CVE-2007-4559 Patch #5
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snitch
reviewed
Nov 23, 2022
| @@ -57,7 +57,26 @@ def maxmind_download(suffix, **kwargs): | |||
| extract_members = [member for member in tar_file.getmembers() | |||
| if member.name.endswith('.mmdb')] | |||
| assert len(extract_members) == 1 | |||
| tar_file.extractall(path=db_dir_path, members=extract_members) | |||
| def is_within_directory(directory, target): | |||
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E306 expected 1 blank line before a nested definition, found 0
| @@ -57,7 +57,26 @@ def maxmind_download(suffix, **kwargs): | |||
| extract_members = [member for member in tar_file.getmembers() | |||
| if member.name.endswith('.mmdb')] | |||
| assert len(extract_members) == 1 | |||
| tar_file.extractall(path=db_dir_path, members=extract_members) | |||
| def is_within_directory(directory, target): | |||
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| abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory) | ||
| abs_target = os.path.abspath(target) | ||
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| abs_target = os.path.abspath(target) | ||
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| prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target]) | ||
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| prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target]) | ||
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| return prefix == abs_directory | ||
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| member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name) | ||
| if not is_within_directory(path, member_path): | ||
| raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File") | ||
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| if not is_within_directory(path, member_path): | ||
| raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File") | ||
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| tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) |
| raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File") | ||
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| tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) | ||
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| tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) | ||
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| tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) | ||
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| safe_extract(tar_file, path=db_dir_path, members=extract_members) |
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Patching CVE-2007-4559
Hi, we are security researchers from the Advanced Research Center at Trellix. We have began a campaign to patch a widespread bug named CVE-2007-4559. CVE-2007-4559 is a 15 year old bug in the Python tarfile package. By using extract() or extractall() on a tarfile object without sanitizing input, a maliciously crafted .tar file could perform a directory path traversal attack. We found at least one unsantized extractall() in your codebase and are providing a patch for you via pull request. The patch essentially checks to see if all tarfile members will be extracted safely and throws an exception otherwise. We encourage you to use this patch or your own solution to secure against CVE-2007-4559. Further technical information about the vulnerability can be found in this blog.
If you have further questions you may contact us through this projects lead researcher Kasimir Schulz.