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YaFTL and VsVFL #1

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i just want to finish iDroid on A4

Dan Carpenter and others added 30 commits August 11, 2013 15:38
commit de1e0c40aceb9d5bff09c3a3b97b2f1b178af53f upstream.

The ->reserved field isn't cleared so we leak one byte of stack
information to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Luis Henriques <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
There was a mismerge of 7b175c46720f8e6b92801bb634c93d1016f80c62 for the
3.0 kernel, so this fixes it up.

Also mark the stable stuff "Supported", as it is.

Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 0231bb5336758426b44ccd798ccd3c5419c95d58 upstream.

When we have group with mixed events (hw/sw) we want to end up
with group leader being in hw context. So if group leader is
initialy sw event, we move all the events under hw context.

The move is done for each event by removing it from its context
and adding it back into proper one. As a part of the removal the
event is automatically disabled, which is not what we want at
this stage of creating groups.

The fix is to initialize event state after removal from sw
context.

This fix resulted from the following discussion:

  http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.perf.user/1144

Reported-by: Andreas Hollmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Corey Ashford <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit eaa5a990191d204ba0f9d35dbe5505ec2cdd1460 upstream.

GCC will optimize mxcsr_feature_mask_init in arch/x86/kernel/i387.c:

		memset(&fx_scratch, 0, sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct));
		asm volatile("fxsave %0" : : "m" (fx_scratch));
		mask = fx_scratch.mxcsr_mask;
		if (mask == 0)
			mask = 0x0000ffbf;

to

		memset(&fx_scratch, 0, sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct));
		asm volatile("fxsave %0" : : "m" (fx_scratch));
		mask = 0x0000ffbf;

since asm statement doesn’t say it will update fx_scratch.  As the
result, the DAZ bit will be cleared.  This patch fixes it. This bug
dates back to at least kernel 2.6.12.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 9c5da09d266ca9b32eb16cf940f8161d949c2fe5 upstream.

An rmdir pushes css's ref count to zero.  However, if the associated
directory is open at the time, the dentry ref count is non-zero.  If
the fd for this directory is then passed into perf_event_open, it
does a css_get().  This bounces the ref count back up from zero.  This
is a problem by itself.  But what makes it turn into a crash is the
fact that we end up doing an extra dput, since we perform a dput
when css_put sees the ref count go down to zero.

css_tryget() does not fall into that trap. So, we use that instead.

Reproduction test-case for the bug:

 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stdio.h>

 #define PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP    (1U << 2)

 int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *hw_event_uptr,
                     pid_t pid, int cpu, int group_fd, unsigned long flags) {
         return syscall(__NR_perf_event_open,hw_event_uptr, pid, cpu,
                 group_fd, flags);
 }

 /*
  * Directly poke at the perf_event bug, since it's proving hard to repro
  * depending on where in the kernel tree.  what moved?
  */
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
        int fd;
        struct perf_event_attr attr;
        memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr));
        attr.exclude_kernel = 1;
        attr.size = sizeof(attr);
        mkdir("/dev/cgroup/perf_event/blah", 0777);
        fd = open("/dev/cgroup/perf_event/blah", O_RDONLY);
        perror("open");
        rmdir("/dev/cgroup/perf_event/blah");
        sleep(2);
        perf_event_open(&attr, fd, 0, -1,  PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP);
        perror("perf_event_open");
        close(fd);
        return 0;
 }

Signed-off-by: Salman Qazi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 087d273caf4f7d3f2159256f255f1f432bc84a5b ]

This patch doesn't change the compiled code because ARC_HDR_SIZE is 4
and sizeof(int) is 4, but the intent was to use the header size and not
the sizeof the header size.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 651e92716aaae60fc41b9652f54cb6803896e0da ]

Limit the min/max value passed to the
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syn_retries.

Signed-off-by: Michal Tesar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c5c7774d7eb4397891edca9ebdf750ba90977a69 ]

In commit 2f94aabd9f6c925d77aecb3ff020f1cc12ed8f86
(refactor sctp_outq_teardown to insure proper re-initalization)
we modified sctp_outq_teardown to use sctp_outq_init to fully re-initalize the
outq structure.  Steve West recently asked me why I removed the q->error = 0
initalization from sctp_outq_teardown.  I did so because I was operating under
the impression that sctp_outq_init would properly initalize that value for us,
but it doesn't.  sctp_outq_init operates under the assumption that the outq
struct is all 0's (as it is when called from sctp_association_init), but using
it in __sctp_outq_teardown violates that assumption. We should do a memset in
sctp_outq_init to ensure that the entire structure is in a known state there
instead.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reported-by: "West, Steve (NSN - US/Fort Worth)" <[email protected]>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 905a6f96a1b18e490a75f810d733ced93c39b0e5 ]

Otherwise we end up dereferencing the already freed net->ipv6.mrt pointer
which leads to a panic (from Srivatsa S. Bhat):

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff882018552020
IP: [<ffffffffa0366b02>] ip6mr_sk_done+0x32/0xb0 [ipv6]
PGD 290a067 PUD 207ffe0067 PMD 207ff1d067 PTE 8000002018552060
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: ebtable_nat ebtables nfs fscache nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle iptable_filter ip_tables nfsd lockd nfs_acl exportfs auth_rpcgss autofs4 sunrpc 8021q garp bridge stp llc ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter
+ip6_tables ipv6 vfat fat vhost_net macvtap macvlan vhost tun kvm_intel kvm uinput iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support cdc_ether usbnet mii microcode i2c_i801 i2c_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp ioatdma dca mlx4_core be2net wmi acpi_cpufreq mperf ext4 jbd2 mbcache dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u33:0 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1-ea45e-a #4
Hardware name: IBM  -[8737R2A]-/00Y2738, BIOS -[B2E120RUS-1.20]- 11/30/2012
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
task: ffff8810393641c0 ti: ffff881039366000 task.ti: ffff881039366000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0366b02>]  [<ffffffffa0366b02>] ip6mr_sk_done+0x32/0xb0 [ipv6]
RSP: 0018:ffff881039367bd8  EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff881039367fd8 RBX: ffff882018552000 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff881039367b68 RDI: ffff881039367b68
RBP: ffff881039367bf8 R08: ffff881039367b68 R09: 2222222222222222
R10: 2222222222222222 R11: 2222222222222222 R12: ffff882015a7a040
R13: ffff882014eb89c0 R14: ffff8820289e2800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88103fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff882018552020 CR3: 0000000001c0b000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
Stack:
 ffff881039367c18 ffff882014eb89c0 ffff882015e28c00 0000000000000000
 ffff881039367c18 ffffffffa034d9d1 ffff8820289e2800 ffff882014eb89c0
 ffff881039367c58 ffffffff815bdecb ffffffff815bddf2 ffff882014eb89c0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffffa034d9d1>] rawv6_close+0x21/0x40 [ipv6]
 [<ffffffff815bdecb>] inet_release+0xfb/0x220
 [<ffffffff815bddf2>] ? inet_release+0x22/0x220
 [<ffffffffa032686f>] inet6_release+0x3f/0x50 [ipv6]
 [<ffffffff8151c1d9>] sock_release+0x29/0xa0
 [<ffffffff81525520>] sk_release_kernel+0x30/0x70
 [<ffffffffa034f14b>] icmpv6_sk_exit+0x3b/0x80 [ipv6]
 [<ffffffff8152fff9>] ops_exit_list+0x39/0x60
 [<ffffffff815306fb>] cleanup_net+0xfb/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff81075e3a>] process_one_work+0x1da/0x610
 [<ffffffff81075dc9>] ? process_one_work+0x169/0x610
 [<ffffffff81076390>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
 [<ffffffff81076270>] ? process_one_work+0x610/0x610
 [<ffffffff8107da2e>] kthread+0xee/0x100
 [<ffffffff8107d940>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
 [<ffffffff8162a99c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
 [<ffffffff8107d940>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
Code: 20 48 89 5d e8 4c 89 65 f0 4c 89 6d f8 66 66 66 66 90 4c 8b 67 30 49 89 fd e8 db 3c 1e e1 49 8b 9c 24 90 08 00 00 48 85 db 74 06 <4c> 39 6b 20 74 20 bb f3 ff ff ff e8 8e 3c 1e e1 89 d8 4c 8b 65
RIP  [<ffffffffa0366b02>] ip6mr_sk_done+0x32/0xb0 [ipv6]
 RSP <ffff881039367bd8>
CR2: ffff882018552020

Reported-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 20f0170377264e8449b6987041f0bcc4d746d3ed ]

usbnet doesn't support yet SG, so drivers should not advertise SG or TSO
capabilities, as they allow TCP stack to build large TSO packets that
need to be linearized and might use order-5 pages.

This adds an extra copy overhead and possible allocation failures.

Current code ignore skb_linearize() return code so crashes are even
possible.

Best is to not pretend SG/TSO is supported, and add this again when/if
usbnet really supports SG for devices who could get a performance gain.

Based on a prior patch from Freddy Xin <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a0db856a95a29efb1c23db55c02d9f0ff4f0db48 ]

Make sure the reserved fields, and padding (if any), are
fully initialized.

Based upon a patch by Dan Carpenter and feedback from
Joe Perches.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ff862a4668dd6dba962b1d2d8bd344afa6375683 ]

This is inspired by a5cc68f3d6 "af_key: fix info leaks in notify
messages".  There are some struct members which don't get initialized
and could disclose small amounts of private information.

Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8cb3b9c3642c0263d48f31d525bcee7170eedc20 ]

The "pvc" struct has a hole after pvc.sap_family which is not cleared.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 93d783bcca69bfacc8dc739d8a050498402587b5 upstream.

In adt7470_write_word_data(), which writes two bytes using
i2c_smbus_write_byte_data(), the return codes are incorrectly AND-ed
together when they should be OR-ed together.

The return code of i2c_smbus_write_byte_data() is zero for success.

The upshot is only the first byte was ever written to the hardware.
The 2nd byte was never written out.

I noticed that trying to set the fan speed limits was not working
correctly on my system.  Setting the fan speed limits is the only
code that uses adt7470_write_word_data().  After making the change
the limit settings work and the alarms work also.

Signed-off-by: Curt Brune <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 057b82be3ca3d066478e43b162fc082930a746c9 upstream.

There's a window between find_port_by_devt() returning a port and us
taking a kref on the port, where the port could get unplugged.  Fix it
by taking the reference in find_port_by_devt() itself.

Problem reported and analyzed by Mateusz Guzik.

Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 671bdea2b9f210566610603ecbb6584c8a201c8c upstream.

Between open() being called and processed, the port can be unplugged.
Check if this happened, and bail out.

A simple test script to reproduce this is:

while true; do for i in $(seq 1 100); do echo $i > /dev/vport0p3; done; done;

This opens and closes the port a lot of times; unplugging the port while
this is happening triggers the bug.

Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit ea3768b4386a8d1790f4cc9a35de4f55b92d6442 upstream.

We used to keep the port's char device structs and the /sys entries
around till the last reference to the port was dropped.  This is
actually unnecessary, and resulted in buggy behaviour:

1. Open port in guest
2. Hot-unplug port
3. Hot-plug a port with the same 'name' property as the unplugged one

This resulted in hot-plug being unsuccessful, as a port with the same
name already exists (even though it was unplugged).

This behaviour resulted in a warning message like this one:

-------------------8<---------------------------------------
WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted)
Hardware name: KVM
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename
'/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/virtio0/virtio-ports/vport0p1'

Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8106b607>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0
 [<ffffffff8106b6f6>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50
 [<ffffffff811f2319>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130
 [<ffffffff811f23e8>] ? create_dir+0x68/0xb0
 [<ffffffff811f2469>] ? sysfs_create_dir+0x39/0x50
 [<ffffffff81273129>] ? kobject_add_internal+0xb9/0x260
 [<ffffffff812733d8>] ? kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60
 [<ffffffff812734b4>] ? kobject_add+0x44/0x70
 [<ffffffff81349de4>] ? get_device_parent+0xf4/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff8134b389>] ? device_add+0xc9/0x650

-------------------8<---------------------------------------

Instead of relying on guest applications to release all references to
the ports, we should go ahead and unregister the port from all the core
layers.  Any open/read calls on the port will then just return errors,
and an unplug/plug operation on the host will succeed as expected.

This also caused buggy behaviour in case of the device removal (not just
a port): when the device was removed (which means all ports on that
device are removed automatically as well), the ports with active
users would clean up only when the last references were dropped -- and
it would be too late then to be referencing char device pointers,
resulting in oopses:

-------------------8<---------------------------------------
PID: 6162   TASK: ffff8801147ad500  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "cat"
 #0 [ffff88011b9d5a90] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103232b
 #1 [ffff88011b9d5af0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b9322
 #2 [ffff88011b9d5bc0] oops_end at ffffffff814f4a50
 #3 [ffff88011b9d5bf0] die at ffffffff8100f26b
 #4 [ffff88011b9d5c20] do_general_protection at ffffffff814f45e2
 #5 [ffff88011b9d5c50] general_protection at ffffffff814f3db5
    [exception RIP: strlen+2]
    RIP: ffffffff81272ae2  RSP: ffff88011b9d5d00  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff880118901c18  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: ffff88011799982c  RSI: 00000000000000d0  RDI: 3a303030302f3030
    RBP: ffff88011b9d5d38   R8: 0000000000000006   R9: ffffffffa0134500
    R10: 0000000000001000  R11: 0000000000001000  R12: ffff880117a1cc10
    R13: 00000000000000d0  R14: 0000000000000017  R15: ffffffff81aff700
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #6 [ffff88011b9d5d00] kobject_get_path at ffffffff8126dc5d
 #7 [ffff88011b9d5d40] kobject_uevent_env at ffffffff8126e551
 #8 [ffff88011b9d5dd0] kobject_uevent at ffffffff8126e9eb
 #9 [ffff88011b9d5de0] device_del at ffffffff813440c7

-------------------8<---------------------------------------

So clean up when we have all the context, and all that's left to do when
the references to the port have dropped is to free up the port struct
itself.

Reported-by: chayang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: YOGANANTH SUBRAMANIAN <[email protected]>
Reported-by: FuXiangChun <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Qunfang Zhang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sibiao Luo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 92d3453815fbe74d539c86b60dab39ecdf01bb99 upstream.

SIGIO should be sent when a port gets unplugged.  It should only be sent
to prcesses that have the port opened, and have asked for SIGIO to be
delivered.  We were clearing out guest_connected before calling
send_sigio_to_port(), resulting in a sigio not getting sent to
processes.

Fix by setting guest_connected to false after invoking the sigio
function.

Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 96f97a83910cdb9d89d127c5ee523f8fc040a804 upstream.

If a port gets unplugged while a user is blocked on read(), -ENODEV is
returned.  However, subsequent read()s returned 0, indicating there's no
host-side connection (but not indicating the device went away).

This also happened when a port was unplugged and the user didn't have
any blocking operation pending.  If the user didn't monitor the SIGIO
signal, they won't have a chance to find out if the port went away.

Fix by returning -ENODEV on all read()s after the port gets unplugged.
write() already behaves this way.

Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…dirs)

commit 776164c1faac4966ab14418bb0922e1820da1d19 upstream.

debugfs_remove_recursive() is wrong,

1. it wrongly assumes that !list_empty(d_subdirs) means that this
   dir should be removed.

   This is not that bad by itself, but:

2. if d_subdirs does not becomes empty after __debugfs_remove()
   it gives up and silently fails, it doesn't even try to remove
   other entries.

   However ->d_subdirs can be non-empty because it still has the
   already deleted !debugfs_positive() entries.

3. simple_release_fs() is called even if __debugfs_remove() fails.

Suppose we have

	dir1/
		dir2/
			file2
		file1

and someone opens dir1/dir2/file2.

Now, debugfs_remove_recursive(dir1/dir2) succeeds, and dir1/dir2 goes
away.

But debugfs_remove_recursive(dir1) silently fails and doesn't remove
this directory. Because it tries to delete (the already deleted)
dir1/dir2/file2 again and then fails due to "Avoid infinite loop"
logic.

Test-case:

	#!/bin/sh

	cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
	echo 'p:probe/sigprocmask sigprocmask' >> kprobe_events
	sleep 1000 < events/probe/sigprocmask/id &
	echo -n >| kprobe_events

	[ -d events/probe ] && echo "ERR!! failed to rm probe"

And after that it is not possible to create another probe entry.

With this patch debugfs_remove_recursive() skips !debugfs_positive()
files although this is not strictly needed. The most important change
is that it does not try to make ->d_subdirs empty, it simply scans
the whole list(s) recursively and removes as much as possible.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit b2a3ad9ca502169fc4c11296fa20f56059c7c031 upstream.

gcc-4.7.0 has started throwing these warnings when building cifs.ko.

  CC [M]  fs/cifs/cifssmb.o
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function ‘CIFSSMBSetCIFSACL’:
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:3905:9: warning: array subscript is above array bounds [-Warray-bounds]
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function ‘CIFSSMBSetFileInfo’:
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:5711:8: warning: array subscript is above array bounds [-Warray-bounds]
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function ‘CIFSSMBUnixSetFileInfo’:
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:6001:25: warning: array subscript is above array bounds [-Warray-bounds]

This patch cleans up the code a bit by using the offsetof macro instead
of the funky "&pSMB->hdr.Protocol" construct.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit ed5467da0e369e65b247b99eb6403cb79172bcda upstream.

tracing_read_pipe zeros all fields bellow "seq". The declaration contains
a comment about that, but it doesn't help.

The first field is "snapshot", it's true when current open file is
snapshot. Looks obvious, that it should not be zeroed.

The second field is "started". It was converted from cpumask_t to
cpumask_var_t (v2.6.28-4983-g4462344), in other words it was
converted from cpumask to pointer on cpumask.

Currently the reference on "started" memory is lost after the first read
from tracing_read_pipe and a proper object will never be freed.

The "started" is never dereferenced for trace_pipe, because trace_pipe
can't have the TRACE_FILE_ANNOTATE options.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit b497ceb964a80ebada3b9b3cea4261409039e25a upstream.

ARM cannot handle udelay for more than 2 miliseconds, so we
should use mdelay instead for those.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: GOTO Masanori <[email protected]>
Cc: YOKOTA Hiroshi <[email protected]>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit b911a6bdeef5848c468597d040e3407e0aee04ce upstream.

NFS appears to use d_obtain_alias() to create the root dentry rather than
d_make_root.  This can cause 'prepend_path()' to complain that the root
has a weird name if an NFS filesystem is lazily unmounted.  e.g.  if
"/mnt" is an NFS mount then

 { cd /mnt; umount -l /mnt ; ls -l /proc/self/cwd; }

will cause a WARN message like
   WARNING: at /home/git/linux/fs/dcache.c:2624 prepend_path+0x1d7/0x1e0()
   ...
   Root dentry has weird name <>

to appear in kernel logs.

So change d_obtain_alias() to use "/" rather than "" as the anonymous
name.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: use named initialisers instead of QSTR_INIT()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit d0528b5d71faf612014dd7672e44225c915344b2 upstream.

Judging anonymous memory's vm_area_struct, perf_mmap_event's filename
will be set to "//anon" indicating this vma belongs to anonymous
memory.

Once hugepage is used, vma's vm_file points to hugetlbfs. In this way,
this vma will not be regarded as anonymous memory by is_anon_memory() in
perf user space utility.

Signed-off-by: Joshua Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Akihiro Nagai <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Joshua Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Vinson Lee <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I44ea4347dc59884944b168719ffe5d17ca4f4355
Change-Id: Ibddc671c50edeb6d0048f44b7086bb2cefce2eb0
commit 13d60f4b6ab5b702dc8d2ee20999f98a93728aec upstream.

The futex_keys of process shared futexes are generated from the page
offset, the mapping host and the mapping index of the futex user space
address. This should result in an unique identifier for each futex.

Though this is not true when futexes are located in different subpages
of an hugepage. The reason is, that the mapping index for all those
futexes evaluates to the index of the base page of the hugetlbfs
mapping. So a futex at offset 0 of the hugepage mapping and another
one at offset PAGE_SIZE of the same hugepage mapping have identical
futex_keys. This happens because the futex code blindly uses
page->index.

Steps to reproduce the bug:

1. Map a file from hugetlbfs. Initialize pthread_mutex1 at offset 0
   and pthread_mutex2 at offset PAGE_SIZE of the hugetlbfs
   mapping.

   The mutexes must be initialized as PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED because
   PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE mutexes are not affected by this issue as
   their keys solely depend on the user space address.

2. Lock mutex1 and mutex2

3. Create thread1 and in the thread function lock mutex1, which
   results in thread1 blocking on the locked mutex1.

4. Create thread2 and in the thread function lock mutex2, which
   results in thread2 blocking on the locked mutex2.

5. Unlock mutex2. Despite the fact that mutex2 got unlocked, thread2
   still blocks on mutex2 because the futex_key points to mutex1.

To solve this issue we need to take the normal page index of the page
which contains the futex into account, if the futex is in an hugetlbfs
mapping. In other words, we calculate the normal page mapping index of
the subpage in the hugetlbfs mapping.

Mappings which are not based on hugetlbfs are not affected and still
use page->index.

Thanks to Mel Gorman who provided a patch for adding proper evaluation
functions to the hugetlbfs code to avoid exposing hugetlbfs specific
details to the futex code.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ma Chenggong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: 'Mel Gorman' <[email protected]>
Acked-by: 'Darren Hart' <[email protected]>
Cc: 'Peter Zijlstra' <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/000101ce71a6%24a83c5880%24f8b50980%24@com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Russell King and others added 30 commits May 13, 2014 15:35
…OMAINS

commit 8404663f81d212918ff85f493649a7991209fa04 upstream.

The {get,put}_user macros don't perform range checking on the provided
__user address when !CPU_HAS_DOMAINS.

This patch reworks the out-of-line assembly accessors to check the user
address against a specified limit, returning -EFAULT if is is out of
range.

[will: changed get_user register allocation to match put_user]
[rmk: fixed building on older ARM architectures]

Change-Id: I3e3ddeaa51e47798bcf27181afd3785ccc015317
Reported-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST.  And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.

If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
  int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
  struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
  ...
  memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
  ...
  tb->used += space;

so the race of the two can result in something like this:
              A                                B
__tty_buffer_request_room
                                  __tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
                                  memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM

B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.

Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes.  This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.

Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9 (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.

js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call

Change-Id: I38a42ec49af337e77472db5e43cfbc18786f1419
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.

Change-Id: I03941dc5737bcb9d3ddd2ec88f7c263c27a1247d
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Clark Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Cc: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <[email protected]>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.

Change-Id: I5242efcdc3c08159c652fe645e1f85b27687e6ca
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Clark Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Cc: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <[email protected]>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
…addr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Change-Id: I473bf486ad451de0bfd049a110b69795a6fda451
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Change-Id: Ic8714ed2e9dee323a011eed42f7c0159c65dfbf3
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Change-Id: I4eeb2e139b720f1dd46e43407a96b3d9a19aacd1
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Cc: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Change-Id: Ic410036b38ccb7289b3d58eff56ad64d3a9dcada
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Cc: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
KSM thread to scan pages is getting schedule on definite timeout.
That wakes up CPU from idle state and hence may affect the power
consumption. Provide an optional support to use deferred timer
which suites low-power use-cases.

To enable deferred timers,
$ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/deferred_timer

Change-Id: I07fe199f97fe1f72f9a9e1b0b757a3ac533719e8
Signed-off-by: Chintan Pandya <[email protected]>
commit 206a81c18401c0cde6e579164f752c4b147324ce upstream.

The lzo decompressor can, if given some really crazy data, possibly
overrun some variable types.  Modify the checking logic to properly
detect overruns before they happen.

Change-Id: I078cb9fc43b3282263dc9a10dd407bf5d2372d09
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "Don A. Bailey" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.

As David Miller points out:

  "If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
   use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"

Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.

Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <[email protected]>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Change-Id: Iccb3384e7090e8c7cbcd717c12465c45d22c4393
syscall_get_nr can return -1 in the case that the task is not executing
a system call.

This patch fixes perf_syscall_{enter,exit} to check that the syscall
number is valid before using it as an index into a bitmap.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Change-Id: Iedc719957e184c6572b3ad94e241ae2a97a0b533
Cc: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc: Wade Farnsworth <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls.  If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.

 # trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
 ...
 true-653   [000]   384.675777: sys_enter:            NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
 true-653   [000]   384.675812: sys_exit:             NR 192 = 1995915264
 true-653   [000]   384.675971: sys_enter:            NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
 true-653   [000]   384.675988: sys_exit:             NR 983045 = 0
 ...

 # trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
 [   17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
 [   17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
 [   17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
 [   17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
 [   17.290169] Modules linked in:
 [   17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
 [   17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
 [   17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
 [   17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184

Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.

Commit cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/[email protected]

Fixes: cd0980f "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>

Conflicts:
	kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c

Change-Id: I512142f8f1e1b2a8dc063209666dbce9737377e7
Change-Id: I7ae00a4f62f8642f0897ede404dc2430ab097cf3
There is a long standing bug in linux tcp stack, about ACK messages sent
on behalf of TIME_WAIT sockets.

In the IP header of the ACK message, we choose to reflect TOS field of
incoming message, and this might break some setups.

Example of things that were broken :
  - Routing using TOS as a selector
  - Firewalls
  - Trafic classification / shaping

We now remember in timewait structure the inet tos field and use it in
ACK generation, and route lookup.

Notes :
 - We still reflect incoming TOS in RST messages.
 - We could extend MuraliRaja Muniraju patch to report TOS value in
netlink messages for TIME_WAIT sockets.
 - A patch is needed for IPv6

Change-Id: Ic7ad8a7b858de181bfe2a789c472f84955397d4c
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
gcc compiler is smart enough to use a single load/store if we
memcpy(dptr, sptr, 8) on x86_64, regardless of
CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE

In IP header, daddr immediately follows saddr, this wont change in the
future. We only need to make sure our flowi4 (saddr,daddr) fields wont
break the rule.

Change-Id: Iad9c8fd9121ec84c2599b013badaebba92db7c39
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
The raw sockets can provide source address for
routing but their privileges are not considered. We
can provide non-local source address, make sure the
FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC flag is set if socket has privileges
for this, i.e. based on hdrincl (IP_HDRINCL) and
transparent flags.

Change-Id: I136b161c584deac3885efbf217e959e1a829fc1d
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
This contains the following commits:

1. 0149763 net: core: Add a UID range to fib rules.
2. 1650474 net: core: Use the socket UID in routing lookups.
3. 0b16771 net: ipv4: Add the UID to the route cache.
4. ee058f1 net: core: Add a RTA_UID attribute to routes.
    This is so that userspace can do per-UID route lookups.

Bug: 15413527
Change-Id: I1285474c6734614d3bda6f61d88dfe89a4af7892
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Bug: 15413527
Change-Id: If33bebb7b52c0ebfa8dac2452607bce0c2b0faa0
Signed-off-by: Sreeram Ramachandran <[email protected]>
Block Dev Added but not Working (Help Needed)
TODO: LwVM Partition Table
Help Needed for blk_dev
but still buggy
write mode added(not tested)
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