title: "SCION Control Plane PKI" abbrev: "SCION CP-PKI" category: info submissiontype: independent
docname: draft-dekater-scion-pki-latest v: 3
keyword: Internet-Draft venue:
mail: "[email protected]"
github: "scionassociation/scion-cppki_I-D" latest: "https://scionassociation.github.io/scion-cppki_I-D/draft-dekater-scion-pki.html"
author:
-
ins: C. de Kater name: Corine de Kater org: SCION Association email: [email protected]
-
ins: N. Rustignoli name: Nicola Rustignoli org: SCION Association email: [email protected]
-
ins: S. Hitz name: Samuel Hitz org: Anapaya Systems email: [email protected]
normative: I-D.dekater-scion-controlplane: I-D.dekater-scion-dataplane: RFC5280: RFC5480: RFC5652: RFC5758: RFC9217: X.509: title: "ITU-T X.509 (10/2016) | Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks" date: 10/2016 target: https://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/13031 X.680: title: "ITU-T X.680 (02/2021) | Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation" date: 02/2021 target: https://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14468 X.690: title: "ITU-T X.690 (02/2021) | Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)" date: 02/2021 target: https://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14472 X9.62: title: "ANSI X9.62-1998 | Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm" date: 1998
informative: I-D.dekater-panrg-scion-overview: ISD-AS-assignments: title: "SCION ISD and AS Assignments" date: 2024 target: https://docs.anapaya.net/en/latest/resources/isd-as-assignments/ RFC5398: RFC6996: RFC8210: BARRERA17: DOI.10.1145/3085591 CHUAT22: title: "The Complete Guide to SCION" date: 2022 target: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05288-0 seriesinfo: ISBN: 978-3-031-05287-3 author: - ins: L. Chuat name: Laurent Chuat org: ETH Zuerich - ins: M. Legner name: Markus Legner org: ETH Zuerich - ins: D. Basin name: David Basin org: ETH Zuerich - ins: D. Hausheer name: David Hausheer org: Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg - ins: S. Hitz name: Samuel Hitz org: Anapaya Systems - ins: P. Mueller name: Peter Mueller org: ETH Zuerich - ins: A. Perrig name: Adrian Perrig org: ETH Zuerich SCIONLAB: title: SCIONLAB - A Next-Generation Internet Testbed date: 2020 target: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9259355 author: - ins: J. Kown name: Jonghoon Kwon org: ETH Zuerich - ins: J. García-Pardo name: Juan A. García-Pardo org: ETH Zuerich - ins: M. Legner name: Markus Legner org: ETH Zuerich - ins: F. Wirz name: François Wirz org: ETH Zuerich - ins: M. Frei name: Matthias Frei org: ETH Zuerich - ins: D. Hausheer name: David Hausheer org: Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg - ins: A. Perrig name: Adrian Perrig org: ETH Zuerich
--- abstract
This document presents the trust concept and design of the SCION Control Plane Public Key Infrastructure (CP-PKI). SCION (Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-generation networks) is a path-aware, inter-domain network architecture where the Control Plane PKI handles cryptographic material and lays the foundation for the authentication procedures in SCION. It is used by SCION's Control Plane to authenticate and verify path information, and builds the basis for SCION's trust model based on Isolation Domains.
This document describes the trust model behind the SCION's Control Plane PKI, including specifications of the different types of certificates and the Trust Root Configuration. It also specifies how to deploy the Control Plane PKI infrastructure.
--- middle
SCION is a path-aware internetworking routing architecture as described in {{RFC9217}}. It allows endpoints and applications to select paths across the network to use for traffic, based on trustworthy path properties. SCION is an inter-domain network architecture and is therefore not concerned with intra-domain forwarding.
SCION has been developed with the following goals:
Availability - to provide highly available communication that can send traffic over paths with optimal or required characteristics, quickly handle inter-domain link or router failures (both on the last hop or anywhere along the path) and provide continuity in the presence of adversaries.
Security - to introduce a new approach to inter-domain path security that leverages path awareness in combination with a unique trust model. The goal is to provide higher levels of trust in routing information to prevent traffic hijacking, and enable users to decide where their data travels based on routing information that can be unambiguously attributed to an AS, ensuring that packets are only forwarded along authorized path segments. A particular use case is to enable geofencing.
Scalability - to improve the scalability of the inter-domain control plane and data plane, avoiding existing limitations related to convergence and forwarding table size. The advertising of path segments is separated into a beaconing process within each Isolation Domain (ISD) and between ISDs which incurs minimal overhead and resource requirements on routers.
SCION relies on three main components:
PKI - To achieve scalability and trust, SCION organizes existing ASes into logical groups of independent routing planes called Isolation Domains (ISDs). All ASes in an ISD agree on a set of trust roots called the Trust Root Configuration (TRC) which is a collection of signed root certificates in X.509 v3 format {{RFC5280}}. The ISD is governed by a set of core ASes which typically manage the trust roots and provide connectivity to other ISDs. This is the basis of the public key infrastructure which the SCION Control Plane relies upon for the authentication of messages that is used for the SCION Control Plane.
Control Plane - performs inter-domain routing by discovering and securely disseminating path information between ASes. The core ASes use Path-segment Construction Beacons (PCBs) to explore intra-ISD paths, or to explore paths across different ISDs. See {{I-D.dekater-scion-controlplane}}
Data Plane - carries out secure packet forwarding between SCION-enabled ASes over paths selected by endpoints. A SCION border router reuses existing intra-domain infrastructure to communicate to other SCION routers or SCION endpoints within its AS. See {{I-D.dekater-scion-dataplane}}
This document describes the SCION PKI component used by the Control Plane. It should be read in conjunction with the other components {{I-D.dekater-scion-controlplane}} and {{I-D.dekater-scion-dataplane}}.
The SCION architecture was initially developed outside of the IETF by ETH Zurich with significant contributions from Anapaya Systems. It is deployed in the Swiss finance sector to provide resilient connectivity between financial institutions. The aim of this document is to document the existing protocol specification as deployed, and to introduce new concepts that can potentially be further improved to address particular problems with the current Internet architecture.
Note (to be removed before publication): this document, together with the other components {{I-D.dekater-scion-controlplane}} and {{I-D.dekater-scion-dataplane}}, deprecates {{I-D.dekater-panrg-scion-overview}}.
Control Plane PKI (CP-PKI): The control plane PKI is the public-key infrastructure upon which SCION's Control Plane relies for the authentication of messages. It is a set of policies, roles, and procedures that are used to manage trust root configurations (TRCs) and certificates.
Autonomous System (AS): An autonomous system is a network under a common administrative control. For example, the network of an Internet service provider or organization can constitute an AS.
Isolation Domain (ISD): In SCION, Autonomous Systems (ASes) are organized into logical groups called isolation domains or ISDs. Each ISD consists of ASes that span an area with a uniform trust environment (i.e., a common jurisdiction). A possible model is for ISDs to be formed along national boundaries or federations of nations.
Core AS: Each isolation domain (ISD) is administered by a set of distinguished autonomous systems (ASes) called core ASes, which are responsible for initiating the path discovery and path construction process known as "beaconing".
Trust Root Configuration (TRC): A Trust Root Configuration or TRC is a signed collection of certificates pertaining to an isolation domain (ISD). TRCs also contain ISD-specific policies.
Authoritative AS: Authoritative ASes are those ASes in an ISD that always have the latest TRCs of the ISD. As a consequence, authoritative ASes also start the announcement of a TRC update.
Base TRC: A base TRC is a trust root configuration (TRC) that other parties trust axiomatically. In other words, trust for a base TRC is assumed, not derived from another cryptographic object. Each ISD MUST create and sign a base TRC when the ISD is established. A base TRC is either the first TRC of the ISD or the result of a trust reset.
TRC Signing Ceremony: The ceremony during which the very first base TRC of an ISD, called the initial TRC, is signed. The initial TRC is a special case of the base TRC where the number of the ISD is assigned.
TRC Update: A regular TRC update is a periodic re-issuance of the TRC where the entities and policies listed in the TRC remain unchanged. A sensitive TRC update is an update that modifies critical aspects of the TRC, such as the set of core ASes. In both cases, the base TRC remains unchanged.
Voting ASes: Those ASes within an ISD that may sign TRC updates. The process of appending a signature to a new TRC is called "casting a vote".
Voting Quorum: The voting quorum is a trust root configuration (TRC) field that indicates the number of votes (signatures) needed on a successor TRC for it to be verifiable. A voting quorum greater than one will thus prevent a single entity from creating a malicious TRC update.
Grace Period: The grace period is an interval during which the previous version of a trust root configuration (TRC) is still considered active after a new version has been published.
Trust Reset: A trust reset is the action of announcing a new base TRC for an existing ISD. A trust reset SHOULD only be triggered after a catastrophic event involving the loss or compromise of several important private keys.
{::boilerplate bcp14-tagged}
Given the diverse nature of the constituents in the current Internet, an important challenge is how to scale authentication of network elements (such as AS ownership, hop-by-hop routing information, name servers for DNS, and domains for TLS) to the global environment. The roots of trust of currently prevalent public key infrastructure (PKI) models do not scale well to a global environment because (1) mutually distrustful parties cannot agree on a single trust root (monopoly model), and because (2) the security of a plethora of roots of trust is only as strong as its weakest link (oligopoly model) - see also {{BARRERA17}}.
The monopoly model suffers from two main drawbacks: First, all parties must agree on a single root of trust. Secondly, the single root of trust represents a single point of failure, the misuse of which enables the forging of certificates. Its revocation can also result in a kill switch for all the entities it certifies.
The oligopoly model relies on several roots of trust, all equally and completely trusted. However, this is not automatically better: whereas the monopoly model has a single point of failure, the oligopoly model has the drawback of exposing more than one point of failure.
Thus, there is a need for a trust architecture that supports meaningful trust roots in a global environment with inherently distrustful parties. This new trust architecture should provide the following properties:
- Trust agility (see further below);
- Resilience to single root of trust compromise;
- Multilateral governance; and
- Support for policy versioning and updates.
Ideally, the trust architecture allows parties that mutually trust each other to form their own trust "union" or "domain", and to freely decide whether to trust other trust unions (domains) outside their own trust bubble.
To fulfill the above requirements, which in fact apply well to inter-domain networking, SCION introduces the concept of Isolation Domains. An Isolation Domain (ISD) is a building block for achieving high availability, scalability, and support for heterogeneous trust. It consists of a logical grouping of ASes that share a uniform trust environment (i.e. a common jurisdiction).
An ISD is administered by one or multiple ASes, called the voting ASes. Furthermore, each ISD has a set of ASes that form the ISD core; these are the core ASes. The set of core and voting ASes can, but do not necessarily have to, overlap. It is governed by a policy called the Trust Root Configuration (TRC), which is negotiated by the ISD core, and which defines the locally scoped roots of trust used to validate bindings between names and public keys.
Authentication in SCION is based on digital certificates that bind identifiers to public keys and carry digital signatures that are verified by roots of trust. SCION allows each ISD to define its own set of trust roots, along with the policy governing their use. Such scoping of trust roots within an ISD improves security as compromise of a private key associated with a trust root cannot be used to forge a certificate outside the ISD. An ISD's trust roots and policy are encoded in the TRC, which has a version number, a list of public keys that serves as root of trust for various purposes, and policies governing the number of signatures required for performing different types of actions. The TRC serves as a way to bootstrap all authentication within SCION. Additionally, TRC versioning is used to efficiently revoke compromised roots of trust.
The TRC also provides trust agility, that is it enables users to select the trust roots used to initiate certificate validation. This implies that users are free to choose an ISD they believe maintains a uncompromised set of trust roots. ISD members can also decide whether to trust other ISDs and thus transparently define trust relationships between parts of the network. The SCION trust model therefore, differs from the one provided by other PKI architectures.
The need for trust agility also means that SCION does not by design provide IP prefix origin validation as provided by RPKI {{RFC8210}}. RPKI's trust model is currently reliant on the trust roots provided by the five Regional Internet Registries, and therefore outside of the governance of an ISD.
As previously mentioned, the Control Plane PKI is organized at an ISD level whereby each ISD can independently specify its own Trust Root Configuration (TRC) and build its own verification chain. Each TRC consists of a collection of signed root certificates, which are used to sign CA certificates, which are in turn used to sign AS certificates. The TRC also includes ISD policies that specify, for example, the TRC's usage, validity, and future updates. The so-called base TRC constitutes the ISD's trust anchor which is signed during a signing ceremony by the voting ASes and then distributed throughout the ISD.
There are two types of TRC updates: regular and sensitive. A regular TRC update is a periodic re-issuance of the TRC where the entities and policies listed in the TRC remain unchanged, whereas a sensitive TRC update is an update that modifies critical aspects of the TRC, such as the set of core ASes. In both cases the base TRC remains unchanged.
If the ISD's TRC has been compromised, it is necessary for an ISD to re-establish the trust root. This is possible with a process called trust reset (if permitted by the ISD's trust policy). In this case, a new base TRC is created.
The Control Plane PKI does not explicitly support certificate revocation. Instead it relies on the two mechanisms described above and on short-lived certificates. This approach constitutes an attractive alternative to a revocation system for the following reasons:
- Both short-lived certificates and revocation lists must be signed by a CA. Instead of periodically signing a new revocation list, the CA can simply re-issue all the non-revoked certificates. Although the overhead of signing multiple certificates is greater than that of signing a single revocation list, the overall complexity of the system is reduced. In the Control Plane PKI the number of certificates that each CA must renew is manageable as it is limited to at most the number of ASes within an ISD.
- Even with a revocation system, a compromised key cannot be instantaneously revoked. Through their validity period, both short-lived certificates and revocation lists implicitly define an attack window (i.e. a period during which an attacker who managed to compromise a key could use it before it becomes invalid). In both cases, the CA must consider a tradeoff between efficiency and security when picking this validity period.
The base TRC constitutes the root of trust within an ISD. {{figure-1}} provides a view of the trust chain within an ISD, based on its TRC. For detailed descriptions, please refer to and .
TRC 2
+--------------------------------------+
|+------------------------------------+|
||- Version - Core ASes ||
+--------+ ||- ID - Description || +--------+
| TRC 1 | ||- Validity - No Trust Reset || | TRC 3 |
| (Base |---->||- Grace Period - Voting Quorum ||--->| |
| TRC) | ||- ... || | |
+--------+ |+------------------------------------+| +--------+
|+----------------+ +----------------+|
|| Regular Voting | |Sensitive Voting||
|| Certificate | | Certificate ||
|+----------------+ +----------------+|
|+----------------+ +----------------+|
|| Votes | | Signatures ||
|+----------------+ +----------------+|
|+------------------------------------+|
|| CP Root Certificates ||
|+----------+-------------+-----------+|
| | | |
+-----------+-------------+------------+
| |
| |
v v
+-----------+ +-----------+
| CP CA | | CP CA |
|Certificate| |Certificate|
+-+-------+-+ +-----+-----+
| | |
| | |
v v v
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| CP AS | | CP AS | | CP AS |
|Certificate| |Certificate| |Certificate|
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
{: #figure-1 title="Chain of trust within an ISD"}
All certificates used in the Control plane PKI are in X.509 v3 format {{RFC5280}} and additionally the TRC contains self-signed certificates instead of plain public keys. Self-signed certificates have the following advantages over plain public keys: (1) They make the binding between name and public key explicit; and (2) the binding is signed to prove possession of the corresponding private key.
All ASes in SCION have the task to sign and verify control plane messages. However, certain ASes have additional roles:
- Core ASes: Core ASes are a distinct set of ASes in the SCION Control Plane. For each ISD, the core ASes are listed in the TRC. Each core AS in an ISD has links to other core ASes (in the same or in different ISDs).
- Certification authorities (CAs): CAs are responsible for issuing AS certificates to other ASes and/or themselves.
- Voting ASes: Only certain ASes within an ISD may sign TRC updates. The process of appending a signature to a new TRC is called "casting a vote", and the designated ASes that hold the private keys to sign a TRC update are "voting ASes".
- Authoritative ASes: Authoritative ASes are those ASes in an ISD that always have the latest TRCs of the ISD. They start the announcement of a TRC update.
The Control Plane PKI can be seen as a function that transforms potential distrust among different parties into a mutually accepted trust contract including a trust update and reset policy as well as certificates used for authentication procedures in SCION's Control Plane.
For the function to work, it is not necessary that the ASes of the ISD all trust each other. However, all ASes MUST trust the ISD's core ASes, authoritative ASes, voting ASes, as well as its CA(s). These trusted parties negotiate the ISD trust contract in a "bootstrapping of trust" ceremony, where cryptographic material is exchanged and the ISD's trust anchor (the initial Trust Root Configuration) is created and signed.
Prior to the ceremony, the trusted parties MUST decide about the validity period of the TRC as well as the number of votes required to update a TRC. They MUST also bring the required keys and certificates, the so-called root and voting keys/certificates.
During the ceremony, the trusted parties decide about the number of the ISD. This MUST be an integer in the inclusive range between 64 and 4094. The next table shows the current allocation of ISD numbers in SCION:
| ISD | Description | |-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 0 | The wildcard ISD. | | 1 - 15 | Reserved for documentation and sample code (analogous to {{RFC5398}}. | | 16 - 63 | Private use (analogous to {{RFC6996}}). Can be used for testing and private deployments. | | 64 - 4094 | Public ISDs. Should be allocated in ascending order, without gaps and "vanity" numbers. | | 4095 - 65535 | Reserved for future use. | {: #table-1 title="ISD Number Allocations"}
The output of the bootstrapping of trust ceremony, or the trust "function", are the ISD's initial Trust Root Configuration as well as mutually trusted and accepted CA and AS certificates - the latter are used to verify control plane messages. Together with the ISD's control plane root certificates, the CA and AS certificates build the ISD's trust and verification chain.
This section provides a detailed specification of all certificates used by the Control Plane PKI.
There are three types of Control Plane (CP) certificates: root certificates, CA certificates, and AS certificates. Together, they build a chain of trust that is anchored in the Trust Root Configuration (TRC) file of the respective Isolation Domain (ISD). Additionally, there are regular and sensitive voting certificates which define the keys to cast votes in a regular or sensitive TRC update.
All certificates in the Control Plane PKI are in X.509 v3 format {{RFC5280}}.
The trust is anchored in the TRC for each ISD. The trust root is axiomatic: All trust derived from this anchor relies on all parties transitively trusting the TRC.
The trust hierarchy looks like this:
TRC
── Regular Voting Certificates
└── TRC (next version, regular update)
── Sensitive Voting Certificates
└── TRC (next version, sensitive update)
── CP Root Certificates
└── CP CA Certificates
└── CP AS Certificates
The private key of the Control Plane root certificate is used to sign Control Plane CA certificates. Consequently, the public key of the Control Plane Root certificate is used to verify Control Plane CA certificates, i.e. root certificates determine which ASes act as a CA in an ISD.
In X.509 terms, Control Plane root certificates are self-signed CA certificates. That is, issuer and subject of the certificate are the same entity, and the public key in the root certificate can be used to verify the root certificate's signature. The public key of the Control Plane root certificate and proof of ownership of the private key are embedded in the TRC of an ISD, via the self-signed Control Plane root certificate. This facilitates the bootstrapping of trust within an ISD, and marks the Control Plane root certificates as the starting point of an ISD's certificate verification path.
The RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of a Control Plane root certificate is 1 year.
Note: The TRC of each ISD contains a trusted set of Control Plane root certificates, and this set builds the root of each ISD's verification path. For more information on the selection of this trusted set of root certificates, see .
The private key of the Control Plane CA is used to sign Control Plane AS certificates. Consequently, Control Plane CA certificates holding the public key of the Control Plane CA are used to verify Control Plane AS certificates.
The public key needed to verify the CA certificate is in a Control Plane root certificate. CA certificates do not bundle the root certificate needed to verify them. In order to verify a CA certificate, a pool of root certificates must first be extracted from one or more active TRCs (as described in ).
The RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of a Control Plane CA certificate is 11 days.
SCION ASes sign control plane messages, such as Path Construction Beacons, with their AS private key. Consequently, Control Plane AS certificates holding the corresponding AS public key are required to verify control plane messages.
In X.509 terms, Control Plane AS certificates are end-entity certificates. That is, they cannot be used to verify other certificates.
The RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of a CP AS certificate is 3 days.
There are two types of voting certificates: the (1) regular voting certificates and the (2) sensitive voting certificates. They contain the public keys associated with the private keys that MAY cast votes in the TRC update process. Voting certificates are X.509-style certificates.
Regular and sensitive voting certificates are used to verify regular and sensitive TRC updates, respectively, and are embedded in the TRC.
Regular voting certificates state which keys MAY cast votes in a regular update. In X.509 terms, regular voting certificates are self-signed end-entity certificates. This means that the issuer and subject of a regular voting certificate are the same entity, and the public key within the certificate can be used to verify the certificate's signature. However, a regular voting certificate cannot be used to verify other certificates.
The RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of a regular voting certificate is 1 year.
Sensitive voting certificates specify which keys MAY cast votes in a sensitive update. In X.509 terms, sensitive voting certificates are self-signed end-entity certificates. This means that the issuer and subject of a sensitive voting certificate are the same entity, and the public key within the certificate can be used to verify the certificate's signature. However, a sensitive voting certificate cannot be used to verify other certificates.
The RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of a sensitive voting certificate is 5 years.
Note:
Both SCION Control Plane root certificates and Control Plane CA certificates are in fact CA certificates. That is, they can both be used to verify other certificates.
One important difference between both certificate types lies in their validity period: A SCION Control Plane root certificate has a RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of one year, whereas the RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of a SCION Control Plane CA certificate is 11 days. This is because a root certificate is part of the TRC of an ISD, which itself also has a RECOMMENDED maximum validity period of one year (see Table 2 below). This ensures that the TRC need not be updated all the time and is thus relatively stable.
The SCION root private key and public key/certificate are used to sign and verify the Control Plane CA certificates, respectively. The control plane CA certificates are explicitly NOT part of the TRC, for reasons of security. The Control Plane CA certificates are used to verify the Control Plane AS certificates, which in turn are used to verify control plane messages. Routing is made more secure if both the SCION Control Plane CA and AS certificates can be renewed on a very regular basis. If the control plane CA and AS certificates were part of the TRC, then the TRC would have to be updated constantly, which is undesirable.
{{table-2}} and {{table-3}} below provide an overview of the different types of key pairs and certificates in the control plane PKI.
| Name | Notation (1) | Used to verify/sign | |----------------------+----------------------+----------------------------| | Sensitive voting key | Ksens | TRC updates (sensitive) | | Regular voting key | Kreg | TRC updates (regular) | | CP root key | Kroot | CP CA certificates | | CP CA key | KCA | CP AS certificates | | CP AS key | KAS | CP messages, path segments | {: #table-2 title="Key chain"}
(1) Kx = PKx + SKx, where x = certificate type, PKx = public key, and SKx = private key
| Name | Notation | Signed with | Contains | Validity (2) | |------------------------+-------------------+------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------+--------------| | TRC (trust root conf.) | TRC | SKsens, SKreg (1) | Croot, Csens, Creg (1) | 1 year | | Sensitive voting cert. | Csens | SKsens | PKsens | 5 years | | Regular voting cert. | Creg | SKreg | PKreg | 1 year | | CP root certificate | Croot | SKroot | PKroot | 1 year | | CP CA certificate | CCA | SKroot | PKCA | 11 days (3) | | CP AS certificate | CAS | SKCA | PKAS | 3 days | {: #table-3 title="Certificates"}
(1) Multiple signatures and certificates of each type MAY be included in a TRC.
(2) Recommended maximum validity period.
(3) A validity of 11 days with 4 days overlap between two CA certificates is RECOMMENDED to enable the best possible operational procedures when performing a CA certificate rollover.
{{figure-2}} shows the content of a base/initial TRC, and the relationship between a TRC and the five types of certificates. The initial signatures are replaced by those of the Regular Voting Certificates with the first regular update to the base TRC.
+--------------------------------------------+
| TRC 1 |
| (base/initial) |
|+------------------------------------------+|
|| - Version - Core ASes ||
|| - ID - Description ||
|| - Validity - No Trust Reset ||
|| - Grace Period - Voting Quorum ||
|| - ... ||
|+------------------------------------------+|
|+--------------------++--------------------+|
|| Votes || Regular Voting ||
|| (cert. indices) || Certificates ||
|| || ||
|| || +-----+ +-----+ ||
|| (empty) || | (1) | | (2) | ||
|| || |C | |C | ...||
|| || | reg | | reg | ||
|+--------------------+| +-----+ +-----+ ||
|+--------------------+| ||
|| || ||
|| || ||
|| Signatures |+--------------------+|
|| |+--------------------+|
||+------------------+|| Sensitive Voting ||
||| 73 A9 4E AO 0D...||| Certificates ||
||+------------------+|| +-----+ +-----+ ||
||+------------------+|| | (3) | | (4) | ||
||| 53 B7 7C 98 56...||| |C | |C | ||
||+------------------+|| | sens| | sens| ...||
|| ... || +-----+ +-----+ ||
|+--------------------++--------------------+|
|+------------------------------------------+|
|| CP Root Certificates ||
|| ||
|| +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ ||
|| | (5) | | (6) | | (7) | | (8) | ||
|| |C | |C | |C | |C | ||
|| | root| | root| | root| | root| ... ||
|| +-----+ +--+--+ +-----+ +--+--+ ||
|+------------+---------------+-------------+|
+-------------+---------------+--------------+
| |
v v
+-----------+ +-----------+
| CP CA | | CP CA |
|Certificate| |Certificate|
+-----+-----+ +-----+-----+
| |
v v
+-----------+ +-----------+
| CP AS | | CP AS |
|Certificate| |Certificate|
+-----------+ +-----------+
{: #figure-2 title="TRC update chain and the different types of associated certificates. Arrows show how signatures are verified; in other words, they indicate that a public key contained in a certificate or TRC can be used to verify the authenticity of another item."}
Whilst the certificates used in the Control Plane PKI are X.509 v3 certificates, the SCION specification is more restrictive. This section defines these additional constraints and conditions in comparison to {{RFC5280}}.
The described fields of the Control Plane PKI certificates are relevant for each certificate regardless of the certificate type. For detailed descriptions of the full generic format of X.509 v3 certificates, see {{RFC5280}} and {{X.509}} clause 7.2.
TBSCertificate sequence: Contains information associated with the subject of the certificate and the CA that issued it. It includes the following fields:
-
versionfield: Describes the version of the encoded certificate. It MUST be set to "v3" (as extensions are REQUIRED in SCION). -
serialNumberfield: A positive integer assigned by the CA to each certificate. It MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a given CA. -
signaturefield: Contains the identifier for the algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate. -
issuerfield: Contains the distinguished name (DN) of the entity that has issued and signed the certificate (usually a CA).-
SCION constraints:
- This field MUST be non-empty.
- SCION implementations MUST ONLY use the “UTF8String” value type for all attributes (including the SCION-specific attribute
ISD-AS number).
-
Additional conditions and remarks: All SCION implementations MUST support the additional SCION-specific attribute
ISD-AS number. For details, see and .
-
-
validityfield: Defines the validity period of the certificate.- SCION constraints: All certificates MUST have a well-defined expiration date. Certificates with a generalized time value are not valid and MUST be rejected.
- Additional conditions and remarks: SCION recommends a specific maximum validity period for each type of certificate. For details, see . SCION implementations SHOULD adopt these values.
-
subjectfield: Defines the entity that owns the certificate.-
SCION constraints:
- This field MUST be non-empty.
- SCION implementations MUST ONLY use the “UTF8String” value type for all attributes (including the SCION-specific attribute
ISD-AS number).
-
Additional conditions and remarks: The
subjectfield is specified in the same way as theissuerfield. For details, see and .
-
-
subjectPublicKeyInfofield: Carries the public key of the certificate's subject (the entity that owns the certificate, as defined in thesubjectfield). ThesubjectPublicKeyInfofield also identifies which algorithm to use with the key.- SCION constraints: For constraints regarding the algorithm, see the
signaturefield.
- SCION constraints: For constraints regarding the algorithm, see the
-
issuerUniqueIDfield: it MUST NOT be used in SCION. -
subjectUniqueIDfield: it MUST NOT be used in SCION. -
extensionssequence: Defines the extensions of the certificate. For a description of all extensions used in SCION, see .
For security reasons, SCION uses a custom list of acceptable signature algorithms which is specified in the signature field. The list currently only contains the ECDSA signature algorithm (defined in {{X9.62}}) although this may be extended in future.
The Object Identifiers (OIDs) for ECDSA are defined as ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, and ecdsa-with-SHA512 in {{RFC5758}}.
Important: SCION implementations MUST reject cryptographic algorithms not found in this list.
The only accepted curves for ECDSA are:
- NIST P-256 (NISTFIPS186-4, section D.1.2.3) (named
secp256r1in {{RFC5480}}) - NIST P-384 (NISTFIPS186-4, section D.1.2.4) (named
secp384r1in {{RFC5480}}) - NIST P-521 (NISTFIPS186-4, section D.1.2.5) (named
secp521r1in {{RFC5480}})
The OIDs for the above curves are specified in section 2.1.1.1 of {{RFC5480}}.
The appropriate hash size to use when producing a signature with an ECDSA key is:
- ECDSA with SHA-256, for a P-256 signing key
- ECDSA with SHA-384, for a P-384 signing key
- ECDSA with SHA-512, for a P-521 signing key
Important: SCION implementations MUST include support for P-256, P-384, and P-521.
The issuer field contains the distinguished name (DN) of the CA that created the certificate. {{RFC5280}}, section 4.1.2.4, describes the field's syntax and attributes. In addition to these attributes, SCION implementations MUST also support the SCION-specific attribute ISD-AS number. See .
The ISD-AS number attribute identifies the SCION ISD and AS. In the SCION open source implementation, the attribute type is id-at-ia, defined as:
id-at-ia AttributeType ::= {id-scion id-cppki(1) id-at(2) 1}
where id-scion specifies the root SCION object identifier (OID).
Note: The root SCION object identifier (OID) for the SCION open-source implementation is the IANA Private Enterprise Number '55324':
id-scion ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER {1 3 6 1 4 1 55324}
The string representation of the ISD-AS number attribute MUST follow the text representation defined in {{I-D.dekater-scion-controlplane}}, section "Text Representation". The canonical string formatting of AS numbers in the AS range (0, 232-1) MUST use the decimal form. Larger AS numbers, i.e., from 232 to 248-1, MUST use a 16-bit, colon-separated, lower-case, hex encoding with leading zeros omitted: 1:0:0 to ffff:ffff:ffff.
The ISD-AS number attribute MUST be present exactly once in the distinguished name of the certificate issuer or owner, specified in the issuer or subject field respectively. Implementations MUST NOT create nor successfully verify certificates whose issuer and subject fields do not include the ISD-AS number at all, or include it more than once.
Note: Voting certificates are not required to include the ISD-AS number attribute in their distinguished name.
{{RFC5280}}, section 4.2.1, defines the syntax of the Extensions sequence in a X.509 certificate. Descriptions of each standard certificate extension can be found in {{RFC5280}}, section 4.2.1. The corresponding clauses in {{X.509}} are clause 7.2 and clause 9, respectively.
Currently, the following extensions are relevant for SCION:
authorityKeyIdentifiersubjectKeyIdentifierkeyUsageextKeyUsagebasicConstraints
The following sections describe the SCION-specifics in regard to these extensions.
The authorityKeyIdentifier extension identifies the public key corresponding to the private key used to sign a certificate.
For the syntax and definition of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension, see {{RFC5280}}, section 4.2.1.1, and {{X.509}}, clause 9.2.2.1.
The authorityKeyIdentifier extension provides three attributes to specify the public key:
keyIdentifierauthorityCertIssuerauthorityCertSerialNumber
In SCION, using the keyIdentifier attribute is the preferred way to specify the authorityKeyIdentifier extension.
Important: SCION implementations MAY also support the use of the authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber attributes. However, if these attributes are set and support for them is missing, implementations SHOULD error out.
This extension MUST always be non-critical. However, SCION implementations MUST error out if the extension is not present AND the certificate is not self-signed.
The subjectKeyIdentifier extension identifies certificates that contain a particular public key. It can be used, for example, by control plane messages to identify which certificate to use for verification. The extension allows for overlapping control plane CA keys, for example during updates.
For the syntax and definition of the subjectKeyIdentifier extension, see {{RFC5280}}, section 4.2.1.2, and {{X.509}}, clause 9.2.2.2.
This extension MUST always be non-critical. However, SCION implementations MUST error out if the extension is not present.
The keyUsage extension identifies the intended usage of the public key in the corresponding certificate. For the syntax and definition of the keyUsage extension, see {{RFC5280}}, section 4.2.1.3, and {{X.509}}, clause 9.2.2.3.
The attributes of the keyUsage extension define possible ways of using the public key. The attributes have the following meaning in SCION:
digitalSignature: The public key can be used to verify the digital signature of a control plane payload.contentCommitment: Not used.keyEncipherment: Not used.dataEncipherment: Not used.keyAgreement: Not used.keyCertSign: The public key can be used to verify the CA signature on a control plane certificate.cRLSign: Not used.encipherOnly: Not used.decipherOnly: Not used.
Important: If a certificate’s public key is used to verify the signature of a control plane payload (digitalSignature attribute), it MUST be possible to trace back the private key used to sign the certificate. This is done by referencing the ISD-AS and the subject key identifier (via the subjectKeyIdentifier extension). For more information about the subjectKeyIdentifier extension, see .
If present, the keyUsage extension SHOULD be marked as "critical". That is, the critical Boolean attribute of this extension MUST be set to TRUE (the default is FALSE).
Note: If a certificate extension is marked "critical", the public key in the certificate SHOULD only be used for the purpose set in the critical extension.
Each Control Plane PKI certificate type uses the public key differently, and consequently also specifies the attributes of the keyUsage extension differently. The next table shows the specifications per certificate type.
| Certificate Type | Root | CA | AS | Voting (regular and sensitive) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Attribute: | ||||
keyUsage extension itself |
MUST be present | MUST be present | MUST be present | MAY be present (but is not required) |
digitalSignature |
MUST NOT be set (1) | MUST NOT be set (2) | MUST be set | If the extension is present, the digitalSignature attribute MUST NOT be set |
keyCertSign |
MUST be set | MUST be set | MUST NOT be set | If the extension is present, the keyCertSign attribute MUST NOT be set |
| {: #table-4 title="keyUsage extension - Specifications per certificate type"} |
(1) The root certificate SHOULD NOT be used to verify control plane messages.
(2) The CA certificate SHOULD NOT be used to verify control plane messages.
The extKeyUsage extension specifies additional usages of the public key in the certificate. For the syntax and definition of the extKeyUsage extension, see {{X.509}}, clause 9.2.2.4.
SCION uses the following attributes of the Extended Key Usage extension, as defined in Section 4.2.1.12 of {{RFC5280}}:
id-kp-serverAuth: If set, the public key can be used for SCION Control Plane server authentication.id-kp-clientAuth: If set, the public key can be used for SCION Control Plane client authentication.id-kp-timeStamping: If set, the public key can be used for the verification of timestamps.
Additionally, the Extended Key Usage extension sequence MAY include the SCION-specific attributes id-kp-root, id-kp-regular, and id-kp-sensitive. These attributes are used in the TRC setup, to distinguish root certificates, regular voting certificates, and sensitive voting certificates from each other. For more information, see .
The specifications of the extKeyUsage extension differ per SCION Control Plane PKI certificate type. The next table provides an overview of the specifications per certificate type.
The id-kp-root, id-kp-regular, and id-kp-sensitive attributes MUST be specified as follows:
- Root certificate:
id-kp-root AttributeType ::= {id-scion id-cppki(1) id-kp(3) 3} - Regular voting certificate:
id-kp-regular AttributeType ::= {id-scion id-cppki(1) id-kp(3) 2} - Sensitive voting certificate:
id-kp-sensitive AttributeType ::= {id-scion id-cppki(1) id-kp(3) 1}
where id-scion specifies the root SCION object identifier (OID).
Note: The root SCION object identifier (OID) for the SCION open-source implementation is the IANA Private Enterprise Number '55324':
id-scion ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER {1 3 6 1 4 1 55324}
The basicConstraints extension specifies whether the certificate subject may act as a CA. For the syntax and definition of the basicConstraints extension, see {{X.509}}, clause 9.4.2.1.
The basicConstraints extension includes the following attributes relevant for SCION:
cAattribute: Specifies whether the certificate subject may act as a CA. If yes, this attribute MUST be set to TRUE.pathLenConstraintattribute: This attribute is only relevant if thecAattribute is set to TRUE. It specifies the maximum number of CA certificates that may follow this CA certificate in the certification chain. Value "0" means that this CA may only issue end-entity certificates, but no CA certificates. If the attribute is not set, there is no limit to the maximum length of the certification path.
The settings of the basicConstraints extension differ for each SCION Control Plane PKI certificate type. The next table shows the specifications per certificate type.
| Certificate Type | Root | CA | AS | Voting (regular and sensitive) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Attribute: | ||||
basicConstraints extension itself |
MUST be present | MUST be present | SHOULD NOT be present | SHOULD NOT be present |
cA |
MUST be set to TRUE | MUST be set to TRUE | If the extension is present, this attribute MUST be set to FALSE | If the extension is present, this attribute MUST be set to FALSE |
pathLenConstraint |
SHOULD be set to "1", MUST be marked as "critical" | SHOULD be set to "0" (1), MUST be marked as "critical" | If the extension is present, this attribute MUST be absent. | If the extension is present, this attribute MUST be absent. |
| {: #table-6 title="basicConstraints extension - Specifications per certificate type"} |
(1) Control Plane CAs can only issue end-entity certificates.
This section provides an in-depth specification of the Trust Root Configuration (TRC) file (see ). The TRC contains policy information about an ISD and acts as a distribution mechanism for the trust anchors of that ISD. It enables the securing of control plane interactions and is thus an integral part of the SCION infrastructure.
The initial TRC of an ISD is signed during a signing ceremony and then distributed throughout the ISD. This signing ceremony follows specific rules; describes these rules.
The TRC is a signed collection of {{X.509}} v3 certificates. Additionally, the TRC contains ISD-specific policies encoded in a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) {{RFC5652}} envelope.
The TRC's certificates collection consists of a set of control plane root certificates which build the root of the certification chain for the AS certificates in an ISD. The other certificates in the TRC are solely used for signing the next TRC, a process called "voting". The verification of a new TRC thus depends on the policies and voting certificates defined in the previous TRC.
This section specifies the TRC including format definitions and dpayload fields. The section uses the ITU-T {{X.680}} syntax.
### TRC Types and States {#trc-states}
The following types of TRCs exist:
- Initial: The very first TRC of an ISD is the initial TRC of that ISD. It is a special case of the base TRC, where the number of the ISD is specified.
- Base: A base TRC is either the initial TRC, or the first TRC after a trust reset (see ). Trust for a base TRC cannot be inferred by verifying a TRC update; base TRCs are trusted axiomatically, similarly to how root CA certificates are trusted by clients in the Web PKI.
- Update: All non-base TRCs are updated TRCs. They are the product of either a regular or a sensitive update.
A TRC can have the following states:
- Valid: The validity period of a TRC is defined in the TRC itself, in the
validityfield (see ). A TRC is considered valid if the current time falls within its validity period. - Active: An active TRC is a valid TRC that can be used for verifying certificate signatures. This is either the latest TRC or the predecessor TRC, if it is still in its grace period (as defined in the
gracePeriodfield of the new TRC, see ). No more than two TRCs can be active at the same time for any ISD.
{{figure-2}} shows the content of both a base/initial TRC, the changes made with the first regular update to the base TRC. All elements of the TRC is detailed in the following subsections.
### TRC Format
The TRC defines the roots of trust of an ISD and is the basis of the ISD's Control Plane PKI. It holds the root and voting certificates of the ISD and defines the ISD's trust policy.
#### TRC Schema {#trcpayload}
The following code block shows the format of a TRC specification file (the payload schema):
TRCPayload ::= SEQUENCE {
version TRCFormatVersion,
iD TRCID,
validity Validity,
gracePeriod INTEGER,
noTrustReset BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
votes SEQUENCE OF INTEGER (SIZE (1..255)),
votingQuorum INTEGER (1..255),
coreASes SEQUENCE OF ASN,
authoritativeASes SEQUENCE OF ASN,
description UTF8String (SIZE (0..1024)),
certificates SEQUENCE OF Certificate }
TRCFormatVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
TRCID ::= SEQUENCE {
iSD ISD,
serialNumber INTEGER (1..MAX),
baseNumber INTEGER (1..MAX) }
ISD ::= INTEGER (1..65535)
Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
notBefore Time,
notAfter Time }
ASN ::= INTEGER (1..281474976710655)
The TRCPayload sequence contains the identifying information of a TRC as well as policy information for TRC updates. Furthermore, it defines the list of certificates that build the trust anchor of the ISD.
For signature calculation, the data that is to be signed is encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER) {{X.690}}. For more details, see .
#### TRC Fields
This section describes the syntax and semantics of all TRC payload fields.
##### version Field
The version field describes the version of the TRC format specification.
Currently, the version MUST always be "v1".
##### iD Field {#id}
The iD field specifies the unique identifier of the TRC.
The identifier is a unique sequence of
- ISD number (
iSDattribute), - base number (
baseNumberattribute), and - TRC serial number (
serialNumberattribute).
All numbers MUST be positive integers.
- The ISD number MUST be an integer in the inclusive range from 64 to 4094 (i.e., the numbering range for public ISDs, see Input).
- The base number indicates the starting point of the current TRC update chain. This starting point is either the ISD's initial TRC or the currently valid base TRC, if the valid base TRC differs from the initial TRC. The latter MUST be the case after a trust reset.
- The serial number represents the current update cycle, counting from the initial TRC of a specific ISD.
A TRC where the base number is equal to the serial number is a base TRC. The initial TRC is a special case of a base TRC and MUST have a serial number of 1 and a base number of 1. With every TRC update, the serial number MUST be incremented by one. This facilitates uniquely identifying the predecessor and successor TRC in an update chain.
If a trust reset is necessary, a new base TRC is announced in order to start a new and clean TRC update chain. The base number of this new TRC update chain SHOULD be the number following the serial number of the latest TRC that was produced by a non-compromised TRC update for this ISD.
Example
The following simple example illustrates how to specify the ID of the TRCs in an TRC update chain for ISD 74. The IDs are given in a human-readable notation, where Bxx is the base number, and Sxx the serial number.
| Update | TRC ID | Remarks | |-------------+---------------------+--------------------------------------------------| | Initial | ISD74-B01-S01 | | | Regular | ISD74-B01-S02 | Only the serial number is incremented. | | Regular | ISD74-B01-S03 | Only the serial number is incremented. | | Sensitive | ISD74-B01-S04 | Only the serial number is incremented. | | Trust reset | ISD74-B05-S05 | A trust reset includes the creation of a new base TRC. The new base number follows the serial number "04" of the latest TRC resulting from a non-compromised TRC update for this ISD. | | Regular | ISD74-B05-S06 | Only the serial number is incremented. | | Regular | ISD74-B05-S07 | Only the serial number is incremented. | | And so on | | | {: #table-7 title="ID of TRCs in TRC update chain"}
##### validity Field {#validity}
The validity field defines the validity period of the TRC. This is the period of time during which the TRC is in the "valid" state. The notBefore and notAfter attributes of the validity field specify the lower and upper bound of the time interval during which a TRC can be active.
Note: An active TRC is a valid TRC that can be used for verifying certificate signatures. The time period during which a TRC is active can be shorter than the time period during which the TRC is valid. For more information, see .
The validity field consists of a sequence of two dates, as defined in section 7.2. of {{X.509}}.
In addition to this standard definition, the following constraint applies to the validity field of the TRC:
- All TRCs MUST have a well-defined expiration date. SCION implementations MUST NOT create TRCs that use the "99991231235959Z" generalized time value, and verifiers MUST error out when encountering such a TRC.
##### gracePeriod Field {#grace}
The gracePeriod field of a TRC specifies the period of time during which the predecessor TRC can still be considered active (the "grace period"). The grace period starts at the beginning of the validity period of the new TRC.
The validity period of the predecessor TRC ends when:
- the grace period has passed;
- the predecessor’s expiration time is reached; or
- the successor TRC of the new TRC has been announced.
Note: The event that happens first marks the end of the predecessor's validity period.
The gracePeriod field defines the grace period as a number of seconds (positive integer).
The value of the gracePeriod field in a base TRC MUST be zero. The value of the gracePeriod field in a non-base TRC SHOULD be non-zero. It SHOULD be long enough to provide sufficient overlap between the TRCs in order to facilitate interruption-free operations in the ISD. If the grace period is too short, some Control Plane AS certificates might expire before the corresponding AS can fetch an updated version from its CA.
##### noTrustReset Boolean {#notrustreset}
The noTrustReset Boolean specifies whether a trust reset is forbidden by the ISD. Within a TRC update chain, this value MUST NOT be changed by a regular or sensitive update. However, it is possible to change the noTrustReset value in the event of a trust reset, where a new base TRC is created.
The noTrustReset field is OPTIONAL and defaults to FALSE.
Important: Note that once the noTrustReset Boolean is set to TRUE and a trust reset is disallowed, this cannot be reversed. Therefore, ISDs SHOULD always set this value to FALSE, unless they have sufficiently assessed the risks and implications of making a trust reset impossible.
Note: A trust reset represents a special use case where a new base TRC is created. It therefore differs from a TRC update (regular or sensitive), as the signatures in the new base TRC cannot be verified with the certificates contained in the predecessor TRC. Instead, a trust reset base TRC must be axiomatically trusted, similarly to how the initial TRC is trusted.
The votes field contains a sequence of indices that refer to the voting certificates in the predecessor TRC. If index i is part of the votes field, then the voting certificate at position i in the certificates sequence of the predecessor TRC casted a vote on the successor TRC. For more information on the certificates sequence, see .
Note: In a base TRC, the votes sequence is empty.
Every entry in the votes sequence MUST be unique.
Further restrictions on votes are discussed in .
Note: The votes sequence of indices is mandatory in order to prevent stripping voting signatures from the TRC. Absence of the votes sequence makes it possible to transform a TRC with more voting signatures than the voting quorum into multiple verifiable TRCs with the same payload, but different voting signature sets. This would violate the requirement of uniqueness of a TRC.
##### votingQuorum Field {#quorum}
The votingQuorum field defines the number of necessary votes on a successor TRC to make it verifiable.
A voting quorum greater than one will prevent a single entity from creating a malicious TRC update.
##### coreASes Field {#core}
The coreASes field contains the AS numbers of the core ASes in this ISD.
Each core AS number MUST be unique in the sequence of core AS numbers. That is, each AS number MUST appear only once in the coreASes field.
###### Revoking or Assigning Core Status
- To revoke the core status of a given AS, remove the respective AS number from the sequence of AS numbers in the
coreASesfield. - To assign the core status to a given AS, add the respective AS number to the sequence of AS numbers in the
coreASesfield.
Important: Revoking or assigning the core status of/to an AS always requires a (sensitive) TRC update.
##### authoritativeASes Field {#auth}
The authoritativeASes field contains the AS numbers of the authoritative ASes in this ISD.
Authoritative ASes are those ASes in an ISD that always have the latest TRCs of the ISD. As a consequence, authoritative ASes also start the announcement of a TRC update.
- Every authoritative AS MUST be a core AS and be listed in the
coreASesfield. - Each authoritative AS number MUST be unique in the sequence of authoritative AS numbers. That is, each AS number MUST NOT appear more than once in the
authoritativeASesfield.
###### Revoking or Assigning Authoritative Status
- To revoke the authoritative status of a given AS, remove the respective AS number from the sequence of AS numbers in the
authoritativeASesfield. - To assign the authoritative status to a given AS, add the respective AS number to the sequence of AS numbers in the
authoritativeASesfield.
Important: Revoking or assigning the authoritative status of/to an AS always requires a (sensitive) TRC update.
##### description Field {#description}
The description field contains a UTF-8 encoded string that describes the ISD.
- The
descriptionfield SHOULD NOT be empty. - The description of the ISD MUST be in English. Additionally, the
descriptionfield MAY contain information in other languages.
The voting ASes and the certification authorities (CAs) of an ISD are not specified explicitly in the ISD's TRC. Instead, this information is defined by the list of voting and root certificates in the certificates field of the TRC payload.
The certificates field is a sequence of self-signed X.509 certificates. Each certificate in the certificate sequence MUST be one of the following types:
- a sensitive voting certificate,
- a regular voting certificate, or
- a CP root certificate.
A certificate that is no control plane root or voting certificate MUST NOT be included in the sequence of certificates in the certificates field.
Note: A certificate's type (voting or root) is specified in the extKeyUsage extension of the certificate, by means of the SCION-specific attributes id-kp-regular, id-kp-sensitive, and id-kp-root, respectively. For more information, see .
The following constraints MUST hold for each certificate in the certificates field of the TRC payload:
- Each certificate MUST be unique in the sequence of certificates. That is, each certificate MUST NOT appear more than once in the
certificatesfield. - The
issuer/serialNumberpair for each certificate MUST be unique. - If an ISD-AS number is present in the distinguished name of the certificate, this ISD number MUST be equal to the ISD number of the TRC (which is defined in the
iDfield (see ). - Every certificate MUST have a validity period that fully contains the validity period of this TRC. That is, the
notBeforedate of this TRC's validity period MUST be equal to or later than the certificate'snotBeforedate, and thenotAfterdate of this TRC's validity period MUST be before or equal to the certificate'snotAfterdate. - Per certificate type, every certificate distinguished name MUST be unique.
The following must hold for the entire sequence of certificates in the certificates field:
votingQuorum<= count (sensitive voting certificates)
That is, the quorum defined in the TRC'svotingQuorumfield () MUST be smaller than or equal to the number of sensitive voting certificates specified in the TRC'scertificatesfield.votingQuorum<= count (regular voting certificates)
That is, the quorum defined in the TRC'svotingQuorumfield () MUST be smaller than or equal to the number of regular voting certificates specified in the TRC'scertificatesfield.
### TRC Signature Syntax {#signed-format}
A TRC contains policy information about an ISD and acts as a distribution mechanism for the trust anchors of that ISD.
Each TRC is digitally signed and the syntax used to sign and encapsulate the TRC payload is the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as defined in {{RFC5652}}. The signed TRC payload is of the CMS signed-data content type, as defined in Section 5 of {{RFC5652}}, and encapsulated in a CMS ContentInfo element, as defined in Section 3 of {{RFC5652}}.
For detailed information on the general syntax definitions of the Cryptographic Message Syntax, see sections 3 and 5 of {{RFC5652}}.
SCION implementations MUST fulfil the following additional rules, as well as the general syntax rules specified in {{RFC5652}}:
EncapsulatedContentInfosequence:- The
eContentTypefield MUST be set to "id-data". - The content of the
eContentfield MUST be the DER-encoded TRC payload. This has the benefit that the format is backwards compatible with PKCS #7, as described in Section 5.2.1 of {{RFC5652}}.
- The
SignedDatasequence:- The
certificatesfield MUST be left empty. The certificate pool used to verify a TRC update is already specified in thecertificatesfield of the predecessor TRC's payload (see also ). - The
versionfield MUST be set to "1". This is because SCION uses the "id-data" content type to encapsulate content info, and does not specify any certificate in theSignedDatasequence (see also Section 5.1 of {{RFC5652}}).
- The
SignerIdentifierchoice:- The type of signer identifier chosen here MUST be
IssuerAndSerialNumber.
- The type of signer identifier chosen here MUST be
SignerInfosequence:- The
versionfield MUST be set to "1". This is because SCION uses theIssuerAndSerialNumbertype of signer identifier (see also Section 5.3 of {{RFC5652}}). - The algorithm specified in the
signatureAlgorithmfield MUST be one of the algorithms supported by SCION (for details, see signature Field - Additional Information). - The
digestAlgorithmis determined by the algorithm specified in thesignatureAlgorithmfield.
- The
#### TRC Equality
The signer information in the signed TRC is part of an unordered set, as per {{RFC5652}}. This implies that the signer information can be reordered without affecting verification, although certain operations require TRCs to be equal im accordance with the following definition:
Two TRCs are equal, if and only if their payloads are byte equal.
Two TRCs with byte equal payloads can be considered as equal because the TRC payload exactly defines which signatures must be attached in the signed TRC:
- The REQUIRED signatures from voting certificates are explicitly mentioned in the
votesfield of the payload: If index "i" is part of thevotesfield, then the voting certificate at position i in thecertificatessequence of the predecessor TRC casted a vote on the successor TRC. See also . - The REQUIRED signatures for new certificates are implied by the currently valid TRC payload, and, in case of a TRC update, the predecessor payload.
### Certification Path - Trust Anchor Pool
The certification path of a Control PlaneAS certificate starts in a Control Plane root certificate. The Control Plane root certificate for a given ISD is distributed via the TRC.
However, AS certificates and the corresponding signing CA certificates are not part of the TRC, but bundled into certificate chains and distributed separately from the corresponding TRC. This separation makes it possible to extend the validity period of the root certificate, and to update the corresponding TRC without having to modify the certificate chain. To be able to validate a certification path, each AS builds a collection of root certificates from the latest TRC of the relevant ISD.
The following section explains how to build a trust anchor pool.
Note: Any entity sending information that is secured by the Control Plane PKI, such as control plane messages, MUST be able to provide all the necessary trust material, such as certificates, to verify said information. If any cryptographic material is missing in the process, the relying party MUST query the originator of the message for the missing material. If it cannot be resolved, the verification process fails. For more details, see 4.2 "Signing and Verifying Control Plane Messages" .
#### TRC Selection For Trust Anchor Pool {#trc-selection}
The selection of the right set of TRCs to build the trust anchor pool depends on the time of verification. The trust anchor pool is usually used to verify control plane messages and this case, the time of verification is the current time. However, if the trust anchor pool will be used for auditing, the time of verification is the point in time to check whether a given signature was verifiable.
The selection algorithm for building the trust anchor pool is described in pseudo-python code below.
def select_trust_anchors(trcs: Dict[(int,int), TRC], \
verification_time: int) -> Set[RootCert]:
"""
Args:
trcs: The dictionary mapping (serial number, \
base number) to the TRC for a given ISD.
verification_time: The time of verification.
Returns:
The set of CP Root certificates acting as trust anchors.
"""
# Find highest base number that has a TRC with validity
# period starting before verification time.
base_nr = 1
for trc in trcs.values()
if trc.id.base_nr > base_nr and trc.validity.not_before \
<= verification_time:
base_nr = trc.id.base_nr
# Find TRC with highest serial number with given base number
# and a validity period starting before verification time.
serial_nr = 1
for trc in trcs[isd].values():
if trc.id.base_nr != base_nr:
continue
if trc.id.serial_nr > serial_nr and \
trc.validity.not_before <= verification_time:
serial_nr = trc.id.serial_nr
candidate = trcs[(serial_nr, base_nr)]
# If the verification time is not inside the validity period,
# there is no valid set of trust anchors.
if not candidate.validity.contains(verification_time):
return set()
# If the grace period has passed, only the certificates in
# that TRC may be used as trust anchors.
if candidate.validity.not_before + candidate.grace_period \
< verification_time:
return collect_trust_anchors(candidate)
predecessor = trcs.get((serial_nr-1, base_nr))
if not predecessor or predecessor.validity.not_after < \
verification_time:
return collect_trust_anchors(candidate)
return collect_trust_anchors(candidate) | \
collect_trust_anchors(predecessor)
def collect_trust_anchors(trc: TRC) -> Set[RootCert]:
"""
Args:
trc: A TRC from which the CP Root Certificates shall \
be extracted.
Returns:
The set of CP Root certificates acting as trust anchors.
"""
roots = set()
for cert in trc.certificates:
if not cert.basic_constraints.ca:
continue
roots.add(cert)
return roots### TRC Updates {#update}
All non-base TRCs of an ISD are updates of the ISD's base TRC(s). The TRC update chain consists of regular and sensitive TRC updates, and the type of update determines the (payload) information that changes in the updated TRC.
This section describes the rules that apply to updating a TRC in regard to the payload information contained in the TRC. Some rules are valid for both update types whilst some only apply to a regular or a sensitive TRC update. Based on the type of update, different sets of voters are needed to create a verifiable TRC update and the corresponding voting (signing) process is also described. To verify a TRC update, a relying party MUST perform a couple of checks which are also listed.
#### Changed or New Certificates {#change-new}
In the context of a TRC update,
- A certificate is changing, if the certificate is part of the
certificatessequence in the predecessor TRC, but no longer part of thecertificatessequence in the updated TRC. Instead, thecertificatessequence of the updated TRC holds another certificate of the same type and with the same distinguished name. - A certificate is new, if there is no certificate of the same type and distinguished name at all in the
certificatessequence of the predecessor TRC.
Note: Every new sensitive or regular voting certificate in a TRC attaches a signature to the TRC. This is done to ensure that the freshly included voting entity agrees with the contents of the TRC it is now part of.
#### Update Rules - Overview
The following table gives an overview of the types of TRC update as well as the rules that must apply in regard to the updated TRC's payload information.
The sections that follow provide more detailed descriptions of each rule.
| Type of Update | Payload Updated TRC - Unchanged Elements | Payload Updated TRC - Required Changes | Payload Updated TRC: Other Rules to Hold |
|------------------------------------+-------------------------------------------+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------|
| Both Regular AND Sensitive Updates | - iD field: iSD and baseNumber
- noTrustReset field | iD field: serialNumber MUST be incremented by 1 | votes field: Number of votes (indices) => number set in the votingQuorum field of the predecessor TRC |
| Regular TRC Update | - Quorum in the votingQuorum field
- Core ASes in the coreASes field
- ASes in the authoritativeASes field
- Nr. and distinguished names of root & voting certificates in the certificates field
- Set of sensitive voting certificates in the certificates field | | votes field:
- All votes MUST only refer to regular voting certificates in the predecessor TRC
- Must include votes of each changed regular voting certificate from the predecessor TRC
signatures field:
- Must include signatures of each changed root certificate from the predecessor TRC |
| Sensitive TRC Update | If the update does not qualify as a regular update, it is a sensitive update | | votes field:
- All votes MUST only refer to sensitive voting certificates in the predecessor TRC |
{: #table-8 title="Overview of the update types and corresponding rules"}
#### General Update Rules
The following rules MUST hold for each updated TRC, independent of the update type:
- The
iSDandbaseNumberin theiDfield MUST NOT change (see also ). - The
serialNumberin theiDfield MUST be incremented by one. - The
noTrustResetfield MUST NOT change (see also ). - The
votessequence of the updated TRC MUST only contain indices that refer to sensitive or regular voting certificates in the predecessor TRC. This guarantees that the updated TRC only contains valid votes authenticated by sensitive or regular voting certificates in the predecessor TRC. For more information, see and . - The number of votes in the updated TRC MUST be greater than or equal to the number set in the
votingQuorumfield of the predecessor TRC (see ). The number of votes corresponds to the number of indices in thevotesfield of the updated TRC.
#### Regular TRC Update
A regular TRC update is a periodic re-issuance of the TRC where the entities and policies listed in the TRC remain unchanged.
A TRC update qualifies as a regular update, if the following rules apply in regard to the TRC's payload information.
- The settings of the following fields in the updated TRC MUST remain the same compared to the predecessor TRC:
- The voting quorum set in the
votingQuorumfield. - The core ASes specified in the
coreASesfield. - The authoritative ASes specified in the
authoritativeASesfield. - The number of sensitive and regular voting certificates as well as Control Plane root certificates included in the
certificatesfield, and their distinguished names. - The set of sensitive voting certificates specified in the
certificatesfield.
- The voting quorum set in the
- For every regular voting certificate that changes, the regular voting certificate in the predecessor TRC is part of the voters on the updated TRC. That is, for each changed regular voting certificate, an index in the
votesfield of the updated TRC MUST refer to the changed regular voting certificate in the predecessor TRC. - For every Control Plane root certificate that changes, the updated TRC MUST include a signature created with the private key belonging to the changed Control Plane root certificate (which is part of the predecessor TRC).
- In order for a regular TRC update to be verifiable, all votes MUST be cast by regular voting certificates. That is, each index in the
votesfield of the regularly updated TRC MUST refer to a regular voting certificate in thecertificatesfield of the predecessor TRC.
#### Sensitive TRC Update
If a TRC update does not qualify as a regular update, it is considered a sensitive update.
- In order for a sensitive update to be verifiable, all votes MUST be cast by sensitive voting certificates. That is, each index in the
votesfield of the sensitively updated TRC MUST refer to a sensitive voting certificate in thecertificatesfield of the predecessor TRC.
#### Signing a TRC Update
As described above, a set of voters MUST cast votes on the updated TRC to make it verifiable. The votingQuorum field of the predecessor TRC (see ) defines the required number of voters, which will represent regular or sensitive voting certificates, respectively.
Furthermore, if one or more new certificates are added to the updated TRC, the corresponding voting representatives MUST also sign the updated TRC in order to show that they have access to the private keys listed in these fresh certificates. This is called "showing proof-of-possession", and done by signing the TRC with the respective private key. For the distinction between changed and new certificates in a TRC update, see .
It is up to the ISD members to decide how the "casting a vote" procedure for updated TRCs will take place. Some ISDs will make a distinction between regular and sensitive updates. These ISDs divide the regular and sensitive signing keys in different security classes and act accordingly, e.g. they keep the regular key in an online vault while the sensitive key would be stored offline. This way, the regular TRC update would lend itself to being automated (since the keys are accessible online) whereas the sensitive one would require manual actions to access the offline key. However, other ISDs keep both regular and sensitive keys online and perform both updates automatically.
#### TRC Update Verification
To verify a TRC update, the relying party MUST perform the following checks:
- Check that the specified update rules as described above are respected.
- Check whether the update is regular or sensitive.
- In case of a regular update,
- check that the signatures for the changing certificates are present and verifiable, and
- check that all votes are cast by a regular voting certificate.
- In case of a sensitive update, check that all votes are cast by a sensitive voting certificate.
- In case of a regular update,
- In both cases, check that all signatures are verifiable, and no superfluous signatures are attached.
If one or more of the above checks gives a negative result, the updated TRC SHOULD be rejected.
The very first base TRC of an ISD - called the initial TRC - is a special case of the base TRC where the number of the ISD is chosen. The initial TRC MUST be signed during a special signing ceremony - all voting representatives of the initial TRC need to take part in this signing ceremony to sign this and exchange their public keys. Following this, all entities within an ISD can obtain the TRC by means of a secure offline or online mechanism.
describes a possible procedure for the signing ceremony of an ISD's initial TRC. It is in principle up to the initial members of an ISD how to organize the signing ceremony. However, it is recommended having a process in line with the ceremony described in the Appendix.
This section provides several specifications regarding the deployment of the control plane PKI.
### Base TRC
Base TRCs are trust anchors and thus axiomatically trusted. All ASes within an ISD MUST be pre-loaded with the currently valid base-version TRC of their own ISD. For all specifications regarding the creation and distribution of initial/base TRCs, see .
### TRC Update
All non-base TRCs of an ISD are updates of the ISD's base TRC(s). The TRC update chain consists of regular and sensitive TRC updates. The specifications and rules that apply to updating a TRC are described in .
#### TRC Update Discovery {#discover-trcupdate}
Relying parties MUST have at least one valid TRC available. Relying parties MUST discover TRC updates within the grace period defined in the updated TRC. They SHOULD discover TRC updates in a matter of minutes to hours. Additionally, the following requirement MUST be satisfied:
Requirement
Any entity sending information that is secured by the Control Plane PKI MUST be able to provide all the necessary trust material to verify said information.
SCION provides the following mechanisms for discovering TRC updates and fulfilling the above requirement:
-
Beaconing Process
The TRC version is announced in the beaconing process. Each AS MUST announce what it considers to be the latest TRC, and MUST include the hash value of the TRC contents to facilitate the discovery of discrepancies. Therefore, relying parties that are part of the beaconing process discover TRC updates passively, i.e. a core AS notices TRC updates for remote ISDs that are on the beaconing path. A non-core AS only notices TRC updates for the local ISD through the beaconing process. The creation of a new TRC SHOULD trigger the generation of new control plane messages, as the propagation of control plane messages will help other ASes rapidly discover the new TRC. -
Path Lookup
In every path segment, all ASes MUST reference the latest TRC of their ISD. Therefore, when resolving paths, every relying party will notice TRC updates, even remote ones.
Note: The above mechanism only works when there is an active communication between the relying party and the ISD in question.
## Signing and Verifying Control Plane Messages {#signing-verifying-cp-messages}
SCION requires that control plane messages are signed. The main purpose of the Control Plane PKI is providing a mechanism to distribute and authenticate public keys that are used to verify control plane messages and information, e.g. each hop information in a path segment is signed by the respective AS. Consequently, all relying parties MUST be able to verify signatures with the help of the Control Plane PKI.
The following sections specify the requirements that apply to the signing and verification of control plane messages.
### Signing a Control Plane Message
An AS signs control plane messages with the private key that corresponds to the (valid) AS' certificate.
The AS MUST attach the following information as signature metadata. It is the minimum information a relying party requires to identify which certificate to use to verify the signed message.
- ISD-AS number: The ISD-AS number of the signing entity. For specification details, see .
- Subject key identifier: The identifier of the public key that MUST be used to verify the message. For specification details, see .
Additionally, the signer SHOULD include the following information:
- Serial and base number of the latest TRC: Including this information allows relying parties to discover TRC updates and trust resets. For specification details, see .
- Timestamp: For many messages, the time at which it was signed is useful information to ensure freshness.
### Verifying a Control Plane Message
When the relying party receives a control plane message they want to verify, the relying party first needs to identify the certificate needed to validate the corresponding signature on the message.
AS certificates are bundled together with the corresponding signing CA certificate into certificate chains. For efficiency, SCION distributes these certificate chains separately from the signed messages.
A certificate chain is verified against the Control Plane root certificate, although the the root certificate is bunded with the TRC and not in the chain. This makes it possible to extend the validity period of the root certificate and update the corresponding TRC without having to modify the certificate chain.
To verify a control plane message, the relying party MUST perform the following steps:
- Build a collection of root certificates from the latest TRC of the relevant ISD (that is, the ISD referenced in the signature metadata of the message). If the grace period (see ) introduced by the latest TRC is still on-going, the root certificates in the second-to-latest TRC MUST also be included. For a description on how to build the correct collection of certificates, see .
- If the signature metadata of the message contains the serial and base number of the latest TRC, the relying party MUST check that they have this latest TRC. If not, the relying party MUST request the latest TRC.
- After constructing the pool of root certificates, the relying party MUST select the certificate chain used to verify the message. The AS certificate included in this certificate chain MUST have the following properties:
- The ISD-AS number in the subject of the AS certificate MUST match the ISD-AS number in the signature metadata. See also .
- The subject key identifier of the AS certificate MUST match the subject key identifier in the signature metadata. See also .
- The AS certificate MUST be valid at verification time. Normally, this will be the current time. In special cases, e.g., auditing, the time can be set to the past to check if the message was verifiable at the given time.
- After selecting a certificate chain to verify the control plane messages, the relying party MUST verify the certificate chain, by:
- Executing the regular X.509 verification procedure. For details, see {{X.509}}.
- Checking that
- If the verification of the certificate chain was successful, the relying party can now verify the control plane messages, with the root certificates from the certificate chain.
If any cryptographic material is missing in the process, the relying party MUST query the originator of the message for the missing material. If it cannot be resolved, the verification process fails.
Important: An implication of the above procedure is that path segments SHOULD be verifiable at time of use. It is not enough to rely on path segments being verified on insert since TRC updates that change the root key can invalidate a certificate chain.
The steps REQUIRED to create a new AS certificate are the following:
- The AS creates a new key pair and a certificate signing request (CSR) using that key pair.
- The AS sends the certificate signing request to the relevant CA within the ISD.
- The CA uses its CA key and the CSR to create the new AS certificate.
- The CA sends the AS certificate back to the AS.
When an AS joins an ISD, the first CSR is sent out of band to one of the CAs as part of the formalities to join the ISD. Subsequent certificate renewals MAY be automated and can leverage the control plane communication infrastructure.
The goal of SCION is to provide a secure inter-domain network architecture, therefore this section focuses on inter-AS security considerations. All intra-AS trust- and security aspects are out of scope.
In PKIs, CAs have both the responsibility and power to issue and revoke certificates. A compromised or misbehaving CA could refuse to issue certificates to legitimate entities and/or issue illegitimate certificates to allow impersonation of another entity. In the context of the Control Plane PKI, refusing to issue or renew a certificate to an AS will ultimately cut that AS off from the network, turning the Control Plane PKI into a potential network kill switch, so within each ISD there are usually multiple independent CAs.
SCION fundamentally differs from a global monopolistic trust model as each ISD manages its own trust roots instead of a single global entity providing those roots. This structure gives each ISD autonomy in terms of key management and in terms of trust, and prevents the occurrence of a global kill switch affecting all ISDs at once. However, each ISD is still susceptible to compromises that could affect or halt other components (control plane and forwarding).
In SCION there is no central authority that could "switch off" an ISD as each relies on its own independent trust roots. Each AS within an ISD is therefore dependant on its ISD's PKI for its functioning, although the following compromises are potentially possible:
- At TRC level: The private root keys of the root certificates contained in an TRC are used to sign CA certificates. If one of these private root keys is compromised, the adversary could issue illegitimate CA certificates which may be used in further attacks. To maliciously perform a TRC update, an attacker would need to compromise multiple voting keys, the number of which is dependent on the voting quorum set in the TRC - the higher the quorum, the more unlikely a malicious update will be.
- At CA level: The private keys of an ISD's CA certificates are used to sign the AS certificates and all ASes within an ISD obtain certificates directly from the CAs. If one of the CA’s keys is compromised, an adversary could issue illegitimate AS certificates, which may be used in further attacks.
- At AS level: Each AS within an ISD signs control plane messages with their AS private key. If the keys of an AS are compromised by an adversary, this adversary can illegitimately sign control plane messages including Path Construction Beacons (PCBs). This means that the adversary can manipulate the PCBs and propagate them to neighboring ASes or register/store them as path segments.
This section deals with possible recovery from the compromises discussed in the previous paragraph. As described in , there is no revocation in the Control Plane PKI.
- At TRC level: If any of the root keys or voting keys contained in the TRC are compromised, the TRC MUST be updated as described in . A trust reset is only required in the case the number of compromised keys at the same time is greater or equal than the TRC's quorum (see ) and a invalid update has been produced and distributed in the network.
- At CA level: If the private key related to a CA certificate is compromised, the impacted CA AS MUST obtain a new CA certificate from the corresponding root AS. CA certificates are generally short lived to limit the impact of compromise. Alternatively, with a TRC update, a new root keys can also be forced, invalidating the compromised CA.
- At AS level: In the event of a key compromise of a (non-core) AS, the impacted AS needs to obtain a new certificate from its CA. This process will vary depending on internal issuance protocols.
The Control Plane PKI lays the foundation for the authentication procedures in SCION by providing each AS within a specific ISD with a certified key pair. These keys enable the authentication of all control plane messages - every AS and endpoint can verify all control plane messages by following the certificate chain.
The relying party MUST be able to discover and obtain new or updated cryptographic material. For the control plane messages, this is simplified by the observation that the sender of a message (e.g. of a path construction beacon during path exploration or a path segment during a path lookup) always has all the cryptographic material to verify it. Thus, the receiver can always immediately obtain all the cryptographic material from the message originator. As the corresponding PKI messaging thus only occurs when the control plane is already communicating, these requests to obtain cryptographic material are not prone to additional denial of service attacks. We therefore refer to {{I-D.dekater-scion-controlplane}} for a more detailed description of DoS vulnerabilities of control-plane messages.
For certificate renewal, on the other hand, this does not apply. Denial of Service on the CA infrastructure or on the communication links from the individual ASes to the CA could be used by an attacker to prevent victim ASes from renewing their certificates, halting the path discovery process. This risk can be mitigated in multiple ways:
- CAs only need to be accessible from ASes within the ISD, reducing the potential DoS attack surface
- ISDs usually rely on multiple CAs
- ISDs could create policies and processes to renew certificates out-of-band
This document has no IANA actions.
The SCION AS and ISD number are SCION-specific numbers. They are currently allocated by Anapaya Systems, a provider of SCION-based networking software and solutions (see {{ISD-AS-assignments}}). This task is currently being transitioned from Anapaya to the SCION Association.
--- back
{:numbered="false"}
Many thanks go to Fritz Steinmann (SIX Group AG), Juan A. Garcia Prado (ETH Zurich) and Russ Housley (IETF) for reviewing this document. We are also very grateful to Adrian Perrig (ETH Zurich), for providing guidance and feedback about each aspect of SCION. Finally, we are indebted to the SCION development teams of Anapaya and ETH Zurich, for their practical knowledge and for the documentation about the CP PKI, as well as to the authors of {{CHUAT22}} - the book is an important source of input and inspiration for this draft.
{:numbered="false"}
SCIONLab is a global research network that is available to test the SCION architecture. You can create and use your ASes using your own computation resources which allows you to gain real-world experience of deploying and managing a SCION network.
More information can be found on the SCIONLab website and in the {{SCIONLAB}} paper.
{:numbered="false"}
The following sections describe a possible Signing Ceremony for the first (initial) base TRC of an ISD. Although each ISD is free to decide how to shape this ceremony, it is recommended establishing a procedure similar to the one below.
## Ceremony Participants {:numbered="false"}
A Signing Ceremony includes participants from member organizations of the respective Isolation Domain. The participants of the Signing Ceremony fulfill different roles:
- The Ceremony Administrator is in charge of moderating the signing process. The Ceremony Administrator guides all participants through the steps and may also act as an intermediary between participants when they share information with each other.
- A Voting AS Representative is capable of creating voting signatures on the TRC. The Voting Representative is in possession of a device with the private keys of the respective certificates in the TRC.
- A Witness is any person that participates in the ceremony as a passive entity. The Witness has no active role in any of the steps of the ceremony but can stop the process and ask for more information if they feel the integrity of the process might have been compromised.
Note: It is assumed that the member organizations of the ISD have decided in advance, before the Signing Ceremony, on the roles of the ceremony participants. That is, they have reached agreement about the Certificate Authority (CA) ASes (that will also issue the root certificates), the voting ASes, the voting AS representatives, the Ceremony Administrator and the Witnesses.
Note: For the Signing Ceremony, it is assumed that all parties are trustworthy. Issues encountered during the ceremony are assumed to be caused by honest mistakes and not by malicious intent. Hash comparison checks are included to counter mistakes, such that every participant is sure that they operate on the same data. Furthermore, the private keys of each participant never leave their machine.The Ceremony Administrator does not have to be entrusted with private keys.
{:numbered="false"}
Prior to the Signing Ceremony, participants MUST decide on the physical location of the ceremony, the devices that will be used during the ceremony and the policy of the ISD. Specifically, the voting entities agree on the following parameters:
- validity of the TRC,
- voting quorum,
- core ASes/authoritative ASes,
- description, and
- list of Control Plane root certificates.
When these values are agreed upon, a number of voters equal to or larger than the specified voting quorum, needs to execute the Signing Ceremony. For the base TRC, all voting entities need to be present with both their sensitive and regular voting keys. The ceremony process is structured in multiple rounds of data sharing. The Ceremony Administrator leads the interaction and provides instructions to each participant.
### Location {:numbered="false"}
The location must provide electricity and enough power sockets for each participant. Furthermore, it should provide a monitor (or projector) that allows the Ceremony Administrator to screencast.
### Devices {:numbered="false"}
Each participant brings their own device that is provisioned with the required material, as described below.
- Device to exchange data. This device can either be provided by the Ceremony Administrator or by any of the voting representatives.
- Ceremony Administrator's device: The Ceremony Administrator should bring a machine that is capable of creating and verifying a TRC. Furthermore, it needs to be able to compute the SHA-512 digest (hash value) of files.
- Voting representative's device: The voting representative should bring a machine that is capable of signing and verifying TRCs. Thus, the machine needs to have access to all the voting private keys. Furthermore, it needs to be able to compute the SHA-512 digest (hash value) of the files.
It is very important that all devices, especially the data exchange device, are not compromised. Therefore, the ceremony should ideally include a procedure to verify that the devices are secure.
{:numbered="false"}
Each party involved in a Signing Ceremony MUST go through several defined steps in preparation for the ceremony. This section outlines these steps.
#### Preparatory Tasks of the Ceremony Administrator {:numbered="false"}
In the preparation phase of the TRC Signing Ceremony, the Ceremony Administrator has the following tasks:
- Send out the Signing Ceremony description and phases to the participants, all in digital form.
- Remind all representatives of the voting ASes that they need to agree on a common TRC policy before scheduling the Signing Ceremony.
- Bring all digitally distributed documents as a printout for all parties that take part.
#### Preparatory Tasks of the Voting AS Representatives {:numbered="false"}
The preparatory task of the representatives of the voting ASes (short: the voters) is to generate the necessary certificates.
Important: Before generating the certificates, all voters need to agree on a preliminary TRC policy, in particular on the validity period of the TRC. This is necessary because all the certificates that are generated in advance MUST cover the full TRC validity period. The other policy values could be amended during the ceremony itself.
Each representative of a voting AS MUST create the following keys and certificates:
- A sensitive voting private key, and a certificate holding the corresponding public key.
- A regular voting private key, and a certificate holding the corresponding public key.
{:numbered="false"}
Each AS that will be a Certificate Authority (a so-called CA AS) MUST ensure that the following key and certificate is available:
- A control plane root private key, and a certificate holding the corresponding public key.
This implies that there will be one control plane root certificate per CA AS.
Note: Representatives of CA ASes need not be present at the signing ceremony themselves as they do not have to put a signature on the TRC. However, if a CA AS does not attend the signing ceremony in person, it MUST ensure that the corresponding root certificate is available at the ceremony to be shared.
## Ceremony Process {:numbered="false"}
The Signing Ceremony process for the initial base TRC is structured in multiple rounds of data sharing. The Ceremony Administrator leads the interaction and instructs each participant with what to do.
The ceremony process contains the following phases:
- Phase 1: Certificate Exchange. In the first phase of the ceremony, all voting parties share the certificates that must be part of the TRC with the Ceremony Administrator.
- Phase 2: Generation of the TRC Payload. In the second phase, the Ceremony Administrator generates the TRC payload based on the bundled certificates and the agreed upon ISD policy.
- Phase 3: TRC Signing. In the third phase, each voting representative attaches the required signatures to the TRC.
- Phase 4: TRC Validation. In the final phase of the ceremony, all voting representatives share the signed TRC with the Ceremony Administrator, who aggregates it in a single signed TRC document.
A detailed description of each phase follows below.
### Phase 1: Certificate Exchange {#phase1} {:numbered="false"}
In Phase 1 of the Signing Ceremony, all parties share the certificates that must be part of the TRC with the Ceremony Administrator. For the representatives of the voting ASes, these are the sensitive and the regular voting certificates. For the representatives of the CA ASes, these are the Control Plane root certificates. If a CA AS does not attend the signing ceremony in person, it MUST ensure that the corresponding root certificate is available at the ceremony to be shared.
The actual sharing happens over the data exchange device, which goes from one voting representative to the next. Each representative copies the requested certificates from their own machine onto the data exchange device, before forwarding the device to the next voter. The last representative returns the device to the Ceremony Administrator.
Important: Note that only the certificates need to be shared during this step, not the private keys. Copying a private key by mistake invalidates the security of the ceremony.
For each provided certificate, the Ceremony Administrator checks that its validity period covers the previously agreed-upon TRC validity, that the signature algorithms are correct, and that the certificate is of the valid type (root, sensitive voting or regular voting certificate). If the results of these checks are as expected, the Ceremony Administrator computes the SHA256 sum for each certificate.
The Ceremony Administrator then aggregates and bundles the provided certificates, and calculates the hash value (SHA-512 digest) over the entire bundle. Additionally, the Ceremony Administrator displays all hash values on the monitor.
The Ceremony Administrator now shares the bundle with the representatives of the voting and CA ASes. This could happen again via the data exchange device, which goes from one representative to the next. Each representative verifies that the certificates they contributed have the same hash value as the displayed value on the monitor. Furthermore, all representatives MUST confirm that the hash value of the bundled certificates on their machine is equal to the value on the monitor.
Phase 1 is concluded when every representative has confirmed that the SHA256 sums are correct.
Note: If there is a mismatch in any of the SHA256 sums, Phase 1 needs to be repeated.
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In Phase 2 of the ceremony, the Ceremony Administrator generates the TRC payload based on the bundled certificates and the agreed upon ISD policy. The result is displayed on the monitor along with a hash value (SHA-512 digest).
To be able to generate the payload, the Ceremony Administrator MUST ask the voting representatives for:
- The ISD number of the ISD. The number (identifier, ID) of an ISD MUST be chosen and agreed upon by the participants during the signing ceremony of the ISD's initial TRC. The Ceremony Administrator needs the ISD number to specify the identifier (ID) of the initial TRC. This
iDis part of the TRC payload. For more information, see . - The description of the TRC. For more information, see .
- The AS numbers of the core ASes of the ISD. For more information, see .
- The AS numbers of the authoritative ASes of the ISD. For more information, see .
- The voting quorum for the next TRC update. For more information, see .
- The validity period of the new TRC. For more information, see .
Note: It is assumed that the voting ASes have agreed on the answers to the above questions in advance, before the signing ceremony.
The Ceremony Administrator can now specify the TRC payload variables in the payload template file, and show the filled-in template on the monitor. When the voters have verified the data, the Ceremony Administrator can compute the DER encoding of the TRC data as well as the SHA256 sum of the TRC payload file. The Ceremony Administrator then distributes the TRC payload (via the data exchange device) to all voting representatives, who verify the payload's hash value. The voters do this by computing the hash value of the TRC payload on their machine and checking whether their value matches the one on the monitor.
Phase 2 successfully concludes once every voting representative confirms that the contents of the TRC payload are correct.
{:numbered="false"}
In Phase 3, each voting representative attaches a signature created with each one of their private voting keys to the TRC (payload file). They do this on their own machine. The purpose of signing a TRC that contains newly introduced public keys with the corresponding private keys is to prove the possession of the private keys.
Phase 3 concludes after all voting representatives have cast their votes.
### Phase 4: TRC Validation {#phase4} {:numbered="false"}
In Phase 4, all voting representatives share the signed TRC with the Ceremony Administrator. This happens again over the data exchange device, which goes from one voter to the next. Each voting representative copies the TRC payload signed with the voter's private keys from their own machine onto the data exchange device. The last voter returns the device to the Ceremony Administrator, who assembles the final TRC by aggregating the payload data with the votes (signatures) cast by the voting representatives.
The signed TRC is validated by inspecting its contents on the monitor and verifying the signatures based on the exchanged certificates in Phase 1. The ceremony administrator then shares the signed TRC with all participants. Each of them MUST then inspect it once more, and verify it based on the certificates exchanged in Phase 1. At this point, the ceremony is completed. All participants have the signed TRC, and can use it to distribute the trust anchors for their ISD.
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Changes made to drafts since ISE submission. This section is to be removed before publication.
{:numbered="false"}
- Fix oversized diagrams
- Introduction text rewording
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Minor changes:
- Clarified relationship with RPKI.
- Added this changelog
- General text editing
- References: fixed ITU, ANSI, Assigned ISD-AS, fixed cross-reference to text formatting in the CP draft
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Major changes:
- Added overview of SCION components to Introduction section.
Minor changes:
- General edits to make terminology consistent, remove duplication and rationalize text.
- Removed forward references.
- Added RFC2119 compliant terminology.