Pull in bpf/for-next (8f4a95080418)

.mailmap

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Adam Oldham <[email protected]>
 Adam Radford <[email protected]>
 Adriana Reus <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Adrian Bunk <[email protected]>
+Ajay Kaher <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Akhil P Oommen <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alan Cox <[email protected]>
 Alan Cox <[email protected]>
@@ -36,6 +37,17 @@ Alexei Avshalom Lazar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alexey Makhalov <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Alex Elder <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alex Hung <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alex Shi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Alex Shi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -96,6 +108,8 @@ Ben Widawsky <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Ben Widawsky <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Ben Widawsky <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Benjamin Poirier <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -110,6 +124,7 @@ Brendan Higgins <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Brian Avery <[email protected]>
 Brian King <[email protected]>
 Brian Silverman <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Bryan Tan <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Cai Huoqing <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Can Guo <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Carl Huang <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -443,7 +458,8 @@ Mythri P K <[email protected]>
 Nadav Amit <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nadav Amit <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nadia Yvette Chambers <[email protected]> William Lee Irwin III <[email protected]>
-Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Neeraj Upadhyay <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -496,6 +512,7 @@ Praveen BP <[email protected]>
 Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Prasad Sodagudi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Punit Agrawal <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Puranjay Mohan <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Qais Yousef <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Qais Yousef <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Quentin Monnet <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -521,6 +538,7 @@ Rémi Denis-Courmont <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <[email protected]>
 Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Richard Genoud <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Richard Leitner <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -529,6 +547,7 @@ Rocky Liao <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Ronak Doshi <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Muchun Song <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Muchun Song <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Ross Zwisler <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
@@ -651,6 +670,7 @@ Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
+Vishnu Dasa <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Vivek Aknurwar <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Vivien Didelot <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
 Vlad Dogaru <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

CREDITS

@@ -3146,6 +3146,10 @@ S: Triftstra=DFe 55
 S: 13353 Berlin
 S: Germany
 
+N: Gustavo Pimental
+E: [email protected]
+D: PCI driver for Synopsys DesignWare
+
 N: Emanuel Pirker
 E: [email protected]
 D: AIC5800 IEEE 1394, RAW I/O on 1394

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
 the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
 Enhanced IBRS.
 
-Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
-unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
-unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
-For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
-retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
+eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF.
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or
+use the BHB clearing sequence.
 
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
@@ -430,6 +429,23 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
   ===========================  =======================================================
 
+  - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+ * - BHI: Not affected
+   - System is not affected
+ * - BHI: Retpoline
+   - System is protected by retpoline
+ * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
+   - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
+   - System is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable
+   - System is vulnerable to BHI
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop
+   - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
@@ -484,7 +500,11 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
    boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
-   Spectre v2 variant attacks.
+   some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of
+   indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are
+   isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated
+   between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against
+   BHI attacks.
 
    On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
    injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
@@ -638,6 +658,18 @@ kernel command line.
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
+	spectre_bhi=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
+		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
+
+		on
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
+		off
+			Disable the mitigation.
+
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
 Mitigation selection guide

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3423,6 +3423,9 @@
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
+			Note, "mitigations" is supported if and only if the
+			kernel was built with CPU_MITIGATIONS=y.
+
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
@@ -3444,6 +3447,7 @@
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_bhi=off [X86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -4590,9 +4594,10 @@
 		norid		[S390] ignore the RID field and force use of
 				one PCI domain per PCI function
 
-	pcie_aspm=	[PCIE] Forcibly enable or disable PCIe Active State Power
+	pcie_aspm=	[PCIE] Forcibly enable or ignore PCIe Active State Power
 			Management.
-		off	Disable ASPM.
+		off	Don't touch ASPM configuration at all.  Leave any
+			configuration done by firmware unchanged.
 		force	Enable ASPM even on devices that claim not to support it.
 			WARNING: Forcing ASPM on may cause system lockups.
 
@@ -6063,6 +6068,15 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst
 
+	spectre_bhi=	[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+			(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the
+			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
+			clearing sequence.
+
+			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+			       as needed.
+			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+
 	spectre_v2=	[X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
 			The default operation protects the kernel from
@@ -6599,7 +6613,7 @@
 			To turn off having tracepoints sent to printk,
 			 echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/tracepoint_printk
 			Note, echoing 1 into this file without the
-			tracepoint_printk kernel cmdline option has no effect.
+			tp_printk kernel cmdline option has no effect.
 
 			The tp_printk_stop_on_boot (see below) can also be used
 			to stop the printing of events to console at

Documentation/admin-guide/mm/zswap.rst

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Setting this parameter to 100 will disable the hysteresis.
 
 Some users cannot tolerate the swapping that comes with zswap store failures
 and zswap writebacks. Swapping can be disabled entirely (without disabling
-zswap itself) on a cgroup-basis as follows:
+zswap itself) on a cgroup-basis as follows::
 
 	echo 0 > /sys/fs/cgroup/<cgroup-name>/memory.zswap.writeback
 
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ writeback (because the same pages might be rejected again and again).
 When there is a sizable amount of cold memory residing in the zswap pool, it
 can be advantageous to proactively write these cold pages to swap and reclaim
 the memory for other use cases. By default, the zswap shrinker is disabled.
-User can enable it as follows:
+User can enable it as follows::
 
   echo Y > /sys/module/zswap/parameters/shrinker_enabled
 

Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst

@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ two flavors of JITs, the newer eBPF JIT currently supported on:
   - riscv64
   - riscv32
   - loongarch64
+  - arc
 
 And the older cBPF JIT supported on the following archs: