Guard against open redirect URL parameters in login #4763
Merged
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Signed-off-by: Katrina Rogan <[email protected]>
dosubot
bot
added
size:M
Signed-off-by: Katrina Rogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Katrina Rogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Katrina Rogan <[email protected]>
wild-endeavor
previously approved these changes
Jan 23, 2024
Signed-off-by: Katrina Rogan <[email protected]>
wild-endeavor
previously approved these changes
Jan 23, 2024
Signed-off-by: Katrina Rogan <[email protected]>
wild-endeavor
previously approved these changes
Jan 23, 2024
Codecov ReportAttention:
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## master #4763 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 58.18% 58.17% -0.01%
==========================================
Files 626 626
Lines 53833 53862 +29
==========================================
+ Hits 31322 31336 +14
- Misses 20003 20016 +13
- Partials 2508 2510 +2
Flags with carried forward coverage won't be shown. Click here to find out more. ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. |
pmahindrakar-oss
previously approved these changes
Jan 23, 2024
flyteadmin/auth/handler_utils.go
Outdated
| return url.Hostname() == authorizedURL.Hostname() && url.Port() == authorizedURL.Port() && url.Scheme == authorizedURL.Scheme | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| func GetRedirectURLAllowed(ctx context.Context, redirectParam string, cfg *config.Config) bool { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Nit: urlRedirectParam
| @@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ func GetLoginHandler(ctx context.Context, authCtx interfaces.AuthenticationConte | |||
| logger.Debugf(ctx, "Setting CSRF state cookie to %s and state to %s\n", csrfToken, state) | |||
| url := authCtx.OAuth2ClientConfig(GetPublicURL(ctx, request, authCtx.Options())).AuthCodeURL(state) | |||
| queryParams := request.URL.Query() | |||
| if !GetRedirectURLAllowed(ctx, queryParams.Get(RedirectURLParameter), authCtx.Options()) { | |||
| logger.Infof(ctx, "unauthorized redirect URI") | |||
Signed-off-by: Katrina Rogan <[email protected]>
katrogan
dismissed stale reviews from pmahindrakar-oss and wild-endeavor
via
dd5e6fa
pmahindrakar-oss
approved these changes
Jan 23, 2024
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Why are the changes needed?
Best practices recommend for not allowing open redirect URIs upon log-in, see https://developers.google.com/search/blog/2009/01/open-redirect-urls-is-your-site-being
What changes were proposed in this pull request?
This change uses flyteadmin's configured authorized URIs (for which flyteadmin is exposed and accessible) to validate redirect URIs
How was this patch tested?
Tested on a local deployment. Tried with
/login?redirect_url=http://www.google.comwhich now fails and with a valid redirect to<flyteadmin>/consolewhich succeeded.Setup process
Screenshots
Check all the applicable boxes
Related PRs
Docs link