feat: implement PKCE to make public client more secure #196
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
This branch implements PKCE and randomizes the state parameter to add protections against replay attacks and some classes of compromised clients.
Because the client-secret has to be part of the .kube/config for all users, dex-k8s-authenticator is effectively a public client. Implementing PKCE means that an adversary who knows the client secret and is able to intercept URLs visited (and thus the authorization code) still has insufficient information to retrieve an access token because they lack the un-hashed code_verifier.
PKCE works with Dex without any additional configuration, for both types of client, so I've enabled it by default.