Update 2023-12-04.md

meetingNotes/2023-12-04.md

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Ned and Monty said that within TGC specs, you assume that a composite device wil
 
 MikeO believes that model does not cover the usecases of "Big" HSMs. The motivating example is an HSM which is backing a key vault in a public cloud like AWS or Azure. The typical way this is handled is that the cloud provider will create inside the HSM a separate "partition" for each of their customers / tenants / accounts. The term "partition" is undefined, but MikeO chose it because each HSM vendor seems to handle multi-tenancy differently. The open question is whether HSM vendors will implement this in a way that is covered by the TCG usecases -- ie we can model it as a Lead Attestor producing a single Attestation; or whether we need to accomodate the usecase where there are essentially multiple Lead Attesters / multiple Target Environments within a single CSR. Note: 3rd party Endorsements are different; we are trying to get a grasp on whether one attesting cert chain will ever produce multiple independent Evidence Statements.
 
-The discussion centered around the slide [CSR_Attestation_example.png](./CSR_Attestation_example.png) from MikeO's CAB/F slide deck, and whether that actually represents a valid usecase. Eric Amoder indicated that it does, but more input from other HSM vendors would be helpful.
+The discussion centered around the slide [CSR_Attestation_example.png](./CSR_Attestation_example.PNG) from MikeO's CAB/F slide deck, and whether that actually represents a valid usecase. Eric Amoder indicated that it does, but more input from other HSM vendors would be helpful.
 
 MikeO pointed out that since forming this group in April 2023, we have lost participation from many of the HSM vendors (which was our motivating usecase) and their voices have been diluted by more TCG participants.