fix(deps): update dependency electron-updater to v6.3.0 [security] #864
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
This PR contains the following updates:
6.2.1
->6.3.0
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2024-39698
Observations
The file
packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts
implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (process.env.ComSpec
on Windows, usuallyC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
):https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41
Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by
cmd.exe
expands any environment variable found in command-line above.Exploitation
This creates a situation where
verifySignature()
can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid.Impact
This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.).
Patch
This vulnerability was patched in #8295, by comparing the path in the output of
Get-AuthenticodeSignature
with the intended one. The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.Release Notes
electron-userland/electron-builder (electron-updater)
v6.3.0
Compare Source
Minor Changes
53cec79b
Thanks @beyondkmp! - feat: adding differential downloader for updates on macOSPatch Changes
#8108
3d4cc7ae
Thanks @beyondkmp! - feat: addminimumSystemVersion
in electron updater#8304
1ac86c9e
Thanks @mmaietta! - chore: update pnpm to 9.4.0#8323
fa3275c0
Thanks @mmaietta! - chore(deps): update dependency typescript to v5.5.3#8135
c2392de7
Thanks @mmaietta! - fix: unstable hdiutil retry mechanism#8295
ac2e6a25
Thanks @mmaietta! - fix: verify LiteralPath of update file during windows signature verification#8311
35a0784e
Thanks @rastiqdev! - fix(rpm-updater): stop uninstalling app before update#8227
48c59535
Thanks @rotu! - fix(docs): update autoupdate docs noting that channels work with Github#8110
fa7982f1
Thanks @mmaietta! - chore: entering alpha release stageUpdated dependencies [
3d4cc7ae
,1ac86c9e
,ad668ae1
,445911a7
,140e2f0e
,fa7982f1
]:Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.