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chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v2.0.7 [security] - autoclosed #564

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@renovate renovate bot commented Oct 3, 2023

Mend Renovate

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
urllib3 (changelog) ==2.0.5 -> ==2.0.7 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-43804

urllib3 doesn't treat the Cookie HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a Cookie header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.

Users must handle redirects themselves instead of relying on urllib3's automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Cookie header, thus we decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

  • Using an affected version of urllib3 (patched in v1.26.17 and v2.0.6)
  • Using the Cookie header on requests, which is mostly typical for impersonating a browser.
  • Not disabling HTTP redirects
  • Either not using HTTPS or for the origin server to redirect to a malicious origin.

Remediation

  • Upgrading to at least urllib3 v1.26.17 or v2.0.6
  • Disabling HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests.
  • Not using the Cookie header.

CVE-2023-45803

urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 "See Other" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like POST) to GET as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers.

From RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1:

A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported.

Affected usages

Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable.

Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability:

  • If you're using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON)
  • The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised.

Remediation

You can remediate this vulnerability with any of the following steps:

  • Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3 (v1.26.18 or v2.0.7)
  • Disable redirects for services that you aren't expecting to respond with redirects with redirects=False.
  • Disable automatic redirects with redirects=False and handle 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.

Release Notes

urllib3/urllib3 (urllib3)

v2.0.7

Compare Source

==================

  • Made body stripped from HTTP requests changing the request method to GET after HTTP 303 "See Other" redirect responses.

v2.0.6

Compare Source

==================

  • Added the Cookie header to the list of headers to strip from requests when redirecting to a different host. As before, different headers can be set via Retry.remove_headers_on_redirect.

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from 93fd408 to a84158b Compare October 3, 2023 20:07
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codecov bot commented Oct 3, 2023

Codecov Report

All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests ✅

Comparison is base (9c36212) 74.03% compared to head (ceaffc0) 74.03%.
Report is 1 commits behind head on main.

❗ Current head ceaffc0 differs from pull request most recent head 6d94397. Consider uploading reports for the commit 6d94397 to get more accurate results

Additional details and impacted files
@@            Coverage Diff            @@
##               main     #564   +/-   ##
=========================================
  Coverage     74.03%   74.03%           
  Complexity      168      168           
=========================================
  Files            87       87           
  Lines          1933     1933           
  Branches        121      121           
=========================================
  Hits           1431     1431           
  Misses          498      498           
  Partials          4        4           

☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
📢 Have feedback on the report? Share it here.

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 4 times, most recently from 93d6d92 to c76e486 Compare October 9, 2023 13:20
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 3 times, most recently from d8f162d to b99c52d Compare October 13, 2023 16:47
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v2.0.6 [security] chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v2.0.7 [security] Oct 17, 2023
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from b99c52d to b1cd852 Compare October 17, 2023 21:32
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from b1cd852 to c8b6587 Compare November 6, 2023 11:30
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from a716259 to fb1686e Compare November 24, 2023 01:03
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 5fa24fd to b87fe3e Compare December 8, 2023 19:18
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 13 times, most recently from 52d402e to 65095e4 Compare December 15, 2023 14:41
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 11 times, most recently from d85f325 to d418c2a Compare December 19, 2023 22:03
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from e163558 to ceaffc0 Compare January 3, 2024 14:47
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch from ceaffc0 to 6d94397 Compare January 5, 2024 16:55
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v2.0.7 [security] chore(deps): update dependency urllib3 to v2.0.7 [security] - autoclosed Jan 12, 2024
@renovate renovate bot closed this Jan 12, 2024
@renovate renovate bot deleted the renovate/pypi-urllib3-vulnerability branch January 12, 2024 13:26
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