From 4ae4c83ba073248b098a5c987afaab448776bb21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Langley Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 20:22:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #1957 from w3c/spk SHA: f8163ea38ba03fb2352b5d6730bac6db1225b30a Reason: push, by nsatragno Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --- index.html | 12318 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 4863 insertions(+), 7455 deletions(-) diff --git a/index.html b/index.html index 51eb69b09..d84ef2b89 100644 --- a/index.html +++ b/index.html @@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ - Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level + Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 3 - + - + - - + + - + - + - - - + + - +

Web Authentication:
An API for accessing Public Key Credentials
Level 3

-

Editor’s Draft,

+

Editor’s Draft,

More details about this document
@@ -398,7 +931,7 @@

Web Authentication:
An API for accessing Public Key Credentials
Level
Feedback:
GitHub
Editors: -
(Microsoft) +
(Self-Issued Consulting)
(Microsoft)
(Yubico)
Former Editors: @@ -419,7 +952,8 @@

Web Authentication:
An API for accessing Public Key Credentials
Level
Giridhar Mandyam (Qualcomm)
Matthew Miller (Cisco)
Nina Satragno (Google) -
Nick Steele (Gemini) +
Ki-Eun Shin (SK Telecom) +
Nick Steele (1Password)
Jiewen Tan (Apple)
Shane Weeden (IBM)
Mike West (Google) @@ -430,7 +964,7 @@

Web Authentication:
An API for accessing Public Key Credentials
Level

-

Copyright © 2022 W3C® (MIT, ERCIM, Keio, Beihang). W3C liability, trademark and permissive document license rules apply.

+

Copyright © 2023 World Wide Web Consortium. W3C® liability, trademark and permissive document license rules apply.

@@ -461,7 +995,7 @@

Essential Claim(s) must disclose the information in accordance with section 6 of the W3C Patent Policy.

-

This document is governed by the 2 November 2021 W3C Process Document.

+

This document is governed by the 03 November 2023 W3C Process Document.

@@ -527,8 +1061,9 @@

Table of Contents

  • 5.1.5 Store an Existing Credential - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method
  • 5.1.6 Preventing Silent Access to an Existing Credential - PublicKeyCredential’s [[preventSilentAccess]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method
  • 5.1.7 Availability of User-Verifying Platform Authenticator - PublicKeyCredential’s isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method -
  • 5.1.8 Deserialize Registration ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseCreationOptionsFromJSON() Method -
  • 5.1.9 Deserialize Authentication ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseRequestOptionsFromJSON() Methods +
  • 5.1.8 Availability of a passkey platform authenticator - PublicKeyCredential’s isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method +
  • 5.1.9 Deserialize Registration ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseCreationOptionsFromJSON() Method +
  • 5.1.10 Deserialize Authentication ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseRequestOptionsFromJSON() Methods
  • 5.2 Authenticator Responses (interface AuthenticatorResponse) @@ -577,6 +1112,7 @@

    Table of Contents

  • 5.8.4 Authenticator Transport Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorTransport)
  • 5.8.5 Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier (typedef COSEAlgorithmIdentifier)
  • 5.8.6 User Verification Requirement Enumeration (enum UserVerificationRequirement) +
  • 5.8.7 User-agent Hints Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialHints)
  • 5.9 Permissions Policy integration
  • 5.10 Using Web Authentication within iframe elements @@ -616,15 +1152,16 @@

    Table of Contents

  • 6.5 Attestation
      +
    1. 6.5.1 Attestation in assertions
    2. - 6.5.1 Attested Credential Data + 6.5.2 Attested Credential Data
        -
      1. 6.5.1.1 Examples of credentialPublicKey Values Encoded in COSE_Key Format +
      2. 6.5.2.1 Examples of credentialPublicKey Values Encoded in COSE_Key Format
      -
    3. 6.5.2 Attestation Statement Formats -
    4. 6.5.3 Attestation Types -
    5. 6.5.4 Generating an Attestation Object -
    6. 6.5.5 Signature Formats for Packed Attestation, FIDO U2F Attestation, and Assertion Signatures +
    7. 6.5.3 Attestation Statement Formats +
    8. 6.5.4 Attestation Types +
    9. 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object +
    10. 6.5.6 Signature Formats for Packed Attestation, FIDO U2F Attestation, and Assertion Signatures
  • @@ -656,6 +1193,7 @@

    Table of Contents

  • 8.6 FIDO U2F Attestation Statement Format
  • 8.7 None Attestation Statement Format
  • 8.8 Apple Anonymous Attestation Statement Format +
  • 8.9 Compound Attestation Statement Format
  • 9 WebAuthn Extensions @@ -682,6 +1220,23 @@

    Table of Contents

    10.2 Authenticator Extensions
    1. 10.2.1 User Verification Method Extension (uvm) +
    2. + 10.2.2 Supplemental public keys extension (supplementalPubKeys) +
        +
      1. 10.2.2.1 Relying Party Usage +
      2. + 10.2.2.2 Extension Definition +
          +
        1. 10.2.2.2.1 AAGUIDs +
        2. 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations +
        +
      3. + 10.2.2.3 supplementalPubKeys Extension Output Verification Procedures +
          +
        1. 10.2.2.3.1 Registration (create()) +
        2. 10.2.2.3.2 Authentication (get()) +
        +
  • @@ -731,6 +1286,7 @@

    Table of Contents

  • 13.4.6 Credential Loss and Key Mobility
  • 13.4.7 Unprotected account detection
  • 13.4.8 Code injection attacks +
  • 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential
  • @@ -760,7 +1316,11 @@

    Table of Contents

  • 14.6.3 Privacy leak via credential IDs -
  • 15 Accessibility Considerations +
  • + 15 Accessibility Considerations +
      +
    1. 15.1 Recommended Range for Ceremony Timeouts +
  • 16 Acknowledgements
  • Index @@ -791,7 +1351,7 @@

    1

    Relying Parties employ the Web Authentication API during two distinct, but related, ceremonies involving a user. The first is Registration, where a public key credential is created on an authenticator, and scoped to a Relying Party with the present user’s account (the account might already exist or might be created at this time). The second is Authentication, where the Relying Party is presented with an Authentication Assertion proving the presence and consent of the user who registered the public key credential. Functionally, the Web Authentication -API comprises a PublicKeyCredential which extends the Credential Management API [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1], and +API comprises a PublicKeyCredential which extends the Credential Management API [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1], and infrastructure which allows those credentials to be used with navigator.credentials.create() and navigator.credentials.get(). The former is used during Registration, and the latter during Authentication.

    Broadly, compliant authenticators protect public key credentials, and interact with user agents to implement the Web Authentication API. @@ -807,7 +1367,7 @@

    All audiences ought to begin with § 1.2 Use Cases, § 1.3 Sample API Usage Scenarios, and § 4 Terminology, and should also -refer to [WebAuthnAPIGuide] for an overall tutorial. +refer to [WebAuthnAPIGuide] for an overall tutorial. Beyond that, the intended audiences for this document are the following main groups:

    -

    Note: This approach of registering multiple authenticators for an account is also useful in account recovery use cases.

    +

    Note: This approach of registering multiple authenticators for an account is also useful in account recovery use cases.

    -

    Note: Since this computer lacks a platform authenticator, the website may require the user to present their USB security +

    Note: Since this computer lacks a platform authenticator, the website may require the user to present their USB security key from time to time or each time the user interacts with the website. This is at the website’s discretion.

  • Later, on their laptop (which features a platform authenticator):

    @@ -1023,7 +1583,7 @@

    The sample code for generating and registering a new key follows:

    -
    if (!window.PublicKeyCredential) { /* Client not capable. Handle error. */ }
+
    if (!window.PublicKeyCredential) { /* Client not capable. Handle error. */ }
 
 var publicKey = {
   // The challenge is produced by the server; see the Security Considerations
@@ -1059,7 +1619,7 @@ 
    : "preferred"
   },
 
-  timeout: 360000,  // 6 minutes
+  timeout: 300000,  // 5 minutes
   excludeCredentials: [
     // Don’t re-register any authenticator that has one of these credentials
     {"id": Uint8Array.from(window.atob("ufJWp8YGlibm1Kd9XQBWN1WAw2jy5In2Xhon9HAqcXE="), c=>c.charCodeAt(0)), "type": "public-key"},
@@ -1167,14 +1727,14 @@ 
    <
    
    
    If the Relying Party script does not have any hints available (e.g., from locally stored data) to help it narrow the list of
 credentials, then the sample code for performing such an authentication might look like this:
    
-
    if (!window.PublicKeyCredential) { /* Client not capable. Handle error. */ }
+
    if (!window.PublicKeyCredential) { /* Client not capable. Handle error. */ }
 
 // credentialId is generated by the authenticator and is an opaque random byte array
 var credentialId = new Uint8Array([183, 148, 245 /* more random bytes previously generated by the authenticator */]);
 var options = {
   // The challenge is produced by the server; see the Security Considerations
   challenge: new Uint8Array([4,101,15 /* 29 more random bytes generated by the server */]),
-  timeout: 120000,  // 2 minutes
+  timeout: 300000,  // 5 minutes
   allowCredentials: [{ type: "public-key", id: credentialId }]
 };
 
@@ -1187,7 +1747,7 @@ 
    <
 
    
    
    On the other hand, if the Relying Party script has some hints to help it narrow the list of credentials, then the sample code for
 performing such an authentication might look like the following. Note that this sample also demonstrates how to use the Credential Properties Extension.
    
-
    if (!window.PublicKeyCredential) { /* Client not capable. Handle error. */ }
+
    if (!window.PublicKeyCredential) { /* Client not capable. Handle error. */ }
 
 var encoder = new TextEncoder();
 var acceptableCredential1 = {
@@ -1202,7 +1762,7 @@ 
    <
 var options = {
   // The challenge is produced by the server; see the Security Considerations
   challenge: new Uint8Array([8,18,33 /* 29 more random bytes generated by the server */]),
-  timeout: 120000,  // 2 minutes
+  timeout: 300000,  // 5 minutes
   allowCredentials: [acceptableCredential1, acceptableCredential2],
   extensions: { 'credProps': true }
 };
@@ -1294,7 +1854,7 @@ 
    
    
    A conforming User Agent MUST also be a conforming implementation of the IDL fragments of this specification, as described in the
-“Web IDL” specification. [WebIDL]
    
+“Web IDL” specification. [WebIDL]
    
    
    2.1.1. Enumerations as DOMString types
    
    
    Enumeration types are not referenced by other parts of the Web IDL because that
 would preclude other values from being used without updating this specification
@@ -1323,53 +1883,53 @@ 
    Base64url Encoding refers to the base64 encoding using the URL- and filename-safe character set defined
-in Section 5 of [RFC4648], with all trailing '=' characters omitted (as permitted by Section 3.2) and without the
+in Section 5 of [RFC4648], with all trailing '=' characters omitted (as permitted by Section 3.2) and without the
 inclusion of any line breaks, whitespace, or other additional characters.
    
     
    CBOR
     
    
-     
    A number of structures in this specification, including attestation statements and extensions, are encoded using the CTAP2 canonical CBOR encoding form of the Compact Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949],
-as defined in [FIDO-CTAP].
    
+     
    A number of structures in this specification, including attestation statements and extensions, are encoded using the CTAP2 canonical CBOR encoding form of the Compact Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949],
+as defined in [FIDO-CTAP].
    
     
    CDDL
     
    
-     
    This specification describes the syntax of all CBOR-encoded data using the CBOR Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610].
    
+     
    This specification describes the syntax of all CBOR-encoded data using the CBOR Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610].
    
     
    COSE
     
    
-     
    CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052] [RFC9053].
-The IANA COSE Algorithms registry [IANA-COSE-ALGS-REG] originally established by [RFC8152] and updated by these specifications is also used.
    
+     
    CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052] [RFC9053].
+The IANA COSE Algorithms registry [IANA-COSE-ALGS-REG] originally established by [RFC8152] and updated by these specifications is also used.
    
     
    Credential Management
     
    
-     
    The API described in this document is an extension of the Credential concept defined in [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1].
    
+     
    The API described in this document is an extension of the Credential concept defined in [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1].
    
     
    DOM
     
    
-     
    DOMException and the DOMException values used in this specification are defined in [DOM4].
    
+     
    DOMException and the DOMException values used in this specification are defined in [DOM4].
    
     
    ECMAScript
     
    
-     
    %ArrayBuffer% is defined in [ECMAScript].
    
+     
    %ArrayBuffer% is defined in [ECMAScript].
    
     
    HTML
     
    
-     
    The concepts of browsing context, origin, opaque origin, tuple origin, relevant settings object, same site and is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to are defined in [HTML].
    
+     
    The concepts of browsing context, origin, opaque origin, tuple origin, relevant settings object, same site and is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to are defined in [HTML].
    
     
    URL
     
    
-     
    The concepts of domain, host, port, scheme, valid domain and valid domain string are defined in [URL].
    
+     
    The concepts of domain, host, port, scheme, valid domain and valid domain string are defined in [URL].
    
     
    Web IDL
     
    
-     
    Many of the interface definitions and all of the IDL in this specification depend on [WebIDL]. This updated version of
+     
    Many of the interface definitions and all of the IDL in this specification depend on [WebIDL]. This updated version of
 the Web IDL standard adds support for Promises, which are now the preferred mechanism for asynchronous
 interaction in all new web APIs.
    
     
    FIDO AppID
     
    
      
    The algorithms for determining the FacetID of a calling application and determining if a caller’s FacetID is authorized for an AppID (used only in
-the AppID extension) are defined by [FIDO-APPID].
    
+the AppID extension) are defined by [FIDO-APPID].
    
    
    
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and
-"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
    
+"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
    
    
    4. Terminology
    
    
    
     
    Attestation
     
    
      
    Generally, attestation is a statement that serves to bear witness, confirm, or authenticate.
 In the WebAuthn context, attestation is employed to provide verifiable evidence as to the origin of an authenticator and the data it emits. This includes such things as credential IDs, credential key pairs, signature counters, etc.
    
-     
    An attestation statement is provided within an attestation object during a registration ceremony. See also § 6.5 Attestation and Figure 6. Whether or how the client conveys the attestation statement and AAGUID portions of the attestation object to the Relying Party is described by attestation conveyance.
    
+     
    An attestation statement is provided within an attestation object during a registration ceremony. See also § 6.5 Attestation and Figure 6. Whether or how the client conveys the attestation statement and aaguid portions of the attestation object to the Relying Party is described by attestation conveyance.
    
     
    Attestation Certificate
     
    
      
    An X.509 Certificate for the attestation key pair used by an authenticator to attest to its manufacture
@@ -1391,14 +1951,15 @@ 
    Assertion
     
    
      
    The cryptographically signed AuthenticatorAssertionResponse object returned by an authenticator as the result of an authenticatorGetAssertion operation.
    
-     
    This corresponds to the [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] specification’s single-use credentials.
    
+     
    This corresponds to the [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] specification’s single-use credentials.
    
     
    Authenticator
     
    WebAuthn Authenticator
     
    
-     
    A cryptographic entity, existing in hardware or software, that can register a user with a given Relying Party and later assert possession of the registered public key credential, and optionally verify the user, when requested by the Relying Party. Authenticators can report information
-regarding their type and security characteristics via attestation during registration.
    
+     
    A cryptographic entity, existing in hardware or software, that can register a user with a given Relying Party and later assert possession of the registered public key credential, and optionally verify the user to the Relying Party. Authenticators can report information
+regarding their type and security characteristics via attestation during registration and assertion.
    
      
    A WebAuthn Authenticator could be a roaming authenticator, a dedicated hardware subsystem integrated into the client device,
-or a software component of the client or client device.
    
+or a software component of the client or client device. A WebAuthn Authenticator is not necessarily confined to operating in 
+a local context, and can generate or store a credential key pair in a server outside of client-side hardware.
    
      
    In general, an authenticator is assumed to have only one user.
 If multiple natural persons share access to an authenticator,
 they are considered to represent the same user in the context of that authenticator.
@@ -1431,13 +1992,13 @@ 
    authenticator that implements biometric recognition.
    
     
    Biometric Recognition
     
    
-     
    The automated recognition of individuals based on their biological and behavioral characteristics [ISOBiometricVocabulary].
    
+     
    The automated recognition of individuals based on their biological and behavioral characteristics [ISOBiometricVocabulary].
    
     
    Bound credential
     
    "Authenticator contains a credential"
     
    "Credential created on an authenticator"
     
    
      
    A public key credential source or public key credential is said to be bound to its managing
-authenticator. This means that only the managing authenticator can generate assertions for the public key
+authenticator. This means that only the managing authenticator can generate assertions for the public key
 credential sources bound to it.
    
      
    This may also be expressed as "the managing authenticator contains the bound credential",
 or "the bound credential was created on its managing authenticator".
@@ -1446,7 +2007,7 @@ 
    § 6.2.2 Credential Storage Modality.
    
     
    Ceremony
     
    
-     
    The concept of a ceremony [Ceremony] is an extension of the concept of a network protocol, with human nodes alongside
+     
    The concept of a ceremony [Ceremony] is an extension of the concept of a network protocol, with human nodes alongside
 computer nodes and with communication links that include user interface(s), human-to-human communication, and transfers of
 physical objects that carry data. What is out-of-band to a protocol is in-band to a ceremony. In this specification, Registration and Authentication are ceremonies, and an authorization gesture is often a component of
 those ceremonies.
    
@@ -1480,10 +2041,11 @@ 
    Client-side discoverable Public Key Credential Source
     
    Client-side discoverable Credential
     
    Discoverable Credential
+    
    Passkey
     
    [DEPRECATED] Resident Credential
     
    [DEPRECATED] Resident Key
     
    
-     
    Note: Historically, client-side discoverable credentials have  been known as resident credentials or resident keys.
+     
    Note: Historically, client-side discoverable credentials have  been known as resident credentials or resident keys.
 Due to the phrases ResidentKey and residentKey being widely used in both the WebAuthn
 API and also in the Authenticator Model (e.g., in dictionary member names, algorithm variable names, and
 operation parameters) the usage of resident within their
@@ -1495,9 +2057,9 @@ 
    discoverable credential capable authenticator can generate an assertion signature for a discoverable credential given only an RP ID,
 which in turn necessitates that the public key credential source is stored in the authenticator or client platform.
 This is in contrast to a Server-side Public Key Credential Source,
-which requires that the authenticator is given both the RP ID and the credential ID but does not require client-side storage of the public key credential source.
    
+which requires that the authenticator is given both the RP ID and the credential ID but does not require client-side storage of the public key credential source.
    
      
    See also: client-side credential storage modality and non-discoverable credential.
    
-     
    Note: Client-side discoverable credentials are also usable in authentication ceremonies where credential IDs are given,
+     
    Note: Client-side discoverable credentials are also usable in authentication ceremonies where credential IDs are given,
 i.e., when calling navigator.credentials.get() with a non-empty allowCredentials argument.
    
     
    Conforming User Agent
     
    
@@ -1514,23 +2076,24 @@ 
    public key credential source, without its Credential ID or mutable items, encrypted so only its managing authenticator can
 decrypt it. This form allows the authenticator to be nearly stateless, by having the Relying Party store any necessary
 state.
    
-       
    Note: [FIDO-UAF-AUTHNR-CMDS] includes guidance on encryption techniques under "Security Guidelines".
    
+       
    Note: [FIDO-UAF-AUTHNR-CMDS] includes guidance on encryption techniques under "Security Guidelines".
    
      
      
    Relying Parties do not need to distinguish these two Credential ID forms.
    
     
    Credential Key Pair
     
    Credential Private Key
     
    Credential Public Key
     
    User Public Key
+    
    User Credential
     
    
-     
    A credential key pair is a pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys generated by an authenticator and scoped to a specific WebAuthn Relying Party. It is the central part of a public key credential.
    
-     
    A credential public key is the public key portion of a credential key pair.
+     
    A credential key pair is a pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys generated by an authenticator and scoped to a specific WebAuthn Relying Party. It is the central part of a public key credential.
    
+     
    A credential public key is the public key portion of a credential key pair.
 The credential public key is returned to the Relying Party during a registration ceremony.
    
-     
    A credential private key is the private key portion of a credential key pair.
+     
    A credential private key is the private key portion of a credential key pair.
 The credential private key is bound to a particular authenticator - its managing authenticator -
 and is expected to never be exposed to any other party, not even to the owner of the authenticator.
    
      
    Note that in the case of self
-attestation, the credential key pair is also used as the attestation key pair, see self attestation for details.
    
-     
    Note: The credential public key is referred to as the user public key in FIDO UAF [UAFProtocol], and in FIDO U2F [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats] and some parts of this specification that relate to it.
    
+attestation, the credential key pair is also used as the attestation key pair, see self attestation for details.
    
+     
    Note: The credential public key is referred to as the user public key in FIDO UAF [UAFProtocol], and in FIDO U2F [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats] and some parts of this specification that relate to it.
    
     
    Credential Properties
     
    
      
    A credential property is some characteristic property of a public key credential source, such as whether it is a client-side discoverable credential or a server-side credential.
    
@@ -1557,81 +2120,102 @@ 
    transports
       
    
        
    The value returned from getTransports() when the public key credential source was registered.
    
-       
    Note: Modifying or removing items from the value returned from getTransports() could negatively impact user experience, or even prevent use of the corresponding credential.
    
-      
    BE
+       
    Note: Modifying or removing items from the value returned from getTransports() could negatively impact user experience, or even prevent use of the corresponding credential.
    
+      
    uvInitialized
       
    
-       
    The value of the BE flag when the public key credential source was created.
    
-      
    BS
+       
    A Boolean value indicating whether any credential from this public key credential source has had the UV flag set.
    
+       
    When this is true, the Relying Party MAY consider the UV flag as an authentication factor in authentication ceremonies.
+For example, a Relying Party might skip a password prompt if uvInitialized is true and the UV flag is set, even when user verification was not required.
    
+       
    When this is false, including an authentication ceremony where it would be updated to true,
+the UV flag MUST NOT be relied upon as an authentication factor.
+This is because the first time a public key credential source sets the UV flag to 1,
+there is not yet any trust relationship established between the Relying Party and the authenticator's user verification.
+Therefore, updating uvInitialized from false to true SHOULD require authorization by an additional authentication factor equivalent to WebAuthn user verification.
    
+      
    backupEligible
       
    
-       
    The latest value of the BS flag in the authenticator data from any ceremony using the public key credential source.
    
+       
    The value of the BE flag when the public key credential source was created.
    
+      
    backupState
+      
    
+       
    The latest value of the BS flag in the authenticator data from any ceremony using the public key credential source.
    
      
    
      
    The following items are OPTIONAL:
    
      
    
       
    attestationObject
       
    
        
    The value of the attestationObject attribute
-when the public key credential source was registered.
-Storing this enables the Relying Party to reference the credential’s attestation statement at a later time.
    
+when the public key credential source was registered.
+Storing this enables the Relying Party to reference the credential’s attestation statement at a later time.
    
       
    attestationClientDataJSON
       
    
        
    The value of the clientDataJSON attribute
-when the public key credential source was registered.
-Storing this in combination with the above attestationObject item enables the Relying Party to re-verify the attestation signature at a later time.
    
+when the public key credential source was registered.
+Storing this in combination with the above attestationObject item enables the Relying Party to re-verify the attestation signature at a later time.
    
+      
    authenticatorDisplayName
+      
    
+       
    A human-palatable description of the public key credential source.
    
+       
    If used, the Relying Party SHOULD use this to describe the credential record in the user’s account settings.
+The Relying Party SHOULD allow the user to choose this value, and MAY allow the user to modify it at will.
    
+       
    The Credential Properties Extension defines the credential property authenticatorDisplayName which, when available, MAY be offered as a default for this value.
+The Relying Party MAY also derive a default value from the authenticator’s attestation statement, if any.
    
      
    
-     
    WebAuthn extensions MAY define additional items needed to process the extension. Relying Parties MAY also include any additional items as needed,
+     
    WebAuthn extensions MAY define additional items needed to process the extension. Relying Parties MAY also include any additional items as needed,
 and MAY omit any items not needed for their implementation.
    
      
    The credential descriptor for a credential record is a PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor value with the contents:
    
      
    
       
    type
       
    
-       
    The type of the credential record.
    
+       
    The type of the credential record.
    
       
    id
       
    
-       
    The id of the credential record.
    
+       
    The id of the credential record.
    
       
    transports
       
    
-       
    The transports of the credential record.
    
+       
    The transports of the credential record.
    
      
    
+    
    Supplemental public key
+    
    
+     
    A additional public key, associated with a user credential, that can be obtained (and exercised) with the supplementalPubKeys extension. These public keys provide more specific continuity signals. For example, a supplemental public key with device scope never leaves the device, while a multi-device credential can. Other supplemental public keys might have a broader scope, as described by their attestation.
    
+     
    Supplemental public keys MUST NOT have a scope that exceeds the scope of their user credential—i.e. they never link two user credentials together. While this specification defines norms around scopes, Relying Parties have to evaluate supplemental public keys in light of their attestation, if any, and assign credibility to claimed scopes accordingly.
    
     
    Generating Authenticator
     
    
      
    The Generating Authenticator is the authenticator involved in the authenticatorMakeCredential operation resulting
-in the creation of a given public key credential source. The generating authenticator is the same as the managing authenticator for single-device credentials. For multi-device credentials, the generating authenticator may or may not be the same as the
+in the creation of a given public key credential source. The generating authenticator is the same as the managing authenticator for single-device credentials. For multi-device credentials, the generating authenticator may or may not be the same as the
 current managing authenticator participating in a given authentication operation.
    
     
    Human Palatability
     
    
-     
    An identifier that is human-palatable is intended to be rememberable and reproducible by typical human
-users, in contrast to identifiers that are, for example, randomly generated sequences of bits [EduPersonObjectClassSpec].
    
+     
    An identifier that is human-palatable is intended to be rememberable and reproducible by typical human
+users, in contrast to identifiers that are, for example, randomly generated sequences of bits [EduPersonObjectClassSpec].
    
     
    Non-Discoverable Credential
     
    
-     
    This is a credential whose credential ID must be provided in allowCredentials when calling navigator.credentials.get() because it is not client-side discoverable. See also server-side credentials.
    
+     
    This is a credential whose credential ID must be provided in allowCredentials when calling navigator.credentials.get() because it is not client-side discoverable. See also server-side credentials.
    
     
    Public Key Credential
     
    
-     
    Generically, a credential is data one entity presents to another in order to authenticate the former to the latter [RFC4949]. The term public key credential refers to one of: a public key credential source, the
-possibly-attested credential public key corresponding to a public key credential source, or an authentication assertion. Which one is generally determined by context.
    
+     
    Generically, a credential is data one entity presents to another in order to authenticate the former to the latter [RFC4949]. The term public key credential refers to one of: a public key credential source, the
+possibly-attested credential public key corresponding to a public key credential source, or an authentication assertion. Which one is generally determined by context.
    
      
    
-       Note: This is a willful violation of [RFC4949]. In English, a "credential" is both a) the thing presented to prove
+       Note: This is a willful violation of [RFC4949]. In English, a "credential" is both a) the thing presented to prove
     a statement and b) intended to be used multiple times. It’s impossible to achieve both criteria securely with a single
-    piece of data in a public key system. [RFC4949] chooses to define a credential as the thing that can be used multiple
+    piece of data in a public key system. [RFC4949] chooses to define a credential as the thing that can be used multiple
     times (the public key), while this specification gives "credential" the English term’s flexibility. This specification
-    uses more specific terms to identify the data related to an [RFC4949] credential: 
+    uses more specific terms to identify the data related to an [RFC4949] credential: 
       
    
        
    "Authentication information" (possibly including a private key)
        
    
-        
    Public key credential source
    
+        
    Public key credential source
    
        
    "Signed value"
        
    
         
    Authentication assertion
    
-       
    [RFC4949] "credential"
+       
    [RFC4949] "credential"
        
    
         
    Credential public key or attestation object
    
       
    
      
    
-     
    At registration time, the authenticator creates an asymmetric key pair, and stores its private key portion and information from the Relying Party into a public key credential source. The public key portion is returned to the Relying Party, which then stores it in the active user account.
-Subsequently, only that Relying Party, as identified by its RP ID, is able to employ the public key credential in authentication ceremonies, via the get() method. The Relying Party uses its stored
+     
    At registration time, the authenticator creates an asymmetric key pair, and stores its private key portion and information from the Relying Party into a public key credential source. The public key portion is returned to the Relying Party, which then stores it in the active user account.
+Subsequently, only that Relying Party, as identified by its RP ID, is able to employ the public key credential in authentication ceremonies, via the get() method. The Relying Party uses its stored
 copy of the credential public key to verify the resultant authentication assertion.
    
     
    Public Key Credential Source
     
    
-     
    A credential source ([CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1]) used by an authenticator to generate authentication assertions. A public key credential source consists of a struct with the following items:
    
+     
    A credential source ([CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1]) used by an authenticator to generate authentication assertions. A public key credential source consists of a struct with the following items:
    
      
    
       
    type
       
    
@@ -1644,86 +2228,86 @@ 
    credential private key.
    
       
    rpId
       
    
-       
    The Relying Party Identifier, for the Relying Party this public key credential source is scoped to.
+       
    The Relying Party Identifier, for the Relying Party this public key credential source is scoped to.
 This is determined by the rp.id parameter of the create() operation.
    
       
    userHandle
       
    
-       
    The user handle associated when this public key credential source was created. This item is
-nullable.
    
+       
    The user handle associated when this public key credential source was created. This item is
+nullable, however user handle MUST always be populated for discoverable credentials.
    
       
    otherUI
       
    
-       
    OPTIONAL other information used by the authenticator to inform its UI. For example, this might include the user’s displayName. otherUI is a mutable item and SHOULD NOT be bound to the public key credential source in a way that prevents otherUI from being updated.
    
+       
    OPTIONAL other information used by the authenticator to inform its UI. For example, this might include the user’s displayName. otherUI is a mutable item and SHOULD NOT be bound to the public key credential source in a way that prevents otherUI from being updated.
    
      
    
-     
    The authenticatorMakeCredential operation creates a public key credential source bound to a authenticatorMakeCredential operation creates a public key credential source bound to a managing authenticator and returns the credential public key associated with its credential
-private key. The Relying Party can use this credential public key to verify the authentication assertions created by
-this public key credential source.
    
+private key. The Relying Party can use this credential public key to verify the authentication assertions created by
+this public key credential source.
    
     
    Rate Limiting
     
    
      
    The process (also known as throttling) by which an authenticator implements controls against brute force attacks by limiting
 the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts within a given period of time. If the limit is reached, the
 authenticator should impose a delay that increases exponentially with each successive attempt, or disable the current
-authentication modality and offer a different authentication factor if available. Rate limiting is often implemented as an
-aspect of user verification.
    
+authentication modality and offer a different authentication factor if available. Rate limiting is often implemented as an
+aspect of user verification.
    
     
    Registration
     
    Registration Ceremony
     
    
-     
    The ceremony where a user, a Relying Party, and the user’s client platform (containing or connected to at least one authenticator) work in concert to create a public key credential and associate it with a user account.
-Note that this includes employing a test of user presence or user verification.
-After a successful registration ceremony, the user can be authenticated by an authentication ceremony.
    
+     
    The ceremony where a user, a Relying Party, and the user’s client platform (containing or connected to at least one authenticator) work in concert to create a public key credential and associate it with a user account.
+Note that this includes employing a test of user presence or user verification.
+After a successful registration ceremony, the user can be authenticated by an authentication ceremony.
    
      
    The WebAuthn registration ceremony is defined in § 7.1 Registering a New Credential,
-and is initiated by the Relying Party invoking a navigator.credentials.create() operation
+and is initiated by the Relying Party invoking a navigator.credentials.create() operation
 with a publicKey argument.
 See § 5 Web Authentication API for an introductory overview and § 1.3.1 Registration for implementation examples.
    
     
    Relying Party
     
    WebAuthn Relying Party
     
    
      
    The entity whose web application utilizes the Web Authentication API to register and authenticate users.
    
-     
    A Relying Party implementation typically consists of both some client-side script
+     
    A Relying Party implementation typically consists of both some client-side script
 that invokes the Web Authentication API in the client,
 and a server-side component that executes the Relying Party operations and other application logic.
 Communication between the two components MUST use HTTPS or equivalent transport security,
 but is otherwise beyond the scope of this specification.
    
-     
    Note: While the term Relying Party is also often used in other contexts (e.g., X.509 and OAuth), an entity acting as a Relying Party in one
-    context is not necessarily a Relying Party in other contexts. In this specification, the term WebAuthn Relying Party is often shortened
-    to be just Relying Party, and explicitly refers to a Relying Party in the WebAuthn context. Note that in any concrete instantiation
+     
    Note: While the term Relying Party is also often used in other contexts (e.g., X.509 and OAuth), an entity acting as a Relying Party in one
+    context is not necessarily a Relying Party in other contexts. In this specification, the term WebAuthn Relying Party is often shortened
+    to be just Relying Party, and explicitly refers to a Relying Party in the WebAuthn context. Note that in any concrete instantiation
     a WebAuthn context may be embedded in a broader overall context, e.g., one based on OAuth.
    
     
    Relying Party Identifier
     
    RP ID
     
    
      
    In the context of the WebAuthn API, a relying party identifier is a valid domain string identifying the WebAuthn Relying Party on whose behalf a given registration or authentication ceremony is being performed. A public key credential can only be used for authentication with the same entity (as identified by RP ID) it was registered with.
    
      
    By default, the RP ID for a
-WebAuthn operation is set to the caller’s origin's effective domain. This default MAY be
-overridden by the caller, as long as the caller-specified RP ID value is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal
-to the caller’s origin's effective domain. See also § 5.1.3 Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method and § 5.1.4 Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Get]](options) Method.
    
+WebAuthn operation is set to the caller’s origin's effective domain. This default MAY be
+overridden by the caller, as long as the caller-specified RP ID value is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal
+to the caller’s origin's effective domain. See also § 5.1.3 Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method and § 5.1.4 Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Get]](options) Method.
    
      
    
        Note: An RP ID is based on a host's domain name. It does not itself include a scheme or port, as an origin does. The RP ID of a public key credential determines its scope. I.e., it determines the set of origins on which the public key credential may be exercised, as follows: 
       
-      
    For example, given a Relying Party whose origin is https://login.example.com:1337, then the following RP IDs are valid: login.example.com (default) and example.com, but not m.login.example.com and not com.
    
-      
    This is done in order to match the behavior of pervasively deployed ambient credentials (e.g., cookies, [RFC6265]).
+      
    For example, given a Relying Party whose origin is https://login.example.com:1337, then the following RP IDs are valid: login.example.com (default) and example.com, but not m.login.example.com and not com.
    
+      
    This is done in order to match the behavior of pervasively deployed ambient credentials (e.g., cookies, [RFC6265]).
     Please note that this is a greater relaxation of "same-origin" restrictions than what document.domain's setter provides.
    
       
    These restrictions on origin values apply to WebAuthn Clients.
    
      
    
-     
    Other specifications mimicking the WebAuthn API to enable WebAuthn public key credentials on non-Web platforms (e.g. native mobile applications), MAY define different rules for binding a caller to a Relying Party Identifier. Though, the RP ID syntaxes MUST conform to either valid domain strings or URIs [RFC3986] [URL].
    
+     
    Other specifications mimicking the WebAuthn API to enable WebAuthn public key credentials on non-Web platforms (e.g. native mobile applications), MAY define different rules for binding a caller to a Relying Party Identifier. Though, the RP ID syntaxes MUST conform to either valid domain strings or URIs [RFC3986] [URL].
    
     
    Server-side Public Key Credential Source
     
    Server-side Credential
     
    [DEPRECATED] Non-Resident Credential
     
    
-     
    Note: Historically, server-side credentials have been known as non-resident credentials.
+     
    Note: Historically, server-side credentials have been known as non-resident credentials.
 For backwards compatibility purposes, the various WebAuthn API and Authenticator Model components
 with various forms of resident within their names have not been changed.
    
      
    A Server-side Public Key Credential Source, or Server-side Credential for short,
-is a public key credential source that is only usable in an authentication ceremony when the Relying Party supplies its credential ID in navigator.credentials.get()'s allowCredentials argument. This means that the Relying Party must
+is a public key credential source that is only usable in an authentication ceremony when the Relying Party supplies its credential ID in navigator.credentials.get()'s allowCredentials argument. This means that the Relying Party must
 manage the credential’s storage and discovery, as well as be able to first identify the user in order to
 discover the credential IDs to supply in the navigator.credentials.get() call.
    
-     
    Client-side storage of the public key credential source is not required for a server-side credential.
+     
    Client-side storage of the public key credential source is not required for a server-side credential.
 This is in contrast to a client-side discoverable credential,
 which instead does not require the user to first be identified in order to provide the user’s credential IDs
 to a navigator.credentials.get() call.
    
@@ -1731,34 +2315,35 @@ 
    Test of User Presence
     
    
      
    A test of user presence is a simple form of authorization gesture and technical process where a user interacts with
-an authenticator by (typically) simply touching it (other modalities may also exist), yielding a Boolean result. Note
-that this does not constitute user verification because a user presence test, by definition,
+an authenticator by (typically) simply touching it (other modalities may also exist), yielding a Boolean result. Note
+that this does not constitute user verification because a user presence test, by definition,
 is not capable of biometric recognition, nor does it involve the presentation of a shared secret such as a password or
 PIN.
    
     
    User Account
     
    
      
    In the context of this specification,
-a user account denotes the mapping of a set of credentials [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] to a (sub)set of a Relying Party's resources, as maintained and authorized by the Relying Party.
-The Relying Party maps a given public key credential to a user account by assigning a user account-specific value to the credential’s user handle and storing a credential record for the credential in the user account.
+a user account denotes the mapping of a set of credentials [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] to a (sub)set of a Relying Party's resources, as maintained and authorized by the Relying Party.
+The Relying Party maps a given public key credential to a user account by assigning a user account-specific value to the credential’s user handle and storing a credential record for the credential in the user account.
 This mapping, the set of credentials, and their authorizations, may evolve over time.
 A given user account might be accessed by one or more natural persons (also known as "users"),
 and one natural person might have access to one or more user accounts,
-depending on actions of the user(s) and the Relying Party.
    
+depending on actions of the user(s) and the Relying Party.
    
     
    User Consent
     
    
      
    User consent means the user agrees with what they are being asked, i.e., it encompasses reading and understanding prompts.
 An authorization gesture is a ceremony component often employed to indicate user consent.
    
     
    User Handle
     
    
-     
    A user handle is an identifier for a user account, specified by the Relying Party as user.id during registration. Discoverable credentials store this identifier and return it as response.userHandle in authentication ceremonies started with an empty allowCredentials argument.
    
-     
    The main use of the user handle is to identify the user account in such authentication ceremonies,
+     
    A user handle is an identifier for a user account, specified by the Relying Party as user.id during registration. Discoverable credentials store this identifier and MUST return it as response.userHandle in authentication ceremonies started with an empty allowCredentials argument.
    
+     
    The main use of the user handle is to identify the user account in such authentication ceremonies,
 but the credential ID could be used instead.
 The main differences are
-that the credential ID is chosen by the authenticator and unique for each credential,
-while the user handle is chosen by the Relying Party and ought to be the same
-for all credentials registered to the same user account.
    
-     
    Authenticators map pairs of RP ID and user handle to public key credential sources.
-As a consequence, an authenticator will store at most one discoverable credential per user handle per Relying Party.
    
+that the credential ID is chosen by the authenticator and is unique for each credential,
+while the user handle is chosen by the Relying Party and ought to be the same
+for all credentials registered to the same user account.
    
+     
    Authenticators map pairs of RP ID and user handle to public key credential sources.
+As a consequence, an authenticator will store at most one discoverable credential per user handle per Relying Party. Therefore
+a secondary use of the user handle is to allow authenticators to know when to replace an existing discoverable credential with a new one during the registration ceremony.
    
      
    A user handle is an opaque byte sequence with a maximum size of 64 bytes, and is not meant to be displayed to the user.
 It MUST NOT contain personally identifying information, see § 14.6.1 User Handle Contents.
    
     
    User Present
@@ -1767,32 +2352,33 @@ 
    present".
    
     
    User Verification
     
    
-     
    The technical process by which an authenticator locally authorizes the invocation of the authenticatorMakeCredential and authenticatorGetAssertion operations. User verification MAY be instigated
-through various authorization gesture modalities; for example, through a touch plus pin code, password entry, or biometric recognition (e.g., presenting a fingerprint) [ISOBiometricVocabulary]. The intent is to
-distinguish individual users.
    
-     
    Note that user verification does not give the Relying Party a concrete identification of the user,
-but when 2 or more ceremonies with user verification have been done with that credential it expresses that it was the same user that performed all of them.
+     
    The technical process by which an authenticator locally authorizes the invocation of the authenticatorMakeCredential and authenticatorGetAssertion operations. User verification MAY be instigated
+through various authorization gesture modalities; for example, through a touch plus pin code, password entry, or biometric recognition (e.g., presenting a fingerprint) [ISOBiometricVocabulary]. The intent is to
+distinguish individual users.
+See also § 6.2.3 Authentication Factor Capability.
    
+     
    Note that user verification does not give the Relying Party a concrete identification of the user,
+but when 2 or more ceremonies with user verification have been done with that credential it expresses that it was the same user that performed all of them.
 The same user might not always be the same natural person, however,
-if multiple natural persons share access to the same authenticator.
    
-     
    Note: Distinguishing natural persons depends in significant part upon the client platform's
-and authenticator's capabilities.
+if multiple natural persons share access to the same authenticator.
    
+     
    Note: Distinguishing natural persons depends in significant part upon the client platform's
+and authenticator's capabilities.
 For example, some devices are intended to be used by a single individual,
 yet they may allow multiple natural persons to enroll fingerprints or know the same PIN
 and thus access the same user account(s) using that device.
    
      
    
        Note: Invocation of the authenticatorMakeCredential and authenticatorGetAssertion operations
     implies use of key material managed by the authenticator. 
-      
    Also, for security, user verification and use of credential private keys must all occur within the logical security boundary defining the authenticator.
    
+      
    Also, for security, user verification and use of credential private keys must all occur within the logical security boundary defining the authenticator.
    
      
    
-     
    User verification procedures MAY implement rate limiting as a protection against brute force attacks.
    
+     
    User verification procedures MAY implement rate limiting as a protection against brute force attacks.
    
     
    User Verified
     
    
-     
    Upon successful completion of a user verification process, the user is said to be "verified".
    
+     
    Upon successful completion of a user verification process, the user is said to be "verified".
    
    
    
    5. Web Authentication API
    
    
    This section normatively specifies the API for creating and using public key credentials. The basic
-idea is that the credentials belong to the user and are managed by a WebAuthn Authenticator, with which the WebAuthn Relying Party interacts through the client platform. Relying Party scripts can (with the user’s consent) request the
-browser to create a new credential for future use by the Relying Party. See Figure , below.
    
+idea is that the credentials belong to the user and are managed by a WebAuthn Authenticator, with which the WebAuthn Relying Party interacts through the client platform. Relying Party scripts can (with the user’s consent) request the
+browser to create a new credential for future use by the Relying Party. See Figure , below.
    
    
    
       
     
    Registration Flow
    
@@ -1816,41 +2402,25 @@ 
    5.
 a different origin, by incorporating the origin in its responses. Specifically, as defined in § 6.3 Authenticator Operations,
 the full origin of the requester is included, and signed over, in the attestation object produced when a new credential
 is created as well as in all assertions produced by WebAuthn credentials.
    
-   
    Additionally, to maintain user privacy and prevent malicious Relying Parties from probing for the presence of public key
-credentials belonging to other Relying Parties, each credential is also scoped to a Relying Party
-Identifier, or RP ID. This RP ID is provided by the client to the authenticator for all operations, and the authenticator ensures that credentials created by a Relying Party can only be used in operations
+   
    Additionally, to maintain user privacy and prevent malicious Relying Parties from probing for the presence of public key
+credentials belonging to other Relying Parties, each credential is also scoped to a Relying Party
+Identifier, or RP ID. This RP ID is provided by the client to the authenticator for all operations, and the authenticator ensures that credentials created by a Relying Party can only be used in operations
 requested by the same RP ID. Separating the origin from the RP ID in this way allows the API to be used in cases
-where a single Relying Party maintains multiple origins.
    
-   
    The client facilitates these security measures by providing the Relying Party's origin and RP ID to the authenticator for
+where a single Relying Party maintains multiple origins.
    
+   
    The client facilitates these security measures by providing the Relying Party's origin and RP ID to the authenticator for
 each operation. Since this is an integral part of the WebAuthn security model, user agents only expose this API to callers in secure contexts.
 For web contexts in particular,
 this only includes those accessed via a secure transport (e.g., TLS) established without errors.
    
    
    The Web Authentication API is defined by the union of the Web IDL fragments presented in the following sections. A combined IDL
 listing is given in the IDL Index.
    
    
    5.1. PublicKeyCredential Interface
    
-   
    
-    
-    
    
-     
    PublicKeyCredential
    
-     
    In all current engines.
    
-     
    
-      Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-      
    
-      Opera?Edge79+
-      
    
-      Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-      
    
-      Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile?
-     
    
-    
    
-   
    
-   
    The PublicKeyCredential interface inherits from Credential [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1], and contains the attributes
+   
    The PublicKeyCredential interface inherits from Credential [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1], and contains the attributes
 that are returned to the caller when a new credential is created, or a new assertion is requested.
    
 
    [SecureContext, Exposed=Window]
 interface PublicKeyCredential : Credential {
     [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer              rawId;
     [SameObject] readonly attribute AuthenticatorResponse    response;
-    [SameObject] readonly attribute DOMString?               authenticatorAttachment;
+    readonly attribute DOMString?                            authenticatorAttachment;
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs getClientExtensionResults();
     static Promise<boolean> isConditionalMediationAvailable();
     PublicKeyCredentialJSON toJSON();
@@ -1861,78 +2431,27 @@ 
    
      
    This attribute is inherited from Credential, though PublicKeyCredential overrides Credential's getter,
 instead returning the base64url encoding of the data contained in the object’s [[identifier]] internal slot.
    
-    
    
-     
    
-      
-      
    
-       
    PublicKeyCredential/rawId
    
-       
    In all current engines.
    
-       
    
-        Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-        
    
-        Opera?Edge79+
-        
    
-        Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-        
    
-        Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile?
-       
    
-      
    
-     
    
-     
    rawId
    
+    
    rawId
     
    
      
    This attribute returns the ArrayBuffer contained in the [[identifier]] internal slot.
    
-    
    
-     
    
-      
-      
    
-       
    PublicKeyCredential/response
    
-       
    In all current engines.
    
-       
    
-        Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-        
    
-        Opera?Edge79+
-        
    
-        Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-        
    
-        Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile?
-       
    
-      
    
-     
    
-     
    response,  of type AuthenticatorResponse, readonly
    
+    
    response,  of type AuthenticatorResponse, readonly
     
    
-     
    This attribute contains the authenticator's response to the client’s request to either create a public key
+     
    This attribute contains the authenticator's response to the client’s request to either create a public key
 credential, or generate an authentication assertion. If the PublicKeyCredential is created in response to create(), this attribute’s value will be an AuthenticatorAttestationResponse, otherwise,
 the PublicKeyCredential was created in response to get(), and this attribute’s value
 will be an AuthenticatorAssertionResponse.
    
     
    authenticatorAttachment,  of type DOMString, readonly, nullable
     
    
      
    This attribute reports the authenticator attachment modality in effect at the time the navigator.credentials.create() or navigator.credentials.get() methods successfully complete.
-The attribute’s value SHOULD be a member of AuthenticatorAttachment. Relying Parties SHOULD treat unknown values
+The attribute’s value SHOULD be a member of AuthenticatorAttachment. Relying Parties SHOULD treat unknown values
 as if the value were null.
    
      
    
-       Note: If, as the result of a registration or authentication ceremony, authenticatorAttachment's value is "cross-platform" and
-concurrently isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable returns true, then the user employed a roaming authenticator for this ceremony while there is an available platform authenticator. Thus the Relying Party has the opportunity to prompt the user to register the available platform authenticator, which may enable more streamlined user experience flows. 
-      
    An authenticator’s attachment modality could change over time.
+       Note: If, as the result of a registration or authentication ceremony, authenticatorAttachment's value is "cross-platform" and
+concurrently isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable returns true, then the user employed a roaming authenticator for this ceremony while there is an available platform authenticator. Thus the Relying Party has the opportunity to prompt the user to register the available platform authenticator, which may enable more streamlined user experience flows. 
+      
    An authenticator’s attachment modality could change over time.
 For example, a mobile phone might at one time only support platform attachment but later receive updates to support cross-platform attachment as well.
    
      
    
-    
    
-     
    
-      
-      
    
-       
    PublicKeyCredential/getClientExtensionResults
    
-       
    In all current engines.
    
-       
    
-        Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-        
    
-        Opera?Edge79+
-        
    
-        Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-        
    
-        Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile?
-       
    
-      
    
-     
    
-     
    getClientExtensionResults()
    
+    
    getClientExtensionResults()
     
    
      
    This operation returns the value of [[clientExtensionsResults]], which is a map containing extension identifier → client extension output entries produced by the extension’s client extension processing.
    
     
    isConditionalMediationAvailable()
@@ -1940,51 +2459,67 @@ 
    PublicKeyCredential overrides this method to indicate availability for conditional mediation. WebAuthn Relying Parties SHOULD verify availability before attempting to set options.mediation to conditional.
    
      
    Upon invocation, a promise is returned that resolves with a value of true if conditional user mediation is available, or false otherwise.
    
      
    This method has no arguments and returns a promise to a Boolean value.
    
-     
    Note: If this method is not present, conditional user mediation is not available.
    
+     
    Note: If this method is not present, conditional user mediation is not available.
    
     
    toJSON()
     
    
      
    This operation returns RegistrationResponseJSON or AuthenticationResponseJSON,
-which are JSON type representations mirroring PublicKeyCredential, suitable for submission to a Relying Party server as an application/json payload. The client is in charge of serializing values to JSON types as usual,
+which are JSON type representations mirroring PublicKeyCredential, suitable for submission to a Relying Party server as an application/json payload. The client is in charge of serializing values to JSON types as usual,
 but MUST take additional steps to first encode any ArrayBuffer values to DOMString values
 using base64url encoding.
    
      
    The RegistrationResponseJSON.clientExtensionResults or AuthenticationResponseJSON.clientExtensionResults member MUST be set to the output of getClientExtensionResults(),
 with any ArrayBuffer values encoded to DOMString values using base64url encoding. This MAY include ArrayBuffer values from extensions registered
-in the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] but not
+in the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] but not
 defined in § 9 WebAuthn Extensions.
    
      
    The AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON.transports member MUST be set to the output of getTransports().
    
+     
    The AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON.publicKey member MUST be set to the output of getPublicKey().
    
+     
    The AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON.publicKeyAlgorithm member MUST be set to the output of getPublicKeyAlgorithm().
    
    
 
    typedef DOMString Base64URLString;
-typedef (RegistrationResponseJSON or AuthenticationResponseJSON) PublicKeyCredentialJSON;
+// The structure of this object will be either
+// RegistrationResponseJSON or AuthenticationResponseJSON
+typedef object PublicKeyCredentialJSON;
 
 dictionary RegistrationResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString id;
-    Base64URLString rawId;
-    AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON response;
-    DOMString?  authenticatorAttachment;
-    AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
-    DOMString type;
+    required Base64URLString id;
+    required Base64URLString rawId;
+    required AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON response;
+    DOMString authenticatorAttachment;
+    required AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
+    required DOMString type;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
-    Base64URLString attestationObject;
-    sequence<DOMString> transports;
+    required Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
+    required Base64URLString authenticatorData;
+    required sequence<DOMString> transports;
+    // The publicKey field will be missing if pubKeyCredParams was used to
+    // negotiate a public-key algorithm that the user agent doesn’t
+    // understand. (See section “Easily accessing credential data” for a
+    // list of which algorithms user agents must support.) If using such an
+    // algorithm then the public key must be parsed directly from
+    // attestationObject or authenticatorData.
+    Base64URLString publicKey;
+    required long long publicKeyAlgorithm;
+    // This value contains copies of some of the fields above. See
+    // section “Easily accessing credential data”.
+    required Base64URLString attestationObject;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString id;
-    Base64URLString rawId;
-    AuthenticatorAssertionResponseJSON response;
-    DOMString?  authenticatorAttachment;
-    AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
-    DOMString type;
+    required Base64URLString id;
+    required Base64URLString rawId;
+    required AuthenticatorAssertionResponseJSON response;
+    DOMString authenticatorAttachment;
+    required AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
+    required DOMString type;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticatorAssertionResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
-    Base64URLString authenticatorData;
-    Base64URLString signature;
-    Base64URLString? userHandle;
+    required Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
+    required Base64URLString authenticatorData;
+    required Base64URLString signature;
+    Base64URLString userHandle;
+    Base64URLString attestationObject;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON {
@@ -1995,7 +2530,7 @@ 
    
      
    The PublicKeyCredential interface object's [[type]] internal slot's value is the string
 "public-key".
    
-     
    Note: This is reflected via the type attribute getter inherited from Credential.
    
+     
    Note: This is reflected via the type attribute getter inherited from Credential.
    
     
    [[discovery]]
     
    
      
    The PublicKeyCredential interface object's [[discovery]] internal slot's value is
@@ -2005,15 +2540,15 @@ 
    This internal slot contains the credential ID, chosen by the authenticator.
 The credential ID is used to look up credentials for use, and is therefore expected to be globally unique
 with high probability across all credentials of the same type, across all authenticators.
    
-     
    Note: This API does not constrain
-the format or length of this identifier, except that it MUST be sufficient for the authenticator to uniquely select a key.
+     
    Note: This API does not constrain
+the format or length of this identifier, except that it MUST be sufficient for the authenticator to uniquely select a key.
 For example, an authenticator without on-board storage may create identifiers containing a credential private key wrapped with a symmetric key that is burned into the authenticator.
    
     
    [[clientExtensionsResults]]
     
    
-     
    This internal slot contains the results of processing client extensions requested by the Relying Party upon the Relying Party's invocation of either navigator.credentials.create() or navigator.credentials.get().
    
+     
    This internal slot contains the results of processing client extensions requested by the Relying Party upon the Relying Party's invocation of either navigator.credentials.create() or navigator.credentials.get().
    
    
-   
    PublicKeyCredential's interface object inherits Credential's implementation of [[CollectFromCredentialStore]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), and defines its own
-implementation of [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), and [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors).
    
+   
    PublicKeyCredential's interface object inherits Credential's implementation of [[CollectFromCredentialStore]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), and defines its own
+implementation of each of [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), and [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors).
    
    
    5.1.1. CredentialCreationOptions Dictionary Extension
    
    
    To support registration via navigator.credentials.create(), this document extends
 the CredentialCreationOptions dictionary as follows:
    
@@ -2030,7 +2565,7 @@ 
    5.1.3. Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method
    
    
    
      PublicKeyCredential's interface object's implementation of the [[Create]](origin,
-options, sameOriginWithAncestors) internal method [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] allows WebAuthn Relying Party scripts to call navigator.credentials.create() to request the creation of a new public key credential source, bound to an authenticator. This navigator.credentials.create() operation can be aborted by leveraging the AbortController;
+options, sameOriginWithAncestors) internal method [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] allows WebAuthn Relying Party scripts to call navigator.credentials.create() to request the creation of a new public key credential source, bound to an authenticator. This navigator.credentials.create() operation can be aborted by leveraging the AbortController;
 see DOM § 3.3 Using AbortController and AbortSignal objects in APIs for detailed instructions. 
     
    This internal method accepts three arguments:
    
     
    
@@ -2044,9 +2579,11 @@ 
    sameOriginWithAncestors
      
    
       
    This argument is a Boolean value which is true if and only if the caller’s environment settings object is same-origin with its ancestors. It is false if caller is cross-origin.
    
+      
    Note: Invocation of this internal method indicates that it was allowed by permissions policy, which is evaluated at the [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] level.
+See § 5.9 Permissions Policy integration.
    
     
    
-    
    Note: This algorithm is synchronous: the Promise resolution/rejection is handled by navigator.credentials.create().
    
-    
    Note: All BufferSource objects used in this algorithm must be snapshotted when the algorithm begins, to
+    
    Note: This algorithm is synchronous: the Promise resolution/rejection is handled by navigator.credentials.create().
    
+    
    Note: All BufferSource objects used in this algorithm must be snapshotted when the algorithm begins, to
 avoid potential synchronization issues. The algorithm implementations should get a copy of the bytes held
 by the buffer source and use that copy for relevant portions of the algorithm.
    
     
    When this method is invoked, the user agent MUST execute the following algorithm:
    
@@ -2054,38 +2591,36 @@ 
    
       
    Assert: options.publicKey is present.
    
      
  • 
-      
    If sameOriginWithAncestors is false, throw a "NotAllowedError" DOMException.
    
-      
    Note: This "sameOriginWithAncestors" restriction aims to address a tracking concern raised in Issue #1336. This may be revised in future versions of this specification.
    
+      
    If sameOriginWithAncestors is false:
    
+      
      
+       
    1. 
+        
      If the relevant global object, as determined by the calling create() implementation, does not have transient activation:
      
+        
        
+         
      1. 
+          
        Throw a "NotAllowedError" DOMException.
        
+        
      
+       
    2. 
+        
      Consume user activation of the relevant global object.
      
+      
    
+      
    NOTE: The client SHOULD make it clear to the user in the case where the origin that is creating a credential is different from the top-level origin of the relevant global object (i.e., is a
+      different origin than the user can see in the address bar).
    
      
  • 
       
    Let pkOptions be the value of options.publicKey.
    
      
  • 
       
    If pkOptions.timeout is present, check if its value lies within a
-reasonable range as defined by the client and if not, correct it to the closest value lying within that range. Set a timer lifetimeTimer to this adjusted value. If pkOptions.timeout is not
-present, then set lifetimeTimer to a client-specific default.
    
-      
    Recommended ranges and defaults for pkOptions.timeout are as follows.
-      If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.userVerification
    
-      
    
-       
    is set to discouraged
-       
    
-        
    Recommended range: 30000 milliseconds to 180000 milliseconds.
    
-       
    
-        
    Recommended default value: 120000 milliseconds (2 minutes).
    
-       
    is set to required or preferred
-       
    
-        
    Recommended range: 30000 milliseconds to 600000 milliseconds.
    
-       
    
-        
    Recommended default value: 300000 milliseconds (5 minutes).
    
-      
    
-      
    Note: The user agent should take cognitive guidelines into considerations regarding timeout for users with special needs.
    
+reasonable range as defined by the client and if not, correct it to the closest value lying within that range. Set a timer lifetimeTimer to this adjusted value. If pkOptions.timeout is not
+present, then set lifetimeTimer to a client-specific default.
    
+      
    See the recommended range and default for a WebAuthn ceremony timeout for guidance on deciding a reasonable range and default for pkOptions.timeout.
    
+      
    Note: The user agent should take cognitive guidelines into considerations regarding timeout for users with special needs.
    
      
  • 
       
    If the length of pkOptions.user.id is not between 1 and 64 bytes (inclusive) then throw a TypeError.
    
      
  • 
       
    Let callerOrigin be origin. If callerOrigin is an opaque origin, throw a "NotAllowedError" DOMException.
    
      
  • 
-      
    Let effectiveDomain be the callerOrigin’s effective domain.
-If effective domain is not a valid domain, then throw a
+      
    Let effectiveDomain be the callerOrigin’s effective domain.
+If effective domain is not a valid domain, then throw a
 "SecurityError" DOMException.
    
-      
    Note: An effective domain may resolve to a host, which can be represented in various manners,
+      
    Note: An effective domain may resolve to a host, which can be represented in various manners,
     such as domain, ipv4 address, ipv6 address, opaque host, or empty host.
     Only the domain format of host is allowed here. This is for simplification and also
     is in recognition of various issues with using direct IP address identification in concert
@@ -2096,14 +2631,14 @@ 
    
        
    is present
        
    
-        
    If pkOptions.rp.id is not a
+        
    If pkOptions.rp.id is not a
 registrable domain suffix of and is not equal to effectiveDomain, throw a "SecurityError" DOMException.
    
        
    Is not present
        
    
         
    Set pkOptions.rp.id to effectiveDomain.
    
       
-      
    Note: pkOptions.rp.id represents the
-        caller’s RP ID. The RP ID defaults to being the caller’s origin's effective domain unless the caller has explicitly set pkOptions.rp.id when calling create().
    
+      
    Note: pkOptions.rp.id represents the
+        caller’s RP ID. The RP ID defaults to being the caller’s origin's effective domain unless the caller has explicitly set pkOptions.rp.id when calling create().
    
      
  • 
       
    Let credTypesAndPubKeyAlgs be a new list whose items are pairs of PublicKeyCredentialType and
 a COSEAlgorithmIdentifier.
    
@@ -2135,8 +2670,8 @@ 
    
      
  • 
       
    Let clientExtensions be a new map and let authenticatorExtensions be a new map.
    
-     
  • 
-      
    If pkOptions.extensions is present, then for each extensionId → clientExtensionInput of pkOptions.extensions:
    
+     
  • 
+       If pkOptions.extensions is present, then for each extensionId → clientExtensionInput of pkOptions.extensions: 
       
      
        
    1. 
         
      If extensionId is not supported by this client platform or is not a registration extension, then continue.
      
@@ -2160,10 +2695,14 @@ 
      The base64url encoding of pkOptions.challenge.
      
        
      origin
        
      
-        
      The serialization of callerOrigin.
      
+        
      The serialization of callerOrigin.
      
+       
      topOrigin
+       
      
+        
      The serialization of callerOrigin’s top-level origin if
+the sameOriginWithAncestors argument passed to this internal method is false, else undefined.
      
        
      crossOrigin
        
      
-        
      The inverse of the value of the sameOriginWithAncestors argument passed to this internal method.
      
+        
      The inverse of the value of the sameOriginWithAncestors argument passed to this internal method.
      
       
      
    2. 
       
      Let clientDataJSON be the JSON-compatible serialization of client data constructed from collectedClientData.
      
@@ -2175,14 +2714,16 @@ 
      
       
      Let issuedRequests be a new ordered set.
      
      
    3. 
-      
      Let authenticators represent a value which at any given instant is a set of client platform-specific handles, where each item identifies an authenticator presently available on this client platform at that instant.
      
-      
      Note: What qualifies an authenticator as "available" is intentionally unspecified; this is meant to represent how authenticators can be hot-plugged into (e.g., via USB)
-or discovered (e.g., via NFC or Bluetooth) by the client by various mechanisms, or permanently built into the client.
      
+      
      Let authenticators represent a value which at any given instant is a set of client platform-specific handles, where each item identifies an authenticator presently available on this client platform at that instant.
      
+      
      Note: What qualifies an authenticator as "available" is intentionally unspecified; this is meant to represent how authenticators can be hot-plugged into (e.g., via USB)
+or discovered (e.g., via NFC or Bluetooth) by the client by various mechanisms, or permanently built into the client.
      
      
    4. 
-      
      Start lifetimeTimer.
      
+      
      Consider the value of hints and craft the user interface accordingly, as the user-agent sees fit.
      
      
    5. 
-      
      While lifetimeTimer has not expired, perform the following actions depending upon lifetimeTimer,
-and the state and response for each authenticator in authenticators:
      
+      
      Start lifetimeTimer.
      
+     
    6. 
+       While lifetimeTimer has not expired, perform the following actions depending upon lifetimeTimer,
+    and the state and response for each authenticator in authenticators: 
       
      
        
      If lifetimeTimer expires,
        
      
@@ -2195,18 +2736,18 @@ 
      For each authenticator in issuedRequests invoke the authenticatorCancel operation on authenticator and remove authenticator from issuedRequests. Then throw the options.signal’s abort reason.
      
        
      If an authenticator becomes available on this client device,
        
      
-        
      Note: This includes the case where an authenticator was available upon lifetimeTimer initiation.
      
+        
      Note: This includes the case where an authenticator was available upon lifetimeTimer initiation.
      
         
        
          
      1. 
           
        This authenticator is now the candidate authenticator.
        
          
      2. 
-          
        If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection is present:
        
+          
        If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection is present:
        
           
          
            
        1. 
-            
          If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment is
+            
          If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment is
 present and its value is not equal to authenticator’s authenticator attachment modality, continue.
          
            
        2. 
-            
          If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.residentKey
          
+            
          If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.residentKey
          
             
          
              
          is present and set to required
              
          
@@ -2217,17 +2758,17 @@ 
          No effect.
          
              
          is not present
              
          
-              
          if pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.requireResidentKey is set to true and the authenticator is not capable of storing a client-side discoverable public
+              
          if pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.requireResidentKey is set to true and the authenticator is not capable of storing a client-side discoverable public
   key credential source, continue.
          
             
          
            
        3. 
-            
          If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.userVerification is
-set to required and the authenticator is not capable of performing user
+            
          If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.userVerification is
+set to required and the authenticator is not capable of performing user
 verification, continue.
          
           
        
          
      3. 
           
        Let requireResidentKey be the effective resident key requirement for credential creation, a Boolean value, as follows:
        
-          
        If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.residentKey
        
+          
        If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.residentKey
        
           
        
            
        is present and set to required
            
        
@@ -2239,7 +2780,7 @@ 
        is capable of client-side credential storage modality
              
        
               
        Let requireResidentKey be true.
        
-             
        is not capable of client-side credential storage modality, or if the client cannot determine authenticator capability,
+             
        is not capable of client-side credential storage modality, or if the client cannot determine authenticator capability,
              
        
               
        Let requireResidentKey be false.
        
             
        
@@ -2248,27 +2789,27 @@ 
        Let requireResidentKey be false.
        
            
        is not present
            
        
-            
        Let requireResidentKey be the value of pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.requireResidentKey.
        
+            
        Let requireResidentKey be the value of pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.requireResidentKey.
        
           
      
          
    7. 
           
      Let userVerification be the effective user verification requirement for credential creation, a Boolean value,
-as follows. If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.userVerification
      
+as follows. If pkOptions.authenticatorSelection.userVerification
      
           
      
-           
      is set to required
+           
      is set to required
            
      
             
      Let userVerification be true.
      
-           
      is set to preferred
+           
      is set to preferred
            
      
             
      If the authenticator
      
             
      
-             
      is capable of user verification
+             
      is capable of user verification
              
      
               
      Let userVerification be true.
      
-             
      is not capable of user verification
+             
      is not capable of user verification
              
      
               
      Let userVerification be false.
      
             
      
-           
      is set to discouraged
+           
      is set to discouraged
            
      
             
      Let userVerification be false.
      
           
      
@@ -2282,6 +2823,15 @@ 
      
             
      Let enterpriseAttestationPossible be false.
      
           
+         
    8. 
+          
      Let attestationFormats be a list of strings, initialized to the value of pkOptions.attestationFormats.
      
+         
    9. 
+          
      If pkOptions.attestation
      
+          
      
+           
      is set to none
+           
      
+            
      Set attestationFormats be the single-element list containing the string “none”
      
+          
      
          
    10. 
           
      Let excludeCredentialDescriptorList be a new list.
      
          
    11. 
@@ -2290,15 +2840,15 @@ 
      
             
      If C.transports is not empty, and authenticator is connected over a transport not
 mentioned in C.transports, the client MAY continue.
      
-            
      Note: If the client chooses to continue, this could result in
-inadvertently registering multiple credentials bound to the same authenticator if the transport hints in C.transports are not accurate.
+            
      Note: If the client chooses to continue, this could result in
+inadvertently registering multiple credentials bound to the same authenticator if the transport hints in C.transports are not accurate.
 For example, stored transport hints could become inaccurate
 as a result of software upgrades adding new connectivity options.
      
            
    12. 
             
      Otherwise, Append C to excludeCredentialDescriptorList.
      
            
    13. 
              
-            
      Invoke the authenticatorMakeCredential operation on authenticator with clientDataHash, pkOptions.rp, pkOptions.user, requireResidentKey, userVerification, credTypesAndPubKeyAlgs, excludeCredentialDescriptorList, enterpriseAttestationPossible,
+            
      Invoke the authenticatorMakeCredential operation on authenticator with clientDataHash, pkOptions.rp, pkOptions.user, requireResidentKey, userVerification, credTypesAndPubKeyAlgs, excludeCredentialDescriptorList, enterpriseAttestationPossible, attestationFormats,
         and authenticatorExtensions as parameters.
      
           
    
          
  • 
@@ -2314,7 +2864,7 @@ 
    Remove authenticator from issuedRequests.
    
          
  • 
           
    For each remaining authenticator in issuedRequests invoke the authenticatorCancel operation on authenticator and remove it from issuedRequests.
    
-          
    Note: Authenticators may return an indication of "the user cancelled the entire operation".
+          
    Note: Authenticators may return an indication of "the user cancelled the entire operation".
 How a user agent manifests this state to users is unspecified.
    
         
        
    If any authenticator returns an error status equivalent to "InvalidStateError",
@@ -2327,12 +2877,12 @@ 
    
           
    Throw an "InvalidStateError" DOMException.
    
         
-        
    Note: This error status is handled separately because the authenticator returns it only if excludeCredentialDescriptorList identifies a credential bound to the authenticator and the user has consented to the operation. Given this explicit consent, it is acceptable for this case to be
-distinguishable to the Relying Party.
    
+        
    Note: This error status is handled separately because the authenticator returns it only if excludeCredentialDescriptorList identifies a credential bound to the authenticator and the user has consented to the operation. Given this explicit consent, it is acceptable for this case to be
+distinguishable to the Relying Party.
    
        
    If any authenticator returns an error status not equivalent to "InvalidStateError",
        
    
         
    Remove authenticator from issuedRequests.
    
-        
    Note: This case does not imply user consent for the operation, so details about the error are hidden from the Relying Party in order to prevent leak of potentially identifying information. See § 14.5.1 Registration Ceremony Privacy for
+        
    Note: This case does not imply user consent for the operation, so details about the error are hidden from the Relying Party in order to prevent leak of potentially identifying information. See § 14.5.1 Registration Ceremony Privacy for
 details.
    
        
    If any authenticator indicates success,
        
    
@@ -2345,13 +2895,13 @@ 
    attestationObjectResult
            
    
             
    whose value is the bytes returned from the successful authenticatorMakeCredential operation.
    
-            
    Note: this value is attObj, as defined in § 6.5.4 Generating an Attestation Object.
    
+            
    Note: this value is attObj, as defined in § 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object.
    
            
    clientDataJSONResult
            
    
             
    whose value is the bytes of clientDataJSON.
    
            
    attestationConveyancePreferenceOption
            
    
-            
    whose value is the value of pkOptions.attestation.
    
+            
    whose value is the value of pkOptions.attestation.
    
            
    clientExtensionResults
            
    
             
    whose value is an AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs object containing extension identifier → client extension output entries. The entries are created by running each extension’s client extension processing algorithm to create the client extension outputs, for each client extension in pkOptions.extensions.
    
@@ -2362,29 +2912,29 @@ 
    
             
    If credentialCreationData.attestationConveyancePreferenceOption’s value is
    
             
    
-             
    none
+             
    none
              
    
               
    Replace potentially uniquely identifying information with non-identifying versions of the
 same:
    
               
      
                
    1. 
-                
      If the AAGUID in the attested credential data is 16 zero bytes, credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult.fmt is "packed", and "x5c" is absent from credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult, then self attestation is being used and no further action is needed.
      
+                
      If the aaguid in the attested credential data is 16 zero bytes, credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult.fmt is "packed", and "x5c" is absent from credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult, then self attestation is being used and no further action is needed.
      
                
    2. 
                 
      Otherwise
      
                 
        
                  
      1. 
-                  
        Replace the AAGUID in the attested credential data with 16 zero bytes.
        
+                  
        Replace the aaguid in the attested credential data with 16 zero bytes.
        
                  
      2. 
-                  
        Set the value of credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult.fmt to "none", and set the value of credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult.attStmt to be an empty CBOR map. (See § 8.7 None Attestation Statement Format and § 6.5.4 Generating an Attestation Object).
        
+                  
        Set the value of credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult.fmt to "none", and set the value of credentialCreationData.attestationObjectResult.attStmt to be an empty CBOR map. (See § 8.7 None Attestation Statement Format and § 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object).
        
                 
      
               
    
              
    indirect
              
    
-              
    The client MAY replace the AAGUID and attestation statement with a more privacy-friendly
+              
    The client MAY replace the aaguid and attestation statement with a more privacy-friendly
 and/or more easily verifiable version of the same data (for example, by employing an Anonymization CA).
    
              
    direct or enterprise
              
    
-              
    Convey the authenticator's AAGUID and attestation statement, unaltered, to the Relying Party.
    
+              
    Convey the authenticator's AAGUID and attestation statement, unaltered, to the Relying Party.
    
             
    
            
  • 
             
    Let attestationObject be a new ArrayBuffer, created using global’s %ArrayBuffer%, containing the
@@ -2413,9 +2963,9 @@ 
    [[transports]]
                
    
                 
    A sequence of zero or more unique DOMStrings, in lexicographical order, that the authenticator is believed to support. The values SHOULD be members of AuthenticatorTransport, but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values.
    
-                
    If a user agent does not wish to divulge this information it MAY substitute an arbitrary sequence designed to preserve privacy. This sequence MUST still be valid, i.e. lexicographically sorted and free of duplicates. For example, it may use the empty sequence. Either way, in this case the user agent takes the risk that Relying Party behavior may be suboptimal.
    
+                
    If a user agent does not wish to divulge this information it MAY substitute an arbitrary sequence designed to preserve privacy. This sequence MUST still be valid, i.e. lexicographically sorted and free of duplicates. For example, it may use the empty sequence. Either way, in this case the user agent takes the risk that Relying Party behavior may be suboptimal.
    
                 
    If the user agent does not have any transport information, it SHOULD set this field to the empty sequence.
    
-                
    Note: How user agents discover transports supported by a given authenticator is outside the scope of this specification, but may include information from an attestation certificate (for example [FIDO-Transports-Ext]), metadata communicated in an authenticator protocol such as CTAP2, or special-case knowledge about a platform authenticator.
    
+                
    Note: How user agents discover transports supported by a given authenticator is outside the scope of this specification, but may include information from an attestation certificate (for example [FIDO-Transports-Ext]), metadata communicated in an authenticator protocol such as CTAP2, or special-case knowledge about a platform authenticator.
    
               
              
    [[clientExtensionsResults]]
              
    
@@ -2439,22 +2989,22 @@ 
    
    
    5.1.4. Use an Existing Credential to Make an Assertion - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Get]](options) Method
    
    
    WebAuthn Relying Parties call navigator.credentials.get({publicKey:..., ...}) to
-discover and use an existing public key credential, with the user’s consent. Relying Party script optionally specifies some criteria
-to indicate what public key credential sources are acceptable to it. The client platform locates public key credential sources matching the specified criteria, and guides the user to pick one that the script will be allowed to use. The user may choose to
-decline the entire interaction even if a public key credential source is present, for example to maintain privacy. If the user picks a public key credential source, the user agent then uses § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation to sign a Relying Party-provided challenge and other collected data into an authentication assertion, which is used as a credential.
    
-   
    The navigator.credentials.get() implementation [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] calls PublicKeyCredential.[[CollectFromCredentialStore]]() to collect any credentials that
+discover and use an existing public key credential, with the user’s consent. Relying Party script optionally specifies some criteria
+to indicate what public key credential sources are acceptable to it. The client platform locates public key credential sources matching the specified criteria, and guides the user to pick one that the script will be allowed to use. The user may choose to
+decline the entire interaction even if a public key credential source is present, for example to maintain privacy. If the user picks a public key credential source, the user agent then uses § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation to sign a Relying Party-provided challenge and other collected data into an authentication assertion, which is used as a credential.
    
+   
    The navigator.credentials.get() implementation [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] calls PublicKeyCredential.[[CollectFromCredentialStore]]() to collect any credentials that
 should be available without user mediation (roughly, this specification’s authorization gesture), and if it does not find
 exactly one of those, it then calls PublicKeyCredential.[[DiscoverFromExternalSource]]() to have
-the user select a public key credential source.
    
-   
    Since this specification requires an authorization gesture to create any assertions, the PublicKeyCredential.[[CollectFromCredentialStore]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) internal method inherits the default behavior of Credential.[[CollectFromCredentialStore]](), of returning an empty set.
    
+the user select a public key credential source.
    
+   
    Since this specification requires an authorization gesture to create any assertions, the PublicKeyCredential.[[CollectFromCredentialStore]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) internal method inherits the default behavior of Credential.[[CollectFromCredentialStore]](), of returning an empty set.
    
    
    In general, the user agent SHOULD show some UI to the user to guide them in selecting and authorizing an authenticator with which
-to complete the operation. By setting options.mediation to conditional, Relying Parties can indicate that a prominent modal UI should not be shown unless credentials are discovered. Relying Party script SHOULD first check that isConditionalMediationAvailable() returns true in order to avoid
+to complete the operation. By setting options.mediation to conditional, Relying Parties can indicate that a prominent modal UI should not be shown unless credentials are discovered. Relying Party script SHOULD first check that isConditionalMediationAvailable() returns true in order to avoid
 the possibility of causing a user-visible error to be returned if the user agent does not support conditional user mediation.
    
    
    This navigator.credentials.get() operation can be aborted by leveraging the AbortController;
 see DOM § 3.3 Using AbortController and AbortSignal objects in APIs for detailed instructions.
    
    
    5.1.4.1. PublicKeyCredential’s [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method
    
    
    
-    
    This internal method accepts three arguments:
    
+    
    This internal method accepts three arguments:
    
     
    
      
    origin
      
    
@@ -2466,11 +3016,11 @@ 
    sameOriginWithAncestors
      
    
       
    This argument is a Boolean value which is true if and only if the caller’s environment settings object is same-origin with its ancestors. It is false if caller is cross-origin.
    
-      
    Note: Invocation of this internal method indicates that it was allowed by permissions policy, which is evaluated at the [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] level.
+      
    Note: Invocation of this internal method indicates that it was allowed by permissions policy, which is evaluated at the [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] level.
 See § 5.9 Permissions Policy integration.
    
     
    
-    
    Note: This algorithm is synchronous: the Promise resolution/rejection is handled by navigator.credentials.get().
    
-    
    Note: All BufferSource objects used in this algorithm must be snapshotted when the algorithm begins, to
+    
    Note: This algorithm is synchronous: the Promise resolution/rejection is handled by navigator.credentials.get().
    
+    
    Note: All BufferSource objects used in this algorithm must be snapshotted when the algorithm begins, to
 avoid potential synchronization issues. The algorithm implementations should get a copy of the bytes held
 by the buffer source and use that copy for relevant portions of the algorithm.
    
     
    When this method is invoked, the user agent MUST execute the following algorithm:
    
@@ -2486,10 +3036,10 @@ 
    allowCredentials.
    
        
  • 
         
    Set pkOptions.allowCredentials to empty.
    
-        
    Note: This prevents non-discoverable credentials from being used during conditional requests.
    
+        
    Note: This prevents non-discoverable credentials from being used during conditional requests.
    
        
  • 
         
    Set a timer lifetimeTimer to a value of infinity.
    
-        
    Note: lifetimeTimer is set to a value of infinity so that the user has the entire lifetime of
+        
    Note: lifetimeTimer is set to a value of infinity so that the user has the entire lifetime of
 the Document to interact with any input form control tagged with a "webauthn" autofill detail token. For example, upon the user clicking in such an input field, the user agent can render a list of discovered credentials for the user to select from, and perhaps also give the user the option to "try another way".
    
       
      
  • 
@@ -2499,32 +3049,19 @@ 
    empty list.
    
        
  • 
         
    If pkOptions.timeout is present, check if its value lies
-within a reasonable range as defined by the client and if not, correct it to the closest value lying within that range.
-Set a timer lifetimeTimer to this adjusted value. If pkOptions.timeout is not present, then set lifetimeTimer to a client-specific default.
    
-        
    Recommended ranges and defaults for pkOptions.timeout are as follows.
-      If pkOptions.userVerification
    
-        
    
-         
    is set to discouraged
-         
    
-          
    Recommended range: 30000 milliseconds to 180000 milliseconds.
    
-         
    
-          
    Recommended default value: 120000 milliseconds (2 minutes).
    
-         
    is set to required or preferred
-         
    
-          
    Recommended range: 30000 milliseconds to 600000 milliseconds.
    
-         
    
-          
    Recommended default value: 300000 milliseconds (5 minutes).
    
-        
    
-        
    Note: The user agent should take cognitive guidelines into considerations regarding timeout for users with special needs.
    
+within a reasonable range as defined by the client and if not, correct it to the closest value lying within that range.
+Set a timer lifetimeTimer to this adjusted value. If pkOptions.timeout is not present, then set lifetimeTimer to a client-specific default.
    
+        
    See the recommended range and default for a WebAuthn ceremony timeout for guidance on deciding a reasonable range and default for pkOptions.timeout.
    
+        
    Note: The user agent should take cognitive guidelines into considerations regarding timeout for users with special needs.
    
       
      
  • 
       
    Let callerOrigin be origin. If callerOrigin is
 an opaque origin, throw a "NotAllowedError" DOMException.
    
      
  • 
-      
    Let effectiveDomain be the callerOrigin’s effective domain.
-If effective domain is not a valid domain, then throw a
+      
    Let effectiveDomain be the callerOrigin’s effective domain.
+If effective domain is not a valid domain, then throw a
 "SecurityError" DOMException.
    
-      
    Note: An effective domain may resolve to a host, which can be represented in various manners,
+      
    Note: An effective domain may resolve to a host, which can be represented in various manners,
     such as domain, ipv4 address, ipv6 address, opaque host, or empty host.
     Only the domain format of host is allowed here. This is for simplification and also is
     in recognition of various issues with using direct IP address identification in concert with
@@ -2534,11 +3071,11 @@ 
    rpId is not a registrable domain suffix of and is not
+        
    If pkOptions.rpId is not a registrable domain suffix of and is not
 equal to effectiveDomain, throw a "SecurityError" DOMException.
    
        
  • 
         
    Set rpId to pkOptions.rpId.
    
-        
    Note: rpId represents the caller’s RP ID. The RP ID defaults to being the caller’s origin's effective domain unless the caller has explicitly set pkOptions.rpId when calling get().
    
+        
    Note: rpId represents the caller’s RP ID. The RP ID defaults to being the caller’s origin's effective domain unless the caller has explicitly set pkOptions.rpId when calling get().
    
       
      
  • 
       
    Let clientExtensions be a new map and let authenticatorExtensions be a new map.
    
@@ -2567,10 +3104,14 @@ 
    base64url encoding of pkOptions.challenge
    
        
    origin
        
    
-        
    The serialization of callerOrigin.
    
+        
    The serialization of callerOrigin.
    
+       
    topOrigin
+       
    
+        
    The serialization of callerOrigin’s top-level origin if
+the sameOriginWithAncestors argument passed to this internal method is false, else undefined.
    
        
    crossOrigin
        
    
-        
    The inverse of the value of the sameOriginWithAncestors argument passed to this internal method.
    
+        
    The inverse of the value of the sameOriginWithAncestors argument passed to this internal method.
    
       
      
  • 
       
    Let clientDataJSON be the JSON-compatible serialization of client data constructed from collectedClientData.
    
@@ -2584,11 +3125,13 @@ 
    map.
    
      
  • 
-      
    Let authenticators represent a value which at any given instant is a set of client platform-specific handles, where each item identifies an authenticator presently available on this client platform at that instant.
    
-      
    Note: What qualifies an authenticator as "available" is intentionally unspecified; this is meant to represent how authenticators can be hot-plugged into (e.g., via USB)
-or discovered (e.g., via NFC or Bluetooth) by the client by various mechanisms, or permanently built into the client.
    
+      
    Let authenticators represent a value which at any given instant is a set of client platform-specific handles, where each item identifies an authenticator presently available on this client platform at that instant.
    
+      
    Note: What qualifies an authenticator as "available" is intentionally unspecified; this is meant to represent how authenticators can be hot-plugged into (e.g., via USB)
+or discovered (e.g., via NFC or Bluetooth) by the client by various mechanisms, or permanently built into the client.
    
      
  • 
-      
    Let silentlyDiscoveredCredentials be a new map whose entries are of the form: DiscoverableCredentialMetadata → authenticator.
    
+      
    Let silentlyDiscoveredCredentials be a new map whose entries are of the form: DiscoverableCredentialMetadata → authenticator.
    
+     
  • 
+      
    Consider the value of hints and craft the user interface accordingly, as the user-agent sees fit.
    
      
  • 
       
    Start lifetimeTimer.
    
      
  • 
@@ -2614,7 +3157,7 @@ 
    DiscoverableCredentialMetadata (credentialMetadata) from silentlyDiscoveredCredentials.
    
-            
    Note: The prompt shown SHOULD include values from credentialMetadata’s otherUI such as name and displayName.
    
+            
    Note: The prompt shown SHOULD include values from credentialMetadata’s otherUI such as name and displayName.
    
            
  • 
             
    If the user selects a credentialMetadata,
    
             
      
@@ -2637,10 +3180,10 @@ 
      public key credentials therein,
        
      
         
      Indicate to the user that no eligible credential could be found. When the user acknowledges the dialog, throw a "NotAllowedError" DOMException.
      
-        
      Note: One way a client platform can determine that no authenticator will become available is by examining the transports members of the present PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor items of pkOptions.allowCredentials, if any. For example, if all PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor items list only internal, but all platform authenticators have been tried, then there is no possibility of satisfying the request. Alternatively, all PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor items may list transports that the client platform does not support.
      
+        
      Note: One way a client platform can determine that no authenticator will become available is by examining the transports members of the present PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor items of pkOptions.allowCredentials, if any. For example, if all PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor items list only internal, but all platform authenticators have been tried, then there is no possibility of satisfying the request. Alternatively, all PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor items may list transports that the client platform does not support.
      
        
      If an authenticator becomes available on this client device,
        
      
-        
      Note: This includes the case where an authenticator was available upon lifetimeTimer initiation.
      
+        
      Note: This includes the case where an authenticator was available upon lifetimeTimer initiation.
      
         
        
          
      1. 
           
        If options.mediation is conditional and the authenticator supports the silentCredentialDiscovery operation:
        
@@ -2652,7 +3195,7 @@ 
        is empty or credentialIdFilter contains an item whose id's value is set to credentialMetadata’s id, set silentlyDiscoveredCredentials[credentialMetadata] to authenticator.
        
-              
        Note: A request will be issued to this authenticator upon user selection of a credential via
+              
        Note: A request will be issued to this authenticator upon user selection of a credential via
    interaction with a particular UI context
    (see here for details).
        
             
      
@@ -2663,7 +3206,7 @@ 
      issuing a credential request to an authenticator algorithm with authenticator, savedCredentialIds, pkOptions, rpId, clientDataHash, and authenticatorExtensions.
      
             
      If this returns false, continue.
      
-            
      Note: This branch is taken if options.mediation is conditional and the authenticator does not support the silentCredentialDiscovery operation to allow use of such authenticators during a conditional user mediation request.
      
+            
      Note: This branch is taken if options.mediation is conditional and the authenticator does not support the silentCredentialDiscovery operation to allow use of such authenticators during a conditional user mediation request.
      
            
    1. 
             
      Append authenticator to issuedRequests.
      
           
    
@@ -2679,7 +3222,7 @@ 
    For each remaining authenticator in issuedRequests invoke the authenticatorCancel operation
 on authenticator and remove it from issuedRequests.
    
-          
    Note: Authenticators may return an indication of "the user cancelled the entire operation".
+          
    Note: Authenticators may return an indication of "the user cancelled the entire operation".
 How a user agent manifests this state to users is unspecified.
    
         
        
    If any authenticator returns an error status,
@@ -2702,20 +3245,26 @@ 
    authenticatorDataResult
            
    
-            
    whose value is the bytes of the authenticator data returned by the authenticator.
    
+            
    whose value is the bytes of the authenticator data returned by the authenticator.
    
            
    signatureResult
            
    
-            
    whose value is the bytes of the signature value returned by the authenticator.
    
+            
    whose value is the bytes of the signature value returned by the authenticator.
    
            
    userHandleResult
            
    
-            
    If the authenticator returned a user handle, set the value of userHandleResult to be the bytes of
-the returned user handle. Otherwise, set the value of userHandleResult to null.
    
+            
    If the authenticator returned a user handle, set the value of userHandleResult to be the bytes of
+the returned user handle. Otherwise, set the value of userHandleResult to null.
    
+           
    assertionAttestation
+           
    
+            
    If the authenticator returned an attestation, set the value of assertionAttestation to be the bytes of
+the attestation statement. Otherwise set it to null.
    
            
    clientExtensionResults
            
    
             
    whose value is an AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs object containing extension identifier → client extension output entries. The entries are created by running each extension’s client extension processing algorithm to create the client extension outputs, for each client extension in pkOptions.extensions.
    
           
          
  • 
           
    If credentialIdFilter is not empty and credentialIdFilter does not contain an item whose id's value is set to the value of credentialIdResult, continue.
    
+         
  • 
+          
    If credentialIdFilter is empty and userHandleResult is null, continue.
    
          
  • 
           
    Let constructAssertionAlg be an algorithm that takes a global object global, and whose steps are:
    
           
      
@@ -2743,12 +3292,16 @@ 
      ArrayBuffer, created using global’s %ArrayBuffer%, containing the bytes of assertionCreationData.signatureResult.
      
                
      userHandle
                
      
-                
      If assertionCreationData.userHandleResult is null, set this
-field to null. Otherwise, set this field to a new ArrayBuffer, created using global’s %ArrayBuffer%, containing the bytes of assertionCreationData.userHandleResult.
      
+                
      If assertionCreationData.userHandleResult is null, set this
+field to null. Otherwise, set this field to a new ArrayBuffer, created using global’s %ArrayBuffer%, containing the bytes of assertionCreationData.userHandleResult.
      
+               
      attestationObject
+               
      
+                
      If assertionCreationData.assertionAttestation is null, set this
+field to null. Otherwise, set this field to a new ArrayBuffer, created using global’s %ArrayBuffer%, containing the bytes of assertionCreationData.assertionAttestation.
      
               
              
      [[clientExtensionsResults]]
              
      
-              
      A new ArrayBuffer, created using global’s %ArrayBuffer%, containing the bytes of assertionCreationData.clientExtensionResults.
      
+              
      A new ArrayBuffer, created using global’s %ArrayBuffer%, containing the bytes of assertionCreationData.clientExtensionResults.
      
             
            
    1. 
             
      Return pubKeyCred.
      
@@ -2767,16 +3320,16 @@ 
      5.1.4.2. Issuing a Credential Request to an Authenticator
      
    
      This sub-algorithm of [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]]() encompasses the specific UI context-independent
-steps necessary for requesting a credential from a given authenticator, using given PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.
-It is called by [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]]() from various points depending on which user mediation the present authentication ceremony is subject to (e.g.: conditional mediation).
      
+steps necessary for requesting a credential from a given authenticator, using given PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.
+It is called by [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]]() from various points depending on which user mediation the present authentication ceremony is subject to (e.g.: conditional mediation).
      
    
      This algorithm accepts the following arguments:
      
    
      
     
      authenticator
     
      
-     
      A client platform-specific handle identifying an authenticator presently available on this client platform.
      
+     
      A client platform-specific handle identifying an authenticator presently available on this client platform.
      
     
      savedCredentialIds
     
      
-     
      A map containing authenticator → credential ID. This argument will be modified in this algorithm.
      
+     
      A map containing authenticator → credential ID. This argument will be modified in this algorithm.
      
     
      pkOptions
     
      
      
      This argument is a PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions object specifying the desired attributes of the public key credential to discover.
      
@@ -2790,39 +3343,58 @@ 
      map containing extension identifiers to the base64url encoding of the client extension processing output for authenticator extensions.
      
    
      
-   
      This algorithm returns false if the client determines that the authenticator is not capable of handling the request, or true if
+   
      This algorithm returns false if the client determines that the authenticator is not capable of handling the request, or true if
 the request was issued successfully.
      
    
      The steps for issuing a credential request to an authenticator are as follows:
      
    
        
     
      1. 
-     
        If pkOptions.userVerification is set to required and the authenticator is not capable of performing user verification,
+     
        If pkOptions.userVerification is set to required and the authenticator is not capable of performing user verification,
 return false.
        
     
      2. 
      
        Let userVerification be the effective user verification requirement for assertion, a Boolean value, as
-follows. If pkOptions.userVerification
        
+follows. If pkOptions.userVerification
        
      
        
-      
        is set to required
+      
        is set to required
       
        
        
        Let userVerification be true.
        
-      
        is set to preferred
+      
        is set to preferred
       
        
        
        If the authenticator
        
        
        
-        
        is capable of user verification
+        
        is capable of user verification
         
        
          
        Let userVerification be true.
        
-        
        is not capable of user verification
+        
        is not capable of user verification
         
        
          
        Let userVerification be false.
        
        
        
-      
        is set to discouraged
+      
        is set to discouraged
       
        
        
        Let userVerification be false.
        
      
        
+    
      3. 
+     
        Let enterpriseAttestationPossible be a Boolean value, as follows. If pkOptions.attestation
        
+     
        
+      
        is set to enterprise
+      
        
+       
        Let enterpriseAttestationPossible be true if the user agent wishes to support enterprise attestation for rpId (see Step 7 of § 5.1.4.1 PublicKeyCredential’s [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method). Otherwise false.
        
+      
        otherwise
+      
        
+       
        Let enterpriseAttestationPossible be false.
        
+     
        
+    
      4. 
+     
        Let attestationFormats be a list of strings, initialized to the value of pkOptions.attestationFormats.
        
+    
      5. 
+     
        If pkOptions.attestation
        
+     
        
+      
        is set to none
+      
        
+       
        Set attestationFormats be the single-element list containing the string “none”
        
+     
        
     
      6. 
      
         If pkOptions.allowCredentials
        
      
        
-      
        is not empty
+      
        is not empty
       
        
        
          
         
        1. 
@@ -2832,7 +3404,7 @@ 
          allowCredentials.type.
 Set allowCredentialDescriptorList to this filtered list.
          
         
        2. 
-         
          If allowCredentialDescriptorList is empty, return false.
          
+         
          If allowCredentialDescriptorList is empty, return false.
          
         
        3. 
          
          Let distinctTransports be a new ordered set.
          
         
        4. 
@@ -2840,38 +3412,41 @@ 
          here in § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation for more information).
          
         
        5. 
          
          For each credential descriptor C in allowCredentialDescriptorList, append each value, if any, of C.transports to distinctTransports.
          
-         
          Note: This will aggregate only distinct values of transports (for this authenticator) in distinctTransports due to the properties of ordered sets.
          
+         
          Note: This will aggregate only distinct values of transports (for this authenticator) in distinctTransports due to the properties of ordered sets.
          
         
        6. 
          
          If distinctTransports
          
          
          
-          
          is not empty
+          
          is not empty
           
          
            
          The client selects one transport value from distinctTransports, possibly incorporating local
 configuration knowledge of the appropriate transport to use with authenticator in making its
 selection.
          
-           
          Then, using transport, invoke the authenticatorGetAssertion operation on authenticator, with rpId, clientDataHash, allowCredentialDescriptorList, userVerification, and authenticatorExtensions as parameters.
          
-          
          is empty
+           
          Then, using transport, invoke the authenticatorGetAssertion operation on authenticator, with rpId, clientDataHash, allowCredentialDescriptorList, userVerification, enterpriseAttestationPossible, attestationFormats,
+and authenticatorExtensions as parameters.
          
+          
          is empty
           
          
            
          Using local configuration knowledge of the appropriate transport to use with authenticator,
-invoke the authenticatorGetAssertion operation on authenticator with rpId, clientDataHash, allowCredentialDescriptorList, userVerification, and authenticatorExtensions as parameters.
          
+invoke the authenticatorGetAssertion operation on authenticator with rpId, clientDataHash, allowCredentialDescriptorList, userVerification, enterpriseAttestationPossible, attestationFormats, and authenticatorExtensions as parameters.
          
          
          
        
        
-      
        is empty
+      
        is empty
       
        
-       
        Using local configuration knowledge of the appropriate transport to use with authenticator, invoke the authenticatorGetAssertion operation on authenticator with rpId, clientDataHash, userVerification and authenticatorExtensions as parameters.
        
-       
        Note: In this case, the Relying Party did not supply a list of acceptable credential descriptors. Thus, the
+       
        Using local configuration knowledge of the appropriate transport to use with authenticator, invoke the authenticatorGetAssertion operation on authenticator with rpId, clientDataHash, userVerification, enterpriseAttestationPossible, attestationFormats,
+and authenticatorExtensions as parameters.
        
+       
        Note: In this case, the Relying Party did not supply a list of acceptable credential descriptors. Thus, the
     authenticator is being asked to exercise any credential it may possess that is scoped to
-    the Relying Party, as identified by rpId.
        
+    the Relying Party, as identified by rpId.
        
      
        
     
      7. 
      
        Return true.
        
    
      
    
      5.1.5. Store an Existing Credential - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method
      
    
      
-    
      The [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors) method is not supported
-for Web Authentication’s PublicKeyCredential type, so it always throws an error.
      
-    
      Note: This algorithm is synchronous; the Promise resolution/rejection is handled by navigator.credentials.store().
      
-    
      This internal method accepts two arguments:
      
+    
      The [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors) method is not supported
+for Web Authentication’s PublicKeyCredential type,
+so its implementation of the [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors) internal method always throws an error.
      
+    
      Note: This algorithm is synchronous; the Promise resolution/rejection is handled by navigator.credentials.store().
      
+    
      This internal method accepts two arguments:
      
     
      
      
      credential
      
      
@@ -2891,198 +3466,138 @@ 
      [[preventSilentAccess]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors) method
 will have no effect on authenticators that require an authorization gesture,
 but setting that flag may potentially exclude authenticators that can operate without user intervention.
      
-    
      This internal method accepts no arguments.
      
+    
      This internal method accepts no arguments.
      
    
      
    
      5.1.7. Availability of User-Verifying Platform Authenticator - PublicKeyCredential’s isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method
      
    
      
     
      WebAuthn Relying Parties use this method to determine whether they can create a new credential using a user-verifying platform authenticator.
-Upon invocation, the client employs a client platform-specific procedure to discover available user-verifying platform authenticators.
+Upon invocation, the client employs a client platform-specific procedure to discover available user-verifying platform authenticators.
 If any are discovered, the promise is resolved with the value of true.
 Otherwise, the promise is resolved with the value of false.
-Based on the result, the Relying Party can take further actions to guide the user to create a credential.
      
+Based on the result, the Relying Party can take further actions to guide the user to create a credential.
      
     
      This method has no arguments and returns a Boolean value.
      
-    
      
-     
-     
      
-      
      PublicKeyCredential/isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable
      
-      
      In all current engines.
      
-      
      
-       Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-       
      
-       Opera?Edge79+
-       
      
-       Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-       
      
-       Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile?
-      
      
-     
      
-    
      
 
      partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
     static Promise<boolean> isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable();
 };
 
      
-    
      Note: Invoking this method from a browsing context where the Web Authentication API is "disabled" according to the allowed to use algorithm—i.e., by a permissions policy—will result in the promise being rejected with a DOMException whose name is "NotAllowedError". See also § 5.9 Permissions Policy integration.
      
+    
      Note: Invoking this method from a browsing context where the Web Authentication API is "disabled" according to the allowed to use algorithm—i.e., by a permissions policy—will result in the promise being rejected with a DOMException whose name is "NotAllowedError". See also § 5.9 Permissions Policy integration.
      
    
      
-   
      5.1.8. Deserialize Registration ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseCreationOptionsFromJSON() Method
      
+   
      5.1.8. Availability of a passkey platform authenticator - PublicKeyCredential’s isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() Method
      
+   
      
+    
      WebAuthn Relying Parties use this method to determine whether they can create a new passkey using a user-verifying platform authenticator or a hybrid authenticator.
+Upon invocation, the client employs a client platform-specific procedure to discover available user-verifying platform authenticators and the
+availability of hybrid transport.
+If one or both are discovered, the promise is resolved with the value of true.
+If neither is discovered, the promise is resolved with the value of false.
+Based on the result, the Relying Party can take further actions to guide the user to create a passkey.
      
+    
      This method has no arguments and returns a Boolean value.
      
+
      partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
+    static Promise<boolean> isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable();
+};
+
      
+    
      Note: Invoking this method from a browsing context where the Web Authentication API is "disabled" according to the allowed to use algorithm—i.e., by a permissions policy—will result in the promise being rejected with a DOMException whose name is "NotAllowedError". See also § 5.9 Permissions Policy integration.
      
+   
      
+   
      5.1.9. Deserialize Registration ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseCreationOptionsFromJSON() Method
      
    
      
-    
      WebAuthn Relying Parties use this method to convert JSON type representations of options for navigator.credentials.create() into PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions.
      
-    
      Upon invocation, the client MUST convert the options argument into a new,
+    
      WebAuthn Relying Parties use this method to convert JSON type representations of options for navigator.credentials.create() into PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions.
      
+    
      Upon invocation, the client MUST convert the options argument into a new,
 identically-structured PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions object, using base64url encoding to decode any DOMString attributes in PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON that correspond
 to buffer source type attributes in PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions. This conversion MUST
-also apply to any client extension inputs processed by the client.
      
+also apply to any client extension inputs processed by the client.
      
     
      AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON MAY include extensions registered in the IANA
-"WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] but not defined in § 9 WebAuthn Extensions.
      
-    
      If the client encounters any issues parsing any of the JSON type representations then it
-MUST throw an "EncodingError" DOMException with a description of the incompatible
+"WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] but not defined in § 9 WebAuthn Extensions.
      
+    
      If the client encounters any issues parsing any of the JSON type representations then it
+MUST throw an "EncodingError" DOMException with a description of the incompatible
 value and terminate the operation.
      
-
      partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
+
      partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
     static PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions parseCreationOptionsFromJSON(PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON options);
 };
 
 dictionary PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON {
     required PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity                    rp;
     required PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON              user;
-    required Base64URLString                                challenge;
+    required Base64URLString                                challenge;
     required sequence<PublicKeyCredentialParameters>        pubKeyCredParams;
     unsigned long                                           timeout;
     sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON>             excludeCredentials = [];
     AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria                          authenticatorSelection;
-    DOMString                                               attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     hints = [];
+    DOMString                                               attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON                extensions;
 };
 
 dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON {
-    required Base64URLString        id;
-    required DOMString              name;
-    required DOMString              displayName;
+    required Base64URLString        id;
+    required DOMString              name;
+    required DOMString              displayName;
 };
 
 dictionary PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON {
-    required Base64URLString        id;
-    required DOMString              type;
-    sequence<DOMString>             transports;
+    required Base64URLString        id;
+    required DOMString              type;
+    sequence<DOMString>             transports;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON {
 };
 
      
    
      
-   
      5.1.9. Deserialize Authentication ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseRequestOptionsFromJSON() Methods
      
+   
      5.1.10. Deserialize Authentication ceremony options - PublicKeyCredential’s parseRequestOptionsFromJSON() Methods
      
    
      
-    
      WebAuthn Relying Parties use this method to convert JSON type representations of options for navigator.credentials.get() into PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.
      
-    
      Upon invocation, the client MUST convert the options argument into a new,
-identically-structured PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions object, using base64url encoding to decode any DOMString attributes in PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON that correspond
+    
      WebAuthn Relying Parties use this method to convert JSON type representations of options for navigator.credentials.get() into PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.
      
+    
      Upon invocation, the client MUST convert the options argument into a new,
+identically-structured PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions object, using base64url encoding to decode any DOMString attributes in PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON that correspond
 to buffer source type attributes in PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions. This conversion MUST
-also apply to any client extension inputs processed by the client.
      
+also apply to any client extension inputs processed by the client.
      
     
      AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON MAY include extensions registered in the IANA
-"WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] but not defined in § 9 WebAuthn Extensions.
      
-    
      If the client encounters any issues parsing any of the JSON type representations then it
-MUST throw an "EncodingError" DOMException with a description of the incompatible
+"WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] but not defined in § 9 WebAuthn Extensions.
      
+    
      If the client encounters any issues parsing any of the JSON type representations then it
+MUST throw an "EncodingError" DOMException with a description of the incompatible
 value and terminate the operation.
      
-
      partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
+
      partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
     static PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions parseRequestOptionsFromJSON(PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON options);
 };
 
 dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON {
-    required Base64URLString                                challenge;
+    required Base64URLString                                challenge;
     unsigned long                                           timeout;
-    DOMString                                               rpId;
-    sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON>             allowCredentials = [];
-    DOMString                                               userVerification = "preferred";
+    DOMString                                               rpId;
+    sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON>             allowCredentials = [];
+    DOMString                                               userVerification = "preferred";
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     hints = [];
+    DOMString                                               attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON                extensions;
 };
 
      
    
      
    
      5.2. Authenticator Responses (interface AuthenticatorResponse)
      
-   
      
-    
-    
      
-     
      AuthenticatorResponse
      
-     
      In all current engines.
      
-     
      
-      Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-      
      
-      Opera?Edge79+
-      
      
-      Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-      
      
-      Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-     
      
-    
      
-   
      
-   
      Authenticators respond to Relying Party requests by returning an object derived from the AuthenticatorResponse interface:
      
+   
      Authenticators respond to Relying Party requests by returning an object derived from the AuthenticatorResponse interface:
      
 
      [SecureContext, Exposed=Window]
 interface AuthenticatorResponse {
-    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      clientDataJSON;
+    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      clientDataJSON;
 };
 
      
    
      
     
      
-     
      
-      
      
-       
-       
      
-        
      AuthenticatorResponse/clientDataJSON
      
-        
      In all current engines.
      
-        
      
-         Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-         
      
-         Opera?Edge79+
-         
      
-         Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-         
      
-         Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-        
      
-       
      
-      
      
-      
      clientDataJSON,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
      
+     
      clientDataJSON,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
      
      
       
      This attribute contains a JSON-compatible serialization of the client data, the hash of which is passed to the
-authenticator by the client in its call to either create() or get() (i.e., the client data itself is not sent to the authenticator).
      
+authenticator by the client in its call to either create() or get() (i.e., the client data itself is not sent to the authenticator).
      
     
      
    
      
    
      5.2.1. Information About Public Key Credential (interface AuthenticatorAttestationResponse)
      
-   
      
-    
-    
      
-     
      AuthenticatorAttestationResponse
      
-     
      In all current engines.
      
-     
      
-      Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-      
      
-      Opera?Edge79+
-      
      
-      Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-      
      
-      Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-     
      
-    
      
-   
      
-   
      The AuthenticatorAttestationResponse interface represents the authenticator's response to a client’s request
+   
      The AuthenticatorAttestationResponse interface represents the authenticator's response to a client’s request
 for the creation of a new public key credential. It contains information about the new credential that can be used to
-identify it for later use, and metadata that can be used by the WebAuthn Relying Party to assess the characteristics of the credential
+identify it for later use, and metadata that can be used by the WebAuthn Relying Party to assess the characteristics of the credential
 during registration.
      
-   
      
-    
-    
      
-     
      AuthenticatorAttestationResponse/getTransports
      
-     
      
-      FirefoxNoneSafari16+Chrome74+
-      
      
-      Opera?Edge79+
-      
      
-      Edge (Legacy)?IENone
-      
      
-      Firefox for Android?iOS Safari?Chrome for Android?Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile?
-     
      
-    
      
-   
      
 
      [SecureContext, Exposed=Window]
 interface AuthenticatorAttestationResponse : AuthenticatorResponse {
-    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      attestationObject;
-    sequence<DOMString>                              getTransports();
-    ArrayBuffer                                      getAuthenticatorData();
-    ArrayBuffer?                                     getPublicKey();
+    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      attestationObject;
+    sequence<DOMString>                              getTransports();
+    ArrayBuffer                                      getAuthenticatorData();
+    ArrayBuffer?                                     getPublicKey();
     COSEAlgorithmIdentifier                          getPublicKeyAlgorithm();
 };
 
      
@@ -3093,29 +3608,12 @@ 
      AuthenticatorResponse, contains the JSON-compatible serialization of client data (see § 6.5 Attestation) passed to the authenticator by the client in order to generate this credential. The
 exact JSON serialization MUST be preserved, as the hash of the serialized client data has been computed
 over it.
      
-     
      
-      
      
-       
-       
      
-        
      AuthenticatorAttestationResponse/attestationObject
      
-        
      In all current engines.
      
-        
      
-         Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-         
      
-         Opera?Edge79+
-         
      
-         Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-         
      
-         Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-        
      
-       
      
-      
      
-      
      attestationObject,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
      
+     
      attestationObject,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
      
      
       
      This attribute contains an attestation object, which is opaque to, and cryptographically protected against
-tampering by, the client. The attestation object contains both authenticator data and an attestation
+tampering by, the client. The attestation object contains both authenticator data and an attestation
 statement. The former contains the AAGUID, a unique credential ID, and the credential public key. The
-contents of the attestation statement are determined by the attestation statement format used by the authenticator. It also contains any additional information that the Relying Party's server requires to validate the attestation statement, as well as to decode and validate the authenticator data along with the JSON-compatible serialization of client data. For more details, see § 6.5 Attestation, § 6.5.4 Generating an Attestation Object,
+contents of the attestation statement are determined by the attestation statement format used by the authenticator. It also contains any additional information that the Relying Party's server requires to validate the attestation statement, as well as to decode and validate the authenticator data along with the JSON-compatible serialization of client data. For more details, see § 6.5 Attestation, § 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object,
 and Figure 6.
      
      
      getTransports()
      
      
@@ -3123,22 +3621,22 @@ 
      getAuthenticatorData()
      
      
       
      This operation returns the authenticator data contained within attestationObject. See § 5.2.1.1 Easily accessing credential data.
      
-     
      getPublicKey()
+     
      getPublicKey()
      
      
       
      This operation returns the DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the new credential, or null if this is not available. See § 5.2.1.1 Easily accessing credential data.
      
-     
      getPublicKeyAlgorithm()
+     
      getPublicKeyAlgorithm()
      
      
       
      This operation returns the COSEAlgorithmIdentifier of the new credential. See § 5.2.1.1 Easily accessing credential data.
      
      
      [[transports]]
      
      
-      
      This internal slot contains a sequence of zero or more unique DOMStrings in lexicographical order. These values are the transports that the authenticator is believed to support, or an empty sequence if the information is unavailable. The values SHOULD be members of AuthenticatorTransport but Relying Parties SHOULD accept and store unknown values.
      
+      
      This internal slot contains a sequence of zero or more unique DOMStrings in lexicographical order. These values are the transports that the authenticator is believed to support, or an empty sequence if the information is unavailable. The values SHOULD be members of AuthenticatorTransport but Relying Parties SHOULD accept and store unknown values.
      
     
    
    • 
    
    5.2.1.1. Easily accessing credential data
    
-   
    Every user of the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) method will need to parse and store the returned credential public key in order to verify future authentication assertions. However, the credential public key is in COSE format [RFC9052], inside the credentialPublicKey member of the attestedCredentialData, inside the authenticator data, inside the attestation object conveyed by AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.attestationObject. Relying Parties wishing to use attestation are obliged to do the work of parsing the attestationObject and obtaining the credential public key because that public key copy is the one the authenticator signed. However, many valid WebAuthn use cases do not require attestation. For those uses, user agents can do the work of parsing, expose the authenticator data directly, and translate the credential public key into a more convenient format.
    
-   
    The getPublicKey() operation thus returns the credential public key as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo. This ArrayBuffer can, for example, be passed to Java’s java.security.spec.X509EncodedKeySpec, .NET’s System.Security.Cryptography.ECDsa.ImportSubjectPublicKeyInfo, or Go’s crypto/x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey.
    
-   
    Use of getPublicKey() does impose some limitations: by using pubKeyCredParams, a Relying Party can negotiate with the authenticator to use public key algorithms that the user agent may not understand. However, if the Relying Party does so, the user agent will not be able to translate the resulting credential public key into SubjectPublicKeyInfo format and the return value of getPublicKey() will be null.
    
-   
    User agents MUST be able to return a non-null value for getPublicKey() when the credential public key has a COSEAlgorithmIdentifier value of:
    
+   
    Every user of the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) method will need to parse and store the returned credential public key in order to verify future authentication assertions. However, the credential public key is in COSE format [RFC9052], inside the credentialPublicKey member of the attestedCredentialData, inside the authenticator data, inside the attestation object conveyed by AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.attestationObject. Relying Parties wishing to use attestation are obliged to do the work of parsing the attestationObject and obtaining the credential public key because that public key copy is the one the authenticator signed. However, many valid WebAuthn use cases do not require attestation. For those uses, user agents can do the work of parsing, expose the authenticator data directly, and translate the credential public key into a more convenient format.
    
+   
    The getPublicKey() operation thus returns the credential public key as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo. This ArrayBuffer can, for example, be passed to Java’s java.security.spec.X509EncodedKeySpec, .NET’s System.Security.Cryptography.ECDsa.ImportSubjectPublicKeyInfo, or Go’s crypto/x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey.
    
+   
    Use of getPublicKey() does impose some limitations: by using pubKeyCredParams, a Relying Party can negotiate with the authenticator to use public key algorithms that the user agent may not understand. However, if the Relying Party does so, the user agent will not be able to translate the resulting credential public key into SubjectPublicKeyInfo format and the return value of getPublicKey() will be null.
    
+   
    User agents MUST be able to return a non-null value for getPublicKey() when the credential public key has a COSEAlgorithmIdentifier value of:
    
    
      
     
    • 
      
      -7 (ES256), where kty is 2 (with uncompressed points) and crv is 1 (P-256).
      
@@ -3147,35 +3645,20 @@ 
      
      
      -8 (EdDSA), where crv is 6 (Ed25519).
      
    
    
-   
    A SubjectPublicKeyInfo does not include information about the signing algorithm (for example, which hash function to use) that is included in the COSE public key. To provide this, getPublicKeyAlgorithm() returns the COSEAlgorithmIdentifier for the credential public key.
    
-   
    To remove the need to parse CBOR at all in many cases, getAuthenticatorData() returns the authenticator data from attestationObject. The authenticator data contains other fields that are encoded in a binary format. However, helper functions are not provided to access them because Relying Parties already need to extract those fields when getting an assertion. In contrast to credential creation, where signature verification is optional, Relying Parties should always be verifying signatures from an assertion and thus must extract fields from the signed authenticator data. The same functions used there will also serve during credential creation.
    
-   
    Note: getPublicKey() and getAuthenticatorData() were only added in level two of this spec. Relying Parties SHOULD use feature detection before using these functions by testing the value of 'getPublicKey' in AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.prototype. Relying Parties that require this function to exist may not interoperate with older user-agents.
    
+   
    A SubjectPublicKeyInfo does not include information about the signing algorithm (for example, which hash function to use) that is included in the COSE public key. To provide this, getPublicKeyAlgorithm() returns the COSEAlgorithmIdentifier for the credential public key.
    
+   
    To remove the need to parse CBOR at all in many cases, getAuthenticatorData() returns the authenticator data from attestationObject. The authenticator data contains other fields that are encoded in a binary format. However, helper functions are not provided to access them because Relying Parties already need to extract those fields when getting an assertion. In contrast to credential creation, where signature verification is optional, Relying Parties should always be verifying signatures from an assertion and thus must extract fields from the signed authenticator data. The same functions used there will also serve during credential creation.
    
+   
    Note: getPublicKey() and getAuthenticatorData() were only added in level two of this spec. Relying Parties SHOULD use feature detection before using these functions by testing the value of 'getPublicKey' in AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.prototype. Relying Parties that require this function to exist may not interoperate with older user-agents.
    
    
    5.2.2. Web Authentication Assertion (interface AuthenticatorAssertionResponse)
    
-   
    
-    
-    
    
-     
    AuthenticatorAssertionResponse
    
-     
    In all current engines.
    
-     
    
-      Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-      
    
-      Opera?Edge79+
-      
    
-      Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-      
    
-      Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-     
    
-    
    
-   
    
-   
    The AuthenticatorAssertionResponse interface represents an authenticator's response to a client’s request for
-generation of a new authentication assertion given the WebAuthn Relying Party's challenge and OPTIONAL list of credentials it is
+   
    The AuthenticatorAssertionResponse interface represents an authenticator's response to a client’s request for
+generation of a new authentication assertion given the WebAuthn Relying Party's challenge and OPTIONAL list of credentials it is
 aware of. This response contains a cryptographic signature proving possession of the credential private key, and
 optionally evidence of user consent to a specific transaction.
    
 
    [SecureContext, Exposed=Window]
 interface AuthenticatorAssertionResponse : AuthenticatorResponse {
-    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      authenticatorData;
-    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      signature;
-    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer?     userHandle;
+    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      authenticatorData;
+    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      signature;
+    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer?     userHandle;
+    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer?     attestationObject;
 };
 
    
    
    
@@ -3185,86 +3668,40 @@ 
    AuthenticatorResponse, contains the JSON-compatible serialization of client data (see § 5.8.1 Client Data Used in WebAuthn Signatures (dictionary CollectedClientData)) passed to the authenticator by the client in order to generate this assertion. The
 exact JSON serialization MUST be preserved, as the hash of the serialized client data has been computed
 over it.
    
-     
    
-      
    
-       
-       
    
-        
    AuthenticatorAssertionResponse/authenticatorData
    
-        
    In all current engines.
    
-        
    
-         Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-         
    
-         Opera?Edge79+
-         
    
-         Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-         
    
-         Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-        
    
-       
    
-      
    
-      
    authenticatorData,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
    
+     
    authenticatorData,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
      
    
       
    This attribute contains the authenticator data returned by the authenticator. See § 6.1 Authenticator Data.
    
-     
    
-      
    
-       
-       
    
-        
    AuthenticatorAssertionResponse/signature
    
-        
    In all current engines.
    
-        
    
-         Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-         
    
-         Opera?Edge79+
-         
    
-         Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-         
    
-         Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-        
    
-       
    
-      
    
-      
    signature,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
    
+     
    signature,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly
      
    
       
    This attribute contains the raw signature returned from the authenticator. See § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation.
    
-     
    
-      
    
-       
-       
    
-        
    AuthenticatorAssertionResponse/userHandle
    
-        
    In all current engines.
    
-        
    
-         Firefox60+Safari13+Chrome67+
-         
    
-         Opera?Edge79+
-         
    
-         Edge (Legacy)18IENone
-         
    
-         Firefox for Android92+iOS Safari?Chrome for Android70+Android WebViewNoneSamsung Internet?Opera Mobile48+
-        
    
-       
    
-      
    
-      
    userHandle,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly, nullable
    
+     
    userHandle,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly, nullable
+     
    
+      
    This attribute contains the user handle returned from the authenticator, or null if the authenticator did not return a user handle. See § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation. The authenticator MUST always return a user handle if
+the allowCredentials option used in the authentication ceremony is empty,
+and MAY return one otherwise.
    
+     
    attestationObject,  of type ArrayBuffer, readonly, nullable
      
    
-      
    This attribute contains the user handle returned from the authenticator, or null if the authenticator did not return a user handle. See § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation.
    
+      
    This OPTIONAL attribute contains an attestation object, if the authenticator supports attestation in assertions. The attestation object, if present, includes an attestation statement. Unlike the attestationObject in an AuthenticatorAttestationResponse, it does not contain an authData key because the authenticator data is provided directly in an AuthenticatorAssertionResponse structure. For more details on attestation, see § 6.5 Attestation, § 6.5.1 Attestation in assertions, § 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object, and Figure 6.
    
     
    
    
    
    5.3. Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialParameters)
    
 
    dictionary PublicKeyCredentialParameters {
-    required DOMString                    type;
+    required DOMString                    type;
     required COSEAlgorithmIdentifier      alg;
 };
 
    
    
    
      This dictionary is used to supply additional parameters when creating a new credential. 
     
    
-     
    type,  of type DOMString
+     
    type,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    This member specifies the type of credential to be created. The value SHOULD be a member of PublicKeyCredentialType but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, ignoring any PublicKeyCredentialParameters with an unknown type.
    
+      
    This member specifies the type of credential to be created. The value SHOULD be a member of PublicKeyCredentialType but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, ignoring any PublicKeyCredentialParameters with an unknown type.
    
      
    alg,  of type COSEAlgorithmIdentifier
      
    
       
    This member specifies the cryptographic signature algorithm with which the newly generated credential will be used, and
 thus also the type of asymmetric key pair to be generated, e.g., RSA or Elliptic Curve.
    
     
    
-    
    Note: we use "alg" as the latter member name, rather than spelling-out "algorithm", because it will be serialized into
+    
    Note: we use "alg" as the latter member name, rather than spelling-out "algorithm", because it will be serialized into
         a message to the authenticator, which may be sent over a low-bandwidth link.
    
    
    
    
    5.4. Options for Credential Creation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions)
    
@@ -3273,12 +3710,14 @@ 
    PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity       user;
 
     required BufferSource                             challenge;
-    required sequence<PublicKeyCredentialParameters>  pubKeyCredParams;
+    required sequence<PublicKeyCredentialParameters>  pubKeyCredParams;
 
     unsigned long                                timeout;
-    sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor>      excludeCredentials = [];
-    AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria               authenticatorSelection;
-    DOMString                                    attestation = "none";
+    sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor>      excludeCredentials = [];
+    AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria               authenticatorSelection;
+    sequence<DOMString>                          hints = [];
+    DOMString                                    attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                          attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs         extensions;
 };
 
    • 
@@ -3286,205 +3725,232 @@ 
    rp,  of type PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity
      
    
-      
    This member contains a name and an identifier for the Relying Party responsible for the request.
    
+      
    This member contains a name and an identifier for the Relying Party responsible for the request.
    
       
    Its value’s name member is REQUIRED. See § 5.4.1 Public Key Entity Description (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity) for further
 details.
    
       
    Its value’s id member specifies the RP ID the credential
 should be scoped to. If omitted, its value will be the CredentialsContainer object’s relevant
-settings object's origin's effective domain. See § 5.4.2 Relying Party Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity) for further details.
    
+settings object's origin's effective domain. See § 5.4.2 Relying Party Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity) for further details.
    
      
    user,  of type PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity
      
    
       
    This member contains names and an identifier for the user account performing the registration.
    
-      
    Its value’s name, displayName and id members are REQUIRED. id can be returned as the userHandle in some future authentication ceremonies,
-and is used to overwrite existing discoverable credentials that have the same rp.id and user.id on the same authenticator. name and displayName MAY be used by the authenticator and client in future authentication ceremonies to help the user select a credential, but are not returned to the Relying Party as a result of future authentication ceremonies
    
+      
    Its value’s name, displayName and id members are REQUIRED. id can be returned as the userHandle in some future authentication ceremonies,
+and is used to overwrite existing discoverable credentials that have the same rp.id and user.id on the same authenticator. name and displayName MAY be used by the authenticator and client in future authentication ceremonies to help the user select a credential, but are not returned to the Relying Party as a result of future authentication ceremonies
    
       
    For further details, see § 5.4.1 Public Key Entity Description (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity) and § 5.4.3 User Account Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity).
    
      
    challenge,  of type BufferSource
      
    
-      
    This member specifies a challenge that the authenticator signs, along with other data,
-when producing an attestation object for the newly created credential.
+      
    This member specifies a challenge that the authenticator signs, along with other data,
+when producing an attestation object for the newly created credential.
 See the § 13.4.3 Cryptographic Challenges security consideration.
    
      
    pubKeyCredParams,  of type sequence<PublicKeyCredentialParameters>
      
    
-      
    This member lists the key types and signature algorithms the Relying Party supports,
+      
    This member lists the key types and signature algorithms the Relying Party supports,
 ordered from most preferred to least preferred.
-The client and authenticator make a best-effort to create a credential of the most preferred type possible.
-If none of the listed types can be created, the create() operation fails.
    
+The client and authenticator make a best-effort to create a credential of the most preferred type possible.
+If none of the listed types can be created, the create() operation fails.
    
+      
    Relying Parties that wish to support a wide range of authenticators SHOULD include at least the following COSEAlgorithmIdentifier values:
    
+      
      
+       
    • 
+        
      -8 (Ed25519)
      
+       
    • 
+        
      -7 (ES256)
      
+       
    • 
+        
      -257 (RS256)
      
+      
    
+      
    Additional signature algorithms can be included as needed.
    
      
    timeout,  of type unsigned long
      
    
-      
    This OPTIONAL member specifies a time, in milliseconds, that the Relying Party is willing to wait for the call to complete. This is
-treated as a hint, and MAY be overridden by the client.
    
+      
    This OPTIONAL member specifies a time, in milliseconds, that the Relying Party is willing to wait for the call to complete. This is
+treated as a hint, and MAY be overridden by the client.
    
      
    excludeCredentials,  of type sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor>, defaulting to []
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party SHOULD use this OPTIONAL member to list any existing credentials mapped to this user account (as identified by user.id).
-This ensures that the new credential is not created on an authenticator that already contains a credential mapped to this user account.
-If it would be, the client is requested to instead guide the user to use a different authenticator,
+      
    The Relying Party SHOULD use this OPTIONAL member to list any existing credentials mapped to this user account (as identified by user.id).
+This ensures that the new credential is not created on an authenticator that already contains a credential mapped to this user account.
+If it would be, the client is requested to instead guide the user to use a different authenticator,
 or return an error if that fails.
    
      
    authenticatorSelection,  of type AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify capabilities and settings
-that the authenticator MUST or SHOULD satisfy to participate in the create() operation.
+      
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify capabilities and settings
+that the authenticator MUST or SHOULD satisfy to participate in the create() operation.
 See § 5.4.4 Authenticator Selection Criteria (dictionary AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria).
    
-     
    attestation,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "none"
+     
    hints,  of type sequence<DOMString>, defaulting to []
+     
    
+      
    This OPTIONAL member contains zero or more elements from PublicKeyCredentialHints to guide the user agent in interacting with the user. Note that the elements have type DOMString despite being taken from that enumeration. See § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+     
    attestation,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "none"
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding attestation conveyance.
-Its value SHOULD be a member of AttestationConveyancePreference. Client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist.
    
-      
    The default value is none.
    
+      
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding attestation conveyance.
+Its value SHOULD be a member of AttestationConveyancePreference. Client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist.
    
+      
    The default value is none.
    
+     
    attestationFormats,  of type sequence<DOMString>, defaulting to []
+     
    
+      
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding the attestation statement format used by the authenticator.
+Values SHOULD be taken from the IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
+Values are ordered from most preferable to least preferable.
+This parameter is advisory and the authenticator MAY use an attestation statement not enumerated in this parameter.
    
+      
    The default value is the empty list, which indicates no preference.
    
      
    extensions,  of type AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to provide client extension inputs requesting additional processing by the client and authenticator.
-For example, the Relying Party may request that the client returns additional information about the credential that was created.
    
+      
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to provide client extension inputs requesting additional processing by the client and authenticator.
+For example, the Relying Party may request that the client returns additional information about the credential that was created.
    
       
    The extensions framework is defined in § 9 WebAuthn Extensions.
 Some extensions are defined in § 10 Defined Extensions;
-consult the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809] for an up-to-date list
+consult the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809] for an up-to-date list
 of registered WebAuthn Extensions.
    
     
    
    
    5.4.1. Public Key Entity Description (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity)
    
-   
    The PublicKeyCredentialEntity dictionary describes a user account, or a WebAuthn Relying Party, which a public key credential is
+   
    The PublicKeyCredentialEntity dictionary describes a user account, or a WebAuthn Relying Party, which a public key credential is
 associated with or scoped to, respectively.
    
 
    dictionary PublicKeyCredentialEntity {
-    required DOMString    name;
+    required DOMString    name;
 };
 
    
    
    
     
    
-     
    name,  of type DOMString
+     
    name,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    A human-palatable name for the entity. Its function depends on what the PublicKeyCredentialEntity represents:
    
+      
    A human-palatable name for the entity. Its function depends on what the PublicKeyCredentialEntity represents:
    
       
-      
    When clients, client platforms, or authenticators display a name's value, they should always use UI elements to provide a clear boundary around the displayed value, and not allow overflow into other elements [css-overflow-3].
    
+      
    When clients, client platforms, or authenticators display a name's value, they should always use UI elements to provide a clear boundary around the displayed value, and not allow overflow into other elements [css-overflow-3].
    
       
    Authenticators MAY truncate a name member’s value so that it fits within 64 bytes, if the authenticator stores the value. See § 6.4.1 String Truncation about truncation and other considerations.
    
     
    
    
    
    
    5.4.2. Relying Party Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity)
    
-   
    The PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity dictionary is used to supply additional Relying Party attributes when creating a new credential.
    
+   
    The PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity dictionary is used to supply additional Relying Party attributes when creating a new credential.
    
 
    dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity : PublicKeyCredentialEntity {
-    DOMString      id;
+    DOMString      id;
 };
 
    
    
    
     
    
-     
    id,  of type DOMString
+     
    id,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    A unique identifier for the Relying Party entity, which sets the RP ID.
    
+      
    A unique identifier for the Relying Party entity, which sets the RP ID.
    
     
    
    
    
    
    5.4.3. User Account Parameters for Credential Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity)
    
-   
    The PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity dictionary is used to supply additional user account attributes when creating a new
+   
    The PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity dictionary is used to supply additional user account attributes when creating a new
 credential.
    
 
    dictionary PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity : PublicKeyCredentialEntity {
     required BufferSource   id;
-    required DOMString      displayName;
+    required DOMString      displayName;
 };
 
    
    
    
     
    
      
    id,  of type BufferSource
      
    
-      
    The user handle of the user account.
-A user handle is an opaque byte sequence with a maximum size of 64 bytes,
+      
    The user handle of the user account.
+A user handle is an opaque byte sequence with a maximum size of 64 bytes,
 and is not meant to be displayed to the user.
    
       
    To ensure secure operation, authentication and authorization
-decisions MUST be made on the basis of this id member,  not the displayName nor name members. See Section 6.1 of [RFC8266].
    
-      
    The user handle MUST NOT contain personally identifying information about the user, such as a username or e-mail address;
-see § 14.6.1 User Handle Contents for details. The user handle MUST NOT be empty.
    
-      
    Note: the user handle ought not be a constant value across different user accounts,
-even for non-discoverable credentials, because some authenticators always create discoverable credentials.
-Thus a constant user handle would prevent a user from using such an authenticator
-with more than one user account at the Relying Party.
    
-     
    displayName,  of type DOMString
+decisions MUST be made on the basis of this id member,  not the displayName nor name members. See Section 6.1 of [RFC8266].
    
+      
    The user handle MUST NOT contain personally identifying information about the user, such as a username or e-mail address;
+see § 14.6.1 User Handle Contents for details. The user handle MUST NOT be empty.
    
+      
    Note: the user handle ought not be a constant value across different user accounts,
+even for non-discoverable credentials, because some authenticators always create discoverable credentials.
+Thus a constant user handle would prevent a user from using such an authenticator
+with more than one user account at the Relying Party.
    
+     
    displayName,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    A human-palatable name for the user account, intended only for display. For example, "Alex Müller" or "田中倫". The Relying Party SHOULD let the user choose this, and SHOULD NOT restrict the choice more than necessary.
    
+      
    A human-palatable name for the user account, intended only for
+display. The Relying Party SHOULD let the user choose this, and SHOULD NOT restrict the choice
+more than necessary. If no suitable or human-palatable name is
+available, the Relying Party SHOULD set this value to an empty string.
    
+      
    Examples of suitable values for this identifier include, "Alex Müller", "Alex Müller (ACME Co.)" or "田中倫".
    
       
-      
    When clients, client platforms, or authenticators display a displayName's value, they should always use UI elements to provide a clear boundary around the displayed value, and not allow overflow into other elements [css-overflow-3].
    
-      
    Authenticators MUST accept and store a 64-byte minimum length for a displayName member’s value. Authenticators MAY truncate a displayName member’s value so that it fits within 64 bytes. See § 6.4.1 String Truncation about truncation and other considerations.
    
+      
    When clients, client platforms, or authenticators display a displayName's value, they should always use UI elements to provide a clear boundary around the displayed value, and not allow overflow into other elements [css-overflow-3].
    
+      
    Authenticators MUST accept and store a 64-byte minimum length for a displayName member’s value. Authenticators MAY truncate a displayName member’s value so that it fits within 64 bytes. See § 6.4.1 String Truncation about truncation and other considerations.
    
     
    
    
    
    
    5.4.4. Authenticator Selection Criteria (dictionary AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria)
    
-   
    WebAuthn Relying Parties may use the AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria dictionary to specify their requirements regarding authenticator
+   
    WebAuthn Relying Parties may use the AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria dictionary to specify their requirements regarding authenticator
 attributes.
    
 
    dictionary AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria {
-    DOMString                    authenticatorAttachment;
-    DOMString                    residentKey;
-    boolean                      requireResidentKey = false;
-    DOMString                    userVerification = "preferred";
+    DOMString                    authenticatorAttachment;
+    DOMString                    residentKey;
+    boolean                      requireResidentKey = false;
+    DOMString                    userVerification = "preferred";
 };
 
    
    
    
     
    
-     
    authenticatorAttachment,  of type DOMString
+     
    authenticatorAttachment,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    If this member is present, eligible authenticators are filtered to be only those authenticators attached with the specified authenticator attachment modality (see also § 6.2.1 Authenticator Attachment Modality).
+      
    If this member is present, eligible authenticators are filtered to be only those authenticators attached with the specified authenticator attachment modality (see also § 6.2.1 Authenticator Attachment Modality).
 If this member is absent, then any attachment modality is acceptable.
-The value SHOULD be a member of AuthenticatorAttachment but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values,
+The value SHOULD be a member of AuthenticatorAttachment but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values,
 treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist.
    
-      
    See also the authenticatorAttachment member of PublicKeyCredential,
+      
    See also the authenticatorAttachment member of PublicKeyCredential,
 which can tell what authenticator attachment modality was used
-in a successful create() or get() operation.
    
-     
    residentKey,  of type DOMString
+in a successful create() or get() operation.
    
+     
    residentKey,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    Specifies the extent to which the Relying Party desires to create a client-side discoverable credential. For historical reasons the naming retains the deprecated “resident” terminology. The value SHOULD be a member of ResidentKeyRequirement but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist. If no value is given then the effective value is required if requireResidentKey is true or discouraged if it is false or absent.
    
+      
    Specifies the extent to which the Relying Party desires to create a client-side discoverable credential. For historical reasons the naming retains the deprecated “resident” terminology. The value SHOULD be a member of ResidentKeyRequirement but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist. If no value is given then the effective value is required if requireResidentKey is true or discouraged if it is false or absent.
    
       
    See ResidentKeyRequirement for the description of residentKey's values and semantics.
    
-     
    requireResidentKey,  of type boolean, defaulting to false
+     
    requireResidentKey,  of type boolean, defaulting to false
      
    
-      
    This member is retained for backwards compatibility with WebAuthn Level 1 and, for historical reasons, its naming retains the deprecated “resident” terminology for discoverable credentials. Relying Parties SHOULD set it to true if, and only if, residentKey is set to required.
    
-     
    userVerification,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "preferred"
+      
    This member is retained for backwards compatibility with WebAuthn Level 1 and, for historical reasons, its naming retains the deprecated “resident” terminology for discoverable credentials. Relying Parties SHOULD set it to true if, and only if, residentKey is set to required.
    
+     
    userVerification,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "preferred"
      
    
-      
    This member specifies the Relying Party's requirements regarding user verification for the create() operation.
-The value SHOULD be a member of UserVerificationRequirement but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist.
    
-      
    See UserVerificationRequirement for the description of userVerification's values and semantics.
    
+      
    This member specifies the Relying Party's requirements regarding user verification for the create() operation.
+The value SHOULD be a member of UserVerificationRequirement but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist.
    
+      
    See UserVerificationRequirement for the description of userVerification's values and semantics.
    
     
    
    
    
    
    5.4.5. Authenticator Attachment Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorAttachment)
    
-   
    This enumeration’s values describe authenticators' attachment modalities. Relying Parties use this to express a preferred authenticator attachment modality when calling navigator.credentials.create() to create a credential, and clients use this to report the authenticator attachment modality used to complete a registration or authentication ceremony.
    
+   
    This enumeration’s values describe authenticators' attachment modalities. Relying Parties use this to express a preferred authenticator attachment modality when calling navigator.credentials.create() to create a credential, and clients use this to report the authenticator attachment modality used to complete a registration or authentication ceremony.
    
 
    enum AuthenticatorAttachment {
     "platform",
     "cross-platform"
 };
 
    
-   
    Note: The AuthenticatorAttachment enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+   
    Note: The AuthenticatorAttachment enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
    
    
     
    
      
    platform
@@ -3495,10 +3961,10 @@ 
    This value indicates cross-platform attachment.
    
     
    
    
    
-   
    Note: An authenticator attachment modality selection option is available only in the [[Create]](origin, options,
-sameOriginWithAncestors) operation. The Relying Party may use it to, for example, ensure the user has a roaming credential for
+   
    Note: An authenticator attachment modality selection option is available only in the [[Create]](origin, options,
+sameOriginWithAncestors) operation. The Relying Party may use it to, for example, ensure the user has a roaming credential for
 authenticating on another client device; or to specifically register a platform credential for easier reauthentication using a
-particular client device. The [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) operation has no authenticator attachment modality selection option, so the Relying Party SHOULD accept any of the user’s registered credentials. The client and user will then use whichever is available and convenient at the time.
    
+particular client device. The [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) operation has no authenticator attachment modality selection option, so the Relying Party SHOULD accept any of the user’s registered credentials. The client and user will then use whichever is available and convenient at the time.
    
    
    5.4.6. Resident Key Requirement Enumeration (enum ResidentKeyRequirement)
    
 
    enum ResidentKeyRequirement {
     "discouraged",
@@ -3506,63 +3972,63 @@ 
    
     "required"
 };
 
    
-   
    Note: The ResidentKeyRequirement enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
-   
    This enumeration’s values describe the Relying Party's requirements for client-side discoverable credentials (formerly known as resident credentials or resident keys):
    
+   
    Note: The ResidentKeyRequirement enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+   
    This enumeration’s values describe the Relying Party's requirements for client-side discoverable credentials (formerly known as resident credentials or resident keys):
    
    
    
     
    
      
    discouraged
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party prefers creating a server-side credential, but will accept a client-side discoverable credential.
-The client and authenticator SHOULD create a server-side credential if possible.
    
-      
    Note: A Relying Party cannot require that a created credential is a server-side credential and the Credential Properties Extension may not return a value for the rk property. Because of this, it may be the case that it does not know if a credential is a server-side credential or not and thus does not know whether creating a second credential with the same user handle will evict the first.
    
+      
    The Relying Party prefers creating a server-side credential, but will accept a client-side discoverable credential.
+The client and authenticator SHOULD create a server-side credential if possible.
    
+      
    Note: A Relying Party cannot require that a created credential is a server-side credential and the Credential Properties Extension may not return a value for the rk property. Because of this, it may be the case that it does not know if a credential is a server-side credential or not and thus does not know whether creating a second credential with the same user handle will evict the first.
    
      
    preferred
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party strongly prefers creating a client-side discoverable credential, but will accept a server-side credential.
-The client and authenticator SHOULD create a discoverable credential if possible.
-For example, the client SHOULD guide the user through setting up user verification if needed to create a discoverable credential. This takes precedence over the setting of userVerification.
    
+      
    The Relying Party strongly prefers creating a client-side discoverable credential, but will accept a server-side credential.
+The client and authenticator SHOULD create a discoverable credential if possible.
+For example, the client SHOULD guide the user through setting up user verification if needed to create a discoverable credential. This takes precedence over the setting of userVerification.
    
      
    required
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party requires a client-side discoverable credential.
-The client MUST return an error if a client-side discoverable credential cannot be created.
    
+      
    The Relying Party requires a client-side discoverable credential.
+The client MUST return an error if a client-side discoverable credential cannot be created.
    
     
    
    
    
-   
    Note: The Relying Party can seek information on whether or not the authenticator created a client-side discoverable credential using the resident key credential property of the Credential Properties Extension.
-This is useful when values of discouraged or preferred are used for options.authenticatorSelection.residentKey, because in those cases it is possible for an authenticator to create either a client-side discoverable credential or a server-side credential.
    
+   
    Note: The Relying Party can seek information on whether or not the authenticator created a client-side discoverable credential using the resident key credential property of the Credential Properties Extension.
+This is useful when values of discouraged or preferred are used for options.authenticatorSelection.residentKey, because in those cases it is possible for an authenticator to create either a client-side discoverable credential or a server-side credential.
    
    
    5.4.7. Attestation Conveyance Preference Enumeration (enum AttestationConveyancePreference)
    
-   
    WebAuthn Relying Parties may use AttestationConveyancePreference to specify their preference regarding attestation conveyance during credential generation.
    
+   
    WebAuthn Relying Parties may use AttestationConveyancePreference to specify their preference regarding attestation conveyance during credential generation.
    
 
    enum AttestationConveyancePreference {
-    "none",
+    "none",
     "indirect",
     "direct",
-    "enterprise"
+    "enterprise"
 };
 
    
-   
    Note: The AttestationConveyancePreference enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+   
    Note: The AttestationConveyancePreference enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
    
    
     
    
      
    none
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party is not interested in authenticator attestation. For example, in order to
-potentially avoid having to obtain user consent to relay identifying information to the Relying Party, or to save a
+      
    The Relying Party is not interested in authenticator attestation. For example, in order to
+potentially avoid having to obtain user consent to relay identifying information to the Relying Party, or to save a
 roundtrip to an Attestation CA or Anonymization CA.
-If the authenticator generates an attestation statement that is not a self attestation,
-the client will replace it with a None attestation statement.
    
+If the authenticator generates an attestation statement that is not a self attestation,
+the client will replace it with a None attestation statement.
    
       
    This is the default, and unknown values fall back to the behavior of this value.
    
      
    indirect
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party wants to receive a verifiable attestation statement,
-but allows the client to decide how to obtain such an attestation statement.
-The client MAY replace an authenticator-generated attestation statement with one generated by an Anonymization CA,
-in order to protect the user’s privacy, or to assist Relying Parties with attestation verification in a heterogeneous ecosystem.
    
-      
    Note: There is no guarantee that the Relying Party will obtain a verifiable attestation statement in this case.
-For example, in the case that the authenticator employs self attestation and the client passes the attestation statement through unmodified.
    
+      
    The Relying Party wants to receive a verifiable attestation statement,
+but allows the client to decide how to obtain such an attestation statement.
+The client MAY replace an authenticator-generated attestation statement with one generated by an Anonymization CA,
+in order to protect the user’s privacy, or to assist Relying Parties with attestation verification in a heterogeneous ecosystem.
    
+      
    Note: There is no guarantee that the Relying Party will obtain a verifiable attestation statement in this case.
+For example, in the case that the authenticator employs self attestation and the client passes the attestation statement through unmodified.
    
      
    direct
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party wants to receive the attestation statement as generated by the authenticator.
    
+      
    The Relying Party wants to receive the attestation statement as generated by the authenticator.
    
      
    enterprise
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party wants to receive an attestation statement that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. User agents MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration permits it for the requested RP ID.
    
-      
    If permitted, the user agent SHOULD signal to the authenticator (at invocation time) that enterprise attestation is requested, and convey the resulting AAGUID and attestation statement, unaltered, to the Relying Party.
    
+      
    The Relying Party wants to receive an attestation statement that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. User agents MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration permits it for the requested RP ID.
    
+      
    If permitted, the user agent SHOULD signal to the authenticator (at invocation time) that enterprise attestation is requested, and convey the resulting AAGUID and attestation statement, unaltered, to the Relying Party.
    
     
    
    
    
    
    5.5. Options for Assertion Generation (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions)
    
@@ -3572,83 +4038,101 @@ 
    <
     required BufferSource                challenge;
     unsigned long                        timeout;
     USVString                            rpId;
-    sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor> allowCredentials = [];
-    DOMString                            userVerification = "preferred";
+    sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor> allowCredentials = [];
+    DOMString                            userVerification = "preferred";
+    sequence<DOMString>                  hints = [];
+    DOMString                            attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                  attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs extensions;
 };
 
    
    
    
     
    challenge,  of type BufferSource
     
    
-     
    This member specifies a challenge that the authenticator signs, along with other data, when producing an authentication assertion. See the § 13.4.3 Cryptographic Challenges security consideration.
    
+     
    This member specifies a challenge that the authenticator signs, along with other data, when producing an authentication assertion. See the § 13.4.3 Cryptographic Challenges security consideration.
    
     
    timeout,  of type unsigned long
     
    
-     
    This OPTIONAL member specifies a time, in milliseconds, that the Relying Party is willing to wait for the call to complete.
-The value is treated as a hint, and MAY be overridden by the client.
    
+     
    This OPTIONAL member specifies a time, in milliseconds, that the Relying Party is willing to wait for the call to complete.
+The value is treated as a hint, and MAY be overridden by the client.
    
     
    rpId,  of type USVString
     
    
-     
    This OPTIONAL member specifies the RP ID claimed by the Relying Party.
-The client MUST verify that the Relying Party's origin matches the scope of this RP ID.
-The authenticator MUST verify
-that this RP ID exactly equals the rpId of the credential to be used for the authentication ceremony.
    
+     
    This OPTIONAL member specifies the RP ID claimed by the Relying Party.
+The client MUST verify that the Relying Party's origin matches the scope of this RP ID.
+The authenticator MUST verify
+that this RP ID exactly equals the rpId of the credential to be used for the authentication ceremony.
    
      
    If not specified, its value will
-be the CredentialsContainer object’s relevant settings object's origin's effective domain.
    
+be the CredentialsContainer object’s relevant settings object's origin's effective domain.
    
     
    allowCredentials,  of type sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor>, defaulting to []
     
    
-     
    This OPTIONAL member is used by the client to find authenticators eligible for this authentication ceremony.
+     
    This OPTIONAL member is used by the client to find authenticators eligible for this authentication ceremony.
 It can be used in two ways:
    
      
      
    If not empty, the client MUST return an error if none of the listed credentials can be used.
    
      
    The list is ordered in descending order of preference: the first item in the list is the most
 preferred credential, and the last is the least preferred.
    
-    
    userVerification,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "preferred"
+    
    userVerification,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "preferred"
+    
    
+     
    This OPTIONAL member specifies the Relying Party's requirements regarding user verification for the get() operation. The value SHOULD be a member of UserVerificationRequirement but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist. Eligible authenticators are filtered to only those capable of satisfying this requirement.
    
+     
    See UserVerificationRequirement for the description of userVerification's values and semantics.
    
+    
    hints,  of type sequence<DOMString>, defaulting to []
+    
    
+     
    This OPTIONAL member contains zero or more elements from PublicKeyCredentialHints to guide the user agent in interacting with the user. Note that the elements have type DOMString despite being taken from that enumeration. See § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+    
    attestation,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "none"
+    
    
+     
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding attestation conveyance.
+Its value SHOULD be a member of AttestationConveyancePreference. Client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist.
    
+     
    The default value is none.
    
+    
    attestationFormats,  of type sequence<DOMString>, defaulting to []
     
    
-     
    This OPTIONAL member specifies the Relying Party's requirements regarding user verification for the get() operation. The value SHOULD be a member of UserVerificationRequirement but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist. Eligible authenticators are filtered to only those capable of satisfying this requirement.
    
-     
    See UserVerificationRequirement for the description of userVerification's values and semantics.
    
+     
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding the attestation statement format used by the authenticator.
+Values SHOULD be taken from the IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
+Values are ordered from most preferable to least preferable.
+This parameter is advisory and the authenticator MAY use an attestation statement not enumerated in this parameter.
    
+     
    The default value is the empty list, which indicates no preference.
    
     
    extensions,  of type AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs
     
    
-     
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to provide client extension inputs requesting additional processing by the client and authenticator.
    
+     
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to provide client extension inputs requesting additional processing by the client and authenticator.
    
      
    The extensions framework is defined in § 9 WebAuthn Extensions.
 Some extensions are defined in § 10 Defined Extensions;
-consult the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809] for an up-to-date list
+consult the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809] for an up-to-date list
 of registered WebAuthn Extensions.
    
    
    
    
    5.6. Abort Operations with AbortSignal
    
    
    Developers are encouraged to leverage the AbortController to manage the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) and [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) operations.
 See DOM § 3.3 Using AbortController and AbortSignal objects in APIs section for detailed instructions.
    
-   
    Note: DOM § 3.3 Using AbortController and AbortSignal objects in APIs section specifies that web platform APIs integrating with the AbortController must reject the promise immediately once the AbortSignal is aborted.
+   
    Note: DOM § 3.3 Using AbortController and AbortSignal objects in APIs section specifies that web platform APIs integrating with the AbortController must reject the promise immediately once the AbortSignal is aborted.
     Given the complex inheritance and parallelization structure of the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) and [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) methods, the algorithms for the two APIs fulfills this
-    requirement by checking the aborted property in three places. In the case of [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), the aborted property is checked first in Credential Management 1 § 2.5.4 Create a Credential immediately before calling [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors),
+    requirement by checking the aborted property in three places. In the case of [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), the aborted property is checked first in Credential Management 1 § 2.5.4 Create a Credential immediately before calling [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors),
     then in § 5.1.3 Create a New Credential - PublicKeyCredential’s [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) Method right before authenticator sessions start, and finally
     during authenticator sessions. The same goes for [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors).
    
-   
    The visibility and focus state of the Window object determines whether the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) and [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) operations
-should continue. When the Window object associated with the Document loses focus, [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) and [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) operations
+   
    The visibility and focus state of the Window object determines whether the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) and [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) operations
+should continue. When the Window object associated with the Document loses focus, [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) and [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) operations
 SHOULD be aborted.
    
    
     The WHATWG HTML WG is discussing whether to provide a hook when a browsing context gains or
     loses focuses. If a hook is provided, the above paragraph will be updated to include the hook.
     See WHATWG HTML WG Issue #2711 for more details.
    
    
    5.7. WebAuthn Extensions Inputs and Outputs
    
    
    The subsections below define the data types used for conveying WebAuthn extension inputs and outputs.
    
-   
    Note: Authenticator extension outputs are conveyed as a part of Authenticator data (see Table 1).
    
-   
    Note: The types defined below — AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs and AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs — are applicable to both registration extensions and authentication extensions. The "Authentication..." portion of their names should be regarded as meaning "WebAuthentication..."
    
+   
    Note: Authenticator extension outputs are conveyed as a part of authenticator data (see Table 1).
    
+   
    Note: The types defined below — AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs and AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs — are applicable to both registration extensions and authentication extensions. The "Authentication..." portion of their names should be regarded as meaning "WebAuthentication..."
    
    
    5.7.1. Authentication Extensions Client Inputs (dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs)
    
 
    dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs {
 };
@@ -3667,7 +4151,7 @@ 
    CDDL type AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorInputs defines a CBOR map
 containing the authenticator extension input values for zero or more WebAuthn Extensions.
 Extensions can add members as described in § 9.3 Extending Request Parameters.
    
-   
    This type is not exposed to the Relying Party, but is used by the client and authenticator.
    
+   
    This type is not exposed to the Relying Party, but is used by the client and authenticator.
    
    
    5.7.4. Authentication Extensions Authenticator Outputs (CDDL type AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorOutputs)
    
 
    AuthenticationExtensionsAuthenticatorOutputs = {
   * $$extensionOutput .within ( tstr => any )
@@ -3680,70 +4164,76 @@ 
    public key credential type uses certain data structures that are specified in supporting specifications. These are as
 follows.
    
    
    5.8.1. Client Data Used in WebAuthn Signatures (dictionary CollectedClientData)
    
-   
    The client data represents the contextual bindings of both the WebAuthn Relying Party and the client. It is a key-value
+   
    The client data represents the contextual bindings of both the WebAuthn Relying Party and the client. It is a key-value
 mapping whose keys are strings. Values can be any type that has a valid encoding in JSON. Its structure is defined by the
 following Web IDL.
    
-   
    Note: The CollectedClientData may be extended in the future. Therefore it’s critical when parsing to be tolerant of unknown keys and of any reordering of the keys. See also § 5.8.1.2 Limited Verification Algorithm.
    
+   
    Note: The CollectedClientData may be extended in the future. Therefore it’s critical when parsing to be tolerant of unknown keys and of any reordering of the keys. See also § 5.8.1.2 Limited Verification Algorithm.
    
 
    dictionary CollectedClientData {
-    required DOMString           type;
-    required DOMString           challenge;
-    required DOMString           origin;
-    boolean                      crossOrigin;
+    required DOMString           type;
+    required DOMString           challenge;
+    required DOMString           origin;
+    DOMString                    topOrigin;
+    boolean                      crossOrigin;
 };
 
 dictionary TokenBinding {
-    required DOMString status;
-    DOMString id;
+    required DOMString status;
+    DOMString id;
 };
 
 enum TokenBindingStatus { "present", "supported" };
 
    
    
    
     
    
-     
    type,  of type DOMString
+     
    type,  of type DOMString
      
    
       
    This member contains the string "webauthn.create" when creating new credentials, and "webauthn.get" when getting an
 assertion from an existing credential. The purpose of this member is to prevent certain types of signature confusion
 attacks (where an attacker substitutes one legitimate signature for another).
    
-     
    challenge,  of type DOMString
+     
    challenge,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    This member contains the base64url encoding of the challenge provided by the Relying Party. See the § 13.4.3 Cryptographic Challenges security consideration.
    
-     
    origin,  of type DOMString
+      
    This member contains the base64url encoding of the challenge provided by the Relying Party. See the § 13.4.3 Cryptographic Challenges security consideration.
    
+     
    origin,  of type DOMString
      
    
-      
    This member contains the fully qualified origin of the requester, as provided to the authenticator by the client, in
-the syntax defined by [RFC6454].
    
-     
    crossOrigin,  of type boolean
+      
    This member contains the fully qualified origin of the requester, as provided to the authenticator by the client, in
+the syntax defined by [RFC6454].
    
+     
    topOrigin,  of type DOMString
+     
    
+      
    This OPTIONAL member contains the fully qualified top-level origin of the requester, in the syntax defined
+by [RFC6454]. It is set only if the call was made from context that is not same-origin with its
+ancestors, i.e. if crossOrigin is true.
    
+     
    crossOrigin,  of type boolean
      
    
       
    This OPTIONAL member contains the inverse of the sameOriginWithAncestors argument value
-that was passed into the internal method.
    
+that was passed into the internal method.
    
      
    [RESERVED] tokenBinding
      
    
-      
    This OPTIONAL member contains information about the state of the Token Binding protocol [TokenBinding] used when communicating
-with the Relying Party. Its absence indicates that the client doesn’t support token binding
    
-      
    Note: While Token Binding was present in Level 1 and Level 2 of WebAuthn, its use is not expected in Level 3. The tokenBinding field is reserved so that it will not be reused for a different purpose.
    
+      
    This OPTIONAL member contains information about the state of the Token Binding protocol [TokenBinding] used when communicating
+with the Relying Party. Its absence indicates that the client doesn’t support token binding
    
+      
    Note: While Token Binding was present in Level 1 and Level 2 of WebAuthn, its use is not expected in Level 3. The tokenBinding field is reserved so that it will not be reused for a different purpose.
    
       
    
        
    
-        
    status,  of type DOMString
+        
    status,  of type DOMString
         
    
-         
    This member SHOULD be a member of TokenBindingStatus but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the tokenBinding member does not exist. When known, this member is one of the following:
    
+         
    This member SHOULD be a member of TokenBindingStatus but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the tokenBinding member does not exist. When known, this member is one of the following:
    
          
    
           
    
            
    supported
            
    
-            
    Indicates the client supports token binding, but it was not negotiated when communicating with the Relying Party.
    
+            
    Indicates the client supports token binding, but it was not negotiated when communicating with the Relying Party.
    
            
    present
            
    
-            
    Indicates token binding was used when communicating with the Relying Party. In this case, the id member MUST be present.
    
+            
    Indicates token binding was used when communicating with the Relying Party. In this case, the id member MUST be present.
    
           
    
          
    
-         
    Note: The TokenBindingStatus enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
-        
    id,  of type DOMString
+         
    Note: The TokenBindingStatus enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+        
    id,  of type DOMString
         
    
          
    This member MUST be present if status is present, and MUST be a base64url
-encoding of the Token Binding ID that was used when communicating with the Relying Party.
    
+encoding of the Token Binding ID that was used when communicating with the Relying Party.
    
        
    
       
    
-      
    Note: Obtaining a Token Binding ID is a client platform-specific operation.
    
+      
    Note: Obtaining a Token Binding ID is a client platform-specific operation.
    
     
    
     
    The CollectedClientData structure is used by the client to compute the following quantities:
    
     
    
@@ -3756,7 +4246,7 @@ 
    
    
    
    
    5.8.1.1. Serialization
    
-   
    The serialization of the CollectedClientData is a subset of the algorithm for JSON-serializing to bytes. I.e. it produces a valid JSON encoding of the CollectedClientData but also provides additional structure that may be exploited by verifiers to avoid integrating a full JSON parser. While verifiers are recommended to perform standard JSON parsing, they may use the more limited algorithm below in contexts where a full JSON parser is too large. This verification algorithm requires only base64url encoding, appending of bytestrings (which could be implemented by writing into a fixed template), and three conditional checks (assuming that inputs are known not to need escaping).
    
+   
    The serialization of the CollectedClientData is a subset of the algorithm for JSON-serializing to bytes. I.e. it produces a valid JSON encoding of the CollectedClientData but also provides additional structure that may be exploited by verifiers to avoid integrating a full JSON parser. While verifiers are recommended to perform standard JSON parsing, they may use the more limited algorithm below in contexts where a full JSON parser is too large. This verification algorithm requires only base64url encoding, appending of bytestrings (which could be implemented by writing into a fixed template), and simple conditional checks (assuming that inputs are known not to need escaping).
    
    
    The serialization algorithm works by appending successive byte strings to an, initially empty, partial result until the complete result is obtained.
    
    
      
     
    1. 
@@ -3776,7 +4266,7 @@ 
      ) to result.
      
     
    2. 
-     
      If crossOrigin is not present, or is false:
      
+     
      If crossOrigin is not present, or is false:
      
      
        
       
      1. 
        
        Append 0x66616c7365 (false) to result.
        
@@ -3788,7 +4278,15 @@ 
        CollectedClientData and remove the fields type, challenge, origin, and crossOrigin (if present).
        
+     
        If topOrigin is present:
        
+     
          
+      
        1. 
+       
          Append 0x2c22746f704f726967696e223a (,"topOrigin":) to result.
          
+      
        2. 
+       
          Append CCDToString(topOrigin) to result.
          
+     
        
+    
      2. 
+     
        Create a temporary copy of the CollectedClientData and remove the fields type, challenge, origin, crossOrigin (if present), and topOrigin (if present).
        
     
      3. 
      
        If no fields remain in the temporary copy then:
        
      
          
@@ -3861,17 +4359,17 @@ 
          ) to expected.
          
     
        1. 
-     
          Append CCDToString(type) to expected.
          
+     
          Append CCDToString(type) to expected.
          
     
        2. 
      
          Append 0x2c226368616c6c656e6765223a (,"challenge":) to expected.
          
     
        3. 
      
          Perform base64url encoding on challenge to produce a string, challengeBase64.
          
     
        4. 
-     
          Append CCDToString(challengeBase64) to expected.
          
+     
          Append CCDToString(challengeBase64) to expected.
          
     
        5. 
      
          Append 0x2c226f726967696e223a (,"origin":) to expected.
          
     
        6. 
-     
          Append CCDToString(origin) to expected.
          
+     
          Append CCDToString(origin) to expected.
          
     
        7. 
      
          Append 0x2c2263726f73734f726967696e223a (,"crossOrigin":) to expected.
          
     
        8. 
@@ -3905,14 +4403,14 @@ 
          5.8.1.3. Future development
          
-   
          In order to remain compatible with the limited verification algorithm, future versions of this specification must not remove any of the fields type, challenge, origin, or crossOrigin from CollectedClientData. They also must not change the serialization algorithm to change the order in which those fields are serialized.
          
-   
          If additional fields are added to CollectedClientData then verifiers that employ the limited verification algorithm will not be able to consider them until the two algorithms above are updated to include them. Once such an update occurs then the added fields inherit the same limitations as described in the previous paragraph. Such an algorithm update would have to accomodate serializations produced by previous versions. I.e. the verification algorithm would have to handle the fact that a fifth key–value pair may not appear fifth (or at all) if generated by a user agent working from a previous version.
          
+   
          In order to remain compatible with the limited verification algorithm, future versions of this specification must not remove any of the fields type, challenge, origin, crossOrigin, or topOrigin from CollectedClientData. They also must not change the serialization algorithm to change the order in which those fields are serialized, or insert new fields between them.
          
+   
          If additional fields are added to CollectedClientData then verifiers that employ the limited verification algorithm will not be able to consider them until the two algorithms above are updated to include them. Once such an update occurs then the added fields inherit the same limitations as described in the previous paragraph. Such an algorithm update would have to accomodate serializations produced by previous versions. I.e. the verification algorithm would have to handle the fact that a sixth key–value pair may not appear sixth (or at all) if generated by a user agent working from a previous version.
          
    
          5.8.2. Credential Type Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialType)
          
 
          enum PublicKeyCredentialType {
     "public-key"
 };
 
          
-   
          Note: The PublicKeyCredentialType enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
          
+   
          Note: The PublicKeyCredentialType enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
          
    
          
      This enumeration defines the valid credential types. It is an extension point; values can be added to it in the future, as
     more credential types are defined. The values of this enumeration are used for versioning the Authentication Assertion and
@@ -3921,34 +4419,35 @@ 
          
    
          5.8.3. Credential Descriptor (dictionary PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor)
          
 
          dictionary PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor {
-    required DOMString                    type;
+    required DOMString                    type;
     required BufferSource                 id;
-    sequence<DOMString>                   transports;
+    sequence<DOMString>                   transports;
 };
 
          
    
          This dictionary identifies a specific public key credential.
-It is used in create() to prevent creating duplicate credentials on the same authenticator,
-and in get() to determine if and how the credential can currently be reached by the client.
-It mirrors some fields of the PublicKeyCredential object returned by create() and get().
          
+It is used in create() to prevent creating duplicate credentials on the same authenticator,
+and in get() to determine if and how the credential can currently be reached by the client.
+It mirrors some fields of the PublicKeyCredential object returned by create() and get().
          
    
          
     
          
-     
          type,  of type DOMString
+     
          type,  of type DOMString
      
          
-      
          This member contains the type of the public key credential the caller is referring to. The value SHOULD be a member of PublicKeyCredentialType but client platforms MUST ignore any PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor with an unknown type.
          
-      
          This mirrors the type field of PublicKeyCredential.
          
+      
          This member contains the type of the public key credential the caller is referring to. The value SHOULD be a member of PublicKeyCredentialType but client platforms MUST ignore any PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor with an unknown type.
          
+      
          This mirrors the type field of PublicKeyCredential.
          
+      
          Note: If all PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor elements in allowCredentials are ignored then that MUST result in an error since an empty allowCredentials is semantically distinct.
          
      
          id,  of type BufferSource
      
          
       
          This member contains the credential ID of the public key credential the caller is referring to.
          
-      
          This mirrors the rawId field of PublicKeyCredential.
          
-     
          transports,  of type sequence<DOMString>
+      
          This mirrors the rawId field of PublicKeyCredential.
          
+     
          transports,  of type sequence<DOMString>
      
          
-      
          This OPTIONAL member contains a hint as to how the client might communicate with the managing authenticator of the public key credential the caller is referring to. The values SHOULD be members of AuthenticatorTransport but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values.
          
+      
          This OPTIONAL member contains a hint as to how the client might communicate with the managing authenticator of the public key credential the caller is referring to. The values SHOULD be members of AuthenticatorTransport but client platforms MUST ignore unknown values.
          
       
          This mirrors the response.getTransports() method
-of a PublicKeyCredential structure created by a create() operation.
+of a PublicKeyCredential structure created by a create() operation.
 When registering a new credential,
-the Relying Party SHOULD store the value returned from getTransports().
-When creating a PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor for that credential,
-the Relying Party SHOULD retrieve that stored value
+the Relying Party SHOULD store the value returned from getTransports().
+When creating a PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor for that credential,
+the Relying Party SHOULD retrieve that stored value
 and set it as the value of the transports member.
          
     
          
    
          
@@ -3957,41 +4456,45 @@ 
          "usb",
     "nfc",
     "ble",
-    "hybrid",
+    "smart-card",
+    "hybrid",
     "internal"
 };
 
    
-   
    Note: The AuthenticatorTransport enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+   
    Note: The AuthenticatorTransport enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
    
    
-     Authenticators may implement various transports for communicating with clients. This enumeration
+     Authenticators may implement various transports for communicating with clients. This enumeration
     defines hints as to how clients might communicate with a particular authenticator in order to obtain an assertion for a
-    specific credential. Note that these hints represent the WebAuthn Relying Party's best belief as to how an authenticator may be reached. A Relying Party will typically learn of the supported transports for a public key credential via getTransports(). 
+    specific credential. Note that these hints represent the WebAuthn Relying Party's best belief as to how an authenticator may be reached. A Relying Party will typically learn of the supported transports for a public key credential via getTransports(). 
     
    
      
    usb
      
    
-      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over removable USB.
    
+      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over removable USB.
    
      
    nfc
      
    
-      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over Near Field Communication (NFC).
    
+      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over Near Field Communication (NFC).
    
      
    ble
      
    
-      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over Bluetooth Smart (Bluetooth Low Energy / BLE).
    
+      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over Bluetooth Smart (Bluetooth Low Energy / BLE).
    
+     
    smart-card
+     
    
+      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over ISO/IEC 7816 smart card with contacts.
    
      
    hybrid
      
    
-      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted using a combination of (often separate) data-transport and proximity mechanisms. This supports, for example, authentication on a desktop computer using a smartphone.
    
+      
    Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted using a combination of (often separate) data-transport and proximity mechanisms. This supports, for example, authentication on a desktop computer using a smartphone.
    
      
    internal
      
    
-      
    Indicates the respective authenticator is contacted using a client device-specific transport,
+      
    Indicates the respective authenticator is contacted using a client device-specific transport,
 i.e., it is a platform authenticator.
 These authenticators are not removable from the client device.
    
     
    
    
    
-   
    5.8.5. Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier (typedef COSEAlgorithmIdentifier)
    
+   
    5.8.5. Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier (typedef COSEAlgorithmIdentifier)
    
 
    typedef long COSEAlgorithmIdentifier;
 
    
    
    
-     A COSEAlgorithmIdentifier's value is a number identifying a cryptographic algorithm.
-    The algorithm identifiers SHOULD be values registered in the IANA COSE Algorithms registry [IANA-COSE-ALGS-REG],
+     A COSEAlgorithmIdentifier's value is a number identifying a cryptographic algorithm.
+    The algorithm identifiers SHOULD be values registered in the IANA COSE Algorithms registry [IANA-COSE-ALGS-REG],
     for instance, -7 for "ES256" and -257 for "RS256". 
     
    The COSE algorithms registry leaves degrees of freedom to be specified by other parameters in a COSE key. In order to promote interoperability, this specification makes the following additional guarantees of credential public keys:
    
     
      
@@ -4004,78 +4507,88 @@ 
      
       
      Keys with algorithm EdDSA (-8) MUST specify Ed25519 (6) as the crv parameter. (These always use a compressed form in COSE.)
      
     
    
-    
    These restrictions align with the recommendation in Section 2.1 of [RFC9053].
    
+    
    These restrictions align with the recommendation in Section 2.1 of [RFC9053].
    
    
    
-   
    Note: There are many checks neccessary to correctly implement signature verification using these algorithms. One of these is that, when processing uncompressed elliptic-curve points, implementations should check that the point is actually on the curve. This check is highlighted because it’s judged to be at particular risk of falling through the gap between a cryptographic library and other code.
    
+   
    Note: There are many checks neccessary to correctly implement signature verification using these algorithms. One of these is that, when processing uncompressed elliptic-curve points, implementations should check that the point is actually on the curve. This check is highlighted because it’s judged to be at particular risk of falling through the gap between a cryptographic library and other code.
    
    
    5.8.6. User Verification Requirement Enumeration (enum UserVerificationRequirement)
    
 
    enum UserVerificationRequirement {
-    "required",
-    "preferred",
-    "discouraged"
+    "required",
+    "preferred",
+    "discouraged"
 };
 
    
-   
    A WebAuthn Relying Party may require user verification for some of its operations but not for others, and may use this type to express its
+   
    A WebAuthn Relying Party may require user verification for some of its operations but not for others, and may use this type to express its
 needs.
    
-   
    Note: The UserVerificationRequirement enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+   
    Note: The UserVerificationRequirement enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
    
    
     
    
      
    required
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party requires user verification for the operation and will fail the overall ceremony if the
-response does not have the UV flag set.
-The client MUST return an error if user verification cannot be performed.
    
+      
    The Relying Party requires user verification for the operation and will fail the overall ceremony if the
+response does not have the UV flag set.
+The client MUST return an error if user verification cannot be performed.
    
      
    preferred
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party prefers user verification for the operation if possible, but will not fail the
-operation if the response does not have the UV flag set.
    
+      
    The Relying Party prefers user verification for the operation if possible, but will not fail the
+operation if the response does not have the UV flag set.
    
      
    discouraged
      
    
-      
    The Relying Party does not want user verification employed during the operation (e.g., in the
+      
    The Relying Party does not want user verification employed during the operation (e.g., in the
 interest of minimizing disruption to the user interaction flow).
    
     
    
    
    
-   
    5.9. Permissions Policy integration
    
-   
    
-    
-    
    
-     
    Headers/Feature-Policy/publickey-credentials-get
    
-     
    In only one current engine.
    
-     
    
-      FirefoxNoneSafariNoneChrome84+
-      
    
-      OperaNoneEdge84+
-      
    
-      Edge (Legacy)?IENone
-      
    
-      Firefox for Android?iOS Safari?Chrome for Android?Android WebView?Samsung Internet?Opera MobileNone
-     
    
-    
    
-   
    
-   
    This specification defines one policy-controlled feature identified by
-the feature-identifier token "publickey-credentials-get".
-Its default allowlist is 'self'. [Permissions-Policy]
    
-   
    A Document's permissions policy determines whether any content in that document is allowed to successfully invoke the Web Authentication API, i.e., via navigator.credentials.get({publicKey:..., ...}).
-If disabled in any document, no content in the document will be allowed to use the foregoing methods: attempting to do so will return an error.
    
-   
    Note: Algorithms specified in [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] perform the actual permissions policy evaluation. This is because such policy evaluation needs to occur when there is access to the current settings object. The [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) internal method does not have such access since it is invoked in parallel by CredentialsContainer's Request a Credential abstract operation [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1].
    
-   
    5.10. Using Web Authentication within iframe elements
    
-   
    The Web Authentication API is disabled by default in cross-origin iframes.
-To override this default policy and indicate that a cross-origin iframe is allowed to invoke the Web Authentication API's [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) method, specify the allow attribute on the iframe element and include the publickey-credentials-get feature-identifier token in the allow attribute’s value.
    
-   
    Relying Parties utilizing the WebAuthn API in an embedded context should review § 13.4.2 Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage regarding UI redressing and its possible mitigations.
    
+   
    5.8.7. User-agent Hints Enumeration (enum PublicKeyCredentialHints)
    
+
    enum PublicKeyCredentialHints {
+    "security-key",
+    "client-device",
+    "hybrid",
+};
+
    
+   
    Note: The PublicKeyCredentialHints enumeration is deliberately not referenced, see § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.
    
+   
    
+     WebAuthn Relying Parties may use this enumeration to communicate hints to the user-agent about how a request may be best completed. These hints are not requirements, and do not bind the user-agent, but may guide it in providing the best experience by using contextual information that the Relying Party has about the request. Hints are provided in order of decreasing preference so, if two hints are contradictory, the first one controls. Hints may also overlap: if a more-specific hint is defined a Relying Party may still wish to send less specific ones for user-agents that may not recognise the more specific one. In this case the most specific hint should be sent before the less-specific ones. 
+    
    Hints MAY contradict information contained in credential transports and authenticatorAttachment. When this occurs, the hints take precedence. (Note that transports values are not provided when using discoverable credentials, leaving hints as the only avenue for expressing some aspects of such a request.)
    
+    
    
+     
    security-key
+     
    
+      
    Indicates that the Relying Party believes that users will satisfy this request with a physical security key. For example, an enterprise Relying Party may set this hint if they have issued security keys to their employees and will only accept those authenticators for registration and authentication.
    
+      
    For compatibility with older user agents, when this hint is used in PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, the authenticatorAttachment SHOULD be set to cross-platform.
    
+     
    client-device
+     
    
+      
    Indicates that the Relying Party believes that users will satisfy this request with a platform authenticator attached to the client device.
    
+      
    For compatibility with older user agents, when this hint is used in PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, the authenticatorAttachment SHOULD be set to platform.
    
+     
    hybrid
+     
    
+      
    Indicates that the Relying Party believes that users will satisfy this request with general-purpose authenticators such as smartphones. For example, a consumer Relying Party may believe that only a small fraction of their customers possesses dedicated security keys. This option also implies that the local platform authenticator should not be promoted in the UI.
    
+      
    For compatibility with older user agents, when this hint is used in PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, the authenticatorAttachment SHOULD be set to cross-platform.
    
+    
    
+   
    
+   
    5.9. Permissions Policy integration
    
+   
    This specification defines two policy-controlled features identified by
+the feature-identifier tokens "publickey-credentials-create"
+and "publickey-credentials-get".
+Their default allowlists are both 'self'. [Permissions-Policy]
    
+   
    A Document's permissions policy determines whether any content in that document is allowed to successfully invoke the Web Authentication API, i.e., via navigator.credentials.create({publicKey:..., ...}) or navigator.credentials.get({publicKey:..., ...}) If disabled in any document, no content in the document will be allowed to use the foregoing methods: attempting to do so will return an error.
    
+   
    Note: Algorithms specified in [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] perform the actual permissions policy evaluation. This is because such policy evaluation needs to occur when there is access to the current settings object. The [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) and [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) internal methods does not have such access since they are invoked in parallel by CredentialsContainer's Create a Credential and Request a Credential abstract operations [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1].
    
+   
    5.10. Using Web Authentication within iframe elements
    
+   
    The Web Authentication API is disabled by default in cross-origin iframes.
+To override this default policy and indicate that a cross-origin iframe is allowed to invoke the Web Authentication API's [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) method, specify the allow attribute on the iframe element and include the publickey-credentials-get feature-identifier token in the allow attribute’s value.
    
+   
    Relying Parties utilizing the WebAuthn API in an embedded context should review § 13.4.2 Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage regarding UI redressing and its possible mitigations.
    
    
    6. WebAuthn Authenticator Model
    
-   
    The Web Authentication API implies a specific abstract functional model for a WebAuthn Authenticator. This section
+   
    The Web Authentication API implies a specific abstract functional model for a WebAuthn Authenticator. This section
 describes that authenticator model.
    
-   
    Client platforms MAY implement and expose this abstract model in any way desired. However, the behavior of the client’s Web
-Authentication API implementation, when operating on the authenticators supported by that client platform, MUST be indistinguishable
+   
    Client platforms MAY implement and expose this abstract model in any way desired. However, the behavior of the client’s Web
+Authentication API implementation, when operating on the authenticators supported by that client platform, MUST be indistinguishable
 from the behavior specified in § 5 Web Authentication API.
    
-   
    Note: [FIDO-CTAP] is an example of a concrete instantiation of this model, but it is one in which there are differences in the data it returns and those expected by the WebAuthn API's algorithms. The CTAP2 response messages are CBOR maps constructed using integer keys rather than the string keys defined in this specification for the same objects. The client is expected to perform any needed transformations on such data. The [FIDO-CTAP] specification details the mapping between CTAP2 integer keys and WebAuthn string keys, in section §6.2. Responses.
    
+   
    Note: [FIDO-CTAP] is an example of a concrete instantiation of this model, but it is one in which there are differences in the data it returns and those expected by the WebAuthn API's algorithms. The CTAP2 response messages are CBOR maps constructed using integer keys rather than the string keys defined in this specification for the same objects. The client is expected to perform any needed transformations on such data. The [FIDO-CTAP] specification details the mapping between CTAP2 integer keys and WebAuthn string keys, in section §6.2. Responses.
    
    
    For authenticators, this model defines the logical operations that they MUST support, and the data formats that they expose to
-the client and the WebAuthn Relying Party. However, it does not define the details of how authenticators communicate with the client device,
-unless they are necessary for interoperability with Relying Parties. For instance, this abstract model does not define protocols for
+the client and the WebAuthn Relying Party. However, it does not define the details of how authenticators communicate with the client device,
+unless they are necessary for interoperability with Relying Parties. For instance, this abstract model does not define protocols for
 connecting authenticators to clients over transports such as USB or NFC. Similarly, this abstract model does not define specific
 error codes or methods of returning them; however, it does define error behavior in terms of the needs of the client. Therefore,
 specific error codes are mentioned as a means of showing which error conditions MUST be distinguishable (or not) from each other
 in order to enable a compliant and secure client implementation.
    
-   
    Relying Parties may influence authenticator selection, if they deem necessary, by stipulating various authenticator characteristics
+   
    Relying Parties may influence authenticator selection, if they deem necessary, by stipulating various authenticator characteristics
 when creating credentials and/or when generating assertions, through use of credential creation options or assertion generation options,
 respectively. The algorithms underlying the WebAuthn API marshal these options and pass them to the applicable authenticator operations defined below.
    
    
    In this abstract model, the authenticator provides key management and cryptographic signatures. It can be embedded in the
@@ -4083,29 +4596,30 @@ 
    
-   
    Each authenticator stores a credentials map, a map from (rpId, userHandle) to public key credential source.
    
-   
    Additionally, each authenticator has an AAGUID, which is a 128-bit identifier indicating the type (e.g. make and model) of the
-authenticator. The AAGUID MUST be chosen by the manufacturer to be identical across all substantially identical authenticators
-made by that manufacturer, and different (with high probability) from the AAGUIDs of all other types of authenticators.
-The AAGUID for a given type of authenticator SHOULD be randomly generated to ensure this. The Relying Party MAY use the AAGUID to infer certain
-properties of the authenticator, such as certification level and strength of key protection, using information from other sources.
    
+   
    Each authenticator stores a credentials map, a map from (rpId, userHandle) to public key credential source.
    
+   
    Additionally, each authenticator has an Authenticator Attestation Globally Unique Identifier or AAGUID, which is a 128-bit identifier
+indicating the type (e.g. make and model) of the authenticator. The AAGUID MUST be chosen by its maker to be identical across all substantially identical 
+authenticators made by that maker, and different (with high probability) from the AAGUIDs of all other types of authenticators. The AAGUID for a given type 
+of authenticator SHOULD be randomly generated to ensure this. The Relying Party MAY use the AAGUID to infer certain properties of the authenticator, such as 
+certification level and strength of key protection, using information from other sources. The Relying Party MAY use the AAGUID to attempt to identify the maker of 
+the authenticator without requesting and verifying attestation, but the AAGUID is not provably authentic without attestation.
    
    
    The primary function of the authenticator is to provide WebAuthn signatures, which are bound to various contextual data. These
 data are observed and added at different levels of the stack as a signature request passes from the server to the
 authenticator. In verifying a signature, the server checks these bindings against expected values. These contextual bindings
-are divided in two: Those added by the Relying Party or the client, referred to as client data; and those added by the authenticator,
-referred to as the authenticator data. The authenticator signs over the client data, but is otherwise not interested in
+are divided in two: Those added by the Relying Party or the client, referred to as client data; and those added by the authenticator,
+referred to as the authenticator data. The authenticator signs over the client data, but is otherwise not interested in
 its contents. To save bandwidth and processing requirements on the authenticator, the client hashes the client data and
-sends only the result to the authenticator. The authenticator signs over the combination of the hash of the serialized client data, and its own authenticator data.
    
+sends only the result to the authenticator. The authenticator signs over the combination of the hash of the serialized client data, and its own authenticator data.
    
    
    The goals of this design can be summarized as follows.
    
    
      
     
    • 
-     
      The scheme for generating signatures should accommodate cases where the link between the client device and authenticator
+     
      The scheme for generating signatures should accommodate cases where the link between the client device and authenticator
 is very limited, in bandwidth and/or latency. Examples include Bluetooth Low Energy and Near-Field Communication.
      
     
    • 
      
      The data processed by the authenticator should be small and easy to interpret in low-level code. In particular, authenticators
 should not have to parse high-level encodings such as JSON.
      
     
    • 
-     
      Both the client and the authenticator should have the flexibility to add contextual bindings as needed.
      
+     
      Both the client and the authenticator should have the flexibility to add contextual bindings as needed.
      
     
    • 
      
      The design aims to reuse as much as possible of existing encoding formats in order to aid adoption and implementation.
      
    
    
@@ -4113,29 +4627,29 @@ 
    
     
  • 
      
    An attestation signature is produced when a new public key credential is created via an authenticatorMakeCredential operation. An attestation signature provides cryptographic
-proof of certain properties of the authenticator and the credential. For instance, an attestation signature asserts the authenticator type (as denoted by its AAGUID) and the credential public key. The attestation
-signature is signed by an attestation private key, which is chosen depending on the type of attestation desired.
-For more details on attestation, see § 6.5 Attestation.
    
+proof of certain properties of the authenticator and the credential. For instance, an attestation signature asserts the authenticator type (as denoted by its AAGUID) and the credential public key. The attestation
+signature is signed by an attestation private key, which is chosen depending on the type of attestation desired.
+For more details on attestation, see § 6.5 Attestation.
    
     
  • 
      
    An assertion signature is produced when the authenticatorGetAssertion method is invoked. It represents an
-assertion by the authenticator that the user has consented to a specific transaction, such as logging
-in, or completing a purchase. Thus, an assertion signature asserts that the authenticator possessing a particular credential private key has established, to the best of its ability, that the user requesting this transaction is the
+assertion by the authenticator that the user has consented to a specific transaction, such as logging
+in, or completing a purchase. Thus, an assertion signature asserts that the authenticator possessing a particular credential private key has established, to the best of its ability, that the user requesting this transaction is the
 same user who consented to creating that particular public key credential. It also asserts additional
 information, termed client data, that may be useful to the caller, such as the means by which user consent was
-provided, and the prompt shown to the user by the authenticator. The assertion signature format is illustrated in Figure 4, below.
    
+provided, and the prompt shown to the user by the authenticator. The assertion signature format is illustrated in Figure 4, below.
    
    
    
    The term WebAuthn signature refers to both attestation signatures and assertion signatures.
 The formats of these signatures, as well as the procedures for generating them, are specified below.
    
    
    6.1. Authenticator Data
    
-   
    The authenticator data structure encodes contextual bindings made by the authenticator. These bindings are
-controlled by the authenticator itself, and derive their trust from the WebAuthn Relying Party's assessment of the security properties of the
+   
    The authenticator data structure encodes contextual bindings made by the authenticator. These bindings are
+controlled by the authenticator itself, and derive their trust from the WebAuthn Relying Party's assessment of the security properties of the
 authenticator. In one extreme case, the authenticator may be embedded in the client, and its bindings may be no more trustworthy
 than the client data. At the other extreme, the authenticator may be a discrete entity with high-security hardware and
-software, connected to the client over a secure channel. In both cases, the Relying Party receives the authenticator data in the same
+software, connected to the client over a secure channel. In both cases, the Relying Party receives the authenticator data in the same
 format, and uses its knowledge of the authenticator to make trust decisions.
    
-   
    The authenticator data has a compact but extensible encoding. This is desired since authenticators can be devices with
-limited capabilities and low power requirements, with much simpler software stacks than the client platform.
    
-   
    The authenticator data structure is a byte array of 37 bytes or more,
+   
    The authenticator data has a compact but extensible encoding. This is desired since authenticators can be devices with
+limited capabilities and low power requirements, with much simpler software stacks than the client platform.
    
+   
    The authenticator data structure is a byte array of 37 bytes or more,
 laid out as shown in Table .
    
    
    
     
@@ -4176,20 +4690,20 @@ 
    Bit 3: Backup Eligibility (BE).
    
           
          
  • 
           
    Bit 4: Backup State (BS).
    
           
          
  • 
-          
    Bits 5: Reserved for future use (RFU2).
    
+          
    Bit 5: Reserved for future use (RFU2).
    
          
  • 
           
    Bit 6: Attested credential data included (AT).
    
           
       
    • 
@@ -4210,62 +4724,62 @@ 
    
        
    attestedCredentialData
        variable (if present)
-        attested credential data (if present). See § 6.5.1 Attested Credential Data for details. Its length depends on
+        attested credential data (if present). See § 6.5.2 Attested Credential Data for details. Its length depends on
                 the length of the credential ID and credential public
                 key being attested. 
       
    
        extensions
        variable (if present)
-        Extension-defined authenticator data. This is a CBOR [RFC8949] map with extension identifiers as keys,
+        Extension-defined authenticator data. This is a CBOR [RFC8949] map with extension identifiers as keys,
                 and authenticator extension outputs as values. See § 9 WebAuthn Extensions for details. 
     
    
-    
     Authenticator data layout. The names in the Name column are only for reference within this document, and are not
-        present in the actual representation of the authenticator data. 
    
+    
     Authenticator data layout. The names in the Name column are only for reference within this document, and are not
+        present in the actual representation of the authenticator data. 
    
    
    
-   
    The RP ID is originally received from the client when the credential is created, and again when an assertion is generated.
+   
    The RP ID is originally received from the client when the credential is created, and again when an assertion is generated.
 However, it differs from other client data in some important ways. First, unlike the client data, the RP ID of a
 credential does not change between operations but instead remains the same for the lifetime of that credential. Secondly, it is
 validated by the authenticator during the authenticatorGetAssertion operation, by verifying that the RP ID that
-the requested credential is scoped to exactly matches the RP ID supplied by the client.
    
-   
    Authenticators perform the following steps to generate an authenticator data structure:
    
+the requested credential is scoped to exactly matches the RP ID supplied by the client.
    
+   
    Authenticators perform the following steps to generate an authenticator data structure:
    
    
-   
    Figure  shows a visual representation of the authenticator data structure.
    
+   
    Figure  shows a visual representation of the authenticator data structure.
    
    
    
       
-    
    Authenticator data layout.
    
+    
    Authenticator data layout.
    
    
    
    
    
-     Note: authenticator data describes its own length: If the AT and ED flags are not set, it is always 37 bytes long.
-    The attested credential data (which is only present if the AT flag is set) describes its own length. If the ED flag is set, then the total length is 37 bytes plus the length of the attested credential data (if the AT flag is set), plus the length of the extensions output (a CBOR map) that
+     Note: authenticator data describes its own length: If the AT and ED flags are not set, it is always 37 bytes long.
+    The attested credential data (which is only present if the AT flag is set) describes its own length. If the ED flag is set, then the total length is 37 bytes plus the length of the attested credential data (if the AT flag is set), plus the length of the extensions output (a CBOR map) that
     follows. 
-    
    Determining attested credential data's length, which is variable, involves determining credentialPublicKey’s beginning location given the preceding credentialId’s length, and then determining the credentialPublicKey’s length (see also Section 7 of [RFC9052]).
    
+    
    Determining attested credential data's length, which is variable, involves determining credentialPublicKey’s beginning location given the preceding credentialId’s length, and then determining the credentialPublicKey’s length (see also Section 7 of [RFC9052]).
    
    
    
    
    6.1.1. Signature Counter Considerations
    
    
    Authenticators SHOULD implement a signature counter feature. These counters are conceptually stored for each credential
-by the authenticator, or globally for the authenticator as a whole. The initial value of a credential’s signature counter is specified in the signCount value of the authenticator data returned by authenticatorMakeCredential. The signature counter is incremented for each successful authenticatorGetAssertion operation by some positive value, and subsequent values are returned to the WebAuthn Relying Party within the authenticator data again. The signature counter's purpose is to aid Relying Parties in detecting cloned authenticators. Clone
+by the authenticator, or globally for the authenticator as a whole. The initial value of a credential’s signature counter is specified in the signCount value of the authenticator data returned by authenticatorMakeCredential. The signature counter is incremented for each successful authenticatorGetAssertion operation by some positive value, and subsequent values are returned to the WebAuthn Relying Party within the authenticator data again. The signature counter's purpose is to aid Relying Parties in detecting cloned authenticators. Clone
 detection is more important for authenticators with limited protection measures.
    
-   
    Authenticators that do not implement a signature counter leave the signCount in the authenticator data constant at zero.
    
-   
    A Relying Party stores the signature counter of the most recent authenticatorGetAssertion operation. (Or the counter from the authenticatorMakeCredential operation if no authenticatorGetAssertion has ever been performed on a credential.) In subsequent authenticatorGetAssertion operations, the Relying Party compares the stored signature counter value with the new signCount value returned in the assertion’s authenticator data. If either is non-zero, and the new signCount value is less than or equal to the stored value, a cloned authenticator may exist, or the authenticator may be malfunctioning.
    
-   
    Detecting a signature counter mismatch does not indicate whether the current operation was performed by a cloned authenticator or the original authenticator. Relying Parties should address this situation appropriately relative to their individual situations, i.e., their risk tolerance.
    
+   
    Authenticators that do not implement a signature counter leave the signCount in the authenticator data constant at zero.
    
+   
    A Relying Party stores the signature counter of the most recent authenticatorGetAssertion operation. (Or the counter from the authenticatorMakeCredential operation if no authenticatorGetAssertion has ever been performed on a credential.) In subsequent authenticatorGetAssertion operations, the Relying Party compares the stored signature counter value with the new signCount value returned in the assertion’s authenticator data. If either is non-zero, and the new signCount value is less than or equal to the stored value, a cloned authenticator may exist, or the authenticator may be malfunctioning.
    
+   
    Detecting a signature counter mismatch does not indicate whether the current operation was performed by a cloned authenticator or the original authenticator. Relying Parties should address this situation appropriately relative to their individual situations, i.e., their risk tolerance.
    
    
    Authenticators:
    
    
    
    6.1.2. FIDO U2F Signature Format Compatibility
    
-   
    The format for assertion signatures, which sign over the concatenation of an authenticator data structure and the hash
-of the serialized client data, are compatible with the FIDO U2F authentication signature format (see Section 5.4 of [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats]).
    
-   
    This is because the first 37 bytes of the signed data in a FIDO U2F authentication response message constitute a valid authenticator data structure, and the remaining 32 bytes are the hash of the serialized client data. In this authenticator data structure, the rpIdHash is the FIDO U2F application parameter, all flags except UP are always zero, and the attestedCredentialData and extensions are never present. FIDO U2F authentication signatures can therefore be verified by
+   
    The format for assertion signatures, which sign over the concatenation of an authenticator data structure and the hash
+of the serialized client data, are compatible with the FIDO U2F authentication signature format (see Section 5.4 of [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats]).
    
+   
    This is because the first 37 bytes of the signed data in a FIDO U2F authentication response message constitute a valid authenticator data structure, and the remaining 32 bytes are the hash of the serialized client data. In this authenticator data structure, the rpIdHash is the FIDO U2F application parameter, all flags except UP are always zero, and the attestedCredentialData and extensions are never present. FIDO U2F authentication signatures can therefore be verified by
 the same procedure as other assertion signatures generated by the authenticatorGetAssertion operation.
    
    
    6.1.3. Credential Backup State
    
-   
    Credential backup eligibility and current backup state is conveyed by the BE and BS flags in the authenticator data, as
+   
    Credential backup eligibility and current backup state is conveyed by the BE and BS flags in the authenticator data, as
 defined in Table .
    
-   
    The value of the BE flag is set during authenticatorMakeCredential operation and MUST NOT change.
    
-   
    The value of the BS flag may change over time based on the current state of the public key credential source. Table  below defines
+   
    The value of the BE flag is set during authenticatorMakeCredential operation and MUST NOT change.
    
+   
    The value of the BS flag may change over time based on the current state of the public key credential source. Table  below defines
 valid combinations and their meaning.
    
    
    
     
@@ -4301,65 +4815,65 @@ 
    
        
    1
        0
-        The credential is a multi-device credential and is not currently backed up. 
+        The credential is a multi-device credential and is not currently backed up. 
       
    
        1
        1
-        The credential is a multi-device credential and is currently backed up. 
+        The credential is a multi-device credential and is currently backed up. 
     
    
-    
     BE and BS flag combinations 
    
+    
     BE and BS flag combinations 
    
    
    
-   
    It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Parties store the most recent value of these flags with the user account for future evaluation.
    
-   
    The following is a non-exhaustive list of how Relying Parties might use these flags:
    
+   
    It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Parties store the most recent value of these flags with the user account for future evaluation.
    
+   
    The following is a non-exhaustive list of how Relying Parties might use these flags:
    
    
    
    6.2. Authenticator Taxonomy
    
-   
    Many use cases are dependent on the capabilities of the authenticator used.
+   
    Many use cases are dependent on the capabilities of the authenticator used.
 This section defines some terminology for those capabilities, their most important combinations,
 and which use cases those combinations enable.
    
    
    For example:
    
    
-   
    The above examples illustrate the the primary authenticator type characteristics:
    
+   
    The above examples illustrate the primary authenticator type characteristics:
    
    
@@ -4394,109 +4908,110 @@ 
     cross-platform 
         Client-side storage 
         Multi-factor capable 
+      
+        Passkey platform authenticator 
+        platform (transport = internal) or cross-platform (transport = hybrid)
+        Client-side storage 
+        Multi-factor capable 
     
     
     Definitions of names for some authenticator types. 
    
    
    • 
-   
    A second-factor platform authenticator is convenient to use for re-authentication on the same client device,
+   
    A second-factor platform authenticator is convenient to use for re-authentication on the same client device,
 and can be used to add an extra layer of security both when initiating a new session and when resuming an existing session.
 A second-factor roaming authenticator is more likely to be used
-to authenticate on a particular client device for the first time,
-or on a client device shared between multiple users.
    
-   
    User-verifying platform authenticators and first-factor roaming authenticators enable passwordless multi-factor authentication.
+to authenticate on a particular client device for the first time,
+or on a client device shared between multiple users.
    
+   
    User-verifying platform authenticators and first-factor roaming authenticators enable passwordless multi-factor authentication.
 In addition to the proof of possession of the credential private key,
-these authenticators support user verification as a second authentication factor,
+these authenticators support user verification as a second authentication factor,
 typically a PIN or biometric recognition.
-The authenticator can thus act as two kinds of authentication factor,
-which enables multi-factor authentication while eliminating the need to share a password with the Relying Party.
    
-   
    The four combinations not named in Table  have less distinguished use cases:
    
+The authenticator can thus act as two kinds of authentication factor,
+which enables multi-factor authentication while eliminating the need to share a password with the Relying Party.
    
+   
    The combinations not named in Table  have less distinguished use cases:
    
    
-   
    The following subsections define the aspects authenticator attachment modality, credential storage modality and authentication factor capability in more depth.
    
+   
    The following subsections define the aspects authenticator attachment modality, credential storage modality and authentication factor capability in more depth.
    
    
    6.2.1. Authenticator Attachment Modality
    
-   
    Clients can communicate with authenticators using a variety of mechanisms. For example, a client MAY use a client device-specific API to communicate with an authenticator which is physically bound to a client device. On the other hand, a client can use a variety of standardized cross-platform transport protocols such as Bluetooth (see § 5.8.4 Authenticator Transport Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorTransport)) to discover
-and communicate with cross-platform attached authenticators. We refer to authenticators that
-are part of the client device as platform authenticators, while those that are reachable via cross-platform
+   
    Clients can communicate with authenticators using a variety of mechanisms. For example, a client MAY use a client device-specific API to communicate with an authenticator which is physically bound to a client device. On the other hand, a client can use a variety of standardized cross-platform transport protocols such as Bluetooth (see § 5.8.4 Authenticator Transport Enumeration (enum AuthenticatorTransport)) to discover
+and communicate with cross-platform attached authenticators. We refer to authenticators that
+are part of the client device as platform authenticators, while those that are reachable via cross-platform
 transport protocols are referred to as roaming authenticators.
    
    
-   
    Some platform authenticators could possibly also act as roaming authenticators depending on context. For example, a platform authenticator integrated into a mobile device could make itself available as a roaming authenticator via
+   
    Some platform authenticators could possibly also act as roaming authenticators depending on context. For example, a platform authenticator integrated into a mobile device could make itself available as a roaming authenticator via
 Bluetooth.
-In this case clients running on the mobile device would recognise the authenticator as a platform authenticator,
-while clients running on a different client device and communicating with the same authenticator via Bluetooth
-would recognize it as a roaming authenticator.
    
-   
    The primary use case for platform authenticators is to register a particular client device as a "trusted device",
-so the client device itself acts as a something you have authentication factor for future authentication.
+In this case clients running on the mobile device would recognise the authenticator as a platform authenticator,
+while clients running on a different client device and communicating with the same authenticator via Bluetooth
+would recognize it as a roaming authenticator.
    
+   
    The primary use case for platform authenticators is to register a particular client device as a "trusted device",
+so the client device itself acts as a something you have authentication factor for future authentication.
 This gives the user the convenience benefit
-of not needing a roaming authenticator for future authentication ceremonies, e.g., the user will not have to dig around in
+of not needing a roaming authenticator for future authentication ceremonies, e.g., the user will not have to dig around in
 their pocket for their key fob or phone.
    
-   
    Use cases for roaming authenticators include: authenticating on a new client device for the first time,
-on rarely used client devices, client devices shared between multiple users,
-or client devices that do not include a platform authenticator;
-and when policy or preference dictates that the authenticator be kept separate from the client devices it is used with.
-A roaming authenticator can also be used to hold
-backup credentials in case another authenticator is lost.
    
+   
    Use cases for roaming authenticators include: authenticating on a new client device for the first time,
+on rarely used client devices, client devices shared between multiple users,
+or client devices that do not include a platform authenticator;
+and when policy or preference dictates that the authenticator be kept separate from the client devices it is used with.
+A roaming authenticator can also be used to hold
+backup credentials in case another authenticator is lost.
    
    
    6.2.2. Credential Storage Modality
    
-   
    An authenticator can store a public key credential source in one of two ways:
    
+   
    An authenticator can store a public key credential source in one of two ways:
    
    
      
     
    1. 
-     
      In persistent storage embedded in the authenticator, client or client device, e.g., in a secure element.
+     
      In persistent storage embedded in the authenticator, client or client device, e.g., in a secure element.
 This is a technical requirement for a client-side discoverable public key credential source.
      
     
    2. 
-     
      By encrypting (i.e., wrapping) the credential private key such that only this authenticator can decrypt (i.e., unwrap) it and letting the resulting
-ciphertext be the credential ID for the public key credential source. The credential ID is stored by the Relying Party and returned to the authenticator via the allowCredentials option of get(), which allows the authenticator to decrypt and use the credential private key.
      
-     
      This enables the authenticator to have unlimited storage capacity for credential private keys, since the encrypted credential private keys are stored by the Relying Party instead of by the authenticator - but it means that a credential stored in this way must be retrieved from the Relying Party before the authenticator can use it.
      
+     
      By encrypting (i.e., wrapping) the credential private key such that only this authenticator can decrypt (i.e., unwrap) it and letting the resulting
+ciphertext be the credential ID for the public key credential source. The credential ID is stored by the Relying Party and returned to the authenticator via the allowCredentials option of get(), which allows the authenticator to decrypt and use the credential private key.
      
+     
      This enables the authenticator to have unlimited storage capacity for credential private keys, since the encrypted credential private keys are stored by the Relying Party instead of by the authenticator - but it means that a credential stored in this way must be retrieved from the Relying Party before the authenticator can use it.
      
    
    
-   
    Which of these storage strategies an authenticator supports defines the authenticator's credential storage
+   
    Which of these storage strategies an authenticator supports defines the authenticator's credential storage
 modality as follows:
    
    
-   
    Note that a discoverable credential capable authenticator MAY support both storage strategies. In this case, the authenticator MAY
-at its discretion use different storage strategies for different credentials, though subject to the residentKey or requireResidentKey options of create().
    
+   
    Note that a discoverable credential capable authenticator MAY support both storage strategies. In this case, the authenticator MAY
+at its discretion use different storage strategies for different credentials, though subject to the residentKey or requireResidentKey options of create().
    
    
    6.2.3. Authentication Factor Capability
    
-   
    There are three broad classes of authentication factors that can be used to prove an identity during an authentication
-ceremony: something you have, something you know and something you are. Examples include a physical key, a password,
+   
    There are three broad classes of authentication factors that can be used to prove an identity during an authentication
+ceremony: something you have, something you know and something you are. Examples include a physical key, a password,
 and a fingerprint, respectively.
    
-   
    All WebAuthn Authenticators belong to the something you have class, but an authenticator that supports user
-verification can also act as one or two additional kinds of authentication factor. For example, if the authenticator can
-verify a PIN, the PIN is something you know, and a biometric authenticator can verify something you are. Therefore, an authenticator that supports user verification is multi-factor capable. Conversely, an authenticator that is
-not multi-factor capable is single-factor capable. Note that a single multi-factor capable authenticator could support several modes of user verification, meaning it could act as all three kinds of authentication factor.
    
-   
    Although user verification is performed locally on the authenticator and not by the Relying Party, the authenticator indicates if user verification was performed by setting the UV flag in the signed response returned to the Relying Party.
-The Relying Party can therefore use the UV flag to verify that additional authentication factors were used in a registration or authentication ceremony. The authenticity of the UV flag can in turn be assessed by inspecting the authenticator's attestation statement.
    
+   
    All WebAuthn Authenticators belong to the something you have class, but an authenticator that supports user
+verification can also act as one or two additional kinds of authentication factor. For example, if the authenticator can
+verify a PIN, the PIN is something you know, and a biometric authenticator can verify something you are. Therefore, an authenticator that supports user verification is multi-factor capable. Conversely, an authenticator that is
+not multi-factor capable is single-factor capable. Note that a single multi-factor capable authenticator could support several modes of user verification, meaning it could act as all three kinds of authentication factor.
    
+   
    Although user verification is performed locally on the authenticator and not by the Relying Party, the authenticator indicates if user verification was performed by setting the UV flag in the signed response returned to the Relying Party.
+The Relying Party can therefore use the UV flag to verify that additional authentication factors were used in a registration or authentication ceremony. The authenticity of the UV flag can in turn be assessed by inspecting the authenticator's attestation statement.
    
    
    6.3. Authenticator Operations
    
    
    A WebAuthn Client MUST connect to an authenticator in order to invoke any of the operations of that authenticator. This connection
 defines an authenticator session. An authenticator must maintain isolation between sessions. It may do this by only allowing one
 session to exist at any particular time, or by providing more complicated session management.
    
    
    The following operations can be invoked by the client in an authenticator session.
    
    
    6.3.1. Lookup Credential Source by Credential ID Algorithm
    
-   
    The result of looking up a credential id credentialId in an authenticator authenticator is the result of the following algorithm:
    
+   
    The result of looking up a credential id credentialId in an authenticator authenticator is the result of the following algorithm:
    
    
      
     
    1. 
-     
      If authenticator can decrypt credentialId into a public key credential source credSource:
      
+     
      If authenticator can decrypt credentialId into a public key credential source credSource:
      
      
        
       
      1. 
        
        Set credSource.id to credentialId.
        
@@ -4504,7 +5019,7 @@ 
        For each public key credential source credSource of authenticator’s credentials map:
        
+     
        For each public key credential source credSource of authenticator’s credentials map:
        
      
          
       
        1. 
        
          If credSource.id is credentialId, return credSource.
          
@@ -4520,13 +5035,13 @@ 
          The hash of the serialized client data, provided by the client.
          
     
          rpEntity
     
          
-     
          The Relying Party's PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity.
          
+     
          The Relying Party's PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity.
          
     
          userEntity
     
          
-     
          The user account’s PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, containing the user handle given by the Relying Party.
          
+     
          The user account’s PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, containing the user handle given by the Relying Party.
          
     
          requireResidentKey
     
          
-     
          The effective resident key requirement for credential creation, a Boolean value determined by the client.
          
+     
          The effective resident key requirement for credential creation, a Boolean value determined by the client.
          
     
          requireUserPresence
     
          
      
          The constant Boolean value true.
@@ -4534,27 +5049,30 @@ 
          test of user presence optional although WebAuthn does not.
          
     
          requireUserVerification
     
          
-     
          The effective user verification requirement for credential creation, a Boolean value determined by the client.
          
+     
          The effective user verification requirement for credential creation, a Boolean value determined by the client.
          
     
          credTypesAndPubKeyAlgs
     
          
-     
          A sequence of pairs of PublicKeyCredentialType and public key algorithms (COSEAlgorithmIdentifier) requested by the Relying Party. This sequence is ordered from most preferred to least preferred. The authenticator makes a best-effort to create the most
+     
          A sequence of pairs of PublicKeyCredentialType and public key algorithms (COSEAlgorithmIdentifier) requested by the Relying Party. This sequence is ordered from most preferred to least preferred. The authenticator makes a best-effort to create the most
 preferred credential that it can.
          
     
          excludeCredentialDescriptorList
     
          
-     
          An OPTIONAL list of PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor objects provided by the Relying Party with the intention that, if any of
+     
          An OPTIONAL list of PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor objects provided by the Relying Party with the intention that, if any of
 these are known to the authenticator, it SHOULD NOT create a new credential. excludeCredentialDescriptorList contains a
 list of known credentials.
          
     
          enterpriseAttestationPossible
     
          
      
          A Boolean value that indicates that individually-identifying attestation MAY be returned by the authenticator.
          
+    
          attestationFormats
+    
          
+     
          A sequence of strings that expresses the Relying Party's preference for attestation statement formats, from most to least preferable. If the authenticator returns attestation, then it makes a best-effort attempt to use the most preferable format that it supports.
          
     
          extensions
     
          
-     
          A CBOR map from extension identifiers to their authenticator extension inputs, created by the client based on
-the extensions requested by the Relying Party, if any.
          
+     
          A CBOR map from extension identifiers to their authenticator extension inputs, created by the client based on
+the extensions requested by the Relying Party, if any.
          
    
-   
          Note: Before performing this operation, all other operations in progress in the authenticator session MUST be aborted by
+   
          Note: Before performing this operation, all other operations in progress in the authenticator session MUST be aborted by
 running the authenticatorCancel operation.
          
-   
          When this operation is invoked, the authenticator MUST perform the following procedure:
          
+   
          When this operation is invoked, the authenticator MUST perform the following procedure:
          
    
            
     
          1. 
      
            Check if all the supplied parameters are syntactically well-formed and of the correct length. If not, return an error code
@@ -4577,29 +5095,29 @@ 
            return an error code equivalent to "InvalidStateError" and terminate the operation.
            
         
            does not consent to create a new credential
         
            
-         
            return an error code equivalent to "NotAllowedError" and terminate the operation.
            
+         
            return an error code equivalent to "NotAllowedError" and terminate the operation.
            
        
-       
            Note: The purpose of this authorization gesture is not to proceed with creating a credential,
-but for privacy reasons to authorize disclosure of the fact that descriptor.id is bound to this authenticator.
-If the user consents, the client and Relying Party can detect this and guide the user to use a different authenticator.
+       
            Note: The purpose of this authorization gesture is not to proceed with creating a credential,
+but for privacy reasons to authorize disclosure of the fact that descriptor.id is bound to this authenticator.
+If the user consents, the client and Relying Party can detect this and guide the user to use a different authenticator.
 If the user does not consent,
-the authenticator does not reveal that descriptor.id is bound to it,
+the authenticator does not reveal that descriptor.id is bound to it,
 and responds as if the user simply declined consent to create a credential.
            
      
          
     
        2. 
      
          If requireResidentKey is true and the authenticator cannot store a client-side discoverable public key credential source,
 return an error code equivalent to "ConstraintError" and terminate the operation.
          
     
        3. 
-     
          If requireUserVerification is true and the authenticator cannot perform user verification, return an error code
+     
          If requireUserVerification is true and the authenticator cannot perform user verification, return an error code
 equivalent to "ConstraintError" and terminate the operation.
          
     
        4. 
      
          Once the authorization gesture has been completed and user consent has been obtained, generate a new credential object:
          
      
            
@@ -4609,7 +5127,7 @@ 
            
        
            Let userHandle be userEntity.id.
            
       
          1. 
-       
            Let credentialSource be a new public key credential source with the fields:
            
+       
            Let credentialSource be a new public key credential source with the fields:
            
        
            
         
            type
         
            
@@ -4654,14 +5172,14 @@ 
            Let processedExtensions be the result of authenticator extension processing for each supported extension
 identifier → authenticator extension input in extensions.
            
     
          2. 
-     
            If the authenticator:
            
+     
            If the authenticator:
            
      
            
       
            is a U2F device
       
            
-       
            let the signature counter value for the new credential be zero. (U2F devices may support signature counters but do not return a counter when making a credential. See [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats].)
            
+       
            let the signature counter value for the new credential be zero. (U2F devices may support signature counters but do not return a counter when making a credential. See [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats].)
            
       
            supports a global signature counter
       
            
-       
            Use the global signature counter's actual value when generating authenticator data.
            
+       
            Use the global signature counter's actual value when generating authenticator data.
            
       
            supports a per credential signature counter
       
            
        
            allocate the counter, associate it with the new credential, and initialize the counter value as zero.
            
@@ -4671,13 +5189,15 @@ 
            
     
          3. 
      
            Let attestedCredentialData be the attested credential data byte array including the credentialId and publicKey.
            
+    
          4. 
+     
            Let attestationFormat be the first supported attestation statement format identifier from attestationFormats, taking into account enterpriseAttestationPossible.
+If attestationFormats contains no supported value, then let attestationFormat be the attestation statement format identifier most preferred by this authenticator.
            
     
          5. 
      
            Let authenticatorData be the byte array specified in § 6.1 Authenticator Data, including attestedCredentialData as the attestedCredentialData and processedExtensions, if any, as the extensions.
            
     
          6. 
-     
            Create an attestation object for the new credential using the procedure specified in § 6.5.4 Generating an Attestation Object, using an authenticator-chosen attestation statement format, authenticatorData,
-and hash, as well as taking into account the value of enterpriseAttestationPossible. For more details on attestation, see § 6.5 Attestation.
            
+     
            Create an attestation object for the new credential using the procedure specified in § 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object, the attestation statement format attestationFormat, and the values authenticatorData and hash, as well as taking into account the value of enterpriseAttestationPossible. For more details on attestation, see § 6.5 Attestation.
            
    
          
-   
          On successful completion of this operation, the authenticator returns the attestation object to the client.
          
+   
          On successful completion of this operation, the authenticator returns the attestation object to the client.
          
    
          6.3.3. The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation
          
    
          It takes the following input parameters:
          
    
          
@@ -4689,7 +5209,7 @@ 
          The hash of the serialized client data, provided by the client.
          
     
          allowCredentialDescriptorList
     
          
-     
          An OPTIONAL list of PublicKeyCredentialDescriptors describing credentials acceptable to the Relying Party (possibly filtered
+     
          An OPTIONAL list of PublicKeyCredentialDescriptors describing credentials acceptable to the Relying Party (possibly filtered
 by the client), if any.
          
     
          requireUserPresence
     
          
@@ -4699,19 +5219,25 @@ 
          requireUserVerification
     
          
      
          The effective user verification requirement for assertion, a Boolean value provided by the client.
          
+    
          enterpriseAttestationPossible
+    
          
+     
          A Boolean value that indicates that individually-identifying attestation MAY be returned by the authenticator.
          
+    
          attestationFormats
+    
          
+     
          A sequence of strings that expresses the Relying Party's preference for attestation statement formats, from most to least preferable. If the authenticator returns attestation, then it makes a best-effort attempt to use the most preferable format that it supports.
          
     
          extensions
     
          
      
          A CBOR map from extension identifiers to their authenticator extension inputs, created by the client based on
-the extensions requested by the Relying Party, if any.
          
+the extensions requested by the Relying Party, if any.
          
    
          
-   
          Note: Before performing this operation, all other operations in progress in the authenticator session MUST be aborted by running the authenticatorCancel operation.
          
-   
          When this method is invoked, the authenticator MUST perform the following procedure:
          
+   
          Note: Before performing this operation, all other operations in progress in the authenticator session MUST be aborted by running the authenticatorCancel operation.
          
+   
          When this method is invoked, the authenticator MUST perform the following procedure:
          
    
            
     
          1. 
      
            Check if all the supplied parameters are syntactically well-formed and of the correct length. If not, return an error code
 equivalent to "UnknownError" and terminate the operation.
            
     
          2. 
-     
            Let credentialOptions be a new empty set of public key credential sources.
            
+     
            Let credentialOptions be a new empty set of public key credential sources.
            
     
          3. 
      
            If allowCredentialDescriptorList was supplied, then for each descriptor of allowCredentialDescriptorList:
            
      
              
@@ -4727,39 +5253,50 @@ 
              
      
              Remove any items from credentialOptions whose rpId is not equal to rpId.
              
     
            1. 
-     
              If credentialOptions is now empty, return an error code equivalent to "NotAllowedError" and terminate the operation.
              
-    
            2. 
-     
              Prompt the user to select a public key credential source selectedCredential from credentialOptions.
-Collect an authorization gesture confirming user consent for using selectedCredential.
-The prompt for the authorization gesture may be shown
-by the authenticator if it has its own output capability, or by the user agent otherwise.
              
-     
              If requireUserVerification is true, the authorization gesture MUST include user verification.
              
+     
              If credentialOptions is now empty, return an error code equivalent to "NotAllowedError" and terminate the operation.
              
+    
            3. 
+      Prompt the user to select a public key credential source selectedCredential from credentialOptions.
+    Collect an authorization gesture confirming user consent for using selectedCredential.
+    The prompt for the authorization gesture may be shown
+    by the authenticator if it has its own output capability, or by the user agent otherwise. 
+     
              If requireUserVerification is true, the authorization gesture MUST include user verification.
              
      
              If requireUserPresence is true, the authorization gesture MUST include a test of user presence.
              
      
              If the user does not consent, return an error code equivalent to
-"NotAllowedError" and terminate the operation.
              
+    "NotAllowedError" and terminate the operation.
              
     
            4. 
      
              Let processedExtensions be the result of authenticator extension processing for each supported extension
 identifier → authenticator extension input in extensions.
              
     
            5. 
      
              Increment the credential associated signature counter or the global signature counter value, depending on
-which approach is implemented by the authenticator, by some positive value.
-If the authenticator does not implement a signature counter, let the signature counter value remain constant at
+which approach is implemented by the authenticator, by some positive value.
+If the authenticator does not implement a signature counter, let the signature counter value remain constant at
 zero.
              
+    
            6. 
+     
              If attestationFormats:
              
+     
              
+      
              is not empty
+      
              
+       
              let attestationFormat be the first supported attestation statement format from attestationFormats, taking into account enterpriseAttestationPossible. If none are supported, fallthrough to:
              
+      
              is empty
+      
              
+       
              let attestationFormat be the attestation statement format most preferred by this authenticator. If it does not support attestation during assertion then let this be none.
              
+     
              
     
            7. 
      
              Let authenticatorData be the byte array specified in § 6.1 Authenticator Data including processedExtensions, if any, as
-the extensions and excluding attestedCredentialData.
              
+the extensions and excluding attestedCredentialData. This authenticatorData MUST include attested credential data if, and only if, attestationFormat is not none.
              
     
            8. 
      
              Let signature be the assertion signature of the concatenation authenticatorData || hash using the privateKey of selectedCredential as shown in Figure , below. A simple,
 undelimited
-concatenation is safe to use here because the authenticator data describes its own length. The hash of the serialized
+concatenation is safe to use here because the authenticator data describes its own length. The hash of the serialized
 client data (which potentially has a variable length) is always the last element.
              
      
              
         
       
              Generating an assertion signature.
              
      
              
     
            9. 
-     
              If any error occurred while generating the assertion signature, return an error code equivalent to "UnknownError" and
-terminate the operation.
              
+     
              The attestationFormat is not none then create an attestation object for the new credential using the procedure specified in § 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object, the attestation statement format attestationFormat, and the values authenticatorData and hash, as well as taking into account the value of enterpriseAttestationPossible. For more details on attestation, see § 6.5 Attestation.
              
+    
            10. 
+     
              If any error occurred then return an error code equivalent to "UnknownError" and terminate the operation.
              
     
            11. 
       Return to the user agent: 
      
                
@@ -4767,18 +5304,20 @@ 
                selectedCredential.id, if either a list of credentials
 (i.e., allowCredentialDescriptorList) of length 2 or greater was
 supplied by the client, or no such list was supplied.
                
-       
                Note: If, within allowCredentialDescriptorList, the client supplied exactly one credential and it was successfully employed, then its credential ID is not returned since the client already knows it. This saves transmitting these bytes over
+       
                Note: If, within allowCredentialDescriptorList, the client supplied exactly one credential and it was successfully employed, then its credential ID is not returned since the client already knows it. This saves transmitting these bytes over
         what may be a constrained connection in what is likely a common case.
                
       
              • 
        
                authenticatorData
                
       
              • 
        
                signature
                
+      
              • 
+       
                The attestation object, if an attestation object was created for this assertion.
                
       
              • 
        
                selectedCredential.userHandle
                
-       
                Note: the returned userHandle value may be null, see: userHandleResult.
                
+       
                Note: In cases where allowCredentialDescriptorList was supplied the returned userHandle value may be null, see: userHandleResult.
                
      
              
    
            
-   
            If the authenticator cannot find any credential corresponding to the specified Relying Party that
+   
            If the authenticator cannot find any credential corresponding to the specified Relying Party that
 matches the specified criteria, it terminates the operation and returns an error.
            
    
            6.3.4. The authenticatorCancel Operation
            
    
            This operation takes no input parameters and returns no result.
            
@@ -4792,9 +5331,9 @@ 
            
     
            rpId
     
            
-     
            The caller’s RP ID, as determined by the client.
            
+     
            The caller’s RP ID, as determined by the client.
            
    
-   
            When this operation is invoked, the authenticator MUST perform the following procedure:
            
+   
            When this operation is invoked, the authenticator MUST perform the following procedure:
            
    
              
     
            1. 
      
              Let collectedDiscoverableCredentialMetadata be a new list whose items are DiscoverableCredentialMetadata structs with the following items:
              
@@ -4810,18 +5349,18 @@ 
              A Relying Party Identifier.
              
       
              userHandle
       
              
-       
              A user handle.
              
+       
              A user handle.
              
       
              otherUI
       
              
-       
              Other information used by the authenticator to inform its UI.
              
+       
              Other information used by the authenticator to inform its UI.
              
      
     
            2. 
-     
              For each public key credential source credSource of authenticator’s credentials map:
              
+     
              For each public key credential source credSource of authenticator’s credentials map:
              
      
                
       
              1. 
-       
                If credSource is not a client-side discoverable credential, continue.
                
+       
                If credSource is not a client-side discoverable credential, continue.
                
       
              2. 
-       
                If credSource.rpId is not rpId, continue.
                
+       
                If credSource.rpId is not rpId, continue.
                
       
              3. 
        
                Let discoveredCredentialMetadata be a new DiscoverableCredentialMetadata struct whose items are copies of credSource’s type, id, rpId, userHandle and otherUI.
                
       
              4. 
@@ -4831,17 +5370,17 @@ 
                Return collectedDiscoverableCredentialMetadata.
                
    
              
    
              6.4. String Handling
              
-   
              Authenticators may be required to store arbitrary strings chosen by a Relying Party, for example the name and displayName in a PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity. This section discusses some practical consequences of handling arbitrary strings that may be presented to humans.
              
+   
              Authenticators may be required to store arbitrary strings chosen by a Relying Party, for example the name and displayName in a PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity. This section discusses some practical consequences of handling arbitrary strings that may be presented to humans.
              
    
              6.4.1. String Truncation
              
-   
              Each arbitrary string in the API will have some accommodation for the potentially limited resources available to an authenticator. If string value truncation is the chosen accommodation then authenticators MAY truncate in order to make the string fit within a length equal or greater than the specified minimum supported length. Such truncation SHOULD also respect UTF-8 sequence boundaries or grapheme cluster boundaries [UTR29]. This defines the maximum truncation permitted and authenticators MUST NOT truncate further.
              
-   
              For example, in figure  the string is 65 bytes long. If truncating to 64 bytes then the final 0x88 byte must be removed purely because of space reasons. Since that leaves a partial UTF-8 sequence the remainder of that sequence may also be removed. Since that leaves a partial grapheme cluster an authenticator may remove the remainder of that cluster.
              
+   
              Each arbitrary string in the API will have some accommodation for the potentially limited resources available to an authenticator. If string value truncation is the chosen accommodation then authenticators MAY truncate in order to make the string fit within a length equal or greater than the specified minimum supported length. Such truncation SHOULD also respect UTF-8 sequence boundaries or grapheme cluster boundaries [UAX29]. This defines the maximum truncation permitted and authenticators MUST NOT truncate further.
              
+   
              For example, in figure  the string is 65 bytes long. If truncating to 64 bytes then the final 0x88 byte must be removed purely because of space reasons. Since that leaves a partial UTF-8 sequence the remainder of that sequence may also be removed. Since that leaves a partial grapheme cluster an authenticator may remove the remainder of that cluster.
              
    
              
       
     
              The end of a UTF-8 encoded string showing the positions of different truncation boundaries.
              
    
              
-   
              Conforming User Agents are responsible for ensuring that the authenticator behavior observed by Relying Parties conforms to this specification with respect to string handling. For example, if an authenticator is known to behave incorrectly when asked to store large strings, the user agent SHOULD perform the truncation for it in order to maintain the model from the point of view of the Relying Party. User-agents that do this SHOULD truncate at grapheme cluster boundaries.
              
-   
              Truncation based on UTF-8 sequences alone may cause a grapheme cluster to be truncated. This could make the grapheme cluster render as a different glyph, potentially changing the meaning of the string, instead of removing the glyph entirely.
              
-   
              In addition to that, truncating on byte boundaries alone causes a known issue that user agents should be aware of: if the authenticator is using [FIDO-CTAP] then future messages from the authenticator may contain invalid CBOR since the value is typed as a CBOR string and thus is required to be valid UTF-8. User agents are tasked with handling this to avoid burdening authenticators with understanding character encodings and Unicode character properties. Thus, when dealing with authenticators, user agents SHOULD:
              
+   
              Conforming User Agents are responsible for ensuring that the authenticator behavior observed by Relying Parties conforms to this specification with respect to string handling. For example, if an authenticator is known to behave incorrectly when asked to store large strings, the user agent SHOULD perform the truncation for it in order to maintain the model from the point of view of the Relying Party. User-agents that do this SHOULD truncate at grapheme cluster boundaries.
              
+   
              Truncation based on UTF-8 sequences alone may cause a grapheme cluster to be truncated. This could make the grapheme cluster render as a different glyph, potentially changing the meaning of the string, instead of removing the glyph entirely.
              
+   
              In addition to that, truncating on byte boundaries alone causes a known issue that user agents should be aware of: if the authenticator is using [FIDO-CTAP] then future messages from the authenticator may contain invalid CBOR since the value is typed as a CBOR string and thus is required to be valid UTF-8. User agents are tasked with handling this to avoid burdening authenticators with understanding character encodings and Unicode character properties. Thus, when dealing with authenticators, user agents SHOULD:
              
    
                
     
              1. 
      
                Ensure that any strings sent to authenticators are validly encoded.
                
@@ -4849,7 +5388,7 @@ 
                Handle the case where strings have been truncated resulting in an invalid encoding. For example, any partial code point at the end may be dropped or replaced with U+FFFD.
                
    
              
    
              6.4.2. Language and Direction Encoding
              
-   
              In order to be correctly displayed in context, the language and base direction of a string may be required. Strings in this API may have to be written to fixed-function authenticators and then later read back and displayed on a different platform. Thus language and direction metadata is encoded in the string itself to ensure that it is transported atomically.
              
+   
              In order to be correctly displayed in context, the language and base direction of a string may be required. Strings in this API may have to be written to fixed-function authenticators and then later read back and displayed on a different platform. Thus language and direction metadata is encoded in the string itself to ensure that it is transported atomically.
              
    
              To encode language and direction metadata in a string that is documented as permitting it, suffix its code points with two sequences of code points:
              
    
              The first encodes a language tag with the code point U+E0001 followed by the ASCII values of the language tag each shifted up by U+E0000. For example, the language tag “en-US” becomes the code points U+E0001, U+E0065, U+E006E, U+E002D, U+E0055, U+E0053.
              
    
              The second consists of a single code point which is either U+200E (“LEFT-TO-RIGHT MARK”), U+200F (“RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK”), or U+E007F (“CANCEL TAG”). The first two can be used to indicate directionality but SHOULD only be used when neccessary to produce the correct result. (E.g. an RTL string that starts with LTR-strong characters.) The value U+E007F is a direction-agnostic indication of the end of the language tag.
              
@@ -4862,60 +5401,70 @@ 
              
    
              Consumers of strings that may have language and direction encoded should be aware that truncation could truncate a language tag into a different, but still valid, language. The final directionality marker or CANCEL TAG code point provide an unambigous indication of truncation.
              
    
              6.5. Attestation
              
-   
              Authenticators SHOULD also provide some form of attestation, if possible.
-If an authenticator does, the basic requirement is that the authenticator can
-produce, for each credential public key, an attestation statement verifiable by the WebAuthn Relying Party. Typically, this attestation statement contains a signature by an attestation private key over the attested credential public key and
+   
              Authenticators SHOULD also provide some form of attestation, if possible.
+If an authenticator does, the basic requirement is that the authenticator can
+produce, for each credential public key, an attestation statement verifiable by the WebAuthn Relying Party. Typically, this attestation statement contains a signature by an attestation private key over the attested credential public key and
 a challenge, as well as a certificate or similar data providing provenance information for the attestation public key,
-enabling the Relying Party to make a trust decision. However, if an attestation key pair is not available, then the authenticator
+enabling the Relying Party to make a trust decision. However, if an attestation key pair is not available, then the authenticator
 MAY either perform self attestation of the credential public key with the corresponding credential private key,
-or otherwise perform no attestation. All this
-information is returned by authenticators any time a new public key credential is generated, in the overall form of an attestation object. The relationship of the attestation object with authenticator data (containing attested credential data) and the attestation statement is illustrated in figure , below.
              
-   
              If an authenticator employs self attestation or no attestation, then no provenance information is provided
-for the Relying Party to base a trust decision on.
-In these cases, the authenticator provides no guarantees about its operation to the Relying Party.
              
+or otherwise perform no attestation.
              
+   
              All this information is returned by authenticators any time a new public key credential is generated, and optionally when exercised, in the overall form of an attestation object. The relationship of the attestation object with authenticator data (containing attested credential data) and the attestation statement is illustrated in figure , below.
              
+   
              If an authenticator employs self attestation or no attestation, then no provenance information is provided
+for the Relying Party to base a trust decision on.
+In these cases, the authenticator provides no guarantees about its operation to the Relying Party.
              
    
              
       
-    
              Attestation object layout illustrating the included authenticator data (containing attested credential
-    data) and the attestation statement.
              
+    
              Attestation object layout illustrating the included authenticator data from a create() operation (containing attested credential
+    data) and the attestation statement.
              
    
              
-   
               This figure illustrates only the packed attestation statement format. Several additional attestation statement
+   
               This figure illustrates only the packed attestation statement format. Several additional attestation statement
   formats are defined in § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats. 
              
-   
              An important component of the attestation object is the attestation statement. This is a specific type of signed
-data object, containing statements about a public key credential itself and the authenticator that created it. It
+   
              An important component of the attestation object is the attestation statement. This is a specific type of signed
+data object, containing statements about a public key credential itself and the authenticator that created it. It
 contains an attestation signature created using the key of the attesting authority (except for the case of self
-attestation, when it is created using the credential private key). In order to correctly interpret an attestation
-statement, a Relying Party needs to understand these two aspects of attestation:
              
+attestation, when it is created using the credential private key). In order to correctly interpret an attestation
+statement, a Relying Party needs to understand these two aspects of attestation:
              
    
                
     
              1. 
      
                The attestation statement format is the manner in which the signature is represented and the various contextual
-bindings are incorporated into the attestation statement by the authenticator. In other words, this defines the
-syntax of the statement. Various existing components and OS platforms (such as TPMs and the Android OS) have previously defined attestation statement formats. This specification supports a variety of such formats in an extensible way, as defined in § 6.5.2 Attestation Statement Formats. The formats themselves are identified by strings, as described in § 8.1 Attestation Statement Format Identifiers.
                
+bindings are incorporated into the attestation statement by the authenticator. In other words, this defines the
+syntax of the statement. Various existing components and OS platforms (such as TPMs and the Android OS) have previously defined attestation statement formats. This specification supports a variety of such formats in an extensible way, as defined in § 6.5.3 Attestation Statement Formats. The formats themselves are identified by strings, as described in § 8.1 Attestation Statement Format Identifiers.
                
     
              2. 
-     
                The attestation type defines the semantics of attestation statements and their underlying trust models.
-Specifically, it defines how a Relying Party establishes trust in a particular attestation statement, after verifying that it
-is cryptographically valid. This specification supports a number of attestation types, as described in § 6.5.3 Attestation Types.
                
+     
                The attestation type defines the semantics of attestation statements and their underlying trust models.
+Specifically, it defines how a Relying Party establishes trust in a particular attestation statement, after verifying that it
+is cryptographically valid. This specification supports a number of attestation types, as described in § 6.5.4 Attestation Types.
                
    
              
-   
              In general, there is no simple mapping between attestation statement formats and attestation types. For example, the
-"packed" attestation statement format defined in § 8.2 Packed Attestation Statement Format can be used in conjunction with all attestation
+   
              In general, there is no simple mapping between attestation statement formats and attestation types. For example, the
+"packed" attestation statement format defined in § 8.2 Packed Attestation Statement Format can be used in conjunction with all attestation
 types, while other formats and types have more limited applicability.
              
-   
              The privacy, security and operational characteristics of attestation depend on:
              
+   
              The privacy, security and operational characteristics of attestation depend on:
              
    
-   
              The attestation type and attestation statement format is chosen by the authenticator; Relying Parties can only signal limited attestation conveyance preferences during registration.
-It is expected that most authenticators will support a small number of attestation types and attestation statement
-formats, while Relying Parties will decide what attestation types are acceptable to them by policy. Relying Parties will also need to
-understand the characteristics of the authenticators that they trust, based on information they have about these authenticators. For example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService] provides one way to access such information.
              
-   
              6.5.1. Attested Credential Data
              
-   
              Attested credential data is a variable-length byte array added to the authenticator data when generating an attestation
-object for a given credential. Its format is shown in Table .
              
+   
              The attestation type and attestation statement format is chosen by the authenticator; Relying Parties can only signal their preferences by setting the attestation and attestationFormats parameters, or those with the same names in PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.
              
+   
              It is expected that most authenticators will support a small number of attestation types and attestation statement
+formats, while Relying Parties will decide what attestation types are acceptable to them by policy. Relying Parties will also need to
+understand the characteristics of the authenticators that they trust, based on information they have about these authenticators. For example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService] provides one way to access such information.
              
+   
              6.5.1. Attestation in assertions
              
+   
              Attestation is most commonly provided during credential creation. However, if supported by the authenticator and requested by the Relying Party using the attestation parameter, attestation MAY be provided in assertions.
              
+   
              Attestations in assertions could be helpful in at least the following situations:
              
+   
                
+    
              1. 
+     
                For multi-device credentials, the generating authenticator may have returned a meaningfully different attestation than the authenticator currently exercising the credential. Thus returning an attestation for each use of the credential allows the Relying Party to observe these changes.
                
+    
              2. 
+     
                If the attestation statement format involves a 3rd-party attesting to the state of the authenticator, then returning an attestation with each use of the credential allows for the continued good health of the authenticator to be attested.
                
+   
              
+   
              Attestation objects provided in an AuthenticatorAttestationResponse structure (i.e. as the result of a create() operation) contain at least the three keys shown in the previous figure: fmt, attStmt, and authData. The authData key is not included when an attestation object is provided in an AuthenticatorAssertionResponse (i.e. as the result of a get() operation). That is because the authenticator data is provided directly in the authenticatorData member of the AuthenticatorAssertionResponse. Otherwise, processing of the attestation object is identical.
              
+   
              6.5.2. Attested Credential Data
              
+   
              Attested credential data is a variable-length byte array added to the authenticator data when generating an attestation
+object for a credential. Its format is shown in Table .
              
    
              
     
@@ -4926,7 +5475,7 @@ 
              aaguid
        
              
      
              16
-       The AAGUID of the authenticator.
+       The AAGUID of the authenticator.
       
              
        credentialIdLength
        2
@@ -4939,25 +5488,26 @@ 
              credentialPublicKey
        
              		variable
         The credential public key encoded in COSE_Key format,
-                as defined in Section 7 of [RFC9052], using the CTAP2 canonical CBOR encoding form.
+                as defined in Section 7 of [RFC9052], using the CTAP2 canonical CBOR encoding form.
                 The COSE_Key-encoded credential public key MUST contain the "alg" parameter and MUST NOT
-                contain any other OPTIONAL parameters. The "alg" parameter MUST contain a COSEAlgorithmIdentifier value.
+                contain any other OPTIONAL parameters. The "alg" parameter MUST contain a COSEAlgorithmIdentifier value.
                 The encoded credential public key MUST also contain any additional REQUIRED parameters stipulated by the
                 relevant key type specification, i.e., REQUIRED for the key type "kty" and algorithm "alg"
-                (see Section 2 of [RFC9053]). 
+                (see Section 2 of [RFC9053]). 
     
              
-    
               Attested credential data layout. The names in the Name column are only for reference within this document, and are not
-        present in the actual representation of the attested credential data. 
              
+    
               Attested credential data layout. The names in the Name column are only for reference within this document, and are not
+        present in the actual representation of the attested credential data. 
              
    
              
-   
              6.5.1.1. Examples of credentialPublicKey Values Encoded in COSE_Key Format
              
+   
              Attested credential data is always present in any authenticator data that results from a create() operation. It MUST be present in an authenticator data resulting from a get() operation if, and only if, the attestationObject attribute is present in the assertion result.
              
+   
              6.5.2.1. Examples of credentialPublicKey Values Encoded in COSE_Key Format
              
    
              This section provides examples of COSE_Key-encoded Elliptic Curve and RSA public keys for the ES256, PS256, and RS256
-signature algorithms. These examples adhere to the rules defined above for the credentialPublicKey value, and are presented in CDDL [RFC8610] for clarity.
              
-   
              Section 7 of [RFC9052] defines the general framework for all COSE_Key-encoded keys.
-Specific key types for specific algorithms are defined in [RFC9053] as well as in other specifications,
+signature algorithms. These examples adhere to the rules defined above for the credentialPublicKey value, and are presented in CDDL [RFC8610] for clarity.
              
+   
              Section 7 of [RFC9052] defines the general framework for all COSE_Key-encoded keys.
+Specific key types for specific algorithms are defined in [RFC9053] as well as in other specifications,
 as noted below.
              
-   
              Below is an example of a COSE_Key-encoded Elliptic Curve public key in EC2 format (see Section 7.1 of [RFC9053]),
+   
              Below is an example of a COSE_Key-encoded Elliptic Curve public key in EC2 format (see Section 7.1 of [RFC9053]),
 on the P-256 curve, to be used with the ES256 signature
-algorithm (ECDSA w/ SHA-256, see Section 2.1 of [RFC9053]):
              
+algorithm (ECDSA w/ SHA-256, see Section 2.1 of [RFC9053]):
              
 
              {
   1:   2,  ; kty: EC2 key type
   3:  -7,  ; alg: ES256 signature algorithm
@@ -4969,7 +5519,7 @@ 
              CTAP2 canonical CBOR encoding form, whitespace and line breaks
-are included here for clarity and to match the CDDL [RFC8610] presentation above:
              
+are included here for clarity and to match the CDDL [RFC8610] presentation above:
              
 
              A5
    01  02
 
@@ -4981,9 +5531,9 @@ 
              [RFC8230] Section 4,
+   
              Below is an example of a COSE_Key-encoded 2048-bit RSA public key (see [RFC8230] Section 4,
 to be used with the PS256 signature algorithm
-(RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256, see Section 2 of [RFC8230]:
              
+(RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256, see Section 2 of [RFC8230]:
              
 
              {
   1:   3,  ; kty: RSA key type
   3: -37,  ; alg: PS256
@@ -5004,29 +5554,29 @@ 
              6.5.2. Attestation Statement Formats
              
-   
              As described above, an attestation statement format is a data format which represents a cryptographic signature by an authenticator over a set of contextual bindings. Each attestation statement format MUST be defined using the following
+   
              6.5.3. Attestation Statement Formats
              
+   
              As described above, an attestation statement format is a data format which represents a cryptographic signature by an authenticator over a set of contextual bindings. Each attestation statement format MUST be defined using the following
 template:
              
    
    
-   
              The initial list of specified attestation statement formats is in § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats.
              
-   
              6.5.3. Attestation Types
              
-   
              WebAuthn supports several attestation types, defining the semantics of attestation statements and their underlying trust
+   
              The initial list of specified attestation statement formats is in § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats.
              
+   
              6.5.4. Attestation Types
              
+   
              WebAuthn supports several attestation types, defining the semantics of attestation statements and their underlying trust
 models:
              
-   
              Note: This specification does not define any data structures explicitly expressing the attestation types employed by authenticators. Relying Parties engaging in attestation statement verification — i.e., when
-calling navigator.credentials.create() they select an attestation conveyance other than none and verify the received attestation statement — will determine the employed attestation type as a part of verification. See the "Verification procedure" subsections of § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats. See also § 14.4.1 Attestation Privacy. For all attestation types defined in this
-section other than Self and None, Relying Party verification is followed by
-matching the trust path to an acceptable root certificate per step 20 of § 7.1 Registering a New Credential.
-Differentiating these attestation types becomes useful primarily as a means for determining if the attestation is acceptable
-under Relying Party policy.
              
+   
              Note: This specification does not define any data structures explicitly expressing the attestation types employed by authenticators. Relying Parties engaging in attestation statement verification — i.e., when
+calling navigator.credentials.create() they select an attestation conveyance other than none and verify the received attestation statement — will determine the employed attestation type as a part of verification. See the "Verification procedure" subsections of § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats. See also § 14.4.1 Attestation Privacy. For all attestation types defined in this
+section other than Self and None, Relying Party verification is followed by
+matching the trust path to an acceptable root certificate per step 23 of § 7.1 Registering a New Credential.
+Differentiating these attestation types becomes useful primarily as a means for determining if the attestation is acceptable
+under Relying Party policy.
              
    
              
     
              Basic Attestation (Basic)
     
              
-     
              In the case of basic attestation [UAFProtocol], the authenticator’s attestation key pair is specific to an
+     
              In the case of basic attestation [UAFProtocol], the authenticator’s attestation key pair is specific to an
 authenticator "model", i.e., a "batch" of authenticators.  Thus, authenticators of the same, or similar, model often share the same attestation key pair. See § 14.4.1 Attestation Privacy for further information.
              
      
              Basic attestation is also referred to as batch attestation.
              
     
              Self Attestation (Self)
     
              
-     
              In the case of self attestation, also known as surrogate basic attestation [UAFProtocol], the Authenticator does not have
+     
              In the case of self attestation, also known as surrogate basic attestation [UAFProtocol], the Authenticator does not have
 any specific attestation key pair. Instead it uses the credential private key to create the attestation signature.
 Authenticators without meaningful protection measures for an attestation private key typically use this attestation type.
              
     
              Attestation CA (AttCA)
     
              
-     
              In this case, an authenticator is based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and holds an authenticator-specific
-"endorsement key" (EK). This key is used to securely communicate with a trusted third party, the Attestation CA [TCG-CMCProfile-AIKCertEnroll] (formerly known as a "Privacy CA"). The authenticator can generate multiple
+     
              In this case, an authenticator is based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and holds an authenticator-specific
+"endorsement key" (EK). This key is used to securely communicate with a trusted third party, the Attestation CA [TCG-CMCProfile-AIKCertEnroll] (formerly known as a "Privacy CA"). The authenticator can generate multiple
 attestation identity key pairs (AIK) and requests an Attestation CA to issue an AIK certificate
-for each. Using this approach, such an authenticator can limit the exposure of the EK (which is a global correlation
-handle) to Attestation CA(s). AIKs can be requested for each authenticator-generated public key credential individually, and conveyed to Relying Parties as attestation certificates.
              
-     
              Note: This concept typically leads to multiple attestation certificates. The attestation certificate requested most recently
+for each. Using this approach, such an authenticator can limit the exposure of the EK (which is a global correlation
+handle) to Attestation CA(s). AIKs can be requested for each authenticator-generated public key credential individually, and conveyed to Relying Parties as attestation certificates.
              
+     
              Note: This concept typically leads to multiple attestation certificates. The attestation certificate requested most recently
     is called "active".
              
     
              Anonymization CA (AnonCA)
     
              
-     
              In this case, the authenticator uses an Anonymization CA which dynamically generates per-credential attestation certificates such that the attestation statements presented to Relying Parties do not provide uniquely identifiable information, e.g., that might be used for tracking purposes.
              
-     
              Note: Attestation statements conveying attestations of type AttCA or AnonCA use the same data structure
+     
              In this case, the authenticator uses an Anonymization CA which dynamically generates per-credential attestation certificates such that the attestation statements presented to Relying Parties do not provide uniquely identifiable information, e.g., that might be used for tracking purposes.
              
+     
              Note: Attestation statements conveying attestations of type AttCA or AnonCA use the same data structure
     as those of type Basic, so the three attestation types
     are, in general, distinguishable only with externally provided knowledge regarding the contents of the attestation
-    certificates conveyed in the attestation statement.
              
+    certificates conveyed in the attestation statement.
              
     
              No attestation statement (None)
     
              
      
              In this case, no attestation information is available. See also § 8.7 None Attestation Statement Format.
              
    
              
-   
              6.5.4. Generating an Attestation Object
              
-   
              To generate an attestation object (see: Figure 6) given:
              
+   
              6.5.5. Generating an Attestation Object
              
+   
              To generate an attestation object (see: Figure 6) given:
              
    
              
     
              attestationFormat
     
              
-     
              An attestation statement format.
              
+     
              An attestation statement format.
              
     
              authData
     
              
-     
              A byte array containing authenticator data.
              
+     
              A byte array containing authenticator data.
              
     
              hash
     
              
      
              The hash of the serialized client data.
              
    
              
-   
              the authenticator MUST:
              
+   
              the authenticator MUST:
              
    
                
     
              1. 
      
                Let attStmt be the result of running attestationFormat’s signing procedure given authData and hash.
                
     
              2. 
-     
                Let fmt be attestationFormat’s attestation statement format identifier
                
+     
                Let fmt be attestationFormat’s attestation statement format identifier
                
     
              3. 
-     
                Return the attestation object as a CBOR map with the following syntax, filled in with variables initialized by this
+     
                Return the attestation object as a CBOR map with the following syntax, filled in with variables initialized by this
 algorithm:
                
 
                attObj = {
             authData: bytes,
@@ -5116,10 +5666,10 @@ 
                6.5.5. Signature Formats for Packed Attestation, FIDO U2F Attestation, and Assertion Signatures
                
+   
                6.5.6. Signature Formats for Packed Attestation, FIDO U2F Attestation, and Assertion Signatures
                
    
                  
     
                • 
-     
                  For COSEAlgorithmIdentifier -7 (ES256),  and other ECDSA-based algorithms, the sig value MUST be encoded as an ASN.1 DER Ecdsa-Sig-Value, as defined in [RFC3279] section 2.2.3.
                  
+     
                  For COSEAlgorithmIdentifier -7 (ES256),  and other ECDSA-based algorithms, the sig value MUST be encoded as an ASN.1 DER Ecdsa-Sig-Value, as defined in [RFC3279] section 2.2.3.
                  
 
                  Example:
 30 44                                ; SEQUENCE (68 Bytes)
     02 20                            ; INTEGER (32 Bytes)
@@ -5129,123 +5679,137 @@ 
                  Note: As CTAP1/U2F authenticators are already producing signatures values in this format, CTAP2 authenticators will also produce signatures values in the same format, for consistency reasons.
                  
+     
                  Note: As CTAP1/U2F authenticators are already producing signatures values in this format, CTAP2 authenticators will also produce signatures values in the same format, for consistency reasons.
                  
    
                
    
                It is RECOMMENDED that any new attestation formats defined not use ASN.1 encodings,
     but instead represent signatures as equivalent fixed-length byte arrays without internal structure,
-    using the same representations as used by COSE signatures as defined in [RFC9053] and [RFC8230].
                
+    using the same representations as used by COSE signatures as defined in [RFC9053] and [RFC8230].
                
    
                The below signature format definitions satisfy this requirement and serve as examples for deriving the same for other signature algorithms not explicitly mentioned here:
                
    
                  
     
                • 
      
                  For COSEAlgorithmIdentifier -257 (RS256), sig MUST contain the signature generated using the
-RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme defined in section 8.2.1 in [RFC8017] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
+RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme defined in section 8.2.1 in [RFC8017] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
 The signature is not ASN.1 wrapped.
                  
     
                • 
      
                  For COSEAlgorithmIdentifier -37 (PS256), sig MUST contain the signature generated using the
-RSASSA-PSS signature scheme defined in section 8.1.1 in [RFC8017] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
+RSASSA-PSS signature scheme defined in section 8.1.1 in [RFC8017] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
 The signature is not ASN.1 wrapped.
                  
    
                
-   
                7. WebAuthn Relying Party Operations
                
-   
                A registration or authentication ceremony begins with the WebAuthn Relying Party creating a PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions or PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions object, respectively, which encodes the parameters for the ceremony. The Relying Party SHOULD take care to not leak sensitive information during this stage; see § 14.6.2 Username Enumeration for details.
                
-   
                Upon successful execution of create() or get(), the Relying Party's script receives
-a PublicKeyCredential containing an AuthenticatorAttestationResponse or AuthenticatorAssertionResponse structure,
-respectively, from the client. It must then deliver the contents of this structure to the Relying Party server, using methods outside
-the scope of this specification. This section describes the operations that the Relying Party must perform upon receipt of these
+   
                7. WebAuthn Relying Party Operations
                
+   
                A registration or authentication ceremony begins with the WebAuthn Relying Party creating a PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions or PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions object, respectively, which encodes the parameters for the ceremony. The Relying Party SHOULD take care to not leak sensitive information during this stage; see § 14.6.2 Username Enumeration for details.
                
+   
                Upon successful execution of create() or get(), the Relying Party's script receives
+a PublicKeyCredential containing an AuthenticatorAttestationResponse or AuthenticatorAssertionResponse structure,
+respectively, from the client. It must then deliver the contents of this structure to the Relying Party server, using methods outside
+the scope of this specification. This section describes the operations that the Relying Party must perform upon receipt of these
 structures.
                
    
                7.1. Registering a New Credential
                
-   
                In order to perform a registration ceremony, the Relying Party MUST proceed as follows:
                
+   
                In order to perform a registration ceremony, the Relying Party MUST proceed as follows:
                
    
                  
     
                1. 
-     
                  Let options be a new PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions structure configured to the Relying Party's needs for the ceremony.
                  
+     
                  Let options be a new PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions structure configured to the Relying Party's needs for the ceremony.
                  
     
                2. 
-     
                  Call navigator.credentials.create() and pass options as the publicKey option.
+     
                  Call navigator.credentials.create() and pass options as the publicKey option.
 Let credential be the result of the successfully resolved promise.
 If the promise is rejected, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error, or otherwise guide the user experience as
 might be determinable from the context available in the rejected promise. For example if the promise is rejected with
-an error code equivalent to "InvalidStateError", the user might be instructed to use a different authenticator.
+an error code equivalent to "InvalidStateError", the user might be instructed to use a different authenticator.
 For information on different error contexts and the circumstances leading to them, see § 6.3.2 The authenticatorMakeCredential Operation.
                  
     
                3. 
      
                  Let response be credential.response.
-If response is not an instance of AuthenticatorAttestationResponse, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error.
                  
+If response is not an instance of AuthenticatorAttestationResponse, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error.
                  
     
                4. 
      
                  Let clientExtensionResults be the result of calling credential.getClientExtensionResults().
                  
     
                5. 
      
                  Let JSONtext be the result of
 running UTF-8 decode on the value of response.clientDataJSON.
                  
-     
                  Note: Using any implementation of UTF-8 decode is acceptable as long as it yields the same result as that yielded by
+     
                  Note: Using any implementation of UTF-8 decode is acceptable as long as it yields the same result as that yielded by
 the UTF-8 decode algorithm. In particular, any leading byte order mark (BOM) MUST be stripped.
                  
     
                6. 
      
                  Let C, the client data claimed as collected during the credential creation, be the result of running an
 implementation-specific JSON parser on JSONtext.
                  
-     
                  Note: C may be any implementation-specific data structure representation, as long as C’s components are referenceable, as
+     
                  Note: C may be any implementation-specific data structure representation, as long as C’s components are referenceable, as
 required by this algorithm.
                  
     
                7. 
      
                  Verify that the value of C.type is webauthn.create.
                  
     
                8. 
      
                  Verify that the value of C.challenge equals
 the base64url encoding of options.challenge.
                  
+    
                9.  Verify that the value of C.origin is an origin expected by the Relying Party.
+  See § 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential for guidance. 
     
                10. 
-     
                  Verify that the value of C.origin matches the Relying Party's origin.
                  
+     
                  If C.topOrigin is present:
                  
+     
                    
+      
                  1. 
+       
                    Verify that the Relying Party expects that this credential would have been created within an iframe that is
+not same-origin with its ancestors.
                    
+      
                  2. 
+       
                    Verify that the value of C.topOrigin matches the origin of a page
+that the Relying Party expects to be sub-framed within.
+See § 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential for guidance.
                    
+     
                  
     
                11. 
      
                  Let hash be the result of computing a hash over response.clientDataJSON using SHA-256.
                  
     
                12. 
-     
                  Perform CBOR decoding on the attestationObject field of the AuthenticatorAttestationResponse structure to obtain the attestation statement format fmt, the authenticator data authData, and the attestation statement attStmt.
                  
+     
                  Perform CBOR decoding on the attestationObject field of the AuthenticatorAttestationResponse structure to obtain the attestation statement format fmt, the authenticator data authData, and the attestation statement attStmt.
                  
     
                13. 
-     
                  Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying Party.
                  
+     
                  Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying Party.
                  
     
                14. 
-     
                  Verify that the UP bit of the flags in authData is set.
                  
+     
                  Verify that the UP bit of the flags in authData is set.
                  
     
                15. 
-     
                  If the Relying Party requires user verification for this registration,
-verify that the UV bit of the flags in authData is set.
                  
+     
                  If the Relying Party requires user verification for this registration,
+verify that the UV bit of the flags in authData is set.
                  
     
                16. 
-     
                  If the Relying Party uses the credential’s backup eligibility to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the BE bit of the flags in authData.
                  
+     
                  If the BE bit of the flags in authData is not set, verify that the BS bit is not set.
                  
     
                17. 
-     
                  If the Relying Party uses the credential’s backup state to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the BS bit of the flags in authData.
                  
+     
                  If the Relying Party uses the credential’s backup eligibility to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the BE bit of the flags in authData.
                  
     
                18. 
-     
                  Verify that the "alg" parameter in the credential public key in authData matches the alg attribute of one of the items in options.pubKeyCredParams.
                  
+     
                  If the Relying Party uses the credential’s backup state to inform its user experience flows and/or policies, evaluate the BS bit of the flags in authData.
                  
     
                19. 
-     
                  Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults and the authenticator extension
-outputs in the extensions in authData are as expected, considering the client
-extension input values that were given in options.extensions and any specific policy of the Relying Party regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of options.extensions.
-In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the Relying Party and which extensions are in use.
                  
-     
                  Note: Client platforms MAY enact local policy that sets additional authenticator extensions or client extensions and thus cause values to appear in the authenticator extension outputs or client extension outputs that were not originally specified as part of options.extensions. Relying Parties MUST be prepared to handle such
-situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the attestation. The Relying Party can make this
-decision based on local policy and the extensions in use.
                  
-     
                  Note: Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the client and the authenticator, the Relying Party MUST also be
-prepared to handle cases where none or not all of the requested extensions were acted upon.
                  
+     
                  Verify that the "alg" parameter in the credential public key in authData matches the alg attribute of one of the items in options.pubKeyCredParams.
                  
+    
                20. 
+      Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults and the authenticator extension
+    outputs in the extensions in authData are as expected, considering the client
+    extension input values that were given in options.extensions and any specific policy of the Relying Party regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of options.extensions.
+    In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the Relying Party and which extensions are in use. 
+     
                  Note: Client platforms MAY enact local policy that sets additional authenticator extensions or client extensions and thus cause values to appear in the authenticator extension outputs or client extension outputs that were not originally specified as part of options.extensions. Relying Parties MUST be prepared to handle such
+    situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the attestation. The Relying Party can make this
+    decision based on local policy and the extensions in use.
                  
+     
                  Note: Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the client and the authenticator, the Relying Party MUST also be
+    prepared to handle cases where none or not all of the requested extensions were acted upon.
                  
+     
                  Note: The supplementalPubKeys extension has explicit verification procedures, see § 10.2.2.3.1 Registration (create()).
                  
     
                21. 
      
                  Determine the attestation statement format by performing a USASCII case-sensitive match on fmt against the set of
 supported WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier values.
 An up-to-date list of registered WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier values
 is maintained in the
-IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
                  
-    
                22. 
-     
                  Verify that attStmt is a correct attestation statement, conveying a valid attestation signature, by using the attestation statement format fmt’s verification procedure given attStmt, authData and hash.
                  
-     
                  Note: Each attestation statement format specifies its own verification procedure. See § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats for
-the initially-defined formats, and [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] for the up-to-date list.
                  
-    
                23. 
-     
                  If validation is successful, obtain a list of acceptable trust anchors (i.e. attestation root certificates)
-for that attestation type and attestation statement format fmt, from a trusted source or from policy. For
-example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService] provides one way to obtain such information, using the aaguid in the attestedCredentialData in authData.
                  
-    
                24. 
-     
                  Assess the attestation trustworthiness using the outputs of the verification procedure in step 19, as follows:
                  
+IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
                  
+    
                25. 
+      Verify that attStmt is a correct attestation statement, conveying a valid attestation signature, by using the attestation statement format fmt’s verification procedure given attStmt, authData and hash. 
+     
                  Note: Each attestation statement format specifies its own verification procedure. See § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats for
+    the initially-defined formats, and [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] for the up-to-date list.
                  
+    
                26.  If validation is successful, obtain a list of acceptable trust anchors (i.e. attestation root certificates)
+    for that attestation type and attestation statement format fmt, from a trusted source or from policy. For
+    example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService] provides one way to obtain such information, using the aaguid in the attestedCredentialData in authData. 
+    
                27. 
+      Assess the attestation trustworthiness using the outputs of the verification procedure in step 21, as follows: 
      
     
                28. 
-     
                  Verify that the credentialId is ≤ 1023 bytes. Credential IDs larger than this many bytes SHOULD cause the RP to fail this registration ceremony.
                  
-    
                29. 
-     
                  Verify that the credentialId is not yet registered for any user. If the credentialId is already known then the Relying Party SHOULD fail this registration ceremony.
                  
-     
                  NOTE: The rationale for Relying Parties rejecting duplicate credential IDs is as follows: credential IDs contain sufficient entropy that accidental duplication is very unlikely. However, attestation types other than self attestation do not include a self-signature to explicitly prove possession of the credential private key at registration time. Thus an attacker who has managed to obtain a user’s credential ID and credential public key for a site (this could be potentially accomplished in various ways), could attempt to register a victim’s credential as their own at that site. If the Relying Party accepts this new registration and replaces the victim’s existing credential registration, and the credentials are discoverable, then the victim could be forced to sign into the attacker’s account at their next attempt. Data saved to the site by the victim in that state would then be available to the attacker.
                  
+     
                  Verify that the credentialId is ≤ 1023 bytes. Credential IDs larger than this many bytes SHOULD cause the RP to fail this registration ceremony.
                  
     
                30. 
-     
                  If the attestation statement attStmt verified successfully and is found to be trustworthy,
-then create and store a new credential record in the user account that was denoted in options.user,
-with the following contents:
                  
+     
                  Verify that the credentialId is not yet registered for any user. If the credentialId is already known then the Relying Party SHOULD fail this registration ceremony.
                  
+     
                  NOTE: The rationale for Relying Parties rejecting duplicate credential IDs is as follows: credential IDs contain sufficient entropy that accidental duplication is very unlikely. However, attestation types other than self attestation do not include a self-signature to explicitly prove possession of the credential private key at registration time. Thus an attacker who has managed to obtain a user’s credential ID and credential public key for a site (this could be potentially accomplished in various ways), could attempt to register a victim’s credential as their own at that site. If the Relying Party accepts this new registration and replaces the victim’s existing credential registration, and the credentials are discoverable, then the victim could be forced to sign into the attacker’s account at their next attempt. Data saved to the site by the victim in that state would then be available to the attacker.
                  
+    
                31. 
+      If the attestation statement attStmt verified successfully and is found to be trustworthy,
+    then create and store a new credential record in the user account that was denoted in options.user,
+    with the following contents: 
      
                  
       
                  type
       
                  
@@ -5253,125 +5817,153 @@ 
                  id
       
                  
        
                  credential.id or credential.rawId,
-whichever format is preferred by the Relying Party.
                  
+whichever format is preferred by the Relying Party.
                  
       
                  publicKey
       
                  
        
                  The credential public key in authData.
                  
       
                  signCount
       
                  
        
                  authData.signCount.
                  
+      
                  uvInitialized
+      
                  
+       
                  The value of the UV flag in authData.
                  
       
                  transports
       
                  
        
                  The value returned from response.getTransports().
                  
-      
                  BE
+      
                  backupEligible
       
                  
-       
                  The value of the BE flag in authData.
                  
-      
                  BS
+       
                  The value of the BE flag in authData.
                  
+      
                  backupState
       
                  
-       
                  The value of the BS flag in authData.
                  
+       
                  The value of the BS flag in authData.
                  
      
                  
-     
                  The new credential record MAY also include the following OPTIONAL contents:
                  
+     
                  The new credential record MAY also include the following OPTIONAL contents:
                  
      
                  
       
                  attestationObject
       
                  
-       
                  response.attestationObject.
                  
+       
                  response.attestationObject.
                  
       
                  attestationClientDataJSON
       
                  
        
                  response.clientDataJSON.
                  
      
                  
     
                32. 
-     
                  If the attestation statement attStmt successfully verified but is not trustworthy per step 20 above, the Relying Party SHOULD fail
-the registration ceremony.
                  
-     
                  NOTE: However, if permitted by policy, the Relying Party MAY register the credential ID and credential public key but treat the
-    credential as one with self attestation (see § 6.5.3 Attestation Types). If doing so, the Relying Party is asserting there
-    is no cryptographic proof that the public key credential has been generated by a particular authenticator model.
-    See [FIDOSecRef] and [UAFProtocol] for a more detailed discussion.
                  
+     
                  If the attestation statement attStmt successfully verified but is not trustworthy per step 23 above,
+the Relying Party SHOULD fail the registration ceremony.
                  
+     
                  NOTE: However, if permitted by policy, the Relying Party MAY register the credential ID and credential public key but treat the
+    credential as one with self attestation (see § 6.5.4 Attestation Types). If doing so, the Relying Party is asserting there
+    is no cryptographic proof that the public key credential has been generated by a particular authenticator model.
+    See [FIDOSecRef] and [UAFProtocol] for a more detailed discussion.
                  
    
                
-   
                Verification of attestation objects requires that the Relying Party has a trusted method of determining acceptable trust anchors
-in step 19 above. Also, if certificates are being used, the Relying Party MUST have access to certificate status information for the
-intermediate CA certificates. The Relying Party MUST also be able to build the attestation certificate chain if the client did not
+   
                Verification of attestation objects requires that the Relying Party has a trusted method of determining acceptable trust anchors
+in step 22 above.
+Also, if certificates are being used, the Relying Party MUST have access to certificate status information for the
+intermediate CA certificates. The Relying Party MUST also be able to build the attestation certificate chain if the client did not
 provide this chain in the attestation information.
                
    
                7.2. Verifying an Authentication Assertion
                
-   
                In order to perform an authentication ceremony, the Relying Party MUST proceed as follows:
                
+   
                In order to perform an authentication ceremony, the Relying Party MUST proceed as follows:
                
    
                  
     
                1. 
-     
                  Let options be a new PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions structure configured to the Relying Party's needs for the ceremony.
                  
+     
                  Let options be a new PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions structure configured to the Relying Party's needs for the ceremony.
                  
     
                2. 
-     
                  Call navigator.credentials.get() and pass options as the publicKey option.
+     
                  Call navigator.credentials.get() and pass options as the publicKey option.
 Let credential be the result of the successfully resolved promise.
 If the promise is rejected, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error, or otherwise guide the user experience as might
 be determinable from the context available in the rejected promise. For information on different error contexts and the
 circumstances leading to them, see § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation.
                  
     
                3. 
      
                  Let response be credential.response.
-If response is not an instance of AuthenticatorAssertionResponse, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error.
                  
+If response is not an instance of AuthenticatorAssertionResponse, abort the ceremony with a user-visible error.
                  
     
                4. 
      
                  Let clientExtensionResults be the result of calling credential.getClientExtensionResults().
                  
     
                5. 
-     
                  If options.allowCredentials is not empty,
-verify that credential.id identifies one of the public key credentials listed in options.allowCredentials.
                  
+     
                  If options.allowCredentials is not empty,
+verify that credential.id identifies one of the public key credentials listed in options.allowCredentials.
                  
     
                6. 
-     
                  Identify the user being authenticated and let credentialRecord be the credential record for the credential:
                  
+     
                  Identify the user being authenticated and let credentialRecord be the credential record for the credential:
                  
      
                  
-      
                  If the user was identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated, e.g., via a username or cookie,
+      
                  If the user was identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated, e.g., via a username or cookie,
       
                  
-       
                  verify that the identified user account contains a credential record whose id equals credential.rawId.
-Let credentialRecord be that credential record.
+       
                  verify that the identified user account contains a credential record whose id equals credential.rawId.
+Let credentialRecord be that credential record.
 If response.userHandle is present,
-verify that it equals the user handle of the user account.
                  
-      
                  If the user was not identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated,
+verify that it equals the user handle of the user account.
                  
+      
                  If the user was not identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated,
       
                  
        
                  verify that response.userHandle is present.
-Verify that the user account identified by response.userHandle contains a credential record whose id equals credential.rawId.
-Let credentialRecord be that credential record.
                  
+Verify that the user account identified by response.userHandle contains a credential record whose id equals credential.rawId.
+Let credentialRecord be that credential record.
                  
      
                  
     
                7. 
-     
                  Let cData, authData and sig denote the value of response’s clientDataJSON, authenticatorData, and signature respectively.
                  
+     
                  Let cData, authData and sig denote the value of response’s clientDataJSON, authenticatorData, and signature respectively.
                  
     
                8. 
      
                  Let JSONtext be the result of running UTF-8 decode on the value of cData.
                  
-     
                  Note: Using any implementation of UTF-8 decode is acceptable as long as it yields the same result as that yielded by
+     
                  Note: Using any implementation of UTF-8 decode is acceptable as long as it yields the same result as that yielded by
 the UTF-8 decode algorithm. In particular, any leading byte order mark (BOM) MUST be stripped.
                  
     
                9. 
      
                  Let C, the client data claimed as used for the signature, be the result of running an implementation-specific
 JSON parser on JSONtext.
                  
-     
                  Note: C may be any implementation-specific data structure representation, as long as C’s components are referenceable, as
+     
                  Note: C may be any implementation-specific data structure representation, as long as C’s components are referenceable, as
 required by this algorithm.
                  
     
                10. 
      
                  Verify that the value of C.type is the string webauthn.get.
                  
     
                11. 
      
                  Verify that the value of C.challenge equals
 the base64url encoding of options.challenge.
                  
-    
                12.  Verify that the value of C.origin matches the Relying Party's origin. 
+    
                13.  Verify that the value of C.origin is an origin expected by the Relying Party.
+  See § 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential for guidance. 
+    
                14. 
+     
                  If C.topOrigin is present:
                  
+     
                    
+      
                  1. 
+       
                    Verify that the Relying Party expects this credential to be used within an iframe that is not same-origin with its ancestors.
                    
+      
                  2. 
+       
                    Verify that the value of C.topOrigin matches the origin of a page
+that the Relying Party expects to be sub-framed within.
+See § 13.4.9 Validating the origin of a credential for guidance.
                    
+     
                  
     
                15. 
-      Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying Party. 
-     
                  Note: If using the appid extension, this step needs some special logic. See § 10.1.1 FIDO AppID Extension (appid) for details.
                  
-    
                16. 
-     
                  Verify that the UP bit of the flags in authData is set.
                  
-    
                17. 
-     
                  If the Relying Party requires user verification for this assertion,
-verify that the UV bit of the flags in authData is set.
                  
-    
                18. 
-     
                  If the credential backup state is used as part of Relying Party business logic or policy,
-let currentBe and currentBs be the values of the BE and BS bits, respectively,
-of the flags in authData.
-Compare currentBe and currentBs with credentialRecord.BE and credentialRecord.BS and apply Relying Party policy, if any.
                  
-     
                  Note: See § 6.1.3 Credential Backup State for examples of how a Relying Party might process the BS flag values.
                  
-    
                19. 
-     
                  Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults and the authenticator extension
-outputs in the extensions in authData are as expected, considering the client
-extension input values that were given in options.extensions and any specific policy of the Relying Party regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of options.extensions.
-In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the Relying Party and which extensions are in use.
                  
-     
                  Note: Client platforms MAY enact local policy that sets additional authenticator extensions or client extensions and thus cause values to appear in the authenticator extension outputs or client extension outputs that were not originally specified as part of options.extensions. Relying Parties MUST be prepared to handle such
-situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the assertion. The Relying Party can make this
-decision based on local policy and the extensions in use.
                  
-     
                  Note: Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the client and the authenticator, the Relying Party MUST also be
-prepared to handle cases where none or not all of the requested extensions were acted upon.
                  
+      Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying Party. 
+     
                  Note: If using the appid extension, this step needs some special logic. See § 10.1.1 FIDO AppID Extension (appid) for details.
                  
+    
                20. 
+     
                  Verify that the UP bit of the flags in authData is set.
                  
+    
                21. 
+     
                  Determine whether user verification is required for this assertion. User verification SHOULD be required if, and only if, options.userVerification is set to required.
                  
+     
                  If user verification was determined to be required,
+verify that the UV bit of the flags in authData is set.
+Otherwise, ignore the value of the UV flag.
                  
+    
                22. 
+     
                  If the BE bit of the flags in authData is not set, verify that the BS bit is not set.
                  
+    
                23. 
+     
                  If the credential backup state is used as part of Relying Party business logic or policy,
+let currentBe and currentBs be the values of the BE and BS bits, respectively,
+of the flags in authData.
+Compare currentBe and currentBs with credentialRecord.backupEligible and credentialRecord.backupState:
                  
+     
                    
+      
                  1. 
+       
                    If credentialRecord.backupEligible is set, verify that currentBe is set.
                    
+      
                  2. 
+       
                    If credentialRecord.backupEligible is not set, verify that currentBe is not set.
                    
+      
                  3. 
+       
                    Apply Relying Party policy, if any.
                    
+     
                  
+     
                  Note: See § 6.1.3 Credential Backup State for examples of how a Relying Party might process the BS flag values.
                  
+    
                24. 
+      Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults and the authenticator extension
+    outputs in the extensions in authData are as expected, considering the client
+    extension input values that were given in options.extensions and any specific policy of the Relying Party regarding unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of options.extensions.
+    In the general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the Relying Party and which extensions are in use. 
+     
                  Note: Client platforms MAY enact local policy that sets additional authenticator extensions or client extensions and thus cause values to appear in the authenticator extension outputs or client extension outputs that were not originally specified as part of options.extensions. Relying Parties MUST be prepared to handle such
+    situations, whether it be to ignore the unsolicited extensions or reject the assertion. The Relying Party can make this
+    decision based on local policy and the extensions in use.
                  
+     
                  Note: Since all extensions are OPTIONAL for both the client and the authenticator, the Relying Party MUST also be
+    prepared to handle cases where none or not all of the requested extensions were acted upon.
                  
+     
                  Note: The supplementalPubKeys extension has explicit verification procedures, see § 10.2.2.3.2 Authentication (get()).
                  
     
                25. 
      
                  Let hash be the result of computing a hash over the cData using SHA-256.
                  
     
                26. 
      
                  Using credentialRecord.publicKey,
 verify that sig is a valid signature over the binary concatenation of authData and hash.
                  
-     
                  Note: This verification step is compatible with signatures generated by FIDO U2F authenticators. See § 6.1.2 FIDO U2F Signature Format Compatibility.
                  
+     
                  Note: This verification step is compatible with signatures generated by FIDO U2F authenticators. See § 6.1.2 FIDO U2F Signature Format Compatibility.
                  
     
                27. 
      
                  If authData.signCount is nonzero or credentialRecord.signCount is nonzero,
 then run the following sub-step:
                  
@@ -5385,44 +5977,69 @@ 
                  This is a signal that
           the authenticator may be cloned, i.e. at least
           two copies of the credential private key may exist and are
-          being used in parallel. Relying Parties should incorporate this information
+          being used in parallel. Relying Parties should incorporate this information
           into their risk scoring.
-          Whether the Relying Party updates credentialRecord.signCount below in this case, or not, or fails the authentication ceremony or not, is Relying Party-specific. 
+          Whether the Relying Party updates credentialRecord.signCount below in this case, or not, or fails the authentication ceremony or not, is Relying Party-specific. 
        
      
     
                28. 
-     
                  Update credentialRecord with new state values:
                  
+     
                  If response.attestationObject is present and the Relying Party wishes to verify the attestation then perform CBOR decoding on attestationObject to obtain the attestation statement format fmt, and the attestation statement attStmt.
                  
+     
                    
+      
                  1. 
+       
                    Verify that the AT bit in the flags field of authData is set, indicating that attested credential data is included.
                    
+      
                  2. 
+       
                    Verify that the credentialPublicKey and credentialId fields of the attested credential data in authData match credentialRecord.publicKey and credentialRecord.id, respectively.
                    
+      
                  3. 
+       
                    Determine the attestation statement format by performing a USASCII case-sensitive match on fmt against the set of supported WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier values. An up-to-date list of registered WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier values is maintained in the IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
                    
+      
                  4. 
+       
                    Verify that attStmt is a correct attestation statement, conveying a valid attestation signature, by using the attestation statement format fmt’s verification procedure given attStmt, authData and hash.
                    
+       
                    Note: Each attestation statement format specifies its own verification procedure. See § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats for the initially-defined formats, and [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] for the up-to-date list.
                    
+      
                  5. 
+       
                    If validation is successful, obtain a list of acceptable trust anchors (i.e. attestation root certificates) for that attestation type and attestation statement format fmt, from a trusted source or from policy. The aaguid in the attested credential data can be used to guide this lookup.
                    
+     
                  
+    
                29. 
+      Update credentialRecord with new state values: 
      
                    
       
                  1. 
        
                    Update credentialRecord.signCount to the value of authData.signCount.
                    
       
                  2. 
-       
                    Update credentialRecord.BS to the value of currentBs.
                    
+       
                    Update credentialRecord.backupState to the value of currentBs.
                    
+      
                  3. 
+       
                    If credentialRecord.uvInitialized is false,
+update it to the value of the UV bit in the flags in authData.
+This change SHOULD require authorization by an additional authentication factor equivalent to WebAuthn user verification;
+if not authorized, skip this step.
                    
+      
                  4. 
+       
                    OPTIONALLY, if response.attestationObject is present,
+update credentialRecord.attestationObject to the value of response.attestationObject and update credentialRecord.attestationClientDataJSON to the value of response.clientDataJSON.
                    
      
                  
+     
                  If the Relying Party performs additional security checks beyond these WebAuthn authentication ceremony steps,
+    the above state updates SHOULD be deferred to after those additional checks are completed successfully.
                  
     
                30. 
-     
                  If all the above steps are successful, continue with the authentication ceremony as appropriate. Otherwise, fail the authentication ceremony.
                  
+     
                  If all the above steps are successful, continue with the authentication ceremony as appropriate. Otherwise, fail the authentication ceremony.
                  
    
                
    
                8. Defined Attestation Statement Formats
                
    
                WebAuthn supports pluggable attestation statement formats. This section defines an initial set of such formats.
                
    
                8.1. Attestation Statement Format Identifiers
                
    
                Attestation statement formats are identified by a string, called an attestation statement format identifier, chosen by
-the author of the attestation statement format.
                
+the author of the attestation statement format.
                
    
                Attestation statement format identifiers SHOULD be registered in the
-IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
+IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
 All registered attestation statement format identifiers are unique amongst themselves as a matter of course.
                
    
                Unregistered attestation statement format identifiers SHOULD use lowercase reverse domain-name naming, using a domain name
 registered by the developer, in order to assure uniqueness of the identifier. All attestation statement format identifiers MUST
 be a maximum of 32 octets in length and MUST consist only of printable USASCII characters, excluding backslash and doublequote,
-i.e., VCHAR as defined in [RFC5234] but without %x22 and %x5c.
                
-   
                Note: This means attestation statement format identifiers based on domain names MUST incorporate only LDH Labels [RFC5890].
                
+i.e., VCHAR as defined in [RFC5234] but without %x22 and %x5c.
                
+   
                Note: This means attestation statement format identifiers based on domain names MUST incorporate only LDH Labels [RFC5890].
                
    
                Implementations MUST match WebAuthn attestation statement format identifiers in a case-sensitive fashion.
                
    
                Attestation statement formats that may exist in multiple versions SHOULD include a version in their identifier. In effect,
 different versions are thus treated as different formats, e.g., packed2 as a new version of the § 8.2 Packed Attestation Statement Format.
                
    
                The following sections present a set of currently-defined and registered attestation statement formats and their identifiers.
-The up-to-date list of registered WebAuthn Extensions is maintained in the
-IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
                
+The up-to-date list of registered attestation statement format identifiers is maintained in the
+IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
                
    
                8.2. Packed Attestation Statement Format
                
    
                This is a WebAuthn optimized attestation statement format. It uses a very compact but still extensible encoding method. It is
-implementable by authenticators with limited resources (e.g., secure elements).
                
+implementable by authenticators with limited resources (e.g., secure elements).
                
    
                
     
                Attestation statement format identifier
     
                
@@ -5452,10 +6069,10 @@ 
                
       
                alg
       
                
-       
                A COSEAlgorithmIdentifier containing the identifier of the algorithm used to generate the attestation signature.
                
+       
                A COSEAlgorithmIdentifier containing the identifier of the algorithm used to generate the attestation signature.
                
       
                sig
       
                
-       
                A byte string containing the attestation signature.
                
+       
                A byte string containing the attestation signature.
                
       
                x5c
       
                
        
                The elements of this array contain attestnCert and its certificate chain (if any), each encoded in X.509 format. The attestation
@@ -5473,7 +6090,7 @@ 
                Let authenticatorData denote the authenticator data for the attestation,
 and let clientDataHash denote the hash of the serialized client data.
                
       
              4. 
-       
                If Basic or AttCA attestation is in use, the authenticator produces the sig by concatenating authenticatorData and clientDataHash, and signing the result using an attestation private key selected through an authenticator-specific
+       
                If Basic or AttCA attestation is in use, the authenticator produces the sig by concatenating authenticatorData and clientDataHash, and signing the result using an attestation private key selected through an authenticator-specific
 mechanism. It sets x5c to attestnCert followed by the related certificate chain (if any). It sets alg to the algorithm of the
 attestation private key.
                
       
              5. 
@@ -5483,7 +6100,7 @@ 
                
     
                Verification procedure
     
                
-     
                Given the verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
+     
                Given the verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
 as follows:
                
      
                  
       
                1. 
@@ -5499,7 +6116,7 @@ 
                  Verify that attestnCert meets the requirements in § 8.2.1 Packed Attestation Statement Certificate Requirements.
                  
         
                2. 
          
                  If attestnCert contains an extension with OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.4 (id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid) verify that the
-value of this extension matches the aaguid in authenticatorData.
                  
+value of this extension matches the aaguid in authenticatorData.
                  
         
                3. 
          
                  Optionally, inspect x5c and consult externally provided knowledge to determine whether attStmt conveys a Basic or AttCA attestation.
                  
         
                4. 
@@ -5510,7 +6127,7 @@ 
                  If x5c is not present, self attestation is in use.
                  
        
                    
         
                  • 
-         
                    Validate that alg matches the algorithm of the credentialPublicKey in authenticatorData.
                    
+         
                    Validate that alg matches the algorithm of the credentialPublicKey in authenticatorData.
                    
         
                  • 
          
                    Verify that sig is a valid signature over the concatenation of authenticatorData and clientDataHash using the
 credential public key with alg.
                    
@@ -5555,8 +6172,8 @@ 
                    [RFC5280] are both OPTIONAL as the status of many attestation certificates is available through authenticator metadata services.
-See, for example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService].
                    
+     
                    An Authority Information Access (AIA) extension with entry id-ad-ocsp and a CRL Distribution Point extension [RFC5280] are both OPTIONAL as the status of many attestation certificates is available through authenticator metadata services.
+See, for example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService].
                    
    
                  
    
                  8.3. TPM Attestation Statement Format
                  
    
                  This attestation statement format is generally used by authenticators that use a Trusted Platform Module as their cryptographic
@@ -5594,7 +6211,7 @@ 
                  The version of the TPM specification to which the signature conforms.
                  
       
                  alg
       
                  
-       
                  A COSEAlgorithmIdentifier containing the identifier of the algorithm used to generate the attestation signature.
                  
+       
                  A COSEAlgorithmIdentifier containing the identifier of the algorithm used to generate the attestation signature.
                  
       
                  x5c
       
                  
        
                  aikCert followed by its certificate chain, in X.509 encoding.
                  
@@ -5603,30 +6220,30 @@ 
                  The AIK certificate used for the attestation, in X.509 encoding.
                  
       
                  sig
       
                  
-       
                  The attestation signature, in the form of a TPMT_SIGNATURE structure as specified in [TPMv2-Part2] section 11.3.4.
                  
+       
                  The attestation signature, in the form of a TPMT_SIGNATURE structure as specified in [TPMv2-Part2] section 11.3.4.
                  
       
                  certInfo
       
                  
-       
                  The TPMS_ATTEST structure over which the above signature was computed, as specified in [TPMv2-Part2] section 10.12.8.
                  
+       
                  The TPMS_ATTEST structure over which the above signature was computed, as specified in [TPMv2-Part2] section 10.12.8.
                  
       
                  pubArea
       
                  
-       
                  The TPMT_PUBLIC structure (see [TPMv2-Part2] section 12.2.4) used by the TPM to represent the credential public key.
                  
+       
                  The TPMT_PUBLIC structure (see [TPMv2-Part2] section 12.2.4) used by the TPM to represent the credential public key.
                  
      
                6. 
     
                Signing procedure
     
                
      
                Let authenticatorData denote the authenticator data for the attestation, and let clientDataHash denote the hash of the serialized client data.
                
      
                Concatenate authenticatorData and clientDataHash to form attToBeSigned.
                
-     
                Generate a signature using the procedure specified in [TPMv2-Part3] Section 18.2, using the attestation private key and
+     
                Generate a signature using the procedure specified in [TPMv2-Part3] Section 18.2, using the attestation private key and
 setting the extraData parameter to the digest of attToBeSigned using the hash algorithm corresponding to the "alg" signature algorithm.
 (For the "RS256" algorithm, this would be a SHA-256 digest.)
                
      
                Set the pubArea field to the public area of the credential public key, the certInfo field to the output parameter of the
 same name, and the sig field to the signature obtained from the above procedure.
                
     
                Verification procedure
     
                
-     
                Given the verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
+     
                Given the verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
 as follows:
                
      
                Verify that attStmt is valid CBOR conforming to the syntax defined above and perform CBOR decoding on it to extract the
 contained fields.
                
-     
                Verify that the public key specified by the parameters and unique fields of pubArea is identical to the credentialPublicKey in the attestedCredentialData in authenticatorData.
                
+     
                Verify that the public key specified by the parameters and unique fields of pubArea is identical to the credentialPublicKey in the attestedCredentialData in authenticatorData.
                
      
                Concatenate authenticatorData and clientDataHash to form attToBeSigned.
                
      
                Validate that certInfo is valid:
                
      
                  
@@ -5637,13 +6254,13 @@ 
                  
        
                  Verify that extraData is set to the hash of attToBeSigned using the hash algorithm employed in "alg".
                  
       
                • 
-       
                  Verify that attested contains a TPMS_CERTIFY_INFO structure as specified in [TPMv2-Part2] section 10.12.3,
+       
                  Verify that attested contains a TPMS_CERTIFY_INFO structure as specified in [TPMv2-Part2] section 10.12.3,
 whose name field contains a valid Name for pubArea,
-as computed using the algorithm in the nameAlg field of pubArea using the procedure specified in [TPMv2-Part1] section 16.
                  
+as computed using the algorithm in the nameAlg field of pubArea using the procedure specified in [TPMv2-Part1] section 16.
                  
       
                • 
        
                  Verify that x5c is present.
                  
       
                • 
-       
                  Note that the remaining fields in the "Standard Attestation Structure" [TPMv2-Part1] section 31.2, i.e., qualifiedSigner, clockInfo and firmwareVersion are ignored.
+       
                  Note that the remaining fields in the "Standard Attestation Structure" [TPMv2-Part1] section 31.2, i.e., qualifiedSigner, clockInfo and firmwareVersion are ignored.
 These fields MAY be used as an input to risk engines.
                  
       
                • 
        
                  Verify the sig is a valid signature over certInfo using the attestation public key in aikCert with the
@@ -5652,7 +6269,7 @@ 
                  Verify that aikCert meets the requirements in § 8.3.1 TPM Attestation Statement Certificate Requirements.
                  
       
                • 
        
                  If aikCert contains an extension with OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.4 (id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid) verify that the value of this
-extension matches the aaguid in authenticatorData.
                  
+extension matches the aaguid in authenticatorData.
                  
       
                • 
        
                  If successful, return implementation-specific values representing attestation type AttCA and attestation trust
 path x5c.
                  
@@ -5666,22 +6283,22 @@ 
                  <
     
                • 
      
                  Subject field MUST be set to empty.
                  
     
                • 
-     
                  The Subject Alternative Name extension MUST be set as defined in [TPMv2-EK-Profile] section 3.2.9.
                  
+     
                  The Subject Alternative Name extension MUST be set as defined in [TPMv2-EK-Profile] section 3.2.9.
                  
     
                • 
      
                  The Extended Key Usage extension MUST contain the OID 2.23.133.8.3 ("joint-iso-itu-t(2) internationalorganizations(23) 133 tcg-kp(8) tcg-kp-AIKCertificate(3)").
                  
     
                • 
      
                  The Basic Constraints extension MUST have the CA component set to false.
                  
     
                • 
-     
                  An Authority Information Access (AIA) extension with entry id-ad-ocsp and a CRL Distribution Point extension [RFC5280] are
+     
                  An Authority Information Access (AIA) extension with entry id-ad-ocsp and a CRL Distribution Point extension [RFC5280] are
 both OPTIONAL as the status of many attestation certificates is available through metadata services.
-See, for example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService].
                  
+See, for example, the FIDO Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService].
                  
    
                
    
                8.4. Android Key Attestation Statement Format
                
-   
                When the authenticator in question is a platform authenticator on the Android "N" or later platform, the
+   
                When the authenticator in question is a platform authenticator on the Android "N" or later platform, the
 attestation statement is based on the Android key
 attestation. In these cases, the attestation statement
 is produced by a component running in a secure operating environment, but the authenticator data for the attestation is
-produced outside this environment. The WebAuthn Relying Party is expected to check that the authenticator data claimed to have been used for
+produced outside this environment. The WebAuthn Relying Party is expected to check that the authenticator data claimed to have been used for
 the attestation is consistent with the fields of the attestation certificate’s extension data.
                
    
                
     
                Attestation statement format identifier
@@ -5716,7 +6333,7 @@ 
                <
 and signing the result using the credential private key. It sets alg to the algorithm of the signature format.
                
     
                Verification procedure
     
                
-     
                Given the verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
+     
                Given the verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
 as follows:
                
      
                  
       
                • 
@@ -5726,7 +6343,7 @@ 
                  <
        
                  Verify that sig is a valid signature over the concatenation of authenticatorData and clientDataHash using the
 public key in the first certificate in x5c with the algorithm specified in alg.
                  
       
                • 
-       
                  Verify that the public key in the first certificate in x5c matches the credentialPublicKey in the attestedCredentialData in authenticatorData.
                  
+       
                  Verify that the public key in the first certificate in x5c matches the credentialPublicKey in the attestedCredentialData in authenticatorData.
                  
       
                • 
        
                  Verify that the attestationChallenge field in the attestation certificate extension data is identical to clientDataHash.
                  
       
                • 
@@ -5754,9 +6371,9 @@ 
                  attestation certificate's android key attestation certificate extension
 data is identified by the OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17, and its schema is defined in the Android developer documentation.
                  
    
                  8.5. Android SafetyNet Attestation Statement Format
                  
-   
                  When the authenticator is a platform authenticator on certain Android platforms, the attestation
+   
                  When the authenticator is a platform authenticator on certain Android platforms, the attestation
 statement may be based on the SafetyNet API. In
-this case the authenticator data is completely controlled by the caller of the SafetyNet API (typically an application
+this case the authenticator data is completely controlled by the caller of the SafetyNet API (typically an application
 running on the Android platform) and the attestation statement  provides some statements about the health of the platform
 and the identity of the calling application
 (see SafetyNet Documentation for more details).
                  
@@ -5787,7 +6404,7 @@ 
                  UTF-8 encoded result of the getJwsResult() call of the SafetyNet API. This value is a JWS [RFC7515] object (see SafetyNet online documentation)
+       
                  The UTF-8 encoded result of the getJwsResult() call of the SafetyNet API. This value is a JWS [RFC7515] object (see SafetyNet online documentation)
 in Compact Serialization.
                  
      
                
     
                Signing procedure
@@ -5799,7 +6416,7 @@ 
                verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
+     
                Given the verification procedure inputs attStmt, authenticatorData and clientDataHash, the verification procedure is
 as follows:
                
      
              
     
              Authenticator extension input
@@ -6368,11 +7042,11 @@ 
              10.1.4. Pseudo-random function extension (prf)
              
-   
              This client registration extension and authentication extension allows a Relying Party to evaluate outputs from a pseudo-random function (PRF) associated with a credential. The PRFs provided by this extension map from USVStrings of any length to 32-byte ArrayBuffers.
              
-   
              When requested, if a credential is created on an authenticator that supports this extension then either one or two freshly-seeded PRFs are associated with it. If two PRFs are associated then, when outputs are requested, one PRF is evaluated if user verification is performed and the other is evaluated if only a user presence test is performed. It is the responsibility of the Relying Party to set the userVerification parameter accordingly: Relying Parties SHOULD consistently use either the required or discouraged values of UserVerificationRequirement when using this extension, otherwise the outputs may vary for a given input. To avoid mistakes, the default value of preferred is prohibited when using this extension during assertion because that could cause the PRF used to vary between operations if user verification is later enabled on an authenticator.
              
-   
              As a motivating example, PRF outputs could be used as symmetric keys to encrypt user data. Such encrypted data would be inaccessible without the ability to get assertions from the associated credential. By using the provision below to evaluate the PRF at two inputs in a single assertion operation, the encryption key could be periodically rotated during assertions by choosing a fresh, random input and reencrypting under the new output. If the evaluation inputs are unpredictable then even an attacker who could satisfy user verification, and who had time-limited access to the authenticator, could not learn the encryption key without also knowing the correct PRF input.
              
-   
              This extension is implemented on top of the [FIDO-CTAP] hmac-secret extension. It is a separate client extension because hmac-secret requires that inputs and outputs be encrypted in a manner that only the user agent can perform, and to provide separation between uses by WebAuthn and any uses by the underlying platform. This separation is achieved by hashing the provided PRF inputs with a context string to prevent evaluation of the PRFs for arbitrary inputs.
              
-   
              Note: this extension may be implemented for authenticators that do not use [FIDO-CTAP] so long as the behavior observed by a Relying Party is identical.
              
+   
              This client registration extension and authentication extension allows a Relying Party to evaluate outputs from a pseudo-random function (PRF) associated with a credential. The PRFs provided by this extension map from BufferSources of any length to 32-byte BufferSources.
              
+   
              As a motivating example, PRF outputs could be used as symmetric keys to encrypt user data. Such encrypted data would be inaccessible without the ability to get assertions from the associated credential. By using the provision below to evaluate the PRF at two inputs in a single assertion operation, the encryption key could be periodically rotated during assertions by choosing a fresh, random input and reencrypting under the new output. If the evaluation inputs are unpredictable then even an attacker who could satisfy user verification, and who had time-limited access to the authenticator, could not learn the encryption key without also knowing the correct PRF input.
              
+   
              This extension is implemented on top of the [FIDO-CTAP] hmac-secret extension. It is a separate client extension because hmac-secret requires that inputs and outputs be encrypted in a manner that only the user agent can perform, and to provide separation between uses by WebAuthn and any uses by the underlying platform. This separation is achieved by hashing the provided PRF inputs with a context string to prevent evaluation of the PRFs for arbitrary inputs.
              
+   
              The hmac-secret extension provides two PRFs per credential: one which is used for requests where user verification is performed and another for all other requests. This extension only exposes a single PRF per credential and, when implementing on top of hmac-secret, that PRF MUST be the one used for when user verification is performed. This overrides the UserVerificationRequirement if neccessary.
              
+   
              Note: this extension may be implemented for authenticators that do not use [FIDO-CTAP] so long as the behavior observed by a Relying Party is identical.
              
    
              
     
              Extension identifier
     
              
@@ -6383,13 +7057,13 @@ 
              dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues {
-    required ArrayBuffer first;
-    ArrayBuffer second;
+    required BufferSource first;
+    BufferSource second;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsPRFInputs {
     AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues eval;
-    record<USVString, AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues> evalByCredential;
+    record<USVString, AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues> evalByCredential;
 };
 
 partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs {
@@ -6400,21 +7074,21 @@ 
              eval,  of type AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues
        
              
-        
              One or two inputs on which to evaluate PRF. Not all authenticators support evaluating the PRFs during credential creation so outputs may, or may not, be provided. If not, then an assertion is needed in order to obtain the outputs.
              
-       
              evalByCredential,  of type record<USVString, AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues>
+        
              One or two inputs on which to evaluate PRF. Not all authenticators support evaluating the PRFs during credential creation so outputs may, or may not, be provided. If not, then an assertion is needed in order to obtain the outputs.
              
+       
              evalByCredential,  of type record<USVString, AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues>
        
              
-        
              A record mapping base64url encoded credential IDs to PRF inputs to evaluate for that credential. Only applicable during assertions when allowCredentials is not empty.
              
+        
              A record mapping base64url encoded credential IDs to PRF inputs to evaluate for that credential. Only applicable during assertions when allowCredentials is not empty.
              
       
              
      
     
              Client extension processing (registration)
     
              
      
                
       
              1. 
-       
                If evalByCredential is present, return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
                
+       
                If evalByCredential is present, return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
                
       
              2. 
        
                Set hmac-secret to true in the authenticator extensions input.
                
       
              3. 
-       
                If eval is present and a future extension to [FIDO-CTAP] permits evaluation of the PRF at creation time, configure hmac-secret inputs accordingly:
                
+       
                If eval is present and a future extension to [FIDO-CTAP] permits evaluation of the PRF at creation time, configure hmac-secret inputs accordingly:
                
        
                  
         
                • 
          
                  Let salt1 be the value of SHA-256(UTF8Encode("WebAuthn PRF") || 0x00 || eval.first).
                  
@@ -6426,23 +7100,20 @@ 
                  results to the decrypted PRF result(s), if any.
                  
      
              
-   
-   
              Note: If PRF results are obtained during registration then the Relying Party MUST inspect the UV bit in the flags of the response in order to determine the correct value of userVerification for future assertions. Otherwise results from assertions may be inconsistent with those from the registration.
              
-   
              
     
              Client extension processing (authentication)
     
              
      
                
       
              1. 
-       
                If userVerification has the value preferred, return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
                
+       
                If evalByCredential is not empty but allowCredentials is empty, return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
                
       
              2. 
-       
                If evalByCredential is not empty but allowCredentials is empty, return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
                
+       
                If any key in evalByCredential is the empty string, or is not a valid base64url encoding, or does not equal the id of some element of allowCredentials after performing base64url decoding, then return a DOMException whose name is “SyntaxError”.
                
       
              3. 
        
                Initialize the prf extension output to an empty dictionary.
                
       
              4. 
        
                Let ev be null, and try to find any applicable PRF input(s):
                
        
                  
         
                1. 
-         
                  If evalByCredential is present and contains an entry whose key is the base64url encoding of the credential ID that will be returned, let ev be the value of that entry.
                  
+         
                  If evalByCredential is present and contains an entry whose key is the base64url encoding of the credential ID that will be returned, let ev be the value of that entry.
                  
         
                2. 
          
                  If ev is null and eval is present, then let ev be the value of eval.
                  
        
                
@@ -6454,18 +7125,18 @@ 
                second is present, let salt2 be the value of SHA-256(UTF8Encode("WebAuthn PRF") || 0x00 || ev.second).
                
         
              5. 
-         
                Send an hmac-secret extension to the authenticator using the values of salt1 and, if set, salt2 as the parameters of the same name in that process.
                
+         
                Send an hmac-secret extension to the authenticator using the values of salt1 and, if set, salt2 as the parameters of the same name in that process.
                
         
              6. 
          
                Decrypt the extension result and set results to the PRF result(s), if any.
                
        
              
      
            
     
            Authenticator extension input / processing / output
     
            
-     
            This extension uses the [FIDO-CTAP] hmac-secret extension when communicating with the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for Relying Parties.
            
+     
            This extension uses the [FIDO-CTAP] hmac-secret extension when communicating with the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for Relying Parties.
            
     
            Client extension output
     
            
 
            dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsPRFOutputs {
-    boolean enabled;
+    boolean enabled;
     AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues results;
 };
 
@@ -6475,24 +7146,24 @@ 
            enabled,  of type boolean
+       
            enabled,  of type boolean
        
            
-        
            true if, and only if, the one or two PRFs are available for use with the created credential. This is only reported during registration and is not present in the case of authentication.
            
+        
            true if, and only if, the one or two PRFs are available for use with the created credential. This is only reported during registration and is not present in the case of authentication.
            
        
            results,  of type AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues
        
            
-        
            The results of evaluating the PRF for the inputs given in eval or evalByCredential. Outputs may not be available during registration; see comments in eval.
            
+        
            The results of evaluating the PRF for the inputs given in eval or evalByCredential. Outputs may not be available during registration; see comments in eval.
            
       
      
    
    
            10.1.5. Large blob storage extension (largeBlob)
            
-   
            This client registration extension and authentication extension allows a Relying Party to store opaque data associated with a credential. Since authenticators can only store small amounts of data, and most Relying Parties are online services that can store arbitrary amounts of state for a user, this is only useful in specific cases. For example, the Relying Party might wish to issue certificates rather than run a centralised authentication service.
            
-   
            Note: Relying Parties can assume that the opaque data will be compressed when being written to a space-limited device and so need not compress it themselves.
            
-   
            Since a certificate system needs to sign over the public key of the credential, and that public key is only available after creation, this extension does not add an ability to write blobs in the registration context. However, Relying Parties SHOULD use the registration extension when creating the credential if they wish to later use the authentication extension.
            
+   
            This client registration extension and authentication extension allows a Relying Party to store opaque data associated with a credential. Since authenticators can only store small amounts of data, and most Relying Parties are online services that can store arbitrary amounts of state for a user, this is only useful in specific cases. For example, the Relying Party might wish to issue certificates rather than run a centralised authentication service.
            
+   
            Note: Relying Parties can assume that the opaque data will be compressed when being written to a space-limited device and so need not compress it themselves.
            
+   
            Since a certificate system needs to sign over the public key of the credential, and that public key is only available after creation, this extension does not add an ability to write blobs in the registration context. However, Relying Parties SHOULD use the registration extension when creating the credential if they wish to later use the authentication extension.
            
    
            Since certificates are sizable relative to the storage capabilities of typical authenticators, user agents SHOULD consider what indications and confirmations are suitable to best guide the user in allocating this limited resource and prevent abuse.
            
-   
            Note: In order to interoperate, user agents storing large blobs on authenticators using [FIDO-CTAP] are expected to use the provisions detailed in that specification for storing large, per-credential blobs.
            
-   
            Note: Roaming authenticators that use [FIDO-CTAP] as their cross-platform transport protocol only support this Large Blob extension for discoverable credentials,
-and might return an error unless authenticatorSelection.residentKey is set to preferred or required.
-However, authenticators that do not utilize [FIDO-CTAP] do not necessarily restrict this extension to discoverable credentials.
            
+   
            Note: In order to interoperate, user agents storing large blobs on authenticators using [FIDO-CTAP] are expected to use the provisions detailed in that specification for storing large, per-credential blobs.
            
+   
            Note: Roaming authenticators that use [FIDO-CTAP] as their cross-platform transport protocol only support this Large Blob extension for discoverable credentials,
+and might return an error unless authenticatorSelection.residentKey is set to preferred or required.
+However, authenticators that do not utilize [FIDO-CTAP] do not necessarily restrict this extension to discoverable credentials.
            
    
            
     
            Extension identifier
     
            
@@ -6512,22 +7183,22 @@ 
            <
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs {
-    DOMString support;
-    boolean read;
-    BufferSource write;
+    DOMString support;
+    boolean read;
+    BufferSource write;
 };
 
            
      
            
       
            
-       
            support,  of type DOMString
+       
            support,  of type DOMString
        
            
         
            A DOMString that takes one of the values of LargeBlobSupport. (See § 2.1.1 Enumerations as DOMString types.) Only valid during registration.
            
-       
            read,  of type boolean
+       
            read,  of type boolean
        
            
-        
            A boolean that indicates that the Relying Party would like to fetch the previously-written blob associated with the asserted credential. Only valid during authentication.
            
-       
            write,  of type BufferSource
+        
            A boolean that indicates that the Relying Party would like to fetch the previously-written blob associated with the asserted credential. Only valid during authentication.
            
+       
            write,  of type BufferSource
        
            
-        
            An opaque byte string that the Relying Party wishes to store with the existing credential. Only valid during authentication.
            
+        
            An opaque byte string that the Relying Party wishes to store with the existing credential. Only valid during authentication.
            
       
            
      
            
     
            Client extension processing (registration)
@@ -6537,16 +7208,20 @@ 
            <
        
            If read or write is present:
            
        
              
         
            1. 
-         
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
+         
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
        
            
       
          4. 
        
            If support is present and has the value required:
            
        
              
         
            1. 
          
              Set supported to true.
              
-         
              Note: This is in anticipation of an authenticator capable of storing large blobs becoming available. It occurs during extension processing in Step 11 of [[Create]](). The AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobOutputs will be abandoned if no satisfactory authenticator becomes available.
              
+         
              Note: This is in anticipation of an authenticator capable of storing large blobs becoming available.
+   It occurs during extension processing in Step 12 of [[Create]]().
+   The AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobOutputs will be abandoned if no satisfactory authenticator becomes available.
              
         
            2. 
-         
              If a candidate authenticator becomes available (Step 19 of [[Create]]()) then, before evaluating any options, continue (i.e. ignore the candidate authenticator) if the candidate authenticator is not capable of storing large blobs.
              
+         
              If a candidate authenticator becomes available (Step 20 of [[Create]]()) then,
+  before evaluating any options, continue (i.e. ignore the candidate authenticator)
+  if the candidate authenticator is not capable of storing large blobs.
              
        
            
       
          5. 
        
            Otherwise (i.e. support is absent or has the value preferred):
            
@@ -6562,13 +7237,13 @@ 
            <
        
            If support is present:
            
        
              
         
            1. 
-         
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
+         
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
        
            
       
          6. 
        
            If both read and write are present:
            
        
              
         
            1. 
-         
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
+         
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
        
            
       
          7. 
        
            If read is present and has the value true:
            
@@ -6579,19 +7254,19 @@ 
            <
          
            If any authenticator indicates success (in [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]]()), attempt to read any largeBlob data associated with the asserted credential.
            
         
          8. 
          
            If successful, set blob to the result.
            
-         
            Note: if the read is not successful, largeBlob will be present in AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs but the blob member will not be present.
            
+         
            Note: if the read is not successful, largeBlob will be present in AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs but the blob member will not be present.
            
        
          
       
        5. 
        
          If write is present:
          
        
            
         
          1. 
-         
            If allowCredentials does not contain exactly one element:
            
+         
            If allowCredentials does not contain exactly one element:
            
          
              
           
            1. 
-           
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
+           
              Return a DOMException whose name is “NotSupportedError”.
              
          
            
         
          2. 
-         
            If the assertion operation is successful, attempt to store the contents of write on the authenticator, associated with the indicated credential.
            
+         
            If the assertion operation is successful, attempt to store the contents of write on the authenticator, associated with the indicated credential.
            
         
          3. 
          
            Set written to true if successful and false otherwise.
            
        
          
@@ -6603,27 +7278,27 @@ 
          <
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobOutputs {
-    boolean supported;
+    boolean supported;
     ArrayBuffer blob;
-    boolean written;
+    boolean written;
 };
 
    
      
    
       
    
-       
    supported,  of type boolean
+       
    supported,  of type boolean
        
    
         
    true if, and only if, the created credential supports storing large blobs. Only present in registration outputs.
    
        
    blob,  of type ArrayBuffer
        
    
         
    The opaque byte string that was associated with the credential identified by rawId. Only valid if read was true.
    
-       
    written,  of type boolean
+       
    written,  of type boolean
        
    
-        
    A boolean that indicates that the contents of write were successfully stored on the authenticator, associated with the specified credential.
    
+        
    A boolean that indicates that the contents of write were successfully stored on the authenticator, associated with the specified credential.
    
       
    
      
    
     
    Authenticator extension processing
     
    
-     
    This extension directs the user-agent to cause the large blob to be stored on, or retrieved from, the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for Relying Parties.
    
+     
    This extension directs the user-agent to cause the large blob to be stored on, or retrieved from, the authenticator. It thus does not specify any direct authenticator interaction for Relying Parties.
    
    
    
    10.2. Authenticator Extensions
    
    
    This section defines extensions that are both client extensions and authenticator extensions.
    
@@ -6638,9 +7313,9 @@ 
    Registration and Authentication
    
     
    Client extension input
     
    
-     
    The Boolean value true to indicate that this extension is requested by the Relying Party.
    
+     
    The Boolean value true to indicate that this extension is requested by the Relying Party.
    
 
    partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs {
-  boolean uvm;
+  boolean uvm;
 };
 
    
     
    Client extension processing
@@ -6649,8 +7324,8 @@ 
    Client extension output
     
    
      
    Returns a JSON array of 3-element arrays of numbers that encodes the factors in the authenticator extension output.
    
-
    typedef sequence<unsigned long> UvmEntry;
-typedef sequence<UvmEntry> UvmEntries;
+
    typedef sequence<unsigned long> UvmEntry;
+typedef sequence<UvmEntry> UvmEntries;
 
 partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs {
   UvmEntries uvm;
@@ -6665,7 +7340,7 @@ 
    
     
    Authenticator extension processing
     
    
-     
    The authenticator sets the authenticator extension output to be one or more user verification methods indicating the method(s) used
+     
    The authenticator sets the authenticator extension output to be one or more user verification methods indicating the method(s) used
 by the user to authorize the operation, as defined below. This extension can be added to attestation objects and assertions.
    
     
    Authenticator extension output
     
    
@@ -6685,19 +7360,19 @@ 
    
       
    userVerificationMethod
       
    
-       
    The authentication method/factor used by the authenticator to verify the user. Available values are defined in Section 3.1 User Verification Methods of [FIDO-Registry].
    
+       
    The authentication method/factor used by the authenticator to verify the user. Available values are defined in Section 3.1 User Verification Methods of [FIDO-Registry].
    
       
    keyProtectionType
       
    
        
    The method used by the authenticator to protect the FIDO registration private key material. Available values are defined
-in Section 3.2 Key Protection Types of [FIDO-Registry].
    
+in Section 3.2 Key Protection Types of [FIDO-Registry].
    
       
    matcherProtectionType
       
    
        
    The method used by the authenticator to protect the matcher that performs user verification. Available values are defined
-in Section 3.3 Matcher Protection Types of [FIDO-Registry].
    
+in Section 3.3 Matcher Protection Types of [FIDO-Registry].
    
      
      
    If >3 factors can be used in an authentication instance the authenticator vendor MUST select the 3 factors it believes
 will be most relevant to the Server to include in the UVM.
    
-     
    Example for authenticator data containing one UVM extension for a multi-factor authentication instance where 2 factors
+     
    Example for authenticator data containing one UVM extension for a multi-factor authentication instance where 2 factors
 were used:
    
 
    ...                    -- RP ID hash (32 bytes)
 81                     -- UP and ED set
@@ -6717,8 +7392,453 @@ 
    
    
+   
    10.2.2. Supplemental public keys extension (supplementalPubKeys)
    
+   
    This authenticator registration extension and authentication extension provides a Relying Party with additional public key(s) for credentials. This is done by creating user credential-specific key pairs on the authenticator, when required key pairs do not already exist for the user credential being created or exercised, and returning these supplemental keys (along with signatures by them) to the Relying Party. This is done each time this supplementalPubKeys extension is included with either a navigator.credentials.create() or navigator.credentials.get() call.
    
+   
    If the authenticator is incapable of generating a supplemental key pair, or the registration or authentication operation fails for any reason, that key pair is omitted from the output. If no supplemental key pairs remain then this extension is ignored. In this case, there is no supplementalPubKeys extension output generated.
    
+   
    Supplemental keys are not user credentials and they do not have their own credential IDs. Instead, any returned keys are a contextual attribute of their associated user credential. That is, when that user credential is used—along with the supplementalPubKeys extension—on a particular authenticator, a particular set of supplemental keys are returned by the extension, along with signatures demonstrating proof-of-possession of those keys.
    
+   
    Supplemental keys never have a scope that is larger than the user credential. That is, they are never shared between any two user credentials and can never be used to link two user credentials together. They only communicate continuity of some property of their associated user credential.
    
+   
    10.2.2.1. Relying Party Usage
    
+   
    This extension is intended for use by those Relying Parties employing risk-analysis systems informing their sign-in decisions. This extension signals the continuity of some property when used consistently with both navigator.credentials.create() and navigator.credentials.get() operations. The property being signaled depends on the scope of the supplemental key and its attestation statement, if any. The clearest example of a supplemental key is one that is device-bound. Repeated observation of a device-bound supplemental key indicates that a credential is being used repeatedly from the same device. (Which cannot be otherwise assumed in the case of backup eligible credentials.) But supplemental keys with wider scopes are also defined and the exact properties that they communicate depend on the attestation included along with them.
    
+   
    When a Relying Party uses the supplementalPubKeys extension with a create() call to create a new user credential, a signature by one or more new supplemental keys may be returned along with the new supplemental public keys themselves. For the sake of example, assume that a single supplemental public key is returned, called “SPK1”. For as long as the user credential is exercised within the scope of the supplemental key, the Relying Party's subsequent get() operations for that credential will likely generate assertions including further signatures by “SPK1”.
    
+   
    The credential may move beyond the scope of that supplemental key (for example, by being exported and imported elsewhere, if backup eligible) and, if used in this new domain, the get() operation will return a new supplemental key, SPK2, and its signature. Subsequent get() operations may observe either SPK1 or SPK2, depending on the context in which the user credential is being used.
    
+   
    A usage example is thus:
    
+   
    
+    
    A sign-in request is received by a website that, by regulation, must require certain authentication standards. The sign-in is done with a multi-device credential, but also includes a supplemental key with an attestation that states that the supplemental key is only synced after a user has met or exceeded those standards. Since that supplemental key has been seen before, and was initially verified to meet the site’s authentication standards, additional sign-in challenges are not required.
    
+   
    
+   
    Another example of supplemental keys:
    
+   
    
+    
    Say that a sign-in request appears at a website along with some geolocation signal that has not been seen for this user account before, and is outside of the typical usage hours observed for the account. The risk may be deemed high enough not to allow the request, even with an assertion by a multi-device credential on its own. But if a signature from a supplemental key that is device-bound, and that is well established for this user can also be presented, then that may tip the balance.
    
+   
    
+   
    The weight that Relying Parties give to the presence of a signature from a supplemental key may be based on information learned from its optional attestation. An attestation can indicate the level of protection enjoyed by a hardware-bound key, or the policies for other types of supplemental key.
    
+   
    10.2.2.2. Extension Definition
    
+   
    
+    
    Extension identifier
+    
    
+     
    supplementalPubKeys
    
+    
    Operation applicability
+    
    
+     
    Registration and authentication
    
+    
    Client extension input
+    
    
+
    dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs {
+    required sequence<DOMString> scopes;
+    DOMString attestation = "indirect";
+    sequence<DOMString> attestationFormats = [];
+};
+
+partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs {
+    AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs supplementalPubKeys;
+};
+
    
+     
    
+      
    
+       
    scopes,  of type sequence<DOMString>
+       
    
+        
    This required member MUST be non-empty. It specifies the scopes of supplemental public keys that the Relying Party requests. Values are taken from the CDDL below (i.e., currently defined values are provider and device); authenticators silently ignore unrecognized values. Specifying the scopes that a Relying Party can use allows an authenticator to avoid the work of generating superfluous supplemental keys.
    
+       
    attestation,  of type DOMString, defaulting to "indirect"
+       
    
+        
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding attestation conveyance.
+Its value SHOULD be a member of AttestationConveyancePreference. Client platforms MUST ignore unknown values, treating an unknown value as if the member does not exist.
    
+        
    The default value is indirect.
    
+       
    attestationFormats,  of type sequence<DOMString>, defaulting to []
+       
    
+        
    The Relying Party MAY use this OPTIONAL member to specify a preference regarding the attestation statement format used by the authenticator.
+Values SHOULD be taken from the IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
+Values are ordered from most preferable to least preferable.
+This parameter is advisory and the authenticator MAY use an attestation statement not enumerated in this parameter.
    
+        
    The default value is the empty list, which indicates no preference.
    
+      
    
+     
    
+    
    Client extension processing
+    
    
+     
    If supplementalPubKeys is present, the client creates the authenticator extension input from the client extension input.
    
+    
    Client extension output
+    
    
+     
    A sequence of ArrayBuffers containing the signatures returned as the unsigned extension output.
    
+
    dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs {
+    sequence<ArrayBuffer> signatures;
+};
+
+partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs {
+    AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs supplementalPubKeys;
+};
+
    
+    
    Authenticator extension input
+    
    
+     
    A CBOR expression of the client extension input
    
+
    supplementalPublicKeyInputs = {
+  scopes: [+
+    ; A key that has a broader scope than a single device, but still more
+    ; limited than a multi-device credential. The precise scope is specified
+    ; by the attestation of this supplemental public key.
+    "provider" /
+
+    ; A key with "device" scope MUST NOT leave the device on which it is
+    ; created.
+    "device"],
+  attestation: tstr,
+  attestationFormats: [* tstr],
+}
+$$extensionInput //= (
+  supplementalPubKeys: supplementalPublicKeyInputs,
+)
+
    
+    
    Authenticator extension output
+    
    
+     
    The supplemental public key attestation objects, defined by the attObjForSupplementalPubKey type:
    
+
    $$extensionOutput //= (
+    ; This array of supplemental public keys MUST be ordered
+    ; lexicographically by scope and MUST NOT include more than one element
+    ; with a given scope.
+
+    supplementalPubKeys: [+ attObjForSupplementalPubKey],
+)
+
+; This object conveys an attested supplemental public key and is analogous
+; to \`attObj\`.
+attObjForSupplementalPubKey = {
+    aaguid:  bstr,  ; AAGUID (16 bytes fixed-length)
+                    ; https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#aaguid
+
+    spk:     bstr,  ; The public key (self-describing variable length,
+                    ; COSE_Key format, CBOR-encoded)).
+
+    ; See the definition of `scopes` in `supplementalPublicKeyInputs`.
+
+    scope: "provider" / "device",
+
+    ; An authenticator-generated random nonce for inclusion in the attestation
+    ; signature. If the authenticator chooses to not generate a nonce, it sets this
+    ; to a zero-length byte string. See the note below about "randomNonce" for a
+    ; discussion on the nonce’s purpose.
+
+    nonce: bstr .size (0..32),
+
+    ; See https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#sctn-generating-an-attestation-object
+    ;
+    ; Attestation statement formats define the \`fmt\` and \`attStmt\` members of
+    ; $$attStmtType.
+    ; Note that \`fmt\` and \`attStmt\` are top-level members of
+    ; \`attObjForSupplementalPubKey\`.
+    ;
+    ; In summary, the \`attStmt\` will (typically) contain:
+    ;   (1) a SIGNATURE value calculated (using the attestation private key)
+    ;       over (prefix || aaguid || spk || nonce) where \`prefix\` is
+    ;       h’737570706c656d656e74616c5075624b657973206174746573746174696f6e2e
+    ;         00ffffffff'.
+    ;       (See the attestation calculations section, below, for a discussion
+    ;       about the purpose of this \`prefix\` value.)
+    ;   (2) the attestation certificate or public key, and supporting certificates,
+    ;       if any.
+    ;
+    ; Note that there are details dependent upon the particular attestation
+    ; statement format.
+    ; See https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#sctn-defined-attestation-formats.
+
+    $$attStmtType,
+
+    ; An optional boolean that indicates whether the attestation statement
+    ; contains uniquely identifying information. This can only be true
+    ; when the \`attestation\` field of the extension input is "enterprise"
+    ; and either the user-agent or the authenticator permits uniquely
+    ; identifying attestation for the requested RP ID.
+
+    ? epAtt: bool .default false,
+}
+
+
    
+    
    Unsigned extension output
+    
    
+     
    A non-empty CBOR array of byte strings containing the signatures generated with the supplemental private keys, in the same order as in the authenticator extension output.
    
+
    supplementalPublicKeyOutputs = [+ bstr]
+
+$$unsignedExtensionOutputs //= (
+  supplementalPubKeys: supplementalPublicKeyOutputs,
+)
+
    
+    
    Authenticator extension processing
+    
    
+     
    For both authenticatorMakeCredential and authenticatorGetAssertion operations:
    
+     
      
+      
    1. 
+       
      Create or select the public key credential source as usual (see § 6.3.2 The authenticatorMakeCredential Operation, or § 6.3.3 The authenticatorGetAssertion Operation as appropriate).
      
+      
    2. 
+       
      Let scopes be the set of all supplemental public key scopes that the authenticator supports. Update scopes to be the intersection of itself and scopes. If scopes is empty, terminate these processing steps with no extension output.
      
+      
    3. 
+       
      Let spks and spkSigs be empty arrays.
      
+      
    4. 
+       
      Sort scopes lexicographically.
      
+      
    5. 
+       
      For each scope in scopes:
      
+       
        
+        
      1. 
+         
        If a supplemental key with scope scope does not already exist for this {Credential ID, RP ID, userHandle} tuple on the authenticator, create it using the same public key algorithm as that used by the user credential's credential key pair, otherwise locate the existing supplemental key.
        
+        
      2. 
+         
        Let attFormat be the chosen attestation statement format, and attAaguid be a 16-byte value, based on the value of attestation in the extension input:
        
+         
        
+          
        none
+          
        
+           
        attFormat is "none" or "self", at the authenticator’s discretion, and attAaguid is 16 zero bytes. (Note that, since the supplemental public key is already exercised during navigator.credentials.create() calls, the proof-of-possession property provided by "self" attestation is superfluous in that context.)
        
+          
        indirect, direct
+          
        
+           
        attFormat is an attestation statement format appropriate for this authenticator based on attestationFormats, and attAaguid is the corresponding AAGUID, which MAY be the authenticator’s AAGUID. (Since the supplemental public key's scope is different from the user credential, it will often have a different attestation. For example, the attestation for a supplemental public key with “device” scope can be tied to hardware roots of trust, although it does not have to be.)
        
+          
        enterprise
+          
        
+           
        The Relying Party wants to receive an attestation statement that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. Authenticators MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested RP ID. If not permitted, then follow the steps for direct attestation. Otherwise attFormat is an attestation statement format appropriate for this authenticator based on attestationFormats, and attAaguid is the corresponding AAGUID, which MAY be the authenticator’s AAGUID.
        
+           
        Note: CTAP2 does not currently provide for an enterpriseAttestation signal during an authenticatorGetAssertion call. Until that is changed, platform-managed enterprise attestation will not work in that context with CTAP2 authenticators.
        
+         
        
+        
      3. 
+         
        Let spk be the newly created or existing supplemental public key, in COSE_Key format in the same fashion as for the user credential’s credentialPublicKey when the latter is conveyed in attested credential data.
        
+        
      4. 
+         
        Let supplementalPrivateKey be the newly created or existing private key corresponding to spk.
        
+        
      5. 
+         
        Let randomNonce be a fresh randomly-generated byte string of 32 bytes maximum length, or a zero length byte string if the authenticator chooses to not generate a nonce.
        
+         
        Note: randomNonce’s purpose is to randomize the attestation signature value for supplemental public keys. If this is not done, then an attestation signature value remains constant for all such signatures issued on behalf of this user credential, possibly exposing the authenticator's attestation private key to side-channel attacks. The randomness-generation mechanism should be carefully chosen by the authenticator implementer.
        
+        
      6. 
+         
        Let supplementalPubKey be a CBOR map as defined by attObjForSupplementalPubKey above, with keys and values as follows:
        
+         
        Note: as with all CBOR structures used in this specification, the CTAP2 canonical CBOR encoding form MUST be used.
        
+         
          
+          
        1. 
+           
          Set a key and value for the scope group based on the value of scope.
          
+          
        2. 
+           
          Let the aaguid key’s value be attAaguid.
          
+          
        3. 
+           
          Let the spk key’s value be spk.
          
+          
        4. 
+           
          Let the nonce key’s value be randomNonce.
          
+          
        5. 
+           
          Let the values of the $$attStmtType group socket be the result of generating an attestation statement with the attestation statement format, attFormat. See § 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations.
          
+           
          Note: The details of the $$attStmtType values are dependent upon the particular attestation statement format. See § 6.5.3 Attestation Statement Formats.
          
+          
        6. 
+           
          If the $$attStmtType group socket contains uniquely identifying information then let epAtt be true. Otherwise omit the epAtt field. (This field can only be true when the attestation field of the extension input is "enterprise" and either the user-agent or the authenticator permits uniquely identifying attestation for the requested RP ID.)
          
+         
        
+        
      7. 
+         
        Append supplementalPubKey to spks.
        
+        
      8. 
+         
        Let spkSig be the result of signing the assertion signature input with supplementalPrivateKey.
        
+         
        Note: the assertion signature input, and thus spkSig, covers the Relying Party's challenge because it includes the hash of the serialized client data. Thus the Relying Party knows that spkSig is a fresh signature.
        
+        
      9. 
+         
        Append spkSig to spkSigs.
        
+       
      
+      
    6. 
+       
      Let the supplementalPubKeys authenticator extension output value be the CBOR array spks.
      
+      
    7. 
+       
      Let the CBOR encoding of spkSigs be the extension’s unsigned extension output.
      
+       
      Note: spkSigs cannot be included in the authenticator extension output because it is returned inside the authenticator data and that would imply that the signature signs over itself.
      
+     
    
+   
    
+   
    10.2.2.2.1. AAGUIDs
    
+   
    Any non-zero AAGUIDs included in the supplementalPubKeys extension output aid a Relying Party in validating the attestation statement of the supplemental public key. The interpretation of each AAGUID depends on the scope of the corresponding key. Some or all may differ from the aaguid in the attested credential data of a multi-device credential. Thus the AAGUID of a supplemental public key MAY be different in a single response and either, or both, may be zero depending on the options requested and authenticator behaviour.
    
+   
    10.2.2.2.2. Attestation calculations
    
+   
    When computing attestations, the process in § 6.5.5 Generating an Attestation Object takes two inputs: authData and hash. When calculating an attestation for a supplemental public key, the typical value for authData contains the attestation signature itself, which is impossible. Also the attestation of a supplemental public key is potentially used repeatedly, thus may want to be cached. But signing over values that include Relying Party-chosen nonces, like the hash of the serialized client data, makes that impossible.
    
+   
    Therefore when calculating an attestation for a supplemental public key, the inputs are:
    
+   
      
+    
    • 
+     
      For authData, substitute the concatenation of the byte string h’737570706c656d656e74616c5075624b657973206174746573746174696f6e2e00ffffffff' and the value of aaguid from the extension output.
      
+    
    • 
+     
      For hash, substitute the concatenation of the spk and nonce fields from the extension output. (The nonce MAY be empty.)
      
+   
    
+   
    The attestation signature is thus typically calculated over the bytes of (h’737570706c656d656e74616c5075624b657973206174746573746174696f6e2e00ffffffff' || aaguid || spk || nonce). The 37-byte prefix ensures domain separation: it takes the place of the RP ID hash, flags, and signature counter fields in those messages and ensures that no attestation signature for a supplemental public key can be confused with a signature for a user credential.
    
+   
    Note that when nonce is empty, then the (signed) authenticator extension output MAY be constant. However, the (unsigned) spkSig output is always unique and prevents replay of the (signed) extension output without knowledge of the supplemental private key.
    
+   
    10.2.2.3. supplementalPubKeys Extension Output Verification Procedures
    
+   
    Verifying the supplementalPubKeys extension output is performed by the Relying Party whenever a supplemental public key is returned within the extension output.
    
+   
    The supplementalPubKeys extension adds the following item to credential records:
    
+   
    
+    
    supplementalPubKeys
+    
    
+     
    An initially empty set of supplemental public key records associated with this public key credential source.
    
+     
    A supplemental public key record is an abstract representation of a registered supplemental public key.
+It is a struct with the following items:
    
+     
    
+      
    aaguid
+      
    
+       
    The AAGUID included with the supplemental public key.
+This MAY be different from the aaguid in the attestationObject, if any, of the containing credential record.
    
+      
    spk
+      
    
+       
    The public key portion of the supplemental public key.
    
+      
    scope
+      
    
+       
    The scope of the supplemental public key. See § 10.2.2.2 Extension Definition for details.
    
+      
    fmt
+      
    
+       
    The attestation statement format of the supplemental public key’s attestation statement.
    
+      
    attStmt
+      
    
+       
    The supplemental public key’s attestation statement.
    
+     
    
+   
    
+   
    10.2.2.3.1. Registration (create())
    
+   
    If the Relying Party requested the supplementalPubKeys extension in a navigator.credentials.create() call,
+then the below verification steps are performed in the context of step 19 of § 7.1 Registering a New Credential using these variables established therein: credential, clientExtensionResults, authData, and hash. Relying Party policy may specify whether a response without a supplementalPubKeys extension output is acceptable.
    
+   
      
+    
    1. 
+     
      Verify that the supplementalPubKeys member of clientExtensionResults exists, and contains the signatures field. Let signatures be the value of that field.
      
+    
    2. 
+     
      Let attObjsForSupplementalPublicKey be the value of the supplementalPubKeys member of the authenticator extension output from authData.
      
+    
    3. 
+     
      If the size of attObjsForSupplementalPublicKey is not equal to the size of signatures then abort the registration process with an error.
      
+    
    4. 
+     
      Iterate over the indices of attObjsForSupplementalPublicKey (which, after the check in the previous step, must also be the indices of signatures). Then, for each (attObjForSupplementalPubKey, signature) from the two lists:
      
+     
        
+      
      1. 
+       
        Extract the contained fields from attObjForSupplementalPubKey: aaguid, spk, nonce, fmt and attStmt. Also let scope reflect the scope, specified by the member of the scope group that is present.
        
+       
        Note: The latter attObjForSupplementalPubKey fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of the top-level attestation object.
        
+      
      2. 
+       
        Verify that signature is a valid signature over the assertion signature input (i.e. authData and hash) by the supplemental public key spk. (The signature algorithm is the same as for the user credential.)
        
+      
      3. 
+       
        Optionally, if attestation was requested and the Relying Party wishes to verify it, verify that attStmt is a correct attestation statement, conveying a valid attestation signature, by using the attestation statement format fmt’s verification procedure given attStmt. See § 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations. Relying Party policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.
        
+       
        Note: If fmt’s value is "none" there is no attestation signature to verify.
        
+      
      4. 
+       
        Create a new supplemental public key record with the contents:
        
+       
        
+        
        aaguid
+        
        
+         
        The value of aaguid.
        
+        
        spk
+        
        
+         
        The value of spk.
        
+        
        scope
+        
        
+         
        The value of scope.
        
+        
        fmt
+        
        
+         
        The value of fmt.
        
+        
        attStmt
+        
        
+         
        The value of attStmt.
        
+       
        
+       
        In step 26 of § 7.1 Registering a New Credential,
+add this supplemental public key record to the supplementalPubKeys member of the new credential record.
        
+     
      
+   
    
+   
    See also § 10.2.2.1 Relying Party Usage for further details.
    
+   
    10.2.2.3.2. Authentication (get())
    
+   
    If the Relying Party requested the supplementalPubKeys extension in a navigator.credentials.get() call,
+then the below verification steps are performed in the context of step 17 of § 7.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion using these variables established therein: credential, clientExtensionResults, authData, hash, and credentialRecord. Relying Party policy may specify whether a response without a supplementalPubKeys extension output is acceptable.
    
+   
      
+    
    1. 
+     
      Let recognizedSpks be a new empty set.
      
+    
    2. 
+     
      Verify that the supplementalPubKeys member of clientExtensionResults exists, and contains the signatures field. Let signatures be the value of that field.
      
+    
    3. 
+     
      Let attObjsForSupplementalPubKeys be the value of the supplementalPubKeys member of the authenticator extension output from authData.
      
+    
    4. 
+     
      If the size of attObjsForSupplementalPubKeys is not equal to the size of signatures then abort the authentication process with an error.
      
+    
    5. 
+     
      Iterate over the indices of attObjsForSupplementalPubKeys (which, after the check in the previous step, must also be the indices of signatures). Then, for each (attObjForSupplementalPubKey, signature) from the two lists:
      
+     
        
+      
      1. 
+       
        Extract the contained fields from attObjForSupplementalPubKey: aaguid, spk, nonce, fmt, attStmt. Also let scope reflect the scope, specified by the member of the scope group that is present.
        
+       
        Note: The latter attObjForSupplementalPubKey fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of authenticator data.
        
+      
      2. 
+       
        Verify that signature is a valid signature over the assertion signature input (i.e. authData and hash) by the supplemental public key spk. (The signature algorithm is the same as for the user credential.)
        
+      
      3. 
+       
        Let matchedSpkRecords be a new empty set. For each spkRecord in credentialRecord.supplementalPubKeys:
        
+       
          
+        
        1. 
+         
          If spkRecord.aaguid equals aaguid, spkRecord.spk equals spk,
+  and spkRecord.scope equals scope:
          
+         
            
+          
          1. 
+           
            Append spkRecord to matchedSpkRecords.
            
+         
          
+       
        
+      
      4. 
+       
        If matchedSpkRecords
        
+       
        
+        
        has size greater than one:
+        
        
+         
        Some form of error has occurred: credentialRecord invariants have been broken. Terminate these verification steps.
        
+        
        has size equal to one:
+        
        
+         
        This is a known supplemental public key
        
+         
        If fmt’s value is "none" then there is no attestation signature to verify and this is a known supplemental public key with a valid signature. Append spkRecord to recognizedSpks and continue to the next iteration, if any.
        
+         
        Otherwise, let spkRecord be matchedSpkRecords[0]. If the attStmt in attObjForSupplementalPubKey:
        
+         
        
+          
        equals spkRecord.attStmt by binary equality:
+          
        
+           
        This is a known supplemental public key with a valid signature and valid attestation. Append spkRecord to recognizedSpks and continue to the next iteration, if any.
        
+           
        Note: This authenticator is not generating a fresh per-response random nonce.
        
+          
        does not equal spkRecord.attStmt by binary equality:
+          
        
+           
        Optionally, if attestation was requested and the RP wishes to verify it, verify that attStmt is a correct attestation statement, conveying a valid attestation signature, by using the attestation statement format fmt’s verification procedure given attStmt. See § 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations. Relying Party policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.
        
+           
        If the result is:
        
+           
        
+            
        successful
+            
        
+             
        This is a known supplemental public key with a valid signature and valid attestation. Append spkRecord to recognizedSpks and continue to the next iteration, if any.
        
+            
        unsuccessful
+            
        
+             
        Some form of error has occurred. It is indeterminate whether this is a valid supplemental public key. Either terminate these verification steps with an error or continue to the next iteration, if any, to ignore this key.
        
+           
        
+         
        
+        
        is empty:
+        
        
+         
        This is possibly a new supplemental public key.
        
+         
          
+          
        1. 
+           
          Let matchedSpkKeys be a new empty set. For each spkRecord in credentialRecord.supplementalPubKeys:
          
+           
            
+            
          1. 
+             
            If spkRecord.spk equals spk:
            
+             
              
+              
            1. 
+               
              Append spkRecord to matchedSpkKeys.
              
+             
            
+           
          
+          
        2. 
+           
          If matchedSpkKeys is empty:
          
+           
          
+            
          If fmt’s value is "none":
+            
          
+             
          There is no attestation signature to verify and this is a new supplemental key. Unless Relying Party policy specifies that this attestation is unacceptable, Create a new supplemental public key record and then continue to the next iteration, if any.
          
+            
          Otherwise:
+            
          
+             
          Optionally, if attestation was requested and the RP wishes to verify it, verify that attStmt is a correct attestation statement, conveying a valid attestation signature, by using the attestation statement format fmt’s verification procedure given attStmt. See § 10.2.2.2.2 Attestation calculations. Relying Party policy may specifiy which attestations are acceptable.
          
+             
          If the result is:
          
+             
          
+              
          successful
+              
          
+               
          This is a new supplemental public key. Create a new supplemental public key record then continue to the next iteration, if any.
          
+              
          unsuccessful
+              
          
+               
          Some form of error has occurred and a supplemental public key record cannot be created. Either terminate these verification steps with an error or continue to the next iteration, if any, to ignore this supplemental public key.
          
+             
          
+           
          
+          
        3. 
+           
          Otherwise there is some form of error: we recieved a known spk value, but one or more of the accompanying aaguid or scope values did not match what the Relying Party has stored along with that spk value. Terminate these verification steps.
          
+         
        
+       
        
+     
      
+   
    
+   
    At the end of these steps, recognizedSpks contains zero or more supplemental public keys that were previously known for this user credential. These keys make claims about the continuity of certain factors between this authentication attempt and previous ones. The Relying Party should judge those claims in light of the attestations provided, if any, and evaluate the risk of this authentication in light of this information.
    
+   
    See also § 10.2.2.1 Relying Party Usage.
    
+   
    To Create a new supplemental public key record, perform the following steps:
    
+   
      
+    
    1. 
+     
      Create a new supplemental public key record with the contents:
      
+     
      
+      
      aaguid
+      
      
+       
      The value of aaguid.
      
+      
      spk
+      
      
+       
      The value of spk.
      
+      
      scope
+      
      
+       
      The value of scope.
      
+      
      fmt
+      
      
+       
      The value of fmt.
      
+      
      attStmt
+      
      
+       
      The value of attStmt.
      
+     
      
+     
      In step 22 of § 7.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion, append this supplemental public key record to credentialRecord.supplementalPubKeys.
      
+   
    
    
    11. User Agent Automation
    
-   
    For the purposes of user agent automation and web application testing, this document defines a number of [WebDriver] extension commands.
    
+   
    For the purposes of user agent automation and web application testing, this document defines a number of [WebDriver] extension commands.
    
    
    11.1. WebAuthn WebDriver Extension Capability
    
    
    In order to advertise the availability of the extension commands defined below, a new extension capability is defined.
    
    
    
@@ -6753,7 +7873,7 @@ 
    11.1.1. Authenticator Extension Capabilities
    
-   
    Additionally, extension capabilities are defined for every authenticator extension (i.e. those defining authenticator extension processing) defined in this specification:
    
+   
    Additionally, extension capabilities are defined for every authenticator extension (i.e. those defining authenticator extension processing) defined in this specification:
    
    
    
     
@@ -6782,7 +7902,7 @@ 
    
        
    
      
    boolean
-       Indicates whether the endpoint node WebAuthn WebDriver implementation supports the credBlob extension defined in [FIDO-CTAP].
+       Indicates whether the endpoint node WebAuthn WebDriver implementation supports the credBlob extension defined in [FIDO-CTAP].
     
    
    
    
    
    When validating capabilities, the extension-specific substeps to validate an authenticator extension capability key with value are the following:
    
@@ -6795,48 +7915,48 @@ 
    matching capabilities, the extension-specific steps to match an authenticator extension capability key with value are the following:
    
    
      
     
    1. 
-     
      If value is true and the endpoint node WebAuthn WebDriver implementation does not support the authenticator extension identified by the key,
+     
      If value is true and the endpoint node WebAuthn WebDriver implementation does not support the authenticator extension identified by the key,
 the match is unsuccessful.
      
     
    2. 
      
      Otherwise, the match is successful.
      
    
    
-   
    User-Agents implementing defined authenticator extensions SHOULD implement the corresponding authenticator extension capability.
    
+   
    User-Agents implementing defined authenticator extensions SHOULD implement the corresponding authenticator extension capability.
    
    
    11.2. Virtual Authenticators
    
    
    These WebDriver extension commands create and interact with Virtual Authenticators: software implementations of the Authenticator Model. Virtual Authenticators are stored in a Virtual Authenticator Database.
 Each stored virtual authenticator has the following properties:
    
    
    
     
    authenticatorId
     
    
-     
    An non-null string made using up to 48 characters from the unreserved production defined in Appendix A of [RFC3986] that uniquely identifies the Virtual Authenticator.
    
+     
    An non-null string made using up to 48 characters from the unreserved production defined in Appendix A of [RFC3986] that uniquely identifies the Virtual Authenticator.
    
     
    protocol
     
    
-     
    The protocol the Virtual Authenticator speaks: one of "ctap1/u2f", "ctap2" or "ctap2_1" [FIDO-CTAP].
    
+     
    The protocol the Virtual Authenticator speaks: one of "ctap1/u2f", "ctap2" or "ctap2_1" [FIDO-CTAP].
    
     
    transport
     
    
-     
    The AuthenticatorTransport simulated. If the transport is set to internal, the
-authenticator simulates platform attachment. Otherwise, it simulates cross-platform attachment.
    
+     
    The AuthenticatorTransport simulated. If the transport is set to internal, the
+authenticator simulates platform attachment. Otherwise, it simulates cross-platform attachment.
    
     
    hasResidentKey
     
    
      
    If set to true the authenticator will support client-side discoverable credentials.
    
     
    hasUserVerification
     
    
-     
    If set to true, the authenticator supports user verification.
    
+     
    If set to true, the authenticator supports user verification.
    
     
    isUserConsenting
     
    
-     
    Determines the result of all user consent authorization gestures, and by extension, any test of user presence performed on the Virtual Authenticator. If set to true, a user consent will always be granted. If set to false, it will not be granted.
    
+     
    Determines the result of all user consent authorization gestures, and by extension, any test of user presence performed on the Virtual Authenticator. If set to true, a user consent will always be granted. If set to false, it will not be granted.
    
     
    isUserVerified
     
    
-     
    Determines the result of User Verification performed on the Virtual Authenticator. If set to true, User Verification will always succeed. If set to false, it will fail.
    
-     
    Note: This property has no effect if hasUserVerification is set to false.
    
+     
    Determines the result of User Verification performed on the Virtual Authenticator. If set to true, User Verification will always succeed. If set to false, it will fail.
    
+     
    Note: This property has no effect if hasUserVerification is set to false.
    
     
    extensions
     
    
-     
    A string array containing the extension identifiers supported by the Virtual Authenticator.
    
-     
    A Virtual authenticator MUST support all authenticator extensions present in its extensions array.
-It MUST NOT support any authenticator extension not present in its extensions array.
    
+     
    A string array containing the extension identifiers supported by the Virtual Authenticator.
    
+     
    A Virtual authenticator MUST support all authenticator extensions present in its extensions array.
+It MUST NOT support any authenticator extension not present in its extensions array.
    
     
    uvm
     
    
-     
    A UvmEntries array to be set as the authenticator extension output when processing the User Verification Method extension.
    
-     
    Note: This property has no effect if the Virtual Authenticator does not support the User Verification Method extension.
    
+     
    A UvmEntries array to be set as the authenticator extension output when processing the User Verification Method extension.
    
+     
    Note: This property has no effect if the Virtual Authenticator does not support the User Verification Method extension.
    
    
    
    
    11.3. Add Virtual Authenticator
    
    
    The Add Virtual Authenticator WebDriver extension command creates a software Virtual Authenticator. It is
@@ -6871,7 +7991,7 @@ 
    AuthenticatorTransport values
+       AuthenticatorTransport values
        None
       
        hasResidentKey
@@ -6896,7 +8016,7 @@ 
    extension identifiers
+       An array containing extension identifiers
        Empty array
       
        uvm
@@ -6909,7 +8029,7 @@ 
    Object, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
-     
    Note: parameters is a Authenticator Configuration object.
    
+     
    Note: parameters is a Authenticator Configuration object.
    
     
  • 
      
    Let authenticator be a new Virtual Authenticator.
    
     
  • 
@@ -6942,7 +8062,7 @@ 
    extension identifier supported by the endpoint node WebAuthn WebDriver implementation,
+       
    If extension is not an extension identifier supported by the endpoint node WebAuthn WebDriver implementation,
 return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code unsupported operation.
    
      
     
  • 
@@ -6980,7 +8100,7 @@ 
    success.
    
    
    
    11.5. Add Credential
    
-   
    The Add Credential WebDriver extension command injects a Public Key Credential Source into an existing Virtual Authenticator. It is defined as follows:
    
+   
    The Add Credential WebDriver extension command injects a Public Key Credential Source into an existing Virtual Authenticator. It is defined as follows:
    
    
    
     
@@ -7004,7 +8124,7 @@ 
    Credential ID encoded using Base64url Encoding.
+       
    
      
    The Credential ID encoded using Base64url Encoding.
        string
       
    
        isResidentCredential
@@ -7012,23 +8132,23 @@ 
    Relying Party ID the credential is scoped to.
+       
    		The Relying Party ID the credential is scoped to.
        string
       
    
        privateKey
-        An asymmetric key package containing a single private key per [RFC5958], encoded using Base64url Encoding. 
+        An asymmetric key package containing a single private key per [RFC5958], encoded using Base64url Encoding. 
        string
       
    
        userHandle
-        The userHandle associated to the credential encoded using Base64url Encoding. This property may not be defined. 
+        The userHandle associated to the credential encoded using Base64url Encoding. This property may not be defined. 
        string
       
    
        signCount
-       The initial value for a signature counter associated to the public key credential source.
+       The initial value for a signature counter associated to the public key credential source.
        number
       
    
        largeBlob
-        The large, per-credential blob associated to the public key credential source, encoded using Base64url Encoding.
+        The large, per-credential blob associated to the public key credential source, encoded using Base64url Encoding.
                     This property may not be defined. 
        string
     
    
@@ -7037,9 +8157,9 @@ 
    Object, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
-     
    Note: parameters is a Credential Parameters object.
    
+     
    Note: parameters is a Credential Parameters object.
    
     
  • 
-     
    Let credentialId be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ credentialId property.
    
+     
    Let credentialId be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ credentialId property.
    
     
  • 
      
    If credentialId is failure, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
     
  • 
@@ -7049,19 +8169,19 @@ 
    RP ID, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
+     
    If rpId is not a valid RP ID, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
     
  • 
-     
    Let privateKey be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ privateKey property.
    
+     
    Let privateKey be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ privateKey property.
    
     
  • 
      
    If privateKey is failure, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
     
  • 
      
    If privateKey is not a validly-encoded asymmetric key package containing a single ECDSA private key on the P-256
- curve per [RFC5958], return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
+ curve per [RFC5958], return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
     
  • 
      
    If the parameters’ userHandle property is defined:
    
      
      
       
    1. 
-       
      Let userHandle be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ userHandle property.
      
+       
      Let userHandle be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ userHandle property.
      
       
    2. 
        
      If userHandle is failure, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
      
      
    
@@ -7084,7 +8204,7 @@ 
    largeBlob extension and the parameters’ largeBlob feature is defined:
    
      
      
       
    1. 
-       
      Let largeBlob be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ largeBlob property.
      
+       
      Let largeBlob be the result of decoding Base64url Encoding on the parameters’ largeBlob property.
      
       
    2. 
        
      If largeBlob is failure, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
      
      
    
@@ -7100,13 +8220,13 @@ 
    type
       
    
        
    public-key
    
-      
    id
+      
    id
       
    
        
    credentialId
    
       
    privateKey
       
    
        
    privateKey
    
-      
    rpId
+      
    rpId
       
    
        
    rpId
    
       
    userHandle
@@ -7123,8 +8243,8 @@ 
    success.
    
    
    
    11.6. Get Credentials
    
-   
    The Get Credentials WebDriver extension command returns one Credential Parameters object for every Public Key Credential Source stored in a Virtual Authenticator, regardless of whether they were
-stored using Add Credential or navigator.credentials.create(). It is defined as follows:
    
+   
    The Get Credentials WebDriver extension command returns one Credential Parameters object for every Public Key Credential Source stored in a Virtual Authenticator, regardless of whether they were
+stored using Add Credential or navigator.credentials.create(). It is defined as follows:
    
    
    
     
@@ -7145,13 +8265,13 @@ 
    Public Key Credential Source credential, managed by the authenticator identified by authenticatorId,
+     
    For each Public Key Credential Source credential, managed by the authenticator identified by authenticatorId,
 construct a corresponding Credential Parameters Object and add it to credentialsArray.
    
     
  • 
      
    Return success with data containing credentialsArray.
    
    
    
    11.7. Remove Credential
    
-   
    The Remove Credential WebDriver extension command removes a Public Key Credential Source stored on a Virtual Authenticator. It is defined as follows:
    
+   
    The Remove Credential WebDriver extension command removes a Public Key Credential Source stored on a Virtual Authenticator. It is defined as follows:
    
    
    
     
    • 
      
    
@@ -7172,14 +8292,14 @@ 
    Virtual Authenticator identified by authenticatorId.
    
     
  • 
-     
    If credentialId does not match any Public Key Credential Source managed by authenticator, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
+     
    If credentialId does not match any Public Key Credential Source managed by authenticator, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
     
  • 
-     
    Remove the Public Key Credential Source identified by credentialId managed by authenticator.
    
+     
    Remove the Public Key Credential Source identified by credentialId managed by authenticator.
    
     
  • 
      
    Return success.
    
    
    
    11.8. Remove All Credentials
    
-   
    The Remove All Credentials WebDriver extension command removes all Public Key Credential Sources stored on a Virtual Authenticator. It is defined as follows:
    
+   
    The Remove All Credentials WebDriver extension command removes all Public Key Credential Sources stored on a Virtual Authenticator. It is defined as follows:
    
    
    
     
    • 
      
    
@@ -7198,7 +8318,7 @@ 
    Virtual Authenticator stored in the Virtual Authenticator
  Database, return a WebDriver error with WebDriver error code invalid argument.
    
     
  • 
-     
    Remove all Public Key Credential Sources managed by the Virtual Authenticator identified by authenticatorId.
    
+     
    Remove all Public Key Credential Sources managed by the Virtual Authenticator identified by authenticatorId.
    
     
  • 
      
    Return success.
    
    
@@ -7236,12 +8356,12 @@ 
    12. IANA Considerations
    
    
    12.1. WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier Registrations Updates
    
    
    This section updates the below-listed attestation statement formats defined in Section § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats in the
-IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809], originally registered in [WebAuthn-1], to point to this specification.
    
+IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809], originally registered in [WebAuthn-1], to point to this specification.
    
    
      
     
    • 
      
      WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier: packed
      
     
    • 
-     
      Description: The "packed" attestation statement format is a WebAuthn-optimized format for attestation. It uses a very
+     
      Description: The "packed" attestation statement format is a WebAuthn-optimized format for attestation. It uses a very
 compact but still extensible encoding method. This format is implementable by authenticators with limited resources (e.g.,
 secure elements).
      
     
    • 
@@ -7275,7 +8395,7 @@ 
      Specification Document: Section § 8.6 FIDO U2F Attestation Statement Format of this specification
      
    
    
    
    12.2. WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier Registrations
    
-   
    This section registers the below-listed attestation statement formats, newly defined in Section § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats, in the IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
    
+   
    This section registers the below-listed attestation statement formats, newly defined in Section § 8 Defined Attestation Statement Formats, in the IANA "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
    
    
      
     
    • 
      
      WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier: apple
      
@@ -7286,414 +8406,460 @@ 
      
      
      WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifier: none
      
     
    • 
-     
      Description: Used to replace any authenticator-provided attestation statement when a WebAuthn Relying Party indicates it does not wish to receive attestation information.
      
+     
      Description: Used to replace any authenticator-provided attestation statement when a WebAuthn Relying Party indicates it does not wish to receive attestation information.
      
     
    • 
      
      Specification Document: Section § 8.7 None Attestation Statement Format of this specification
      
    
    
    
    12.3. WebAuthn Extension Identifier Registrations Updates
    
-   
    This section updates the below-listed extension identifier values defined in Section § 10 Defined Extensions in the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809], originally registered in [WebAuthn-1], to point to this specification.
    
+   
    This section updates the below-listed extension identifier values defined in Section § 10 Defined Extensions in the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809], originally registered in [WebAuthn-1], to point to this specification.
    
    
    
    12.4. WebAuthn Extension Identifier Registrations
    
-   
    This section registers the below-listed extension identifier values, newly defined in Section § 10 Defined Extensions, in the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
    
+   
    This section registers the below-listed extension identifier values, newly defined in Section § 10 Defined Extensions, in the IANA "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809].
    
    
    
    13. Security Considerations
    
    
    This specification defines a Web API and a cryptographic peer-entity authentication protocol.
-The Web Authentication API allows Web developers (i.e., "authors") to utilize the Web Authentication protocol in their registration and authentication ceremonies.
-The entities comprising the Web Authentication protocol endpoints are user-controlled WebAuthn Authenticators and a WebAuthn Relying Party's
-computing environment hosting the Relying Party's web application.
-In this model, the user agent, together with the WebAuthn Client, comprise an intermediary between authenticators and Relying Parties.
-Additionally, authenticators can attest to Relying Parties as to their provenance.
    
-   
    At this time, this specification does not feature detailed security considerations. However, the [FIDOSecRef] document provides a security analysis which is overall applicable to this specification.
-Also, the [FIDOAuthnrSecReqs] document suite provides useful information about authenticator security characteristics.
    
+The Web Authentication API allows Web developers (i.e., "authors") to utilize the Web Authentication protocol in their registration and authentication ceremonies.
+The entities comprising the Web Authentication protocol endpoints are user-controlled WebAuthn Authenticators and a WebAuthn Relying Party's
+computing environment hosting the Relying Party's web application.
+In this model, the user agent, together with the WebAuthn Client, comprise an intermediary between authenticators and Relying Parties.
+Additionally, authenticators can attest to Relying Parties as to their provenance.
    
+   
    At this time, this specification does not feature detailed security considerations. However, the [FIDOSecRef] document provides a security analysis which is overall applicable to this specification.
+Also, the [FIDOAuthnrSecReqs] document suite provides useful information about authenticator security characteristics.
    
    
    The below subsections comprise the current Web Authentication-specific security considerations.
 They are divided by audience;
 general security considerations are direct subsections of this section,
-while security considerations specifically for authenticator, client and Relying Party implementers
+while security considerations specifically for authenticator, client and Relying Party implementers
 are grouped into respective subsections.
    
    
    13.1. Credential ID Unsigned
    
-   
    The credential ID is not signed.
-This is not a problem because all that would happen if an authenticator returns
-the wrong credential ID, or if an attacker intercepts and manipulates the credential ID, is that the WebAuthn Relying Party would not look up the correct credential public key with which to verify the returned signed authenticator data (a.k.a., assertion), and thus the interaction would end in an error.
    
+   
    The credential ID is not signed.
+This is not a problem because all that would happen if an authenticator returns
+the wrong credential ID, or if an attacker intercepts and manipulates the credential ID, is that the WebAuthn Relying Party would not look up the correct credential public key with which to verify the returned signed authenticator data (a.k.a., assertion), and thus the interaction would end in an error.
    
    
    13.2. Physical Proximity between Client and Authenticator
    
-   
    In the WebAuthn authenticator model, it is generally assumed that roaming authenticators are physically close to, and communicate directly with, the client.
+   
    In the WebAuthn authenticator model, it is generally assumed that roaming authenticators are physically close to, and communicate directly with, the client.
 This arrangement has some important advantages.
    
-   
    The promise of physical proximity between client and authenticator is a key strength of a something you have authentication factor.
-For example, if a roaming authenticator can communicate only via USB or Bluetooth,
+   
    The promise of physical proximity between client and authenticator is a key strength of a something you have authentication factor.
+For example, if a roaming authenticator can communicate only via USB or Bluetooth,
 the limited range of these transports ensures that any malicious actor
-must physically be within that range in order to interact with the authenticator.
-This is not necessarily true of an authenticator that can be invoked remotely —
-even if the authenticator verifies user presence,
+must physically be within that range in order to interact with the authenticator.
+This is not necessarily true of an authenticator that can be invoked remotely —
+even if the authenticator verifies user presence,
 users can be tricked into authorizing remotely initiated malicious requests.
    
-   
    Direct communication between client and authenticator means the client can enforce the scope restrictions for credentials.
-By contrast, if the communication between client and authenticator is mediated by some third party,
-then the client has to trust the third party to
-enforce the scope restrictions and control access to the authenticator.
+   
    Direct communication between client and authenticator means the client can enforce the scope restrictions for credentials.
+By contrast, if the communication between client and authenticator is mediated by some third party,
+then the client has to trust the third party to
+enforce the scope restrictions and control access to the authenticator.
 Failure to do either could result in
-a malicious Relying Party receiving authentication assertions valid for other Relying Parties,
+a malicious Relying Party receiving authentication assertions valid for other Relying Parties,
 or in a malicious user gaining access to authentication assertions for other users.
    
-   
    If designing a solution where the authenticator does not need to be physically close to the client,
-or where client and authenticator do not communicate directly,
+   
    If designing a solution where the authenticator does not need to be physically close to the client,
+or where client and authenticator do not communicate directly,
 designers SHOULD consider how this affects the enforcement of scope restrictions
-and the strength of the authenticator as a something you have authentication factor.
    
-   
    13.3. Security considerations for authenticators 
    
+and the strength of the authenticator as a something you have authentication factor.
    
+   
    13.3. Security considerations for authenticators 
    
    
    13.3.1. Attestation Certificate Hierarchy
    
    
    A 3-tier hierarchy for attestation certificates is RECOMMENDED (i.e., Attestation Root, Attestation Issuing CA, Attestation
-Certificate). It is also RECOMMENDED that for each WebAuthn Authenticator device line (i.e., model), a separate issuing CA is
+Certificate). It is also RECOMMENDED that for each WebAuthn Authenticator device line (i.e., model), a separate issuing CA is
 used to help facilitate isolating problems with a specific version of an authenticator model.
    
-   
    If the attestation root certificate is not dedicated to a single WebAuthn Authenticator device line (i.e., AAGUID), the AAGUID
-SHOULD be specified in the attestation certificate itself, so that it can be verified against the authenticator data.
    
+   
    If the attestation root certificate is not dedicated to a single WebAuthn Authenticator device line (i.e., AAGUID), the AAGUID
+SHOULD be specified in the attestation certificate itself, so that it can be verified against the authenticator data.
    
    
    13.3.2. Attestation Certificate and Attestation Certificate CA Compromise
    
-   
    When an intermediate CA or a root CA used for issuing attestation certificates is compromised, WebAuthn Authenticator attestation key pairs are still safe although their certificates can no longer be trusted. A WebAuthn Authenticator manufacturer that
-has recorded the attestation public keys for their authenticator models can issue new attestation certificates for these keys from a new
-intermediate CA or from a new root CA. If the root CA changes, the WebAuthn Relying Parties MUST update their trusted root certificates
+   
    When an intermediate CA or a root CA used for issuing attestation certificates is compromised, WebAuthn Authenticator attestation key pairs are still safe although their certificates can no longer be trusted. A WebAuthn Authenticator manufacturer that
+has recorded the attestation public keys for their authenticator models can issue new attestation certificates for these keys from a new
+intermediate CA or from a new root CA. If the root CA changes, the WebAuthn Relying Parties MUST update their trusted root certificates
 accordingly.
    
-   
    A WebAuthn Authenticator attestation certificate MUST be revoked by the issuing CA if its private key has been compromised. A WebAuthn
-Authenticator manufacturer may need to ship a firmware update and inject new attestation private keys and certificates into already
-manufactured WebAuthn Authenticators, if the exposure was due to a firmware flaw. (The process by which this happens is out of
-scope for this specification.) If the WebAuthn Authenticator manufacturer does not have this capability, then it may not be
-possible for Relying Parties to trust any further attestation statements from the affected WebAuthn Authenticators.
    
-   
    See also the related security consideration for Relying Parties in § 13.4.5 Revoked Attestation Certificates.
    
-   
    13.4. Security considerations for Relying Parties
    
+   
    A WebAuthn Authenticator attestation certificate MUST be revoked by the issuing CA if its private key has been compromised. A WebAuthn
+Authenticator manufacturer may need to ship a firmware update and inject new attestation private keys and certificates into already
+manufactured WebAuthn Authenticators, if the exposure was due to a firmware flaw. (The process by which this happens is out of
+scope for this specification.) If the WebAuthn Authenticator manufacturer does not have this capability, then it may not be
+possible for Relying Parties to trust any further attestation statements from the affected WebAuthn Authenticators.
    
+   
    See also the related security consideration for Relying Parties in § 13.4.5 Revoked Attestation Certificates.
    
+   
    13.4. Security considerations for Relying Parties
    
    
    13.4.1. Security Benefits for WebAuthn Relying Parties
    
-   
    The main benefits offered to WebAuthn Relying Parties by this specification include:
    
+   
    The main benefits offered to WebAuthn Relying Parties by this specification include:
    
    
      
     
    1. 
      
      Users and accounts can be secured using widely compatible, easy-to-use multi-factor authentication.
      
     
    2. 
-     
      The Relying Party does not need to provision authenticator hardware to its users. Instead, each user can independently obtain
-any conforming authenticator and use that same authenticator with any number of Relying Parties. The Relying Party can optionally
-enforce requirements on authenticators' security properties by inspecting the attestation statements returned from the authenticators.
      
+     
      The Relying Party does not need to provision authenticator hardware to its users. Instead, each user can independently obtain
+any conforming authenticator and use that same authenticator with any number of Relying Parties. The Relying Party can optionally
+enforce requirements on authenticators' security properties by inspecting the attestation statements returned from the authenticators.
      
     
    3. 
-     
      Authentication ceremonies are resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks.
-Regarding registration ceremonies, see § 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations, below.
      
+     
      Authentication ceremonies are resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks.
+Regarding registration ceremonies, see § 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations, below.
      
     
    4. 
-     
      The Relying Party can automatically support multiple types of user verification - for example PIN, biometrics and/or future
-methods - with little or no code change, and can let each user decide which they prefer to use via their choice of authenticator.
      
+     
      The Relying Party can automatically support multiple types of user verification - for example PIN, biometrics and/or future
+methods - with little or no code change, and can let each user decide which they prefer to use via their choice of authenticator.
      
     
    5. 
-     
      The Relying Party does not need to store additional secrets in order to gain the above benefits.
      
+     
      The Relying Party does not need to store additional secrets in order to gain the above benefits.
      
    
    
-   
    As stated in the Conformance section, the Relying Party MUST behave as described in § 7 WebAuthn Relying Party Operations to obtain all of the above security benefits. However, one notable use case that departs slightly from this is described below in § 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations.
    
+   
    As stated in the Conformance section, the Relying Party MUST behave as described in § 7 WebAuthn Relying Party Operations to obtain all of the above security benefits. However, one notable use case that departs slightly from this is described below in § 13.4.4 Attestation Limitations.
    
    
    13.4.2. Visibility Considerations for Embedded Usage
    
-   
    Simplistic use of WebAuthn in an embedded context, e.g., within iframes as described in § 5.10 Using Web Authentication within iframe elements, may make users vulnerable to UI Redressing attacks, also known as "Clickjacking". This is where an attacker overlays their own UI on top of a Relying Party's intended UI and attempts to trick the user into performing unintended actions with the Relying Party. For example, using these techniques, an attacker might be able to trick users into purchasing items, transferring money, etc.
    
-   
    Even though WebAuthn-specific UI is typically handled by the client platform and thus is not vulnerable to UI Redressing, it is likely important for an Relying Party having embedded WebAuthn-wielding content to ensure that their content’s UI is visible to the user. An emerging means to do so is by observing the status of the experimental Intersection Observer v2's isVisible attribute. For example, the Relying Party's script running in the embedded context could pre-emptively load itself in a popup window if it detects isVisble being set to false, thus side-stepping any occlusion of their content.
    
+   
    Simplistic use of WebAuthn in an embedded context, e.g., within iframes as described in § 5.10 Using Web Authentication within iframe elements, may make users vulnerable to UI Redressing attacks, also known as "Clickjacking". This is where an attacker overlays their own UI on top of a Relying Party's intended UI and attempts to trick the user into performing unintended actions with the Relying Party. For example, using these techniques, an attacker might be able to trick users into purchasing items, transferring money, etc.
    
+   
    Even though WebAuthn-specific UI is typically handled by the client platform and thus is not vulnerable to UI Redressing, it is likely important for an Relying Party having embedded WebAuthn-wielding content to ensure that their content’s UI is visible to the user. An emerging means to do so is by observing the status of the experimental Intersection Observer v2's isVisible attribute. For example, the Relying Party's script running in the embedded context could pre-emptively load itself in a popup window if it detects isVisble being set to false, thus side-stepping any occlusion of their content.
    
    
    13.4.3. Cryptographic Challenges
    
    
    As a cryptographic protocol, Web Authentication is dependent upon randomized challenges
-to avoid replay attacks. Therefore, the values of both PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions.challenge and PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.challenge MUST be randomly generated
-by Relying Parties in an environment they trust (e.g., on the server-side), and the
+to avoid replay attacks. Therefore, the values of both PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions.challenge and PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.challenge MUST be randomly generated
+by Relying Parties in an environment they trust (e.g., on the server-side), and the
 returned challenge value in the client’s
 response MUST match what was generated. This SHOULD be done in a fashion that does not rely
-upon a client’s behavior, e.g., the Relying Party SHOULD store the challenge temporarily
+upon a client’s behavior, e.g., the Relying Party SHOULD store the challenge temporarily
 until the operation is complete. Tolerating a mismatch will compromise the security
 of the protocol.
    
+   
    Challenges SHOULD be valid for a duration similar to the
+upper limit of the recommended range and default for a WebAuthn ceremony timeout.
    
    
    In order to prevent replay attacks, the challenges MUST contain enough entropy to make guessing them infeasible. Challenges SHOULD
 therefore be at least 16 bytes long.
    
    
    13.4.4. Attestation Limitations
    
    
    This section is not normative.
    
-   
    When registering a new credential, the attestation statement, if present,
-may allow the WebAuthn Relying Party to derive assurances about various authenticator qualities.
-For example, the authenticator model, or how it stores and protects credential private keys.
-However, it is important to note that an attestation statement, on its own,
-provides no means for a Relying Party to verify that an attestation object was generated
-by the authenticator the user intended, and not by a man-in-the-middle attacker.
-For example, such an attacker could use malicious code injected into Relying Party script.
-The Relying Party must therefore rely on other means, e.g., TLS and related technologies,
-to protect the attestation object from man-in-the-middle attacks.
    
-   
    Under the assumption that a registration ceremony is completed securely, and that the authenticator maintains
-confidentiality of the credential private key, subsequent authentication ceremonies using that public key
+   
    When registering a new credential, the attestation statement, if present,
+may allow the WebAuthn Relying Party to derive assurances about various authenticator qualities.
+For example, the authenticator model, or how it stores and protects credential private keys.
+However, it is important to note that an attestation statement, on its own,
+provides no means for a Relying Party to verify that an attestation object was generated
+by the authenticator the user intended, and not by a man-in-the-middle attacker.
+For example, such an attacker could use malicious code injected into Relying Party script.
+The Relying Party must therefore rely on other means, e.g., TLS and related technologies,
+to protect the attestation object from man-in-the-middle attacks.
    
+   
    Under the assumption that a registration ceremony is completed securely, and that the authenticator maintains
+confidentiality of the credential private key, subsequent authentication ceremonies using that public key
 credential are resistant to tampering by man-in-the-middle attacks.
    
-   
    The discussion above holds for all attestation types. In all cases it is possible for a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace the PublicKeyCredential object, including the attestation statement and the credential public key to be registered, and subsequently tamper with future authentication assertions scoped for the
-same Relying Party and passing through the same attacker.
    
-   
    Such an attack would potentially be detectable; since the Relying Party has registered the attacker’s credential public key rather
-than the user’s, the attacker must tamper with all subsequent authentication ceremonies with that Relying Party: unscathed
+   
    The discussion above holds for all attestation types. In all cases it is possible for a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace the PublicKeyCredential object, including the attestation statement and the credential public key to be registered, and subsequently tamper with future authentication assertions scoped for the
+same Relying Party and passing through the same attacker.
    
+   
    Such an attack would potentially be detectable; since the Relying Party has registered the attacker’s credential public key rather
+than the user’s, the attacker must tamper with all subsequent authentication ceremonies with that Relying Party: unscathed
 ceremonies will fail, potentially revealing the attack.
    
-   
    Attestation types other than Self Attestation and None can increase the difficulty of such attacks, since Relying Parties can possibly display authenticator information, e.g., model designation, to the user. An attacker might therefore need to use
-a genuine authenticator of the same model as the user’s authenticator, or the user might notice that the Relying Party reports
-a different authenticator model than the user expects.
    
-   
    Note: All variants of man-in-the-middle attacks described above are more difficult for an attacker to mount
+   
    Attestation types other than Self Attestation and None can increase the difficulty of such attacks, since Relying Parties can possibly display authenticator information, e.g., model designation, to the user. An attacker might therefore need to use
+a genuine authenticator of the same model as the user’s authenticator, or the user might notice that the Relying Party reports
+a different authenticator model than the user expects.
    
+   
    Note: All variants of man-in-the-middle attacks described above are more difficult for an attacker to mount
 than a man-in-the-middle attack against conventional password authentication.
    
    
    13.4.5. Revoked Attestation Certificates
    
-   
    If attestation certificate validation fails due to a revoked intermediate attestation CA certificate, and the Relying Party's policy
-requires rejecting the registration/authentication request in these situations, then it is RECOMMENDED that the Relying Party also
+   
    If attestation certificate validation fails due to a revoked intermediate attestation CA certificate, and the Relying Party's policy
+requires rejecting the registration/authentication request in these situations, then it is RECOMMENDED that the Relying Party also
 un-registers (or marks with a trust level equivalent to "self attestation") public key credentials that were registered
 after the CA compromise date using an attestation certificate chaining up to the same intermediate CA. It is thus RECOMMENDED
-that Relying Parties remember intermediate attestation CA certificates during registration in order to un-register
-related public key credentials if the registration was performed after revocation of such certificates.
    
-   
    See also the related security consideration for authenticators in § 13.3.2 Attestation Certificate and Attestation Certificate CA Compromise.
    
+that Relying Parties remember intermediate attestation CA certificates during registration in order to un-register
+related public key credentials if the registration was performed after revocation of such certificates.
    
+   
    See also the related security consideration for authenticators in § 13.3.2 Attestation Certificate and Attestation Certificate CA Compromise.
    
    
    13.4.6. Credential Loss and Key Mobility
    
-   
    This specification defines no protocol for backing up credential private keys, or for sharing them between authenticators.
-In general, it is expected that a credential private key never leaves the authenticator that created it. Losing an authenticator therefore, in general, means losing all credentials bound to the
-lost authenticator, which could lock the user out of an account if the user has only one credential registered with the Relying Party. Instead of backing up or sharing private keys, the Web Authentication API allows registering
+   
    This specification defines no protocol for backing up credential private keys, or for sharing them between authenticators.
+In general, it is expected that a credential private key never leaves the authenticator that created it. Losing an authenticator therefore, in general, means losing all credentials bound to the
+lost authenticator, which could lock the user out of an account if the user has only one credential registered with the Relying Party. Instead of backing up or sharing private keys, the Web Authentication API allows registering
 multiple credentials for the same user. For example, a user might register platform credentials on
-frequently used client devices, and one or more roaming credentials for use as backup and with new or rarely used client
+frequently used client devices, and one or more roaming credentials for use as backup and with new or rarely used client
 devices.
    
-   
    Relying Parties SHOULD allow and encourage users to register multiple credentials to the same user account. Relying Parties SHOULD make use of the excludeCredentials and user.id options to ensure that these
-different credentials are bound to different authenticators.
    
+   
    Relying Parties SHOULD allow and encourage users to register multiple credentials to the same user account. Relying Parties SHOULD make use of the excludeCredentials and user.id options to ensure that these
+different credentials are bound to different authenticators.
    
    
    13.4.7. Unprotected account detection
    
    
    This section is not normative.
    
-   
    This security consideration applies to Relying Parties that support authentication ceremonies with a non-empty allowCredentials argument as the first authentication step.
+   
    This security consideration applies to Relying Parties that support authentication ceremonies with a non-empty allowCredentials argument as the first authentication step.
 For example, if using authentication with server-side credentials as the first authentication step.
    
-   
    In this case the allowCredentials argument risks leaking information
-about which user accounts have WebAuthn credentials registered and which do not,
+   
    In this case the allowCredentials argument risks leaking information
+about which user accounts have WebAuthn credentials registered and which do not,
 which may be a signal of account protection strength.
-For example, say an attacker can initiate an authentication ceremony by providing only a username,
-and the Relying Party responds with a non-empty allowCredentials for some user accounts,
-and with failure or a password challenge for other user accounts.
-The attacker can then conclude that the latter user accounts likely do not require a WebAuthn assertion for successful authentication,
+For example, say an attacker can initiate an authentication ceremony by providing only a username,
+and the Relying Party responds with a non-empty allowCredentials for some user accounts,
+and with failure or a password challenge for other user accounts.
+The attacker can then conclude that the latter user accounts likely do not require a WebAuthn assertion for successful authentication,
 and thus focus an attack on those likely weaker accounts.
    
    
    This issue is similar to the one described in § 14.6.2 Username Enumeration and § 14.6.3 Privacy leak via credential IDs, and can be mitigated in similar ways.
    
    
    13.4.8. Code injection attacks
    
-   
    Any malicious code executing on an origin within the scope of a Relying Party's public key credentials has the potential to invalidate any and all security guarantees WebAuthn may provide. WebAuthn Clients only expose the WebAuthn API in secure contexts,
-which mitigates the most basic attacks but SHOULD be combined with additional precautions by Relying Parties.
    
+   
    Any malicious code executing on an origin within the scope of a Relying Party's public key credentials has the potential to invalidate any and all security guarantees WebAuthn may provide. WebAuthn Clients only expose the WebAuthn API in secure contexts,
+which mitigates the most basic attacks but SHOULD be combined with additional precautions by Relying Parties.
    
    
    Code injection can happen in several ways;
 this section attempts to point out some likely scenarios and suggest suitable mitigations,
 but is not an exhaustive list.
    
    
-   
    14. Privacy Considerations
    
-   
    The privacy principles in [FIDO-Privacy-Principles] also apply to this specification.
    
-   
    This section is divided by audience;
-general privacy considerations are direct subsections of this section,
-while privacy considerations specifically for authenticator, client and Relying Party implementers
-are grouped into respective subsections.
    
+   
    13.4.9. Validating the origin of a credential
    
+   
    When registering a credential and
+when verifying an assertion,
+the Relying Party MUST validate the origin member of the client data.
    
+   
    The Relying Party MUST NOT accept unexpected values of origin,
+as doing so could allow a malicious website to obtain valid credentials.
+Although the scope of WebAuthn credentials prevents their use on domains
+outside the RP ID they were registered for,
+the Relying Party's origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection
+in case a faulty authenticator fails to enforce credential scope.
+See also § 13.4.8 Code injection attacks for discussion of potentially malicious subdomains.
    
+   
    Validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the Relying Party.
+For example:
    
+   
      
+    
    • 
+     
      A web application served only at https://example.org SHOULD require origin to exactly equal https://example.org.
      
+     
      This is the simplest case, where origin is expected
+to be the string https:// followed by the RP ID.
      
+    
    • 
+     
      A web application served at a small number of domains might require origin to exactly equal some element of a list of allowed origins,
+for example the list ["https://example.org", "https://login.example.org"].
      
+    
    • 
+     
      A web application served at a large set of domains that changes often might parse origin structurally and require that the URL scheme is https and that the authority equals or is any subdomain of the RP ID - for example, example.org or any subdomain of example.org).
      
+     
      Note: See § 13.4.8 Code injection attacks for a discussion of the risks of allowing any subdomain of the RP ID.
      
+    
    • 
+     
      A web application with a companion native application might allow origin to be an operating system dependent
+identifier for the native application. For example, such a Relying Party might require that origin exactly equals some element of the list ["https://example.org", "example-os:appid:204ffa1a5af110ac483f131a1bef8a841a7adb0d8d135908bbd964ed05d2653b"].
      
+   
    
+   
    Similar considerations apply when validating the topOrigin member of the client data.
+When topOrigin is present, the Relying Party MUST validate that its value is expected.
+This validation MAY be performed by exact string matching or any other method as needed by the Relying Party.
+For example:
    
+   
      
+    
    • 
+     
      A web application that does not wish to be embedded in a cross-origin iframe might require topOrigin to exactly equal origin.
      
+    
    • 
+     
      A web application that wishes to be embedded in a cross-origin iframe on a small number of domains
+might require topOrigin to exactly equal some element of a list of allowed origins,
+for example the list ["https://example-partner1.org", "https://login.partner2-example.org"].
      
+    
    • 
+     
      A web application that wishes to be embedded in a cross-origin iframe on a large number of domains
+might allow any value of topOrigin, or use a dynamic procedure
+to determine whether a given topOrigin value is allowed for a particular ceremony.
      
+   
    
+   
    14. Privacy Considerations
    
+   
    The privacy principles in [FIDO-Privacy-Principles] also apply to this specification.
    
+   
    This section is divided by audience;
+general privacy considerations are direct subsections of this section,
+while privacy considerations specifically for authenticator, client and Relying Party implementers
+are grouped into respective subsections.
    
    
    14.1. De-anonymization Prevention Measures
    
    
    This section is not normative.
    
-   
    Many aspects of the design of the Web Authentication API are motivated by privacy concerns. The main concern considered in
+   
    Many aspects of the design of the Web Authentication API are motivated by privacy concerns. The main concern considered in
 this specification is the protection of the user’s personal identity, i.e., the identification of a human being or a correlation
-of separate identities as belonging to the same human being. Although the Web Authentication API does not use or provide any
+of separate identities as belonging to the same human being. Although the Web Authentication API does not use or provide any
 form of global identity, the following kinds of potentially correlatable identifiers are used:
    
    
-   
    Some of the above information is necessarily shared with the Relying Party. The following sections describe the measures taken to
-prevent malicious Relying Parties from using it to discover a user’s personal identity.
    
+   
    Some of the above information is necessarily shared with the Relying Party. The following sections describe the measures taken to
+prevent malicious Relying Parties from using it to discover a user’s personal identity.
    
    
    14.2. Anonymous, Scoped, Non-correlatable Public Key Credentials
    
    
    This section is not normative.
    
-   
    Although Credential IDs and credential public keys are necessarily shared with the WebAuthn Relying Party to enable strong
-authentication, they are designed to be minimally identifying and not shared between Relying Parties.
    
+   
    Although Credential IDs and credential public keys are necessarily shared with the WebAuthn Relying Party to enable strong
+authentication, they are designed to be minimally identifying and not shared between Relying Parties.
    
    
-   
    Additionally, a client-side discoverable public key credential source can optionally include a user
-handle specified by the Relying Party. The credential can then be used to both identify and authenticate the user.
-This means that a privacy-conscious Relying Party can allow creation of a user account without a traditional username,
-further improving non-correlatability between Relying Parties.
    
+   
    Additionally, a client-side discoverable public key credential source can optionally include a user
+handle specified by the Relying Party. The credential can then be used to both identify and authenticate the user.
+This means that a privacy-conscious Relying Party can allow creation of a user account without a traditional username,
+further improving non-correlatability between Relying Parties.
    
    
    14.3. Authenticator-local Biometric Recognition
    
-   
    Biometric authenticators perform the biometric recognition internally in the authenticator - though for platform
-authenticators the biometric data might also be visible to the client, depending on the implementation. Biometric data is
-not revealed to the WebAuthn Relying Party; it is used only locally to perform user verification authorizing the creation and registration of, or authentication using, a public key credential. A malicious Relying Party therefore cannot discover the
-user’s personal identity via biometric data, and a security breach at a Relying Party cannot expose biometric data for an attacker to
-use for forging logins at other Relying Parties.
    
-   
    In the case where a Relying Party requires biometric recognition, this is performed locally by the biometric authenticator perfoming user verification and then signaling the result by setting the UV flag in the signed assertion response,
-instead of revealing the biometric data itself to the Relying Party.
    
-   
    14.4. Privacy considerations for authenticators
    
+   
    Biometric authenticators perform the biometric recognition internally in the authenticator - though for platform
+authenticators the biometric data might also be visible to the client, depending on the implementation. Biometric data is
+not revealed to the WebAuthn Relying Party; it is used only locally to perform user verification authorizing the creation and registration of, or authentication using, a public key credential. A malicious Relying Party therefore cannot discover the
+user’s personal identity via biometric data, and a security breach at a Relying Party cannot expose biometric data for an attacker to
+use for forging logins at other Relying Parties.
    
+   
    In the case where a Relying Party requires biometric recognition, this is performed locally by the biometric authenticator perfoming user verification and then signaling the result by setting the UV flag in the signed assertion response,
+instead of revealing the biometric data itself to the Relying Party.
    
+   
    14.4. Privacy considerations for authenticators
    
    
    14.4.1. Attestation Privacy
    
    
    Attestation certificates and attestation key pairs can be used to track users
 or link various online identities of the same user together.
 This can be mitigated in several ways, including:
    
    
    
    14.4.2. Privacy of personally identifying information Stored in Authenticators
    
-   
    Authenticators MAY provide additional information to clients outside what’s defined by this specification, e.g.,
-to enable the client to provide a rich UI with which the user can pick which credential to use for an authentication
-ceremony. If an authenticator chooses to do so, it SHOULD NOT expose personally identifying information unless successful user verification has been
-performed. If the authenticator supports user verification with more than one concurrently enrolled user, the authenticator SHOULD NOT expose personally identifying information of users other than the currently verified user. Consequently, an authenticator that is not capable of user verification SHOULD NOT store personally identifying information.
    
-   
    For the purposes of this discussion, the user handle conveyed as the id member of PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity is not considered personally identifying information; see § 14.6.1 User Handle Contents.
    
-   
    These recommendations serve to prevent an adversary with physical access to an authenticator from extracting personally identifying information about the authenticator's enrolled user(s).
    
-   
    14.5. Privacy considerations for clients
    
+   
    Authenticators MAY provide additional information to clients outside what’s defined by this specification, e.g.,
+to enable the client to provide a rich UI with which the user can pick which credential to use for an authentication
+ceremony. If an authenticator chooses to do so, it SHOULD NOT expose personally identifying information unless successful user verification has been
+performed. If the authenticator supports user verification with more than one concurrently enrolled user, the authenticator SHOULD NOT expose personally identifying information of users other than the currently verified user. Consequently, an authenticator that is not capable of user verification SHOULD NOT store personally identifying information.
    
+   
    For the purposes of this discussion, the user handle conveyed as the id member of PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity is not considered personally identifying information; see § 14.6.1 User Handle Contents.
    
+   
    These recommendations serve to prevent an adversary with physical access to an authenticator from extracting personally identifying information about the authenticator's enrolled user(s).
    
+   
    14.5. Privacy considerations for clients
    
    
    14.5.1. Registration Ceremony Privacy
    
-   
    In order to protect users from being identified without consent, implementations of the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) method need to take care to not leak information that
-could enable a malicious WebAuthn Relying Party to distinguish between these cases, where "excluded" means that at least one of the credentials listed by the Relying Party in excludeCredentials is bound to the authenticator:
    
+   
    In order to protect users from being identified without consent, implementations of the [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) method need to take care to not leak information that
+could enable a malicious WebAuthn Relying Party to distinguish between these cases, where "excluded" means that at least one of the credentials listed by the Relying Party in excludeCredentials is bound to the authenticator:
    
    
-   
    If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious Relying Party could identify the user by probing for
+   
    If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious Relying Party could identify the user by probing for
 which credentials are available. For example, one such information leak is if the client returns a
-failure response as soon as an excluded authenticator becomes available. In this case - especially if the excluded authenticator is a platform authenticator - the Relying Party could detect that the ceremony was canceled before the
+failure response as soon as an excluded authenticator becomes available. In this case - especially if the excluded authenticator is a platform authenticator - the Relying Party could detect that the ceremony was canceled before the
 timeout and before the user could feasibly have canceled it manually, and thus conclude that at least one of the credentials listed in the excludeCredentials parameter is available to the user.
    
    
    The above is not a concern, however, if the user has consented to create a new credential before a
 distinguishable error is returned, because in this case the user has confirmed intent to share the information that would be
 leaked.
    
    
    14.5.2. Authentication Ceremony Privacy
    
    
    In order to protect users from being identified without consent, implementations of the [[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors) method need to take care to not
-leak information that could enable a malicious WebAuthn Relying Party to distinguish between these cases, where "named" means that the credential is listed by the Relying Party in allowCredentials:
    
+leak information that could enable a malicious WebAuthn Relying Party to distinguish between these cases, where "named" means that the credential is listed by the Relying Party in allowCredentials:
    
    
-   
    If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious Relying Party could identify the user by probing
+   
    If the above cases are distinguishable, information is leaked by which a malicious Relying Party could identify the user by probing
 for which credentials are available. For example, one such information leak is if the client returns a
-failure response as soon as the user denies consent to proceed with an authentication ceremony. In this
-case the Relying Party could detect that the ceremony was canceled by the user and not the timeout, and thus conclude that at least
-one of the credentials listed in the allowCredentials parameter is
+failure response as soon as the user denies consent to proceed with an authentication ceremony. In this
+case the Relying Party could detect that the ceremony was canceled by the user and not the timeout, and thus conclude that at least
+one of the credentials listed in the allowCredentials parameter is
 available to the user.
    
    
    14.5.3. Privacy Between Operating System Accounts
    
-   
    If a platform authenticator is included in a client device with a multi-user operating system, the platform
-authenticator and client device SHOULD work together to ensure that the existence of any platform credential is revealed
+   
    If a platform authenticator is included in a client device with a multi-user operating system, the platform
+authenticator and client device SHOULD work together to ensure that the existence of any platform credential is revealed
 only to the operating system user that created that platform credential.
    
-   
    14.6. Privacy considerations for Relying Parties
    
+   
    14.6. Privacy considerations for Relying Parties
    
    
    14.6.1. User Handle Contents
    
-   
    Since the user handle is not considered personally identifying information in § 14.4.2 Privacy of personally identifying information Stored in Authenticators,
-and since authenticators MAY reveal user handles without first performing user verification,
-the Relying Party MUST NOT include personally identifying information, e.g., e-mail
-addresses or usernames, in the user handle. This includes hash values of personally identifying information, unless the hash
-function is salted with salt values private to the Relying Party, since hashing does not prevent probing for guessable input
-values. It is RECOMMENDED to let the user handle be 64 random bytes, and store this value in the user account.
    
+   
    Since the user handle is not considered personally identifying information in § 14.4.2 Privacy of personally identifying information Stored in Authenticators,
+and since authenticators MAY reveal user handles without first performing user verification,
+the Relying Party MUST NOT include personally identifying information, e.g., e-mail
+addresses or usernames, in the user handle. This includes hash values of personally identifying information, unless the hash
+function is salted with salt values private to the Relying Party, since hashing does not prevent probing for guessable input
+values. It is RECOMMENDED to let the user handle be 64 random bytes, and store this value in the user account.
    
    
    14.6.2. Username Enumeration
    
-   
    While initiating a registration or authentication ceremony, there is a risk that the WebAuthn Relying Party might leak sensitive
-information about its registered users. For example, if a Relying Party uses e-mail addresses as usernames and an attacker attempts to
-initiate an authentication ceremony for "alex.mueller@example.com" and the Relying Party responds with a failure, but then
-successfully initiates an authentication ceremony for "j.doe@example.com", then the attacker can conclude that "j.doe@example.com"
-is registered and "alex.mueller@example.com" is not. The Relying Party has thus leaked the possibly sensitive information that
-"j.doe@example.com" has a user account at this Relying Party.
    
-   
    The following is a non-normative, non-exhaustive list of measures the Relying Party may implement to mitigate or prevent information
+   
    While initiating a registration or authentication ceremony, there is a risk that the WebAuthn Relying Party might leak sensitive
+information about its registered users. For example, if a Relying Party uses e-mail addresses as usernames and an attacker attempts to
+initiate an authentication ceremony for "alex.mueller@example.com" and the Relying Party responds with a failure, but then
+successfully initiates an authentication ceremony for "j.doe@example.com", then the attacker can conclude that "j.doe@example.com"
+is registered and "alex.mueller@example.com" is not. The Relying Party has thus leaked the possibly sensitive information that
+"j.doe@example.com" has a user account at this Relying Party.
    
+   
    The following is a non-normative, non-exhaustive list of measures the Relying Party may implement to mitigate or prevent information
 leakage due to such an attack:
    
    
    
  • Assertion, in § 4
+   
  • assertionAttestation, in § 5.1.4.1
    
  • assertion signature, in § 6
    
  • AT, in § 6.1
-   
  • AttCA, in § 6.5.3
+   
  • AttCA, in § 6.5.4
    
  • Attestation, in § 4
    
  • 
     attestation
     
-   
  • Attestation CA, in § 6.5.3
+   
  • Attestation CA, in § 6.5.4
    
  • Attestation Certificate, in § 4
    
  • attestationClientDataJSON, in § 4
    
  • Attestation Conveyance, in § 5.4.7
    
  • AttestationConveyancePreference, in § 5.4.7
    
  • attestationConveyancePreferenceOption, in § 5.1.3
+   
  • 
+    attestationFormats
+    
    
  • attestation key pair, in § 4
    
  • attestation object, in § 6.5
    
  • 
     attestationObject
     
    
  • attestationObjectResult, in § 5.1.3
@@ -7830,16 +9024,17 @@ 
    attestation statement, in § 6.5
    
  • attestation statement format, in § 6.5
    
  • attestation statement format identifier, in § 8.1
-   
  • attestation trust path, in § 6.5.2
+   
  • attestation trust path, in § 6.5.3
    
  • attestation type, in § 6.5
-   
  • Attested credential data, in § 6.5.1
+   
  • Attested credential data, in § 6.5.2
    
  • attestedCredentialData, in § 6.1
+   
  • attStmt, in § 10.2.2.3
    
  • Authentication, in § 4
    
  • Authentication Assertion, in § 4
    
  • Authentication Ceremony, in § 4
    
  • authentication extension, in § 9
    
  • AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs, in § 5.7.1
-   
  • AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+   
  • AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON, in § 5.1.9
    
  • AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs, in § 5.7.2
    
  • AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON, in § 5.1
    
  • AuthenticationExtensionsLargeBlobInputs, in § 10.1.5
@@ -7847,6 +9042,8 @@ 
    AuthenticationExtensionsPRFInputs, in § 10.1.4
    
  • AuthenticationExtensionsPRFOutputs, in § 10.1.4
    
  • AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues, in § 10.1.4
+   
  • AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs, in § 10.2.2.2
+   
  • AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs, in § 10.2.2.2
    
  • Authentication Factor Capability, in § 6.2.3
    
  • AuthenticationResponseJSON, in § 5.1
    
  • Authenticator, in § 4
@@ -7872,10 +9069,17 @@ 
    attribute for AuthenticatorAssertionResponse, in § 5.2.2
      
  • dict-member for AuthenticatorAssertionResponseJSON, in § 5.1
+     
  • dict-member for AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON, in § 5.1
     
-   
  • authenticator data claimed to have been used for the attestation, in § 6.5.2
-   
  • authenticator data for the attestation, in § 6.5.2
+   
  • authenticator data claimed to have been used for the attestation, in § 6.5.3
+   
  • authenticator data for the attestation, in § 6.5.3
    
  • authenticatorDataResult, in § 5.1.4.1
+   
  • 
+    authenticatorDisplayName
+    
    
  • authenticator extension, in § 9
    
  • Authenticator Extension Capabilities, in § 11.1.1
    
  • authenticator extension input, in § 9.3
@@ -7891,7 +9095,7 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria, in § 5.4.4
    
  • authenticator session, in § 6.3
@@ -7901,30 +9105,22 @@ 
    Backed Up, in § 4
    
  • Backup Eligibility, in § 4
    
  • Backup Eligible, in § 4
+   
  • backupEligible, in § 4
    
  • Backup State, in § 4
+   
  • backupState, in § 4
    
  • Base64url Encoding, in § 3
    
  • Base64URLString, in § 5.1
-   
  • Basic, in § 6.5.3
-   
  • Basic Attestation, in § 6.5.3
-   
  • batch attestation, in § 6.5.3
-   
  • 
-    BE
-    
+   
  • Basic, in § 6.5.4
+   
  • Basic Attestation, in § 6.5.4
+   
  • batch attestation, in § 6.5.4
+   
  • BE, in § 6.1
    
  • Biometric Authenticator, in § 4
    
  • Biometric Recognition, in § 4
    
  • "ble", in § 5.8.4
    
  • ble, in § 5.8.4
    
  • blob, in § 10.1.5
    
  • Bound credential, in § 4
-   
  • 
-    BS
-    
+   
  • BS, in § 6.1
    
  • candidate authenticator, in § 5.1.3
    
  • CBOR, in § 3
    
  • CCDToString, in § 5.8.1.1
@@ -7935,9 +9131,9 @@ 
    dict-member for CollectedClientData, in § 5.8.1
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions, in § 5.5
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.10
     
    
  • Client, in § 4
    
  • client data, in § 5.8.1
@@ -7954,7 +9150,9 @@ 
    dfn for assertionCreationData, in § 5.1.4.1
      
  • dfn for credentialCreationData, in § 5.1.3
     
+   
  • "client-device", in § 5.8.7
    
  • Client Device, in § 4
+   
  • client-device, in § 5.8.7
    
  • client extension, in § 9
    
  • client extension input, in § 9.3
    
  • client extension output, in § 9.4
@@ -7979,12 +9177,13 @@ 
    Conforming User Agent, in § 4
    
  • contains, in § 4
    
  • COSEAlgorithmIdentifier, in § 5.8.5
+   
  • Create a new supplemental public key record, in § 10.2.2.3.2
    
  • created on, in § 4
    
  • [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors), in § 5.1.3
    
  • credential descriptor for a credential record, in § 4
    
  • Credential ID, in § 4
-   
  • credentialId, in § 6.5.1
-   
  • credentialIdLength, in § 6.5.1
+   
  • credentialId, in § 6.5.2
+   
  • credentialIdLength, in § 6.5.2
    
  • credentialIdResult, in § 5.1.4.1
    
  • Credential Key Pair, in § 4
    
  • Credential Parameters, in § 11.5
@@ -7992,7 +9191,7 @@ 
    Credential Properties, in § 4
    
  • CredentialPropertiesOutput, in § 10.1.3
    
  • Credential Public Key, in § 4
-   
  • credentialPublicKey, in § 6.5.1
+   
  • credentialPublicKey, in § 6.5.2
    
  • Credential Record, in § 4
    
  • credentials map, in § 6
    
  • credential storage modality, in § 6.2.2
@@ -8031,7 +9230,7 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, in § 5.4.3
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • ED, in § 6.1
    
  • effective resident key requirement for credential creation, in § 5.1.3
@@ -8046,7 +9245,7 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • extension identifier, in § 9.1
    
  • 
@@ -8054,13 +9253,14 @@ 
    dfn for authData, in § 6.1
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions, in § 5.5
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.10
     
    
  • first, in § 10.1.4
    
  • First-factor roaming authenticator, in § 6.2
    
  • flags, in § 6.1
+   
  • fmt, in § 10.2.2.3
    
  • Generating Authenticator, in § 4
    
  • getAuthenticatorData(), in § 5.2.1
    
  • getClientExtensionResults(), in § 5.1
@@ -8069,9 +9269,27 @@ 
    getPublicKeyAlgorithm(), in § 5.2.1
    
  • getTransports(), in § 5.2.1
    
  • Hash of the serialized client data, in § 5.8.1
+   
  • 
+    hints
+    
    
  • Human Palatability, in § 4
-   
  • "hybrid", in § 5.8.4
-   
  • hybrid, in § 5.8.4
+   
  • 
+    "hybrid"
+    
+   
  • 
+    hybrid
+    
    
  • 
     id
     
@@ -8093,6 +9311,7 @@ 
    "internal", in § 5.8.4
    
  • internal, in § 5.8.4
    
  • isConditionalMediationAvailable(), in § 5.1
+   
  • isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable(), in § 5.1.8
    
  • Issuing a Credential Request to an Authenticator, in § 5.1.4.2
    
  • isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable(), in § 5.1.7
    
  • JSON-compatible serialization of client data, in § 5.8.1
@@ -8113,13 +9332,13 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialEntity, in § 5.4.1
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • "nfc", in § 5.8.4
    
  • nfc, in § 5.8.4
    
  • Non-Discoverable Credential, in § 4
    
  • "none", in § 5.4.7
-   
  • None, in § 6.5.3
+   
  • None, in § 6.5.4
    
  • none, in § 5.4.7
    
  • Non-Resident Credential, in § 4
    
  • origin, in § 5.8.1
@@ -8129,8 +9348,10 @@ 
    dfn for DiscoverableCredentialMetadata, in § 6.3.5
      
  • dfn for public key credential source, in § 4
     
-   
  • parseCreationOptionsFromJSON(options), in § 5.1.8
-   
  • parseRequestOptionsFromJSON(options), in § 5.1.9
+   
  • parseCreationOptionsFromJSON(options), in § 5.1.9
+   
  • parseRequestOptionsFromJSON(options), in § 5.1.10
+   
  • Passkey, in § 4
+   
  • Passkey platform authenticator, in § 6.2
    
  • perform the following steps to generate an authenticator data structure, in § 6.1
    
  • "platform", in § 5.4.5
    
  • platform, in § 5.4.5
@@ -8165,7 +9386,7 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • "public-key", in § 5.8.2
    
  • public-key, in § 5.8.2
@@ -8173,26 +9394,30 @@ 
    abstract-op for credential record, in § 4
+     
  • dict-member for AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON, in § 5.1
      
  • dict-member for CredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.1.1
      
  • dict-member for CredentialRequestOptions, in § 5.1.2
     
+   
  • publicKeyAlgorithm, in § 5.1
    
  • Public Key Credential, in § 4
    
  • PublicKeyCredential, in § 5.1
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-   
  • PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+   
  • PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor, in § 5.8.3
-   
  • PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON, in § 5.1.8
+   
  • PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON, in § 5.1.9
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialEntity, in § 5.4.1
+   
  • PublicKeyCredentialHints, in § 5.8.7
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialJSON, in § 5.1
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialParameters, in § 5.3
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions, in § 5.5
-   
  • PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
+   
  • PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.10
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity, in § 5.4.2
+   
  • publickey-credentials-create-feature, in § 5.9
    
  • publickey-credentials-get-feature, in § 5.9
    
  • Public Key Credential Source, in § 4
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialType, in § 5.8.2
    
  • PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, in § 5.4.3
-   
  • PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON, in § 5.1.8
+   
  • PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON, in § 5.1.9
    
  • Rate Limiting, in § 4
    
  • 
     rawId
@@ -8202,6 +9427,7 @@ 
    dict-member for RegistrationResponseJSON, in § 5.1
     
    
  • read, in § 10.1.5
+   
  • recommended range and default for a WebAuthn ceremony timeout, in § 15.1
    
  • Registration, in § 4
    
  • Registration Ceremony, in § 4
    
  • registration extension, in § 9
@@ -8245,7 +9471,7 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • RP ID, in § 4
    
  • 
@@ -8253,16 +9479,24 @@ 
    dfn for public key credential source, in § 4
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions, in § 5.5
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.10
     
    
  • rpIdHash, in § 6.1
-   
  • scope, in § 4
+   
  • 
+    scope
+    
+   
  • scopes, in § 10.2.2.2
    
  • second, in § 10.1.4
    
  • Second-factor platform authenticator, in § 6.2
    
  • Second-factor roaming authenticator, in § 6.2
+   
  • "security-key", in § 5.8.7
+   
  • security-key, in § 5.8.7
    
  • selected authenticator, in § 5.1.3
-   
  • Self, in § 6.5.3
-   
  • Self Attestation, in § 6.5.3
+   
  • Self, in § 6.5.4
+   
  • Self Attestation, in § 6.5.4
    
  • Server-side Credential, in § 4
    
  • server-side credential storage modality, in § 6.2.2
    
  • Server-side Public Key Credential Source, in § 4
@@ -8275,18 +9509,32 @@ 
    Signature Counter, in § 6.1.1
    
  • signatureResult, in § 5.1.4.1
+   
  • signatures, in § 10.2.2.2
    
  • 
     signCount
     
-   
  • Signing procedure, in § 6.5.2
+   
  • Signing procedure, in § 6.5.3
    
  • silentCredentialDiscovery, in § 6.3.5
    
  • single-device credential, in § 4
    
  • single-factor capable, in § 6.2.3
+   
  • "smart-card", in § 5.8.4
+   
  • smart-card, in § 5.8.4
+   
  • spk, in § 10.2.2.3
    
  • status, in § 5.8.1
    
  • [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors), in § 5.1.5
+   
  • 
+    supplementalPubKeys
+    
+   
  • Supplemental public key, in § 4
+   
  • supplemental public key record, in § 10.2.2.3
    
  • support, in § 10.1.5
    
  • "supported", in § 5.8.1
    
  • 
@@ -8300,14 +9548,15 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions, in § 5.5
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.10
     
    
  • toJSON(), in § 5.1
    
  • TokenBinding, in § 5.8.1
    
  • tokenBinding, in § 5.8.1
    
  • TokenBindingStatus, in § 5.8.1
+   
  • topOrigin, in § 5.8.1
    
  • [[transports]], in § 5.2.1
    
  • 
     transports
@@ -8315,7 +9564,7 @@ 
    abstract-op for credential record, in § 4
      
  • dict-member for AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON, in § 5.1
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor, in § 5.8.3
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • [[type]], in § 5.1
    
  • 
@@ -8327,11 +9576,12 @@ 
    dict-member for AuthenticationResponseJSON, in § 5.1
      
  • dict-member for CollectedClientData, in § 5.8.1
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor, in § 5.8.3
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON, in § 5.1.9
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialParameters, in § 5.3
      
  • dict-member for RegistrationResponseJSON, in § 5.1
     
    
  • UI Redressing, in § 13.4.2
+   
  • Unsigned extension outputs, in § 9.5
    
  • UP, in § 6.1
    
  • "usb", in § 5.8.4
    
  • usb, in § 5.8.4
@@ -8339,10 +9589,11 @@ 
    dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, in § 5.4
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.8
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
     
    
  • User Account, in § 4
    
  • User Consent, in § 4
+   
  • User Credential, in § 4
    
  • User Handle, in § 4
    
  • 
     userHandle
@@ -8360,13 +9611,14 @@ 
    dict-member for AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria, in § 5.4.4
      
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions, in § 5.5
-     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.9
+     
  • dict-member for PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON, in § 5.1.10
     
    
  • User Verification Method, in § 10.2.1
    
  • UserVerificationRequirement, in § 5.8.6
    
  • User Verified, in § 4
    
  • User-verifying platform authenticator, in § 6.2
    
  • UV, in § 6.1
+   
  • uvInitialized, in § 4
    
  • 
     uvm
     
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    Terms defined by reference
    
   
      
    
    • 
     [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • Credential
-     
      • CredentialCreationOptions
-     
      • CredentialRequestOptions
-     
      • CredentialsContainer
-     
      • Request a Credential
-     
      • [[CollectFromCredentialStore]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)
-     
      • [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)
-     
      • [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors)
-     
      • [[discovery]]
-     
      • [[type]]
-     
      • conditional
-     
      • create()
-     
      • credential
-     
      • credential source
-     
      • get()
-     
      • id
-     
      • mediation
-     
      • remote
-     
      • same-origin with its ancestors
-     
      • signal (for CredentialRequestOptions)
-     
      • store()
-     
      • type
-     
      • user mediation
+     
      • Create a Credential
+     
      • Credential
+     
      • CredentialCreationOptions
+     
      • CredentialRequestOptions
+     
      • CredentialsContainer
+     
      • Request a Credential
+     
      • [[CollectFromCredentialStore]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)
+     
      • [[Create]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)
+     
      • [[Store]](credential, sameOriginWithAncestors)
+     
      • [[discovery]]
+     
      • [[type]]
+     
      • conditional
+     
      • create()
+     
      • credential
+     
      • credential source
+     
      • get()
+     
      • id
+     
      • mediation
+     
      • remote
+     
      • same-origin with its ancestors
+     
      • signal (for CredentialCreationOptions)
+     
      • signal (for CredentialRequestOptions)
+     
      • store()
+     
      • type
+     
      • user mediation
     
      
    
    • 
     [DOM4] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • AbortController
-     
      • AbortSignal
-     
      • Document
-     
      • abort reason
-     
      • aborted
-     
      • document
+     
      • AbortController
+     
      • AbortSignal
+     
      • Document
+     
      • abort reason
+     
      • aborted
+     
      • document
     
      
    
    • 
     [ECMAScript] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • %arraybuffer%
-     
      • internal method
-     
      • internal slot
-     
      • own property
+     
      • %arraybuffer%
+     
      • internal method
+     
      • internal slot
+     
      • own property
     
      
    
    • 
     [ENCODING] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • utf-8 decode
-     
      • utf-8 encode
-    
      
-   
    • 
-    [FETCH] defines the following terms:
-    
        
-     
      • window
+     
      • utf-8 decode
+     
      • utf-8 encode
     
      
    
    • 
     [FIDO-APPID] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • determining if a caller's facetid is authorized for an appid
-     
      • determining the facetid of a calling application
+     
      • determining if a caller's facetid is authorized for an appid
+     
      • determining the facetid of a calling application
     
      
    
    • 
     [FIDO-CTAP] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • ctap2 canonical cbor encoding form
-     
      • large, per-credential blobs
-     
      • §6.2. responses
+     
      • ctap2 canonical cbor encoding form
+     
      • large, per-credential blobs
+     
      • §6.2. responses
     
      
    
    • 
     [FIDO-Registry] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • section 3.1 user verification methods
-     
      • section 3.2 key protection types
-     
      • section 3.3 matcher protection types
-     
      • section 3.6.2 public key representation formats
+     
      • section 3.1 user verification methods
+     
      • section 3.2 key protection types
+     
      • section 3.3 matcher protection types
+     
      • section 3.6.2 public key representation formats
     
      
    
    • 
     [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • application parameter
-     
      • section 4.3
-     
      • section 5.4
+     
      • application parameter
+     
      • section 4.3
+     
      • section 5.4
     
      
    
    • 
     [FileAPI] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • object
+     
      • object
     
      
    
    • 
     [HTML] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • allow
-     
      • allowed to use
-     
      • ascii serialization of an origin
-     
      • autocomplete
-     
      • autofill detail token
-     
      • browsing context
-     
      • current settings object
-     
      • document.domain
-     
      • effective domain
-     
      • environment settings object
-     
      • global object
-     
      • iframe
-     
      • in parallel
-     
      • input
-     
      • is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to
-     
      • is not a registrable domain suffix of and is not equal to
-     
      • opaque origin
-     
      • origin (for environment settings object)
-     
      • permissions policy
-     
      • relevant settings object
-     
      • same site
-     
      • secure context
-     
      • textarea
-     
      • tuple origin
+     
      • Window
+     
      • allow
+     
      • allowed to use
+     
      • ascii serialization of an origin
+     
      • autocomplete
+     
      • autofill detail token
+     
      • browsing context
+     
      • consume user activation
+     
      • current settings object
+     
      • document.domain
+     
      • effective domain
+     
      • environment settings object
+     
      • global object
+     
      • iframe
+     
      • in parallel
+     
      • input
+     
      • is a registrable domain suffix of or is equal to
+     
      • is not a registrable domain suffix of and is not equal to
+     
      • opaque origin
+     
      • origin
+     
      • origin (for environment settings object)
+     
      • permissions policy
+     
      • relevant global object
+     
      • relevant settings object
+     
      • same site
+     
      • secure context
+     
      • textarea
+     
      • top-level origin
+     
      • transient activation
+     
      • tuple origin
+    
      
+   
    • 
+    [I18N-GLOSSARY] defines the following terms:
+    
        
+     
      • grapheme cluster
     
      
    
    • 
     [INFRA] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • append (for set)
-     
      • boolean
-     
      • byte sequence
-     
      • continue
-     
      • empty
-     
      • entry
-     
      • exist
-     
      • for each (for map)
-     
      • is empty
-     
      • is not empty
-     
      • item (for struct)
-     
      • key
-     
      • list
-     
      • map
-     
      • ordered set
-     
      • remove
-     
      • serialize json to bytes
-     
      • set (for map)
-     
      • size
-     
      • struct
-     
      • value
-     
      • while
-     
      • willful violation
+     
      • append (for list)
+     
      • append (for set)
+     
      • boolean
+     
      • byte sequence
+     
      • continue
+     
      • empty
+     
      • entry
+     
      • exist
+     
      • for each (for list)
+     
      • for each (for map)
+     
      • intersection
+     
      • is empty
+     
      • is not empty
+     
      • item (for list)
+     
      • item (for struct)
+     
      • iterate
+     
      • key
+     
      • list
+     
      • map
+     
      • ordered set
+     
      • remove
+     
      • serialize json to bytes
+     
      • set
+     
      • set (for map)
+     
      • size
+     
      • struct
+     
      • value
+     
      • while
+     
      • willful violation
     
      
    
    • 
     [PAGE-VISIBILITY] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • visibility states
+     
      • visibility states
     
      
    
    • 
     [Permissions-Policy] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • default allowlist
-     
      • policy-controlled feature
+     
      • default allowlists
+     
      • policy-controlled feature
     
      
    
    • 
     [RFC4949] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • man-in-the-middle attack
-     
      • salt
-     
      • salted
+     
      • man-in-the-middle attack
+     
      • salt
+     
      • salted
     
      
    
    • 
     [RFC5280] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • subjectpublickeyinfo
+     
      • subjectpublickeyinfo
     
      
    
    • 
     [RFC5646] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • language tag
+     
      • language tag
     
      
    
    • 
     [RFC8230] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • section 2
-     
      • section 4
+     
      • section 2
+     
      • section 4
     
      
    
    • 
     [RFC8610] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • group sockets
+     
      • group sockets
     
      
    
    • 
     [RFC9052] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • cose key
-     
      • kty
-     
      • section 7
+     
      • cose key
+     
      • kty
+     
      • section 7
     
      
    
    • 
     [RFC9053] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • crv
-     
      • section 2
-     
      • section 2.1
-     
      • section 7.1
+     
      • crv
+     
      • section 2
+     
      • section 2.1
+     
      • section 7.1
     
      
    
    • 
     [SP800-800-63r3] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • authentication factor
-     
      • multi-factor
-     
      • second-factor
-     
      • single-factor
-     
      • something you are
-     
      • something you have
-     
      • something you know
+     
      • authentication factor
+     
      • multi-factor
+     
      • second-factor
+     
      • single-factor
+     
      • something you are
+     
      • something you have
+     
      • something you know
     
      
    
    • 
     [TokenBinding] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • token binding
-     
      • token binding id
+     
      • token binding
+     
      • token binding id
     
      
    
    • 
     [URL] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • domain
-     
      • empty host
-     
      • host
-     
      • ipv4 address
-     
      • ipv6 address
-     
      • opaque host
-     
      • port
-     
      • scheme
-     
      • valid domain
-     
      • valid domain string
-    
      
-   
    • 
-    [UTR29] defines the following terms:
-    
        
-     
      • grapheme cluster
-    
      
-   
    • 
-    [WebAuthn-1] defines the following terms:
-    
        
-     
      • tokenBinding
+     
      • domain
+     
      • empty host
+     
      • host
+     
      • ipv4 address
+     
      • ipv6 address
+     
      • opaque host
+     
      • port
+     
      • scheme
+     
      • valid domain
+     
      • valid domain string
     
      
    
    • 
     [WebDriver] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • endpoint node
-     
      • extension capability
-     
      • extension command
-     
      • getting a property
-     
      • invalid argument
-     
      • matching capabilities
-     
      • remote end steps
-     
      • set a property
-     
      • success
-     
      • unsupported operation
-     
      • validating capabilities
-     
      • webdriver error
-     
      • webdriver error code
+     
      • endpoint node
+     
      • extension capability
+     
      • extension command
+     
      • getting a property
+     
      • invalid argument
+     
      • matching capabilities
+     
      • remote end steps
+     
      • set a property
+     
      • success
+     
      • unsupported operation
+     
      • validating capabilities
+     
      • webdriver error
+     
      • webdriver error code
     
      
    
    • 
     [WebIDL] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • ArrayBuffer
-     
      • BufferSource
-     
      • ConstraintError
-     
      • DOMException
-     
      • DOMString
-     
      • EncodingError
-     
      • Exposed
-     
      • InvalidStateError
-     
      • NotAllowedError
-     
      • NotSupportedError
-     
      • Promise
-     
      • SameObject
-     
      • SecureContext
-     
      • SecurityError
-     
      • TypeError
-     
      • USVString
-     
      • UnknownError
-     
      • boolean
-     
      • buffer source types
-     
      • get a copy of the bytes held by the buffer source
-     
      • interface object
-     
      • json type
-     
      • long
-     
      • record
-     
      • sequence
-     
      • unsigned long
+     
      • ArrayBuffer
+     
      • BufferSource
+     
      • ConstraintError
+     
      • DOMException
+     
      • DOMString
+     
      • EncodingError
+     
      • Exposed
+     
      • InvalidStateError
+     
      • NotAllowedError
+     
      • NotSupportedError
+     
      • Promise
+     
      • SameObject
+     
      • SecureContext
+     
      • SecurityError
+     
      • SyntaxError
+     
      • TypeError
+     
      • USVString
+     
      • UnknownError
+     
      • boolean
+     
      • buffer source types
+     
      • get a copy of the bytes held by the buffer source
+     
      • interface object
+     
      • json type
+     
      • long
+     
      • long long
+     
      • object
+     
      • record
+     
      • sequence
+     
      • unsigned long
     
      
    
    • 
     [WHATWG HTML] defines the following terms:
     
        
-     
      • focus
+     
      • focus
     
      
   
    
   
    References
    
@@ -10140,18 +9953,14 @@ 
    N
    
    Mike West; Adam Barth; Daniel Veditz. Content Security Policy Level 2. URL: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/
    
    [DOM4]
    
    Anne van Kesteren. DOM Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/
-   
    [DOM4]
-   
    Anne van Kesteren. DOM Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/
    
    [ECMAScript]
    
    ECMAScript Language Specification. URL: https://tc39.es/ecma262/multipage/
    
    [ENCODING]
    
    Anne van Kesteren. Encoding Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://encoding.spec.whatwg.org/
-   
    [FETCH]
-   
    Anne van Kesteren. Fetch Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/
    
    [FIDO-APPID]
    
    D. Balfanz; et al. FIDO AppID and Facet Specification. 27 February 2018. FIDO Alliance Implementation Draft. URL: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-appid-and-facets-v2.0-id-20180227.html
    
    [FIDO-CTAP]
-   
    J. Bradley; et al. Client to Authenticator Protocol. 9 March 2021. FIDO Alliance Review Draft. URL: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-rd-20210309/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-rd-20210309.html
+   
    J. Bradley; et al. Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP). 15 June 2021. FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard. URL: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html
    
    [FIDO-Privacy-Principles]
    
    FIDO Alliance. FIDO Privacy Principles. FIDO Alliance Whitepaper. URL: https://fidoalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FIDO_Alliance_Whitepaper_Privacy_Principles.pdf
    
    [FIDO-Registry]
@@ -10159,9 +9968,11 @@ 
    N
    
    [FIDO-U2F-Message-Formats]
    
    D. Balfanz; J. Ehrensvard; J. Lang. FIDO U2F Raw Message Formats. FIDO Alliance Implementation Draft. URL: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.1-id-20160915/fido-u2f-raw-message-formats-v1.1-id-20160915.html
    
    [FileAPI]
-   
    Marijn Kruisselbrink; Arun Ranganathan. File API. URL: https://w3c.github.io/FileAPI/
+   
    Marijn Kruisselbrink. File API. URL: https://w3c.github.io/FileAPI/
    
    [HTML]
    
    Anne van Kesteren; et al. HTML Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/
+   
    [I18N-GLOSSARY]
+   
    Richard Ishida; Addison Phillips. Internationalization Glossary. URL: https://w3c.github.io/i18n-glossary/
    
    [IANA-COSE-ALGS-REG]
    
    IANA CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Algorithms Registry. URL: https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#algorithms
    
    [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries]
@@ -10230,12 +10041,8 @@ 
    N
    
    Trusted Platform Module Library, Part 3: Commands. URL: https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-3-Commands-01.38.pdf
    
    [URL]
    
    Anne van Kesteren. URL Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/
-   
    [UTR29]
-   
    UNICODE Text Segmentation. URL: http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr29/
    
    [WCAG21]
-   
    Andrew Kirkpatrick; et al. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1. URL: https://w3c.github.io/wcag/21/guidelines/
-   
    [WebAuthn-1]
-   
    Dirk Balfanz; et al. Web Authentication:An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1. URL: https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/
+   
    Michael Cooper; et al. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1. URL: https://w3c.github.io/wcag/guidelines/22/
    
    [WebDriver]
    
    Simon Stewart; David Burns. WebDriver. URL: https://w3c.github.io/webdriver/
    
    [WebIDL]
@@ -10246,7 +10053,7 @@ 
    [Ceremony]
    
    Carl Ellison. Ceremony Design and Analysis. 2007. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/399.pdf
    
    [CSS-OVERFLOW-3]
-   
    David Baron; Elika Etemad; Florian Rivoal. CSS Overflow Module Level 3. URL: https://drafts.csswg.org/css-overflow-3/
+   
    Elika Etemad; Florian Rivoal. CSS Overflow Module Level 3. URL: https://drafts.csswg.org/css-overflow-3/
    
    [EduPersonObjectClassSpec]
    
    EduPerson. ongoing. URL: https://refeds.org/eduperson
    
    [FIDO-Transports-Ext]
@@ -10273,6 +10080,10 @@ 
    K. Moriarty, Ed.; et al. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2. November 2016. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017
    
    [UAFProtocol]
    
    R. Lindemann; et al. FIDO UAF Protocol Specification v1.0. FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard. URL: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-uaf-v1.0-ps-20141208/fido-uaf-protocol-v1.0-ps-20141208.html
+   
    [UAX29]
+   
    UNICODE Text Segmentation. URL: http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr29/
+   
    [WebAuthn-1]
+   
    Dirk Balfanz; et al. Web Authentication:An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1. URL: https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/
    
    [WebAuthnAPIGuide]
    
    Web Authentication API Guide. Experimental. URL: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API
   
@@ -10281,44 +10092,58 @@ 
    I
 interface PublicKeyCredential : Credential {
     [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer              rawId;
     [SameObject] readonly attribute AuthenticatorResponse    response;
-    [SameObject] readonly attribute DOMString?               authenticatorAttachment;
+    readonly attribute DOMString?                            authenticatorAttachment;
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs getClientExtensionResults();
     static Promise<boolean> isConditionalMediationAvailable();
     PublicKeyCredentialJSON toJSON();
 };
 
 typedef DOMString Base64URLString;
-typedef (RegistrationResponseJSON or AuthenticationResponseJSON) PublicKeyCredentialJSON;
+// The structure of this object will be either
+// RegistrationResponseJSON or AuthenticationResponseJSON
+typedef object PublicKeyCredentialJSON;
 
 dictionary RegistrationResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString id;
-    Base64URLString rawId;
-    AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON response;
-    DOMString?  authenticatorAttachment;
-    AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
-    DOMString type;
+    required Base64URLString id;
+    required Base64URLString rawId;
+    required AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON response;
+    DOMString authenticatorAttachment;
+    required AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
+    required DOMString type;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticatorAttestationResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
-    Base64URLString attestationObject;
-    sequence<DOMString> transports;
+    required Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
+    required Base64URLString authenticatorData;
+    required sequence<DOMString> transports;
+    // The publicKey field will be missing if pubKeyCredParams was used to
+    // negotiate a public-key algorithm that the user agent doesn’t
+    // understand. (See section “Easily accessing credential data” for a
+    // list of which algorithms user agents must support.) If using such an
+    // algorithm then the public key must be parsed directly from
+    // attestationObject or authenticatorData.
+    Base64URLString publicKey;
+    required long long publicKeyAlgorithm;
+    // This value contains copies of some of the fields above. See
+    // section “Easily accessing credential data”.
+    required Base64URLString attestationObject;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString id;
-    Base64URLString rawId;
-    AuthenticatorAssertionResponseJSON response;
-    DOMString?  authenticatorAttachment;
-    AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
-    DOMString type;
+    required Base64URLString id;
+    required Base64URLString rawId;
+    required AuthenticatorAssertionResponseJSON response;
+    DOMString authenticatorAttachment;
+    required AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON clientExtensionResults;
+    required DOMString type;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticatorAssertionResponseJSON {
-    Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
-    Base64URLString authenticatorData;
-    Base64URLString signature;
-    Base64URLString? userHandle;
+    required Base64URLString clientDataJSON;
+    required Base64URLString authenticatorData;
+    required Base64URLString signature;
+    Base64URLString userHandle;
+    Base64URLString attestationObject;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputsJSON {
@@ -10336,6 +10161,10 @@ 
    I
     static Promise<boolean> isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable();
 };
 
+partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
+    static Promise<boolean> isPasskeyPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable();
+};
+
 partial interface PublicKeyCredential {
     static PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions parseCreationOptionsFromJSON(PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON options);
 };
@@ -10348,7 +10177,9 @@ 
    I
     unsigned long                                           timeout;
     sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON>             excludeCredentials = [];
     AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria                          authenticatorSelection;
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     hints = [];
     DOMString                                               attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON                extensions;
 };
 
@@ -10377,6 +10208,9 @@ 
    I
     DOMString                                               rpId;
     sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON>             allowCredentials = [];
     DOMString                                               userVerification = "preferred";
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     hints = [];
+    DOMString                                               attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                                     attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputsJSON                extensions;
 };
 
@@ -10399,6 +10233,7 @@ 
    I
     [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      authenticatorData;
     [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer      signature;
     [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer?     userHandle;
+    [SameObject] readonly attribute ArrayBuffer?     attestationObject;
 };
 
 dictionary PublicKeyCredentialParameters {
@@ -10416,7 +10251,9 @@ 
    I
     unsigned long                                timeout;
     sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor>      excludeCredentials = [];
     AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria               authenticatorSelection;
+    sequence<DOMString>                          hints = [];
     DOMString                                    attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                          attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs         extensions;
 };
 
@@ -10464,6 +10301,9 @@ 
    I
     USVString                            rpId;
     sequence<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor> allowCredentials = [];
     DOMString                            userVerification = "preferred";
+    sequence<DOMString>                  hints = [];
+    DOMString                            attestation = "none";
+    sequence<DOMString>                  attestationFormats = [];
     AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs extensions;
 };
 
@@ -10477,6 +10317,7 @@ 
    I
     required DOMString           type;
     required DOMString           challenge;
     required DOMString           origin;
+    DOMString                    topOrigin;
     boolean                      crossOrigin;
 };
 
@@ -10501,6 +10342,7 @@ 
    I
     "usb",
     "nfc",
     "ble",
+    "smart-card",
     "hybrid",
     "internal"
 };
@@ -10513,6 +10355,12 @@ 
    I
     "discouraged"
 };
 
+enum PublicKeyCredentialHints {
+    "security-key",
+    "client-device",
+    "hybrid",
+};
+
 partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs {
   USVString appid;
 };
@@ -10535,6 +10383,7 @@ 
    I
 
 dictionary CredentialPropertiesOutput {
     boolean rk;
+    USVString authenticatorDisplayName;
 };
 
 partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs {
@@ -10542,8 +10391,8 @@ 
    I
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsPRFValues {
-    required ArrayBuffer first;
-    ArrayBuffer second;
+    required BufferSource first;
+    BufferSource second;
 };
 
 dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsPRFInputs {
@@ -10600,6 +10449,24 @@ 
    I
   UvmEntries uvm;
 };
 
+dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs {
+    required sequence<DOMString> scopes;
+    DOMString attestation = "indirect";
+    sequence<DOMString> attestationFormats = [];
+};
+
+partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs {
+    AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs supplementalPubKeys;
+};
+
+dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs {
+    sequence<ArrayBuffer> signatures;
+};
+
+partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs {
+    AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs supplementalPubKeys;
+};
+
 
   
    Issues Index
    
   
    
@@ -10607,3880 +10474,1421 @@ 
    WHATWG HTML WG Issue #2711 for more details. ↵
    
   
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\ No newline at end of file
+function cmpTops(a,b) {
+    return a.top - b.top;
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("load", repositionAnnoPanels);
+window.addEventListener("resize", repositionAnnoPanels);
+}
+
\ No newline at end of file

    •