data/reports: update GO-2024-3321

Add GHSA and extend description to include additional
context from the announcement.

  - data/reports/GO-2024-3321.yaml

Updates #3321
Fixes #3328

Change-Id: I14ce706997a2468c27ab3a1c3c8087a14158ffcb
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/vulndb/+/635695
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Tatiana Bradley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zvonimir Pavlinovic <[email protected]>

data/cve/v5/GO-2024-3321.json

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
       "descriptions": [
         {
           "lang": "en",
-          "value": "Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass."
+          "value": "Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that \"A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate.\" Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/[email protected] enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance."
         }
       ],
       "affected": [
@@ -50,13 +50,13 @@
       ],
       "references": [
         {
-          "url": "https://go.dev/issue/70779"
+          "url": "https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909"
         },
         {
           "url": "https://go.dev/cl/635315"
         },
         {
-          "url": "https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909"
+          "url": "https://go.dev/issue/70779"
         },
         {
           "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/-nPEi39gI4Q/m/cGVPJCqdAQAJ"

data/osv/GO-2024-3321.json

@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
   "modified": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
   "published": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
   "aliases": [
-    "CVE-2024-45337"
+    "CVE-2024-45337",
+    "GHSA-v778-237x-gjrc"
   ],
   "summary": "Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto",
-  "details": "Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.",
+  "details": "Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.\n\nThe documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that \"A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate.\" Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions.\n\nFor example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key.\n\nSince this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/[email protected] enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth.\n\nUsers should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.",
   "affected": [
     {
       "package": {
@@ -41,16 +42,16 @@
   ],
   "references": [
     {
-      "type": "REPORT",
-      "url": "https://go.dev/issue/70779"
+      "type": "FIX",
+      "url": "https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909"
     },
     {
       "type": "FIX",
       "url": "https://go.dev/cl/635315"
     },
     {
-      "type": "FIX",
-      "url": "https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909"
+      "type": "REPORT",
+      "url": "https://go.dev/issue/70779"
     },
     {
       "type": "WEB",

data/reports/GO-2024-3321.yaml

@@ -8,19 +8,58 @@ modules:
         - package: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
           symbols:
             - ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback
-summary: Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
+summary: |-
+    Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in
+    golang.org/x/crypto
 description: |-
     Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback
     callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.
+
+    The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this
+    function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to
+    authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about
+    whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding
+    private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order
+    in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client
+    successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the
+    key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security
+    relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make
+    incorrect assumptions.
+
+    For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate
+    with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with
+    B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B
+    for which the attacker does not actually control the private key.
+
+    Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation
+    golang.org/x/[email protected] enforces the property that, when successfully
+    authenticating via public key, the last key passed to
+    ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the
+    connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same
+    key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key
+    passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a
+    different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or
+    NoClientAuth.
+
+    Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from
+    the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the
+    authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the
+    connection is established the state corresponding to the successful
+    authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field.
+    Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it
+    across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to
+    the relevant projects for guidance.
+ghsas:
+    - GHSA-v778-237x-gjrc
 credits:
     - Damien Tournoud (Platform.sh / Upsun)
     - Patrick Dawkins (Platform.sh / Upsun)
     - Vince Parker (Platform.sh / Upsun)
     - Jules Duvivier (Platform.sh / Upsun)
 references:
-    - report: https://go.dev/issue/70779
-    - fix: https://go.dev/cl/635315
     - fix: https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909
+    - fix: https://go.dev/cl/635315
+    - report: https://go.dev/issue/70779
     - web: https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/-nPEi39gI4Q/m/cGVPJCqdAQAJ
 cve_metadata:
     id: CVE-2024-45337