7_Professional-Notes

PROFESSIONAL NOTES
PREPARED BY
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER H. W. UNDERWOOD, U. S. NAVY
FROM MAY 7 TO JUNE 7
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
GREAT BRITAIN .......
FRANCE ..........
GERMANY .......
UNITED STATES ...
ENGINEERING .
AVIATION
TION .................
MERCHANT MARINE........
MISCELLANEOUS ......
CURRENT NAVAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAPERS.........
I 249
1258
1265
1267
1274.
1286
..
.
.....
.....
...........................
1294
1303
1311
1303
GREAT BRITAIN
Naval Shipbuilding Requirements
The Engineer, 15 May, 1925.-All who appreciate the importance of naval
defense will welcome the new shipbuilding program which the government
is expected to introduce before the Parliament adjourns for the summer
recess. We have put off till the very last moment the provision of new
ships to replace those which are past their prime, and the result is that
our present-day fleet, though sufficiently imposing on paper, contains a
large proportion of second-rate vessels, deficient in speed, armament, and
other essential qualities. Particularly is this the case with our cruisers, of
which no more than a dozen compare at all favorably with representative
ships under foreign flags. The hope that other powers, noticing the virtual
suspension of naval shipbuilding by this country, would refrain from ex-
panding their respective fleets, has not been fulfilled. While it might be
premature to speak of a new race for naval supremacy, there is an un-
mistakable tendency abroad to multiply vessels of which the aggregate
tonnage is not restricted by the Washington Treaty. Cruisers, destroyers,
submarines—all may be built without limit as to number, and since the
relative combatant worth of such craft has been substantially increased by
the reduction of battle fleets, a certain temptation exists to develop these
types on a liberal scale; hence, the large program of so-called "auxiliary"
construction which have come into effect since the Washington Conference.
Taking cruisers alone, it will be found that the five leading powers have
legislated since that event for a total of forty new cruisers, and of this
number only seven are being built for the British Empire. In destroyers
and submarines the British ratio of new tonnage is very much lower. Hay-
ing regard to the magnitude of our sea interests, it is clearly impossible for
us to remain passive in the face of this progressive decline in our naval


  p. 1250 (#158)                      #

1250
| July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
power. Imperative as the demand may be for economy in state expenditure,
it must not be allowed to override the urgent needs of national defense.
In the case of the navy retrenchment has already been carried to the extreme
limit. From now on it will pay us better to invest money in new ships than
to spend it on the upkeep of material which is largely inefficient.
A study of the Navy List shows that about a score of the cruisers re-
tained for service has ceased to be effective for war purposes. Probably
these vessels would have been paid off long since, but for the shortage of
cruising ships of any description. As it is, they must continue to serve
until replaced by something better, but the expenditure of large sums year
by year on ships of inferior fighting value is bad policy from every point of
view. Thanks to the patriotic action of the Australian Government in or-
dering two ships, seven major cruisers of post-war design will eventually
be at the disposal of the Empire. These, however, can be regarded only as
the nucleus of our future cruising feet, which the Admiralty considers
should attain a strength of fifty-two units. This estimate may be revised
by the government committee which has been investigating the whole ques-
tion of ship replacement, though in our judgment it errs, if at all, on the
moderate side. Whether all the new cruisers should be of the 10,000-ton
type which the Washington Agreement has practically standardized is a
problem of some importance. While is is true that most of the foreign
vessels now under construction belong to this class, both Japan and France
have built ships of considerably smaller dimensions. Cruisers of 10,000
tons seem to us unnecessarily large for duty with the battle fleet, for which
function ships of reduced displacement would probably be of equal use
and much less expensive. It is to be hoped, therefore, that our construc-
tors will not acquire the habit of regarding the maximum tonnage allowed
by the treaty as the basic figure for all new cruiser designs. For reasons
which may be cogent enough-though they are not very obvious to the
uninitiated—the Admiralty chooses to observe a great deal of mystery about
the ships now in hand. We can only trust that this policy of reticence will
be justified by results, but past experience with ships built in a similar
atmosphere of secrecy has not been encouraging. The three French cruisers
of the Duguay-Trouin class, although laid down after the treaty, have a
normal displacement of only 7,900 tons. High speed is their main feature,
to achieve which both armament and protection have been sacrificed. Their
speed is 34.5 knots, they mount eight 6.1-inch guns, and armor is non-
existent save for thin decks and splinter-proof gun turrets. Acclaimed at
the date of inception as wholly admirable, the design has since been con-
demned by some of the foremost French critics. Of greater interest are
the four Japanese cruisers of the Furutaka class, the nameship of which
was put afloat in February and the Kako last month. Displacing only
7,100 tons, they have a legend speed of 33 knots, and are armed with six
8-in guns, so disposed as to permit of a full discharge on either beam and
a bow fire of four guns. In planning these ships Japanese designers seem
to have moved out of the rut in which some of their foreign colleagues
are apparently content to remain. There is not, nor has there even been, any
technical objection to arming a ship of moderate size with a few heavy
guns, instead of a greater number of lighter pieces. Volume of fire was,
no doubt, the cardinal factor in former years, when control methods were
of the crudest, and a ship of fine lines, apt to be lively in a seaway, could not
hope to make effective use of slow-firing ordnance of heavy caliber. But
today, when the gun of medium caliber can be worked as easily, and dis-
charged almost as rapidly, as the quick firer of an earlier period, and when,
moreover, improved systems of fire control ensure a reasonable percentage
of hits under difficult conditions, the cast iron rule of equipping light
cruisers with no guns above 6-inch caliber is, or ought to be, discredited.


  p. 1251 (#159)                      #

1925]
1251
Professional Notes
By disregarding this obsolete rule Japanese designers have evolved in the
Furutaka a ship of considerably greater fighting power than contemporary
vessels of equal and even superior tonnage. Compared with her, the 7,500-
ton American cruisers of the Omaha group, with their twelve 6-inch guns,
appear to disadvantage, and our own ships of the E class—7,600 tons and
seven 6-inch guns—are still worse. Unless the experience derived from
the late war is utterly misleading, neither the Omaha nor the Enterprise
would stand a sporting chance in a duel with the smaller Japanese ship.
We cite the Furutaka merely as a specimen of what may be done on a much
smaller displacement than 10,000 tons, without suggesting that replicas of
the design should be laid down for the British fleet, though it does seem to
us that ships of this class would be more useful than vessels like the Enter-
prise and Emerald. The only British cruising ship that approximates to the
Furutaka in size is the Adventure, which is primarily designed for mine-
laying. Her displacement is 7,260 tons, but although she was launched
nearly a year ago, details of her speed and armament are still withheld by
the naval authorities.
In addition to cruisers, the forthcoming program is expected to make
provision for destroyers and submarines. Of the first named we have 195
boats. Half of them were built during the war, and their normal span
of "life" has been curtailed by the strenuous service they were called upon
to perform. Actually, therefore, we have only about 100 destroyers that
are thoroughly efficient. The design of future boats must perforce be in-
Suenced by current progress abroad, which is all in the direction of increased
tonnage and heavier armament. The new French flotilla leaders, of which
twenty-one are under construction and projected, are vessels of 2,360 tons,
with a speed of 35.5 knots, armed with five 5.1-inch guns. There are no
leaders as powerful as this in our service. Japan, also, is reported to be
planning a series of new "destroyers,” to displace no less than 3,000 tons
and to carry several 5.5-inch guns. The value of the destroyer as an anti-
dote to the submarine was so clearly demonstrated in the late conflict that
the need for maintaining an adequate force of vessels of that type scarcely
requires emphasis. It is true that the Washington Agreement seeks to ban
submarine attacks on merchant shipping, but one of the leading powers
has still to ratify this particular clause of the treaty, and parchment safe-
guards are not, in any case, always effective in time of war. Finally, we
have fewer submarines than either the United States or Japan, though the
type is one clearly destined to play an important part in naval strategy.
A strong case could be presented for laying down a dozen or more new
submarines of large dimensions, to be employed as patrol ships or convoy
guards, on the oceanic trade routes which form the arteries of the Empire.
Apart from the obsolete K class, we have at present only five or six sub-
marines capable of undertaking this essential duty. There will, no doubt,
be an outcry in some quarters when the new shipbuilding program appears,
for the cost is bound to be heavy, but the bill must be faced unless the
country is prepared to sacrifice its sea power, which is synonymous with
its safety, welfare and prosperity.
The Value of Hong-kong
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record. 15 April, 1925.
- I confess that I have never been quite clear as to why the British Gov-
ernment acquiesced so readily at the Washington Conference in the sug-
gested restriction with regard to Hong-kong as a naval base. They agreed
that no more development work should be undertaken; that the dockyard
resources of the place should remain just as they were. Was this conces-
sion intended to ensure sanction to the Singapore scheme? Was it designed


  p. 1252 (#160)                      #

1252
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
as a generous gesture to the United States in return for her readiness to
undertake no further fortification of the bases of Manila and Yap? The
former seems a very probable explanation. The latter is a matter which
could have little direct concern for us. But, then, neither could our policy
with regard to Hong-kong have any direct concern for the United States.
Ever since we "acquired” possession of it Hong-kong has been our
dominant naval base in the Far East. At the beginning of the present cen-
tury we had a battle fleet based upon it, consisting of six ships of the Glory
class and the two Barfleurs. The political and strategical reasons which
brought about a reduction of the China fleet to a very small squadron are
a matter of common knowledge, and I do not propose to refer further to
them than to point out that they no longer exist. The need for naval con-
centration in European waters seems very unlikely to recur in our time.
Our alliance with Japan has been abrogated—very unfortunately, I venture
to think. Japan, faced with what she imagined to be a prospect of isolation,
has now entered into a treaty with Soviet Russia, of the full extent of
which we have no knowledge. Whatever the significance of that compact
may be, one thing is certain : it cannot be anything like so friendly to Brit-
ish interests as as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
It was during the days when the British China fleet was, relatively, a
very great force that Hong-kong developed to its present position. Of
course, a great deal of work has been done since, but the general scheme of
the modern naval establishment was evolved during that period. The idea
was to make the port a battleship base of the first order. But, just as even
greater and more important undertakings, such as the Keyham extension
of Devonport Dockyard, have been outclassed within two decades by the
extraordinary growth in warship dimensions, so has Hong-kong failed to
realize this original purpose. The Admiralty No. 1 Dock is 555 feet long,
with 95 feet width of entrance, and 39 feet of water over the sills. It is
therefore inadequate to receiving any capital ship remaining on the effective
list. The New Dock at Quarry Bay, belonging to Messrs. Butterfield and
Swire, is 750 feet long, 88 feet wide, and 34.5 feet of water over the sills,
so that no ship with blister bulges could look at it. The Kowloon Dock is
700 feet long, 86 feet wide, with 30 feet of water. The Hope and Cosmo-
politan Docks are only able to accommodate small cruisers and other craft
of comparatively light displacement.
When I was last in Hong-kong, about two years ago, I was told that
there was no engineering difficulty in the way of developing the big docks
to a degree which would render them equal to any demands ever likely to be
imposed. That such development would have been entered upon, sooner or
later, is pretty certain, otherwise the restrictions of the Washington Agree-
ment under this head become merely pointless.
In point of strategic position it is frequently stated that Hong-kong
cannot compare with Singapore. But strategic position in relation to what?
The tendency to talk in generalities about what really depends entirely upon
specific circumstances is apt to lead to very indefinite conclusions. It is
useless to mince matters in defining strategic values. Both Hong-kong and
Singapore are naval bases of first class importance only in the supposition
of war with a great naval power in the Pacific. There is only one great
naval power whose natural war zone lies in the Pacific, and that is Japan.
Unless we are prepared to visualize the possibility of a conflict with Japan
it becomes almost impossible to estimate the relative strategical values of
Hong-kong or Singapore. Such a war is not going to be brought about
merely by contemplating it as a conceivable event. On the contrary, realiza-
tion of it and preparation for it (under the mask of as much polite camou-
flage as we please) are very much more likely to avert it than the easier
course of declaring it to be "unthinkable.”


  p. 1253 (#161)                      #

1925]
1253
Professional Notes
Two broad aspects have to be considered in relation to any question of
the value of a war base. The first is its geographical advantages, as deter-
mined by the probable zone of the active struggle, for the conduct of opera-
tions. The second is the ability to hold it against attempts at capture or
* destruction, which would be the obvious objective of the enemy. As to
operations, the character of these would be dictated in no small measure by
the situation and resources of the base itself. Distance is a governing
factor in strategy.
If it comes to a question of choice between Hong-kong and Singapore
under the conditions of such a presumptive war as to render both of them
bases of first-rate consequence, I think there can be little difficulty in de-
ciding in favor of Singapore. Hong-kong may present certain features of
advantage over the Malaya Island, but by the test of points the balance is
altogether in favor of the latter.
I confess that the Yellow Peril, in the accepted sense of the term, has
never much impressed me. It may become a sinister reality some day, but
that some day is so remote that we may leave worrying about it to posterity.
So far from China and Japan showing any signs of a future coalescence,
forming a threat to the peace of the White World, they are very antag-
onistic just now, but, in order to avoid too pointed a reference to a country
with which we are living on the most friendly relations, let me speak of the
Pacific objective—that objective out of which the Singapore scheme and
Australia's active naval policy have arisen-as the Yellow Peril.
A conflict with the Yellow Peril means not only war upon our commerce
traversing the Pacific, but a tremendous menace to India and Australia, as
well as to numerous lesser territories of the Empire. Indeed, such a war,
should it ever come to pass, would most likely arise out of an attempt at
forcible penetration of Australian terrain under the plea of sheer necessity
to find an outlet for over-population. There are other perfectly possible
causes of war; this is the most definite and the most probable one.
Singapore is more favorably seated than Hong-kong for countering any
naval descent from the China Sea. Moreover, it is a reasonable assump-
tion that the preliminary move to any such descent would be an attempt to
either capture or destroy Hong-kong. The place would not be easy to
defend against a strong military expedition, and with Kowloon in the occu-
pation of the enemy the island would be untenable as a naval base. It
would be the experience of Port Arthur over again.
Singapore is all but invulnerable against attack by land. In the first
place, the peninsula off the southern extremity of which it lies is a British
dominion, and in the second place it would be singularly difficult ground for
military operations on a big scale. The railway and main communications
are frequently within easy reach of long-range gunfire from the sea, and
are closely bordered by dense forests and jungles. A Yellow Peril fleet, in
order to attack Singapore, would have to steam nearly 3,000 miles from
its home bases—too great a distance altogether for capital ship operations,
which might reasonably be expected to extend over a considerable time. In
fact, it would be like carrying out an attack upon New York with Plymouth
as a base.
So in any attempt to estimate the relative values of Hong-kong and
Singapore as first class naval bases we must take into account this very
important question of the ability to hold either in the event of war with the
Yellow Peril. Hong-kong is better situated, strategically, for the delivery
of swift offensive operations, because it is more on the spot. But the
necessity to be on the defensive would be much more urgent than in the
case of Singapore, and to this extent geographical advantage would be more
than neutralized.


  p. 1254 (#162)                      #

1254
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The decision to develop Singapore as the British fleet base of the Pacific
does not imply any minimizing of the value of Hong-kong. We are cer-
tainly not going to give up the latter place because we are making more
of the former. As a point d'appui for submarine and destroyer operations
and for aircraft concentration it would be of vital importance in a Yellow
Peril war-so long as we could continue to hold it. But, it is just because
of this vital importance that we may be sure the Yellow Peril legions
(which we must assume to be as well equipped for war as the White World
legions) would spare no effort to wrest it from us.
As long as it were possible to materialize the traditional doctrine of
the British Navy, to seek out the enemy and attack him swiftly, Hong-
kong has strategical claims superior to those of Singapore, but, when we
pass to the phase of protective warfare, the Malaya base holds the superior
position. It is so much further down the flank of any great movement of
descent, either upon Australia or India, by the Yellow Peril forces that,
in addition to the great enforced extension of their line of retreat on being
brought to action (how valuable this would have proved at Jutland!), the
scope for heading-off tactics is so much more favorable. In a sketchy
way it may be said that Hong-kong would figure more as a base for
chasing, and Singapore for intercepting.
My reference to the possibility of a Yellow Peril descent upon India may
call forth a smile of incredulity, but this idea is no mere figment of fancy,
devised to form a theme upon which to write. During four months of
touring India I was astonished to find how openly and widely the coming
of the Yellow Peril conquerors is being proclaimed, and believed in, in the
native bazaars. I do not suggest that there is any organized government
propaganda in all this, but it must be perfectly well known to the Indian
authorities that there are countless Japanese moving about in the great
cities, telling the credulous Hindus what good times they will have and
how much more prosperous they will be "when we come here as the mas-
ters of India." Perhaps we can afford to laugh at this. A good many of us
laughed very derisively at the idea of the German menace until the bolt fell.
We yet have to see whether the Soviet-Japanese Treaty may not presently
give a new aspect to the value of Hong-kong. The difficulty about accept-
ing such restrictions as are imposed by the Washington Agreement is that
things have to be taken as they then are. It is impossible to foresee changes
which may alter the whole complexion of world affairs. The United States
is realizing this in regard to the prohibition to further fortify or improve
either Manila or Yap. Circumstances alter cases, and the point of view of
today may be radically different from the point of view of tomorrow. Six
months ago the British Government would have ratified the Geneva Protocol
with a loud murmur of self-gratulation. A few weeks ago the British
Government announced that the Geneva Protocol—so far as this country
is concerned- has never been anything more than stillborn.
Cups and Saucers for Seamen
The Naval and Military Record, 6 May, 1925.—The announcement that
cups and saucers are to replace the traditional mess bowl in the Royal Navy
is a very minor matter in itself, but it opens up a distinctly interesting line
of reflection. The customs of the sea have long been one of the great
attractions of the sea life. No disinterested man will pretend that a ham-
mock is as comfortable to sleep in as a four-poster bed, or that being
routed out of the aforesaid hammock in order to stand the middle watch is
as pleasant as all-night in, or that a sheath knife is quite as nice as an ivory-
handled blade, accompanied by an electro-plated fork as a means of attack-
ing bully beef. Yet the youthful imagination finds a glamor of romance


  p. 1255 (#163)                      #

1925]
1255
Professional Notes
in the idea of all this picturesque unconventionality, and the youthful imag-
ination means a tremendous asset in recruiting for the Royal Navy.
There is an old story worth recalling in this connection. In the long
bygone days a certain hard-bitten old Jack did a particularly gallant act,
and the admiral under whom he was serving was so impressed that he asked
him to dine in his cabin. All went well until the dessert stage was reached.
Then Jack raised his finger bowl and lapped up its contents. Very tact-
fully the admiral's servant filled it again. Jack lapped up the second dose.
As the servant was once again pouring in water Jack, in a stage whisper,
said, "Put a drop o' rum in it this time, mate!" The moral is that the
lower deck does not want finger bowls. Does it want cups and saucers?
Is the additional luxury of being able to drink tea with the little finger poised
any real compensation for the blow to tradition ?
George Cupples, in The Green Hand, draws a great picture of the new
midshipman, on the first wet morning down-Channel, coming upon the
poop with an umbrella over his head, "and the hands forward all of a roar."
We do not suggest it is ever likely to come quite to this in the service, if
only that the service itself may be trusted to see that it shall not. Comfort
and cleanliness, by all means, but no grandmotherliness! Since the hon-
orable memberess for Plymouth has failed to abolish the rum ration, the
next best thing she can do is to suggest that it be served in wine glasses.
The Union Jack Club
The Army. Navy and Air Force Gazette, 9 May, 1925.—To those of us
who have been associated with the Union Jack Club from its early begin-
nings, the last annual general meeting presented an unfamiliar feature in
the absence of a former president, Sir Edward Ward. What the council
feels on this subject has been recorded in the report; what the club feels
has been eloquently expressed in the address which the elected members of
the general committee handed to Sir Edward Ward. Members will never
forget the thoroughness and the devotion which characterized his work for
the club.
The club is not a one-man show. It is, according to the figures of last
year, a 288,000 men's show, with a council of men of experience, ability,
and whole-hearted devotion to its interests. The Union Jack Club, as Sir
Walter Lawrence, its new president, remarked, is a wonderful and unique
institution, in that it runs without splash, advertisement and booming, yet
always moving with the times and keeping abreast of the requirements of
the services. Colonel Sir Henry Streatfeild, Sir George Majoribanks, and
Brigadier General Gascoigne and others have done much for this fine
service institution, which has now nearly 700 beds, looks after the leave
men, and has supplied as many as 2,000 meals in one day.
This club depends on two great points. One is finance, and on this
score the club is sound and self-supporting. The second point is the tone
of the club. When Sir Walter Lawrence was asked to draw up the rules
he borrowed from clubs in the West End the rules which now govern the
C'nion Jack Club and, looking back over the years that have passed, one
can say that the tone of the Union Jack Club is one of its greatest assets.
How tone comes is a mystery, but, when once it is established, it grows
strong. It is in the hands of the members, who are jealous guardians of
the honor of the club, which never closes, and is open day and night.
In the old days, when a leave man arrived at Waterloo he had nowhere
to go, and he fell a ready victim to those who made it a profitable business
to meet him when his purse was full. What a change the Union Jack Club
has worked. The trade of the harpies and the confidence men has become
flat, stale and unprofitable. The club has raised the self-respect of the man


  p. 1256 (#164)                      #

1256
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
as well as catering for him, and it is a rare thing now to see drunkenness
in uniform, or to witness any man being escorted to a platform by singing
and tipsy undesirables. The clean, manly life in the services and the broader,
better lines of education have an abettor outside of barracks in the help-
ful facilities of the Waterloo Road Club, which has accomplished its
share in the general uplift and performed a truly national service. It en-
joys the fruit of its pioneering days in that it is now an established factor
in the life of the services—a club, a home, a restaurant, a resting place,
bank, safe deposit, and the mustering place for journeys to and fro.
Naval Engineering Training
The Naval and Military Record, 8 April, 1925.—The statement that the
Admiralty are inviting twenty-five candidates to sit for the next examination
of special entry cadets, to qualify as officers of the Engineer branch, lends
itself to some interesting reflections. In no branch of the Royal Navy has
the system of training undergone so many changes since the introduction of
the Selborne scheme twenty-three years ago. About the only thing that
can be said in favor of that scheme, as it originally applied to the engineers,
is that the principle of common entry was good. It did away with the long
standing friction on the subject of status, and with the distinction which had
come down from the days when the "ship's engineers” might, without un-
kindness, be described as more homely than polished. But, common entry
and common training are two very different things. A grounding in the
elements of practical marine engineering might well prove of value to an
executive officer. Time spent in learning seamanship and navigation is little
better than lost to the naval engineer.
It soon became apparent that where the Selborne scheme was presently
going to break was in its relation to the engineer branch. It came into
being almost with the advent of a new era of development in naval en-
gineering, due to the adoption of the turbine, oil fuel, the transition from
the Scotch boiler to the water tube type, the dawn of the internal com-
bustion problem, the expansion of electrical equipment, and the like. Of
course, the Selborne scheme provided for specialist training for the class
of lieutenants (E) which it proposed to create, but the approach to that
specialist training was much too long: too much time altogether was lavished
upon the "Jack of all Trades" business. Thoughtful men began to ask in
what way it was expected that the Selborne scheme was going to prove any
better-or, indeed, was going to prove half as good-as the old Keyham
régime which it superseded. They were told to wait and see, not to pull
up the young tree by the roots in order to find out how it was growing.
I do not propose to trace the history of the innumerable "niodifications"
which have been introduced into the Selborne-Cawdor methods of producing
a class of naval engineers since it first became clear that the young tree was
not growing at all well. This would take up too much space altogether,
however briefly it were done. It ought to be rather interesting, during a
big naval foregathering, for a party of engineer officers to get together and
compare notes as to just what particular phase of the evolution was cur-
rent when they were training.
The fact is the Admiralty had to realize that, under the Selborne scheme,
instead of overtaking the rapid development in the science of marine en-
gineering, which is the essential elementary condition of every sound
principle of training, the rapid development was outdistancing the tardy
progress of the Osborne entries. The navy was coming to rely more and
yet more upon the old Keyham class of engineers as it perceived the portents
of failure in the mode by which they were to be supplanted.
-


  p. 1257 (#165)                      #

1925)
1257
Professional Notes
To say that we have completed the cycle which began at Christmas,
1902, and are now back to the old Keyham method of training may not be
strictly true, because things change materially in such a progressive science
as engineering, and had the old Keyham régime remained it would not have
been precisely the same today as it was twenty-three years ago. But, it is
true to this extent: the Selbourne scheme has been modified virtually out
of existence, and in principle, if not in actual practice, we are back to the
specific form of training of the old Royal Naval Engineering College days.
While I suppose we may admit the premise that an engineer can never
know too much about his job, I am not sure that the existent method of
specializing for the engineer branch does not ask rather too much. For this
reason, it probably is that the present-day Keyham system is not yielding a
sufficiency of officers, to meet the requirements of the fleet, so that the
Admiralty have to call for candidates for twenty-five direct entry cadet-
ships. Efficiency is a relative work. In the normal course we judge of it
by the standard of results. Thus we should say that the engineer officers
of the Mercantile Marine are a highly efficient body of men, since the liners
they run come and go with clockwork-like punctuality. Yet I doubt if
there is an engineer officer in the Mercantile Marine who could gain twenty
per cent of marks in the examination which a "dagger” lieutenant (E) has
to pass in order to attain to that symbol. The simple explanation is that
he does not want such obtuse theoretical knowledge. He is a thorough
master of the practical side of his business—and that is enough for him.
The super-specialist in the engine-room of a warship seems to me a sort
of Gulliver among his comrades. There is a great gulf of erudite superiority
between him and the other men who stand on the watch-keeping platform.
Yet does he get much opportunity for the exercise of that profound
theoretical knowledge which he has striven so laboriously to acquire? I
was once shipmate with one of the engineer officers who brought the Cal-
liope out of Apia harbor in the teeth of a violent hurricane, in which sev-
eral other warships failed to escape destruction. The exploit will be
recalled by the older generation of naval men. I asked him how the
Calliope alone managed to get clear, and I remember his answer: "We
knew just what had to be done, and we did it.” Which, to my mind, is the
most effective form of theory of all.
Let me not be misunderstood into implying any disparagement of super-
knowledge (or "dagger" knowledge, if you prefer it) nor of the men who
possess it, but I am venturing to wonder whether the system does not pass
the limits of utility. The vocational value of theory can only be gauged
in relation to its application to practice. I believe it is a fact that a large
number of very eligible aspirants are deterred from entering as engineer
cadets by the apprehension of what lies in front of them. Is it not the fact
that the question of maintaining the supply of engineer officers for the
Navy is causing some concern to the Admiralty ?
I believe direct entry to be the sound principle in the case of the execu-
tive branch, taking the term to imply the starting point of naval training
where ordinary education ceases, but it is by no means certain that the same
principle applies equally to the engineering branch. Mathematics, for in-
stance, which play such an essential part in all engineering, might be studied
rather more intensively than is usual in the course of a general education
by those who design to enter the navy as engineers. The direct entry
executive cadet is not expected to bring any initial professional qualifications
-he is merely the finished schoolboy-but the age of between seventeen-
and-a-half and eighteen is rather advanced for a youth to "take up” en-
gineering on the same principle. Therefore, the age limit might, with
advantage, be lowered in the case of candidates for the engineer branch,
although not to anything like the Dartmouth standard.


  p. 1258 (#166)                      #

1258
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Probably the present Keyham scheme has come to stay, but this is not
to say that it is necessarily at the end of the many modifications from
which it has been evolved. It has so entirely broken away from the Sel-
borne plan that even were the existing Dartmouth régime superseded by a
new order of things (and this is far from unlikely in the not distant future)
there is no reason why it should not continue, but in this event the direct
entry of officers for the engineer branch should cease. These various meth-
ods of attaining a single end savor too much of expedient or experiment.
When two or more systems have been thoroughly tested in practice, one
must have proved itself the best. Granted, it may not be easy to discrim-
inate definitely between methods possessing their own inherent advantages
and drawbacks. The Admiralty are clearly of opinion that the direct entry
candidate may make an efficient engineer on a very much shorter and
simpler course of training than the Dartmouth entry; otherwise, they would
not be announcing vacancies for twenty-five of them at the next examina-
tion. This being so, it is not unreasonable to raise the whole question as to
whether the present regular system of entry and training for the engineer
branch is really on the best possible lines ?
The answer is that it is producing a highly efficient class of engineer
officer. Well, so did the old Keyham régime, but in those days the doctrine
was to turn out a uniform standard of professional attainments. This was
known as the "Keyham standard," and was a splendid groundwork for the
exercise of those brains by which a man gets on in the navy as in every
other walk of life. There was no attempt at "super" grading: no ultra-
specializing; the accepted principle was a uniform high level of proficiency.
Since then there has developed a system of training to inequality. Is this
plan good for esprit de corps within the branch ?
It is a very big question, and one upon which the wise man would be
conjectural and inquiring rather than didactic. I hear a good deal of
criticism in the service itself upon the present method of training engineer
officers, but long experience has taught me that service criticism may not
always prove an infallible mentor. The present system may be the best
it is humanly possible to devise, but, if so, why supplement it by any other
form of entry and training ? The super-specialist may be an invaluable man
as squadron engineer officer, but there is this danger about it: his sub-
ordinates may shrink from appealing to him lest he shall reprove their
ignorance. That such a thing is extremely unlikely to happen is merely a
tribute to the spirit of the service. I do not say that "MacAndrew's
Hymn" embodies the rudiments of modern naval engineering, but the wet
shirt still keeps the ship going. I once made a passage in company with
a "dagger” lieutenant (E), who on one occasion confided to me that it was
really wasting his time to go on to the engine-room watch platform: the
artificers and the mechanicians among them knew their job perfectly, and he
felt he ought to be doing better things. He may have been joking, but I
confess that his remarks set me musing upon whether too much academic
training for a severely practical profession is altogether a wise principle.
FRANCE
French Destroyers and Light Cruisers
The Naval and Military Record, 6 May, 1925.--St. Nazaire, which has
the distinction of having in hand the largest number of torpedo craft of
the new program: viz., the 2,400-ton destroyers, Chacal, Leopard, Lynx,
and the 1,460-ton torpilleur d'escadre Simoun, is making an effort to com-
plete them at an early date. Commanders have been appointed to the new
destroyers, but the unit most advanced is the Simoun, that is having the
finishing touches to her internal and external equipments, and has on board


  p. 1259 (#167)                      #

1925)
1259
Professional Notes
part of her crew. She is expected to leave St. Nazaire two months hence
ior Lorient, where she will commission for her trials, that will be watched
with attention by the naval world. The Simouns are remarkable units in
every respect, and, as eighteen of the class are in hand already, and eighteen
more projected, which means they will be an important asset of French sea
power, they are well worth close investigation with a view to elucidating
the question of their fighting worth. In the first place, they mark a depar-
ture from previous French shipbuilding practices, whereas pre-war contre-
torpilleurs of the Bouchier type (of which over twenty units were built)
were inferior in size and caliber of guns and torpedoes to contemporary
British, American, and Italian destroyers, the Simouns, officially described
as torpilleurs d'escadre (a very modest appellation), are superior in most
respects to all British destroyers in commission excepting Aotilla leaders.
In their general design they are copied from the British V and W classes
-similar shape of hull (though in the French the bows are more swanlike,
overhanging and pleasing to the eye, and the sterns also different) and
superstructures. In the Simouns, however, there are three funnels, rather
slender and of inordinate length, closely packed together, the two aft being
very near, which makes them a rather conspicuous target, and is a matter
of criticism among older officiers de vasseau, who question whether tor-
pilleurs so bulky and vulnerable will ever be able to launch their torpedoes
with chances of success. In truth, they are canonnieres rapides rather than
torpilleurs, as the gift of invisibility is totally denied to them. They will
be, in the light of the last conflict, excellent patrol boats for either screen-
ing a battle squadron or watching or blockading a hostile base, and, lastly,
they will be in a position to engage contemporary rivals with fair chances
owing to the superiority of caliber and range of their guns. Boats of such
seakeeping power and endurance French admirals would have welcomed
during the war, and Admirals Dartige du Fournet, Ronarch, for instance,
bitterly complained of the fragility and inferior armament of their contre-
tor pilleurs.
Similar reproaches nobody will think of applying to the Simouns. They
are larger than the British W's by nearly 150 tons, have 3,000 more horse-
power, and four 130 mil, versus four 120 mil. British guns, which means
longer range for the French, that have also the benefit of heavier and more
effective torpedoes. For ships of their class they have the maximum range
and hitting power, and, so far, are the best investment the Marine Francaise
has made in the torpedo boat line. Still, "the proof of the pudding is in
the eating," and the true value of these fine boats will depend on their
robustness and sea speed--two assets that are interdependent to a higher
degree than formerly owing to the tremendous strain on hulls with rates
of going exceeding 30 knots in choppy waters. The Simouns are expected
to develop from 35,000 to 40,000 h.p. on trial, and under favorable conditions
they ought to excel their nominal speed (33 knots) by 3 or 4 knots. Against
wind and seas their speed, of course, will be considerably reduced by their
great amount of top hamper, but even then the peculiar shape of their
sterns (that imitate those of big tugs) ought to be of good use to them.
It is felt that for 1,500-ton ships the 5.1-inch caliber of guns cannot safely
be exceeded; as the Italians have found out to their sorrow with the Aquila
class, that carry three 6-inch weapons, having insufficient command of fire
and being of little use in heavy weather. In the improved Simouns of
1,550 tons in hand, added robustness, speed, and fighting endurance have
been the improvements aimed at. The Simoun type, all points considered,
will be hard to beat by rival designers. The majority of our experts are
satisfied that it will prove a handy instrument of offensive in most circum-
stances of war, especially if its real speed can be increased as well as the
range of its torpedoes. Happily, war experience has taught French officers


  p. 1260 (#168)                      #

1260
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
the importance of efficient torpedoes, and torpedo design, construction, and
training are receiving special attention, and schools, laboratories, experi-
mental testing grounds have been created. A similar system is next to be
applied to the mining branch. France is making an effort with a view to
regaining her former supremacy for underwater warfare.
The armament of the Chacal class of destroyers (of which six are com-
pleting afloat and three on the point of being laid down), that was originally
to include six 130-mil. guns (two on twin mountings), has not been ap-
proved by naval opinion. The 5.1-inch gun (27 kilo shell) has no very great
superiority over the 4.7-inch caliber (21 kilo projectile) in the matter of
range and destroying power, and, moreover, twin mountings for small
quickfirers are not to be commended, being especially make-believe in nar-
row and quick rolling boats. In the cramped and crowded deck space of
destroyers even of great length (120) meters in the Chacals, 125 in the
new boats), there is not sufficient room for six gun positions at least with
the present fashion of distributing the whole armament on the axial line. It
is for this reason that British flotilla leaders have only five gun positions.
Even in longer ships, such as the British Delhis, of 4,800 tons, it has not
been easy to find six gun positions, and space is rather limited for the central
6-inch weapons; hence the necessity, if armament is to be strengthened, of
increasing the caliber of weapons rather than their number. It has been
decided, en principe, to mount in the new super-destroyers either 5.5-inch
ordnance (39 kilo shells) or light 6.1-inch guns (50 kilo shell), both cali-
bers assuring advantage of range over all destroyers in existence, and in
reality transforming new contretorpilleurs into destroyers of destroyers
(which was the name the British First Lord, Winston Churchill, gave ten
years since to the British Arethusas). L'Architecture navale est un per-
petual recommencement. Comparative.
In the cruiser line, also, superiority over all comers is what Gallic ex-
perts are aiming at The 8,000-ton Duguay-Trouins, now commissioning
for trials, though valuable on account of their extreme speed (over 35
knots), are undergunned and vulnerable 175 meters long targets; the 10,000-
ton Tourville and Duquesne, that carry 8-inch guns, do not appear to be in
any way better than their British American, or Italian rivals of similar
Washington displacement. Foolish it would be for France to invest her
meager finances in a few copies of rivals four or five times more numerous.
Superior quality must make up for inferior numbers, as it did when great
savants like Dupuy de Lôme and de Bussy (1860-1896), were in charge of
French Navy construction. The Paris Yacht judiciously denounces the
extreme vulnerability to gun, torpedo, and bombs of those 10,000-ton Wash-
ington cruisers of enormous length totally or insufficiently armored, capable
of dealing heavy blows at long range but powerless to withstand the same.
Despite their great age, the 14,000-ton croiseurs-cuirassés of the Quinet
type preserve good value in the face of such opponents.
Battle Cruisers and Croiseurs de Combat
The Naval and Military Record, 20 May, 1925.-Far-reaching conse-
quences for both France and England may be expected from the long-
prepared attack the Boche and Bolshevist subsidized Riffans are so cleverly,
and with such astonishing means of action, leading against the well-trained
but numerically inadequate troops of Marshal Lyautey, the famed con-
queror of Morocco. It is nothing less than a revolt of the Moslem world
against European rule, an extension of the anti-English movement in Egypt
and in India, containing in germs equal perils for our two countries.
Smuggling of arms by sea is the disquieting point. The nominally Spanish
coast must be blockaded; a colonial alliance between Spain and France is


  p. 1261 (#169)                      #

1925]
1261
Professional Notes
imperative, as well as a defensive entente between Great Britain and France
for their common safety.
Lieutenant Young's new volume translated into French: A bord des
Croisers de bataille (Librarie Payot, Paris) has attracted attention and
comments in naval circles; it gives a graphic insight into the life of those
great armored mastodons combining calibers and speed that played the de-
termining role in the naval war, a type of ship just now in favor in influential
navy quarters, and, besides, it enabled French naval students to understand
better the commanding personality of Admiral Beatty, the modern ex-
ponent of the Nelsonian doctrine which French experts are unanimous in
considering the true secret of victory. Joindre l'enemi et le battre avec des
forces superieures (Admiral Darrieus) has been the way of the best ad-
mirals of all times, and the greatest victories have been won through
"damning the risks," as Farragut so elegantly said. Trafalgar, Aboukir,
like Ostend and Zeebrugge, have only one explanation and justification :
namely, Audaces Fortuna juvat. In war extreme boldness is wisdom, and
this remains true notwithstanding mines and submarines. Admiral Beatty's
lack of an adequate flotilla force both in number and in size (which ac-
counted for the escape of the baby-killing Hipper squadron after the
Hartlepool and Scarborough bombardments) causes French readers to
appreciate the fighting worth of the fine new torpilleurs de'escadre of the
Simoun type (1,500 tons and 33 knots), of which twelve are practically
ready, and of the 2,400-ton Jaguar series of destroyers, of which six are also
to be commissioned at an early date. On the other hand, details which
M. Young gives in his book as to the several damaging interferences of the
London Admiralty with Admiral Beatty's freedom of action are held to
reflect unfavorably on the soundness of the present French naval organiza-
tion for war, in virtue of which all our squadrons and flotillas are to move
exclusively according to orders from Paris. In the last war Admiral de
Lapeyrére deliberately disregarded orders that Minister Augagneur, an ex-
ceedingly clever surgeon, but totally ignorant of ships, wired him to make
haste and with 20-knot battleships promptly catch the 28-knot Goeben and
Breslau.
The battle cruiser question is anew under investigation in Admiralty
quarters. To compete solely in 10,000-ton Washington limit cruisers would
be for France a losing game, since her present financial straits preclude the
possibility of her ever possessing numbers adequate to her needs. To make
up for inferior numbers French scientific genius must be allowed free scope
of action, as it was when Dupuy de Lôme threw all rivals into obsolescence
by creating the first steam battleship (Le Napoléon) and the first armored
frigate (La Gloire), and when de Bussy achieved similar success with his
epoch-making 6,300-ton Dupuy de Lôme, prototype of all croiseurs cuirasses.
Now, from a technical standpoint we have come back to a situation similar
to that of 1890. In those times there were only two great navies : namely,
the British and the French, and the British was building, wholesale, pro-
tected cruisers designed for broadside fighting. A victorious retort of de
Bussy was to encase completely the hull and armament of the Dupuy de
Lôme in light armor (110 mil.), then proof against 6-inch projectiles at
fighting range, and to distribute the eight single-gun turrets for end-on
tactics, that are, of course, the tactics of the weaker side. The Dupuy de
Lôme was a stroke of genius (in certain respects more original and more
creditable than the Dreadnought, that was mainly a miracle of size).
Retrospective and comparative investigation causes the Dupuy de Lôme de-
sign to be more admired now than she was at the time of her creation.
Thirty years ago British publicists were fond of expending ready wit on the
score of her ugliness (which was beauty when compared with today's
cruisers), but acknowledged her formidable strength.


  p. 1262 (#170)                      #

1262
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Therefore, the problem that the Section Technique is called upon to solve
consists in finding a modern counterpart to the Dupuy de Lôme capable of
throwing into relative obsolescence the two dozen unarmored 33-35-knot
croiseurs leger built or building. A result of that sort cannot be achieved
out of displacements inferior to 10,000 tons. Armored cruisers of under
10,000 tons, which would be enlarged copies of the excellent Latouche-
Treville (4,700 tons, complete armor with eight turrets, rather low free-
board, and reduced visibility), and in which extra protection would be
obtained at the expense both of the number of guns and of speed, would be
a doubtful investment, being powerless both to escape from the deadly grip
of 31-33-knot battle cruisers of the Hood and Renown and Tiger-Kongo
types and to catch 34-knot cruisers of the Kent-Trieste-Omaha classes.
Moreover, the new 8-inch weapons that will arm 10,000-ton Washington-
limit cruisers are vastly superior to the 20 and 21 centimeter guns employed
in the Great War, and it must not be thought that light armoring on pre-war
lines would do against them. Again, the advent of large sea-worthy de-
stroyers and of tempest-proof flying boats render close or even moderate
range unlikely in future contests. On this latter point, however, it is only
right to say that artificial cloud and camouflage tactics open new possi-
bilities and offer wide scope for surprises. Here, indeed, is the best argu-
ment for small tough armored cruisers of some 8,000 tons, 27 knots, and
six long-caliber 203 mil. guns.
A far better solution, however, is open the Section Technique as the
result of the right France has, under the Washington Agreement, to replace
the lost battleship France by 35,000 tons of capital ships. A 35,000-ton
counterpart to the British Nelson-Rodney type would only give emphemeral
worth to the obsolete Toulon battle squadron. Two 17,500-ton croiseurs de
combat of 35 knots, able in a seaway to catch up to 10,000-ton Washington
cruisers of however great paper speed and to crush them under the terrific
salvoes of eight weapons of 12-inch hore in quadruple turrets disposed for
end-on fire and for anti-chemical warfare, would for several years give to
France speed and caliber supremacy combined, especially as two more
croiseurs de combat of that class could be laid down in 1927. Long-range
salvo firing is considered by French specialists to be the key to the artillery
problem, and no longer mere caliber. To that end the quadruple turret is
to be revived, all the more so as recent experiments have shown it to offer,
at a minimum of cost, a maximum of offensive and defensive efficiency.
Of course, it would also be open to France to invest her 70,000 tons of
armored tonnage (1926-27) in six petits cuirassés de croi sière of 11,700
tons, 33 knots, four 9.4-inch long-caliber weapons, outranging the Wash-
ington type of cruisers and, at long range, being proof against 8-inch guns,
but it would be an inferior compromise and more costly in every way.
French Naval Policy
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 20 May, 1925.-
The French Senate has sanctioned a “special credit” for new naval con-
struction during the course of the present financial year. It is a surprisingly
modest contribution, totalling only 33,000,000 francs, or little more than
one third of a million sterling. The program toward which it forms an
instalment comprises one light cruiser, three destroyers of the high sea, four
coastal torpedo boats, seven submarines, two submarine and one surface
minelayers, and one aircraft carrier. Naval construction is, relatively, con-
siderably more costly in France than in this country, and so it is abundantly
clear that very little progress will be made with these proposed vessels dur-
ing the current year.


  p. 1263 (#171)                      #

19251
1263
Professional Notes
No doubt there is a political reason at the back of this apparent modesty.
France is courting the financial good will of the United States. Apart from
the fact that President Coolidge is reported to be steadily working to bring
about another Washington Conference, if France were to undertake any
heavy naval expenditure at the present juncture she would be manifestly
weakening her plea of inability to pay her debts, and the necessity to in-
crease them.
The naval policy of France must always hold a very direct interest for
this country. True, it is an interest of quite a different character from
that which had existed as an immemorial tradition down to the era of the
entente cordiale. No longer is it the interest of rivalry, but of friendly con-
cern as to how far our next door neighbor is maintaining her place in the
balance of armed sea strength. That such a situation as arose in August,
1914, when the British fleet alone stood between the German Navy and the
French coast, is likely to recur in our time is inconceivable. But some day,
and well in our time, the German Navy will begin to expand again, and it
is eminently desirable that from the very day this process starts France
should not only be a long lap ahead, but in a position to remain so.
The new French program, in a very limited way, follows the doctrines of
the Jeune Ecole—the “Mosquito School," as it has been termed in this
country. It is purely a defensive program. Even as such, it is so inade-
quate, bearing in mind what very trifling progress can possibly be made with
it during the present year, that we must look beyond it and try and form
conclusions as to the French view of sea power. It is true that at the .
present time France has a larger number of submarines, built or projected,
than any other naval power, but she appears to be following very much the
principle that was illustrated in the case of our own Frobisher and Effing-
ham, so that this big underwater armada, categorically shown in the official
returns, is likely to remain only a paper force for some years to come. This
again is probably the result of financial stringency.
What I regard as probable is that France has arrived at a stage of com-
plete dubiety as to the future of naval warfare, and is marking time until
that future begins to unfold. Whether this is a wise policy I am not pre-
pared to say, but it is quite possible that it may react upon other naval
powers.
In the first place it seems tolerably clear that France has renounced the
capital ship. There is a small and influential body of French opinion which
is urging a return to battleship construction, but it is little more than a
voice in the wilderness. The Republic will continue to maintain such battle-
ships as remain to her so long as they are seaworthy (none of them can be
deemed war-worthy now by existing standards), but that she will replace
them as they fall into obsolescence is more than doubtful. Is she not setting
an example in this which may presently bear definite fruit with the other
great sea' powers? Italy has frankly abandoned the battleship, probably
for very much the same reasons which have induced France to do so.
Russia is negligible in this consideration. Germany must remain prob-
lematical for years to come, but I anticipate that the conclusions which in-
fluence the other great sea powers will be precisely the conclusions to which
Germany would come.
In the case of the Big Three, we have come to a hiatus which may yet
prove a definite break. Great Britain is building two battleships: when
they are completed neither she, nor the United States, nor Japan can lay
down any more capital ships for another seven years under the Washington
Treaty, except for the purposes of replacement, under very rigid conditions.
In other words, the Big Three cannot increase their capital ship strength
during the next seven years. When the Neilson and Rodney are ready to


  p. 1264 (#172)                      #

1264
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
take their place in the British fleet, four ships of the Iron Duke class have
to be removed from the Navy List.
We have already reached a stage when the value of the capital ship is a
subject of much uncertainty. During the next seven years that phase of
uncertainty may crystallize into definite conclusions. I believe it is true to
say that Great Britain, the United States and Japan are now maintaining
capital ships more from rivalry than from any policy of absolute conviction.
One cannot renounce them unless the others do, and for one to suggest it
may give rise to a mistaken impression.
The alleged view of the late Sir Percy Scott's midshipman, that the
battleship is "no damned good” is, of course, ridiculous, but the whole
tendency of sea warfare is to become more mobile and more elusive. The
stately old fleet action grows steadily more improbable as a decisive feature
of the future naval conflict, if only because of the ever-increasing difficulty
of forcing a reluctant enemy to come forth and accept battle. Meanwhile,
we find the naval ratios changing while the capital ship position remains
static. Captain Knox, of the United States Navy, has pointed out that the
real purpose of the Washington Agreement is becoming entirely neutralized.
Sea power has now to be measured in a new rule of values.
If a new Washington Conference is convened within the next seven
years, and the United States boldly proposes that the capital ship be aban-
doned, it seems more than likely that France and Italy would readily concur.
The attitude of Japan is problematical. The course of events does not sug-
gest that she is likely to receive with enthusiasm any proposals which
emanate from the United States. On the other hand, if America abandoned
the battleship Japan could certainly afford to do so. Her rôle in the Pacific
is likely to be a defensive one. That is to say, in any war into which she
might be drawn, her policy would be to await attack, in the zone of her own
choice, and as remote from all enemy bases as possible. To such a stra-
tegic purpose her present program of "numbers and mobility” is well suited.
Our own position in the matter, I imagine, will be that of a disposition to
agreement. In other words, I can hardly believe that Great Britain would
stand out for the retention of the capital ship if all the other principal naval
powers concurred in the proposal to abandon her. Naturally, there will be
an instinctive recoil from the idea of breaking with such a great tradition,
but no confusion of sentiment must be permitted to obscure the strictly
practical question. The enforced inactivity of the battle fleets during the
Great War was an object lesson which challenges serious reflection. “Silent
pressure" was all very well in the days when it kept the enemy fleet shut
up in his ports, but the submarine, the destroyer, and the fast cruiser have
changed all that. Sea war tends to become more of a guerilla business,
mainly directed against commerce. The grand fleet was impotent to arrest
the German ( boat campaign, which came dangerously near to accomplish-
ing its purpose. France, I believe, clearly realizes the purport of that les-
son, and this is why her naval policy—or more strictly speaking, her naval
building programs—must have a particular interest for other sea powers.
French Foreign Trade
The Engineer, 24 April, 1925.— The returns of foreign trade during the
first three months of the year show a declension in the values of imports
and exports as compared with the figures for the corresponding period of
1924. On analyzing the returns, however, it is seen that they are far more
favorable than could have been anticipated in view of the heavy duties im-
posed upon French goods imported into Germany since the beginning of the
year. If Germany is taking less it is evident that more is being sent to
other markets. So far as imports are concerned the total value of 9,825


  p. 1265 (#173)                      #

1925)
1265
Professional Notes
million francs was 391 million francs below the figure for the first three
months of 1924. There was a decline in foodstuffs and more particularly in
raw material, especially coal. The value of exports totalled 10,920 million
francs, a decline of 53 millions; but this was due entirely to foodstuffs,
many descriptions of which are not allowed to be exported, and the returns
would seem to imply that France is consuming her own agricultural products
instead of sending them away and purchasing others to make up for a deficit.
There was a notable increase in the value of manufactured goods exported,
the total of 6,535 million francs being 154 millions more than in the first
quarter of last year. Raw material exports amounted to 3,035 million francs,
an augmentation of 9,420,000f. The increases in manufactured goods were
due largely to iron and steel, textiles and motor cars. When studying
quantities it is observable that out of a total of 11,440,920 tons of imports
raw material was responsible for 10,130,875 tons, and there was a reduction
in the total of 1,695,053 tons. The exports amounted to 7,883,111 tons, an
increase of 1,304,722 tons. This augmentation was due principally to raw
material, which accounted for 6,493,192 tons, while the quantity of manu-
factured goods sent away was 1,040,251 tons, an increase of 83,517 tons.
GERMANY
Regulation-Lights and Rules of the Road for Rotorships
Hansa, 7 March, 1925.-On January 30, 1925, the Minister for Trade and
Commerce of the Reich addressed the following communication to the
Deutsche Seeschiffahrtstag:
Tests of Flettner's rotor system for the utilization of wind-pressure for
the propulsion of ships on the high seas have now progressed sufficiently to
show that the system is of practical utility, and that the experimental ship
Buckau will make further voyages overseas.
The rotorship is distinguished externally by two revolving turrets or
towers, 15 m. high and about 3 m. in diameter, one of which is fitted for-
ward (on the forecastle), the other aft (on the poop). In addition to the
towers (rotors) the ship is fitted with a motor, which drives a propeller.
On her future voyages the rotorship will meet other ships at sea, more
than hitherto, and it therefore becomes necessary to clearly define the posi-
tion of the rotorship and her action at sea, with respect to the Rules of the
Road, corresponding to the international regulations for preventing colli-
sions at sea.
Legislative enactment of special regulations cannot be hurried, as first
of all practical experience will have to be gained and collected. Therefore,
the following guiding rules are laid down as an experimental measure to
meet the case of applying the Rules of the Road at Sea to rotorships, said
regulations being published in the Nachrichten für Seefahrer (compare with
page 268 of Hansa.)
1. When the ship is using the motor, the vessel is, in the sense of the
Rules of the Road, to be regulated in the light of a steamer, even though
the rotors are also being used at the same time. The regulations for
steamers will be obeyed in every particular.
2. When the ship is sailing solely by wind power with the aid of the
rotors, the vessel is to be regarded as a sailing ship in the sense of the Rules
of the Road, in the daytime, however, excepting the provisions of Article 17.
The regulations for sailing ships will be obeyed with the sole exception
that the rotorship, on account of her greater maneuvering capacity, will,
in the daytime, make way for every other sailing ship.
The black ball hoisted on the light-mast over the stem on steamers, in
accordance with Article 14 of the Rules of the Road, will also be hoisted,
notwithstanding the exception aforesaid.


  p. 1266 (#174)                      #

1266
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
At night the rotorship, if using rotors only, will act as a sailing ship,
and will carry sailing ship lights only.
3. In foggy weather the motor will always be used. The ship will act
as a steamer.
All other seagoing ships are advised to take note of these rules carried
out by rotorships, and to maneuver their ships accordingly, in order to
avoid getting into dangerous situations.
I respectfully request that the question of the action of rotorships in the
light of the Rules of the Road at Sea be made the subject of discussion in
seafaring circles, and that the outcome of these discussions be communicated
to me in due course.
The board of the Seeschiffahrtstag remitted this communication to a
committee with the request to report. This committee was composed of the
following gentlemen: President: Captain A. Simonsen, Hamburg, Director
Reichenbacher, Hamburg-American Line, Inspector Peterson, (F. Lacisz,
Shipowner, Hamburg) Chief Harbor Master Oertel, Hamburg, Captain
Coltzan, Hamburg, and reported as follows:
1. Rotorships are to be regarded in the same light as motor sailing
ships (and sailing ships with auxiliary engine), and should be subject to
the same Rules and Regulations, that is to say, a rotorship which sails with
the help of her "sailing turrets” only, is to be considered a sailing ship;
when the ship, however, uses the motor and propeller only or in conjunction
with the turrets, the ship is to be considered a steamer, in the sense of the
Rules of the Road at Sea.
2. Rotorships, when sailing with rotors only (that is to say as sailing
ships), shall hoist, in accordance with Article 14 of the Rules of the Road
at Sea, instead of the black ball, a black cone at least 65ctm. high and in
diameter.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ABOVE PROPOSALS
In re 1) The regulations for rotorships which the Ministry for Com-
merce and Trade proposes to issue (II S No 457 II dng of January 30,
1925) order, that the rotorship is to be regarded as a steamer, in the sense
of the Rules of the Road at Sea, when using engine and propeller, even
when the rotors are also being used. This is in keeping with present regu-
lations applicable to motor sailing ships (and sailing ships with auxiliary
engine). The regulations of the Ministry of Commerce and Trade propose,
however, to impose upon the rotorship the duty, even when sailing solely by
wind power with the rotors, of making way in the daytime for every other
sailing ship, whereas as against steamers, the ship in these circumstances is
to be regarded as a sailing ship. At night, however, under the same con-
ditions, she is to be sailing ship entirely, carrying sailing ship's lights. That
would place rotorships in the position of hybrids, and would lead to all sorts
of confusion and dangerous complications. Then again, the regulation
suggested, that the rotorship, sailing without the engine, shall in the day-
time make way for all sailing ships, but at night shall act as a sailing ship
entirely, would create grave situations on the border line between night
and day (dawn and twilight), inasmuch as, in the moment of sunrise or
sunset respectively, the duty to give way would under certain circumstances
automatically pass from one ship and be imposed upon another.
It is also wrong from the point of seamanship and impracticable to de-
mand of a rotorship, sailing "close hauled" (against the wind) with rotors
only, that she shall give way to sailing ships sailing with a fair wind and
aft. That is a regulation prejudicing the rotorship, for which there is no
justification, as the rotorship is every bit as much dependent upon the wind
as any other sailing ship, even though she can sail closer to the wind than a
ship with yards and square sails, but that is a feature possessed by fore and
aft schooners and yachts also.


  p. 1267 (#175)                      #

1925]
1267
Professional Notes
Confused and ill-defined, and consequently dangerous regulations are a
serious menace to the safety of shipping. The regulations suggested, more-
over, constitute an unnecessary oppression and prejudice for rotorships.
The committee has therefore arrived at the conviction that nothing but the
application to rotorships of the regulations as at present in force for motor
sailing ships will assure clear, distinct and unambiguous conditions, and the
committee therefore feels impelled earnestly to recommend the adoption
of the regulations it has proposed, all the more so, as allowance must be
made for the fact, that in all probability there will sooner or later be
rotorships having neither engine nor propeller.
The "practical" experience with the ministry's provisional regulations
would probably have to be dearly paid for by shipping, and prove to be a
serious obstacle in the way of economic exploitation of this new German
invention. It is also not to be expected that the other seafaring nations will
agree to such regulations, and consequently they would be nothing but a
source of trouble and danger for the rotorships.
The regulation that the rotorship shall always use the auxiliary engine
in foggy weather is also an unnecessary burden, and not always practicable,
inasmuch, as we have already stated, as there will be rotorships that have
no auxiliary engines.
In re 2) It is absolutely necessary for other ships to be able to dis-
tinguish at all times and instantly, whether a rotorship is using the engine
and propeller or not. In other words, whether she is sailing as a steamer
or as a sailing ship. As from the bridge of other ships it is impossible to
see whether the rotors are in use, or whether they alone are in use, the
rotorship must carry a signal when sailing with rotors only, and it is sug-
gested that the signal be in the form of a black cone. It appears necessary
to decide upon the cone, as in the prospective “Traffic Regulations for Ger-
man Seawater Ways and Routes, Section I," a black ball has been selected
as the signal for ships at anchor, and a black cylinder as the signal for
right of way.
The committee also feels constrained to express its opinion to the effect,
that Article 14 of the Rules of the Road at Sea, seeing that owing to de-
velopments in shipping it is utterly outpaced and antiquated, calls for speedy
amendment; above all, the following sentence should be stricken out:
".... but sails with funnel upright in position.” Nowadays, many motor
sailing ships do not carry the black ball, simply because they have not got
a funnel, and consequently do not take the regulation as applying to them-
selves. At present, therefore, there is, in the case of a sailing motor sail-
ing ship, no possibility of determining whether she is using her engine
also, and consequently should be treated as a steamer.
A revision of Article 14 is therefore an absolute necessity, and the com-
mittee is of opinion that the consideration of this question should be taken
in hand as soon as possible.
UNITED STATES
America's Naval Policy-A British View
By Sir Herbert Russell, The Naval and Military Record, 13 May, 1925.-
In the course of the next few weeks, on the conclusion of grand maneuvers
around the Sandwich Islands, the United States Pacific fleet is proceeding
to Australia. The tour, of course, is in the nature of a friendly visit. It
was decided upon without consultation with Australia, for on being ques-
tioned upon the matter the Commonwealth Premier said that he had seen
the statements in the press and had written to the Navy Department at
Washington to inquire whether they were correct. No doubt the explana-
tion for this is that the press statements were premature.


  p. 1268 (#176)                      #

1268
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
No naval force of the size and power of the Pacific fleet has ever before
visited a foreign country. While the friendly nature of the occasion is
fully realized in Great Britain, it is not unnatural that there should be a
disposition to look rather beyond this aspect of it. “Flag showing" is usually
practiced by single ships or light squadrons. When it is carried out by the
most modern battle fleet in the world, public interest becomes focused upon
the sea power and the sea policy of the navy to which that fleet belongs.
The United States has never, as far as I am aware, vouchsafed any
definition of her naval policy, but we may infer this from her distribution
of naval force and the general character of her naval maneuvers. Since
the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 she has regarded the Pacific as
her cardinal zone. Her Atlantic fleet was reduced in order to strengthen the
Pacific fleet, and under the scheme of war organization the two are re-
garded as a unified command, since under normal conditions they could
link up on either seaboard within a very few days.
That the opening of the Panama Canal imparted a great and progressive
stimulus to American trade with the Far East and Australasia, as well as
with the western South American ports, is a matter of common knowledge.
Possibly, it is not generally recognized in this country how vast this volume
of trade has become, nor how essential it is to American prosperity. Adverse
exchanges are likely to adversely affect the European markets for years to
come. By the time Europe recovers from this economic blight her markets
will be flooded with her own manufactures. Looking east, the prospect is
not very attractive to United States industry; looking west (that is to
say, toward Australia and the Far East) it is far more promising.
Commercial interest, or national prosperity, if a more euphonious term be
sought, is the basis of all modern military policy. National defense simply
means the safeguarding of possessions of such value as to excite the envy of
less prosperous countries. The element of personal quarrels no longer de-
cides war; it has become much too vast and costly an undertaking to be
waged on such grounds. No doubt sentiment makes all the difference be-
tween a popular war and an unpopular one. The decision of this country
to enforce the sanctity of a treaty was a popular one, but behind this direct
casus belli with Germany lay the perception that the doctrine of Deutsch-
land über alles must be scotched, otherwise we should be one of the alles.
On these grounds, then, the Pacific claims the attention of the United
States in just the same way as the Mediterranean claims our attention, but
there is this difference in the comparison, France and Italy having renounced
the relative status of first class naval powers, there is no question of rivalry
in our naval dominance of the Middle Sea. Japan remaining a first class
naval power, and, what is more, a Pacific power, it becomes difficult to
dissociate United States naval policy from the idea of rivalry with her.
Great Britain has interests in the Pacific which are quite as vast as those
of the United States, but there is this distinction. The bulk of British
Pacific trade is with the Empire ; nearly the whole of the United States
Pacific trade is with foreign countries. We have to consider the protection
of great territories; the United States is only concerned with very little
territories. On the other hand, we have this advantage: inter-Empire trade
is not susceptible to prejudicial influences from alien treaties as is foreign
trade. Therefore, Japan as a sea power in the Pacific does not stand in
quite the same relation to ourselves that she does to the United States, unless
indeed we choose to think of her as possibly harboring designs upon British
Empire territories, which is an idea I do not imagine anybody contemplates
very seriously..
Strategically, Japan is so remote from the United States that the notion
of her sea power constituting a menace to her western shores is rather
extravagant. If, in the event of war, she could successfully attack the


  p. 1269 (#177)                      #

1925]
1269
Professional Notes
Panama Canal, and render it even temporarily impassable, it would cer-
tainly be a tremendous coup, but the "if" is altogether too colossal to be
gravely entertained.
Frankly, I do not see why American naval policy need threaten an ulti-
mate conflict with Japan, save with one reservation, to which I will come
later. A dominant navy must dominate somewhere. The Pacific is the
natural sphere for United States naval activity. It is likewise the inevitable
sphere for Japanese naval activity, but the Pacific is such a vast ocean that
there is room for both navies without any apprehension that an ultimate
clash must necessarily result. From Plymouth to New York is only about
half the distance of from Yokohama to San Francisco, yet both Great
Britain and the United States maintain Atlantic fleets without any idea of
rivalry-unless in the minds of such unaccountable people as Mr. William
Shearer.
But the reservation of which I have spoken is the one shadow on the
horizon. Japanese policy in China is viewed with anything but favor in the
United States. Japan pleads ethnological needs as her justification. Trade
competition is not disposed to admit any justification for a policy which
thwarts it. China is like a weakened giant sinking to his knees. Some day
there may be intervention on the part of the powers to save his body from
dismemberment, and set him on his legs again. This will be the danger
point. Self-interest is bound to disclose itself at such a juncture. Japan
wants, and simply must have, room for the expansion of her over-teeming
population, and she must have trade if her economic future is to develop.
She is finding both in China, and is steadily exploiting opportunity. The
United States has become so imbued with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine
that she resents Japanese penetration of China. She is likely to resent it
more as the effects manifest themselves upon American trade. How far
this situation may become a grave menace to peace none will venture to
say. The time is not yet, although intervention in China might precipitate it.
I believe popular opinion in Australia rather inclines to the American
view in regard to this problem. Australia is distrustful of Japan. She has
no definite cause for being so, only the fact that at any time the Japanese
Navy could have Australia at its mercy. The attitude of Australia on the
Singapore question is pretty good evidence of her frame of mind. Let us
admit at once that were it not for Australia we certainly should not be
troubling ourselves about Singapore.
The United States, of course, is perfectly aware of the Australian view
on the subject of Pacific sea power. America realizes that Australia will
see in the visit of the Pacific fleet a further assurance of security against
any "Yellow Peril." America may also assume that the "Yellow Peril"
itself will take the hint. One thing it is impossible to deny: the visit to
Australia gives very definite point to the strategic scheme of the maneuvers
which the Pacific fleet is carrying out before proceeding there. That scheme
postulates joining issue with Japanese sea power.
The Pacific fleet is perfectly free to visit Australia, and Australia is
perfectly free to warmly welcome the Pacific fleet, without any reference
at all to the Mother Country, yet the British Navy becomes politically in-
volved in the event. Already certain Japanese newspapers have referred to
it as something more than a mere coincidence, following so soon upon the
restoration of the Singapore scheme. Scarcely had the Conference of Ad-
mirals concluded at Singapore before the whole of the United States Asiatic
fleet arrived at the port on a visit of several days' duration. Can we alto-
gether wonder that Japanese national opinion is beginning to find tangible
evidence of an Anglo-American "understanding" on the subject of the naval
hegemony of the Pacific?


  p. 1270 (#178)                      #

1270
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
It may be American naval policy to foster such an impression. In her
portentous "aloofness" the United States tells the little outside world noth-
ing, and therefore opinion must seek its own conclusions. A war with
America, Japan would certainly not like, but she would not shirk it as the
alternative to being “cribbed, cabined and confined" from what she deems
to be her proper place in the world. A war with America and the British
Empire she could scarcely contemplate. The odds are too impossible for
mere heroism and "bushido” to face.
But, there is another point of view not to be wholly disregarded in this
consideration: the point of view of the British Empire. Australia may,
and probably does, concur in the American conception, as I understand it.
Is the presumptive Australian view that the British Navy is not perfectly
adequate, and perfectly ready, to protect Australia an impression to be
allowed to go by default? I do not think that any such conception can be
good for the British Empire. Observe, Singapore is a scheme obviously
undertaken primarily for the benefit of Australia, yet the little settlement
of Hong-kong is voluntarily bearing the cost of the first year's work.
Australia may some day be doing more buying and selling with America
than with Great Britain. That would be quite in the legitimate order of
things, but any policy which implicates the British Navy is the business of
the entire British Empire. The people who cheered the special service
squadron in Sydney a year ago must have felt this at the time.
I may be reading into the pending visit of the Pacific fleet far more than
entered into the contemplation of those who organized it, but a great battle
fleet is an instrument of world significance, and when it does anything out-
side of the normal course, reflection gets busy. In any case, the event is a
great demonstration of American sea power. Australia will enjoy the mag-
nificent sea pageant, although incidentally I should not wonder if harbor
authorities are not a little worried as to how they are to berth or moor con-
siderably over one hundred warships.
We cannot ever divest a warship of her real character. Nelson said that
a British frigate is the best negotiator in Europe, since she always spoke to
be understood. She may be the best possible harbinger of friendship, but
when she goes avisiting, not singly, but in squadrons, she inevitably assumes
a political significance which may be interpreted in more ways than one.
We may employ some of our weapons to salute a neighboring state, but we
do not bring out the bulk of our armory for the purpose. Suppose the
Japanese Minister of Marine were to announce that the entire battle fleet of
his country proposed to pay a visit of friendship to Manila in July next,
I wonder what the United States Press would make of it. I do not question
that the Japanese fleet would receive a most hospitable welcome, but would
there not be just a little consternation at such a prodigious manifestation
of amicable feeling ?
Last Word on the 5-5-3 Ratio
The Scientific American, May, 1925.-We have before us a copy of the
recent hearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appro-
priations-a volume of 1,000 pages—which contains the most complete data
on the Navy that we have ever seen in a document of this character. The
Secretary of the Navy and the officers at the heads of departments were
subjected to a very searching examination, particularly as to the status of
our treaty battleship fleet, and the public is now put in possession of the
facts.
The hearing constitutes a complete refutation of the propaganda of the
past few years, which sought to persuade the American public that our
battleship fleet was far below the standing of five in the treaty allocation


  p. 1271 (#179)                      #

1925]
1271
Professional Notes
of 5-5-3 to the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The most startling
disclosure is that of the enormous range of the guns of the 32,600-ton battle-
ships which would lead our fleet into battle. These ranges are from 34,500
yards to 35,700 yards. So far as we know, this is the first time these figures
have been made public, and they constitute a knockout blow to those who
have claimed that our fleet is outranged and outspeeded by any other fleet.
As a matter of fact, the "boot is on the other leg," for the extreme range
of the latest British battleships is only 24,300 yards, or from 10,000 to
11,000 yards less than that of our leading ships. The enormous significance
of this is seen from the following considerations.
It is universally agreed that, as in the great war, so in any war of the
future, battleship actions will be fought with the respective feets drawn
up in two parallel lines, or, as it is technically known, "in column." No
matter how high may be the speed of individual ships, the speed of the
whole column as such will be governed by that of the slowest ship in the
fleet. This speed is about the same in the two fleets, the slowest American
ship being credited with a speed of 20.5 knots and the slowest British ship
with a speed of 21 knots. It is probable that, in the unlikely event of a naval
battle between us and the British, the two fleets would settle down to a speed
CAPITAL SHIPS OF THE UNITED STATES
Turret Guns
Name of Ship
Diameter of
Bore in Inches
Maximum Angle of
Elevation in Degrees
Length in
Calibers
Range in
Yards
Speed in
Knots
Displacement
in Tons
21.2
.......
West Virginia.
Colorado.......
Maryland.
California .....
Tennessee.......
Idaho..............
New Mexico.
Mississippi
Arkansas ........
Wyoming.......
Arizona .........
Pennsylvania....
Oklahoma......
Nevada
New York....
34,500
34,500
34,500
35,500
35,700
24,000
24,000
24,000
24,350
23,500
21,000
21,000
21,000
21,000
21,000
21,000
22,000
21,600
21.4
21.1
21.7
21.4
21.3
21.1
21.1
21.1
21.2
21.0
21.1
20.6
32,600
32,600
32,600
32,300
32,300
32,000
32,000
32,000
26,000
26,000
31,400
31,400
27,500
27,500
27,000
27,000
21,825
21,825
20.5
Texas...
21.5
21.0
22.1
21.0
Florida
Ulah ........
Grant Total.
525,850


  p. 1272 (#180)                      #

1272
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
of about 20 knots. The British line includes five 25-knot ships and four
battle cruisers credited with speeds of 29 to 31.5 knots. Whatever might
happen during the approach of the two feets, it is certain that when they
fell into line for the great test, these faster vessels would have to hold their
speeds down to the fleet fighting speed of 20 knots.
If the weather is clear, and we will suppose it is, and if airplane and
general scouting information has been ample and correct, the two fleets will
deploy into column before they come within range. Thereafter they will
approach each other on more or less converging courses. Now let us see
what would happen. The head of the British line, containing their latest
ships of the Royal Sovereign class, would come under the fire of the head
of our line at a distance of over seventeen and a half miles, or at a distance
where their own 15-inch guns, firing at maximum elevation, would drop
their shells 10 to 11,000 yards, or five to five and a half miles, short of the
American line. They would not dare to come in end-on, because in that
position they would be raked by our salvos, and in spite of the dispersion
of the falling shells, a single eight-gun salvo might drop from three to
half-a-dozen shells upon the deck of any ship thus approaching. Hence, the
approach would be made on a converging course, and instead of fifteen
minutes it would take some twenty-five minutes or more for the British to
get within range. During all that time they would be exposed to heavy
shell fire of a most devastating character to which they could make no reply.
With our system of fire control, and assuming airplane spotting to be pos-
sible, it would be possible to drop between 1,000 and 1,200 shells upon the
leading ships of the British line before they could get in close enough to
return our fire.
It is surely no exaggeration to say that, under existing circumstances,
if our fleet were able to maintain airplane spotting, the head of the British
line would be crumpled up and either severely crippled or put entirely out
of the fight before it could get within hitting range.
At the fleets continued to close in, the British with a range of 24,300
yards, and the next five of our ships with from 23,500 to 24,000 yards,
would engage each other. At this time our eight older ships with 21,000 to
22,000 yards range would be outranged by the opposing British ships by
from 1,800 yards to 2,800 yards. Our own line, of course, would close in
until these older ships could reach the enemy; but for several minutes the
tail end of the British line would have the advantage of ours. But this
temporary advantage of the enemy over our older ships, which would last
for four to six minutes, would not compensate for the fact that for twenty-
five minutes at the commencement of the action the best ships of the British
line had been subjected to an overwhelming gun fire to which they could
make no reply.
The British line would include four battle cruisers, of which the Hood
alone, with guns of 30,300 yards range and 12-inch armor, could stand up
to the fire of the 14-inch and 12-inch guns of our older ships. The other
three, Renown, Repulse and Tiger, with only 9-inch armor, would probably
share the fate of the three battle cruisers, that were sunk by 11-inch and
12-inch gun fire early in the battle of Jutland.
It is for these reasons that we are satisfied that the American public,
on looking a tthese two tables, will agree with us that, far from our fleet
being outranged, and outspeeded, we ourselves have the whiphand, and with
equal gunnery and equal seamanship could very reasonably count upon a
sweeping victory.
And let it be clearly understood that if the proposed elevation of all of
the guns of our fleet to thirty degrees were followed out, not merely our
"big five” but our whole fleet of eighteen ships would have the enemy under
fire for from fifteen up to twenty-five minutes before he could reach us.


  p. 1273 (#181)                      #

1925]
1273
Professional Notes
CAPITAL SHIPS OF THE BRITISH NAVY
Turrent Guns
Name of Ship
Maximum Angle of
Elevation in Degrees
Diameter
of Bore in
Inches
Length in
Calibers
Range in
Yards
Speed in
Knots
Displacement
in Tons
21.6
21.5
21.9
21.6
21.5
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
Royal Sovereign....
Royal Oak..
Revenge . ......
Resolution ...
Ramilies.
Molaya.......
Valiant...........
Barham ........
Oueen Elizabeth
Warspite .......
Hood........
Renown......
Repulse
Tiger .......
Benbow..................
Emperor of India.
Iron Duke
Marlborough.
Thunderer ......
King George...
Ajax.........
Centurion.......
&&&&&&&&&AAAA88888888
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
24,300
30,300
24,300
24,300
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
23,800
25,750
25,750
25,750
25,750
25,750
27,500
27,500
27,500
27,500
27,500
41,200
26,500
26,500
28,500
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
*22,500
*23,000
*23,000
*23,000
15
25.0
31.5
31.5
31.0
29.0
21.5
21.5
21.6
21.6
21.
21.4
15
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
13.5
21.1
21.9
Grand Total..
.580,450
* These four to be scrapped when Nelson and Rodney are completed, when total
will be 558,950, against United States 525,850; the extra tonnage allowed to offset
greater age of British Fleet.
Such a change would vitiate the nice balance which was determined upon
between our officers and those of the British in the selection of the respec-
tive battleship fleets, and would place us at an enormous fighting advantage.
It was brought out at the hearing that, with the exception of the Florida,
the boilers of the ships which had to reduce their speed in the Panama
maneuvers had been repaired and that these ships can now make their trial
speeds. The Florida is in port for similar repairs.
In conclusion, there are two duties which confront the United States-
first, to grant, without any reduction, the appropriations asked by the Navy
Department for repair work; and secondly, to bring our fleet up to treaty
strength in unarmed cruisers, fast scouts, airplane carriers and such vessels
as are not limited by treaty.


  p. 1274 (#182)                      #

1274
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
ENGINEERING
Great Future Predicted for Electric Propulsion
The Westinghouse News, 16 April, 1925.—Electricity, the miraculous
labor saver, wealth producer and greatest agent known to raise the stand-
ards of living, is continuously seeking new fields of application.
At times it brings in fads like radio, and with the swiftness of an over-
right conversion, establishes a new industry appealing to the imagination of
millions whom it daily serves with education, entertainment, comfort and
novelty. In the field of radio, electricity is changing the political aspect of
nations and is swiftly bringing about new international relations, inducing
foreign travel and establishing business and better social relations.
Radio broadcasting was the outgrowth of years of research and experi-
mentation, but the public paid little attention to these trying years. Those
professional organizations that years ago shunned it and tried to hide it for
fear of its probable effect on their systems of communication, today embrace
it closer than a brother as the fear of its power has been changed to a high
regard for its unexpected present and possible future developments.
The public mind is so filled with radio and its achievements that they
quite naturally overlook electricity conquering a new industry, the last one
of the great industries to give it a half a chance to demonstrate its unrivaled
energy, power and ability to achieve.
This industry is the marine industry which in its major part consists of
operating, loading and unloading ships. Tenaciously the ship owners clung
to sail for motive power as wind was the cheapest form of power. When
reciprocating engines were developed its chief opponents were those in favor
of the sail, but their arguments for the cheapest power was gradually over-
come as the faster and more reliable steamships gradually and then quite
suddenly almost entirely replaced the sail ship.
Economic conditions and good business reasons such as running on reg-
ular schedules was a handicap too great for the sail ships.
Electricity, the most restless of all forces, now engages this industry and
is applying its never-failing energy and power in all phases of work from
loading of a ship with greater ease, speed and safety, to controlling and
driving ships of all classes from 138-ton tug to a 43,500-ton displacement
airplane carrier.
Electricity has been installed for propulsion power on sixty-three ships,
according to a paper presented this morning, April 16, 9:30 A. M., by
H. Franklin Harvey, Jr., Electrical Engineer of the Newport News Ship-
building and Dry Dock Company and D. E. Thau, Marine Engineer of the
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company. All of these installa-
tions have been made since 1908 and their number embraces practically all
classes of ships-fire boats, barges, tug boats, ferry boats, auxiliary
schooners, sea-going yachts, river yachts, stern wheel river tow boats,
tankers, seagoing hopper dredges, river boats, dredges, passenger-cargo
ships, cargo vessels, fruit carriers, fuel ships, battle ships and airplane
carriers.
The outstanding feature of electric propulsion which included its various
forms, turbine-electric with alternating and direct current systems, Diesel-
electric propulsion with direct current system with single and double arma-
ture propulsion motors and pilot house control, was included in their com-
prehensive paper.
Practically all forms of ship propulsion, excepting sail, were reviewed in
order to show the advantages of turbine and Diesel-electric propulsion over
those of the reciprocating engine, turbine direct, turbine-gear and direct
Diesel drives.


  p. 1275 (#183)                      #

1925]
1275
Professional Notes
The principle objections to the reciprocating engines, especially for larger
installations, was said to be its weight, space factors and fuel cost. The
turbine-direct drive was declared only 62.75 per cent efficient as the turbines
and propellers must be run at compromised speeds. The direct turbine drive
is also said to have rather poor maneuvering qualities and was slow in stop-
ping when the screws were going full speed ahead. The turbine gear drive,
which is used in the speedy scout cruisers and destroyers, was regarded as
satisfactory where high-speed light turbine and low-speed propellers are
required on account of weight considerations. These considerations like-
wise were said to apply to low-speed cargo vessels where turbine geared
drive is in general lighter in weight, and where transmission efficiency is
probably better than that of the electric drive; the latter, however, was
said to almost equalize in efficiency when the losses in reversing were con-
sidered.
The direct Diesel drive, with its high fuel economy and other advantages,
at the present time has its limitations in size, capacity, reversing charac-
teristics and a slight compromise must be made as the efficient running speed
of the Diesel engine and the efficient speed of a propeller differs, but the
difference between these two is not great enough for the installation of re-
duction gears.
Electric ship propulsion, which has some special outstanding advantages
for all types of craft, finds its greatest advantages for application in ships
requiring a wide cruising radius reliability in machinery, refined control,
reserved power, Alexibility of machinery arangements and low consumption
of fuel when under way and particularly at port, was then discussed in
detail for barges, cable ships, cargo ships, certain naval crafts, coastwise
vessels, dredges, self-propelled, ferry boats, fire boats, fishing boats, lake
boats, liners, light ships, packets, river boats, tow boats, tug boats and yachts.
The outstanding features of the electrice drive included easy and clean
operation, low maintenance costs, accurate control, maneuvering and re-
versing characteristics, efficient speed reductions, quietness of operation and
the greatest power available required when the ship is retarded by heavy
seas, storms or when towing another ship or barges. Likewise the system
of meters recorded the slightest variation of operation making it possible
to correct defects before serious trouble resulted and ease of making re-
pairs at sea.
The torque of propulsion motor which gives additional power when re-
sistance of the propeller is greatest can practically only be compared with
a creek or river which develops the greatest power when it is dammed.
Likewise the propulsion of a tug boat and other electrically propelled craft
develops its greatest power when the ship is retarded by heavy seas and
quick maneuvering.
For turbine-electric drive, alternating current was said to be the most
efficient for high powers, while direct current has been successfully used in
ferry boats. The alternating current permits high voltages with less cur-
rent and consequently smaller inter-connecting cables. The electrical ma-
chinery used for turbo-electric installations are practically the same for
marine as land installations excepting that it is treated to withstand marine
conditions of moisture and salt.
For Diesel-electric drive, direct current has been used with practically all
of the thirty-four installations and was said to be decidedly simpler, more
flexible and reliable, afforded more refined control, provides greater power
in case of casualty to a generating unit and makes possible pilot house
control such as the Ward-Leonard system which is described the most
satisfactory and used in mostly all of the Diesel-electric installations to date.
Pilot house control which has the greatest safety factor where con-
siderable maneuvering is required in close waters, at the present time, is only


  p. 1276 (#184)                      #

1276
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
practical with Diesel-electric drive. On a certain steam tug where it was
necessary for the pilot to signal the engine-room crew for changes of engine
speed and direction, it was found that 566 signals passed between the pilot
house and the engine room during an eight-hour day. With the Diesel elec-
tric tug and Ward-Leonard system of pilot house control, engaged in the
same service, the pilot maneuvered his tug and tow through Cungested
traffic in the river and harbor almost as easily as the taxi driver in a busy
thoroughfare, but without any accidents or collisions as the propulsion
motors can be reversed from full speed ahead to full speed astern without
any danger of stripping gears or otherwise harming the propulsion
machinery.
"Electric drive," said Messrs. Harvey and Thau, "is still in its infancy
and it is to be expected that a longer period of development will still fur-
ther extend its field of application.
"Success of electric drive to date is beyond question and the widespread
interest is conclusive evidence of its indisputable merits and most promis-
ing future.
"The art of electrically propelled ships, while conceived many years ago,
is comparatively new in application and it is, of course, of gratification to
the pioneers that their early predictions are rapidly being fulfilled. After
this system has passed through the lengthy stage of development common
to other types of drive, the expectation of the most enthusiastic will un-
doubtedly be realized."
Aluminum as a Protective Coating for Gratebars
Power. In the March 28 issue of the Zeitschrift des Vereines deutscher
Ingenieure, Robert Hopfeld, director of the Metalisator A. G. of Hamburg,
tells of experiments with gratebars. Bars cast in the ordinary way of gray
iron, and chilled bars of the same shape with a mixture of steel, were used
simultaneously in a furnace in which, owing to the character of the coal,
the bars previously used had burned out rapidly.
After 600 hours of use in the furnace the chilled iron bars, as shown in
Fig. 1, had burned away to such an extent as hardly to be of further use.
The bars of ordinary gray iron were also badly burned, although for
some unapparent reason the wastage in their case was not so uniformly dis-
tributed over the length of the bar.
Although positive conclusions should not be drawn from a single test
in which some accidental condition may have had an important influence, the
evidence, as far as it goes, indicates that the ordinary gray-iron bar is not
more vulnerable than that with the chilled surfaces.
Considering the cause and manner of this rapid deterioration, the author
says that at high temperatures iron, especially wrought iron, is rapidly
oxidized in contact with air. As soon as the layer of oxide thus formed
reaches a sufficient thickness, it peels off and the oxidation continues upon
the newly exposed surface. Cast iron is not so sensitive to this action as
wrought iron, although cast iron oxidizes rapidly at temperatures in excess
of 750 deg C. (1,382 F.).
All coals contain more or less silica, which, combining with the iron
oxide, forms a slag that has a lower melting point than the iron itself. This
slag fastens itself upon the bar, and in consequence of its low melting point
acts as a flux for the as yet unattacked metal. When the spaces between
the bars become obstructed with this slag, the temperature is increased
locally by the consequent diminution of the air flow. The falling of fine
coal through the grate, and its combustion in the ashpit, further aggravates
the condition by heating the incoming air and subjecting the bars to the
heat of a fire below as well as above them.


  p. 1277 (#185)                      #

1925)
1277
Professional Notes
Phosphorus lowers the melting point of the iron. Sulphur in the unused
bar appears as small iron-sulphide crystals having a melting point of 1,210
deg C. (2,210 F.), and in this form does not materially hasten the fusing
of the metal. These crystals, however, in an amount of 0.2 per cent, make
the iron brittle and encourage flaking and the production of cracks and
fissures. For this reason it is desirable that iron that is to sustain high
temperatures should have a low surphur content. Analysis showed, however,
that the sulphur content had increased from 0.09 per cent in the unused t
0.95 per cent in the burnt bars.
From the foregoing it appeared that the life of the bars would be
lengthened if the formation of iron oxide and the increase of the sulphur
content could be prevented. This has been attempted by giving to the bars
a coating of aluminum which hinders, through the formation of aluminum
oxide, the oxidation of the iron and the absorption of sulphur.


FIG. 1-CHILLED BARS AFTER
600 Hours' SERVICE
Fig. 2—METALIZED BARS AFTER
600-HOUR TEST
In applying the process, which consists of spraying the aluminum on in a
molten conditions, the iron should be at a red heat, as the coating applied
to a cold surface is likely to include air, which, by its expansion when the
bar is heated, is likely to impair the integrity of the protective surface and
make the aluminum flake off.
Some of the gray-iron bars were thus treated, about 45 grams of alumi-
num being applied per meter length of bar, and these, simultaneously with
samples of the untreated bars, were subjected to a 600-hour test in the same
furnace. Their appearance at the end of the test is shown in Fig. 2.
Analyses of the sections after this exposure show comparatively imma-
terial changes in the composition of the section, especially as regards the
sulphur content.


  p. 1278 (#186)                      #

1278
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Steam or Oil Engines for Fast Ships?*
The Marine Engineer and Motorship Builder, May, 1925.-It is premature
to talk of the Diesel completely superseding the steam engine. The upper
limit of power of the Diesel engine is much below the upper limit for the
steam engine, so that at present there can be no supersession of machinery
above the Diesel's upper limit of power. High-speed warships of all types
cannot adopt the Diesel engine for this reason. Oil which has made the
Diesel a possibility has much increased the output and the economy of the
steam engine. The advantage of the Diesel over the steam engine is that
the oil has been more efficiently used in the cylinders of the Diesel than in
the furnaces of the boilers which supply the steam for the older type of
machinery, and the steam so produced has not had the same range of tem-
peratures to work in that the oil in the Diesel has had. But developments
are taking place in boilers and steam turbines which promise to remove
some of these differences in economic output. Sir Charles Parsons gave
some figures in a paper read at the World Power Conference in July, 1924,
in which he proposed steam turbines working at 500 pounds per square
inch pressure and 700° F. steam temperature driving propellers, through
reduction gearing, the steam being generated in water-tube boilers fitted with
air preheaters. This system is hereafter referred to as the H.P.T. type. It
is shown that an overall thermal efficiency may be obtained not much in-
ferior to the best results secured by the Diesel. Statesments of this kind
from such a high authority lead to the conclusion that we can either by the
steam or the Diesel engine obtain much more power per ton of fuel carried
and used than can be got in existing steamships.
Before we decide on the relative merits of steam and Diesel engines for
ship propulsion, we have to take into account:
(a) The relative first cost;
(b) The relative cost of Diesel and boiler fuel; and
(c) The relative working costs, including crew and maintenance.
The relative cost of boiler and Diesel oil fuel suitable for ship propul-
sion seems to be a variable quantity. The difference in cost varies from
nothing to twenty per cent in favor of the boiler-fuel oil. There are some
oils of about the same thermal efficiency which can be used in a boiler which
cannot or have not been used in a Diesel engine, and even if they are used
it has been estimated that the cost of the Diesel oil might be nearly twenty
per cent higher without being superseded by the oil suitable for a boiler.
It seems probable that for some time to come the oil fuel for the steam
engine will be cheaper than for the Diesel. The cost of the crew for the
Diesel-engine ship will most probably be less than for the turbine-driven
ship in high-powered machinery, but for powers below 10,000 horsepower
this does not seem to hold. As to the relative cost of maintenance and
repair, it is too early to dogmatize. These costs in the cases of the turbine
and boilers are known, and are not high. The number of moving parts of
a Diesel engine is large, and the liability to wear and damage is not small,
but until the latest types have been run at sea for some time we must wait
for, full knowledge on this subject. It is, therefore, not the Diesel alone
which will make existing steamers obsolete, but also developments in the
steam engine itself are very likely to produce the same results. The gain
in the Diesel over the steam engine is in the smaller consumption of oil per
unit of power, but the cost and weight of the Diesel are much greater than
the turbine installations using high-pressure steam in the way suggested by
Sir Charles Parsons.
* Abstract of Paper read by Sir John Biles, K.C.I.E., LL.D., D.Sc., at the Spring
Meetings of the Sixty-sixth Session of the Institution of Naval Architects, April 1.


  p. 1279 (#187)                      #

1925)
1279
Professional Notes
Take the case of the only Diesel ship of high speed which has been com-
pieted, the Aorangi, and compare its performance with that of a steamship
of about the same dimensions and power. The steamship is all oil-fired with
double-reduction turbines. The following are the leading particulars:
TABLE 1.—COMPARING DIESEL AND STEAM VESSELS OF ABOUT 20,000 Tons
DISPLACEMENT
Diesel (Aorangi) Steam
Dimensions .....
....... 580 ft. X 72 ft. X 546 ft. X 70 ft. X
46 ft. 7 in.
43 ft. 3 in.
Measured
Measured
Sea. Mile. Sea. Mile.
Draught, mean ....
26 ft. 51 in. 24 ft. io in. 25 ft.
Shaft horse-power ................ 12,200 12,400 12,050 13,885
Speed, knots ........ ....... 17.91 18.237 17.2 17.96
Displacement, tons ....
20,740
19,000 19,150
Consumption per shaft horse-power/
hour, in ths...
.......0.395 for main engines
0.036 for auxiliary
— engines
0.431
0.984
Consumption of oil for 3,000 nautical
miles (estimated from sea trial) 393 tons
923 tons
Estimated reserve feed water used
in 3,000 nautical miles ........... 28 tons
350 tons
Total weight of oil and water used
in 3,000 nautical miles .......... 421 tons
1,273 tons
Main gain in speed during voyage
due to reduction in weight of fuel
and oil on board ..... ....0.08 knot
0:23 knot
Equiva lent difference in shaft horse-
power during voyage if vessels run
at same speed .................. 1.4 per cent 4 per cent
Area on five decks due to machinery
openings ....................... about 14,000 sq. ft. 15,500 sq. ft.
Extra length of ship necessary to
give same area of decks exclusive
4.2 ft.
of machinery openings .......
It is claimed for the Diesel engine in passenger ships that more space is
available for passengers than in the steamships. We may judge of this by
observing the relative spaces occupied by machinery openings in the two
cases.
Three different types may now be considered:
(a) Diesel engines.
(b) Steam turbines of existing types of machinery and cylindrical
tubulous boilers.
(c) Steam turbines working at 500 pounds pressure and 700 degrees
temperature from water-tube boilers as proposed by Sir Charles
Parsons, called the H.P.T. type.
The weights of Diesel engines and those of type (b) are very much the
same. The weight of type (c) is from forty to fifty per cent less than (a).
It is generally claimed that the consumption of the Diesel is about 0:4 pound -
per shaft horsepower for the main engines. It is also claimed that for all
purposes in the Aorangi the consumption is 0.5 pound, the difference being
due to the auxiliary purposes for which power and steam are used in the


  p. 1280 (#188)                      #

1280
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
TABLE II.-COMPARATIVE WEIGHTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROPELLING MACHINERY FOR DIFFERENT LENGTHS
OF VOYAGE
Type
(a)
(b)
Steam
(c) (a)
| H.P.T. | Diesel
(b)
Steam
f(c) (a)
(c)
H.P.T. | Diesel | H.P.T.
(c)
Diesel
H.P.T.
20
20
0:7
0.5
27,000
*3.230
4,450
Sea speed, knots.....
Fuel per shaft horsepower ....
Shaft horsepower ...
Distance in nautical miles...
Weight of machinery..
Weight of feed water..
Weight of fuel......
Weight of machinery, fuel and water. . ]
Weight of half fuel and water...
Weight less half fuel and water. ......
Gain over Diesel in weight of machin-
ery, fuel and water........
Gain over Diesel less half fuel and water
20
0.5
27,000
6,460
4,450
109
1,947
6,506
1,028
5,478
20
1:0
28,000
6,460
4,250
1,507
4,037
9,794
2,772
7,022
3,288
loss
1,544
loss
55
27,000
6.460
2,700
727
2,725
6,152
1,726
4,426
354
20
1:0
28,000
3.230
4,250
754
2,018
7,022
1,386
5,636
1,544
loss
672
loss
20
0:7
27,000
3,230
2,700
364
1,362
4,426
863
3,563
1,052
17
0.5
13,500
3,230
2,650
32
572
3,254
302
2,952
17
0:7
13,500
3,230
1,300
214
802
2,316
508
1,808
938
18 .
0.7
16,900
3,230
1,600
253
948
2,801
600
2,201
973
5,478
514
4,964
453
1,052
1,401
1,144
751
Note.-H.P.T.=High-pressure turbine.


  p. 1281 (#189)                      #

1925)
1281
Professional Notes
ship. The amount of steam for auxiliary purposes naturally varies with the
kind of auxiliary machinery and purposes to which fuel is applied. In a
20,000-ton, 20-knot turbine, passenger ship the amount of water evaporated
per pound of oil fuel was measured with the boilers at full power. An esti-
mate of the fuel used for driving the auxiliaries in this ship is 0.15 pound
per oil per hour per shaft horsepower of main engines, and an estimate of
the fuel for auxiliaries in a 20,000-ton Diesel ship of 20 knots gives 0.107
pound per shaft horsepower per hour as the consumption. In the case of
the steamship, steam is used only for feed, air, general service, and circulat-
ing pumps for main and auxiliary condensers, for cooking, evaporator,
ship's heating, brine warming, hot salt- and fresh-water calorifiers. If
0-45 pound is used for Aorangi for all purposes, it seems as if either the
shaft horsepower at which the ship is running has been overestimated, or
that her auxiliaries are very much more efficient than in other ships. In
comparing the Diesel (a) with (b) and (c), the following figures have
been used for auxiliaries :
(a) 0:1
(b) 0.15
(c) 0:1
We may take the consumptions for main machinery as follows:
(a) 0:4
(b) 0.9
(c) 0:6
With sea water at 60 degrees and vacuum 28 inches, the totals for all pur-
poses will be:
(a) 0:5
(b) 1.05
(c) 0.7
Some authorities have determined the amount of make-up feed required
in cylindrical boilers in merchant ships to be three and a half tons per 1,000
horsepower per day. From observations in some recent passenger ships
this amount of water is found to be as much as four tons, no evaporators
being used. In Diesel ships the amount is small and may be taken at about
0.3 ton per 1,000 horsepower per day. This amount will be increased if
fresh water is used in circulation for cooling parts of the engine. This
large difference between the steam and Diesel engines can be reduced by the
use of evaporators. In the steam system (c) it is assumed that two tons per
1,000 horsepower per day will be sufficient, together with evaporators
capable of giving another two tons if required.
The weight of fuel and feed water will vary with the distance between
fuelling ports. Table II gives the totals for these items for different types
of machinery, and for two distances, 6,460 miles and 3,230 miles. It will be
seen that for the longer distance the Diesel and the high-pressure turbine
(or H.P.T.) type are tending toward the same total weight, while the pres-
ent turbine type is about 50 per cent more, the ratios being 1, 1.5, and 0.94.
For the shorter distance the ratio is 1, 1.28, and o-81 for the (a), (b) and
(c) types, respectively. The mean displacement on the voyage will be
affected by the consumption of fuel, and so forth, to the extent shown in
Table II. Table III gives estimates for the different types of machinery
in the same various types of ships, and for various distances run per annum.
The costs of machinery are for the whole installation of boilers, engines,
and auxiliaries as completed in the ships. In the case of 20-knot vessels the
Diesel type of engine costs £13,000 per year more to run than the steam,
while at 17 knots the cost per annum of the Diesel is £7,000 more than that
for the steam. But the cost of running the steam vessel at 18 knots is only
£8,000 per year more than the Diesel at 17 knots. Some investigations have
been made for higher powers which may be of interest. In the case of the
20-knot vessel with the (c) type of machinery, it will be seen that a gain
of 1,052 tons of weight is available in the 3,230-mile voyage. Transforming
this weight into machinery fuel and make-up feed, it is possible to increase
the shaft horsepower to 40,000 and the sea speed to 22 knots. The weight


  p. 1282 (#190)                      #

1282
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
TABLE III.-ANNUAL COSTS FOR VOYAGE OF 120,000 MILES
(a)
Diesel
(6)
Steam
(a)
Diesel
(c)
(6)
H.P.T.
· H.P.T.
H.P.T.
27,000
£460,000
£85, 100
28,000
£380,000
£70,390
27,000
£333,000
£61,605
13,500
£240,000
£44,400
13,500
£175,000
£32,380
16,900
£210,000
£38,850
Shaft horse power....
Cost of machinery..
Interest, depreciation, insurance, and maintenance
per year. ................
Distance steamed per year, miles...
Fuel burnt per year, tons.........
Cost of fuel per year. .........
Lubricating oil per year, tons......
Lubricating oil-cost, per year. .....
Feed water for boilers per year, tons.....
Cost of feed water for boilers per year
Engine-room wages per year..
120,000
36,160
£144,640
337 · 35
£11,554
2,025
£160
£10,000
120,000
75,000
£243,750
7.03
£241
28,000
£2,217
£12,000
80,000
19,853
£64,522
2.66
120,000
50,625
£164,531
6.78
£232
13,500
£1,068
£11,000
80,000
14,180
£56,720
132 · 3
£4,531
80,000
23,472
£72, 287
3 · 14
£108
6,259
£495
£9,000
£71
794
£63
£6,600
5,294
£419
£8,000
Total running expenses. ...
Charges........
£166,354
85,100
£258,208 | £176,831
70,390 61,605
£67,914
44,400
£73,012
32,380
£81,890
38,850
Total...
£251,454 |
£328,598 | £238,436
| £112,314 | £105,392 | £120,740


  p. 1283 (#191)                      #

1925]
1283
Professional Notes
of turbine machinery per shaft horsepower tends to decrease with increase
of power. An estimate of an installation of such machinery for 55,000
horsepower in a 24-knot ship shows that the weight is about 3,600 tons,
which is one third more than that in a 20-knot ship, while the power is more
than double. It is not easy to see how a Diesel installation of this power
could be applied to a ship at the present time, and its weight would prob-
ably be about 8,000 tons. It is, however, in the region of lower powers than
those dealt with that the interest of the large majority of shipowners is
most centered. It cannot be said that the turbine has displaced the recipro-
cating engine in this region. The reduction in weight of the (c) installa-
tion is due in part to the use of high-efficiency water-tube boilers and oil
fuel, which require higher skill in their handling than the ordinary mer-
chant-ship boiler, coal-fired. But a similar consideration has to be kept in
view in the adoption of the Diesel engine in the ordinary type of tramp
steamers. Both types involve the training of more highly skilled engine-
room staffs, which time only can create.
In the case of cross-Channel steamers of high speed the turbine has
completely displaced the reciprocating engine. In this case the weight and
first cost of the installation are the dominating considerations, for the dis-
tances run are short and the amount of fuel carried is comparatively much
smaller than in vessels trading overseas. It is of interest to examine such
a case to see if steam is likely to be displaced by the Diesel engine. The
case of an intallation for a 20-knot vessel of 5,200 horsepower has been
chosen.
The following are comparative figures for twin-screw vessel :
(c)
Item
Diesel
(6)
Present
Turbine
Arrangement
With H.P.
Turbine
Scheme
Power........
Oil consumption, all purposes..!
5,200 s.h.p.
1:15 tons
5,200 s.h.p.
2.09 tons
per hour
5,200 s.h.p.
1.67 tons
per hour
per hour
Oil per shaft horsepower per
hour, all purposes...
Weight of machinery.........
Revolutions per minute......
Cost........................
0.72 lb.
510 tons
0.5 lb.
740 tons
260
£100,000
0.9 lb.
570 tons
260
£62,000
260
£65,000
The question of the practicability of producing reliable machinery of the
(c) type is one for the marine engineer.
Two difficulties will suggest themselves—firstly, that of condenser tubes,
and secondly, that of steam joints. Sir Charles Parsons' proposals are
made by a serious engineer who is ready to carry them out. Other firms
have been consulted who, in this respect, are free from the suspicion of
desiring favor or their own progeny, and they are quite ready to guarantee
results equal to those promised by Sir Charles Parsons, so that there is
solid foundation for belief in the statement of steam efficiency upon which
the comparison with the Diesel engines is based. Further, one firm has
offered equally favorable results in thermal efficiency, first cost, and weight
of installation at a pressure of 265 pounds with an installation in which the
greater efficiency in the method of producing the steam is expected to make
up for the loss of efficiency due to the use of the steam of lower pressure.


  p. 1284 (#192)                      #

1284
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
TABLE IV.-PARTICULARS OF DIESEL ENGINES
Diesel Machinery
Cylinders in Each Engine | Revs.
per
Type of Engine No. Diameter Stroke Min.
B.H.P.
Weight/
B.H.P.
Complete
Installation
Consumption
B.H.P.
Cost per
B.H.P.
Vessel
Builder
In.
In.
22
8
36
120
2,500
T.s. Dolius........... Scott ......... Scott-Still
two-cycle
T.s. Scottish Borderer ... Denny........ Sulzer two-
cycle.....
23.6
141:8
90
2,071
6
125
1,267
38;
38)
125
1,267
S.s. Pinson ........... Beardmore.... bearamote-
... Beardmore.... Beardmore-Tosi
S.s. Pizarro... Beardmore. ... Beardmore-Tosil
T.s. Sycamore.... Richardsons, Beardmore-Tosi
Westgarth..
T.s. Tramore.... Richardsons, Beardmore-Tosi
Westgarth..
T.s. Silurian........... Beardmore.... Beardmore-Tosi
Lb.
10:36 lb./B.H.P./hr.
611
main engines
0.371 lb./B.H./hr. Not given.
all purposes
400 10: 435 lb. includes air, Not given.
main engines scavenge and other
only pumps driven off main
engines
0:42 lb./B.H.P./hr. £31 (1921).
main engines only 7
0:42 lb./B.H.P./hr.
main engines only
0.42 lb./B.H.P./hr.
main engines only
0.42 lb./B.H.P./hr.
main engines only
0.42 lb./B.H.P./hr. £21 10s.
main engines only
(1924).
10.431 lb./B.H.Þ./hr.
400
main engines
0.45 lb./B.H.P./hr.
all purposes
126
6
6
6
381
2,700
2,700
2,700
126
126
Q.s. Aorangi ......... Fairfield....... Fairfield-Sulzer
6
27}
123
12,200
Lb.
452
35. 43
16 1
135
0:379
19.68
19.68
24:8
£31 6s.
£23 18.
35. 43
150
399
S.s. Frem. ............Burmeister
& Wain
T.s. Chastine Maersk... Burmeister
& Wain..
T.s. Tourcoing........ Burmeister
& Wain..
S.s. Centaur (as given Scott....
by Burmeister &
Wain)....
0.376
Burmeister
& Wain
Burmeister
& Wain
Burmeister
& Wain
Burmeister
& Wain
four-cycle
Taken at ?
I.H.P.
I.H.P. 1.15
B.H.P. 8625
I.H.P. 2,300
B.H.P. 1,725
I.H.P. 5,400
B.H.P. 4,050
I.H.P. 2.000
| B.H.P. 1,500
43:7
120
393
0: 377
£18.
24.8
|
54 • 18
110
0° 404
£30.


  p. 1285 (#193)                      #

1925)
1285
Professional Notes
In this installation coal can be used. Yarrow and Company have built
boilers of 400 pounds pressure and 700 degries of superheat, for use in elec-
trical power stations, and they have designed a Yarrow boiler of 500 pounds
pressure and about 700 degrees of superheat for marine engines. James
Howden and Company have proposed and are building a boiler of the
cylindrical and water-tube type combined, which will have 315 pounds
pressure and 700 degrees temperature, and with which they expect to get
very high efficiency. Both these boilers can be arranged to use oil or coal
as fuel
In overseas high-speed vessels the weight is only in favor of the Diesel
for a length of voyage considerably above 6,000 miles, and even in such
cases the mean displacement on the voyage may be three per cent or more in
favor of the steam vessel. For voyages of 3,000 miles there is a gain of over
1,000 tons in weight to be carried, and a gain of five per cent in the mean
displacement on voyage in the steam vessel. In cross-channel vessels the
weight and cost make the Diesel prohibitive compared with the turbine. In
all these cases steam is superior to the Diesel in commercial efficiency.
The employment in marine installations of three turbines in series con-
nected by gearing to the propeller shaft is especialiy appropriate to these
high-pressure schemes, since it enables the high-pressure part of the expan-
sion to be effected in a turbine of small diameter, running at the speed of
revolution most conducive to efficiency. Thus it it proposed to employ an
arrangement giving 27,000 s.h.D. on two shafts. The turbines are coupled
to the shaít through double-reduction gearing, the high pressure at 4,000
revolutions and the intermediate pressure at 2,700 revolutions driving one
primary gear and developing, respectively, twenty per cent and thirty per
cent of the total power. The remaining fifty per cent is developed in the
low-pressure turbine, which runs at 300 revolutions and drives the other
primary gear. The main wheel is then symmetrically driven by two sec-
ondary pinions of equal power and speed, coupled one to each primary wheel.
The heat of the auxiliary exhaust steam is utilized to heat the feed water
to a temperature of 200° F. Further feed heating can be effected by bleed-
ing steam from the turbine, say, at a pressure of 120 pounds per square inch,
to raise the feed temperature to about 310° F. The whole of the heat of the
flue gases is available for pre-heating the furnace air, thus raising the
efficiency of the boiler. To remove the objection that has sometimes been
raised to the use of water-tube boilers for marine work, having regard to
the possibility of leaky condenser tubes admitting salt to the feed system,
it is proposed to subdivide the condensers, fitting two or more condensers
to each turbine exhaust, of a large total capacity, with means to isolate
each condenser, both on the steam and water side, so that on any indication
of leakage of salt it may be effectively dealt with without appreciably re-
ducing the speed of the ship. Suitable instruments would be fitted for the
detection of salinity of the condensate of each condenser. With a boiler
pressure of 500 pounds superheat to a total temperature of 700° F., and a
condenser vacuum of 29 inches Hg. (barometer, 30 inches), it is estimated
that the steam consumption of the turbines of such an installation will not
exceed 6.9 pounds per s.h.p. hour.
Stern Tube Friction Eliminated by Oil
The Nautical Gazette, 23 May, 1925.---Regarding the question as to the
reduction of friction in the stern tubes when oil is used instead of water,
Fergus Cameron, consulting engineer, of Goole, has had an experience with
the steamer Sparta, owned by the Bennett Steamship Company, Ltd., which
gives support to the contention that the lubrication of this bearing does
actually reduce the friction, with a consequent economy of fuel or an in-


  p. 1286 (#194)                      #

1286
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
crease in revolutions. The vessel, which was built in 1900, is fitted with
inverted, direct-acting, triple-expansion engines. She has a plain tail shaft
of eight and three-quarters inches diameter, running in a cast iron bush,
the bottom half of which is lined with white metal, at a speed of ninety-
five revolutions, equal to a peripheral speed of 218 feet per minute. She
is fitted with a Vickers stern tube appliance and lubricated with Vickers
underwater oil.
The vessel was recently docked at Goole, when the tail shaft was drawn
in for inspection, everything being found in excellent condition after
eighteen months' running in and out of the sandy water of the Humber.
On the day on which the shaft was uncoupled there was a strong wind
blowing, with occasional gusts attaining to the speed of a small gale. When
the last coupling bolt had been removed it as found necessary to send a man
into the drydock to hold the propeller still, as it was found impossible to
put in the stops between the tail and shaft coupling and the stern tube
flange, owing to the shaft and the propeller revolving slowly, due to the
action of the wind on the blades.
AVIATION
Detroit Takes Off
Aviation, 27 April, 1925.—With a sudden rush, Detroit has made a con-
certed effort to make itself truly the aeronautical center of the country.
While others have been thinking of the coming dawn of aviation, the home
of the motor car has seized the advantage of position and is planning a com-
prehensive development of all phases of aviation.
FORD
With the public announcement by Edsel Ford of the establishment of a
Ford Airline from Detroit to Chicago the public received its first news
of the interest of the Ford Company in air transportation development.
While foreign aeronautical visitors have tried to interest the Fords in
their enterprises and there has been much inspired publicity of these efforts,
until last week no definite plans were announced. Even now the extent of
the development is problematical. Two Stout Metal monoplanes have been
purchased and are flying from the Ford Airport at Dearborn to Chicago on
a schedule that will be made daily as soon as equipment permits. The Ford
Airport, with its mooring mast, its airplane factory and its airship hangar,
will be the most complete in the country, but the further announcement that
the Ford Company intends to manufacture small and inexpensive planes
and a light commercial engine arouses the greatest enthusiasm in aero-
nautical circles, for when the vast resources of the great Ford organization
are centered on a project, it can be considered to be the result of a very
careful investigation.
COFFIN
The second, and in some ways a more important, Detroit plan is the
formation, there, of a group of capitalists headed by Howard Coffin to
promote an operating air transport company. This, project has already
secured the cooperation of some of the best known men in the country.
Until an official announcement of the personnel of the company is made it
will not be helpful to list the names of those that have been rumored
as participating in the underwriting. It can be said, however, that the
plans of the promoters do not include any sale of stock to the public.
Unofficially, it is reported that the company intends to start an experimental
air line between New York and Chicago using the Air Mail route for night
flying. As the Kelly Bill now permits the Post Office Department to make
contracts with private operators of airlines for the transportation of mail,


  p. 1287 (#195)                      #

1925]
1287
Professional Notes
the taking over of the night flying of the eastern section of the Air Mail
may be one of the first undertakings of the proposed company when it is
under way. The tentative plans call for extensions of the operations of the
air lines, as far east as Boston, to the south as far as Atlanta and New Or-
leans, and west to Los Angeles and Seattle. The plans call for the use of
airplanes and airships when either may be found to be advantageous. C. M.
Keys, president of the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation, is asso-
ciated with Mr. Coffin in the organization of the company, the formal plans
of which will shortly be made public.
As has been announced, the Buhl interests in Detroit have formed a
company—The Buhl-Verville Aircraft Corporation—to manufacture air-
planes designed by Alfred Verville. The combination of manufacturing
experience and engineering skill will make this company one from which
much may be expected.
PACKARD.
Then, of course, the Packard Company has carried on an extensive
engineering development with aeronautical engines. The large Packard
engines have recently come to be regarded as one of the standard engines
for the Air Service. Under the guidance of Colonel J. G. Vincent, the
vice president in charge of engineering, the Packard Company has con-
ducted a progressive development program in aeronautical engines that is
beginning to play an important part in the engine field.
Of the Stout and Upson engineering progress much has been known.
Since his designing of the Bat, Mr. Stout has been engaged in the pro-
duction of metal airplanes and his monoplane has been praised by practically
everyone who has studied the ship. Its adoption by the Fords for their
air line is a complete endorsement of its utility as an economical air
transport. Ralph Upson has been making the preliminary engineering study
of a metal airship, and methods of fabrications. While actual building has
not been started the design and fundamental idea has received the most
interested consideration from all parts of the world.
As will be seen, Detroit is taking the aircraft situation with the most
comprehensive seriousness. It has the money, it has the manufacturing
facilities and skill, but what is even more important, it is proceeding with
a large and comprehensive plan to develop aviation all along the line.
The "Los Angeles" a Fine Job
The Scientific American, June, 1925.–False propaganda and misleading
half truths are the bane of modern life. Their malevolence would begin
and end with themselves were it not for the wide publicity they too often
obtain in the daily press and the magazine. Because of the un-American
influences that have been poisoning the country during the last twenty-five
years, it has come about that, if they are to be attractive, the stage must
be salacious and journalism enriched with sensation and scandal.
It has been publicly stated that the metal of the Los Angeles airship is
disintegrating and that this catastrophe is the result of deliberate German
duplicity. That is the latest lie, and we wish it here and now to be under-
stood that it has been deliberately cut out of whole cloth. The framework
of the Los Angeles is not disintegrating, and the ship itself, as the editor
can testify after climbing over every accessible part of it, is a magnificent
job, both in the intelligence of the design and the characteristic thorough-
ness of the workmanship.
A grain of truth in these rumors is to be found in the fact that there
has been a certain amount of corrosion in the keel of the Los Angeles, which
has not been due to any fault in the aluminum alloy of which the frame is
built, but to some chemicals which were accidentally spilt upon it during the


  p. 1288 (#196)                      #

1288
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
operation of the ship. Within the hull is carried a large number of bags of
water which are discharged when it is necessary to lighten the ship. With a
view to preventing freezing at high altitudes, a certain amount of calcium
chloride is mixed with the water, and in pouring the liquid into the bags,
some of it spilled over and ran down into the keel. The calcium chloride
set up a surface corrosion which, in the small latices of which the main
triangular members are built up, became sufficiently serious to necessitate
their removal. This has now been done and the ship is today in first-class
condition. Greater care in filling the bags with anti-freezing mixture, or
better yet, the substitution of wood alcohol or some other suitable substance,
would absolutely remove any similar risk for the future.
As to the suggestion that the Germans had deliberately made up an
alloy which was certain to disintegrate in the course of time and so wreck
the ship, the idea is preposterous. The Zeppelin company who built the
Los Angeles have already become affiliated with a powerful Akron concern,
and the only field for the future building by them of airships lies in this
country. Consequently, there is every inducement for them to make the
Los Angeles a fine exhibit of their skill in design and in construction. In
other words, she is their show ship for America. Our examination of the
vessel confirms the expectation of her excellence. Particularly noticeable is
the construction of the bow to withstand those heavy lateral stresses which
in a gale of wind are liable to tear the bow out of the ship, as happened in
the Shenandoah when her cap was torn loose, and in R-33. A heavy side
gust sets up tension on the lee side and heavy compression on the windward
side of the ship and the aluminum alloy is relatively weaker in compression
than in tension. Hence, a series of straight and stiff rectangular posts
extend from the nose cap to the first circular ring, and these are strengthened
in such a way that they should be proof against the heaviest stresses to
which they can be exposed.
The New Packard Aircraft Engines
Aviation, 11 May, 1925.—The new Packard aircraft engines are built in
two sizes, the model 1500 rated at 500 b.h.p., and the model 2500 rated at
800 b.h.p. The engines are of almost identical design except in size and
were developed concurrently to fill the demand for the entire range of
water cooled engines as it exists today. These engines are suitable for
merson Mnan
Saman
FIG. I
power demands ranging from about 350 b.h.p. to well over 800 b.h.p., gearing
being furnished when required to bring the propeller speed down to the
point of maximum efficiency.
Externally, the engines present an exceptionally clean appearance and are
remarkably compact for their power output as shown by the superimposed
views of the model 1500 and the Liberty engines in Fig. 1. From these


  p. 1289 (#197)                      #

1925)
1289
Professional Notes
diagrams it will be noted that the new small Packard engine is considerably
lighter and more compact than the Liberty but develops far more power.
The larger model 2500 engine is compared in respect to power output and
weight with its predecessor, the model 2025 engine, which powered the
Verville-Packard plane, winner of the first Pulitzer race.
The compact construction, light weight and high power output of these
new engines have been brought about by some rather basic advances in
aircraft engine design resulting from the long experience of the Packard
Motor Car Company in designing and building airplane engines in quantities.
In laying down the new designs the following fundamental principles were
established.
(1) A very high degree of reliability must be attained.
(2) Greatly reduced weight and overall dimensions as compared with
previous designs are highly desirable.
(3) The design must be simple, capable of production in large quantities
and accessible for maintenance in the field.
A comprehensive survey was first made of the fundamental factors in
the design which would be most affected in carrying out these principles.
It was found that the design of the crankshaft bearings would form the
foundation of this research work as the length of the bearings would de-
termine the length of the engine to a large extent. Accordingly, a series
of bearing tests were run over a period of several months in order to
ascertain the ideal combination of material, loads and sizes. As a result of
this work it was found that if the bearings were made sufficiently rigid
and a rapid circulation of oil was maintained through the bearings, in order
to provide lubrication and carry away the heat generated, it would be pos-
sible to obtain satisfactory results with bearings far narrower than had
hitherto been thought advisable.
For example, it was found out in endurance tests of these engines later
that a bearing load factor as high as 35,000 pounds per square inch feet
per second yielded even better results from a standpoint of bearing life than
previous aircraft engine bearings loaded only half as much but which were
not as rigidly supported or as well lubricated.
While the compact overall dimensions of the new engines are basically
determined by the new developments in bearing design, a contributory factor
is the cylinder construction of these engines. The cylinders are individual
and are of all steel construction, the six cylinders of a bank being formed
into a block by means of an aluminum casting termed the valve housing
to which the cylinders are bolted. The cylinder is composed of a drawn
steel sleeve welded to a forged combustion chamber head which is machined
all over and fitted with a head plate and sheet metal water jacket welded
in place. Each cylinder is provided with four valves and short valve ports
are formed integral with the cylinder. The valve ports are accurately hollow
milled on their outer surfaces and the head plate is bored so as to form a
pressed fit over the vale ports, the plate seating on shoulders so as to
provide about three eighths of an inch water space over the top of the com-
bustion chamber.
The cylinder head is provided with five bosses into which long studs are
screwed, thus supporting the valve housing. The spark plug bosses are
formed integral with the combustion chamber. The weight of the complete
model 1500 cylinder is nine and five-tenths pounds and this cylinder develops
nearly fifty h.p. The weight of the complete model 2500 cylinder is fifteen
and two-tenths pounds and this cylinder develops nearly seventy h.p. It will
be noted that the cylinder hold-down flange is located some distance from
the end of the cylinder barrel which permits of a very compact construction
as the ends of the barrels of the two banks are practically allowed to touch
inside the crankcase, the additional height of the crankcase due to this


  p. 1290 (#198)                      #

1 290
| July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
construction naturally increasing its rigidity. Incidentally, it is the fact
that the cylinder barrels project inside the crankcase which permits of these
engines being run successfully in an inverted position, an arrangement now
favored by many airplane designers.
Water is led into the individual cylinders from a manifold connected to
short pipes welded to the jacket at the lower end and the water delivery
from the cylinder is through a series of holes drilled in the top plate and
arranged radially around the exhaust ports so as to insure against local
steam pockets over the exhaust valve seats. A single copper-asbestos
gasket is used between the individual cylinders and the valve housing ; this
gasket is, of course, not subjected to gas pressures as with the conventional
automobile detachable head gasket but merely serves as a water seal and to
prevent leaks between the inlet and exhaust passages.
The valve housing is an aluminum casting machined on all surfaces and
used interchangeably on the right and left hand banks. The housing per-
forms the following functions:
(1) Distributes the mixture to the six cylinders from the two carburetor
cross header manifold connections.
(2) Forms the exhaust passages, each two adjacent cylinders having
their two pairs of exhaust ports siamesed into a single exhaust outlet.
(3) Collects the water circulated through each cylinder jacket and
delivers same through a single outlet at the front of the engine.
(4) Supports the camshaft bearing pedestals and valve stem guides.
Fig. 4 shows diagrammatically the layout of the intake, exhaust and
water passages in the valve housing and the unique arrangement of four
valves feeding from a common port will be noted. The advantages of this
arrangement are that large and free passages are permitted and the casting
is simplified due to the absence of intermediate walls.
A single camshaft is supported in seven cast duralumin bearings bolted to
the top of the valve housing and this camshaft is provided with twelve cams,
each cam operating a pair of valves through
the medium of a cam follower working in
a vertical guide formed integral with the
camshaft bearings. These cam followers
are prevented from turning by means of a
flat milled surface on the side of the cam-
shaft bearing. The cam followers are posi-
tively lubricated from the adjacent camshaft
bearing and the exhaust cam followers are
also utilized as pumps to force oil through
the exhaust valves for cooling purposes.
FIG. 5
This feature of the design is shown dia-
grammatically in Fig. 5 and the method of
circulating the oil through the valves is described as follows:
The camshaft is hollow and supplied with oil under pressure through a
continuous metering groove in the rear bearing. In the camshaft journal
next to each exhaust cam a hole is drilled opposite to the nose of the
corresponding exhaust cam and this hole registers with a vertical passage in
the camshaft bearing pedestal when the cam is at its highest point and the
exhaust valves consequently closed. The oil flows through this passage to
the bottom of the cam follower guide which forms a closed end cylinder and
the space underneath the cam follower is thus filled with oil. The camshaft
in revolving cuts off communication with this passage and when the cam
follower is depressed by the cam the oil can only escape by being forced
through the hollow cam follower stem and the horizontal drilled passages
leading out through the drilled tappets into the exhaust valve stems. The
latter are drilled out their entire length, the lower end of the hole in the


  p. 1291 (#199)                      #

1925)
1291
Professional Notes
valve head being closed by a screwed-in plug. A small steel tube is welded
to this plug and is centered in a counterbore at the upper end of the valve
stem. The oil is forced down through the tube, out at the bottom through
horizontal holes and thus cools the head of the valve. The oil is then dis-
charged through the annular space between the tube and inner wall of the
valve stem and out into the valve housing through horizontal holes drilled
through the upper end of the valve stem just below the counterbore. With
this system a fixed quantity of oil is pumped through each exhaust valve
each time it is opened and thus a very positive means of cooling is pro-
vided. As a result the exhaust valves operate as a very low temperature
and the valve seat is preserved in excellent operating condition over ex-
tensive periods.
Another feature worth mentioning in the valve gear is the valve spring
construction. Instead of the conventional aircraft arrangement of double
concentric valve springs a series of small diameter piano wire springs is
arranged in planetary fashion around the valve stem guide. In the model
1500 engine there are seven of these springs to each valve, and in the model
2500 engine there are ten springs to each valve. The individual valve
springs are located over tubular guides welded to a lower fixed washer and
the upper ends of the springs engage in an annular groove formed in the
movable spring washer.
This valve spring construction has been used for several years with per-
ject results on Packard marine racing engines which had heretofore given
considerable trouble with valve spring breakage at extremely high speeds.
The reason for this preferred construction is not due, as might be thought,
to the extra factor of safety resulting from the use of a multiplicity of
springs, but is due to the fact that in the small diameter springs the
natural period of vibration is very much higher than in the conventional
type of valve spring so that the destructive "dancing" of the valve springs
is avoided with the small diameter springs.
A very light sheet aluminum cover is fastened to the valve housing and
prevents external leakage of oil, this cover making a taper fit over the
ignition distributor drive housings located at the center of the engine and
described later. Oil from the valve housing is returned to the crankcase
through liberal drains placed at both ends of the engine and provided with
oil traps to prevent crankcase vapors accumulating in the valve gear
compartment.
The crankcases on both engines are of the conventional box section type,
the main bearings being supported in the seven transverse webs of the
crankcase upper half. The crankcase finish surface, to which the oil pan
is bolted, is brought down two and one-half inches and two and three-
fourths inches on the models 1500 and 2500 engine respectively below the
centerline of the crankshaft, the object being firstly, to add rigidity to the
crankcase structure, secondly, to provide "ways" into which the main bearing
caps are fitted, and thirdly, to render the oil pan attaching screws and nuts
more accessible.
The bearing caps are duralumin forgins except in the case of the front
and rear caps which are cast of a special heat treated aluminum alloy. The
main bearings are of babbitted steel-backed construction and are doweled
to both the bearing caps and the crankcase upper half. The main bearings
are provided with force feed lubrication, oil being delivered through a
horizontal manifold pressed in the crankcase upper half and distributing
through vertical tubes leading to each bearing pressed in the crankcase
transverse walls.
The oil pan or crankcase lower half serves as a mounting for the com-
bined water and oil pump unit and is provided with the scavenging oil line
leading to the front end and serving to keep the crankcase scavenged on a


  p. 1292 (#200)                      #

1292
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
glide. The oil pan can be removed from the engine at any time without
disturbing the engine bearings.
The crankshafts in both engines follow customary aircraft engine prac-
tice and are noteworthy for their rigidity, the main journals of the two
engines measuring three inches and three and one-half inches in diameter
respectively, and the crankpins are two and one-half inches and three and
one-fourth inches in diameter respectively.
Both main journals and crankpins are bored out with large holes and the
crank pins are plugged to provide an oil reservoir for leading oil to the
crankpin journals. These reservoirs receive oil from the adjacent main
bearings by means of steel tubes pressed into the crankshaft at an angle
and lining up with the main bearing metering grooves at one end and the
crankpin bore at the other. The main bearing metering grooves are located
entirely in the upper half of the main bearings and extending the whole
180 degrees around their circumference.
The connecting rods of the model 1500 engine are of the forked and
plain type fitted with Sumet bronze bearings, and the connecting rods of
the model 2500 engine are of the articulated type fitted with babbitt bearings
applied directly to the big end of the rod. The piston pin bushings in the
connecting rods of both engines are of phosphor bronze and the same
material is used in the link pin bushings of the larger engine. The link pins
of the model 2500 engine are retained in place by a tapered draw bolt passing
through a boss on the master rod.
The pistons of both engines are aluminum castings of the permanent
mold type and are of the slipper type. They are noteworthy for being
extremely short and comparatively light. The model 1500 piston is five
and three-eighths inches in diameter, 3 11/32 inches long and weighs
2.94 pounds for the bare piston. The model 2500 piston is six and three-
eighths inches in diameter, three and fifteen sixteenths inches long and
weighs 4.47 pounds for the bare piston. The lengths of these new
pistons were established after a series of tests were made in which the
length of the skirt was gradually diminished.
The timing gear and accessory drive layout is worthy of note firstly,
for its simplicity, there being the minimum number of gears employed,
secondly, for the integral construction of shaft and gear wherever per-
missible, and thirdly, for the use of pressure lubricated chilled aluminum
plain bearings throughout, these three features combining to save con-
siderable weight while preserving dependability to the utmost extent.
The simplicity of drives was accomplished by grouping the accessories in
a manner which effected important additional weight savings. All fuel,
oil and water pumps were combined into a single unit which is used inter-
changeably on both the model 1500 and 2500 engines. This unit is driven
through an Oldham coupling from a short shaft journaled in the rear bearing
cap. This shaft carries an integral bevel gear at its upper end which meshes
with a bevel gear mounted on an extension of the crankshaft.
The rear end view of the model 2500 engine brings out the simplicity
of the accessory drive layout as compared with previous types of aircraft
engines, and the absence of engine accessories projecting to the rear of the
engine will be appreciated by those having had maintenance experience with
aircraft engines which have been installed in a crowded position against
the firewall or front bulkhead of a plane.
The pump unit contains three spur gears which are housed-in to form
the two oil scavenging pumps and these gears in turn each drive another unit,
the first driving the water pump, the second the fuel pump and the third the
oil pressure pump. The whole pump unit is quite compact and weighs only
sixteen pounds, including in its assembly the oil strainer and oil pressure
relief valve.


  p. 1293 (#201)                      #

1925]
1293
Professional Notes
The camshaft center drive shaft is also formed with its gears integral
and is continued through the top of the crankcase to drive the special
magneto by means of a laminated spring coupling. This magneto is based
on a principle invented by Packard engineers and developed by the Splitdorf
Company and may be briefly described as a single mechanical instrument
with all electrical parts duplicated and independent throughout. That is to
say, there are only one set of magnets, one set of pole pieces, one rotor, one
driving shaft, one coupling, one cam and one set of rotor bearings.
On the other hand, there are two primary and secondary coils, two con-
densers, two interrupter arms, and two sets of contacts as well as double
external binding posts leading to the two separate distributors, either one
of which will fire all twelve cylinders and each having its separate drive
from one of the camshafts. The magneto employs but one magnetic
circuit and the two electrical circuits are independent of one another
throughout. The induction effect between the two primary windings is
substantially eliminated through the use of an impedance coil in the switch
to ground circuit. This instrument differs radically from the two-spark
magneto used formerly to a considerable extent. In the older type it was
customary to utilize both ends of the secondary winding, the high tension
circuit being to one spark plug to ground and from ground back through
the other spark plug. In this type of magneto practically any electrical
failure resulted in both sets of sparks being simultaneously affected whereas
in the new magneto the two electrical systems are completely isolated from
one another and should one system fail it will not appreciably affect the
operation of the other.
Timing of both the magneto and distributors has been facilitated in these
new engines by specially developed mountings, the magneto being furnished
with a slotted flange at the driving end, accurate timing being accomplished
by swinging the magneto bodily on this mounting, two five-sixteenths inch
nuts serving to lock the magneto in its desired position. Similarly, the
distributors can be bodily rotated by loosening a clamp bolt, the final adjust-
ment being made with the assistance of an inspection opening located over
No. I left cylinder terminal.
A recently developed advantage in connection with this ignition system
lies in the fact that a generator can be substituted for the magneto and by
providing a suitable contact breaker on the end of the generator shaft, it is
possible to secure battery ignition to replace the magneto ignition where
desirable without any changes to the engine itself and with no changes to
the wiring between the distributors and spark plugs, it being understood
that the same distributors are used regardless of whether magneto or bat-
tery ignition is employed.
As a result of this interchangeable ignition arrangement engines used in
planes having little electrical demands can be equipped with magnetos and
those used in planes requiring considerable electric current, for wireless,
lighting, and so forth, can be supplied with battery ignition. The result is
that the weight of the engine for each service will be kept to the minimum
and an engine can be transformed from one service to another very easily.
Although both the 500 and the 800 h.p. engines were originally intended
for direct drive service, both have been built for use with gears, the gear
reduction forming a separate unit bolted to a special crankcase flange.
The gear reductions have been designed and built by the Allison Engi-
neering Company of Indianapolis. They are of the spur gear single reduction
type and are entirely self-contained. A noteworthy feature is the employ-
ment of a shock-absorbing drive between the crankshaft and the pinion that
has proved very successful in eliminating the gear trouble resulting from
impact loading. These gear reductions give a two-to-one reduction to the
propeller shaft that has been found to be particularly desirable for load-
carrying airplanes of moderate speed.


  p. 1294 (#202)                      #

1294
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
In addition to providing improved propeller efficiency, these geared
engines lend themselves particularly well to a streamline installation; and,
in this manner, improved propeller efficiency and decreased resistance com-
bine to offer important advantages in airplane performance.
The 500 h.p. engine has also been built in the inverted type and, as men-
tioned previously, an inverted engine has many advantages for aircraft
use. It is entirely possible that the future will see the inverted engine as
one of the standard types. A side view and a rear end view of the inverted
model 1500 engine is shown in Fig. 7.
An inverted engine, when used in airplanes, possesses four major ad-
vantages. First, in the usual type of single-engine tractor airplane, the
pilot's vision straight ahead is seriously obscured by the cylinders and
cowling of either a V-type or a large radial-type engine. He is practically
compelled to swing the airplane from its true course to obtain a view along
the normal line of flight. It is unthinkable that poor vision dead ahead,
such as this, will be tolerated when the air is as full of airplanes as we expect
it to be in the future. Collisions in the air, even today, are far more
numerous than would be the case if poor visibility conditions did not exist.
With an inverted engine, as shown in Fig. 14, the cowling in front of the
pilot can be made to slope to meet the line of the propeller hub spinner; in
this way, favorable vision can be secured.
The second major advantage of the inverted engine lies in the high center
of thrust that ensures better flying qualities, in that it offsets the tendency of
the airplane to climb when full power is on. The additional propeller tip
clearance is also desirable from a consideration of taxiing over rough ground
and, in some cases, removes the limitation on the diameter of the propeller
that would otherwise exist.
A third point in favor of the inverted engine is its accessibility to a
mechanic working on the ground. If the engine mounting is properly
designed and the cowling suitably arranged, the engine can be readily
worked on from the ground without the necessity for stepladders and other
equipment. Furthermore, the crankcase covers can be removed and the
bearings examined, should this be desirable.
The fourth point in favor of the inverted engine has regard to the lo-
cation of the carburetors that, in many installations, will allow gravity fuel
feed and will avoid the use of complicated piping and pumping arrange-
ments. The fire risk is also diminished to a certain extent with this ar-
rangement, for gasoline leaks are confined to the extreme bottom of the
installation, and covering the whole exterior of the engine with gasoline, as
is normally the case, is not possible.
MERCHANT MARINE
Shipowners' Plan for Solution of Merchant Marine Problems
The Nautical Gasette, 16 May, 1925.-After a conference, which lasted
two weeks, the American Steamship Owners' Association, Pacific American
Steamship Association and Shipowners' Association of the Pacific have
drawn up a report and list of recommendations for the development of an
American merchant marine.
The associations are the opinion that further efforts along the lines fol-
lowed in the past will not only fail to place American shipping on a
successful and permanent basis, so as to fulfill the objects of a merchant
marine, but, instead, the hope of ever having a privately owned merchant
marine, adequate for national requirements, will be destroyed. The mistakes
of the past are not without remedy, however, and the associations believe
that if the problem is taken in hand in a businesslike way a merchant marine
adequate for all necessary purposes of national defense and trade can be


  p. 1295 (#203)                      #

1925)
1295
Professional Notes
established and carried on under private ownership at a far less cost to
the government than at present. The report states that this cannot be
done by the private owner unaided, however, due to existing differentials in
fixed charges and cost of operation, upkeep and overhead, as compared
with those of foreign competitors, and if aids are not granted, the United
States, in due course, will not have a merchant marine of any marked im-
portance in foreign trade. The items of higher cost in the ownership and
operation of American ships in foreign trade are given by the associations
as follows:
(a) Greater capital investments due to higher shipbuilding costs in the
United States, with resultant larger interest charges, higher depreciation and
increased insurance premiums
(b) Larger crews and higher wages in respect to both officers and crews.
(c) More expensive food scale for both officers and crew than required
by foreign nations.
(d) Fifty per cent duty on repairs made in foreign ports and higher
cost of repairs made in American ports.
(e) Unnecessarily burdensome and expensive inspection laws.
(f) Numerous pay-day demands and provisions in the laws making it
difficult to enforce discipline in foreign ports, and resulting in delays from
dissipation and insubordination.
(g) Government fines, resulting from smuggling aliens, liquors and nar-
cotics, despite every effort by shipowners to prevent them.
(h) Greater costs of equipment and supplies.
(i) Unfair admeasurement rules, resulting in increased Panama Canal
tolls and port charges based on the tonnage of American ships.
(j) Higher costs of overhead due to higher standard of wages in the
United States.
The associations state that the time has come when there must be a re-
constitution of the membership and the functions of the Shipping Board, as
experience has shown that it is unwise to have vested in the same body the
functions and duties of making and enforcing such regulations as are
necessary for the promotion of shipping generally, and those of operating
the government's ships and liquidating the government out of the shipping
business. It follows that the body vested with the power of regulation need
not be large, but, on the contrary, a smaller body, composed of men who
know the needs of shipping, will function more efficiently.
Accordingly it is recommended :
(1) That the United States Shipping Board be reduced to three members,
to be appointed by the President without regard to political or geographical
considerations, but with special regard to their business qualifications, one of
whom shall have had commercial shipping experience.
(2) That the Shipping Board so constituted be vested with such regula-
tory powers as are necessary to the promotion of an American merchant
marine, similar to those regulatory powers conferred upon the Shipping
Board by “The Shipping Act, 1916.'
The report avers that the government should be liquidated out of the
shipping business as rapidly as possible, and that this can best be accom-
plished by vesting the liquidating duties and authority in the Fleet Cor-
poration, under the control of the Secretary of Commerce, or a newly con-
stituted Department of Marine. In regard to this the associations
recommend :
(1) That the Emergency Fleet Corporation, either in present or modified
form, be continued in existence as an agency of the government to liquidate
the government out of the shipping business at the earliest possible moment.


  p. 1296 (#204)                      #

1296
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(2) That the control of the Fleet Corporation be vested in the Secretary
of Commerce, or in a newly constituted Department of Marine, through a
transfer of the stock of the Fleet Corporation.
(3) That the Fleet Corporation proceed to a complete liquidation of the
government out of the shipping business as rapidly as possible, disposing of
the ships on such terms and conditions as will help to maintain them in
successful operation.
(4) That pending complete liquidation, the Fleet Corporation be given
supervision over the operation of those services that are found to be
essential to national defense and the promotion of foreign trade.
The associations believe that no service should be maintained regardless
of loss, but that a service should be operated only if the benefits derived
therefrom in promoting trade are commensurate with the cost to the
government. This, however, does not apply to any service the maintenance
of which is justified as a matter of national defense.
Regarding the determination of the services essential to the country's
welfare, hereafter to be maintained, it is recommended:
(1) That the Secretary of Commerce, Postmaster General, Secretary of
the Navy, Director of the Budget, and an American citizen experienced in
shipping, appointed by the President, be created a special agency to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the services to be carried on by combination
passenger and cargo ships, which are essential to national defense and the
promotion of foreign trade.
(2) That the Secretary of Commerce, Postmaster General, Secretary of
the Navy, Director of the Budget, Chairman of the Shipping Board, and
two American citizens experienced in shipping, appointed by the President,
be created a special agency to determine the type and amount of cargo
tonnage required in the services to be carried on by cargo ships, which are
essential to national defense and the promotion of foreign trade.
The report states that while direct aid should be given to those ships
which require it to be made commercially operative in essential services by
private owners, if the country is to have a successful merchant marine, it
is not believed that such aid should necessarily be unifornt to all ships. On
the contrary, it should only be given to ships in the respective trades to the
extent necessary to make their operations in any given trade, taken as a
group, commercially successful. Any flat rate of payment, such as a fixed
sum per month for men employed on the ships, or for mileage made, or
cargo carried, or based solely on the speed or tonnage of ships, would not
accomplish in all cases the desired results. Accordingly, the associations
recommend that the special agency created to determine the necessary
combination passenger and cargo services be vested with authority to fix the
amount of mail payments to be made to the owners of the ships in order
that they may be operated on a successful basis, and that the agency created
to determine the necessary cargo services be authorized to fix the amount
of compensation to be paid to the owners of these ships in order to ensure
successful commercial operation.
The report then takes up the question of indirect aids, under which are
listed changes in the Seamen's Act, navigation laws and immigration laws,
repeal of duties on ship repairs, reduction in Panama Canal tolls, exten-
sion of coastwise laws to the Philippines and island possessions of the
United States, elimination of government competition, and the coordination
of governmental departments.
In regard to the Seamen's Act, the associations recommend that it be
amended so as to provide that the master of a vessel will not be required to
pay wages to any seaman in a foreign port, if the head of the department in
which the seaman is employed reports to the master, and signs an entry in


  p. 1297 (#205)                      #

1925)
1297
Professional Notes
the ship's log to the effect that the seaman came on board at the last port
at which the ship touched in an intoxicated or doped condition, or was found
to have liquor or narcotics in his possession on board ship. Among other
changes recommended in the report are the provisions of the act requiring
the division of seamen into two watches, and firemen, and so forth, into
three watches be made applicable to vessels of 300 tons or more, instead of
100 tons and upwards, and that the crew may be used for the ordinary work
incident to the upkeep, sailing and management of the vessel. It is also
recommended that the provision for a complaint in writing that the vessel
is unsuitable to go to sea, be deleted, and that the determination of the
seaworthiness of vessels be left to the United States Steamboat Inspection
Service and the American Bureau of Shipping.
The associations suggest changes in the navigation laws in the respects
recommended in their reports previously made to the Shipping Board on
this subject. In regard to the immigration law, the report recommends that
it be amended so as to harmonize with the Seamen's Act, and that the
regulations of the Immigration Service be revised so as to be uniformly
applied in all ports in the United States. Concerning duties on repairs in
foreign ports, it is proposed that Section 466 of the Tariff Act of 1922,
which imposes a duty of fifty per cent on repairs to American ships made in
foreign yards, be repealed.
In regard to Panama Canal tolls, the associations suggest that the Panama
Canal Act be amended so that the admeasurement laws and the rules pro-
mulgated for the enforcement of same will not place American ships at a
disadvantage with foreign ships; that tolls be adjusted on partially loaded
ships; that the canal be kept open for the passage of vessels at all hours of
the day and night, except when it is in a condition as to render navigation
unduly hazardous, and that the act be further amended so as to provide that
no tolls shall be levied upon vessels passing through the canal, engaged in
the intercoastal trade of the United States.
In reference to the extension of the coastwise laws of the United States
to trade with the Philippines and other island possessions, as provided for in
Section 21 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, the associations propose that
representation be made to the President of the desirability of fixing a date
for the going into effect of such coastwise laws, as soon as the President
deems it expedient.
In regard to the elimination of government competition, it is recom-
mended that the government should retire from the shipping business now
carried on by the Panama Railroad Steamship Company between ports of the
United States, Panama and the Canal Zone, and that all government officials
and employees should preferentially travel, and all government cargo should
be carried, in privately owned American ships.
It is suggested in the report in connection with the establishment of a
Naval Reserve, that there be maintained under the supervision of the
Secretary of Commerce seven sailing school ships, with auxiliary power, to
train young men for the merchant service, and that men honorably dis-
charged from the navy, after sufficient service in the deck and engine room
departments to enable them to pass examinations for licenses as third
officers or as third assistant engineers, shall be entitled immediately to re-
ceive such licenses, and that A.B. certificates shall be issued to all navy
men immediately upon honorable discharge from the naval service. It is
further recommended that the personnel on American ships be reduced to
a parity with the requirements of the other principal nations,
In regard to inspections, it is proposed that the laws and regulations
governing the organization of the Inspection Service and the inspection of
steam vessels be revised in accordance with the recommendations previously
made to the Shipping Board in this connection. Concerning quarantine


  p. 1298 (#206)                      #

1298
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
regulations, the associations suggest that quarantine stations be established
at all the principal ports of the United States and its possessions, or, where
this is not practicable, that fumigation by competent private companies be
accepted.
Other features of the recommendations of the associations involve more
liberal allowances for depreciation of ships; freedom of transfer of ships to
foreign registry, except in national emergency; enactment of a compensation
act for ship workers, and adoption of continuous discharge books by the
federal government.
The shipowners' associations favor the maintenance of "the time-honored
policy of reserving the coastwise trade to American citizens and American-
built vessels," and ask that for the special encouragement of the inter-
coastal trade the United States mails, now carried in foreign-flag ships to
and from the Panama Canal, be reserved to American intercoastal steamers,
so far as practicable. International recognition of classification societies is
emphasized as desirable, and the shipowners approve an investigation of
deepening the New York barge canal, as an aid to American foreign
commerce.
As to the government's laid-up ships, the shipowners urge that those
vessels having no present or prospective value be sold for scrapping in the
United States or abroad, and that the better vessels of the laid-up fleet
be preserved until they can be sold to American citizens.All present
Shipping Board services that are deemed essential either to the promotion of
commerce or to the national defense, the shipowners insist, should be
operated by American citizens, "preferably those who have had the courage
to invest their money in the shipping business," and who have a capacity and
willingness to buy the ships operated as soon as possible.
National Merchant Marine Policy
By Cary W. Cook, The Nautical Gazette, 27 May, 1925.--It is necessary
for the national defense that the United States shall have a merchant
marine service sufficient to carry all of its domestic commerce and serve
as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency.
It is desirable for the national defense that the United States shall have
upon the major trade routes between United States ports and foreign ports
combination passenger and freight lines with vessels of sufficient speed to
enable them to effectively compete with foreign lines in the carriage of the
mails and to serve as troop transports in time of war. Such ships to be
compensated by liberal mail subventions. Any other form of aid, whether
in form of cash subsidy, discriminating duties, free Canal tolls, or the like,
inevitably and invariably leads to a dependence on federal paternalism in
a field where individual courage and independence are demanded and should
not be granted.
It has been found by some of our large industries desirable to own their
own cargo vessels in the foreign trade, and this should be encouraged.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to encourage
the maintenance by private owners of such a merchant marine, assuring to
owners freedom from regulation or competition, direct or indirect, by the
government. It is recognized that to maintain and expand a merchant marine
the art of shipbuilding shall not be lost or impaired and that American ship-
yards must be encouraged to maintain themselves in a position to again
rapidly expand to meet any national emergency. To that end no vessels
except those wholly built and equipped ready for sea in American yards
shall be permitted to trade between ports of the United States except the
trade between United States ports and the Philippine Islands.


  p. 1299 (#207)                      #

1925]
1299
Professional Notes
Except in time of war or national emergency, there shall be no re-
strictions upon
Building for foreign owners.
Sale of American ships abroad.
Selling securities of shipowners or shipbuilders abroad as long as the
management through ownership of a majority of the capital stock of
building and owning corporations is in the hands of American citizens.
If under laws passed or to be passed in furtherance of the above declared
policy, American shipowners enter the foreign trade with purely cargo
vessels, they will be encouraged as far as consistent with the proper growth
of our foreign trade; but it must be recognized that ships alone do not
make foreign commerce, and sentimental regard for American ships in the
placing the exporters of our surplus in position to cultivate the friendship
of foreign buyers, themselves shipowners, and to take advantage of as low
freight rates as our competitors enjoy through free competition of foreign
foreign trade must not interfere with the more important consideration of
ships.
Foreign Trade of the United States in 1924
Nautical Gazette, 23 May, 1925.-American export trade, which has been
steadily increasing since 1921, continued its upward course in 1924 with a
gain of 10.2 per cent over the previous year, according to an analysis of
this country's foreign trade for last year made by the Foreign Commerce
Department of the chamber of Commerce of the United States. .
Last year's total exports, amounting to $4,591,000,000, were even higher
than those for 1921, a year in which the post-war value still influenced
foreign trade figures, the department says. The increase over 1923 was
$423,000,000.
It is shown in the department's report that in 1923 the value of our
exports was only ten per cent greater than that of our imports, but in 1924
exports outdistanced imports by twenty-seven per cent, the favorable balance
of trade in 1924 being $980,000,000, or more than two and one-half times
the 1923 balance. With an excess of imports of gold and silver amounting
to $222,000,000, our visible favorable balance of trade, which includes both
merchandise and gold and silver, amounted to $758,000,000.
The ten principal commodities in our export trade in 1924, representing
nearly half the total exports, were raw cotton, wheat, automobiles, gasoline
and naphtha, leaf tobacco, refined copper, lard, coal and coke, wheat flour,
and kerosene. Of these ten only two, lard and coal, fell below their 1923
total. All the others made increases ranging from four to 104 per cent.
The value of raw cotton exports, which accounted for more than one-fifth
of our total exports, totalled $951,000,000, or about eighteen per cent higher
than in 1923. The amount of cotton shipped abroad last year was
3,483,000,000 pounds, twenty-seven per cent larger than in the preceding year.
The dominant position of cotton in our exports is marked. Cotton out-
distanced wheat, second leader, by more than $700,000,000, the export value
of wheat being $237,000,000, or double its value in 1923, when it occupied
seventh place among the exports. During 1924, we shipped abroad
166,000,000 bushels of wheat, sixty-nine per cent more than in 1923 and
three times as much as before the war.
For a good many commodities the year 1924 was a record year in the
export trade of the United States. More crude and refined petroleum was
shipped out of this country last year than ever before--4,662,000,000 gallons
topping the previous high-water mark of 1923 by seventeen per cent. The
value. $418,482,000, was high-being exceeded only by the inflated values of


  p. 1300 (#208)                      #

1300
[July
U. S. Vaval Institute Proceedings
1920. Exports of gasoline and naphtha in 1924 totaled 1,180,000,000 gallons,
or forty-one per cent larger than the old 1923 record. The value was not
as large as the 1920 figure. Gas and fuel oil exports were also well above
the billion-gallon mark, reaching 1,438,000,000 gallons, or seventeen per cent
above the previous record, set in 1923. The value was topped in both 1918
and 1920. Kerosene exports amounting to 012,829,000 gallons were the
greatest since 1919. The amount of lubricating oil exported last year,
379,948,000 gallons, has been exceeded only once, in 1920. Exports of crude
petroleum in 1924 totaled 742,135,000 gallons, or about four per cent greater
than the previous record shipments of 1923. The value, $26,586,000 was
exceeded only in 1920. The exports of paraffin wax, 382,820,000 pounds,
have been topped only once, in 1915.
Machinery, vehicles and metals exports also shared in the high figures
of 1924. A new record was set by the exports of agricultural machinery
and impliments, the total value in 1924, $59.974,000, exceeding even the
1920 record, which was made during a period of exceptionally high prices.
The greatest number of typewriters exported, 270,000, since quantity data
became available in 1922, were shipped abroad last year. The abnormal
values of both 1919 and 1920, however, were higher than the 1924 figure.
The exports of adding and calculating machines, totaling 24.993 machines
valued at $5,965,000, have been surpassed only twice, in 1919 and 1920.
The greatest number of automobiles ever exported in one year, 178,883,
were sent abroad in 1924. The quantity topped the previous record of
171,644, made in 1920, though the 1924 value, $131,923,000, was considerably
smaller. The 974,47 tons of iron and steel scraps exported in 1924, as well
as the value, $1,528,000, were exceeded only in 1920. The value of cutlery
exports, $9,529,000, has been surpassed twice only, in 1919 and 1920.
Seven years ago, in 1917, refined copper exports topped the billion-pound
inark. Again, in 1924, was this mark passed, with a total of 1,009,000,000
pounds. The value, $138,298,000, was the largest since 1918.
Logs and timber exports in 1924, 368,000,000 board feet, valued at
$27,500,000 were far greater in both quantity and value than those of any
other year since quantity statistics became available in 1912. The volume
of lumber (boards, planks and scantlings) exported last year, nearly
2,000,000,000 board feet, was surpassed only in three years, 1911, 1912 and
1913.
Record shipments of a number of foodstuffs were also recorded in 1924.
More apples were sent abroad in 1924 than ever before--6,719,000 boxes
and 1.881,000 barrels. Their value was $24,287,000, also a new mark.
Record exports were noted in oranges--2,564,000 boxes, valued at $8,685,000
--new high marks in both quantity and value.
A few import records were made in 1924. A greater amount of standard
newsprint paper, 2,714,000,000 pounds at the highest value, $101,000,000, was
imported in 1924 than in any other year. The quantity was about four per
cent greater and the value three per cent higher than the previous record
imports of 1923.
Record imports of bananas were also made last year--47,384,000 bunches,
valued at $22,074,000-exceeding the previous quantity record of 46,640,000
bunches made in 1914 and the previous high value of $19,739,000 set in
1913. Imports of olives last year mounted to 8,093,000 gallons, twenty-one
per cent greater than the previous high mark set in 1916. The value,
$5,090,000, also was slightly higher than the old record of 1920. This
country also imported more figs than ever before, 42,465,000 pounds.
The amount of cane sugar imported in 1924, 8,272,000,000 pounds, was
exceeded only by the liuge imports of 1922, when 9,722,000,000 pounds were
received.


  p. 1301 (#209)                      #

1925)
1301
Professional Notes
A marked slowing-up of imports as a whole, however, was apparent
throughout the year 1924. The total imports amounted to $3,611,000,000,
a decline of $182,000,000, or about five per cent from the 1923 total. Only
two main import groups made gains over 1923. Crude foodstuffs increased
three per cent in value, and the petroleum-coal-glass group increased three-
tenths of one per cent.
Seven countries--Great Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Cuba
and Italy—purchased nearly two-thirds of American exports in 1924, nearly
$3,000,000,000 worth. These seven countries in recent years have invariably
been found among the country's ten leading customers, with the single
exception of Germany from 1915, through 1919. In 1924 thirty-five countries
each purchased more than $10,000,000 worth of American merchandise-
ninety-six per cent of all shipped abroad-the eighty-odd markets in the
rest of the world taking only four per cent of America's total exports.
Only six of the thirty-five leading nations-Canada, Japan, Sweden,
Norway, Hongkong and Haiti-bought less from us in 1924 than in 1923,
the increases among the twenty-nine others ranging to as high as six times
the 1923 figures.
Among our chief sources of supply, ten countries furnished us with
two thirds of our imports. In order of importance these ten leaders are
Canada, Cuba, Japan, Great Britain, Brazil, Mexico, Straits Settlements,
France, Germany and China.
Chairman ('Connor's Plan to Overcome W’age Differential by
Creation of Merchant Marine Reserve
The Nautical Gazette, 9 May, 1925.--Chairman O'Connor of the Shipping
Board has prepared a new plan for financial aid from the United States
Treasury to privately owned American vessels in foreign trade. The plan,
which will be the major feature of the shipping policy recommendations
which the chairman will make to the next Congress, contemplates the
establishment of a merchant marine reserve in which American seamen who
are to serve on American vessels in the foreign trade will be enlisted. Sea-
men in this reserve will receive from the government a monthly retainer so
long as they are employed on American vessels.
In explaining his plan Chairman O'Connor said:
"High wages constitute the real differential against American vessels in
foreign competitive trade. No nation ever had a real merchant marine that
was not manned by its nationals. An American merchant marine to be
effective as a means of national defense must be manned by American
citizens. American ingenuity will overcome any other difficulties.
"There is no incentive for the private owner, however, to employ
American citizens when for his purpose he can get foreign labor at a lower
wage. On the other hand, the government does receive a tremendous
benefit by having the vessels American manned.
"I favor legislation which will provide for the establishment of a
merchant marine reserve, whereby the government will pay to American
seamen enlisted in the reserve and who serve on American vessels a monthly
retainer.
"This retainer, besides insuring Americans on American vessels, will act
as an aid to American shipowners by absorbing the wage differential between
American and foreign wages, and this will tend to promote the transfer of
the government vessels to private American hands for operation.
"With an ultimate number of 15,000 reservists as a maximum less than
$2,000,000 would be required for the first year, and not more than $6,000,000
approximately would be needed to maintain this reserve when the maximum
number of vessels are in private hands.


  p. 1302 (#210)                      #

1302
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
"This maximum figure of $6,000,000 would represent the aid which the
U. S. Treasury would contribute towards the Merchant Marine for which
we would receive a guarantee of American manned, privately operated
vessels so necessary for national defense and for commercial purposes."
Discussing the subject further, Chairman O'Connor said:.
"We as a nation are committed to the policy of individual ownership in
business enterprise. We do not want the government in any business if that
business can be taken over by men who will run it with care, industry, and
economy generally used by a person who is spending his own money. I, like
the majority of our people, am flat-footed in favor of private ownership and
private operation, but neither my opinion nor that of the public is going
to induce a man to buy a ship and go to sea. You can “Resolve" that an
American ship is a good thing, but you cannot “Whereas” a man into
buying a ship.
“The Shipping Board has six hundred ships which are available or can
be made available for foreign trade. All of these ships are for sale at
bargain prices.
"For every ship that an American citizen buys he will require a crew of
forty men. I am using top figures. To each of these men he will have to
pay twenty dollars more a month than is paid to a man doing the same kind
of work on a foreign ship. I am still using top figures. For a crew of
forty men he has to pay $9,600 more per year than is paid for labor on a
foreign ship. My plan is that when a man buys one of our ships and
operates it in foreign trade he shall be entitled to get out of the United
States Treasury twenty dollars per month for each man in his crew. The
sailor employed, however, must be an American citizen. The entire crew
must be American. Any sailor who ships shall receive no part of this
twenty dollars per month until he has completed a round trip. This plan, if
adopted, will practically put the American fleet on a fighting basis with
foreign competition.
"I have shown how to get at the figures, but the public is interested in
lump sums. How much is it worth in cash to the Cnited States of America
to have a cargo-carrying Acet of a size in all parts of the world, manned
by American men whose experience is available to the United States in
any and all emergencies? It will cost us in bonuses to American labor
on the oceans $960,000 dolllars for each one hundred vessels which we are
able to put into private hands.
"If we sell all of our ships to private operators, which in the course of
time we would hope to do, it would cost us less than $6,000,000.
"If the United States Government wants a permanent American merchant
marine—and we have said that we do want it-they can have it at the cost
above mentioned.”
Shipowners are of the opinion that such aid should come from the Navy
Department instead of through the Treasury Department, as suggested by
Mr. O'Connor, because the matter has to do with national defense. It is
recalled that the Navy Department had a bill introduced in Congress last
year along this line, and it is expected that renewed efforts will be made to
have the matter brought up again before the new Congress.
It is pointed out by shipowners that Great Britain, in addition to provid-
ing a naval retainer for both officers and men, pays allowances to certain
ships. One of these, the Mauretania, has an allowance of $700,000 a year
as an auxiliary cruiser. In France no retainer is paid to the men, as they
are subject to compulsory military service.


  p. 1303 (#211)                      #

1925)
1303
Professional Notes
MISCELLANEOUS
The Dutch East Indies; Projects for Defense
By Hector C. Bywater, The Baltimore Sun, 25 May, 1925.---London,
May 8.-One of the richest domains on earth is that comprised in the East
Indian Archipelago, the "spice islands" sought by Columbus, Vasco da Gama
and other doughty navigators of old. Thoroughly developed, the natural
resources of this region might prove of fabulous value. Even as it is they
yield rich dividends.
Two thirds of this vast territory, with all its actual and unexploited
wealth, is owned by Holland-a state of minor military importance, whose
home population numbers barely 7,000,000 souls and whose European fron-
tiers inclose no more than 12,600 square miles—yet for centuries this small
nation has ruled over Eastern dominions exceeding 735,000 square miles,
inhabited by 47,000,000 people.
It is surely a notable circumstance that amidst all the predatory wars of
the past, waged by great military powers obsessed with the land hunger, so
comparatively feeble a state should have been left in undisturbed possession
of these fertile islands.
Though by no means intensively cultivated, Java, Sumatra and Celebes
already produce a large surplus of commodities for which there is a great
and ever-growing demand.
Prospectors declare that the mineral deposits have scarcely been scratched,
yet the yearly exports of coal, tin and other minerals are considerable, and
the annual output of petroleum has almost reached two million tons.
Improved methods of cultivation would, it is estimated, double or treble the
present crops of rice, maize, soya beans, coffee, tea, sugar and rubber.
There are, however, special reasons for the immunity which Holland has
enjoyed in respect of her Eastern empire, and the much-abused "balance of
power" is mainly responsible. An attempt by any one of the great powers
to acquire the Dutch islands of the archipelago either by conquest or pur-
chase would probably be resisted by rival states, less on account of the
material wealth of the territory than because of its high strategical value.
To this fact must be ascribed the long-continued integrity of the Nether-
lands' East Indies, unless we admit that certain rough rules of honesty and
ethics still govern the world's political affairsa thesis somewhat discredited
nowadays.
Since Holland is absolutely dependent on these colonies for her economic,
and, therefore, her political, existence, it is not surprising that she should
be seized at times with nervous fears for their safety.
There was one period of the pre-war era at which Germany was suspected
of having designs upon them, but that peril, if it ever existed, has receded
into the background. Relief was openly expressed in Holland when the
former German lands in and about New Guinea were alloted to Britain
under the Versailles mandate.
Japan has since come to occupy Germany's place as the potential invader,
though it cannot be said that the Japanese, either by word or deed, have
given the least hint of any such intention. This notwithstanding many people
in Holland are convinced that Japan is turning covetous eyes on the East
Indies, both as an outlet for her surplus population and as a source of those
foods and mineral supplies which her own territory is no longer able to
furnish in the volume required.
The Dutch attitude on this matter is logical enough. Pointing out that
Great Britain, though a former ally of Japan's is building an expensive
naval base at Singapore for the protection of Australasia, they remind you
that their own eastern colonies offer a more tempting and a more accessible
prize to the Japanese.


  p. 1304 (#212)                      #

I 304
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
The East Indies contain everything that Japan needs in the way of
supplies, comestible and industrial. Strategically they would be worth more
to her than Australia, and while the subjugation of a continent is a task
irom which she might well shrink-involving as it would a desperate
struggle against the whole might of the British Empire-neither the military
nor the diplomatic obstacles in the way of acquiring the Dutch islands would
necessarily prove' insurniountable.
In any case, they add, it is unthinkable that Japan would conquer
Australia and leave the nearer Dutch islands unmolested.
And so it followed that the Dutch have always taken an intense interest
in the Singapore scheme. Nowhere was chagrin more openly expressed than
in Holland when the British Labor Government turned the project down last
year. Now that work is to be resumed on the Singapore base the merchants
of Rotterdam doubtless sleep better o'nights, soothed by the reflection that
the long arm of the British Navy will effectively shield their opulent
colonies from would-be aggressors.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Singapore scheme evokes more en-
thusiasm in Holland than in England, perhaps because Holland stands to
benefit from it without sharing the cost.
On the other hand, she is not prepared to intrust the defense of her
oversea empire entirely to foreigners. Local combatant forces of con-
siderable strength are being organized, though the large naval program
introduced for this purpose a few years ago was rejected by the Dutch
Parliament.
Practically every new warship is dispatched, on completion, to the East
Indies, where the bulk of the Netherlands navy is permanently stationed.
Reliance is placed chiefly on submarines, minelayers and aircraft, supported
by a few swift cruisers. The East Indies submarine flotilla will eventually
number sixteen boats.
Dutch colonials take a pessimistic view of the Far Eastern situation.
Believing that Japan will soon be driven by sheer economic stress to extend
her boundaries, they foresee a great conflict in the Pacific, with the Dutch
islands playing an important role.
Their situation athwart the trade routes between Europe and East Asia
is such as to invest them with a strategic value of the first order. Neither
Britain nor America, it is held, could afford to stand aside if Japan sought
to lay violent hands on the archipelago. Holland thus reckons on finding
powerful allies if her colonies are ever menaced. Their very existence
increases her danger of being drawn into war.
"In the opening stage of war," writes a Dutch naval critic, "there would
be a desperate race to get possession of Java and Celebes, and here is
explained the seeming paradox that the Indies can be held permanently only
with the aid of an ally, and yet must be able by their own strength to repulse
the initial attack. Only in this way can we be sure that the help tendered
by an ally would not arrive too late."
A glance at the map reveals the soundness of this argument. If Celebes
or Dutch Borneo became Japanese, America's hold on the Philippines would
be rendered more precarious even than it is today. With Japanese naval
bases in Java, Singapore would be outflanked and the defense of Australia
made infinitely more difficult.
The contingencies foreshadowed may never materialize, but that they
are not wholly impossible is proved by Holland's action in spending large
sums to strengthen the defenses of her East Indian colonies.


  p. 1305 (#213)                      #

1925]
1305
Professional Notes
Some Aspects of Education
The Engineer, 17 April, 1925.–At the annual meetings of the Association
of Technical Institutions on Friday and Saturday, March 6-7, it was resolved
that a conference should be called to consider the relationship between
technical education and industries. We may assume from a knowledge of
the constitution of the association and from consideration of some of the
speeches and papers that the schools in the mind of the association were those
that are fed from the primary and secondary schools directly administered
by the board of education, and not the more scientific colleges and univer-
sities. Possibly we might differentiate broadly between the two by describ-
ing one as technological and the other as technical, the former teaching
more technology and craftsmanship than science, the latter more science
than technology. The boundary is ill-defined and fortunately in this con-
nection is of relatively little importance. The important thing is that the
association recognizes that the time has come when the position of technical
education ought to be reviewed. We are very heartily in accord with that
view, and trust that whilst the association is paying attention to that class
of education in which it is mainly interested, the position of the technical
education and training of those engineers who follow a rather more scientific
course, as affected by the progress of engineering since the last conference
was held, now some fourteen years ago, will not be forgotten.
In the course of recent inquiries we have noticed with the greatest
pleasure the growth of the belief that technical and scientific education
must do more for the student than merely provicie him with the tools of
his vocation. There are even, we are glad to say, those who hold that a
scientific education may be as “liberal" as the classical education of our
grandfathers, that it may open and broaden the mind and add that refine-
ment of feeling without which education can never become cultivation.
It is on that aspect of the subject that we desire to place a few ideas before
our readers today. Several hours of leisure have already been added to
the week, and in succeeding years the hours of work will grow less and less,
and the hours when men have to employ themselves will increase. While
the manner in which the working hours are used will affect the material
welfare of the nation, the employment of the leisure hours, the hours outside
the factory and office, will affect the intellectual development and the content-
ment of the people. There was a time when emplovers boasted of living
for their work alone, and when the men, willy-nilly, had no time to think
of anything else. We have heard it said by experienced works managers
that shops were happier in those days. Their work meant more to the
men. It was not merely an incident in the twenty-four hours; they went
to bed with it, they woke up with it, they thought little else, and talked of
little else. It filled their lives and, generally speaking, a full life is a
happy life. Clearly, such a view has its limitations. The mechanic, proud
of his handicraft, the machinist rejoicing in his skill and in his knowledge
of the characteristics of the tool he operated, even the laborer "upon the
floor” who might be called upon at any moment to exercise his ingenuity,
might find a relish in an existence spent wholly in work; but there are
craits less enviable than these crafts in which work is physical drudgery,
dull soul-breaking routine from which the worst-spent leisure is a longed-
for relief. It is to be feared that in engineering we have added to the
latter. Manual skill is now reserved for the few, while for the many,
labor is a long monotony of repitition. Natural progress, on the one hand,
and trade union demarcation on the other, have between them prevented
that self-expression which gave interest to labor. It is not surprising,
therefore, that men look ever toward the reduction of hours and turn their
minds to occupations which will give some outlet to their workshop-stunted


  p. 1306 (#214)                      #

1306
[July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
personalities. While this motion is taking place amongst the men themselves,
it involves those immediately above them, the charge hands and foremen,
and spreads even, in many cases, to the managers and directors. Work
shorter hours in the shops and sooner or later shorter hours will be worked
in the offices. This course, as we have suggested, is not wholly to be de-
precated. The man who thinks of nothing but his immediate work is
generally a dull dog-unless the work itself happens to be of the broadest
nature—but not to think of work and to think of nothing else is worse
still. It is for that reason, we say, that the problem of the future is the
problem of leisure. For the solution of it, we must turn to education;
not vocational education alone, but to some form of education that will
broaden our interests, enlarge our imaginations, and bring us into harmony
with other men. That kind of education can, we believe, be given in
technical colleges if a bold change is effected in curricula. At the present
moment the attempt is made to teach too much. The student is required
to study intimately too many subjects. What we conceive to be desirable
is a very thorough grounding in certain selected subjects, and a broad
general knowledge of others. Give the student a thorough grasp of
principles, and if he cannot make use of them he will never, with all the
teaching of details in the world, shine in his profession. For example,
the mechanical engineer should be taught with the greatest completeness
the principles of mechanics and machinery, but his knowledge of physics,
sound, light and heat-thermo-dynamics excepted-and of electricity and of
chemistry need not be so intimate, and should be qualitative rather than
quantitative. In these subjects he would probably learn more that would be
useful to him from lectures such as Tyndall gave than from classroom work,
which requires him to do mathematical exercises in subjects with the princi-
ples of which his knowledge is far from intimate. By the employment of
some such differentiation, we might succeed in making men with broader
interests in science as a whole, while assuring ourselves that on a few
selected subjects they were more throrough than men now are.
Of course, as ever the examination is the bane of education. We all
know that as a test of real competence it fails hopelessly, and yet because
it is so difficult to find any practicable alternative, we have gone on
employing it and allowing it to intrude more and more into the training of
our youths. As long as it, in its present form, is the test of merit, technical
education will remain what it is, and great authorities will have to lament,
as one did to us only a few days ago, that not more than five per cent of
all the students were worth the money that had been spent on them. A
single good question would be a better test than the half-dozen or more that
are now set before the candidate. More could be learned of a student's
knowledge and mentality by asking him to “discuss the derivation of the
laws of moving bodies” than by a dozen mathematical puzzles; more of the
practical value of his mathematical knowledge by a single question on the
value of superheat or higher pressures or reheating, than by a score of set
exercises. However, such things are details; we may take it that the nature
of examinations will change when at length we admit the defects of the
present systein of technical education, and recognize that in the future we
must make broader, more cultivated, engineers than satisfied the needs of
the past.
The War Fleets of the Nations
Engineering, 17 April, 1925.—The annual return presented to Parliament,
entitled "Fleets (The British Empire and Foreign Countries)," is generally
worthy of close attention, for it shows almost at a glance the relative
strengths of the navies of the powers. It also indicates, by the numbers


  p. 1307 (#215)                      #

1925)
1307
Professional Notes
and types of warships building and projected, the trend of naval opinion
in the different countries, and especially in the case when, as at present,
expenditure is very strictly limited in all countries, and only vessels con-
sidered most necessary are laid down. The reported intention of President
Coolidge to call another conference, for the consideration of further limita-
tion of naval armaments, renders the return for the present year of more
than ordinary interest, for the information it contains must form the basis
on which decisions are likely to be reached.
Events have moved so rapidly in these later times that it hardly seems
four years ago that the then President of the United States called a con-
ference of the powers, which resulted in the Washington Naval Treaty.
Yet such is the case, although the time taken in the necessary formalities
by which the Parliaments of the various countries endorsed the action of
their representatives at the conference postponed the effective date of the
treaty to August 23, 1923. It remains in force until the end of 1926, and in
the interval the signatory powers bind themselves to abide by its provisions.
It will be remembered that by the treaty, limits are placed on the tonnage
of individual units, on the largest caliber of gun mounted, and on the
total tonnage possessed by each nation, of both capital ships and aircraft
carriers, the two largest types of war vessels. The treaty by implication
also limits the tonnage of any light cruiser which may be constructed and
the caliber of its largest guns. Although some attempt was made at the
conference to limit the total tonnage of this type of warship, and also
that of submarines, no agreement was reached. Presumably the next con-
ference will reconsider these matters and endeavor to arrive at a satisfactory
result.
So far as capital ships are concerned, the treaty limits the standard
displacement to 35,000 tons per unit, the caliber of guns to 16 inches, and the
total tonnage to 525,000 tons each for the United States and the British
Empire, 315,000 for Japan, and 175,000 each for France and Italy, these
figures corresponding to ratios 15-9-5. For aircraft carriers the maximum
tonnage of a unit is 27,000 standard tons, the largest caliber of gun 8 inches,
and the total tonnage allocated to the United States and the British Empire
135,000 tons each, Japan 81,000, and France and Italy 60,000 tons each
The ratios are here 1-9-623, France and Italy obtaining a one-third larger
ratio for this type than for capital ships. Although 27,000 tons is the
maximum tonnage allowed, it was agreed by the conference that any of the
powers could build one or two carriers of 33,000 tons, provided the total
tonnage was not exceeded. This provision was included to meet the con-
venience of the United States, whose naval authorities, for reasons of
economy, desired to convert the battle cruisers Lexington and Saratoga,
of 33,000 tons displacement, to aircraft carriers. By Articles XI and XII
of the treaty no vessel exceeding 10,000 tons standard displacement, other
than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, or carrying a gun greater than
8-inch caliber, other than a capital ship, is to be laid down by any of the
signatory powers while the treaty remains in force. These two articles
thus fix the maximum displacement of light cruisers to 10,000 tons and the
largest gun carried in them to 8-inch. The standard displacement is very
nearly that of the ship fully completed, but without oil and fuel and reserve
feed water for boilers.
The provisions of the treaty outlined above are useful to remember when
studying the contents of the Parliamentary Return referred to at the outset.
A summary shows the numbers of completed vessels in the navies of the
powers, and the numbers under construction and projected. These are as
follows: British Empire, 467 and twenty; United States, 539 and forty-
four; Japan, 211 and sixty-seven; France, 219 and 126; Italy, 260 and fifty-
eight; Russia, 164 and thirty-five; and Germany, fifty-one and two. Judged


  p. 1308 (#216)                      #

1308
| July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
by completed numbers the British Empire takes second place to the United
States; for vessels under construction and projected it is last on the list,
except for Germany. Of the twenty British ships now being constructed
six were laid down during the war, two others are coastal motor boats.
If, however, the numbers of capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers,
flotilla leaders, destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines are taken, the
British Empire has 348 completed; the United States, 478; Japan, 192;
France, 126; and Italy, 193.
The return shows that in capital ships, the British Empire, United
States, and Japan have the numbers and individual ships agreed to at the
Washington Conference, but France has one less-the La France sunk by
striking a rock in August, 1922—and Italy three less, viz., the Leonardo da
Vince, Vittorio Emanuele and Regina Elena. It was stated at the time of
the La France's loss that she would be replaced by a new ship but no steps
have been taken to carry this into effect. The numbers of battleships in
the various navies are British Empire eighteen, United States eighteen,
Japan six, France nine, Italy seven, Russia three and Germany eight, while
the British Empire and Japan have each four battle cruisers. The capital
ships of the United States are of newer construction than those of other
powers, seven having been completed since 1917. Japan has three completed
since that year and the British Empire one, the Hood. The average age,
reckoned from the date of completion, of the United States capital ships
is eight years, compared with ten for the British Empire, eight and one-
half for Japan, twelve for France, and thirteen for Italy. The capital
ships of the British Empire carry altogether one hundred 15-inch and eighty-
eight 13/2-inch guns; those of the United States, twenty-four 16-inch,
one hundred and twenty-four 14-inch and forty-four 12-inch; those of
Japan sixteen 16-inch and eighty 14-inch; those of France thirty 13:4-inch
and forty-eight 12-inch, and those of Italy sixty-eight 12-inch and twenty-
four 8-inch guns. The battleships of the American fleet have a maximum
speed of 20%2 to 21 knots, of Japan 22"/2 to 23, of the British Empire 21
to 25, of France 1994 to 20, and of Italy 211/2 to 23 knots. The British
battle cruisers have speeds of over 30 knots and those of Japan 2772.
Only three capital ships are under construction at the present time, the
Nelson and Rodney laid down in 1922, and the Russian Demokratuga started
in 1914, but unlikely to be completed. When the two British battleships
are passed into commission, four of the older ships will be scrapped.
Of the battle cruiser type, the British Empire and Japan are the only
two powers which have examples. The Saratoga and Lexington laid
down in 1920 by the United States were designed as battle cruisers, but are
now being converted.
Dealing next with cruisers, the return shows that the British Empire
has forty-nine completed and eight building and projected. These figures
compare with thirty-one and nine for the United States, twenty-eight and
eleven for Japan, sixteen and nine for France, thirteen and five for Italy,
seven and seven for Russia, and eight and one for Germany. The eight
British cruisers building are the Emerald, Enterprise and Effingham, laid
down during the war, and five of the Kent class ordered last year. Of the
nine United States vessels, the Memphis was started in 1920, eight are
authorized, and money has been recently appropriated for two. Nine of
the Japanese vessels are building and two projected. France has five
cruisers laid down and four more are to be ordered before 1929, while
Italy has two building and three projected. The total tonnages (a) of
compelted cruisers, (b) of those which, have been completed fifteen years,


  p. 1309 (#217)                      #

1925)
1309
Professional Notes
are now considered obsolete, and (c) of those building and projected are
given in the following table :
(6)
Nation
(a)
Completed
Tonnage,
Modern and
Obsolete
Building and
Projected
Tonnage
Obsolete
Tonnage
atc-b
British Empire.....
United States..
Japan.
France
Italy........
234,000
252,000
166,000
150,000
68,000
38,000
184,000
75,000
100,000
10,000
75,000 (?)
87,500
85,000
84,000
50,000
271,000
155,500
176,000
134,000
108,000
The displacement of the Kent class is not stated in the return, and in the
table is taken as 10,000, the maximum allowed and as shown for the latest
cruisers of all the other powers. Five each of the French and Italian
cruisers are surrendered German and Austrian vessels.
It is interesting to speculate on the direction in which the next Wash-
ington Conference, if held, will move in connection with cruiser tonnage.
If the 5-5-3 ratio adopted for capital ships and aircraft-carriers is suggested
and agreed to, there must result a great scrapping of British and Japanese
tonnage, or a large building program for the United States. On the other
hand, the British representatives may urge the ocean routes, which must be
protected to ensure an adequate food supply to this country, necessitate a
much larger ratio than to the United States and Japan, for which con-
ditions are different. The problem of arriving at a conclusion agreeable to
all promises to be a difficult one.
Of cruiser mine layers only one is referred to in the return, and this is
the British Adventure, laid down in 1922, but of which no details are given.
The British Empire is credited with the greatest number, eight, of air-
craft-carriers, all of which are recorded as built. The United States and
Japan have each two completed and two building, while France and Italy
have no vessels of the type built and only one each building. Of the total
of eighteen aircraft-carriers mentioned, only two, the Hermes and llosho,
were designed for the purpose, the remainder are converted vessels. The
eight of the British Empire are the Glorious, Courageus, Furious, Hermes,
Eagle, Argus, Pegasus and Ark Royal, the total tonnage being 114,000 tons.
Of these, the two first are under conversion, and until they are completed
the tonnage afioat will be 77,000, or rather over one half the amount allowed
by the treaty. The Wright and Langley, the two completed American
vessels, have a tonnage of 24,000 and a speed of 15 knots. With the
Saratoga and Lexington completed the total tonnage will be 90,000. The
Hosho and Wakamiya, of the Japanese Navy, are of 15,000 tons total, the
first named having a speed of 25 knots. The Akagi, a battle cruiser, and
the Kaga, a battleship, each of 27,000 tons are being converted to aircraft-
carriers. The French are converting the battleship Béarn, of 21,000 tons,
and the Italians a merchant ship of 5,000 tons for the same purpose. It is
evident the three strongest naval powers anticipate that the aircraft-carrier,
a type unknown at the outbreak of war in 1914, will play an important part
in future naval warfare.


  p. 1310 (#218)                      #

•1310
(July
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
Interesting figures are given in relation to the torpedo craft-flotilla
leaders, destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines—of the various navies.
Flotilla leaders are a type first used in the British Navy, the earliest being
ordered just before the war. They are the leaders and flagships of the
torpedo flotillas, and for this reason are larger and faster than destroyers.
The British Empire has seventeen completed and one—the Keppell-laid
down in 1918 still under construction. The American and Japanese Navies
have no vessel of the type, and are not building or proposing to build any.
The French have one, a surrendered German vessel, and the Italians nine,
four being of small tonnage. The French naval authorities have, however,
adopted the type, are building six, and fifteen more are to be laid down
before 1929. Those under construction are powerful vessels of 2,360 tons
displacement, 50,000 horsepower, 3572 knots speed, with five 5.1-inch guns,
and six torpedo tubes. The largest British vessels are of 1,800 tons, 40,000
horsepower, 361/2 knots speed, with five 4.7-inch guns and two triple torpedo
tubes. Italy is building two of the type, of 2,200 tons each, 50,000 horse-
power, 35 knots speed, and eight 4.7-inch guns. In torpedo boat destroyers
the United States hold a big lead, 309 being completed and twelve projected.
The British Empire follows with 189 and two; while Japan has 101 com-
pleted and twenty-three building and projected. The corresponding numbers
for France are fifty-four and thirty-six, for Italy fifty-three and twenty-
four; and for Russia eighty and twenty-six. The total completed tonnages,
including flotilla leaders, are as follows: United States, 355,000 tons of
which by far the greater proportion have been completed since 1917; 15,000
tons have been completed over twelve years and are, therefore, considered
obsolete. The tonnage of the other powers are: British Empire, 234,000;
Japan, 88,000, including 9,500 obsolete; France, 41,000, 7,500 obsolete; and
Italy, 39,000, of which 2,700 is out of date. Japan has under construction
eight destroyers of 1,400 tons each, and fifteen others are authorized;
France has laid down eighteen of about 1,450 tons, and contemplates another
eighteen before 1929; Italy has eight under construction, and eight others
ordered.
The only navy possessing torpedo boats is Italy, which has sixty-eight
of these craft. No further vessels of the type are being constructed for the
Italian or other navies, and in view of this the designation of torpedo boat
destroyers is obsolete.
In submarines, the Unted States also hold a lead, nearly as pronounced
as for destroyers since 118 are completed and fifteen building and projected.
The corresponding figures for other nations are: Breat Britain, sixty-three
and four; Japan, fifty-one and twenty-eight; France, forty-six and fifty-
nine; and Italy, forty-three and twenty. The completed tonnages are:
United States, 80,000, of which 10,000 is stated to be for coast defense only;
the British Empire, 53,000; Japan, 30,000, including 1,700 obsolete having
been completed over ten years; France, 30,000, of which 1,700 is obsolete;
and Italy, 17,500.
Of the fifteen submarines building and projected by the United States,
three fleet submarines of 2,200 tons surface displacements, and three of 900
tions are under construction, five more of the former type are authorized
but not laid down, and four more are projected. Of the four building for
the British Empire two were laid down in 1918X1 in 1922 and Oi in
1924. Japan laid down eight of over 1,000 tons last year, four of a smaller
type are also building, and sixteen are authorized. France has embarked
on a very extensive submarine program, two of 1,360 tons, nine of 1,130,
and eighteen of 590 having been laid down since 1922. Two cruiser sub-
marines of 3,000 tons each, and thirty-four of ordinary type are to be
ordered before 1929, while three of 590 tons, termed second class, are to be


  p. 1311 (#219)                      #

1925)
1311
Professional Notes
laid down each year. Italy has placed orders for twelve submarines, four
being of 1.300 tons, four of 800, and four of 780, and eight others are
projected. These figures show very clearly that large programs of sub-
marine construction are contemplated by nearly all the powers. .
Six other types of war vessels are included in the return: viz., coast
deiense vessels, sloops, coastal motor boats, gunboats, and despatch vessels,
river gunboats, and minesweepers. In all these classes, with the exception
of gunboats and despatch vessels, the British Empire leads in numbers. In
coast defense vessels the British have three, the only other being one
possessed by the United States. The British Navy has thirty-five sloops, and
the French eight; twenty-nine coastal motor boats, Japan and France two,
and Italy twelve; two gunboats and despatch vessels, and France forty-nine;
eighteen river gunboats, and Japan eight; sixty-two minesweepers, the
United States having forty-five, Japan three, France twenty-nine, and Italy
forty. In this last type which was shown to be very necessary by war
experience, are all relatively new vessels.
A close study of the contents of this Parliamentary Return leaves many
impressions, but amongst these the strongest are the marked superiority of
the American Navy in all types of war vessels, with the exception of
cruisers and aircraft carriers; the increasing importance of aeroplanes in
future naval operations expected by the three leading powers, but not
apparently by France and Italy; the activity in torpedo craft construction
by all the powers, with the exception of the British Empire, and the increas-
ing tonnage of individual units; and finally, the relatively small program of
British new construction. This last impression is undoubtedly a result of
financial stringency, a cause which appears to have little influence on new
construction in other countries.
CURRENT PROFESSIONAL NOTES AND PAPERS
"The Design of Merchant Ships," "Seaworthiness, Stability and Rolling,"
"The Strength of Ships," and other articles in The Annual Number of The
Shipbuilder, May, 1925.
"New Motor Liner Aorangi.” The Scientific American, June.
"The Gauging of Rivers and Tidal Currents." Engineering, May 15, 1925.
"Principles of Metallurgy of Ferrous Metals," and "A Chart for De-
termining the Weight of Moist Air." Mechanical Engineer, June, 1925.
“The Limiting Range of Airplanes." Aviation, May 25, 1925.
“The Air Requirements of the Army,” and “The Evolution of Artillery
in the Great War.” The Journal of the Royal Artillery, April, 1925.
"The Role of Malleable Cast Iron in Ordnance," and "Air Clarifiers."
Army Ordnance, March-April, 1925.
"The United States and Rigid Airships.” The Engineer, April 24, 1925.