IPIP-342: Ambient Discovery of Content Routers

IPIP/0342-content-router-discovery.md

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+# IPIP 0342: Content Router Ambient Discovery
+
+- Start Date: 2022-11-11
+- Related Issues:
+  - https://hackmd.io/bh4-SCWfTBG2vfClG0NUFg
+  - https://github.com/ipfs/kubo/issues/9150
+  - https://github.com/filecoin-project/storetheindex/issues/823
+
+## Summary
+
+The Interplanetary stack has slowly opened itself to support extensibility of
+the content routing subsystem. This extensibility is used today by network
+indexers, like https://cid.contact/, to bridge content from large providers
+that cannot practically provide all content to the IPFS DHT. A missing piece
+of this story is that there is not a process by which IPFS nodes can discover
+these alernative content routing systems automatically. This IPIP proposes
+a mechanism by which IPFS nodes can discover and make use of content routing
+systems.
+
+The mechanism proposed by this IPIP, where nodes gossip preferred routers
+to their connected peers, can also have broader applications. The same
+mechnism could be used for external IPNS, peer routers, relays, or DNS
+resolvers. We point out the label allowing re-use of this mechanism for
+other systems in the (protocol design)[#1-content-routing-as-a-libp2p-protocol],
+but otherwise leave the concerete design for other systems to subsequent
+IPIPs.
+
+## Motivation
+
+There is currently not a process by which IPFS nodes can discover alernative
+content routing systems automatically. This has led to a reliance on
+centralized systems, like the hydra boosters, to fill the gap and offer
+content only available in network indexer to current IPFS nodes. This strategy
+is also insufficient long term because:
+1. It limits speed to the use of a globally distributed kademlia DHT
+2. It is insufficient for providing content in applications where content grows
+    super-linearly to peers, such that the burden on a traditional DHT would
+    become unsustainable.
+
+
+## Detailed design
+
+This spec is designed for the ability of IPFS nodes to automatically discover
+and make use of 'content routers'. Content routers are services which are able
+to fulfill IPFS's [ContentRouting](https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/blob/master/core/routing/routing.go#L26)
+API. These routers currently are considered to directly support queries using
+the protocols specified by
+[IPIP-337](https://github.com/ipfs/specs/pulls/337)
+and/or
+[IPIP-327](https://github.com/ipfs/specs/pull/327).
+
+In addition, this protocol expects that content routers that may be considered
+for auto-configuration/discovery by IPFS nodes will have knowledge of the
+entire CID space - in other words a delegation to such a router may be
+considered 'exhaustive'.
+
+### 0. content-router discovery state tracking
+
+Nodes will conceptually track a registry about known content routers.
+This registry will be able to understand for a given content router two
+properties:
+* reliability - how many good vs bad responses has this router responded
+with. This statistic should be windowed, such that the client can calculate
+it in terms of the last week or month. This will in practice be stored as
+daily buckets of successful and unsuccessful queries against a router, where
+success indicates that the router was queried, and the data was subsequently
+retrieved from a node returned as a provider by that router.
+* performance - how quickly does this router respond.
+
+This protocol expects nodes to be able to keep reliability (a metric
+capturing both availability and correctness) separate from performance
+for the purpose of propagating content routing information.
+
+In addtion, nodes may wish to track the most recent time they have learned
+content routing information from the other peers they are and have been
+connected with.
+
+Conceptually, propagation of content routers will look like nodes gossiping
+their knowledge of router existance to each other. Initially, we expect that
+the current topology will look a bit more like a feedback loop over a
+bipartite graph - where one side of the graph is the set of general purpose
+IPFS nodes, and the other side are the bootstrap and core-infrastructural
+nodes with high connectivity in the network.
+
+### 1. content-routing as a libp2p protocol
+
+IPFS nodes will advertise and coordinate discover of content routers using a
+new libp2p protocol advertised as "/ipfs/router-discovery/1.0.0".
+
+The protocol will follow a request-response model.
+A node will open a stream on the protocol when it wants to discover new
+content routers it does not already know.
+The node will request routers from the peer that it does not already know.
+To express what it does know, it will query with a bloom filter. The
+statistical data structure provides a minimal amount of deniability around
+the routers that the client already knows.
+
+* The size of the bloom filter is chosen by the client. It is sized such
+that it has a greater than 99% certainly that it will receive a useful
+response. The maximum size of a query may be capped by the server, but can be
+effectively considered to be under 10kb.
+* The client will hash it's known content routers into the bloom filter
+to set bits in the filter at the locations to which these known routers
+hash.
+* The server will have a parameter for a number of servers it wants to return
+to content discovery queries. By default this will be 10. (This default is
+picked as the result of modeling router propagation). It will iterate through
+it's list of known content routers, hashing them against the bloom filter and
+selecting the top routers that are not already known to the client. It will
+return this list, along with it's reliability score for each.
+
+#### protocol messages
+
+Protocol messages are encoded using *cbor*. The following protocol examples demonstrate
+the schemas of requests and responses if they were to be encoded with JSON.
+
+A query on the "/ipfs/router-discovery/1.0.0" protocol will look like:
+```json
+{
+  "router": "string",
+  "filter": "bytes of the bloom filter"
+}
+```
+
+A concrete example would be:
+```json
+{
+  "router": "content-routing",
+  "filter": {"/": {"Bytes": "xhCakxnfIHbzeOjqlbZjawUKf7uvCXAkp0L5z9jF3actECFyCzriAuS1xiyhBCailtsYEwoy/hanhiIHqTZgnA=="}}
+}
+```
+
+A response is a list of entries, which looks like:
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "peer": "multiaddr.MultiAddr",
+    "score": float
+  }
+]
+```
+
+A concrete example would be:
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "peer": "/dns4/cid.contact/tcp/443/https",
+    "score": 0.95
+  },
+  {
+    "peer": "/dns4/dev.cid.contact/tcp/443/https",
+    "score": 0.90
+  },
+]
+```
+
+### 2. probing of the discovery protocol
+
+A node will probe it's connected peers for content routing updates in two
+situations:
+
+1. When it needs to perform a content routing query, and has not
+successfully performed a sync in over a day.
+2. When it's auto-nat status indicates it is eligible to be a DHT server, and
+it has not successfully performed a synce in over a day.
+
+These parameters are also set through modeling.
+
+To perform a probe, the node will consider the set of peers it is currently
+connected to. It will order peers. The specific ordering is left to the
+node, but it should strive for diversity - an example ordering would be to
+rank peers by how recently a content routing discovery query has been make
+to that peer, with tie breaking preference for LAN nodes and for nodes
+with explicit peering agreements.
+
+Other factors that may be considered include:
+* Reputation of the peer, including how long it has been connected and if it
+  has served useful content in the past.
+* Latency / ping time of the peer.
+
+### 3. selection of routers
+
+Nodes are free to make content routing queries across content routing
+systems they are aware of as they wish. An example strategy balancing
+user experience and discovery is described.
+
+The node maintains two thresholds:
+* good (reliability > 99%, performance < 100ms)
+* uncertain (queries < 5)
+
+Content routers meeting the good reliability threshold are ordered by
+performance. the top one is queried, as is an 'uncertain' router if
+one exists.
+
+These threshold values are maintained for a year for the purposes
+of local selection.
+They are maintained for a month for the purpose of admitting
+knowledge of routers to others - so a client will no longer set bits for
+routers it is aware of but which do not meet it's threshold for 'good'
+after a month. If peers then subseuqently respond with these nodes
+on discovery probes, the local node may use that to consider the
+node as again 'uncertain' and attempt additional probes against it less than
+a year later.
+
+Nodes which participate as DHT servers should also consider if they
+are being used only in an infrastructural capacity. If they are
+receiving content routing requests from other peers, but there have been
+no direct requests from the node itself that can be used to move
+known content routers past the 'uncertain' threshold, the node may
+choose to issue content routing queries for a fraction of the DHT
+lookup queries it receives as a way to maintain a more accurate
+table of content  routers.
+
+## Test fixtures
+
+TK is a CID currently only available through the content routing system,
+and not through the IPFS DHT. This is a piece of content that can be queried
+to validate the presence of alternative content routing systems.
+
+## Design rationale
+
+As expressed in the motivation section, we need to design a system through
+which nodes can discover content routers without a centralized point of
+failure, and can use these routers to improve user performance for content
+routing to levels faster than the current DHT.
+
+This design is self-contained - it does not require standing up additional
+infrastructure or making additional connections for discovery but rather
+gossips routers over existing peer connections.
+
+The design limits the ability of an adversary to impact user experience:
+1. it does not propose at this stage to replace DHT queries, but only to
+supplement them with content routing queries, which minimized user
+noticable impact.
+2. nodes will only propagate content routers they believe to work,
+limiting the spread of spam / unavailable content routers to the directly
+connected peers of an adversary.
+
+With the exception of LAN tables, the other connections made by IPFS
+nodes do not have geographic locality. As a result, performance is
+separated in the tracking of content routers because it will not be
+effective as a ranking factor in the non-geographically-aware
+gossip system described here. As an optimization, nodes may choose to
+prioritize 'fast' content routers when responding to queries from peers
+where sharded latency observations may be relevant. For example:
+* Peers on the local LAN
+* Peers in the local /16 IPv4 subnet
+* Peers with observed latency less than 25ms
+
+### User benefit
+
+- Users will benefit from faster discovery of content providers.
+- Users will also benefit from access to more CIDs than they currently do through
+queries limited to the IPFS DHT
+- Router discovery and reputation mechanism improves relisience. 
+- IPFS user agents will not be tied to static set of hard-coded HTTP endpoints
+  that may stop working at any time.
+- Users will benefit from replacing misbehaving (censorship, DoS, hardware
+  failure) routers with useful ones without having to upgrade their software.
+
+
+### Compatibility
+
+Nodes which do not upgrade to support this IPIP will be limited to the sub-set of
+content available in the DHT. this will potentially degrade over time as more
+large providers limit their publishing per the [IPNI](https://github.com/ipni)
+ingestion protocol.
+
+Nodes may limit their complexity through a hard-coded list of known content
+routers, essentially limiting their implementation to design section 3 of this
+IPIP. This comes at a price: (1) hard-coded routers become easy targets 
+for denial of service attacks, decreasing the resilliency of the entire setup;
+(2) nodes risk being out of date and to offer sub-optimal performance through their
+failure to discover additional near-by content routing instances.
+
+### Security
+
+TODO: this section provides a rough sketch of arguments, but has not been fully
+developed into prose at this time. At present, it is most useful for
+comments and suggestions of other security considerations that should be
+included as this draft develops.
+
+#### 1. Malicious Content Routers
+##### a. Providing Bad Content Routing Records
+
+* records under double hashing are signed, so can't provide a record for a real peer
+* if you provide non-working records, you are down-ranked
+
+##### b. Availability Attacks / failing to provide records
+
+* if list of records insufficient, client will get more from other providers in subsequent queries, leading to downranking
+
+#### 2. Exposure of IPFS Clients (enumeration of network participants)
+
+* a new provider is only visible to directly connected peers. they only forward it to peers asking them if it meets their bar
+for reliability.  This means propogation through the network is only posisble for routers that behave correctly.
+* because clients only propagate their 'top' routers, latency is also relevant, and with sufficient number of routers, the would only
+propagate in their local geographic area before becoming uncompetitive on latencyk
+
+### Alternatives
+
+#### Ambient discovery in the style of circuit relays
+
+Circuit relays are discovered ambiently by nodes during protocol enumeration.
+When connecting with another libp2p node, IPFS nodes will probe
+supported protocols. If they notice circut relay support at this time, they
+make use of such aggregated knowledge when making connections needing the
+support of relays.
+
+This is not considered sufficient for content routing, because most content
+routers will not act as general peers within the IPFS mesh, so they would
+not be directly discovered. Instead, the gossip discovery protocol is
+ambiently discovered in much the same way as circuit relays.
+
+#### Advertisement in the DHT
+
+This suffers from one of two problems depending on tuning: Either it results in
+a global list that all clients see new providers, or it takes an inordinant
+amount of querying before a client happens to run into a provider, leading to
+degraded experiences for most clients. The single global list that a provider
+can automatically add itself to leads to issues for how to mitigate an
+enumeration of all network participants by a malicious content router.
+
+Pros:
+* Network is already there, no need to create a new protocol to "provide" new providers instead of CIDs.
+* You could potentially associate a provider with a specific root CID content.
+Cons:
+* Nodes cannot drop use of the DHT / other content routing options always are 'second tier'.
+
+
+#### Static list of known routers distributed with IPFS clients
+
+This has worked for the current IPFS bootstrap node, but leads to the need for
+policies around how to decide which content routers will be included in such a
+list, and fails to evolve efficiently as new content routers are added to the
+system.
+
+### Copyright
+
+Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).