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Update module github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 to v2.7.16 [SECURITY] #75

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@renovate renovate bot commented Jan 19, 2024

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 v2.7.14 -> v2.7.16 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-22424

Impact

The Argo CD API prior to versions 2.10-rc2, 2.9.4, 2.8.8, and 2.7.16 are vulnerable to a cross-server request forgery (CSRF) attack when the attacker has the ability to write HTML to a page on the same parent domain as Argo CD.

A CSRF attack works by tricking an authenticated Argo CD user into loading a web page which contains code to call Argo CD API endpoints on the victim’s behalf. For example, an attacker could send an Argo CD user a link to a page which looks harmless but in the background calls an Argo CD API endpoint to create an application running malicious code.

Argo CD uses the “Lax” SameSite cookie policy to prevent CSRF attacks where the attacker controls an external domain. The malicious external website can attempt to call the Argo CD API, but the web browser will refuse to send the Argo CD auth token with the request.

Many companies host Argo CD on an internal subdomain, such as https://argo-cd.internal.example.com. If an attacker can place malicious code on, for example, https://test.internal.example.com/, they can still perform a CSRF attack. In this case, the “Lax” SameSite cookie does not prevent the browser from sending the auth cookie, because the destination is a parent domain of the Argo CD API.

Browsers generally block such attacks by applying CORS policies to sensitive requests with sensitive content types. Specifically, browsers will send a “preflight request” for POSTs with content type “application/json” asking the destination API “are you allowed to accept requests from my domain?” If the destination API does not answer “yes,” the browser will block the request.

Before the patched versions, Argo CD did not validate that requests contained the correct content type header. So an attacker could bypass the browser’s CORS check by setting the content type to something which is considered “not sensitive” such as “text/plain.” The browser wouldn’t send the preflight request, and Argo CD would happily accept the contents (which are actually still JSON) and perform the requested action (such as running malicious code).

Patches

A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions:

  • 2.10-rc2
  • 2.9.4
  • 2.8.8
  • 2.7.16

🚨 The patch contains a breaking API change. 🚨 The Argo CD API will no longer accept non-GET requests which do not specify application/json as their Content-Type. The accepted content types list is configurable, and it is possible (but discouraged) to disable the content type check completely.

Workarounds

The only way to completely resolve the issue is to upgrade.

Credits

The Argo CD team would like to express their gratitude to An Trinh of Calif who reported the issue confidentially according to our guidelines and published a helpful blog post to describe the issue. We would also like to thank them for actively participating in the review for the patch.

References


Release Notes

argoproj/argo-cd (github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2)

v2.7.16

Compare Source

Quick Start

Non-HA:
kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.7.16/manifests/install.yaml
HA:
kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.7.16/manifests/ha/install.yaml

Release Signatures and Provenance

All Argo CD container images are signed by cosign. A Provenance is generated for container images and CLI binaries which meet the SLSA Level 3 specifications. See the documentation on how to verify.

Upgrading

If upgrading from a different minor version, be sure to read the upgrading documentation.

Changelog

This release fixes a security issue: GHSA-92mw-q256-5vwg

🚨 Important: The security fix includes a breaking API change. Please read the GHSA before upgrading! 🚨

Bug fixes
Documentation
Dependency updates

Full Changelog: argoproj/argo-cd@v2.7.15...v2.7.16

v2.7.15

Compare Source

Quick Start

Non-HA:
kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.7.15/manifests/install.yaml
HA:
kubectl create namespace argocd
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2.7.15/manifests/ha/install.yaml

Release Signatures and Provenance

All Argo CD container images are signed by cosign. A Provenance is generated for container images and CLI binaries which meet the SLSA Level 3 specifications. See the documentation on how to verify.

Upgrading

If upgrading from a different minor version, be sure to read the upgrading documentation.

Changelog

Bug fixes
Documentation
Dependency updates
Other work

Full Changelog: argoproj/argo-cd@v2.7.14...v2.7.15


Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/go-github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2-vulnerability branch from 592b670 to 36dac17 Compare January 28, 2024 14:21
@ioboi ioboi self-assigned this Jan 28, 2024
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/go-github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2-vulnerability branch from 36dac17 to 7b9fa82 Compare January 28, 2024 14:35
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/go-github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2-vulnerability branch from 7b9fa82 to 36f472b Compare January 28, 2024 14:36
@ioboi ioboi merged commit e8caa96 into main Jan 28, 2024
1 check passed
@ioboi ioboi deleted the renovate/go-github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2-vulnerability branch January 28, 2024 15:33
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