Feature/code improvements

[Badatos]

Test the Codacy coverage report

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being called with a command string ($cmdSed9) that is not constant. This can be a security risk because if any part of $cmdSed9 is influenced by user input or external data, it could lead to command injection vulnerabilities. An attacker could potentially execute arbitrary commands on the server if they can control the contents of the command being executed.

To mitigate this risk, it's best to avoid constructing shell commands with variable data. If you must include variable input in a command, you should use escapeshellarg() or escapeshellcmd() to ensure that the input is safely escaped for use as a shell argument. In this case, since the command is being constructed with the $enableChat variable, you should ensure that this variable is properly escaped.

Here's a single line code suggestion to escape the $enableChat variable before it is used in the exec function:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed9 2>&1", $aVerifSed9, $sVerifSed9);
	$cmdSed9 = "sed -i \"s/^.*BBB_ENABLE_CHAT=.*/ - BBB_ENABLE_CHAT=" . escapeshellarg($enableChat) . "/\" " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile);

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used to execute a command that is built from various string concatenations and variables. This can be a security risk if any of the variables included in the command are user-controlled or can be manipulated by an attacker, as it could allow for command injection attacks.

To mitigate this risk, it's important to avoid executing dynamically constructed shell commands. Instead, you can use PHP's built-in functions for making HTTP requests, such as curl_init and curl_exec, which are safer and do not involve the shell.

Here is a suggested single line change to replace the exec call with a safer alternative:

Suggested change

exec("$cmdBroadcaster2 2>&1", $aVerifBroadcaster2, $sVerifBroadcaster2);

$ch = curl_init(); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, checkEndWithoutSlash(POD_URL) . "/rest/broadcasters/$nameMeeting/"); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, array('Content-Type: application/json', 'Authorization: Token ' . POD_TOKEN)); $aVerifBroadcaster2[0] = curl_exec($ch); $sVerifBroadcaster2 = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE); curl_close($ch);

Please note that the suggested line of code will need to be adapted if the $nameMeeting variable is not properly sanitized or if it comes from an untrusted source. Always ensure that any data used in a URL is URL-encoded and safe to use in an HTTP request to prevent URL injection attacks.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used to execute a command that is being constructed dynamically with string concatenation. This can lead to security vulnerabilities, such as command injection, if any of the concatenated components (POD_TOKEN, POD_HLS_STREAM, nameMeeting, etc.) are user-controlled or can be manipulated by an attacker.

To fix this issue, we should avoid directly executing dynamically constructed commands. Instead, we should use functions that allow for the safe passing of arguments, such as proc_open or escapeshellarg.

Here's a single line suggestion that uses escapeshellarg to escape the arguments safely before concatenating them into the command string:

Suggested change

exec("$cmdBroadcaster 2>&1", $aVerifBroadcaster, $sVerifBroadcaster);

$cmdBroadcaster = "curl --silent -H " . escapeshellarg('Content-Type: multipart/form-data') . " -H " . escapeshellarg('Authorization: Token ' . POD_TOKEN) . " -F " . escapeshellarg('url=' . checkEndSlash(POD_HLS_STREAM) . "$nameMeeting.m3u8") . " -F " . escapeshellarg('building=' . checkEndWithoutSlash(POD_URL) . "/rest/buildings/" . POD_ID_BUILDING . "/") . " -F " . escapeshellarg('name=' . $nameMeetingToDisplay) . " -F 'status=true' -F " . escapeshellarg('is_restricted=' . $isRestricted) . " " . escapeshellarg(checkEndWithoutSlash(POD_URL) . "/rest/broadcasters/");

Please note that this suggestion assumes that the variables POD_TOKEN, POD_HLS_STREAM, nameMeeting, POD_URL, POD_ID_BUILDING, nameMeetingToDisplay, and isRestricted are all safe and not user-controlled. If any of these variables can be influenced by an external user, they should also be properly sanitized before use.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used to execute a command that is constructed from variables. This can be a security risk if the variables are not properly sanitized, as it could allow for command injection attacks if an attacker can control the input to these variables.

To mitigate this issue, you should avoid constructing shell commands with dynamic content that could be manipulated. If you must use dynamic content, you should use escapeshellarg() or escapeshellcmd() to ensure that any user input is properly escaped before being used in a shell command. However, in this case, since you're not directly using user input and are constructing the command using server-controlled variables, you can use escapeshellarg() to safely escape the $dockerFile variable, which is the only variable in the command that could potentially be influenced by user input.

Here's the single line code suggestion to fix the issue:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed01 2>&1", $aVerifSed01, $sVerifSed01);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*:6379:.*/ - \"$port:6379\"/") . " " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile) . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed01, $sVerifSed01);

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being called with a command string that is constructed with variables. This can be a security risk if the variables are not properly sanitized, as it could potentially allow for command injection attacks if an attacker can control the input to those variables.

To fix this issue, we should ensure that any variable used in the command is properly escaped to prevent command injection. PHP provides a function called escapeshellarg which can be used to safely escape an argument for use in a shell command.

Here's the updated line using escapeshellarg:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed0 2>&1", $aVerifSed0, $sVerifSed0);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*container_name:.*/ container_name: $nameContainer/") . " $dockerFile 2>&1", $aVerifSed0, $sVerifSed0);

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep refers to the use of potentially non-constant data in an exec() command, which can lead to command injection vulnerabilities if the variables included in the command are not properly sanitized or come from an untrusted source. In the provided code, the $cmdSed6 variable is being constructed with data that may be dynamic or user-controlled (the FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS constant and the $dockerFile variable), and then it's being executed without any further validation.

To fix the issue, you should ensure that any dynamic or user-supplied data is properly escaped before being used in shell commands. In PHP, you can use the escapeshellarg() function to safely escape arguments. Since your request is to provide a single line change, I'll focus on making the $cmdSed6 line safer:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed6 2>&1", $aVerifSed6, $sVerifSed6);
	$cmdSed6 = "sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS=.*/ - FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS=".FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS."/") . " " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile);

This change will ensure that both the sed pattern and the $dockerFile path are properly escaped, reducing the risk of command injection. However, it's important to review all instances where external commands are executed with dynamic data and apply similar sanitization techniques.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

ℹ️ Codacy found a minor Code Style issue: Inline comments must end in full-stops, exclamation marks, or question marks

The issue identified by PHP_CodeSniffer is that inline comments in PHP should end with a punctuation mark such as a full stop (period), exclamation mark, or question mark. This is a part of the coding standards to ensure consistency and readability in the codebase.

The line in question is an inline comment that does not end with a punctuation mark:

Suggested change

	// cf. BBB_RESOLUTION
	// cf. BBB_RESOLUTION

To address this code style issue, you would simply need to add a full stop at the end of the comment. Here's the suggested single line change:

Suggested change

	// cf. BBB_RESOLUTION
	// cf. BBB_RESOLUTION.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

ℹ️ Codacy found a minor Code Style issue: Empty line required after block comment

The issue identified by PHP_CodeSniffer is that, according to the coding standards it is using (likely PSR-1/PSR-2 or a similar style guide), there should be a blank line after a block comment ends and before the next block of code begins. This helps in improving readability by visually separating the comment block from the code.

To fix the issue, you need to add an empty line after the block comment and before the declaration of the global variables. Here's the suggested single line change:

Suggested change

	*/

When you add this line to your code, it should look like this:

 // FIN PARAMETRAGE
 
 /*
  * Variables globales
  */
 
 // Variable permettant de savoir si le script a rencontré au moins une erreur
 $txtErrorInScript = "";
 // Variable permettant de connaitre les lives en cours sur ce serveur
 $livesInProgressOnThisServer = array();
 
 /*  Début de la phase principale */
 try {
     // Gestion de la timezone
     date_default_timezone_set('Europe/Paris');

Now there's an empty line after the comment block, which should satisfy the coding standards enforced by PHP_CodeSniffer.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue here is that the exec() function is being used to execute a command that is constructed dynamically from variables, which can potentially be manipulated. If an attacker can control the input to these variables, they could inject malicious commands that will be executed on the server. This is known as a command injection vulnerability.

To fix the issue, we should ensure that any variable parts of the command are properly escaped to prevent command injection. In PHP, we can use the escapeshellarg() function to safely escape arguments before they are used in the shell command.

Here's the code suggestion to fix the issue:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed6 2>&1", $aVerifSed6, $sVerifSed6);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS=.*/ - FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS=".FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS."/") . " $dockerFile 2>&1", $aVerifSed6, $sVerifSed6);

However, please note that the $dockerFile variable should also be sanitized if it's coming from an untrusted source. If $dockerFile is also dynamic, you should apply escapeshellarg() to it as well:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed6 2>&1", $aVerifSed6, $sVerifSed6);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS=.*/ - FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS=".FFMPEG_STREAM_THREADS."/") . " " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile) . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed6, $sVerifSed6);

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being called with a variable ($cmdSed13) that is constructed dynamically. This can lead to command injection vulnerabilities if the variable includes user-controllable input that is not properly sanitized. An attacker could potentially execute arbitrary commands on the server.

To fix this issue, you should ensure that any dynamic content in the command is properly escaped to prevent command injection. However, since you've asked for a single line change and without additional context on the origin of BBB_ATTENDEE_PASSWORD and $dockerFile, it's difficult to provide a completely secure solution.

Assuming BBB_ATTENDEE_PASSWORD and $dockerFile are not user-controlled or have been properly sanitized elsewhere in the code, a single line change would be to use escapeshellarg or escapeshellcmd to escape the command. However, this may not address all security concerns if the variables are indeed user-controlled.

Here's a suggestion to escape the entire command:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed13 2>&1", $aVerifSed13, $sVerifSed13);
	exec(escapeshellcmd("$cmdSed13") . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed13, $sVerifSed13);

This will ensure that the command is treated as a single string argument to exec and not parsed for additional commands. However, it is crucial to review the rest of the code to ensure that BBB_ATTENDEE_PASSWORD and $dockerFile are not susceptible to injection attacks. If they are user-controlled, they should be sanitized before being used in the command.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used to execute a command that is built from variables ($cmdSed14), which could potentially be manipulated to include malicious content. This is a common security vulnerability known as "command injection". To mitigate this risk, it's important to ensure that any dynamic content in the command is properly sanitized and validated before execution.

To fix the issue, we should avoid directly executing commands that contain variable input. Instead, we can use functions that allow us to pass arguments separately from the command, such as proc_open or escapeshellarg to escape any arguments that are being passed to the shell command.

Here's a single line change that uses escapeshellarg to escape the argument before executing the command:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed14 2>&1", $aVerifSed14, $sVerifSed14);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*BBB_MODERATOR_PASSWORD=.*/ - BBB_MODERATOR_PASSWORD=".BBB_MODERATOR_PASSWORD."/") . " " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile) . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed14, $sVerifSed14);

This ensures that the values in BBB_MODERATOR_PASSWORD and $dockerFile are treated as literal strings and not as executable code, which helps prevent command injection attacks. However, please note that this change assumes BBB_MODERATOR_PASSWORD and $dockerFile are defined and sanitized elsewhere in the code. If these variables can be influenced by user input, further validation and sanitization would be necessary.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used to execute a command that is constructed dynamically from variables and constants. This practice can be dangerous because it can potentially allow for command injection if the variables are not properly sanitized or if they can be influenced by user input. In this case, the value of FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE is being directly interpolated into the command string.

To mitigate this risk, you should ensure that any dynamic content being included in the command is properly escaped to prevent injection attacks. PHP provides a function called escapeshellarg which can be used to safely escape arguments before they are used in a shell command.

Here's the single line code suggestion to fix the issue:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed5 2>&1", $aVerifSed5, $sVerifSed5);
	$cmdSed5 = "sed -i \"s/^.*FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE=.*/ - FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE=".escapeshellarg(FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE)."/\" $dockerFile";

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is related to the use of the exec function with a command string that is constructed dynamically. This practice can lead to security vulnerabilities such as command injection if the variables concatenated into the command are not properly sanitized or come from untrusted sources. An attacker could potentially inject additional commands or manipulate the existing command to perform malicious actions.

To fix this issue, it's important to ensure that any external input is properly sanitized before being used in a command. However, as a single line change to improve the security without a complete context of where the variables $urlMeeting and POD_TOKEN come from, I would suggest using the escapeshellarg function to escape any shell metacharacters in the $urlMeeting variable:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmd 2>&1", $aVerif, $sVerif);
	$cmd .= "-X GET " . escapeshellarg($urlMeeting);

This change will ensure that the $urlMeeting variable is treated as a single argument to the curl command and any special characters are properly escaped, reducing the risk of command injection. However, please note that this is a mitigation step and a thorough security review should be conducted to ensure all inputs are sanitized and the system is secure against command injection attacks.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

ℹ️ Codacy found a minor Code Style issue: Inline comments must end in full-stops, exclamation marks, or question marks

The issue identified by PHP_CodeSniffer is that the inline comment // Fin de la phase principale does not end with a punctuation mark such as a full stop (period), exclamation mark, or question mark. According to the coding standards that PHP_CodeSniffer is enforcing, inline comments should be complete sentences and end with proper punctuation to improve readability and maintain consistency throughout the codebase.

Here is the suggested change to fix the issue:

Suggested change

	// Fin de la phase principale
	// Fin de la phase principale.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used to execute a command that includes a variable ($cmdCp), which could potentially be manipulated to include arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability. This is particularly dangerous if any part of $cmdCp can be influenced by user input.

A safer approach is to use functions that avoid shell execution, such as copy(), which is a built-in PHP function designed for copying files without invoking the shell. Here's the code suggestion that replaces the exec call with the copy function:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdCp 2>&1", $aVerifCp, $sVerifCp);
	if (copy('./docker-compose.default.yml', $fichierCompose)) {

This change removes the use of exec and instead uses copy to duplicate the file, with the source and destination as arguments. This approach is safer because it does not involve shell commands and is not susceptible to command injection. You would also need to adjust the subsequent code to handle the success or error accordingly since copy returns a boolean value indicating success or failure, rather than setting an exit status code and output array.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep refers to the use of variable $cmdSed13 in the exec function, which can lead to security vulnerabilities if the variable contains user input or can be manipulated by an attacker. This is commonly known as command injection. If an attacker can control the contents of $cmdSed13, they could potentially execute arbitrary commands on the server.

To fix this issue, we need to ensure that the command being executed is safe and not influenced by external input. One way to do this is to avoid directly embedding variables into the command string and instead use an array to pass arguments to the exec function, which will prevent command injection as each element of the array will be treated as a separate argument.

Here's the single line code suggestion to fix the issue:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed13 2>&1", $aVerifSed13, $sVerifSed13);
	exec("sed -i", array("s/^.*BBB_ATTENDEE_PASSWORD=.*/ - BBB_ATTENDEE_PASSWORD=".escapeshellarg(BBB_ATTENDEE_PASSWORD)."/", $dockerFile), $aVerifSed13, $sVerifSed13);

Note: This suggestion assumes that BBB_ATTENDEE_PASSWORD and $dockerFile are sanitized or trusted values. If they can be influenced by user input, they should also be properly escaped using escapeshellarg or similar functions to ensure they do not introduce vulnerabilities.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used with a variable ($cmdSed7) that is constructed from dynamic input. This can lead to command injection vulnerabilities if the input is not properly sanitized, as an attacker could potentially craft input that alters the intended command to execute arbitrary code.

To fix this issue, we should avoid directly embedding variables into the command string. Instead, we can use the escapeshellarg function to ensure that any arguments are safely escaped and cannot be used to inject additional commands. Here's a single line change to fix the issue:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed7 2>&1", $aVerifSed7, $sVerifSed7);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*BBB_MEETING_ID=.*/ - BBB_MEETING_ID=$idMeeting/") . " " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile) . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed7, $sVerifSed7);

This change applies escapeshellarg to both the sed command pattern and the $dockerFile variable to ensure that they are treated as single arguments to the sed command, without the possibility of command injection.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being used to execute a command that includes variable input ($cmdSed2), which could potentially be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands if the variable input is not properly sanitized or controlled. This is a common security vulnerability known as Command Injection.

To mitigate this issue, the command and its arguments should be properly escaped to ensure that any special characters do not have unintended effects. However, since sed is being used to modify a file, it would be better to use PHP's built-in functions to read, modify, and write the file content, thus avoiding the use of exec altogether.

Since you asked for a single line change, here's a suggestion that uses escapeshellarg to escape the $dockerFile variable before it's passed into the exec command. This is not a comprehensive fix, but it's a step in the right direction for mitigating the immediate issue:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed2 2>&1", $aVerifSed2, $sVerifSed2);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*BBB_SECRET=.*/ - BBB_SECRET=".BBB_SECRET."/") . " " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile) . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed2, $sVerifSed2);

Please note that this suggestion assumes that BBB_SECRET is a defined constant that does not contain any characters that would need to be escaped for the shell. If BBB_SECRET can contain special characters, it should also be escaped. Ideally, you would refactor the code to avoid using exec for such operations.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec function is being called with a variable ($cmdSed12), which means the command being executed is constructed at runtime. This can be a security risk if the variable's content is influenced by user input or external sources that could be maliciously crafted, leading to command injection vulnerabilities.

To mitigate this risk, it's important to ensure that any dynamic content within the command is properly sanitized and escaped. However, if the command does not require dynamic content from untrusted sources, it should be hardcoded as a constant to prevent any possibility of injection.

Since the $cmdSed12 variable seems to be constructed using dynamic content (like $nameMeetingToDisplay), we should ensure that this content is safe to use within the shell command. If $nameMeetingToDisplay is derived from user input, it needs to be properly escaped.

Given that the task is to provide a single-line code suggestion to fix the issue, and assuming that $nameMeetingToDisplay is a trusted variable that does not require further sanitization, we can use escapeshellarg to ensure that the variable is safely used within the shell command:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed12 2>&1", $aVerifSed12, $sVerifSed12);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*BBB_MEETING_TITLE=.*/ - BBB_MEETING_TITLE=$nameMeetingToDisplay/") . " " . escapeshellarg($dockerFile) . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed12, $sVerifSed12);

However, if $nameMeetingToDisplay or $dockerFile can be influenced by user input, they should be sanitized before being used in the command. The escapeshellarg function will add single quotes around the input string and escape any existing single quotes to ensure that the input is treated as a single argument to the command being executed, thus preventing command injection.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue that the Semgrep linter has identified is the use of the exec function with a command string that is constructed dynamically. This can be a security risk if any part of the command string comes from an untrusted source, as it could allow for command injection attacks where an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the system.

In the provided code snippet, it's not clear if FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE or $dockerFile are derived from user input or another untrusted source. However, as a best practice, it's important to ensure that any dynamic content in the command string is properly sanitized and escaped.

A common approach to mitigate this risk is to avoid constructing shell commands with dynamic content altogether. Instead, use functions that allow passing arguments as an array, which prevents shell command injection by treating all arguments as literal strings rather than part of the shell command.

Since we are limited to a single line change, here's a suggestion that uses escapeshellarg to escape the arguments properly. This function will make sure that any special characters are escaped and treated as a single argument to the command, reducing the risk of injection.

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed5 2>&1", $aVerifSed5, $sVerifSed5);
	exec("sed -i " . escapeshellarg("s/^.*FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE=.*/ - FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE=".FFMPEG_STREAM_VIDEO_BITRATE."/") . " $dockerFile 2>&1", $aVerifSed5, $sVerifSed5);

Please note that the above suggestion assumes that $dockerFile is a trusted variable that does not contain any user-supplied data. If $dockerFile can be influenced by an external source, it should also be sanitized or validated to ensure it is safe to use in a shell command. If it's not trusted, you would also apply escapeshellarg to $dockerFile.

For a more comprehensive solution that is not limited to a single line change, consider refactoring the code to use a PHP library for handling Docker files or a more secure method of templating and manipulating configuration files.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

ℹ️ Codacy found a minor Code Style issue: Block comment text must start on a new line

The issue identified by PHP_CodeSniffer is regarding the placement of the comment text in a block comment. According to the coding standards that PHP_CodeSniffer is enforcing, the text of a block comment must start on the line after the opening comment delimiter /*. In the provided code snippet, the comment text starts on the same line as the opening delimiter, which is against the expected style.

To fix this issue, you should move the comment text to a new line, right below the /*. Here is the suggested single line change to comply with the coding standard:

    /* 
     Création des répertoires et des fichiers compose
     pour le plugin BigBlueButton-liveStreaming */

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

❌ Codacy found a critical Security issue: Executing non-constant commands.

The issue identified by Semgrep is that the exec() function is being used to execute a command that is constructed from variable input. This can potentially lead to command injection vulnerabilities if the variable input is not properly sanitized or comes from an untrusted source. In this case, the $cmdSed1 variable is constructed using the $bbbURL variable, which is derived from the BBB_URL constant. If BBB_URL is not properly validated elsewhere in the code, it could be exploited.

To fix this issue, you should ensure that any dynamic content being included in the command is properly escaped to prevent command injection. However, since the code suggestion requires a single line change, we can use the escapeshellarg() function to escape the entire command before executing it. Here's the suggested code change:

Suggested change

	exec("$cmdSed1 2>&1", $aVerifSed1, $sVerifSed1);
	exec(escapeshellarg($cmdSed1) . " 2>&1", $aVerifSed1, $sVerifSed1);

This change will escape any shell metacharacters in the $cmdSed1 command, making it safer to execute. However, it's important to note that this approach may not work as intended if $cmdSed1 contains shell arguments or options, since escapeshellarg() will treat the whole string as a single argument. A more robust solution would involve escaping individual components of the command as needed and ensuring that BBB_URL and any other variables used to construct shell commands are thoroughly validated.

---

This comment was generated by an experimental AI tool.

[codacy-production]

Coverage summary from Codacy

See diff coverage on Codacy

Coverage variation	Diff coverage
Report missing for 880e4a91	✅ 97.66%

Coverage variation details

	Coverable lines	Covered lines	Coverage
Common ancestor commit (880e4a9)	Report Missing	Report Missing	Report Missing
Head commit (13b0914)	16009	11424	71.36%

Coverage variation is the difference between the coverage for the head and common ancestor commits of the pull request branch: <coverage of head commit> - <coverage of common ancestor commit>

Diff coverage details

	Coverable lines	Covered lines	Diff coverage
Pull request (#7)	171	167	97.66%

Diff coverage is the percentage of lines that are covered by tests out of the coverable lines that the pull request added or modified: <covered lines added or modified>/<coverable lines added or modified> * 100%

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_{Codacy will stop sending the deprecated coverage status from June 5th, 2024. Learn more}

Footnotes

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[coveralls]

Pull Request Test Coverage Report for Build 9108522858

Details

• 167 of 171 (97.66%) changed or added relevant lines in 21 files are covered.
• No unchanged relevant lines lost coverage.
• Overall coverage increased (+0.1%) to 71.36%

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Changes Missing Coverage	Covered Lines	Changed/Added Lines	%
pod/live/apps.py	5	6	83.33%
pod/recorder/apps.py	3	4	75.0%
pod/authentication/apps.py	3	5	60.0%

Totals
Change from base Build 9093017937:	0.1%
Covered Lines:	11424
Relevant Lines:	16009

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💛 - Coveralls