
pressure of 500 pounds superheat to a total temperature of 700° F., and a
condenser vacuum of 29 inches Hg. (barometer, 30 inches), it is estimated
that the steam consumption of the turbines of such an installation will not
exceed 6.9 pounds per s.h.p. hour.
Stern Tube Friction Eliminated by Oil
The Nautical Gazette, 23 May, 1925.---Regarding the question as to the
reduction of friction in the stern tubes when oil is used instead of water,
Fergus Cameron, consulting engineer, of Goole, has had an experience with
the steamer Sparta, owned by the Bennett Steamship Company, Ltd., which
gives support to the contention that the lubrication of this bearing does
actually reduce the friction, with a consequent economy of fuel or an in-


  p. 1286 (#194)                      #

1286
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
crease in revolutions. The vessel, which was built in 1900, is fitted with
inverted, direct-acting, triple-expansion engines. She has a plain tail shaft
of eight and three-quarters inches diameter, running in a cast iron bush,
the bottom half of which is lined with white metal, at a speed of ninety-
five revolutions, equal to a peripheral speed of 218 feet per minute. She
is fitted with a Vickers stern tube appliance and lubricated with Vickers
underwater oil.
The vessel was recently docked at Goole, when the tail shaft was drawn
in for inspection, everything being found in excellent condition after
eighteen months' running in and out of the sandy water of the Humber.
On the day on which the shaft was uncoupled there was a strong wind
blowing, with occasional gusts attaining to the speed of a small gale. When
the last coupling bolt had been removed it as found necessary to send a man
into the drydock to hold the propeller still, as it was found impossible to
put in the stops between the tail and shaft coupling and the stern tube
flange, owing to the shaft and the propeller revolving slowly, due to the
action of the wind on the blades.
AVIATION
Detroit Takes Off
Aviation, 27 April, 1925.—With a sudden rush, Detroit has made a con-
certed effort to make itself truly the aeronautical center of the country.
While others have been thinking of the coming dawn of aviation, the home
of the motor car has seized the advantage of position and is planning a com-
prehensive development of all phases of aviation.
FORD
With the public announcement by Edsel Ford of the establishment of a
Ford Airline from Detroit to Chicago the public received its first news
of the interest of the Ford Company in air transportation development.
While foreign aeronautical visitors have tried to interest the Fords in
their enterprises and there has been much inspired publicity of these efforts,
until last week no definite plans were announced. Even now the extent of
the development is problematical. Two Stout Metal monoplanes have been
purchased and are flying from the Ford Airport at Dearborn to Chicago on
a schedule that will be made daily as soon as equipment permits. The Ford
Airport, with its mooring mast, its airplane factory and its airship hangar,
will be the most complete in the country, but the further announcement that
the Ford Company intends to manufacture small and inexpensive planes
and a light commercial engine arouses the greatest enthusiasm in aero-
nautical circles, for when the vast resources of the great Ford organization
are centered on a project, it can be considered to be the result of a very
careful investigation.
COFFIN
The second, and in some ways a more important, Detroit plan is the
formation, there, of a group of capitalists headed by Howard Coffin to
promote an operating air transport company. This, project has already
secured the cooperation of some of the best known men in the country.
Until an official announcement of the personnel of the company is made it
will not be helpful to list the names of those that have been rumored
as participating in the underwriting. It can be said, however, that the
plans of the promoters do not include any sale of stock to the public.
Unofficially, it is reported that the company intends to start an experimental
air line between New York and Chicago using the Air Mail route for night
flying. As the Kelly Bill now permits the Post Office Department to make
contracts with private operators of airlines for the transportation of mail,


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Professional Notes
the taking over of the night flying of the eastern section of the Air Mail
may be one of the first undertakings of the proposed company when it is
under way. The tentative plans call for extensions of the operations of the
air lines, as far east as Boston, to the south as far as Atlanta and New Or-
leans, and west to Los Angeles and Seattle. The plans call for the use of
airplanes and airships when either may be found to be advantageous. C. M.
Keys, president of the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation, is asso-
ciated with Mr. Coffin in the organization of the company, the formal plans
of which will shortly be made public.
As has been announced, the Buhl interests in Detroit have formed a
company—The Buhl-Verville Aircraft Corporation—to manufacture air-
planes designed by Alfred Verville. The combination of manufacturing
experience and engineering skill will make this company one from which
much may be expected.
PACKARD.
Then, of course, the Packard Company has carried on an extensive
engineering development with aeronautical engines. The large Packard
engines have recently come to be regarded as one of the standard engines
for the Air Service. Under the guidance of Colonel J. G. Vincent, the
vice president in charge of engineering, the Packard Company has con-
ducted a progressive development program in aeronautical engines that is
beginning to play an important part in the engine field.
Of the Stout and Upson engineering progress much has been known.
Since his designing of the Bat, Mr. Stout has been engaged in the pro-
duction of metal airplanes and his monoplane has been praised by practically
everyone who has studied the ship. Its adoption by the Fords for their
air line is a complete endorsement of its utility as an economical air
transport. Ralph Upson has been making the preliminary engineering study
of a metal airship, and methods of fabrications. While actual building has
not been started the design and fundamental idea has received the most
interested consideration from all parts of the world.
As will be seen, Detroit is taking the aircraft situation with the most
comprehensive seriousness. It has the money, it has the manufacturing
facilities and skill, but what is even more important, it is proceeding with
a large and comprehensive plan to develop aviation all along the line.
The "Los Angeles" a Fine Job
The Scientific American, June, 1925.–False propaganda and misleading
half truths are the bane of modern life. Their malevolence would begin
and end with themselves were it not for the wide publicity they too often
obtain in the daily press and the magazine. Because of the un-American
influences that have been poisoning the country during the last twenty-five
years, it has come about that, if they are to be attractive, the stage must
be salacious and journalism enriched with sensation and scandal.
It has been publicly stated that the metal of the Los Angeles airship is
disintegrating and that this catastrophe is the result of deliberate German
duplicity. That is the latest lie, and we wish it here and now to be under-
stood that it has been deliberately cut out of whole cloth. The framework
of the Los Angeles is not disintegrating, and the ship itself, as the editor
can testify after climbing over every accessible part of it, is a magnificent
job, both in the intelligence of the design and the characteristic thorough-
ness of the workmanship.
A grain of truth in these rumors is to be found in the fact that there
has been a certain amount of corrosion in the keel of the Los Angeles, which
has not been due to any fault in the aluminum alloy of which the frame is
built, but to some chemicals which were accidentally spilt upon it during the


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
operation of the ship. Within the hull is carried a large number of bags of
water which are discharged when it is necessary to lighten the ship. With a
view to preventing freezing at high altitudes, a certain amount of calcium
chloride is mixed with the water, and in pouring the liquid into the bags,
some of it spilled over and ran down into the keel. The calcium chloride
set up a surface corrosion which, in the small latices of which the main
triangular members are built up, became sufficiently serious to necessitate
their removal. This has now been done and the ship is today in first-class
condition. Greater care in filling the bags with anti-freezing mixture, or
better yet, the substitution of wood alcohol or some other suitable substance,
would absolutely remove any similar risk for the future.
As to the suggestion that the Germans had deliberately made up an
alloy which was certain to disintegrate in the course of time and so wreck
the ship, the idea is preposterous. The Zeppelin company who built the
Los Angeles have already become affiliated with a powerful Akron concern,
and the only field for the future building by them of airships lies in this
country. Consequently, there is every inducement for them to make the
Los Angeles a fine exhibit of their skill in design and in construction. In
other words, she is their show ship for America. Our examination of the
vessel confirms the expectation of her excellence. Particularly noticeable is
the construction of the bow to withstand those heavy lateral stresses which
in a gale of wind are liable to tear the bow out of the ship, as happened in
the Shenandoah when her cap was torn loose, and in R-33. A heavy side
gust sets up tension on the lee side and heavy compression on the windward
side of the ship and the aluminum alloy is relatively weaker in compression
than in tension. Hence, a series of straight and stiff rectangular posts
extend from the nose cap to the first circular ring, and these are strengthened
in such a way that they should be proof against the heaviest stresses to
which they can be exposed.
The New Packard Aircraft Engines
Aviation, 11 May, 1925.—The new Packard aircraft engines are built in
two sizes, the model 1500 rated at 500 b.h.p., and the model 2500 rated at
800 b.h.p. The engines are of almost identical design except in size and
were developed concurrently to fill the demand for the entire range of
water cooled engines as it exists today. These engines are suitable for
merson Mnan
Saman
FIG. I
power demands ranging from about 350 b.h.p. to well over 800 b.h.p., gearing
being furnished when required to bring the propeller speed down to the
point of maximum efficiency.
Externally, the engines present an exceptionally clean appearance and are
remarkably compact for their power output as shown by the superimposed
views of the model 1500 and the Liberty engines in Fig. 1. From these


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Professional Notes
diagrams it will be noted that the new small Packard engine is considerably
lighter and more compact than the Liberty but develops far more power.
The larger model 2500 engine is compared in respect to power output and
weight with its predecessor, the model 2025 engine, which powered the
Verville-Packard plane, winner of the first Pulitzer race.
The compact construction, light weight and high power output of these
new engines have been brought about by some rather basic advances in
aircraft engine design resulting from the long experience of the Packard
Motor Car Company in designing and building airplane engines in quantities.
In laying down the new designs the following fundamental principles were
established.
(1) A very high degree of reliability must be attained.
(2) Greatly reduced weight and overall dimensions as compared with
previous designs are highly desirable.
(3) The design must be simple, capable of production in large quantities
and accessible for maintenance in the field.
A comprehensive survey was first made of the fundamental factors in
the design which would be most affected in carrying out these principles.
It was found that the design of the crankshaft bearings would form the
foundation of this research work as the length of the bearings would de-
termine the length of the engine to a large extent. Accordingly, a series
of bearing tests were run over a period of several months in order to
ascertain the ideal combination of material, loads and sizes. As a result of
this work it was found that if the bearings were made sufficiently rigid
and a rapid circulation of oil was maintained through the bearings, in order
to provide lubrication and carry away the heat generated, it would be pos-
sible to obtain satisfactory results with bearings far narrower than had
hitherto been thought advisable.
For example, it was found out in endurance tests of these engines later
that a bearing load factor as high as 35,000 pounds per square inch feet
per second yielded even better results from a standpoint of bearing life than
previous aircraft engine bearings loaded only half as much but which were
not as rigidly supported or as well lubricated.
While the compact overall dimensions of the new engines are basically
determined by the new developments in bearing design, a contributory factor
is the cylinder construction of these engines. The cylinders are individual
and are of all steel construction, the six cylinders of a bank being formed
into a block by means of an aluminum casting termed the valve housing
to which the cylinders are bolted. The cylinder is composed of a drawn
steel sleeve welded to a forged combustion chamber head which is machined
all over and fitted with a head plate and sheet metal water jacket welded
in place. Each cylinder is provided with four valves and short valve ports
are formed integral with the cylinder. The valve ports are accurately hollow
milled on their outer surfaces and the head plate is bored so as to form a
pressed fit over the vale ports, the plate seating on shoulders so as to
provide about three eighths of an inch water space over the top of the com-
bustion chamber.
The cylinder head is provided with five bosses into which long studs are
screwed, thus supporting the valve housing. The spark plug bosses are
formed integral with the combustion chamber. The weight of the complete
model 1500 cylinder is nine and five-tenths pounds and this cylinder develops
nearly fifty h.p. The weight of the complete model 2500 cylinder is fifteen
and two-tenths pounds and this cylinder develops nearly seventy h.p. It will
be noted that the cylinder hold-down flange is located some distance from
the end of the cylinder barrel which permits of a very compact construction
as the ends of the barrels of the two banks are practically allowed to touch
inside the crankcase, the additional height of the crankcase due to this


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| July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
construction naturally increasing its rigidity. Incidentally, it is the fact
that the cylinder barrels project inside the crankcase which permits of these
engines being run successfully in an inverted position, an arrangement now
favored by many airplane designers.
Water is led into the individual cylinders from a manifold connected to
short pipes welded to the jacket at the lower end and the water delivery
from the cylinder is through a series of holes drilled in the top plate and
arranged radially around the exhaust ports so as to insure against local
steam pockets over the exhaust valve seats. A single copper-asbestos
gasket is used between the individual cylinders and the valve housing ; this
gasket is, of course, not subjected to gas pressures as with the conventional
automobile detachable head gasket but merely serves as a water seal and to
prevent leaks between the inlet and exhaust passages.
The valve housing is an aluminum casting machined on all surfaces and
used interchangeably on the right and left hand banks. The housing per-
forms the following functions:
(1) Distributes the mixture to the six cylinders from the two carburetor
cross header manifold connections.
(2) Forms the exhaust passages, each two adjacent cylinders having
their two pairs of exhaust ports siamesed into a single exhaust outlet.
(3) Collects the water circulated through each cylinder jacket and
delivers same through a single outlet at the front of the engine.
(4) Supports the camshaft bearing pedestals and valve stem guides.
Fig. 4 shows diagrammatically the layout of the intake, exhaust and
water passages in the valve housing and the unique arrangement of four
valves feeding from a common port will be noted. The advantages of this
arrangement are that large and free passages are permitted and the casting
is simplified due to the absence of intermediate walls.
A single camshaft is supported in seven cast duralumin bearings bolted to
the top of the valve housing and this camshaft is provided with twelve cams,
each cam operating a pair of valves through
the medium of a cam follower working in
a vertical guide formed integral with the
camshaft bearings. These cam followers
are prevented from turning by means of a
flat milled surface on the side of the cam-
shaft bearing. The cam followers are posi-
tively lubricated from the adjacent camshaft
bearing and the exhaust cam followers are
also utilized as pumps to force oil through
the exhaust valves for cooling purposes.
FIG. 5
This feature of the design is shown dia-
grammatically in Fig. 5 and the method of
circulating the oil through the valves is described as follows:
The camshaft is hollow and supplied with oil under pressure through a
continuous metering groove in the rear bearing. In the camshaft journal
next to each exhaust cam a hole is drilled opposite to the nose of the
corresponding exhaust cam and this hole registers with a vertical passage in
the camshaft bearing pedestal when the cam is at its highest point and the
exhaust valves consequently closed. The oil flows through this passage to
the bottom of the cam follower guide which forms a closed end cylinder and
the space underneath the cam follower is thus filled with oil. The camshaft
in revolving cuts off communication with this passage and when the cam
follower is depressed by the cam the oil can only escape by being forced
through the hollow cam follower stem and the horizontal drilled passages
leading out through the drilled tappets into the exhaust valve stems. The
latter are drilled out their entire length, the lower end of the hole in the


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1925)
1291
Professional Notes
valve head being closed by a screwed-in plug. A small steel tube is welded
to this plug and is centered in a counterbore at the upper end of the valve
stem. The oil is forced down through the tube, out at the bottom through
horizontal holes and thus cools the head of the valve. The oil is then dis-
charged through the annular space between the tube and inner wall of the
valve stem and out into the valve housing through horizontal holes drilled
through the upper end of the valve stem just below the counterbore. With
this system a fixed quantity of oil is pumped through each exhaust valve
each time it is opened and thus a very positive means of cooling is pro-
vided. As a result the exhaust valves operate as a very low temperature
and the valve seat is preserved in excellent operating condition over ex-
tensive periods.
Another feature worth mentioning in the valve gear is the valve spring
construction. Instead of the conventional aircraft arrangement of double
concentric valve springs a series of small diameter piano wire springs is
arranged in planetary fashion around the valve stem guide. In the model
1500 engine there are seven of these springs to each valve, and in the model
2500 engine there are ten springs to each valve. The individual valve
springs are located over tubular guides welded to a lower fixed washer and
the upper ends of the springs engage in an annular groove formed in the
movable spring washer.
This valve spring construction has been used for several years with per-
ject results on Packard marine racing engines which had heretofore given
considerable trouble with valve spring breakage at extremely high speeds.
The reason for this preferred construction is not due, as might be thought,
to the extra factor of safety resulting from the use of a multiplicity of
springs, but is due to the fact that in the small diameter springs the
natural period of vibration is very much higher than in the conventional
type of valve spring so that the destructive "dancing" of the valve springs
is avoided with the small diameter springs.
A very light sheet aluminum cover is fastened to the valve housing and
prevents external leakage of oil, this cover making a taper fit over the
ignition distributor drive housings located at the center of the engine and
described later. Oil from the valve housing is returned to the crankcase
through liberal drains placed at both ends of the engine and provided with
oil traps to prevent crankcase vapors accumulating in the valve gear
compartment.
The crankcases on both engines are of the conventional box section type,
the main bearings being supported in the seven transverse webs of the
crankcase upper half. The crankcase finish surface, to which the oil pan
is bolted, is brought down two and one-half inches and two and three-
fourths inches on the models 1500 and 2500 engine respectively below the
centerline of the crankshaft, the object being firstly, to add rigidity to the
crankcase structure, secondly, to provide "ways" into which the main bearing
caps are fitted, and thirdly, to render the oil pan attaching screws and nuts
more accessible.
The bearing caps are duralumin forgins except in the case of the front
and rear caps which are cast of a special heat treated aluminum alloy. The
main bearings are of babbitted steel-backed construction and are doweled
to both the bearing caps and the crankcase upper half. The main bearings
are provided with force feed lubrication, oil being delivered through a
horizontal manifold pressed in the crankcase upper half and distributing
through vertical tubes leading to each bearing pressed in the crankcase
transverse walls.
The oil pan or crankcase lower half serves as a mounting for the com-
bined water and oil pump unit and is provided with the scavenging oil line
leading to the front end and serving to keep the crankcase scavenged on a


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[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
glide. The oil pan can be removed from the engine at any time without
disturbing the engine bearings.
The crankshafts in both engines follow customary aircraft engine prac-
tice and are noteworthy for their rigidity, the main journals of the two
engines measuring three inches and three and one-half inches in diameter
respectively, and the crankpins are two and one-half inches and three and
one-fourth inches in diameter respectively.
Both main journals and crankpins are bored out with large holes and the
crank pins are plugged to provide an oil reservoir for leading oil to the
crankpin journals. These reservoirs receive oil from the adjacent main
bearings by means of steel tubes pressed into the crankshaft at an angle
and lining up with the main bearing metering grooves at one end and the
crankpin bore at the other. The main bearing metering grooves are located
entirely in the upper half of the main bearings and extending the whole
180 degrees around their circumference.
The connecting rods of the model 1500 engine are of the forked and
plain type fitted with Sumet bronze bearings, and the connecting rods of
the model 2500 engine are of the articulated type fitted with babbitt bearings
applied directly to the big end of the rod. The piston pin bushings in the
connecting rods of both engines are of phosphor bronze and the same
material is used in the link pin bushings of the larger engine. The link pins
of the model 2500 engine are retained in place by a tapered draw bolt passing
through a boss on the master rod.
The pistons of both engines are aluminum castings of the permanent
mold type and are of the slipper type. They are noteworthy for being
extremely short and comparatively light. The model 1500 piston is five
and three-eighths inches in diameter, 3 11/32 inches long and weighs
2.94 pounds for the bare piston. The model 2500 piston is six and three-
eighths inches in diameter, three and fifteen sixteenths inches long and
weighs 4.47 pounds for the bare piston. The lengths of these new
pistons were established after a series of tests were made in which the
length of the skirt was gradually diminished.
The timing gear and accessory drive layout is worthy of note firstly,
for its simplicity, there being the minimum number of gears employed,
secondly, for the integral construction of shaft and gear wherever per-
missible, and thirdly, for the use of pressure lubricated chilled aluminum
plain bearings throughout, these three features combining to save con-
siderable weight while preserving dependability to the utmost extent.
The simplicity of drives was accomplished by grouping the accessories in
a manner which effected important additional weight savings. All fuel,
oil and water pumps were combined into a single unit which is used inter-
changeably on both the model 1500 and 2500 engines. This unit is driven
through an Oldham coupling from a short shaft journaled in the rear bearing
cap. This shaft carries an integral bevel gear at its upper end which meshes
with a bevel gear mounted on an extension of the crankshaft.
The rear end view of the model 2500 engine brings out the simplicity
of the accessory drive layout as compared with previous types of aircraft
engines, and the absence of engine accessories projecting to the rear of the
engine will be appreciated by those having had maintenance experience with
aircraft engines which have been installed in a crowded position against
the firewall or front bulkhead of a plane.
The pump unit contains three spur gears which are housed-in to form
the two oil scavenging pumps and these gears in turn each drive another unit,
the first driving the water pump, the second the fuel pump and the third the
oil pressure pump. The whole pump unit is quite compact and weighs only
sixteen pounds, including in its assembly the oil strainer and oil pressure
relief valve.


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1293
Professional Notes
The camshaft center drive shaft is also formed with its gears integral
and is continued through the top of the crankcase to drive the special
magneto by means of a laminated spring coupling. This magneto is based
on a principle invented by Packard engineers and developed by the Splitdorf
Company and may be briefly described as a single mechanical instrument
with all electrical parts duplicated and independent throughout. That is to
say, there are only one set of magnets, one set of pole pieces, one rotor, one
driving shaft, one coupling, one cam and one set of rotor bearings.
On the other hand, there are two primary and secondary coils, two con-
densers, two interrupter arms, and two sets of contacts as well as double
external binding posts leading to the two separate distributors, either one
of which will fire all twelve cylinders and each having its separate drive
from one of the camshafts. The magneto employs but one magnetic
circuit and the two electrical circuits are independent of one another
throughout. The induction effect between the two primary windings is
substantially eliminated through the use of an impedance coil in the switch
to ground circuit. This instrument differs radically from the two-spark
magneto used formerly to a considerable extent. In the older type it was
customary to utilize both ends of the secondary winding, the high tension
circuit being to one spark plug to ground and from ground back through
the other spark plug. In this type of magneto practically any electrical
failure resulted in both sets of sparks being simultaneously affected whereas
in the new magneto the two electrical systems are completely isolated from
one another and should one system fail it will not appreciably affect the
operation of the other.
Timing of both the magneto and distributors has been facilitated in these
new engines by specially developed mountings, the magneto being furnished
with a slotted flange at the driving end, accurate timing being accomplished
by swinging the magneto bodily on this mounting, two five-sixteenths inch
nuts serving to lock the magneto in its desired position. Similarly, the
distributors can be bodily rotated by loosening a clamp bolt, the final adjust-
ment being made with the assistance of an inspection opening located over
No. I left cylinder terminal.
A recently developed advantage in connection with this ignition system
lies in the fact that a generator can be substituted for the magneto and by
providing a suitable contact breaker on the end of the generator shaft, it is
possible to secure battery ignition to replace the magneto ignition where
desirable without any changes to the engine itself and with no changes to
the wiring between the distributors and spark plugs, it being understood
that the same distributors are used regardless of whether magneto or bat-
tery ignition is employed.
As a result of this interchangeable ignition arrangement engines used in
planes having little electrical demands can be equipped with magnetos and
those used in planes requiring considerable electric current, for wireless,
lighting, and so forth, can be supplied with battery ignition. The result is
that the weight of the engine for each service will be kept to the minimum
and an engine can be transformed from one service to another very easily.
Although both the 500 and the 800 h.p. engines were originally intended
for direct drive service, both have been built for use with gears, the gear
reduction forming a separate unit bolted to a special crankcase flange.
The gear reductions have been designed and built by the Allison Engi-
neering Company of Indianapolis. They are of the spur gear single reduction
type and are entirely self-contained. A noteworthy feature is the employ-
ment of a shock-absorbing drive between the crankshaft and the pinion that
has proved very successful in eliminating the gear trouble resulting from
impact loading. These gear reductions give a two-to-one reduction to the
propeller shaft that has been found to be particularly desirable for load-
carrying airplanes of moderate speed.


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In addition to providing improved propeller efficiency, these geared
engines lend themselves particularly well to a streamline installation; and,
in this manner, improved propeller efficiency and decreased resistance com-
bine to offer important advantages in airplane performance.
The 500 h.p. engine has also been built in the inverted type and, as men-
tioned previously, an inverted engine has many advantages for aircraft
use. It is entirely possible that the future will see the inverted engine as
one of the standard types. A side view and a rear end view of the inverted
model 1500 engine is shown in Fig. 7.
An inverted engine, when used in airplanes, possesses four major ad-
vantages. First, in the usual type of single-engine tractor airplane, the
pilot's vision straight ahead is seriously obscured by the cylinders and
cowling of either a V-type or a large radial-type engine. He is practically
compelled to swing the airplane from its true course to obtain a view along
the normal line of flight. It is unthinkable that poor vision dead ahead,
such as this, will be tolerated when the air is as full of airplanes as we expect
it to be in the future. Collisions in the air, even today, are far more
numerous than would be the case if poor visibility conditions did not exist.
With an inverted engine, as shown in Fig. 14, the cowling in front of the
pilot can be made to slope to meet the line of the propeller hub spinner; in
this way, favorable vision can be secured.
The second major advantage of the inverted engine lies in the high center
of thrust that ensures better flying qualities, in that it offsets the tendency of
the airplane to climb when full power is on. The additional propeller tip
clearance is also desirable from a consideration of taxiing over rough ground
and, in some cases, removes the limitation on the diameter of the propeller
that would otherwise exist.
A third point in favor of the inverted engine is its accessibility to a
mechanic working on the ground. If the engine mounting is properly
designed and the cowling suitably arranged, the engine can be readily
worked on from the ground without the necessity for stepladders and other
equipment. Furthermore, the crankcase covers can be removed and the
bearings examined, should this be desirable.
The fourth point in favor of the inverted engine has regard to the lo-
cation of the carburetors that, in many installations, will allow gravity fuel
feed and will avoid the use of complicated piping and pumping arrange-
ments. The fire risk is also diminished to a certain extent with this ar-
rangement, for gasoline leaks are confined to the extreme bottom of the
installation, and covering the whole exterior of the engine with gasoline, as
is normally the case, is not possible.
MERCHANT MARINE
Shipowners' Plan for Solution of Merchant Marine Problems
The Nautical Gasette, 16 May, 1925.-After a conference, which lasted
two weeks, the American Steamship Owners' Association, Pacific American
Steamship Association and Shipowners' Association of the Pacific have
drawn up a report and list of recommendations for the development of an
American merchant marine.
The associations are the opinion that further efforts along the lines fol-
lowed in the past will not only fail to place American shipping on a
successful and permanent basis, so as to fulfill the objects of a merchant
marine, but, instead, the hope of ever having a privately owned merchant
marine, adequate for national requirements, will be destroyed. The mistakes
of the past are not without remedy, however, and the associations believe
that if the problem is taken in hand in a businesslike way a merchant marine
adequate for all necessary purposes of national defense and trade can be


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1925)
1295
Professional Notes
established and carried on under private ownership at a far less cost to
the government than at present. The report states that this cannot be
done by the private owner unaided, however, due to existing differentials in
fixed charges and cost of operation, upkeep and overhead, as compared
with those of foreign competitors, and if aids are not granted, the United
States, in due course, will not have a merchant marine of any marked im-
portance in foreign trade. The items of higher cost in the ownership and
operation of American ships in foreign trade are given by the associations
as follows:
(a) Greater capital investments due to higher shipbuilding costs in the
United States, with resultant larger interest charges, higher depreciation and
increased insurance premiums
(b) Larger crews and higher wages in respect to both officers and crews.
(c) More expensive food scale for both officers and crew than required
by foreign nations.
(d) Fifty per cent duty on repairs made in foreign ports and higher
cost of repairs made in American ports.
(e) Unnecessarily burdensome and expensive inspection laws.
(f) Numerous pay-day demands and provisions in the laws making it
difficult to enforce discipline in foreign ports, and resulting in delays from
dissipation and insubordination.
(g) Government fines, resulting from smuggling aliens, liquors and nar-
cotics, despite every effort by shipowners to prevent them.
(h) Greater costs of equipment and supplies.
(i) Unfair admeasurement rules, resulting in increased Panama Canal
tolls and port charges based on the tonnage of American ships.
(j) Higher costs of overhead due to higher standard of wages in the
United States.
The associations state that the time has come when there must be a re-
constitution of the membership and the functions of the Shipping Board, as
experience has shown that it is unwise to have vested in the same body the
functions and duties of making and enforcing such regulations as are
necessary for the promotion of shipping generally, and those of operating
the government's ships and liquidating the government out of the shipping
business. It follows that the body vested with the power of regulation need
not be large, but, on the contrary, a smaller body, composed of men who
know the needs of shipping, will function more efficiently.
Accordingly it is recommended :
(1) That the United States Shipping Board be reduced to three members,
to be appointed by the President without regard to political or geographical
considerations, but with special regard to their business qualifications, one of
whom shall have had commercial shipping experience.
(2) That the Shipping Board so constituted be vested with such regula-
tory powers as are necessary to the promotion of an American merchant
marine, similar to those regulatory powers conferred upon the Shipping
Board by “The Shipping Act, 1916.'
The report avers that the government should be liquidated out of the
shipping business as rapidly as possible, and that this can best be accom-
plished by vesting the liquidating duties and authority in the Fleet Cor-
poration, under the control of the Secretary of Commerce, or a newly con-
stituted Department of Marine. In regard to this the associations
recommend :
(1) That the Emergency Fleet Corporation, either in present or modified
form, be continued in existence as an agency of the government to liquidate
the government out of the shipping business at the earliest possible moment.


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(2) That the control of the Fleet Corporation be vested in the Secretary
of Commerce, or in a newly constituted Department of Marine, through a
transfer of the stock of the Fleet Corporation.
(3) That the Fleet Corporation proceed to a complete liquidation of the
government out of the shipping business as rapidly as possible, disposing of
the ships on such terms and conditions as will help to maintain them in
successful operation.
(4) That pending complete liquidation, the Fleet Corporation be given
supervision over the operation of those services that are found to be
essential to national defense and the promotion of foreign trade.
The associations believe that no service should be maintained regardless
of loss, but that a service should be operated only if the benefits derived
therefrom in promoting trade are commensurate with the cost to the
government. This, however, does not apply to any service the maintenance
of which is justified as a matter of national defense.
Regarding the determination of the services essential to the country's
welfare, hereafter to be maintained, it is recommended:
(1) That the Secretary of Commerce, Postmaster General, Secretary of
the Navy, Director of the Budget, and an American citizen experienced in
shipping, appointed by the President, be created a special agency to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the services to be carried on by combination
passenger and cargo ships, which are essential to national defense and the
promotion of foreign trade.
(2) That the Secretary of Commerce, Postmaster General, Secretary of
the Navy, Director of the Budget, Chairman of the Shipping Board, and
two American citizens experienced in shipping, appointed by the President,
be created a special agency to determine the type and amount of cargo
tonnage required in the services to be carried on by cargo ships, which are
essential to national defense and the promotion of foreign trade.
The report states that while direct aid should be given to those ships
which require it to be made commercially operative in essential services by
private owners, if the country is to have a successful merchant marine, it
is not believed that such aid should necessarily be unifornt to all ships. On
the contrary, it should only be given to ships in the respective trades to the
extent necessary to make their operations in any given trade, taken as a
group, commercially successful. Any flat rate of payment, such as a fixed
sum per month for men employed on the ships, or for mileage made, or
cargo carried, or based solely on the speed or tonnage of ships, would not
accomplish in all cases the desired results. Accordingly, the associations
recommend that the special agency created to determine the necessary
combination passenger and cargo services be vested with authority to fix the
amount of mail payments to be made to the owners of the ships in order
that they may be operated on a successful basis, and that the agency created
to determine the necessary cargo services be authorized to fix the amount
of compensation to be paid to the owners of these ships in order to ensure
successful commercial operation.
The report then takes up the question of indirect aids, under which are
listed changes in the Seamen's Act, navigation laws and immigration laws,
repeal of duties on ship repairs, reduction in Panama Canal tolls, exten-
sion of coastwise laws to the Philippines and island possessions of the
United States, elimination of government competition, and the coordination
of governmental departments.
In regard to the Seamen's Act, the associations recommend that it be
amended so as to provide that the master of a vessel will not be required to
pay wages to any seaman in a foreign port, if the head of the department in
which the seaman is employed reports to the master, and signs an entry in


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Professional Notes
the ship's log to the effect that the seaman came on board at the last port
at which the ship touched in an intoxicated or doped condition, or was found
to have liquor or narcotics in his possession on board ship. Among other
changes recommended in the report are the provisions of the act requiring
the division of seamen into two watches, and firemen, and so forth, into
three watches be made applicable to vessels of 300 tons or more, instead of
100 tons and upwards, and that the crew may be used for the ordinary work
incident to the upkeep, sailing and management of the vessel. It is also
recommended that the provision for a complaint in writing that the vessel
is unsuitable to go to sea, be deleted, and that the determination of the
seaworthiness of vessels be left to the United States Steamboat Inspection
Service and the American Bureau of Shipping.
The associations suggest changes in the navigation laws in the respects
recommended in their reports previously made to the Shipping Board on
this subject. In regard to the immigration law, the report recommends that
it be amended so as to harmonize with the Seamen's Act, and that the
regulations of the Immigration Service be revised so as to be uniformly
applied in all ports in the United States. Concerning duties on repairs in
foreign ports, it is proposed that Section 466 of the Tariff Act of 1922,
which imposes a duty of fifty per cent on repairs to American ships made in
foreign yards, be repealed.
In regard to Panama Canal tolls, the associations suggest that the Panama
Canal Act be amended so that the admeasurement laws and the rules pro-
mulgated for the enforcement of same will not place American ships at a
disadvantage with foreign ships; that tolls be adjusted on partially loaded
ships; that the canal be kept open for the passage of vessels at all hours of
the day and night, except when it is in a condition as to render navigation
unduly hazardous, and that the act be further amended so as to provide that
no tolls shall be levied upon vessels passing through the canal, engaged in
the intercoastal trade of the United States.
In reference to the extension of the coastwise laws of the United States
to trade with the Philippines and other island possessions, as provided for in
Section 21 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, the associations propose that
representation be made to the President of the desirability of fixing a date
for the going into effect of such coastwise laws, as soon as the President
deems it expedient.
In regard to the elimination of government competition, it is recom-
mended that the government should retire from the shipping business now
carried on by the Panama Railroad Steamship Company between ports of the
United States, Panama and the Canal Zone, and that all government officials
and employees should preferentially travel, and all government cargo should
be carried, in privately owned American ships.
It is suggested in the report in connection with the establishment of a
Naval Reserve, that there be maintained under the supervision of the
Secretary of Commerce seven sailing school ships, with auxiliary power, to
train young men for the merchant service, and that men honorably dis-
charged from the navy, after sufficient service in the deck and engine room
departments to enable them to pass examinations for licenses as third
officers or as third assistant engineers, shall be entitled immediately to re-
ceive such licenses, and that A.B. certificates shall be issued to all navy
men immediately upon honorable discharge from the naval service. It is
further recommended that the personnel on American ships be reduced to
a parity with the requirements of the other principal nations,
In regard to inspections, it is proposed that the laws and regulations
governing the organization of the Inspection Service and the inspection of
steam vessels be revised in accordance with the recommendations previously
made to the Shipping Board in this connection. Concerning quarantine


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regulations, the associations suggest that quarantine stations be established
at all the principal ports of the United States and its possessions, or, where
this is not practicable, that fumigation by competent private companies be
accepted.
Other features of the recommendations of the associations involve more
liberal allowances for depreciation of ships; freedom of transfer of ships to
foreign registry, except in national emergency; enactment of a compensation
act for ship workers, and adoption of continuous discharge books by the
federal government.
The shipowners' associations favor the maintenance of "the time-honored
policy of reserving the coastwise trade to American citizens and American-
built vessels," and ask that for the special encouragement of the inter-
coastal trade the United States mails, now carried in foreign-flag ships to
and from the Panama Canal, be reserved to American intercoastal steamers,
so far as practicable. International recognition of classification societies is
emphasized as desirable, and the shipowners approve an investigation of
deepening the New York barge canal, as an aid to American foreign
commerce.
As to the government's laid-up ships, the shipowners urge that those
vessels having no present or prospective value be sold for scrapping in the
United States or abroad, and that the better vessels of the laid-up fleet
be preserved until they can be sold to American citizens.All present
Shipping Board services that are deemed essential either to the promotion of
commerce or to the national defense, the shipowners insist, should be
operated by American citizens, "preferably those who have had the courage
to invest their money in the shipping business," and who have a capacity and
willingness to buy the ships operated as soon as possible.
National Merchant Marine Policy
By Cary W. Cook, The Nautical Gazette, 27 May, 1925.--It is necessary
for the national defense that the United States shall have a merchant
marine service sufficient to carry all of its domestic commerce and serve
as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency.
It is desirable for the national defense that the United States shall have
upon the major trade routes between United States ports and foreign ports
combination passenger and freight lines with vessels of sufficient speed to
enable them to effectively compete with foreign lines in the carriage of the
mails and to serve as troop transports in time of war. Such ships to be
compensated by liberal mail subventions. Any other form of aid, whether
in form of cash subsidy, discriminating duties, free Canal tolls, or the like,
inevitably and invariably leads to a dependence on federal paternalism in
a field where individual courage and independence are demanded and should
not be granted.
It has been found by some of our large industries desirable to own their
own cargo vessels in the foreign trade, and this should be encouraged.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to encourage
the maintenance by private owners of such a merchant marine, assuring to
owners freedom from regulation or competition, direct or indirect, by the
government. It is recognized that to maintain and expand a merchant marine
the art of shipbuilding shall not be lost or impaired and that American ship-
yards must be encouraged to maintain themselves in a position to again
rapidly expand to meet any national emergency. To that end no vessels
except those wholly built and equipped ready for sea in American yards
shall be permitted to trade between ports of the United States except the
trade between United States ports and the Philippine Islands.


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Professional Notes
Except in time of war or national emergency, there shall be no re-
strictions upon
Building for foreign owners.
Sale of American ships abroad.
Selling securities of shipowners or shipbuilders abroad as long as the
management through ownership of a majority of the capital stock of
building and owning corporations is in the hands of American citizens.
If under laws passed or to be passed in furtherance of the above declared
policy, American shipowners enter the foreign trade with purely cargo
vessels, they will be encouraged as far as consistent with the proper growth
of our foreign trade; but it must be recognized that ships alone do not
make foreign commerce, and sentimental regard for American ships in the
placing the exporters of our surplus in position to cultivate the friendship
of foreign buyers, themselves shipowners, and to take advantage of as low
freight rates as our competitors enjoy through free competition of foreign
foreign trade must not interfere with the more important consideration of
ships.
Foreign Trade of the United States in 1924
Nautical Gazette, 23 May, 1925.-American export trade, which has been
steadily increasing since 1921, continued its upward course in 1924 with a
gain of 10.2 per cent over the previous year, according to an analysis of
this country's foreign trade for last year made by the Foreign Commerce
Department of the chamber of Commerce of the United States. .
Last year's total exports, amounting to $4,591,000,000, were even higher
than those for 1921, a year in which the post-war value still influenced
foreign trade figures, the department says. The increase over 1923 was
$423,000,000.
It is shown in the department's report that in 1923 the value of our
exports was only ten per cent greater than that of our imports, but in 1924
exports outdistanced imports by twenty-seven per cent, the favorable balance
of trade in 1924 being $980,000,000, or more than two and one-half times
the 1923 balance. With an excess of imports of gold and silver amounting
to $222,000,000, our visible favorable balance of trade, which includes both
merchandise and gold and silver, amounted to $758,000,000.
The ten principal commodities in our export trade in 1924, representing
nearly half the total exports, were raw cotton, wheat, automobiles, gasoline
and naphtha, leaf tobacco, refined copper, lard, coal and coke, wheat flour,
and kerosene. Of these ten only two, lard and coal, fell below their 1923
total. All the others made increases ranging from four to 104 per cent.
The value of raw cotton exports, which accounted for more than one-fifth
of our total exports, totalled $951,000,000, or about eighteen per cent higher
than in 1923. The amount of cotton shipped abroad last year was
3,483,000,000 pounds, twenty-seven per cent larger than in the preceding year.
The dominant position of cotton in our exports is marked. Cotton out-
distanced wheat, second leader, by more than $700,000,000, the export value
of wheat being $237,000,000, or double its value in 1923, when it occupied
seventh place among the exports. During 1924, we shipped abroad
166,000,000 bushels of wheat, sixty-nine per cent more than in 1923 and
three times as much as before the war.
For a good many commodities the year 1924 was a record year in the
export trade of the United States. More crude and refined petroleum was
shipped out of this country last year than ever before--4,662,000,000 gallons
topping the previous high-water mark of 1923 by seventeen per cent. The
value. $418,482,000, was high-being exceeded only by the inflated values of


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1920. Exports of gasoline and naphtha in 1924 totaled 1,180,000,000 gallons,
or forty-one per cent larger than the old 1923 record. The value was not
as large as the 1920 figure. Gas and fuel oil exports were also well above
the billion-gallon mark, reaching 1,438,000,000 gallons, or seventeen per cent
above the previous record, set in 1923. The value was topped in both 1918
and 1920. Kerosene exports amounting to 012,829,000 gallons were the
greatest since 1919. The amount of lubricating oil exported last year,
379,948,000 gallons, has been exceeded only once, in 1920. Exports of crude
petroleum in 1924 totaled 742,135,000 gallons, or about four per cent greater
than the previous record shipments of 1923. The value, $26,586,000 was
exceeded only in 1920. The exports of paraffin wax, 382,820,000 pounds,
have been topped only once, in 1915.
Machinery, vehicles and metals exports also shared in the high figures
of 1924. A new record was set by the exports of agricultural machinery
and impliments, the total value in 1924, $59.974,000, exceeding even the
1920 record, which was made during a period of exceptionally high prices.
The greatest number of typewriters exported, 270,000, since quantity data
became available in 1922, were shipped abroad last year. The abnormal
values of both 1919 and 1920, however, were higher than the 1924 figure.
The exports of adding and calculating machines, totaling 24.993 machines
valued at $5,965,000, have been surpassed only twice, in 1919 and 1920.
The greatest number of automobiles ever exported in one year, 178,883,
were sent abroad in 1924. The quantity topped the previous record of
171,644, made in 1920, though the 1924 value, $131,923,000, was considerably
smaller. The 974,47 tons of iron and steel scraps exported in 1924, as well
as the value, $1,528,000, were exceeded only in 1920. The value of cutlery
exports, $9,529,000, has been surpassed twice only, in 1919 and 1920.
Seven years ago, in 1917, refined copper exports topped the billion-pound
inark. Again, in 1924, was this mark passed, with a total of 1,009,000,000
pounds. The value, $138,298,000, was the largest since 1918.
Logs and timber exports in 1924, 368,000,000 board feet, valued at
$27,500,000 were far greater in both quantity and value than those of any
other year since quantity statistics became available in 1912. The volume
of lumber (boards, planks and scantlings) exported last year, nearly
2,000,000,000 board feet, was surpassed only in three years, 1911, 1912 and
1913.
Record shipments of a number of foodstuffs were also recorded in 1924.
More apples were sent abroad in 1924 than ever before--6,719,000 boxes
and 1.881,000 barrels. Their value was $24,287,000, also a new mark.
Record exports were noted in oranges--2,564,000 boxes, valued at $8,685,000
--new high marks in both quantity and value.
A few import records were made in 1924. A greater amount of standard
newsprint paper, 2,714,000,000 pounds at the highest value, $101,000,000, was
imported in 1924 than in any other year. The quantity was about four per
cent greater and the value three per cent higher than the previous record
imports of 1923.
Record imports of bananas were also made last year--47,384,000 bunches,
valued at $22,074,000-exceeding the previous quantity record of 46,640,000
bunches made in 1914 and the previous high value of $19,739,000 set in
1913. Imports of olives last year mounted to 8,093,000 gallons, twenty-one
per cent greater than the previous high mark set in 1916. The value,
$5,090,000, also was slightly higher than the old record of 1920. This
country also imported more figs than ever before, 42,465,000 pounds.
The amount of cane sugar imported in 1924, 8,272,000,000 pounds, was
exceeded only by the liuge imports of 1922, when 9,722,000,000 pounds were
received.


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A marked slowing-up of imports as a whole, however, was apparent
throughout the year 1924. The total imports amounted to $3,611,000,000,
a decline of $182,000,000, or about five per cent from the 1923 total. Only
two main import groups made gains over 1923. Crude foodstuffs increased
three per cent in value, and the petroleum-coal-glass group increased three-
tenths of one per cent.
Seven countries--Great Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Cuba
and Italy—purchased nearly two-thirds of American exports in 1924, nearly
$3,000,000,000 worth. These seven countries in recent years have invariably
been found among the country's ten leading customers, with the single
exception of Germany from 1915, through 1919. In 1924 thirty-five countries
each purchased more than $10,000,000 worth of American merchandise-
ninety-six per cent of all shipped abroad-the eighty-odd markets in the
rest of the world taking only four per cent of America's total exports.
Only six of the thirty-five leading nations-Canada, Japan, Sweden,
Norway, Hongkong and Haiti-bought less from us in 1924 than in 1923,
the increases among the twenty-nine others ranging to as high as six times
the 1923 figures.
Among our chief sources of supply, ten countries furnished us with
two thirds of our imports. In order of importance these ten leaders are
Canada, Cuba, Japan, Great Britain, Brazil, Mexico, Straits Settlements,
France, Germany and China.
Chairman ('Connor's Plan to Overcome W’age Differential by
Creation of Merchant Marine Reserve
The Nautical Gazette, 9 May, 1925.--Chairman O'Connor of the Shipping
Board has prepared a new plan for financial aid from the United States
Treasury to privately owned American vessels in foreign trade. The plan,
which will be the major feature of the shipping policy recommendations
which the chairman will make to the next Congress, contemplates the
establishment of a merchant marine reserve in which American seamen who
are to serve on American vessels in the foreign trade will be enlisted. Sea-
men in this reserve will receive from the government a monthly retainer so
long as they are employed on American vessels.
In explaining his plan Chairman O'Connor said:
"High wages constitute the real differential against American vessels in
foreign competitive trade. No nation ever had a real merchant marine that
was not manned by its nationals. An American merchant marine to be
effective as a means of national defense must be manned by American
citizens. American ingenuity will overcome any other difficulties.
"There is no incentive for the private owner, however, to employ
American citizens when for his purpose he can get foreign labor at a lower
wage. On the other hand, the government does receive a tremendous
benefit by having the vessels American manned.
"I favor legislation which will provide for the establishment of a
merchant marine reserve, whereby the government will pay to American
seamen enlisted in the reserve and who serve on American vessels a monthly
retainer.
"This retainer, besides insuring Americans on American vessels, will act
as an aid to American shipowners by absorbing the wage differential between
American and foreign wages, and this will tend to promote the transfer of
the government vessels to private American hands for operation.
"With an ultimate number of 15,000 reservists as a maximum less than
$2,000,000 would be required for the first year, and not more than $6,000,000
approximately would be needed to maintain this reserve when the maximum
number of vessels are in private hands.


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"This maximum figure of $6,000,000 would represent the aid which the
U. S. Treasury would contribute towards the Merchant Marine for which
we would receive a guarantee of American manned, privately operated
vessels so necessary for national defense and for commercial purposes."
Discussing the subject further, Chairman O'Connor said:.
"We as a nation are committed to the policy of individual ownership in
business enterprise. We do not want the government in any business if that
business can be taken over by men who will run it with care, industry, and
economy generally used by a person who is spending his own money. I, like
the majority of our people, am flat-footed in favor of private ownership and
private operation, but neither my opinion nor that of the public is going
to induce a man to buy a ship and go to sea. You can “Resolve" that an
American ship is a good thing, but you cannot “Whereas” a man into
buying a ship.
“The Shipping Board has six hundred ships which are available or can
be made available for foreign trade. All of these ships are for sale at
bargain prices.
"For every ship that an American citizen buys he will require a crew of
forty men. I am using top figures. To each of these men he will have to
pay twenty dollars more a month than is paid to a man doing the same kind
of work on a foreign ship. I am still using top figures. For a crew of
forty men he has to pay $9,600 more per year than is paid for labor on a
foreign ship. My plan is that when a man buys one of our ships and
operates it in foreign trade he shall be entitled to get out of the United
States Treasury twenty dollars per month for each man in his crew. The
sailor employed, however, must be an American citizen. The entire crew
must be American. Any sailor who ships shall receive no part of this
twenty dollars per month until he has completed a round trip. This plan, if
adopted, will practically put the American fleet on a fighting basis with
foreign competition.
"I have shown how to get at the figures, but the public is interested in
lump sums. How much is it worth in cash to the Cnited States of America
to have a cargo-carrying Acet of a size in all parts of the world, manned
by American men whose experience is available to the United States in
any and all emergencies? It will cost us in bonuses to American labor
on the oceans $960,000 dolllars for each one hundred vessels which we are
able to put into private hands.
"If we sell all of our ships to private operators, which in the course of
time we would hope to do, it would cost us less than $6,000,000.
"If the United States Government wants a permanent American merchant
marine—and we have said that we do want it-they can have it at the cost
above mentioned.”
Shipowners are of the opinion that such aid should come from the Navy
Department instead of through the Treasury Department, as suggested by
Mr. O'Connor, because the matter has to do with national defense. It is
recalled that the Navy Department had a bill introduced in Congress last
year along this line, and it is expected that renewed efforts will be made to
have the matter brought up again before the new Congress.
It is pointed out by shipowners that Great Britain, in addition to provid-
ing a naval retainer for both officers and men, pays allowances to certain
ships. One of these, the Mauretania, has an allowance of $700,000 a year
as an auxiliary cruiser. In France no retainer is paid to the men, as they
are subject to compulsory military service.


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Professional Notes
MISCELLANEOUS
The Dutch East Indies; Projects for Defense
By Hector C. Bywater, The Baltimore Sun, 25 May, 1925.---London,
May 8.-One of the richest domains on earth is that comprised in the East
Indian Archipelago, the "spice islands" sought by Columbus, Vasco da Gama
and other doughty navigators of old. Thoroughly developed, the natural
resources of this region might prove of fabulous value. Even as it is they
yield rich dividends.
Two thirds of this vast territory, with all its actual and unexploited
wealth, is owned by Holland-a state of minor military importance, whose
home population numbers barely 7,000,000 souls and whose European fron-
tiers inclose no more than 12,600 square miles—yet for centuries this small
nation has ruled over Eastern dominions exceeding 735,000 square miles,
inhabited by 47,000,000 people.
It is surely a notable circumstance that amidst all the predatory wars of
the past, waged by great military powers obsessed with the land hunger, so
comparatively feeble a state should have been left in undisturbed possession
of these fertile islands.
Though by no means intensively cultivated, Java, Sumatra and Celebes
already produce a large surplus of commodities for which there is a great
and ever-growing demand.
Prospectors declare that the mineral deposits have scarcely been scratched,
yet the yearly exports of coal, tin and other minerals are considerable, and
the annual output of petroleum has almost reached two million tons.
Improved methods of cultivation would, it is estimated, double or treble the
present crops of rice, maize, soya beans, coffee, tea, sugar and rubber.
There are, however, special reasons for the immunity which Holland has
enjoyed in respect of her Eastern empire, and the much-abused "balance of
power" is mainly responsible. An attempt by any one of the great powers
to acquire the Dutch islands of the archipelago either by conquest or pur-
chase would probably be resisted by rival states, less on account of the
material wealth of the territory than because of its high strategical value.
To this fact must be ascribed the long-continued integrity of the Nether-
lands' East Indies, unless we admit that certain rough rules of honesty and
ethics still govern the world's political affairsa thesis somewhat discredited
nowadays.
Since Holland is absolutely dependent on these colonies for her economic,
and, therefore, her political, existence, it is not surprising that she should
be seized at times with nervous fears for their safety.
There was one period of the pre-war era at which Germany was suspected
of having designs upon them, but that peril, if it ever existed, has receded
into the background. Relief was openly expressed in Holland when the
former German lands in and about New Guinea were alloted to Britain
under the Versailles mandate.
Japan has since come to occupy Germany's place as the potential invader,
though it cannot be said that the Japanese, either by word or deed, have
given the least hint of any such intention. This notwithstanding many people
in Holland are convinced that Japan is turning covetous eyes on the East
Indies, both as an outlet for her surplus population and as a source of those
foods and mineral supplies which her own territory is no longer able to
furnish in the volume required.
The Dutch attitude on this matter is logical enough. Pointing out that
Great Britain, though a former ally of Japan's is building an expensive
naval base at Singapore for the protection of Australasia, they remind you
that their own eastern colonies offer a more tempting and a more accessible
prize to the Japanese.


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The East Indies contain everything that Japan needs in the way of
supplies, comestible and industrial. Strategically they would be worth more
to her than Australia, and while the subjugation of a continent is a task
irom which she might well shrink-involving as it would a desperate
struggle against the whole might of the British Empire-neither the military
nor the diplomatic obstacles in the way of acquiring the Dutch islands would
necessarily prove' insurniountable.
In any case, they add, it is unthinkable that Japan would conquer
Australia and leave the nearer Dutch islands unmolested.
And so it followed that the Dutch have always taken an intense interest
in the Singapore scheme. Nowhere was chagrin more openly expressed than
in Holland when the British Labor Government turned the project down last
year. Now that work is to be resumed on the Singapore base the merchants
of Rotterdam doubtless sleep better o'nights, soothed by the reflection that
the long arm of the British Navy will effectively shield their opulent
colonies from would-be aggressors.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Singapore scheme evokes more en-
thusiasm in Holland than in England, perhaps because Holland stands to
benefit from it without sharing the cost.
On the other hand, she is not prepared to intrust the defense of her
oversea empire entirely to foreigners. Local combatant forces of con-
siderable strength are being organized, though the large naval program
introduced for this purpose a few years ago was rejected by the Dutch
Parliament.
Practically every new warship is dispatched, on completion, to the East
Indies, where the bulk of the Netherlands navy is permanently stationed.
Reliance is placed chiefly on submarines, minelayers and aircraft, supported
by a few swift cruisers. The East Indies submarine flotilla will eventually
number sixteen boats.
Dutch colonials take a pessimistic view of the Far Eastern situation.
Believing that Japan will soon be driven by sheer economic stress to extend
her boundaries, they foresee a great conflict in the Pacific, with the Dutch
islands playing an important role.
Their situation athwart the trade routes between Europe and East Asia
is such as to invest them with a strategic value of the first order. Neither
Britain nor America, it is held, could afford to stand aside if Japan sought
to lay violent hands on the archipelago. Holland thus reckons on finding
powerful allies if her colonies are ever menaced. Their very existence
increases her danger of being drawn into war.
"In the opening stage of war," writes a Dutch naval critic, "there would
be a desperate race to get possession of Java and Celebes, and here is
explained the seeming paradox that the Indies can be held permanently only
with the aid of an ally, and yet must be able by their own strength to repulse
the initial attack. Only in this way can we be sure that the help tendered
by an ally would not arrive too late."
A glance at the map reveals the soundness of this argument. If Celebes
or Dutch Borneo became Japanese, America's hold on the Philippines would
be rendered more precarious even than it is today. With Japanese naval
bases in Java, Singapore would be outflanked and the defense of Australia
made infinitely more difficult.
The contingencies foreshadowed may never materialize, but that they
are not wholly impossible is proved by Holland's action in spending large
sums to strengthen the defenses of her East Indian colonies.


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Professional Notes
Some Aspects of Education
The Engineer, 17 April, 1925.–At the annual meetings of the Association
of Technical Institutions on Friday and Saturday, March 6-7, it was resolved
that a conference should be called to consider the relationship between
technical education and industries. We may assume from a knowledge of
the constitution of the association and from consideration of some of the
speeches and papers that the schools in the mind of the association were those
that are fed from the primary and secondary schools directly administered
by the board of education, and not the more scientific colleges and univer-
sities. Possibly we might differentiate broadly between the two by describ-
ing one as technological and the other as technical, the former teaching
more technology and craftsmanship than science, the latter more science
than technology. The boundary is ill-defined and fortunately in this con-
nection is of relatively little importance. The important thing is that the
association recognizes that the time has come when the position of technical
education ought to be reviewed. We are very heartily in accord with that
view, and trust that whilst the association is paying attention to that class
of education in which it is mainly interested, the position of the technical
education and training of those engineers who follow a rather more scientific
course, as affected by the progress of engineering since the last conference
was held, now some fourteen years ago, will not be forgotten.
In the course of recent inquiries we have noticed with the greatest
pleasure the growth of the belief that technical and scientific education
must do more for the student than merely provicie him with the tools of
his vocation. There are even, we are glad to say, those who hold that a
scientific education may be as “liberal" as the classical education of our
grandfathers, that it may open and broaden the mind and add that refine-
ment of feeling without which education can never become cultivation.
It is on that aspect of the subject that we desire to place a few ideas before
our readers today. Several hours of leisure have already been added to
the week, and in succeeding years the hours of work will grow less and less,
and the hours when men have to employ themselves will increase. While
the manner in which the working hours are used will affect the material
welfare of the nation, the employment of the leisure hours, the hours outside
the factory and office, will affect the intellectual development and the content-
ment of the people. There was a time when emplovers boasted of living
for their work alone, and when the men, willy-nilly, had no time to think
of anything else. We have heard it said by experienced works managers
that shops were happier in those days. Their work meant more to the
men. It was not merely an incident in the twenty-four hours; they went
to bed with it, they woke up with it, they thought little else, and talked of
little else. It filled their lives and, generally speaking, a full life is a
happy life. Clearly, such a view has its limitations. The mechanic, proud
of his handicraft, the machinist rejoicing in his skill and in his knowledge
of the characteristics of the tool he operated, even the laborer "upon the
floor” who might be called upon at any moment to exercise his ingenuity,
might find a relish in an existence spent wholly in work; but there are
craits less enviable than these crafts in which work is physical drudgery,
dull soul-breaking routine from which the worst-spent leisure is a longed-
for relief. It is to be feared that in engineering we have added to the
latter. Manual skill is now reserved for the few, while for the many,
labor is a long monotony of repitition. Natural progress, on the one hand,
and trade union demarcation on the other, have between them prevented
that self-expression which gave interest to labor. It is not surprising,
therefore, that men look ever toward the reduction of hours and turn their
minds to occupations which will give some outlet to their workshop-stunted


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
personalities. While this motion is taking place amongst the men themselves,
it involves those immediately above them, the charge hands and foremen,
and spreads even, in many cases, to the managers and directors. Work
shorter hours in the shops and sooner or later shorter hours will be worked
in the offices. This course, as we have suggested, is not wholly to be de-
precated. The man who thinks of nothing but his immediate work is
generally a dull dog-unless the work itself happens to be of the broadest
nature—but not to think of work and to think of nothing else is worse
still. It is for that reason, we say, that the problem of the future is the
problem of leisure. For the solution of it, we must turn to education;
not vocational education alone, but to some form of education that will
broaden our interests, enlarge our imaginations, and bring us into harmony
with other men. That kind of education can, we believe, be given in
technical colleges if a bold change is effected in curricula. At the present
moment the attempt is made to teach too much. The student is required
to study intimately too many subjects. What we conceive to be desirable
is a very thorough grounding in certain selected subjects, and a broad
general knowledge of others. Give the student a thorough grasp of
principles, and if he cannot make use of them he will never, with all the
teaching of details in the world, shine in his profession. For example,
the mechanical engineer should be taught with the greatest completeness
the principles of mechanics and machinery, but his knowledge of physics,
sound, light and heat-thermo-dynamics excepted-and of electricity and of
chemistry need not be so intimate, and should be qualitative rather than
quantitative. In these subjects he would probably learn more that would be
useful to him from lectures such as Tyndall gave than from classroom work,
which requires him to do mathematical exercises in subjects with the princi-
ples of which his knowledge is far from intimate. By the employment of
some such differentiation, we might succeed in making men with broader
interests in science as a whole, while assuring ourselves that on a few
selected subjects they were more throrough than men now are.
Of course, as ever the examination is the bane of education. We all
know that as a test of real competence it fails hopelessly, and yet because
it is so difficult to find any practicable alternative, we have gone on
employing it and allowing it to intrude more and more into the training of
our youths. As long as it, in its present form, is the test of merit, technical
education will remain what it is, and great authorities will have to lament,
as one did to us only a few days ago, that not more than five per cent of
all the students were worth the money that had been spent on them. A
single good question would be a better test than the half-dozen or more that
are now set before the candidate. More could be learned of a student's
knowledge and mentality by asking him to “discuss the derivation of the
laws of moving bodies” than by a dozen mathematical puzzles; more of the
practical value of his mathematical knowledge by a single question on the
value of superheat or higher pressures or reheating, than by a score of set
exercises. However, such things are details; we may take it that the nature
of examinations will change when at length we admit the defects of the
present systein of technical education, and recognize that in the future we
must make broader, more cultivated, engineers than satisfied the needs of
the past.
The War Fleets of the Nations
Engineering, 17 April, 1925.—The annual return presented to Parliament,
entitled "Fleets (The British Empire and Foreign Countries)," is generally
worthy of close attention, for it shows almost at a glance the relative
strengths of the navies of the powers. It also indicates, by the numbers


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Professional Notes
and types of warships building and projected, the trend of naval opinion
in the different countries, and especially in the case when, as at present,
expenditure is very strictly limited in all countries, and only vessels con-
sidered most necessary are laid down. The reported intention of President
Coolidge to call another conference, for the consideration of further limita-
tion of naval armaments, renders the return for the present year of more
than ordinary interest, for the information it contains must form the basis
on which decisions are likely to be reached.
Events have moved so rapidly in these later times that it hardly seems
four years ago that the then President of the United States called a con-
ference of the powers, which resulted in the Washington Naval Treaty.
Yet such is the case, although the time taken in the necessary formalities
by which the Parliaments of the various countries endorsed the action of
their representatives at the conference postponed the effective date of the
treaty to August 23, 1923. It remains in force until the end of 1926, and in
the interval the signatory powers bind themselves to abide by its provisions.
It will be remembered that by the treaty, limits are placed on the tonnage
of individual units, on the largest caliber of gun mounted, and on the
total tonnage possessed by each nation, of both capital ships and aircraft
carriers, the two largest types of war vessels. The treaty by implication
also limits the tonnage of any light cruiser which may be constructed and
the caliber of its largest guns. Although some attempt was made at the
conference to limit the total tonnage of this type of warship, and also
that of submarines, no agreement was reached. Presumably the next con-
ference will reconsider these matters and endeavor to arrive at a satisfactory
result.
So far as capital ships are concerned, the treaty limits the standard
displacement to 35,000 tons per unit, the caliber of guns to 16 inches, and the
total tonnage to 525,000 tons each for the United States and the British
Empire, 315,000 for Japan, and 175,000 each for France and Italy, these
figures corresponding to ratios 15-9-5. For aircraft carriers the maximum
tonnage of a unit is 27,000 standard tons, the largest caliber of gun 8 inches,
and the total tonnage allocated to the United States and the British Empire
135,000 tons each, Japan 81,000, and France and Italy 60,000 tons each
The ratios are here 1-9-623, France and Italy obtaining a one-third larger
ratio for this type than for capital ships. Although 27,000 tons is the
maximum tonnage allowed, it was agreed by the conference that any of the
powers could build one or two carriers of 33,000 tons, provided the total
tonnage was not exceeded. This provision was included to meet the con-
venience of the United States, whose naval authorities, for reasons of
economy, desired to convert the battle cruisers Lexington and Saratoga,
of 33,000 tons displacement, to aircraft carriers. By Articles XI and XII
of the treaty no vessel exceeding 10,000 tons standard displacement, other
than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, or carrying a gun greater than
8-inch caliber, other than a capital ship, is to be laid down by any of the
signatory powers while the treaty remains in force. These two articles
thus fix the maximum displacement of light cruisers to 10,000 tons and the
largest gun carried in them to 8-inch. The standard displacement is very
nearly that of the ship fully completed, but without oil and fuel and reserve
feed water for boilers.
The provisions of the treaty outlined above are useful to remember when
studying the contents of the Parliamentary Return referred to at the outset.
A summary shows the numbers of completed vessels in the navies of the
powers, and the numbers under construction and projected. These are as
follows: British Empire, 467 and twenty; United States, 539 and forty-
four; Japan, 211 and sixty-seven; France, 219 and 126; Italy, 260 and fifty-
eight; Russia, 164 and thirty-five; and Germany, fifty-one and two. Judged


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
by completed numbers the British Empire takes second place to the United
States; for vessels under construction and projected it is last on the list,
except for Germany. Of the twenty British ships now being constructed
six were laid down during the war, two others are coastal motor boats.
If, however, the numbers of capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers,
flotilla leaders, destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines are taken, the
British Empire has 348 completed; the United States, 478; Japan, 192;
France, 126; and Italy, 193.
The return shows that in capital ships, the British Empire, United
States, and Japan have the numbers and individual ships agreed to at the
Washington Conference, but France has one less-the La France sunk by
striking a rock in August, 1922—and Italy three less, viz., the Leonardo da
Vince, Vittorio Emanuele and Regina Elena. It was stated at the time of
the La France's loss that she would be replaced by a new ship but no steps
have been taken to carry this into effect. The numbers of battleships in
the various navies are British Empire eighteen, United States eighteen,
Japan six, France nine, Italy seven, Russia three and Germany eight, while
the British Empire and Japan have each four battle cruisers. The capital
ships of the United States are of newer construction than those of other
powers, seven having been completed since 1917. Japan has three completed
since that year and the British Empire one, the Hood. The average age,
reckoned from the date of completion, of the United States capital ships
is eight years, compared with ten for the British Empire, eight and one-
half for Japan, twelve for France, and thirteen for Italy. The capital
ships of the British Empire carry altogether one hundred 15-inch and eighty-
eight 13/2-inch guns; those of the United States, twenty-four 16-inch,
one hundred and twenty-four 14-inch and forty-four 12-inch; those of
Japan sixteen 16-inch and eighty 14-inch; those of France thirty 13:4-inch
and forty-eight 12-inch, and those of Italy sixty-eight 12-inch and twenty-
four 8-inch guns. The battleships of the American fleet have a maximum
speed of 20%2 to 21 knots, of Japan 22"/2 to 23, of the British Empire 21
to 25, of France 1994 to 20, and of Italy 211/2 to 23 knots. The British
battle cruisers have speeds of over 30 knots and those of Japan 2772.
Only three capital ships are under construction at the present time, the
Nelson and Rodney laid down in 1922, and the Russian Demokratuga started
in 1914, but unlikely to be completed. When the two British battleships
are passed into commission, four of the older ships will be scrapped.
Of the battle cruiser type, the British Empire and Japan are the only
two powers which have examples. The Saratoga and Lexington laid
down in 1920 by the United States were designed as battle cruisers, but are
now being converted.
Dealing next with cruisers, the return shows that the British Empire
has forty-nine completed and eight building and projected. These figures
compare with thirty-one and nine for the United States, twenty-eight and
eleven for Japan, sixteen and nine for France, thirteen and five for Italy,
seven and seven for Russia, and eight and one for Germany. The eight
British cruisers building are the Emerald, Enterprise and Effingham, laid
down during the war, and five of the Kent class ordered last year. Of the
nine United States vessels, the Memphis was started in 1920, eight are
authorized, and money has been recently appropriated for two. Nine of
the Japanese vessels are building and two projected. France has five
cruisers laid down and four more are to be ordered before 1929, while
Italy has two building and three projected. The total tonnages (a) of
compelted cruisers, (b) of those which, have been completed fifteen years,


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Professional Notes
are now considered obsolete, and (c) of those building and projected are
given in the following table :
(6)
Nation
(a)
Completed
Tonnage,
Modern and
Obsolete
Building and
Projected
Tonnage
Obsolete
Tonnage
atc-b
British Empire.....
United States..
Japan.
France
Italy........
234,000
252,000
166,000
150,000
68,000
38,000
184,000
75,000
100,000
10,000
75,000 (?)
87,500
85,000
84,000
50,000
271,000
155,500
176,000
134,000
108,000
The displacement of the Kent class is not stated in the return, and in the
table is taken as 10,000, the maximum allowed and as shown for the latest
cruisers of all the other powers. Five each of the French and Italian
cruisers are surrendered German and Austrian vessels.
It is interesting to speculate on the direction in which the next Wash-
ington Conference, if held, will move in connection with cruiser tonnage.
If the 5-5-3 ratio adopted for capital ships and aircraft-carriers is suggested
and agreed to, there must result a great scrapping of British and Japanese
tonnage, or a large building program for the United States. On the other
hand, the British representatives may urge the ocean routes, which must be
protected to ensure an adequate food supply to this country, necessitate a
much larger ratio than to the United States and Japan, for which con-
ditions are different. The problem of arriving at a conclusion agreeable to
all promises to be a difficult one.
Of cruiser mine layers only one is referred to in the return, and this is
the British Adventure, laid down in 1922, but of which no details are given.
The British Empire is credited with the greatest number, eight, of air-
craft-carriers, all of which are recorded as built. The United States and
Japan have each two completed and two building, while France and Italy
have no vessels of the type built and only one each building. Of the total
of eighteen aircraft-carriers mentioned, only two, the Hermes and llosho,
were designed for the purpose, the remainder are converted vessels. The
eight of the British Empire are the Glorious, Courageus, Furious, Hermes,
Eagle, Argus, Pegasus and Ark Royal, the total tonnage being 114,000 tons.
Of these, the two first are under conversion, and until they are completed
the tonnage afioat will be 77,000, or rather over one half the amount allowed
by the treaty. The Wright and Langley, the two completed American
vessels, have a tonnage of 24,000 and a speed of 15 knots. With the
Saratoga and Lexington completed the total tonnage will be 90,000. The
Hosho and Wakamiya, of the Japanese Navy, are of 15,000 tons total, the
first named having a speed of 25 knots. The Akagi, a battle cruiser, and
the Kaga, a battleship, each of 27,000 tons are being converted to aircraft-
carriers. The French are converting the battleship Béarn, of 21,000 tons,
and the Italians a merchant ship of 5,000 tons for the same purpose. It is
evident the three strongest naval powers anticipate that the aircraft-carrier,
a type unknown at the outbreak of war in 1914, will play an important part
in future naval warfare.


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Interesting figures are given in relation to the torpedo craft-flotilla
leaders, destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines—of the various navies.
Flotilla leaders are a type first used in the British Navy, the earliest being
ordered just before the war. They are the leaders and flagships of the
torpedo flotillas, and for this reason are larger and faster than destroyers.
The British Empire has seventeen completed and one—the Keppell-laid
down in 1918 still under construction. The American and Japanese Navies
have no vessel of the type, and are not building or proposing to build any.
The French have one, a surrendered German vessel, and the Italians nine,
four being of small tonnage. The French naval authorities have, however,
adopted the type, are building six, and fifteen more are to be laid down
before 1929. Those under construction are powerful vessels of 2,360 tons
displacement, 50,000 horsepower, 3572 knots speed, with five 5.1-inch guns,
and six torpedo tubes. The largest British vessels are of 1,800 tons, 40,000
horsepower, 361/2 knots speed, with five 4.7-inch guns and two triple torpedo
tubes. Italy is building two of the type, of 2,200 tons each, 50,000 horse-
power, 35 knots speed, and eight 4.7-inch guns. In torpedo boat destroyers
the United States hold a big lead, 309 being completed and twelve projected.
The British Empire follows with 189 and two; while Japan has 101 com-
pleted and twenty-three building and projected. The corresponding numbers
for France are fifty-four and thirty-six, for Italy fifty-three and twenty-
four; and for Russia eighty and twenty-six. The total completed tonnages,
including flotilla leaders, are as follows: United States, 355,000 tons of
which by far the greater proportion have been completed since 1917; 15,000
tons have been completed over twelve years and are, therefore, considered
obsolete. The tonnage of the other powers are: British Empire, 234,000;
Japan, 88,000, including 9,500 obsolete; France, 41,000, 7,500 obsolete; and
Italy, 39,000, of which 2,700 is out of date. Japan has under construction
eight destroyers of 1,400 tons each, and fifteen others are authorized;
France has laid down eighteen of about 1,450 tons, and contemplates another
eighteen before 1929; Italy has eight under construction, and eight others
ordered.
The only navy possessing torpedo boats is Italy, which has sixty-eight
of these craft. No further vessels of the type are being constructed for the
Italian or other navies, and in view of this the designation of torpedo boat
destroyers is obsolete.
In submarines, the Unted States also hold a lead, nearly as pronounced
as for destroyers since 118 are completed and fifteen building and projected.
The corresponding figures for other nations are: Breat Britain, sixty-three
and four; Japan, fifty-one and twenty-eight; France, forty-six and fifty-
nine; and Italy, forty-three and twenty. The completed tonnages are:
United States, 80,000, of which 10,000 is stated to be for coast defense only;
the British Empire, 53,000; Japan, 30,000, including 1,700 obsolete having
been completed over ten years; France, 30,000, of which 1,700 is obsolete;
and Italy, 17,500.
Of the fifteen submarines building and projected by the United States,
three fleet submarines of 2,200 tons surface displacements, and three of 900
tions are under construction, five more of the former type are authorized
but not laid down, and four more are projected. Of the four building for
the British Empire two were laid down in 1918X1 in 1922 and Oi in
1924. Japan laid down eight of over 1,000 tons last year, four of a smaller
type are also building, and sixteen are authorized. France has embarked
on a very extensive submarine program, two of 1,360 tons, nine of 1,130,
and eighteen of 590 having been laid down since 1922. Two cruiser sub-
marines of 3,000 tons each, and thirty-four of ordinary type are to be
ordered before 1929, while three of 590 tons, termed second class, are to be


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Professional Notes
laid down each year. Italy has placed orders for twelve submarines, four
being of 1.300 tons, four of 800, and four of 780, and eight others are
projected. These figures show very clearly that large programs of sub-
marine construction are contemplated by nearly all the powers. .
Six other types of war vessels are included in the return: viz., coast
deiense vessels, sloops, coastal motor boats, gunboats, and despatch vessels,
river gunboats, and minesweepers. In all these classes, with the exception
of gunboats and despatch vessels, the British Empire leads in numbers. In
coast defense vessels the British have three, the only other being one
possessed by the United States. The British Navy has thirty-five sloops, and
the French eight; twenty-nine coastal motor boats, Japan and France two,
and Italy twelve; two gunboats and despatch vessels, and France forty-nine;
eighteen river gunboats, and Japan eight; sixty-two minesweepers, the
United States having forty-five, Japan three, France twenty-nine, and Italy
forty. In this last type which was shown to be very necessary by war
experience, are all relatively new vessels.
A close study of the contents of this Parliamentary Return leaves many
impressions, but amongst these the strongest are the marked superiority of
the American Navy in all types of war vessels, with the exception of
cruisers and aircraft carriers; the increasing importance of aeroplanes in
future naval operations expected by the three leading powers, but not
apparently by France and Italy; the activity in torpedo craft construction
by all the powers, with the exception of the British Empire, and the increas-
ing tonnage of individual units; and finally, the relatively small program of
British new construction. This last impression is undoubtedly a result of
financial stringency, a cause which appears to have little influence on new
construction in other countries.
CURRENT PROFESSIONAL NOTES AND PAPERS
"The Design of Merchant Ships," "Seaworthiness, Stability and Rolling,"
"The Strength of Ships," and other articles in The Annual Number of The
Shipbuilder, May, 1925.
"New Motor Liner Aorangi.” The Scientific American, June.
"The Gauging of Rivers and Tidal Currents." Engineering, May 15, 1925.
"Principles of Metallurgy of Ferrous Metals," and "A Chart for De-
termining the Weight of Moist Air." Mechanical Engineer, June, 1925.
“The Limiting Range of Airplanes." Aviation, May 25, 1925.
“The Air Requirements of the Army,” and “The Evolution of Artillery
in the Great War.” The Journal of the Royal Artillery, April, 1925.
"The Role of Malleable Cast Iron in Ordnance," and "Air Clarifiers."
Army Ordnance, March-April, 1925.
"The United States and Rigid Airships.” The Engineer, April 24, 1925.


  p. 1312 (#220)                      #

NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FROM MAY 7 TO JUNE 7
PREPARED BY
PROFESSOR ALLAN Westcott, U. S. Naval ACADEMY
• EUROPEAN DEBT NEGOTIATIONS
UNITED STATES REQUESTS SETTLEMENT.—In the third week of May the
American State Department acting through the United States ambassadors
in foreign capitols, and as a channel of transmission for the United States
debt Commission, suggested to the French, Italian, Belgium and other Euro-
pean governments in debt to the United States the desirability of appointing
debt funding commissions for the adjustment of these debts. This publicly
announced step had been preceded by informal conversations with France
and other powers.
The European nations who have funded their American debt, and those
who have not made such arrangements, are indicated by the following
lable expressed in millions of dollars (taken from Time, of 25 May):
UNFUNDED
FUNDED
France ... ..........$4,210 Great Britain ........$4.554
Italy ..
..... 2,138 Poland
.... 178
Belgium .....
Finland
Russia ......
225 Lithuania .....
Czecho-Slovakia
118 Hungary .........
Yugo-Slavia
Rumania ...
$4,749
Austria ......
Esthonia .....
Greece .......
Armenia ..
Latvia
$7.369
Total ........
.............$12,118
FRANCE CONSIDERS DEBT PROBLEM.-On May 15 it was announced that
the French Cabinet had delegated Foreign Minister Briand and Finance
Minister Caillaux to consult experts and create what would be in effect
a French funding committee to work out definite proposals to submit to
the United States. The present ministry in France thus manifested a serious
intention to reach a solution of the problem, which has already proved
embarrassing to France in matters of foreign policy. Suggestions have


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Notes on International Affairs
appeared to the effect that the British Government would not object to terms
to France more favorable than those accorded to Great Britain.
BELGIUM APPOINTS COMMISSION.—It was announced on May 30 that
the Belgian Government had appointed former Premier Theunis as chair-
man of the Belgian Debt Commission, and that the commission would
depart for the United States at an early date. In addition to her American
debt of $480,000,000, Belgium owes $503,000,000 to Great Britain and
$584,000,000 to France. Belgium contends that payment of her indebtedness
has been made contingent upon payments from Germany, but it is the view
of the United States authorities that such a correlation has not bcen
conceded.
EUROPEAN "SECURITY” NEGOTIATIONS
AGREEMENT BLOCKED OVER RHINE ZONE.-During May, Great Britain,
France and Germany continued to consider the possibilities of a tri-partite
security agreement. A compact which should include Germany was preferred
by a majority of the present British Ministry over an agreement between
Great Britain and France alone. Germany had already professed willing-
ness to guarantee the security of France's eastern frontier, provided Germany
was given promise of a possible rectification of her own eastern boundaries.
France, however, bound already by agreements with Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and other states of eastern Europe, found it difficult to enter into
an agreement which, while assuring her own safety, would leave her
powerless to interfere in behalf of her allies and would give Germany
virtually a free hand in eastern Europe. On the other hand, German
authorities characterized as "unbelievable” the demand of France for the
right to march across the Rhineland to aid her Polish and Czechoslovak
allies.
Specifically, France hesitated to agree that, as Germany proposed, the
neutralized strip along the Rhine should serve not only to secure France
from German attack, but also to secure Germany under all circumstances
against French action. The views of the French Government were set
forth in a note to Germany penned by M. Briand in the latter part of May.
GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONTIER.—A memorandum on British foreign
policy, prepared by the British Foreign Office last February and intended
only for presentation to the Cabinet, appeared in the press on May 2. In
this memorandum, the British Foreign Office frankly stated that "it may be
possible to revise by European agreement the dangerous conditions involved
in the Silesian Settlement and the Polish Corridor.” This statement indicated
not only a British tendency to recognize the validity of Germany's grievances
regarding her eastern boundaries, but also the menace to the peace of
Europe in this situation. The desire of Germany for a union with Austria,
however, met with the united opposition of both Great Britain and France.


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U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
GERMAN DISARMAMENT.-- In the midst of security negotiations, the
Allied powers agreed upon the terms of a note to Germany regarding her
non-fulfillment of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty,
and this note was transmitted on June 2. · The belief was expressed that
Germany would be able to carry on the requirements by next September,
and that evacuation of the Cologne area would then be possible. The note
called for dissolution of the German General Staff, dissolution of all secret
organizations, dismantling of former munitions factories in the Ruhr, and
demilitarization of the police.
The Reparations Commission reported on May 29 that Germany had
carried out the terms of the Dawes plan.
FRANCE
THE RIFF WAR.—During May it appeared clear that the hostilities
between French forces and the Riff tribes in Morrocco would be a long-
drawn-out affair. This is explained partly by the fact that France by inter-
national agreement is not permitted to carry hostilities within the Spanish
zone where the Riffs have their strongholds, and partly by the fact that the
political opposition of the socialist and Communist parties in France re-
strains the Government from an aggressive campaign. In these circum-
stances, and pending the arrival of reinforcements, General Lyauty estab-
lished a strong defensive line north of Fez. A special envoy was sent to
Spain to negotiate for Franco-Spanish cooperation and a stricter blockade on
munitions of war reaching the Riffs through the Spanish lines.
GERMANY
HINDENBURG INAUGURATED.-General von Hindenburg took oath of office
as President of the German Republic before the President of the Reichstag
at noon on May 12. On his entry into Berlin previous to his inauguration,
the president-elect was greeted by an immense throng estimated at 500,000
people. Following the ceremony of inauguration, the President reviewed
his guard of honor, composed of an honor company of his old regiment, the
Third Prussian Guards.
On May 20 the Reichstag supported the Luther Ministry by a confidence
vote of 214 to 129 in questions of internal policy.
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.—Berlin, 18 May.-Bitter criticism of the
Entente attitude toward Gerniany, especially regarding the continued non-
evacuation of the Cologne zone, was expressed with his customary vehemence
today by Foreign Minister Stresemann, in his long-awaited speech before
the Reichstag on German foreign policy.
The tone of Herr Stresemann's speech, which lasted more than an hour
and a half, was contained in the following statement:
"The dispute between the Entente and Germany does not hinge on the
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of this or that clause of the Versailles Treaty.
It hinges on the question of whether respect and equality can be denied for
an indefinite period to a cultured nation of 60,000,000 souls."
Referring to the question of Germany's eastern frontiers, which has so
agitated Europe recently, Herr Stresemann denied that Germany's proposals


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1925)
1315
Notes on International Affairs
implied any hostility toward Poland, or foreshadowed a German attempt to
alter the eastern frontiers by force, but he added that Germany never would
agree to the permanency of those frontiers. In conclusion, he emphasized
Germany's willingness to negotiate toward a solution of the pending
difficulties, adding, however, that all efforts must fail unless other nations
were inspired by the same honorable desires.
Referring to Germany's entry into the League of Nations, Herr Strese-
mann repeated what German spokesmen already have stated: viz., that a
disarmed Germany cannot undertake any warlike move such as would be
possible to nations which have not disarmed. This German view has not
been taken into account at Geneva by the League's Council, he said.
Herr Stresemann then reiterated the German Government's intention to
carry out the Dawes plan. So far, Germany has fulfilled all of her obliga-
tions under the plan, he said, and she means to continue doing so, despite
changes in her Government. He also took up the recent improvement in the
relations between Germany and other nations. Among these he especially
enumerated the United States, Mexico and Japan. The United States, he
declared, is the most active nation in furthering the economic restoration of
Europe, adding that no nation could view this American activity with more
pleasure than Germany.
"I am glad to state that our relations with the United States are entirely
satisfactory," declared Herr Stresemann.
ARMS TRAFFIC CONFERENCE
DECISIONS OF CONFERENCE.—The Arms Traffic Conference which
assembled in Geneva early in May with representatives of forty-four
nations, continued in session throughout the month. The business of the
conference was to consider and revise the terms of a draft convention to
regulate international traffic in munitions of war which had already been
formulated by a committee of experts. The convention as finally agreed
upon will be submitted to the powers, and according to its present terms
will go into effect when ratified by twelve of the most important arms-
producing countries. In general, the smaller, non-producing nations oppose
the convention, since it will tend to limit their sources for munitions of war.
The Draft Convention establishes three categories of arms: (1) arms and
munitions exclusively designed for use in land, sea, or air warfare; (2)
arms capable of use for either military or other purposes; (3) arms of no
military value. Among matters tentatively settled in the conference may
be noted the following:
(A) Warships, submarines, airplanes, armored trains, gunpowder ex-
plosives, and most types of revolvers were transferred from the first category
(which cannot be exported without government license) to the second
category.
(B) In deference to the United States, it was decided that no central
bureau under the League of Nations should be established for the collection
and publication of arms traffic statistics, but that each producing nation
should adopt a license system and publish its own statistics.
(C) A geographic zone was tentatively mapped out to include thirty-
three nations (but not Turkey or Persia) in which arms traffic would be
restricted.


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1316
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
In general the United States delegation was successful in eliminating
from the clauses of the proposed convention any direct reference to utiliza-
tion of the League of Nations. The conference revealed also the unwilling-
ness of European powers to restrict arms traffic in view of the unwilling-
ness of Russia to enter into the agreement, and the absence of any general
European security compact. The producing nations hesitated to hamper
private arms manufacturers to the extent that their factories would fall
into disuse and be unavailable in time of war.


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SECRETARY'S NOTES
Membership New members joining since last report:
Coello, G., Lieutenant Commander, Ar Griffin, J. H., Ensign, U.S.N.
gentine Navy
Pennington, J. A., Lieut., U.S.N.
Ragonnet, E. L., Mr.
Due to detachment from the Naval Academy,
Resignation of Lieutenant Commander R. C. Smith, Jr.,
Assistant Editor U. S. Navy, has submitted his resignation as
assistant editor. Lieutenant Commander
R. S. Field, U. S. Navy, has been selected to succeed Lieutenant
Commander Smith.
The Institute desires articles of interest to all branches
Articles of the service, including the reserve force. Non-
members as well as members may submit articles, and
authors receive due compensation for articles published. Com-
pact, well digested articles are more likely to be accepted for
early publication. In accepting articles for publication, the In-
stitute reserves the right to have such articles revised or rearranged,
where necessary, in order to bring them up to the required stand-
ard of articles published in the PROCEEDINGS—the cost, if any, to
be deducted from the compensation due the author.
Twenty copies of reprints are furnished authors
Reprints of
free of charge. Additional copies to the number
Articles
desired will be furnished at author's expense, pro-
vided request is made before going to press.
Discussion of articles published in the PROCEED-
Discussions Ings is cordially invited. Discussions accepted
for publication are paid for at approximately
one-half the rate for original articles.
Book
Reviews
As soon as practicable after the publication of books
on subjects of professional interest, the Institute
aims to publish authoritative reviews of them.


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1318
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
In the past, many errors have resulted from the
Address of
habit of changing an officer's address as soon
Members
as his transfer orders are published in the papers.
No change will be made in the future except upon receipt of
notification by the member concerned. Reliance upon the former
method may, in extreme cases, mean a delay of almost four
months. To insure the prompt delivery of the PROCEEDINGS and
other communications from the U. S. Naval Institute, it is essen-
tial that members and subscribers notify the Secretary-Treasurer
without delay of every change of address. No responsibility can
be accepted for failure to receive the PROCEEDINGS, where mem-
bers fail to comply with this rule. Changes of address should
reach the Institute by the 23d of the month, to be effective for the
issue of the PROCEEDINGS of the following month.
Wanted: The Naval Institute is desirous of obtaining sev-
Luce's
eral copies of Luce's Seamanship (any edition),
Seamanship and would appreciate it if anyone having same
would communicate with the Secretary-Treas-
urer, stating edition, condition, and price desired.
H. A. BALDRIDGE,
Captain, U. S. Navy', Secretary-Treasurer.


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gingering
rary
AUG 10 1925
United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings
VOL. 51
AUGUST, 1925
NO. 270


NST
ALI
NAV
NAVAL
ACADEMY
U.S.
ITUT
DENS
1873
SCIENTIA
CONTENTS
Flying Over the Polar Sea.-Byrd
Finding Geographical Position in North Pole Region. - Littlehales 1339
National Strategy.-Frost .
1343
Administration of Industrial Work in Navy Yards.-Williams 1391
Submarine Capabilities and Limitations. Baker . .
1398
The Salvage of S-19.-Hilliard . . . . . . . .
1408
How the Navy Helped Them Home.-Barker
1415
The Selection and Use of Binoculars.-McCracken.
1446
The Dacia Dilemma.-Wainwright .
1452
A Bachelor Looks at the Navy Pay Bills.-Rochester
1455
Honi Heke's War of 1845 in New Zealand.-McClellan
1459
The Army Industrial College.-Snow .
1469
Powell's "Perry's Victory on Lake Erie."-Lewis .
1473
The Pacific Zone.-Russell . . .
1480
Discussion · · ·
:
· · · ·
1489
· ·
Professional Notes
1499
Notes on International Affairs
1563
Book Reviews . .
1569
. .
Secretary's Notes . .
1570


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It Was The Idea Of Progress That
Brought The Naval Institute
Into Being
Columbus was a dreamer—but behind his dreams there was a
definite practical purpose. The wealth of Cathay, the spices and
perfumes of the East Indies were at the feet of the man to dis-
cover a new route to those lands. Intense study and a logical
process of reasoning had convinced Columbus that this planet upon
which we live is round. His was a mind years in advance of his
times. It was difficult to convince men of the soundness of his
project and the means for the accomplishment of his dream were
impossible to obtain for a long period. But, it was his idea which
gave this man the unbounded courage and untiring perseverance
to accomplish a quest even greater than that which he had
anticipated.
It was this idea of seeing beyond the times that led to the
organization of the Naval Institute. In the Navy, perhaps, more
than in any other profession, men with vision and far-sightedness
are needed. It is only by study, exchange of ideas, and an ability
to impart our ideas to others that any progress is made. For this
reason the Naval Institute has, through the publication of its
PROCEEDINGS, always encouraged officers to think along naval lines
and helped them to present their ideas to the Navy in a suitable
form. Articles in the PROCEEDINGS have been forerunners of
many of the great improvements in our Navy. But Progress
demands that we never stand still. The Naval Institute dreams
of greater advancement in years to come.
To accomplish the maximum amount of good it is desired that
every officer in the Navy be a member of the Naval Institute and
a subscriber to the PROCEEDINGS. To advance with one's pro-
fession one must keep acquainted with every move in that pro-
fession. The Naval Institute offers to officers of the Navy the
simplest method of doing this. The annual membership dues are
$3.00 (including subscription to the PROCEEDINGS). A check
payable to the Secretary of the Naval Institute, Annapolis, Mary-
land, will bring immediate attention.
Secretary of the to the Prol memb
The above was written by Midshipman (now Ensign) Harry Wagner of
the class of 1925, U.S.N.A., who won first prize for the most acceptable
advertisement for the Naval Institute-to appear in the 1925 Lucky Bag.
The Lucky Bag staff, ineligible in the contest, determined the prize winner.
-


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United States
Naval Institute
Proceedings
August, 1925
Edited by H. A. Baldridge

STI
AVA
TUT
U.S.
1873
U. S. Naval Institute
Publication Office: Menasha, Wisconsin
Editorial and Business Office: Annapolis, Maryland


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COPYRIGHT, 1925
BY
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
The Collegiate Press
GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING CO.
MENASHA, WIS.


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