dont use pull_request_target as it opens the repo for pwnage.. #813
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@thomasnordquist i'll merge. It turns out, checking out an explicit commit from source branch is inherently unsafe! Any untrusted code should be run in the context of the source repo! I suggest we change event to |
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pull_request_target event will be run in target repo context and will have access to secrets etc!
https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/