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Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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- commits: | ||
- subject: "os-helpers-tpm2: fix empty efivar reads" | ||
hash: 3f9d048f964f922c9bfaeee4939197cb31c8eef6 | ||
body: | | ||
When reading from efi variables in hostapp-update hooks during rollback, | ||
tcgtool will improperly read zero bytes from efivar files. This results | ||
in an improper calculation of the PCR 7 digest, and an unbootable | ||
system. | ||
|
||
Read the file contents, skipping the first four bytes that are | ||
attributes, and pipe the data directly to tcgtool to work around this. | ||
footer: | ||
Change-type: patch | ||
change-type: patch | ||
Signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
author: Joseph Kogut | ||
nested: [] | ||
- subject: "rollback-health: bind mount EFI partition in old_rootfs" | ||
hash: 8761c1d6536d86249757f37925ae40d905716cc3 | ||
body: | | ||
Some hooks, such as 0-signed-update, will attempt to read files from the | ||
EFI system partition, such as combined policy binaries. | ||
|
||
Bind mount the EFI partition into old_rootfs before running hooks to | ||
ensure this is available. | ||
footer: | ||
Change-type: patch | ||
change-type: patch | ||
Signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
author: Joseph Kogut | ||
nested: [] | ||
- subject: "rollback-health: mount securityfs in old_rootfs" | ||
hash: e87838103af3c5ee05c60b7105353f987af47e61 | ||
body: | | ||
When rollback-health runs, a failing healthcheck causes the | ||
hostapp-update hooks to be run from the inactive partition, to make the | ||
inactive system bootable again. | ||
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||
The 0-signed-update hook, which updates the sealing policy for secure | ||
boot enabled systems, reads from the securityfs mounted at | ||
/sys/kernel/security in order to parse the TPM event log. | ||
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||
If this filesystem isn't mounted, the hook will improperly detect that | ||
the TPM event log isn't available, and unneccessarily create a combined | ||
policy when a single PCR policy would suffice. | ||
|
||
Mount this filesystem in old_rootfs before chrooting to fix this. | ||
footer: | ||
Change-type: patch | ||
change-type: patch | ||
Signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
author: Joseph Kogut | ||
nested: [] | ||
- subject: "os-helpers-tpm2: compute_pcr7 w/ events post separator" | ||
hash: e4f8f6f9c79f994f873bc930bfa028f2161a29d9 | ||
body: | | ||
In commit 1c19ebb, we append digests from the TPM event log | ||
corresponding to events that are logged before EV_SEPARATOR. For | ||
instance, parsing the event log on a typical system for event types, the | ||
output looks like this: | ||
|
||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (SecureBoot) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (PK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (KEK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (db) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (dbx) | ||
EV_SEPARATOR | ||
|
||
This system requires no merging of event log digests. | ||
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||
On systems that measure EFI binaries (mostly only QEMU w/ edk2), we also | ||
get this: | ||
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||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (SecureBoot) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (PK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (KEK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (db) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (dbx) | ||
EV_SEPARATOR | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY (bootx64.efi) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY (bzImage) | ||
|
||
Again, this requires no merging. We compute the signature of the | ||
relevant EFI binaries ourselves, as they're subject to change during | ||
hostapp-update. | ||
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||
However, we've also seen event logs like this: | ||
|
||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (SecureBoot) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (PK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (KEK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (db) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (dbx) | ||
EV_EFI_ACTION (DMA Protection Disabled) | ||
EV_SEPARATOR | ||
|
||
This case is the one we've handled previously, by reading from the event | ||
log and appending event digests before EV_SEPARATOR. We stopped at | ||
EV_SEPARATOR because we weren't parsing event types previously, and this | ||
digest is a constant that's easily recognized. However, we've since | ||
encountered systems that have unexpected events *after* EV_SEPARATOR, as | ||
shown below. | ||
|
||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (SecureBoot) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (PK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (KEK) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (db) | ||
EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG (dbx) | ||
EV_SEPARATOR | ||
Unknown event type (?!) | ||
|
||
In order to handle this, parse digests and event types into temporary | ||
files and iterate through them together. We only stop appending digests | ||
from the event log when the next event type is EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY | ||
(EFI binary signature) or we hit the end of the list. This should | ||
account for all possible variations. | ||
footer: | ||
Change-type: patch | ||
change-type: patch | ||
Signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
signed-off-by: Joseph Kogut <[email protected]> | ||
author: Joseph Kogut | ||
nested: [] | ||
version: 5.3.15 | ||
title: "" | ||
date: 2024-06-05T00:15:59.506Z | ||
- commits: | ||
- subject: "rtl8192cu: Remove this unmaintained out-of-tree kernel driver" | ||
hash: e3b7a1555542e6b1381f1a5f7131b935d1f66f22 | ||
|
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